

*Kyriakos Mikelis – Gerassimos Karabelias*

**Just Another Form of Dependence?  
A Short Description of the Development of the Discipline  
of International Relations in post-war Greece and Turkey**

*Introduction*

The importance and complexities of the production of knowledge in foreign policy and international politics has been greatly recognized. Several inquiries have attempted to understand the development of the discipline of International Relations (IR) in different settings, i.e. national or regional. They have sought to determine its nature as well as its degree of dependence on a specific scientific community, the American. In fact, the emergence and evolution of IR, both generally and in various countries or regions, entails a wide range of socio-political and intellectual factors which could be examined through a variety of methods.<sup>1</sup> After all, the American or indeed Anglo-Saxon community itself has not been monolithic. Evidently, the discipline has been deeply characterized by an immense variety of realist and non (or anti-) realist approaches. The

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. R. Crawford–D. Jarvis. (ed.), *International Relations. Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought*, State University of New York Press, New York 2001; K.E. Jørgensen–T. Knudsen (ed.), *International Relations in Europe. Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations*, Routledge, London 2006; A. Tickner–O. Wæver (ed.), *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, Routledge, London 2009; A. Acharya–B. Buzan (ed.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*, Routledge, London 2010); P. Kristensen, “Dividing Discipline: Structures of Communication in International Relations”, *International Studies Review* 14.2 (2012), 32-50; A. Tickner–D. Blaney (ed.), *Thinking International Relations Differently*, Routledge, Abingdon 2012.

former have sought to search ‘scientifically’ *realpolitik* and they attribute major significance to it. The latter have questioned either empirically or normatively its role to international politics.

Following this trend, one could not fail to notice an increasing interest among Greek and Turkish scholars, who work either locally or abroad, in comprehending the discipline’s evolution in their home countries.<sup>2</sup> Intuitively, a certain degree of growth is undenia-

<sup>2</sup> With regard to the Greek case, see S. Constantinides, “Greek Foreign Policy: Theoretical Orientations and Praxis”, *Hellenic Studies/Études Helléniques* 4.1 (1996), 43-61; D. Conostas, “Greek Foreign Policy and the Community of International Relations Scholars”, *Hellenic Studies/Études Helléniques* 5.2 (1997), 29-48; T. Couloumbis, “Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974: Theory and Praxis”, *Hellenic Studies/Études Helléniques* 5.2 (1997), 49-63; P. Ifestos, “Fetishist Internationalism: Jousting With Unreality in Greece”, *Hellenic Studies/Études Helléniques* 5.2 (1997), 65-94; S. Stavridis, *Assessing the Views of Academics in Greece on the Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal and a Research Agenda Proposal*, LSE-Hellenic Observatory Online Working Paper 11 (2003), [www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/Stavridis-11.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/Stavridis-11.pdf); P. Tsakonas, “Theory and Practice in Greek Foreign Policy”, *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 5.3 (2005), 427-437; S. Ladi, “Role of Experts in Greek Foreign Policy”, *Hellenic Studies/Études Helléniques* 15.1 (2007), 67-84; S. Makris–K. Mikelis, “Discontent, but Also Blind? Understanding the Discipline of International Relations in Greece”, *Hellenic Studies/Études Helléniques* 16.1 (2008), 155-180. With regard to the Turkish case, see T. Ataöv, “The Teaching of International Relations in Turkey”, *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 2.1 (1967), 373-383; E. Hatipoğlu, “Turkey”, in G.C. Ciavarini Azzi (ed.), *Survey of Current Political Science Research on European Integration Worldwide: 1991-1994*, International Political Science Research Association/Research Committee on European Unification, Brussels 1995, pp. 173-178; N. Yurdusev, “The Study of International Relations in Turkey”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17 (1997), 181-190; B. Aras, “The Academic Perceptions of the Turkish-Israeli Relations”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1.1 (2002), 1-17; F. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Teaching of International Relations in Turkey: Reflection in Foreign Policy of International Legal Human Rights Developments”, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 33 (2002), 123-149; A. Kelleher–U. Kuncak–S. Kharaman, “Turkish Student Attitudes About the United States. Results From a Survey of 112 International Relations Majors at Two Universities in Ankara”, *International Studies Perspectives* 4.3 (2003), 250-264; M. Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Political Science and European Integration”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 10.4

ble due to the important proliferation of the respective departments, especially during the post-Cold War era. The appearances from both Greek and Turkish IR scholars in scientific congresses and journals have obliged the international community of IR experts to affirm clearly, yet rather shortly, the discipline's substantial development.<sup>3</sup> It is exactly this treatment of the IR community towards Greece and Turkey that this article intends, at a first glance, to cover by attempting to offer a better understanding of its growth. On the other hand, it tries to examine the validity of the argument that a country's political culture is reflected in the particular construction of its IR discipline.<sup>4</sup> Finally, it attempts to comparatively

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(2003), 655-663; J. Mathews, "Composing Identities: Literacy Dilemmas of Periphery Scholars Negotiating the Theory/Policy Gap in International Relations", paper presented at the 45th I.S.A. Convention, Quebec, Canada, March 17-20, 2004, [www.isanet.org/archive.html](http://www.isanet.org/archive.html); B. Aral, "An Inquiry Into the 'Turkish School' of International Law", *European Journal of International Law* 16.4 (2005), 769-785; E. Aydınlt-J. Mathews, "Periphery Theorising for a Truly Internationalised Discipline: Spinning IR Theory Out of Anatolia", *Review of International Studies* 34.4 (2008), 693-712; P. Bilgin, "The State of IR in Turkey", *British International Studies Association News* (2008), 5-10; E. Aydınlt -E. & J. Mathews, "Turkey: Homegrown Theorizing and Building a Disciplinary Community", in A. Tickner-O. Wæver (ed.), *International Relations Scholarship Around the World*, Routledge, London 2009, pp. 208-222; P. Bilgin-O. Tanrisever, "A Telling Story of IR in the Periphery: Telling Turkey About the World, Telling the World About Turkey", *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12.2 (2009), 174-179.

<sup>3</sup> A.J.R. Groom-P. Mandaville, "Hegemony and Autonomy in International Relations: The Continental Experience", in R. Crawford-D. Jarvis (ed.), *International Relations. Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought*, State University of New York Press, New York 2001, p. 158.

<sup>4</sup> H.Ø. Breitenbauch-A. Wivel, "Understanding National IR Disciplines Outside the United States: Political Culture and the Construction of International Relations in Denmark", *Journal of International Relations & Development* 7.4 (2004), 414-443. Also see A. Tsygankov-P. Tsygankov, "A Sociology of Dependence in International Relations Theory: A Case of Russian Liberal IR", *International Political Sociology* 1.4 (2007), 307-324. In fact, this article focuses on the so called contextual factors of the development of science. It doesn't disregard the discourse practices and the inner logic of the IR debates. Indeed, one point of critique, especially with regard to the understanding of the Greek case, is

discuss the level of convergence of both IR academic communities with the universal image, which is often associated or even confused with the typical American view of the world.<sup>5</sup> It should be clear that the article's goal is not to describe the IR theory and scientific work produced in the two countries. Instead, it puts emphasis on the circumstances which have allowed, restricted or mitigated the production of this work, through the juxtaposition of the rather insightful self-reflections of their communities.

Greece and Turkey appear to constitute a rather interesting case of study. The two neighbors share, not only a lengthy history of animosity, but also a significant geopolitical position. They are located in the Eastern Mediterranean and they have emerged from the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. Apart from that, they differ in almost everything else; from the degree of their geo-strategic and geo-economic importance for the West, to their geographical and population size, the performance of their national economies, their religion and socio-political culture to civil-military relations, diplomacy and education. In addition, even though both states have been members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and allies to the USA for more than sixty years, their foreign policy has, at times, clashed with the American one. Is this a factor sufficient enough to suggest the symmetric development of the discipline? Do the previous factors suffice to suppose its non-symmetric development? The answer seems to be twofold, due to the existence of points of convergence and divergence.

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the relative lack of attention to the intellectual history and content, in most of the respective literature.

<sup>5</sup> How is such a view specified? For some answers see J. Sterling-Folker, "Lamarckian With a Vengeance: Human Nature and American International Relations Theory", *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9.3 (2006), 227-246; J. Ikenberry, "Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition", *International Studies* 46.1/2 (2009), 203-219. One might refer to 'an' American view instead of 'the'. By this we mean that the IR discipline has developed multi-dimensionally in the USA, with respect to theory and even epistemology/methodology, although non-positivist approaches had to face not only the prominence of positivism but also its perception as universal.

*Short description of the development of IR in Greece*

The discipline of IR can easily be regarded as another victim of the partially diminishing ‘fetishism’ of Greek institutions (Universities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), intellectuals and the public at large with Law and History, especially the ancient one.<sup>6</sup> For more than a hundred and forty years after the state’s formation, the subject of International Relations was considered (but) a small branch of the Legal Studies.<sup>7</sup> This was largely so even during the interwar and the Cold War, when things started to differ distinctively in certain western countries. In fact, a prominent international law expert, Evrigenis, argued in the mid-1960s that, although IR had been established as an autonomous discipline in developed countries, in Greece it did not appear “even in the analytical program of our universities”.<sup>8</sup> Thirty years later, Conostas will emphatically note that, up to the late 1970s, the study of interstate relations was perceived by the Greek academia as a subject belonging only to professors of International Law. Even diplomatic history was taught in conjunction with legal issues.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, the central role of the public sector in education issues has had its impact on this delayed development. The high degree of dependence of the universities and the academic communities on the state for their financial survival, personnel expansion and departmental development ought not to be automatically connected with all the misfortunes regarding their strategic planning and evolution. However, as Saitis remarks, the extreme politiciza-

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<sup>6</sup> The major early exception to the emphasis on ancient history was the scientific work published under the auspices of the Thessalonica-based Institute for Balkan Studies. This work was often dedicated to political and diplomatic aspects of Greece and the rest of the Balkan states.

<sup>7</sup> This was evident in several prominent encyclopaedias.

<sup>8</sup> Δ. Ευρυγένης, «Ελλάς. Μικρά Έθνη και Διεθνείς Σχέσεις», *Διεθνείς Σχέσεις* 5 (1964), 74. At that time, an effort was made to introduce, in the curriculum, a respective subject in Panteios School, at Athens. However, its content was limited and its reception was far from warm.

<sup>9</sup> Conostas, *op.cit.*, 31. Also see Couloumbis, *op.cit.*, 49-50.

tion of educational issues and conflicts among professors and students is related to their strong attachment to state affairs.<sup>10</sup> Thus, as many observers of the development of political science in Greece have noticed, even when the first university school of political sciences (Panteios School) was established during the interwar, its analytical program was oriented towards assisting its graduates in entering state employment rather than to promote research on politics and society. Naturally, the dominance of Law School graduates into the middle and higher levels of state bureaucracy and private institutions and their strict, conservative intellectual approach set the pace of evolution of the Greek society and education.<sup>11</sup>

In addition, one ought to point out the inability of the social formation of Modern Greece to fully adopt the western European standards, in spite of the country's strong reliance on the Enlightenment's intellectual movement for its independence and the creation of political institutions. Even though the majority of Greek academic professors were almost obliged to receive their education and training in western European academic institutions, mainly in Germany and France, there was not a systematic enforcement of the respective scientific research orientation and institutional functioning.<sup>12</sup> For some, the blame falls on the ethnocentric perception of

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<sup>10</sup> C. Saitis, "The Relationship Between the State and the University in Greece", *European Journal of Education* 23.3 (1988), 249-260; C. Saitis, "Main Features of Higher Education in Greece", in C. Gellert (ed.), *Higher Education in Europe*, Kingsley, London 1993, pp. 114-119.

<sup>11</sup> See N. Diamandouros–M. Spourdalakis, "Political Science in Greece", *European Journal of Political Research* 20.3-4 (1991), 375-387; M. Tsinisizelis, "Recent Political Science Writing in Greece", *European Journal of Political Research* 23.4 (1993), 483-501; M. Spourdalakis, "The Study of Political Parties in Greece", *European Journal of Political Research* 25.4 (1994), 499-518; G. Contogeorgis, "Political Science in Greece", in H.D. Klingemann (ed.), *The State of Political Science in Western Europe*, Budrich, Opladen & Farmington Hills, 2007, pp. 187-228.

<sup>12</sup> Π. Κιμουρτζής, *Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών 1837-1860. Οι Πρώτες Γενεές των Διδασκόντων*, Ph.D. thesis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, pp. 77-80. See Constantinides, *op.cit.*, 49.

Greek society. Since the state failed to enclose the entire nation inside its borders, the latter dominated the intellectual orientation of Greek society. As the nation, not the state, became the fundamental point of reference, it was used as the testing ground for all foreign ideologies and institutional arrangements.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, the fear of being characterized as an enemy of the nation assisted in preserving the conservative and traditional character of Greek academic life, limiting the legitimate social scientific *problématiques*.<sup>14</sup>

Some books discussing international politics or even sociological issues were written by intellectuals and intellectual-like diplomats during the interwar. However, they scarcely reached the academic audiences. Most importantly, they didn't form a commonly accepted research core for the future. They were just neglected. The winds of change started to blow at the end of the 1950s-early 1960s through the eruption of discussions regarding the opening up of the universities to a greater amount of students and the introduction of radical changes in the orientation as well as the function of universities.<sup>15</sup> Additional help appeared in the horizon with the creation and functioning, through American encouragement and financial assistance, of several independent centers for scientific research in the areas of economics, politics and sociology.<sup>16</sup> The seven-year dictatorship (1967-1974) is generally perceived as the cause of a considerable delay to this process of reformation in higher education, since it interpreted everything outside

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<sup>13</sup> Π. Κονδύλης, *Η Παρακμή του Αστικού Πολιτισμού. Από τη Μοντέρνα στη Μεταμοντέρνα Εποχή κι από τον Φιλελευθερισμό στη Μαζική Δημοκρατία*, Themelio, Athens 1995, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 30-31.

<sup>14</sup> Tsinisizelis, *op.cit.*, 484.

<sup>15</sup> Ι. Λαμπίρη-Δημάκη, «Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες στην Ελλάδα, 1950-1967. Ειδικό Αφιέρωμα. Γιατί;», στο *Κοινωνικές Επιστήμες και Πρωτοπορία στην Ελλάδα. 1950-1967. Ειδικό Αφιέρωμα*, Gutenberg & National Centre for Social Research), Athens 2003, p. 45.

<sup>16</sup> Examples include the National Centre for Social Research & the Centre for Planning and Economic Research.

the Colonels' nation as a force of opposition and destruction.<sup>17</sup> Under such circumstances, the establishment and development of an IR discipline seemed rather impossible. Valinakis puts this point bluntly, when he argues that, throughout the post-war era, Greek diplomacy and policy-makers followed closely the choices their Allies had made. In addition, they thought that their own analysis of behavior and actions of other fellow states was redundant. Only when it was felt that Turkey attempted to alter the interwar status quo of Greek-Turkish relations, did Greek diplomacy believe that it could raise a different voice from that of its Allies.<sup>18</sup>

Evidently, the end of the Greek military dictatorship, the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations (especially with regard to Cyprus) and the country's entry into the EEC/EU were bound to radically transform not only its civil-military and socio-economic structure but also that of its higher education. The end of the authoritarian-dictatorial state and the return to civilian dominance and democratic politics led to the termination of the elitist-authoritarian institution of Chair in university structure and the creation of semi-autonomous and rather democratically run departments. Moreover, additional universities outside Athens and Thessalonica were established, followed by the entrance of greater amounts of students into universities, the return of young Ph.D.s from western European and north-American universities as well as the gradual formation of programs for post-graduate studies. Hence, the development of neglected scientific areas of studies (e.g. Sociology, Psychology and Politics) and consequently that of the IR discipline appeared as part of the general evolution.<sup>19</sup> In fact, the discipline became a focal

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<sup>17</sup> Diamandouros–Spourdalakis, *op.cit.*, 378; Spourdalakis, *op.cit.*, 501-503. This is indeed the case, although some elements towards a distinct Political Science discourse could be detected at the period.

<sup>18</sup> Γ. Βαλιηνάκης, «Η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική το 1993. Στο Σταυροδρόμι των Αποφάσεων», in *Επετηρίδα Αμυντικής και Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής 1993. Η Ελλάδα και ο Κόσμος 1992*, ELIAMEP, Athens 1993, pp. xi-xii. Also see Couloumbis, *op.cit.*, 50.

<sup>19</sup> Diamandouros–Spourdalakis, *op.cit.*, 378-379; Tsinisizelis, *op.cit.*, 484, 491-498; Couloumbis, *op.cit.*, 50-52. It remains to be seen what the results of a university structure reform, under way, will be.

point of interest as soon as academics, public servants and politicians looked to it for scientific answers to a number of serious questions. Such questions included the level of political, economic and ideological dependence of Greece on western powers, the role of the Greek national identity under the European umbrella as well as the country's required defense capabilities facing an 'aggressive' state (Turkey).<sup>20</sup> Judging, however, from the quantity of the respective scientific work, especially in the early post-junta period, it seems that the prevailing question was the country's membership in the EEC/EU, since its economic and legal aspects, as well as the diplomatic and political ones, posed a major concern for both the public and the political/economic elites.

Under the circumstances, the growth of the IR discipline almost outgrew that of Political Science.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the discipline (including regional studies) is taught in at least ten universities, either in the form of a department or as a specialty.<sup>22</sup> Most of them also offer a post-graduate program. In addition, scientific research on IR issues received a boost from the formation and functioning of several institutions focusing specifically on international relations, European and regional studies or even politics in general.<sup>23</sup> However, in a

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<sup>20</sup> Almost all accounts of the discipline's local development have more or less included this point.

<sup>21</sup> Tsinisizelis, *op.cit.*, 494.

<sup>22</sup> E.g. the University of Athens, Panteion University, the Athens University of Economics and Business, the University of Piraeus, the Aristotle and Macedonia Universities in Thessalonica, the University of Western Macedonia, the University of the Aegean, the University of Peloponnese and the Democritus University of Thrace. Recently, another department was founded at the Ionian University.

<sup>23</sup> Those include the Hellenic Foundation of Foreign and European Policy (ELIAMEP), the Institute of International Relations, the Hellenic Center of European Studies, the Hellenic Institute of International Strategic Studies, the Institute of Mediterranean Studies, the Institute of International Public Law and International Relations, the Institute for Balkan Studies, the Centre of International and European Economic Law, the Hellenic Center of European Research, the Defense Analysis Institute, the Institute of International Economic Relations, the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy and the Andreas Papandreou Institute of Strategic and Development Studies. The first two of the afore-

state where an individual's strong personality seems to sometimes play a greater role than institutions in the affairs of state,<sup>24</sup> it is the personality of professors that attracted attention than the discipline itself. Although leading faculty members have been appointed to desirable governmental and institutional seats for quite a time, a systematic use of scientific research in Greek diplomacy and politics would come in delay.<sup>25</sup>

It is not surprising, therefore, that the rapid growth of the IR discipline in post-dictatorship Greece could not avoid some traditional pitfalls. For instance, theoretical disagreements between different schools of thought over the role of the state in issues of security as well as on the definition of "national interest" soon took a more personal character.<sup>26</sup> To that, one has to add the usual policy of the proponents of a so-called pro-European/Atlantic mode of strategic thought to label the realists as nationalists and populists in order to create a negative, non-progressive image of the latter and lead them to isolation and extinction.<sup>27</sup> This zero-sum approach towards their academic or ideological adversaries appears to have taken valuable amount of time, energy and innovative thinking from these faculty members to the detriment of the IR research. Although there is no shortage of voices that point to the benefits of

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mentioned institutes came to be seen in the 1990s, by the IR community itself, as representing two rival approaches, with regard to the perception of 'national interest' and the future of international politics, the former being more optimist about the attachment of Greek national interest to international and especially European political institutions and the latter being more skeptical.

<sup>24</sup> P. Ioakimides, "The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: Personalities vs Institutions", in S. Stavridis–T. Couloumbis–T. Veremis–N. Waites (ed.), *The Foreign Policies of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s*, Macmillan, London 1999, pp. 140-170; A. Platias, "High Politics in Small Countries", in P. Ifestos (ed.), *Cosmos Yearbook 1995. The Hellenic Review of International Relations*, Institute of International Relations, Athens 1996, pp. 155-168.

<sup>25</sup> See Tsakonas, *op.cit.*; Ladi, *op.cit.*

<sup>26</sup> The result was the emergence of quite a few of rival dyads over a series of issues.

<sup>27</sup> See Constantinides, *op.cit.*, especially 50; Stavridis, *op.cit.*, 20. Compare Constas, *op.cit.*; Couloumbis, *op.cit.*

a peaceful co-existence of all scientific approaches, there has only been some, and still rather limited, progress towards that direction. The problem is not related to the growing use of the Anglo-American IR theoretical tradition but to the relaxed attitude of picking and choosing from that tradition. Thus, the defense of *a priori* chosen pro-realist or anti-realist views of international politics is almost the rule among the IR faculty.<sup>28</sup> This relaxed ‘pick and choose’ attitude raises a number of questions on the level of Greece’s intellectual dependency on traditional western powers. A high level of dependency has arisen exactly because the reproduction of western ideas had not been comprehensive or intuitive enough and was usually reduced to the mere reliance on those ideas for the resolution of scientific discords.

#### *Short description of the development of IR in Turkey*

Unlike Greece, in Turkey there are more systematic studies on the status and history of the IR discipline. However, like in Greece, the role of contextual factors is also included in these studies.

An introductory remark is deemed necessary, concerning the West’s role to the development of science in Turkey. This role has been twofold, both symbolic and practical. In the former case, educational reform has characterized by the use of the Western university as an ideal type. In the latter, the replication of various models of academic organization was strengthened by sending students abroad, inviting scholars from abroad and selectively adopting educational institutional patterns.<sup>29</sup> However, the Cold War marked a departure from the German model to the American one. Since Tur-

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<sup>28</sup> Ifestos, among others, has emphatically criticized the anti-realist views, on the grounds that they have not been comprehensively linked to the core of IR theory. See Π. Ήφαιστος, *Οι Διεθνείς Σχέσεις ως Αντικείμενο Επιστημονικής Μελέτης στην Ελλάδα και στο Εξωτερικό. Διαδρομή, Αντικείμενο, Περιεχόμενο και Γνωσιολογικό Υπόβαθρο*, Ποιότητα, Athens 2003.

<sup>29</sup> A. Öncü, “Academics: The West in the Discourse of University Reform”, in M. Heper–A. Öncü–H. Kramer (ed.), *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, I.B. Tauris, London 1993, pp. 142-176.

key's entry into NATO, its benefits by the Marshal Plan and its political and strategic repositioning closer to the USA, the latter attracted a growing number of students.<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, the perception of the West's role in issues of foreign policy and international politics has been more or less positive but skeptical as well. Overall, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the attempt to create a modern state had naturally left their imprint on the Political Science and IR community. The security culture, which emerged in Turkey after its founding, didn't follow but actually preceded the discipline's development. The choices, with regard to foreign as well as domestic policies, depended upon the beliefs of the new regime's leaders, many of whom originated from the armed forces.<sup>31</sup> In fact, the latter had no doubt that the Turkish state was obliged to survive in a Machiavelian world of power politics as well as a world in which the Christian/Muslim controversy was still deeply felt.<sup>32</sup> The pivotal role of foreign powers to the decline and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, in conjunction with the desire of the Turkish ruling elite to prevent future outcomes similar to the treaty of Sèvres, naturally attracted the interest of high-ranking state officials and scientists, without however seriously challenging the Western orientation.

The interest of Turkish scholars in the development of the discipline of IR appeared as early as in the late 1950s-early 1960s, at a time when foreign policy came up as an issue which could be publicly debated.<sup>33</sup> While Bilge linked the need for a more systematic

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<sup>30</sup> B. Erozan-İ. Turan, "The Development of Political Science in Turkey", *PS: Political Science and Politics* 37.2 (2004), 161-165. Also see Bilgin, *op.cit.*, 5; Bilgin-Tanrisever, *op.cit.*, 175.

<sup>31</sup> M. Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey*, University of Utah, Salt Lake 1976.

<sup>32</sup> A. Karaosmanoğlu, "Officers: Westernization and Democracy", in M. Heper-A. Öncü-H. Kramer (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 19-34 and especially 30-31.

<sup>33</sup> This interest was clearly demonstrated by conferences which were held at that time and were dedicated to the teaching of both international law and international politics.

teaching of IR with the enhancement of security,<sup>34</sup> Ataöv was one of the first scholars who explored the discipline's development and its benefits. He argued that even though the subject of international-interstate affairs was taught in Turkish universities from the country's creation to postwar years, it had not "achieved a definitive form".<sup>35</sup> International Law, Diplomatic History and International Politics dominated the field, in terms of their presence in the academic curricula and publication themes, thus leaving limited breathing space for IR.<sup>36</sup> The dominance of the first two sub-fields may reflect the relatively low profile of Political Science and its development as a sub-product of Philosophy, of Law and of History.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the study of International Law itself depended on a static approach of the international society.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, the development of the sub-field of International Politics may reflect the pivotal role of security in foreign policy debates. Studies with regard to war and security have been appreciated more than studies about European integration, among IR experts.<sup>39</sup> However, the emergence of this sub-field did not result in the demise of the other two, since they were also considered to be serving the country's 'needs' as "captured by the 'facts' of History and Law".<sup>40</sup>

Indeed, the respective research focused mainly on issues which were considered important for Turkey's foreign affairs.<sup>41</sup> "Most of the studies and researchers on international relations", Yurdusev points out, "were but the treatment of Turkish foreign policy. Those studies which took a broader view of the discipline were confined

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<sup>34</sup> S. Bilge, "Milletlerarası Politika Öğretimi", in *Milletlerarası Politika Öğretimi Symposiumu*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara 1962, p. 21.

<sup>35</sup> Ataöv, *op.cit.*, 375.

<sup>36</sup> International politics is the IR sub-field, which focuses on the political sector and the power relations between the actors of the international system and especially the major ones.

<sup>37</sup> Müftüler-Baç, *op.cit.*, 655.

<sup>38</sup> Aral, *op.cit.*, 782-785.

<sup>39</sup> Müftüler-Baç, *op.cit.*, 658.

<sup>40</sup> Bilgin, *op.cit.*, 5. Also see Bilgin-Tanrisever, *op.cit.*, 174.

<sup>41</sup> Hatipoğlu, *op.cit.*, 175. Also see Müftüler-Baç, *op.cit.*, 660-662.

to political aspects”.<sup>42</sup> This was even more important, given that the priority of the Turkish ruling elite was to avoid the repetition of the treaty of Sèvres.<sup>43</sup> Most importantly, “scientific and intellectual discipline in... the expression of ideas was little practiced while strong attachment to... beliefs often stood in the way of freely-ranging discussion”.<sup>44</sup> The focus on Turkish foreign policy was also enabled by the fact that Turkey was under the American umbrella during the Cold War. Consequently, two things were considered to be important: Turkey’s role in the World and the latter’s role in the country’s foreign policy. It was perceived as a special case whose unique geography and history should be appreciated.<sup>45</sup>

Taking into account the focus of political science in general on issues of Turkish politics, political theory, the relation between politics and Islam, political development and consolidation of democracy,<sup>46</sup> it is fair to claim that an emphasis on issues of Turkish interest *per se* could be characterized as normal. Identity’s role in politics and the country’s cultural and political relations with the West has made an impact upon issues of international relations as well. In that respect, the early 1990s brought in major challenges, such as the relationship with the EEC/EU, new choices and issues for Turkish foreign policy as well as disappointment for the West’s role with regard to sensitive issues for public opinion.<sup>47</sup>

The IR discipline seems to have benefited the most from the changes that Turkey’s society, economy and education had to

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<sup>42</sup> Yurdusev, *op.cit.*, 183.

<sup>43</sup> B. Aral, “Turkey’s Insecure Identity from the Perspective of Nationalism”, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 8.1 (1997), 87; M. Aydın, “Securitization of History and Geography: Understanding of Security in Turkey”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 3.2 (2003), 167.

<sup>44</sup> Okyar in M. Heper, “Political Studies in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies* 1.2 (2000), 126.

<sup>45</sup> Bilgin–Tanrisever, *op.cit.*, 175-176, 179.

<sup>46</sup> Müftüler-Baç, *op.cit.*, 657.

<sup>47</sup> İ. Dağı, “Turkey in the 1990s: Foreign Policy, Human Rights and the Search for a New Identity”, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 4.1 (1993), 60. Also see Hatipoğlu, *op.cit.*, 175-176; Müftüler-Baç, *op.cit.*, 656-660; Bilgin–Tanrisever, *op.cit.*, 179.

undergo during the last two decades. One such change has been the transition from a bureaucratic elite (focusing on law) to a technical one (focusing on science), which had a serious effect on political science, in general.<sup>48</sup> The proliferation of the number of IR departments coincided with the rapidly growing urban population, the growth of the Islamic capital and the student body, the return of young Ph.D.s and teaching staff educated abroad to the country, as well as the mitigation of state dominance in higher education and the increase of post-graduate programs. Moreover, this numerical proliferation did not lead automatically to an equivalent growth of IR in theoretical and conceptual terms, but there was a higher appreciation of the theory's role.<sup>49</sup> The older generation of IR scholars and their followers' role has been important. Their statist-elitist social background led them to concentrate their research interests and teaching on issues that were either of a security concern or foreign policy.<sup>50</sup> IR scholars seem to have followed the general trend of Turkish scientists to oscillate between the enhancement of the official state ideology and the development of a critical vision that would challenge it.<sup>51</sup> Overall, however, the liberalization of the Turkish higher education market has proved to be a major facilitating factor for the development of a rather pluralistic discipline, in which the emphasis on academic criteria has enabled the emergence of a variety of competing voices.<sup>52</sup>

The proliferation of institutes and journals dealing with international politics has naturally been quite helpful to the new genera-

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<sup>48</sup> N. Göle, "Engineers and the Emergence of a Technicist Identity", in M. Heper-A. Öncü-H. Kramer (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 200.

<sup>49</sup> Mathews, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-19; Aydınlt-Mathews, "Periphery Theorising", 698-701; Bilgin, *op.cit.*, 6.

<sup>50</sup> Mathews, *op.cit.*, pp. 9-11.

<sup>51</sup> Öncü, *op.cit.*, 143.

<sup>52</sup> See Aydınlt-Mathews, "Periphery Theorising", 698-709; Aydınlt-Mathews, "Turkey. Homegrown Theorizing", pp. 208-222; Bilgin-Tanrisever, *op.cit.*, 176-179. This process has even reached the point of discussing the possibility of 'homegrown' thinking.

tion of Turkish scholars.<sup>53</sup> Ideology, certainly, continues to play an important part in the Turkish academic life (Islamists vs Secularists, Nationalists vs Democrats, Leftists vs Rightists). Moreover, the perception of the US as indifferent or not trustworthy policies towards Turkish vital interests continues to hold.<sup>54</sup> However, even if relations between those institutions seem to continue to depend on the personality of the scholars and their own ideological beliefs and concerns, the tendency of young scholars to expose their work to international IR journals should not be underestimated. As Bilgin notes,<sup>55</sup> Turkey's IR scholars have found a place in the disciplinary division of labour (between those who are expected to theorize about world politics and those who are usually situated in the periphery and are expected to provide the empirical data) and have recently taken advantage of important incentives such as invitations to conferences and international publications. Indeed, some of them may have found themselves in the difficult position that they were inclined to appreciate theoretical analysis but they were heard more when their work informed the world about Turkey. In any case, if one takes into account the changes or the existing challenges in the country's security culture and discourse,<sup>56</sup> a respected polyphony may be expected in the discipline itself.

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<sup>53</sup> For example, an important window for the development of International Relations has been offered by institutes such as the Center for Strategic Research (SAM), the Foreign Policy Institute, the Center for Black Sea and Central Asia, the Center for European Studies, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA Vakfi) as well as publications like *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, *Insight Turkey*, *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, *Turkish Studies*, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* and *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Olaylar ve Yorumlar*.

<sup>54</sup> Kelleher–Kunceck–Kharaman, *op.cit.*, 254.

<sup>55</sup> Bilgin, *op.cit.*, 6.

<sup>56</sup> A. Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs* 54.1 (2002), 199-216; P. Bilgin, "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation", *European Journal of Political Research* 44.2 (2005), 175-201; P. Bilgin, "Securing Turkey Through Western-Oriented Foreign Policy", *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009), 105-125.

When compared to the case of Greece, one may see that the development of the IR discipline in Turkey has several similarities and differences.

### *Similarities*

The following similarities between the two cases can be discerned:

a. Up to the 1980s, few departments were founded in both countries, focusing on international relations or international studies. This is no more the case. In contrast to the discipline's post-Cold War substantial growth, there is little, if any, contribution of both communities to the IR knowledge until the 1990s.<sup>57</sup> Even in cases of such contribution, attention was given especially to the respective foreign policies.<sup>58</sup> Although the rhetoric for the need of following proper theoretical and meta-theoretical standards has been expressed for quite a long time, the actual and broad (i.e. comprehensive) import and discussion of those standards followed after a considerable delay.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore the quite asymmetrical communication with the field's core, in the sense that the latter takes little notice of the periphery's research, cannot be attributed solely to the geographical distance from the western core.<sup>60</sup> Instead, the intellectual misconception of both IR communities over what the periphery stands for seems to be quite important. In any case,

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<sup>57</sup> At present time, there are more than ten departments, in the case of Greece (including regional studies), and four times that in the case of Turkey.

<sup>58</sup> It is indicative that a quite imaginative work, during the 1940s, of a would-be Greek politician (P. Papaligouras, *Théorie de la Société Internationale*, Les Editions Polygraphiques, Zurich 1941) would draw through attention by a Greek IR scholar only 65 years later: E. Χειλά, *Διεθνής Κοινωνία. Διαχρονικές και Σύγχρονες Αντιλήψεις. Η Συμβολή του Παναγή Παπαληγούρα*, Herodotos, Athens 2006.

<sup>59</sup> This was enhanced especially in cases of a personal character that scientific disagreements took.

<sup>60</sup> In contrast with Greece and Turkey, the Nordic states, although geographically peripheral, have contributed quite a lot to the development of Political Science and IR.

the post-Cold War as well the European perspective played a major role in the discussions about how the two countries would do something more than just follow a superpower, as was the case earlier.

b. The great contribution of the educational reform laws, especially during the 1980s, to the transformation of the IR discipline and its institutional growth. This is best illustrated by the rise in the number of universities, (IR) departments and students. The institutional growth and reform of the educational system has contributed to the mitigation of the oligopoly of science, by allowing the discipline's development as something more than the study of international law and international history. This also meant fulfilling the need for knowing neighboring or recently founded countries through increasingly developed regional studies. The methodological and theme variance is affirmed by a growing number of research institutes as well as of IR journals or journals which accept to publish IR articles.

c. The fact that IR ideas and the respective field haven't developed in a way that corresponds to the field's usual images, such as the great debates' schema. The latter captures the discipline's development as a series of disputes: between realism and idealism during the interwar, behaviorism and traditionalism and the paradigms of realism, pluralism/interdependence and Marxism/dependence theories later on and, finally, between rationalist approaches and post-positivist ones. Notably, this difficulty is not different from that of other continental European states. This schema has been forwarded mainly in the Anglo-American literature, but the two communities seem to deviate from it.

The field has rather delayed in developing as something definitely or extensively more than the study of international law and international history. The latter is taken to mean the somewhat intense presence of a formalist, i.e. legalist or historical and in any case a-theoretical, approach. This was the case, especially in the past. Moreover, the investigation of the social and political aspects of the nation-state's build-up was to be done mainly through the arts and letters, the study of law and ideas-centered social research.

However, the correspondence with the field's universal image seems to have played a growingly important role for the local evaluation. Indeed, there is a recent tendency for the explicit reference to IR theory, as the proper lens to guide the much needed systematic empirical research. This fact is not without its problems and dilemmas. For example, the field's function as a national/state science has been and seems to continue to be deemed important.

Finally, a remark can be made concerning the ambivalent role of dependence. Due to the common descent from the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, like Greece, did not follow exclusively a specific educational system. So, they appeared to have the freedom to follow strands of either the Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition or the Realpolitik continental tradition. At present, there seems to be a growing tendency of the local academic staff to pursue their studies in the USA and the UK as well as to highly appreciate higher degrees (M.A., Ph.D.) from western educational institutions, at least in some departments. Although such a tendency demonstrates a certain degree of the Anglo-American intellectual influence in both countries, it should not lead us to quick conclusions.

### *Differences*

Despite their similarities, it would be a mistake to approach the discipline's development in both countries just as two similar non-Saxon states, facing a problem of symmetric communication with the field's core and a considerable delay in importing and reproducing proper theoretical and meta-theoretical standards from abroad. Thus, their differences appear to be the following:

- a. There is a time difference with regard to certain developments, which took place earlier in Turkey. There is no doubt that international law was taught in the departments of Political Science in both countries. Nevertheless, the addition of a distinct and extensive dimension in university teaching, with regard to international politics, took place in Turkey a few years earlier than in Greece. The Turkish IR Community held a conference dedicated to the teaching of international politics, in the early 1960s, just a little

after holding a conference dedicated to the teaching of international law. This demonstrated that scholars recognized that international politics were governed by rules, which could be analyzed scientifically. Greece's IR community reached that level in the early 1980s. One or two decades later, certain themes pursued by some Turkish scholars resembled the post-positivist agenda that grew at the time (including the thorough discussion of the possibility for the development of a homegrown theory), at least in the sense that identity issues had been taken into serious account.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, the actual content of the analysis has not been identical.

b. The IR departments have not been constructed in the same way, notwithstanding the departmental sections of international law in the departments of law. The Greek departments are characterized by the promotion of the term 'international studies' or terms that associate with regional studies like Asian, Balkan, Eastern, Mediterranean and Turkish studies. Specialties or departmental sections vary in each department drawing from a wide range, for example international politics, international institutions and international and/or European economic studies.

The internal structure of Greek IR departments seems to be more diverse than in the Turkish case. With regard to the latter, the departments usually have the title of 'International Relations' or 'Political Science and International Relations'. Their departmental

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<sup>61</sup> To be sure, it is undeniable that a growing number of Greek IR scholars have become acquainted with the aforementioned agenda and have felt the need to offer new insights in the respective analysis [e.g. A. Huliaras–N. Tzifakis, "Contextual Approaches to Human Security: Canada and Japan in the Balkans", *International Journal* 62.3 (2007), 559-575; D. Akriovoulis, *The Ways of Stargazing: Newtonian Metaphoricity in American Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London 2008]. However, it might be more difficult to pinpoint a single's Greek scholar's scientific work during the early 2000s, which is equivalent to that of Bilgin, drawing heavily on critical security studies and critical theory. It is noted that the reference to the adoption of post-positivist themes or methods doesn't have to presume their validity or acceptance by the authors or the readers of this article. Instead, this adoption is used as a criterion for the communication of the local IR communities with the universal community.

sections are often dedicated to international relations and political history as well as international law, among others.

Simply put, the study of politics in Turkey mostly entails IR not as a mere sub-field of Political Science, but as a constituent field with intense presence as well as some degree of diversity. In Greece, and despite the fact that at some point IR seemed to draw equal if not more attention than Political Science, the multi-dimensional study of international affairs is combined with the study of states/nations/regions. The latter has drawn heavily on the cultural/historical/lingual emphasis paid by Greek higher education.

c. The common doubt against the political or cultural western hegemony and the insufficient external support seems to have been handled diversely. In a sense, Greece was characterized by a more problematic and unstable symbolic use of the West as the exemplar for the local scientific and institutional framework, at least until the mid years of the Cold War. Not least, this was the case for the Anglo-Saxon utilitarian thought. For example, when Greek and Turkish scholars, as well as scholars from other countries, were asked in the 1960s, by a prominent international institution, to provide national contributions to the role of the United Nations, the Turkish one was written in English. The Greek was one of the few that were written in French, which had been the main language of scholars' foreign communication up until the 1970s.

Ironically, it is the Turkish case that has been described as one where the term 'self-interested' has a more negative connotation in Turkish than it does in American English.<sup>62</sup> This may be true. But it did not stop either students from going to the USA and then returning (from there) or the American import of the teaching of international politics. This also applies to the Greek case, probably even more so due to the usual (until recently) suspicion against diplomacy as an institution. After all, the main type of agency in politics was the nation and not the state, especially in the eyes of most historians. Subsequently, the distrust against the West has included many dimensions of diplomatic thought, even state-centric ones.

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<sup>62</sup> Kelleher–Kunceck–Kharaman, *op.cit.*

It may be argued that there was an equal indifference by Turkish historians. Indeed, even now diplomatic history may be pursued more in IR departments than in history departments. Nonetheless, this indifference was counterbalanced by the fact that IR (taken to be the study of international law, diplomatic history and even politics albeit with no particular theoretical concern) was a specialty in the capital's university school of political sciences, instead of just one or very few courses as in the Greek case. This Turkish historical background played a role in the field's recent institutional growth, offering more or less a model for the newly founded IR departments.

d. The last dissimilarity has to do with the role and place of political realism. Although Turkish teaching included it long ago, research as well as the actual analysis of foreign policy remained rather a-theoretical, reflecting the restricted interest in understanding/'internalizing' IR theory and in discussing the 'standard' concepts and theories when accounting for Turkish foreign policy.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, the respective analysis implicitly involved political realism. A short of state-centrism with special (albeit not exclusive) reference to politics was prevalent during the Cold War. Its status has ironically been affirmed explicitly by scholars, who were usually familiar with recent disciplinary developments such as the emergence of post-positivism and have managed to gain a place in IR in the last years, adding to the discipline's themes with regard to the role of Islam and secular democracy.<sup>64</sup>

Greek teaching has also included political realism, since the early 1980s. However, research as well as the actual analysis of foreign policy have been characterized mainly by an emphasis (either state-centric or not) to the legal and economic aspects.<sup>65</sup> The

<sup>63</sup> Bilgin, *op.cit.*, 6.

<sup>64</sup> See İ Dağı, "Akademya, Devlet ve 'Uluslararası İlişkiler'. Les Liaisons Dangereuses", *Liberal Düşünce* 1.2 (1996), 76-82; B. Aral, "Türk Dış Politikası Söylemine Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım: Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği Ortaklığı", *Liberal Düşünce* 4.13 (1999), 58-71.

<sup>65</sup> This is not to mean the inexistence of books or articles, dedicated to political and especially strategic aspects.

critique against realism especially in the 1990s was expressed in rather obsolescent terms. In a sense, it has resembled Anglo-American liberal arguments of the 1920s and 1970s, rather than systematically developed IR post-positivist arguments. Indeed, that is why proponents of political realism conceived this critique as broadly internationalist. This conception was strengthened by the fact that that part of the aforementioned critique (or at least against realism's emphasis on military aspects) has included a self-proclaimed realist approach whose arguments had drawn upon interdependence theory.

### *Concluding remarks*

This article has revealed several points of both convergence and divergence concerning the development of the IR discipline in Greece and Turkey. Some similarities have been depicted such as the relatively small contribution of both communities to the IR knowledge at least until fairly recently and an asymmetrical communication with the field's core, the role of the correspondence with the field's universal image and the need for in importing and reproducing proper theoretical and meta-theoretical standards from abroad as well as the contribution of educational structures. Regardless of those similarities and despite the countries' common perception of geopolitical insecurity, the field's development has not been symmetric or identical, due to differences regarding the time in which certain developments took place in each country, the structure of the IR departments, the diverse handling of the common doubt against hegemony/dependence as well as the role of political realism. Evidently, the mere correspondence of the IR discipline locally to universal theoretical standards is a reductionist move. Thus, there is a need for a historical reconstruction of what and why exactly has or has not happened and how scientists see their relationship with practitioners.

An issue has been raised up here and could be the focus of future research, with regard to the two cases under investigation. It has to do with the role of the state-society relationship not only with

regard to politics but to IR as well. Has the state been treated as a monolithic object of scientific, public and diplomatic discourse or has it been treated as a singular actor? What is a formalist view of reality and how might it be dealt? What is the role of the nation as an actor of politics? What exactly does it take for a country with rather strong feelings of insecurity to have IR developed with much more emphasis to itself (IR theory) than to foreign policy? What are the conditions and mechanisms that prevent or enable IR experts, working in geographically peripheral countries, to speak and be heard of? The answers to those questions are important, but it is the method and the guidelines of how those answers are provided that matters more.

Indeed, it is meaningful to claim that adopting a realist or a liberal or even a critical point of view entails the possibility of reproducing a kind of political or social hegemony or practices of exclusion. However, this ought to be investigated empirically and not taken as a dogma, because a dogmatic approach of the scientific hegemony may miss the actual and complex causes and mechanisms of intellectual hegemony. Subsequently, the use of some short of the IR discipline's universal image is always part of local self-reflection. As the cases of Greece and Turkey demonstrate, useful conclusions could be drawn by the study and comparison between peripheral scientific communities at their search for disciplinary role and identity.