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Greek Lessons for Bulgaria's EU Integration

Like all East European new comers to the EU Bulgaria is looking at the example of Ireland and is dreaming to repeat its miracle. In the time span of half a generation the 'Celtic tiger' was able to catch-up with the advanced economies of the EU and to cross the frontier from poverty to wealth. However, sober voices tell a different, more cautionary tale: Bulgaria should look at next-door, culturally close Greece and read correctly the lessons of its EU integration, lessons both negative and positive.

Just as "a person can not descend to the same river twice", any new EU member descends to a different reality. When in 2007 Bulgaria entered into the river of EU, neither Bulgaria nor the EU were the same, compared to the Greek entry in 1981.

In 1981 Greece, a relatively less developed European country, was admitted as the 10th member to the "rich men's club". It had about 66 per cent of the average GDP per capita of the Community. The motives were mainly political –Europe was determined to support Greek democracy after the seven years of the military junta.

Bulgaria together with Romania entered the EU in 2007 as part of the fifth enlargement as its 25th and 26th member. Meanwhile united Europe had gone a long way from the days of the Common Market. The Treaty of Maastricht has added high politics, structural funds, a 4 per cent of GDP limitation to financial transfers and the *acquis communautaire*, the body of European laws, had grown to several thousand pages, grouped in 31 chapters.

Greece of 1981 was a very different country from Bulgaria of 2007. Bulgaria was coming out 45 years of a communist regime with its command economy, isolation from the world and weak or non-existent institutions.

Therefore any parallels between the Greek experience and what Bulgaria might expect from the EU membership are rather conditional and prudent.

The European Union works

At first sight, the most obvious and most important lesson is that the EU works. Twenty years after its entrance Greece is no longer the poor, insecure, isolated country, torn by deep internal conflicts. On the contrary, it is a stable liberal democracy with a smoothly functioning two-party system, member of the most prestigious international organizations, including the inner club of the Eurozone and Schengen. Over time most of its dramatic social, economic and political divisions have been bridged, the traumas of the bloody Civil War and the colonels' dictatorship greatly overcome. A real convergence of elites has occurred: radical rhetoric and behavior have been replaced by self-restraint and moderation and this is true about the right, PASOK, the communists, the Greens, and the military.[1] Ordinary Greeks have also demonstrated a genuine desire to consolidate democracy. The years of EEC/EU membership have led to a gradual but steady change in Greek standing in the world and Greek political culture. And despite the resilience of what P. Nikiforos Diamandouros coined as the 'underdog culture', few would now question the fact that Greece belongs to the developed and democratic West.

In a recent Economist Intelligence Unit survey ranking democracies according to five variables (electoral process/pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture,

[1] See N. Karakatsanis, *The Politics of Elite Transformation. The Consolidation of Greek Democracy in Theoretical Perspective*, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London 2001.

and civil liberties), Greece was placed 22nd among the 28 full democracies out of the evaluated 167 countries of the world.[2]

According to the World Bank estimates in 2007 Greek domestic product (GDP) amounted to 282.8 billion dollars and was equal to the combined GDP of Bulgaria (72.2 billion) and Romania (202.7 billion).

In the Balkans Greece is a regional powerhouse. Greek banks control 20 per cent of the regional market; Greece is a leading investor in all the neighboring countries and plays host to nearly one million foreign workers.

The importance of a political/social consensus vis-à-vis Europe

When and how did Greece achieve this success? Negotiated by the right wing New Democracy and personally by its leader Konstantinos Karamanlis, Greek membership met with considerable resistance in the face of the influential Greek Orthodox Church, the left and a predominantly anti-western public mood. Just months after the admission one of the strongest opponents, the Pan-Hellenic Socialist movement (PASOK) came to power. Elected on a strong anti-western agenda, the Greek socialists and their leader Andreas Papandreou claimed that European membership would perpetuate the peripheral character of the Greek economy and intensify its exploitation from the part of its developed partners. The catastrophic trade deficits of the first two years seemed to confirm their worst fears. As early as March 1981 the Greek government sent the first of its numerous memos to the Commission demanding the re-negotiation of the conditions of admission. The memo was rejected but it marked the beginning of Greece's special relationship with the Community. In the 1980s and the early 1990s PASOK's policy was directed towards promoting 'Greek distinctiveness', fighting for concessions and maximum financial gains,

[2] Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2007, at http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf. Bulgaria occupies the 49th place and is in the group of the "flawed democracies".

but not harmonizing its economic policies with that of EC partners. During the so-called ‘populist decade’,[3] Greek success was measured not by the ability to change and adjust to the highly competitive European environment, but by the resistance to Community’s regulations. The economic situation of the 1980s was marked by stagflation, huge current deficits and deteriorating competitiveness. As a result, Greece not only failed to heal and dynamize its economy, but fell behind the newly accepted Spain and Portugal.[4]

Slowly but surely this policy was reversed. Many factors contributed but the most influential ones were probably the golden rain from the European funds plus the growing feeling of security to a country, historically plagued by a siege mentality. Net financial transfers from the European budget reached 3 per cent of the GDP and 11 per cent of the gross investment; on a per capita basis Greece has received more European funding than any other member except Ireland. By 1992 the Greeks saw no alternative to the EU. After the death of Andreas Papandreou, the Simitis government launched an ambitious program for radical changes in one last attempt to overcome the delay and adapt the economy to the demands of the EMU. Thus it took more than fifteen years for Greece to reach a consensus on the importance of the EU. This was in a sharp contrast to Ireland, where such a political/societal consensus in the face of the European challenge has been very strong and since the 1990s has materialized in a special governmental body.

In the case of Bulgaria the consensus vis-à-vis the EU was much more easily achieved. In fact, it was a crucial part of Bulgaria’s post-communist transition. The East European revolutions of 1989, which Timothy Garton Ash called *refolutions*, and Jürgen Habermas the *rectifying revolutions,* had one slogan: “Back to Europe!”

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[3] See Richard Clogg (ed.), *Greece, 1981-1989: The Populist Decade,* Palgrave Macmillan, London 1993.

[4] See P. Kazakos–P.C. Ioakimidis, *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated,* Pinter Publishers, London-New York 1994; A. Mitsos–E. Mossialos (eds.), *Contemporary Greece and Europe*, European Institute LSE European Political Economy Series, Ashgate Press, London-Sydney 2000; R. Bryant–N. Garganas–G. Tavlas, *Greece Economic Performance and Prospects*, Bank of Greece, The Brookings Institution, Athens-Washington DC 2001.

Europe became the new mantra, a promise and a guarantee, the other name for normalcy. Europe meant a shortcut to prosperity and democracy, to the smoothly operating European institutions and the long deserved inclusion. Thus in Bulgaria as early as 1990 the Grand National Assembly adopted a declaration in favor of a speedy integration into the EC. The Bulgarian Left formed a party named "The Road to Europe". In the euphoria and chaos of the first years of post-communist transition the Bulgarians, like all East Europeans, hoped that once they take the true path, they would quickly shorten the distance and join the developed part of the continent. At that time Bulgaria had approximately the same economic indicators of Portugal. Soon these hopes turned out to be illusionary and the road to Europe longer, more difficult and more expensive. Going a bit ahead, let us remind that the first grand enlargement to the East would occur fifteen years after the regime change, and Bulgaria would be admitted to EU two and a half years later than the CEE and seventeen years after 1989.[5]

The consensus about Europe in the country was so strong that no mainstream political force could allow itself to be against it. After the spectacular collapse of communism, Bulgarians unlike their Greek neighbors cherished no illusions about any 'third way'. After all, the 'second way' had turned out to be a dead end.

Bulgarian ruling elites, even when they derived straight from the communist party, tried not to lag behind the Central European front runners; they did sign duly all the EU agreements, submitted an application for the EU and used the rhetoric of euro- membership for their own legitimation. But these same elites were feet-dragging on reforms, because reforms would eventually erode their own power basis and strengthen the hand of the anti-communist opposition and would put an end to the economic rent seeking in the muddy waters of the delayed transformation. In sharp contrast to the consensus in the Visegrad troika, in Bulgaria (like in Romania)

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[5] On the timetable and problems of the EU enlargement to the East see http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/index.htm. On the delay see Ash Timothy Garton, "The Grim Wedding", *The Guardian* (27-6-2002).

there were influential forces indifferent or hostile to EU; the slow and reluctant reforms reduced the speed of the EU accession.

The situation changed dramatically in 1997 when after an acute crisis and strong street pressure the Bulgarian socialists were forced to resign; early parliamentary elections gave to the reformist Union of the Democratic Forces a mandate for reforms.

In this second revolution the slogan "back to Europe" was raised again, this time specified as "catching up with the Central European front-runners". From that moment Bulgaria and Romania joined the accession's dynamic process. Gradually but steadily, the EU acquired the role of a first rate factor for their developments; the EU perspective structuralized and catalyzed the process of transformation. From purely foreign policy aim, the perspective of EU membership turned into the main engine of domestic policies.[6] Its strong impact changed the balance in favor of the pro-reformist forces. The conditionality of the pre-accession process put the rate of accession in dependence to the progress of the overall reforms.[7] It deprived the enemies of the changes of one important argument: that gradual slow reforms were cheaper and more preferable. The pressure from Brussels –visible and transparent− was used as a justification for the painful unpopular measures and as a further legitimation of the reformist forces.

God (EU) helps him who helps himself

The weight of evidence of two decades of Greek EU membership indicates to the third lesson: just as God helps him who helps himself, the EU helps only those who act in accordance with its requirements and opportunities, to those who were able to formulate

[6] Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism,* Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005.

[7] On the EU conditionality in South East Europe see Aneta Spendzharova, "Bringing Europe In? The Impact of EU Conditionality on Bulgarian and Romanian Politics", *Southeast European Politics*, IV/2-3 (November 2003); Othon Anastasakis−Dimitar Bechev, *EU Conditionality in South East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process*, South East European Studies Programme. European Studies Centre. St Antony's College University of Oxford, April 2003.

and pursue a national development policy. Or in other words, the EU is the necessary but not sufficient condition for the transformation of a country. Its magic works only when it becomes a catalyst for constant reforms and modernization**.** EU integration is a huge opportunity that might be used, or might be missed. For any member country it has been crucial to determine the national interest and how to promote it most effectively.

Successful EU integration is reduced to a country's ability to survive and adapt to the highly competitive environment of Western Europe. The experience of Greece in 1980-1990s suggests that reform process can be very difficult, and resistance to changes very strong. Nationalistic pretensions often mask protectionism, isolationism, or provincialism of circles deeply interested in preserving the closed character of the economy and the society. It is important to identify the potential losers from the reforms, associated with EU –often politically strong– organized labor, state-controlled sectors, and a corrupt political class. EU should lead to a radical change in connection state-society-market.[8]

In the final run, the success or failure of a member country largely depends on how effective its domestic economic policies turn out to be in utilizing EU funds efficiently and attracting foreign direct investment. Indeed, poor economic policy was the main reason why Greece has underperformed other EU members. Economic maladjustment caused the tensions that developed between it and both European institutions and partner countries and vice versa –the tension caused further maladjustment.[9] Recently, the memory of Greece as the 'black sheep' was evoked in connection with new member Poland's obstructionist policies. As *Economist* put it: "The Kaczynskis have won a battle. But they risk making Poland as

[8] L. Tsoukalis, "Greece in the EU: Domestic Reform Coalitions, External Constraints and High Politics", in Mitsos−Mossialos, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

[9] On the difficulties of Greece's adjustment see K. Featherstone−K. Ifantis, *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1996.

Greece used to be: unpopular, expensive, and, most dangerously, marginal”.[10]

Convergence is possible but not easy

When Greece joined the EEC in 1981 its per capita GDP stood at 64 per cent of the Community’s average. In 1990 it fell down to 58 per cent and rose again to 82 per cent in 2004. Meanwhile, Ireland, which started from the same level of 62 per cent of EEC’s average GDP, was able by 1973 to catch up and reach 139 per cent of EC average in 2004.[11] In the 1990s Ireland’s annual growth rate was 6.8 per cent, Greece’s 2 per cent; as a result by the end of the decade Irish GDP was 3 times higher than in 1990, while Greek was 80 per cent higher.

The Irish miracle had many ‘fathers’: a fully liberalized economy, low taxes, flexible and expanding labor market, small government, high priority to education and human capital, native English language and last but not least – the ‘American cousins’.[12] The role of the huge and strong US economy has been so important for the Irish success that some people claim that Irish model is unique and inimitable.

Bulgarians entered the EU in 2007 with great hope and expectations. Despite immense satisfaction, they are aware that they are the poorest members of the EU in terms of their GDP per capita (one third of the EU average). It is most obvious that their economy, administration, infrastructure, and society need to go on with reforms and restructuring in order to achieve high growth and catch up with its European partners. To bridge the gap Bulgaria needs nothing short of a miracle. These are three possible scenarios for future Bulgarian convergence:

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[10] “A swamp of paranoid nostalgia”, *The Economist* (5-7-2007).

[11] According to Eurostat.

[12] See “Dancing an Irish jig”, *The Economist* (5-4-2004).

GROWTH and CONVERGENCE			
Scenarios	I	II	III
Growth GDP per capita Bulgaria	3%	5%	8%
Growth GDP per capita EU-25	2%	2%	2%
Convergence (years/year)	223 (2230)	73 (2080)	36 (2043)

Source: Institute for Market Economy (IME), Sofia

As seen from the above table, if Bulgarian economy grows at 8 per cent annually, convergence will take the acceptable thirty six years. At 3 per cent growth however, it will need two centuries.

The Importance of financial health and economic freedom

After thirty years of high inflation, low growth, diminishing productivity and share of exports and considerable budget deficits, it was only in 1993-1996 that Greece undertook a drastic economic stabilization program. In a short time the country could curb inflation and deficits, stimulate growth and establish a better business climate, so that on January 2001 could join the euro zone.

Bulgarian case is rather different. Bulgaria entered the EU as a poor (or more exactly, as impoverished) country, but in a good financial shape after a decade of healthy growth. In 1996-97 due to a hyperinflation shock the Bulgarian economy hit the bottom for a second time after 1989-90. The crisis led to the introduction of a Currency Board: the most radical, swift and successful economic reform. By imposing almost automatically low inflation and macroeconomic stability, coupled with structural reforms, the currency board has contributed to growth by creating a stable environment for investment.

And in a short time Bulgarian economy started to grow together with FDI. If in 1990-97 GDP diminished at a rate of 4.7 per cent annually, after 1997 it grew at stable 4.5-5 per cent. The country's economic policy has been geared to greater openness, economic freedoms and attracting foreign direct investment.

In 2007 Bulgaria's economy offered more basic economic freedoms than the Greek one. In a recent *Heritage Foundation* ranking of the European countries according to ten basic economic freedoms Bulgaria was placed 29th out of 41 countries, while Greece was 36th (Ireland was second, Belarus 41st).[13]

EU funds or FRI?

In Ireland a long-standing outward orientation of trade and investment policy has been pivotal. The country shifted away from a protectionist import-substitution strategy and persued a consistent policy that actively encourages foreign investmet in export-oriented manufacturing industries.[14]

Foreign investment has been instrumental for the Irish success. Due to an active policy of attracting FDI Ireland managed to ensure the presence of important high-tech companies like Apple, IBM, Lotus, Microsoft, and Oracle. Calculations show that these FDI contributed to almost half of the country's economic growth, 60 per cent of the GDP and 90 per cent of the imports. The EU has done a great deal in funding Ireland's economic blossoming. The sizable EU funding has gone into social projects, retraining schemes, agriculture and infrastructure. Yet the impact of these funds on growth was modest: according to some rough estimates theirs maximum contribution to the annual growth of 8 per cent during the 1990s has been no more than 0.5 per cent.

In contrast, during the first years of Greek membership the amount of FRI in the economy fell sharply down. EU funding was welcome mostly because it has allowed governments to delay adjustment, to buy voters, to go on with the old clientilist system of political favoritism. Greece almost the same amount of funds as Ireland, but Ireland channeled them cleverly, mostly in education, infrastructure, with minimal corruption and waste. Greece was not only less effective in utilizing the EU funds: because of wrong economic policies after it accession FDI inflows in Greek economy

[13] http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/pdf/index2007_RegionB_Europe.pdf.

[14] Ireland. Staff Report for the 2000 Article IV Commission, IMF, July 12, 2000.

diminished and they could not play a significant role in the processes of convergence and restructuring.[15]

Bulgaria does not face this dilemma. Ever since the beginning of the country's long and painful transition from a communist, centrally planned economy to a market one, FDI have been regarded to be the key to growth and development. Heavily indebted, undercapitalized, strongly bound to the CMEA block, Bulgaria considered FDI inflows to be crucial. FDI were expected to solve the balance of payments problems, help re-orient trade from East to West, bring in production and managerial know-how, spur the restructuring, open new markets, as well as to make up for the low savings rate in the economy. Nonetheless it took almost a decade before this task was accomplished.

In 1990-97, despite the economic policy goals declared, Bulgaria failed to attract sizable foreign capital. Investment activity on the whole, local investment included was rather dull and remained well below the average in the transition economies. The reasons were firstly because of the feet dragging on economic reforms, the hesitant economic policy, delayed privatization, high political risk, huge foreign debt, and last but not least, Bulgaria found itself on the wrong side of the warring Yugoslavia.

In 1996-97 due to a hyperinflation shock the Bulgarian economy hit the bottom for a second time after 1989-90. The crisis led to the introduction of a Currency Board: a most radical, swift and successful economic reform. By imposing low inflation and macroeconomic stability, coupled with structural reforms, the currency board has contributed to growth by creating a stable environment for investment. In a short time the economy started to grow together with FDI. If in 1990-1997 GDP diminished at 4.7 per cent, after 1997 it grew at stable 4.5-5 per cent. Consequently, ever since the financial stabilization the volume of FDI and their share in GDP has been increasing. Their average level before the introduction of the Currency Board had been USD 135.3 million or 1.7 per cent of GDP, rising to USD 1,469.2 million or 7.9 per cent of GDP

[15] Bryant–Garganas–Tavlas, *op.cit.*, p. 173.

afterwards.[16] It was the imposed strict financial discipline and market-oriented reforms that increased confidence in Bulgarian economy and attracted foreign investors.

According to data from Bulgarian National Bank and Foreign Investment Agency in the period 1992-2006 Bulgaria got 20.2 billion USD in FDI, 14.6 billion of them in the last four years (2.1 billion in 2003, 3.4 in 2004, 3.9 in 2005, and 5.2 in 2006). 17.2 per cent of all capital was directed to privatization and 82.8 per cent to greenfield and expansion investment.

Since 2004 Bulgaria has been holding one of the top ranks among countries in Central and Eastern Europe in terms of attracted FDI per capita. The share of FDI to GDP is the highest in the region. The ten leading sectors were: Financial intermediation, Trade and repairs, Real estate and business activities, Electricity, gas and water supply, Petroleum, chemical, rubber and plastic products, Telecommunications, Construction, Metallurgy and metal products, and Food products.[17]

The share of FDI to GDP is the highest in the region. According to recent analysis of the Austrian KontrolBank, Bulgaria is one of the four most attractive CEE countries for FDI: despite its relatively small market, Bulgaria is expected to receive some 10 per cent of all FDI in the 19 countries of Central and Eastern Europe.[18]

In this respect FDI are expected to play a major role. Numerous studies emphasize that for the less advanced EU countries, FDI are an important engine of convergence. In general, the countries hosting FDI tend to grow faster than those receiving few FDI. The level, but also the sectoral composition of FDI matters, as well as other factors which may impact on growth like continuing structural reforms and sound macroeconomic policies.[19]

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[16] Calculations of Dimitar Chobanov, “Nine years Currency Board Arrangement”, IME, *Economic Policy Review*, Issue 41 (15-7-2006).

[17] http://investbg.government.bg. Data revised as of March 2007.

[18] http://www.expres.bg/story/16308.

[19] Sandrine Levasseur, *Convergence and FDI in an enlarged EU: What can we learn from the experience of Cohesion countries for the CEECs?,* OFCE-Paris, Studies Department, N° 2006 (12-7-2006). The study points out one

Bulgaria's ambitious mega-projects for the next seven-ten years would require huge inflows of FDI: these include the new nuclear power station Belene, thousands of kilometers of new and repaired highways, two or three major pipelines, airports, bridges, telecommunications; plus a total restructuring of agriculture, health care and education.

The Importance of an Effective State and Administration

At the time of its accession Greece was a country with a huge and over-centralized state apparatus controlling practically every aspect of Greek economy and society. It was exemplified in a strong public sector, a high share of public expenditure GNP and extensive participation in economic activities. Greece was probably the most tightly regulated country in the Community. At the same time, this huge state was notoriously weak in terms of institutions and organizational and functional capacities. So weak, that it is often qualified in Greek literature as 'a colossus with a feet of clay'. The huge economic state interventions driven by clientelistic, political motives gave rise to a paternalistic, regulatory model, which ran counter the economic logic of the EU. European integration gave birth and pushed ahead a dynamic process for rebalancing relations between state and society in the direction of limiting the scope of the state and widening that of society. This process results in the gradual but steady retreat of the state and strengthening of the civil society.[20]

This aspect of Greece's EU transformation is particularly valuable for Bulgaria. In many aspects, the challenge in front of Bulgaria's is much more serious. Dismantling of the totalitarian state and constructing a virtually new modern state has been one of the most important and difficult tasks of its post-communist transition. So far the success has been ambiguous: despite the shell of moder-

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important exception to the rule, Slovenia, where FDI played only secondary role for boosting growth.

[20] P.C. Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment", Hellenic Center For European Studies (EKEM), January 2002 (1).

nity, this newly born state is plagued by strong interventionism, weak institutions, weak civil society, unclear demarcation of public and private interests, consequently by clientilism and corruption. Today Bulgarian state can be also characterized as omnipresent, but weak and inefficient at the same time.

The Greek example shows that strong and many-sided resistance meets the transformation of the character of the historical Balkan state. Very often what looked as defense of domestic producers and promoting national interests was actually protection of political parties' and organized groups' interests. Greece was slow in implementing the European directives and regulations. Success came after a gradual overcoming of the division between supporters of reform/modernization on the one hand and conservatism/populism on the other. Greece remains the country with the highest share of grey economy among the EU and OECD, high levels of corruption,[21] low share of FDI (1 per cent of Greek GDP, 11 per cent in Ireland), the greatest state sector in contrast Ireland which has the smallest one.

In the words of a keen observer, many of the endemic traits of Greek society that have historically weakened the Greek state remain, albeit often in new forms and with new additions. Hence, the transition to democracy and the impact of European integration has left Greece with a political system in which *governments* find it increasingly hard *to govern*. Increasingly, reform expectations clash with accumulated and deeply-set interests and privileges; adjustment to external demands displays delays, crisis and partiality.[22]

Culture matters

Which way will Bulgaria go −the Irish or the Greek– remains to be seen. A careful analysis and juxtaposition of the Irish and the

[21] For recent cases of corruption see "School for scandal", *The Economist* (4-4-2007).

[22] Kevin Featherstone, "Why is Greece Becoming Harder to Govern?", Lecture delivered at the University of Michigan, 17 February 2005.

Greek experience can suggest many outcomes. In some aspects Bulgaria is closer to Greece, in others to Ireland**.**

Bulgaria's demographic situation is similar and even worse than that of Greece: an aging population, low birth rates, aggravated by an ongoing emigration. In contrast, in Ireland −the youngest EU nation– employment rose by 5.5 percent per year, driven by high birth rates and reversal of net migration. Nearly half a million people came back to their motherland. In addition, education rapidly adapted to the new requirements of the country's development. Heavy investment in schools and universities particularly in engineering, computer sciences and telecommunications led to an accelerated accumulation of human capital, as important as the physical one.

The pace of economic catch up largely depends on how effective accession countries' domestic economic policies turn out to be in utilizing EU funds efficiently and attracting foreign direct investment. Given the generally sound economic policies pursued by Bulgaria, plus its high degree of openness and adaptability, the pace of income catch up is more likely to follow the Irish example than the Greek one. Yet cultural characteristics will drive it closer to By way of illustration, in the Corruption Perceptions Index ranking of *Transparency International*, Bulgaria and Greece occupy close places 57th and 54th respectively, while Ireland is 18th and Finland –another EU success– is first.[23]

[23] http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006.