

*Konstantinos Tsivos**

**“His End Was Angelic, His Suffering Martyrlike”
– The Last Days of Alexandros Ypsilantis**

The few Greeks who visit the Terezin concentration camp (Theresienstadt in German), located in today's Czech Republic, on the banks of the river Elbe and 60 kilometres north of Prague, are surprised when they come across a plain sign on the left wing, written in Greek and in Czech, that reads: “The hero and martyr of the Greek National Uprising Alexandros Ypsilantis and his companions were imprisoned here for four years (17 August 1823-25 November 1827).” As it is generally known, after the failure of the uprising in Moldovlachia, Alexandros Ypsilantis, accompanied by his younger brothers Georgios and Nikolaos and the deputy (secretary) Georgios Lassanis, arrived in the Habsburg Empire in June. Under orders of Chancellor Metternich, they were imprisoned in the Mukachevo fortress which is in today's Western Ukraine.

Following the steps taken by the Ypsilantis family and taking into account the deterioration of Alexandros's health, the Austrian Chancellor Metternich consented to transfer the prisoners to fort Terezin in the summer of 1823. The conditions of the imprisonment of the Ypsilantis brothers by Metternich's authoritarian regime are depicted in detail in several studies, including the book of the historian Polychronis Enepekides *Αλέξανδρος Υψηλάντης. Η αιχμαλωσία του εις την Αυστρίαν 1821-1828* (Alexandros Ypsilantis: His captivity in Austria 1821-1828). In this book, Enepekides, who was a professor at the University of Vienna, published all the documents related to the “Furst Ypsilanti oder Baron Schönwarth” dossier, which can be found in the KriegsArchiv in Vienna.¹

With a view to the above, the author examined related archive sources in the Czech State Archive (Státní ústřední archiv–SÚA). There was a rather small dossier (“Kníže Ypsilanti Alexandr”) containing a total of thirty-eight writings covering the period from October to De-

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¹ Polychronis Enepekides, *Αλέξανδρος Υψηλάντης–Η αιχμαλωσία του εις την Αυστρίαν 1821-1828* (Alexandros Ypsilantis: His Captivity in Austria 1821-1828) (Athens: Papazisi, 1969).

cember 1827. In other words, covering the end of his imprisonment and his journey from Terezin to Vienna.² The most important material found in the dossier were presented fifty-four years ago in French on the pages of the *Balkan Studies* journal by the Romanian historian Nicolae Corivan.³

Another important source that gives an account of the last months of Ypsilantis' life is a relatively short but rather comprehensive article by the Czech historian Josef Dostál published in 1939 in the reputable journal *Český časopis historický*. In his article, Dostál cites some of the documents from the "Ypsilantis dossier." Most of the information he cites, especially about the preparations for Alexandros Ypsilantis' visit to Teplice (in the end, the visit that was to take place several days after his "release" in November 1827 never happened), comes from reports of Austrian police agents. Unfortunately, in his article, Dostál did not mention the sources from which he obtained the most relevant information.⁴

Another important source giving testimony not only about the last days of Alexandros Ypsilantis, but also about the morals and atmosphere of the time, are the memoirs of Princess Lulu Thürrheim.⁵ Recently, the 200th anniversary of the Greek Revolution of 1821 presented an opportunity to review certain issues concerning the nature of the uprising and to reformulate questions about certain controversial sides and persons who took part in it. In the dozens of debates and books published on the occasion of the anniversary, hitherto unknown aspects were elucidated, and effort was made to overcome many ingrained stereotypes and taboos. In relation to the topic in question, Alexandros Ypsilantis and his imprisonment, if anything new was added, it is, in the author's opinion, related to the emphasis put on the uprising in Moldavia and Vlachia.⁶

² Státní ústřední archiv [hereafter SÚA] (Central State Archive), fond PGT sign. 1819-1848.

³ Nicolae Corivan, "La captivité d'Alexandre Ypsilanti," *Balkan studies* 8, no. 1 (1967): 87-102.

⁴ Josef Dostál, "Poslední chvíle Alexandra Ypsilantiho v české zemi" (The Last Moments of Alexandros Ypsilantis in the Czech Lands), *Český časopis historický* 3-4 (1939): 488-97.

⁵ Gräfin Lulu Thürrheim, *Mein Leben. Erinnerungen aus Österreichs Grosser Welt (1819-1852)* (René van Rhyen), vol. 3, 289.

⁶ See the books: John Milios, *1821: Ιχνηλατώντας το Έθνος, το Κράτος και τη Μεγάλη Ιδέα* (1821: Tracing the Nation, the State and the Megali Idea) (Athens: Alexandria,

Until recently, the uprising in the Danubian Principalities has not been dealt with sufficient care. The same applies to the attention paid to the protagonist of the rebellion and to the leader of the “Society of Friends” (Filiki Eteria), Alexandros Ypsilantis.⁷ To this day, no scientific biography exists about the leader of the “Society of Friends.” Using the sources cited above, this article will focus mainly on the last days of Alexandros Ypsilantis’ imprisonment, his release, and his stern journey to Vienna. In the above-mentioned documents from the “Ypsilantis dossier,” we will look for aspects that may complete the portrait of Alexandros Ypsilantis. In particular, we will examine the political reasons that led to Ypsilantis’ release, the state of his health, and the repressive nature of the Metternich regime.

The historian Vassilis Kremmydas, when speaking of the Greek revolution, noted that it “was from beginning to end and in all its details a constant struggle of the traditional with the modern.”⁸ This characterisation, the battle between tradition and modernity, was expressed not only in the form of a dispute between competing interest groups and competing protagonists, but also as a dispute that characterised the very protagonists of the revolution, who were “at one time devils and at another angels.”⁹ This contrast was certainly present in the personality of

2020), 25-35; Thanos Veremis–John Koliopoulos–Iakovos Michailidis, *1821 Η δημιουργία ενός έθνους–κράτους* (The Creation of a Nation-state) (Athens: Metaihmio, 2018), 100-12; Stefanos Papageorgiou, *Από το γένος στο έθνος. Η θεμελίωση του ελληνικού κράτους* (From “Genos” to Nation. The Foundation of the Greek State) (Athens: Papazisi, 2005), 87-93.

⁷ Greek literature dedicated to Alexandros Ypsilantis includes the historical novel of the journalist Petros Kasimatis, *Αλέξανδρος Υψηλάντης. Ο τελευταίος πρίγκηπας* (Alexandros Ypsilantis. The Last Prince) (Athens: Livanis, 2020). Worth noting is also the fictional biography of Ypsilantis written for children by Maria Skiadaresi, *Ο Πρίγκηπας* (The Prince) (Athens: Patakis, 2009).

⁸ Thodoris Antonopoulos, «Ο Βασίλης Κρεμμυδάς καταρρίπτει έναν έναν τους μύθους του 1821» (Vassilis Kremmydas Dispels the Myths about 1821), *Lifo* (March 24, 2018), <https://www.lifo.gr/culture/vivlio/o-basilis-kremmydas-katarrippei-enan-enan-toys-mythoys-toy-1821-ki-ohi-mono-kryfo>.

⁹ Kostas Akrivos, *Πότε διάβολος και πότε άγγελος* (Sometimes a Devil and Sometimes an Angel) (Athens: Metaihmio, 2021).

Alexandros Ypsilantis, a man “brave and romantic, but unsuccessful in political terms.”¹⁰

Romantism, bravery, honesty, and selflessness are usually the positive characteristics mentioned by historians who have attempted to recreate the portrait of Alexandros Ypsilantis. His negatives included his impulsiveness, lack of political experience, and grandiose, unrealistic ambitions. But the most important paradox that characterizes the leader of the “Society of Friends” is that despite being a descendant of an old and very affluent aristocratic family he consented to lead a daring revolutionary movement which aimed to overthrow a large empire.

Prince Ypsilantis’ aristocratic origin also defined to a large degree the way he was treated by Austrian authorities during his nearly seven-year confinement in Mukachevo and Terezin. The approach of Austrian authorities to Ypsilantis certainly differed from that to an ordinary prisoner. The conditions of his confinement cannot, however, be described as “luxurious” by any means, as some historians claim.¹¹ Even more unsubstantiated is the claim that the costs of the more favourable conditions of the Ypsilantis brothers’ imprisonment (better rations, use of alcoholic beverages, bathing) were borne by the Austrian army. On the contrary, the Ypsilantis “were political prisoners in their own right,” as Enepekides aptly noted.¹² The costs of their imprisonment were sometimes covered by Ypsilantis’ mother, Elisabeth, and sometimes by female friends of Alexandros Ypsilantis from the Austrian aristocracy or Russian diplomatic service, in particular the sisters Konstantina Razumovska¹³ and Lulu Thürheim.¹⁴

¹⁰ Thanos Veremis, «Αλήθειες και ψέματα για το 1821» (Truth and Lies about 1821), *Proto Thema*, 22-3-2021.

¹¹ Miroslav Šedivý, *Krvavá odysea. Řecký boj za nezávislost* (Bloody Odyssey. The Greek Struggle for Independence) (Prague: EPOCH, 2011).

¹² Enepekides, *op.cit.*, 109.

¹³ Konstantina Razumovska (1785-1867) was the second wife of Andrej Razumovsky (1752-1836), a Russian diplomat who was ambassador to Vienna from 1790. He retired in 1807 but remained in Vienna. During the Vienna Congress (1814) he became a member of the Tsar’s delegation and that is where he probably first met Alexandros Ypsilantis. Toward the end of his life, under the influence of his wife Konstantina, he converted to Catholicism.

¹⁴ Countess Lulu Thürheim (1788-1864) left the memoirs “Mein Leben” referred to above.

The two sisters, even though slightly older than Alexandros Ypsilantis, competed in relation to him in “manifestations of an exalted heart. We live in a romantic era and the fate of a hero and fighter for freedom must have been moving,” explains historian Dostál. The correspondence between Konstantina and Alexandros shows that Princess Razumovska had a “soft spot for Ypsilantis even though she forbade his expressions of affection.”¹⁵ According to Lulu Thürheim’s memoirs, another aristocrat had the same feelings for Ypsilantis: Terezie Chotek (1785-72), sister of the Highest Burgrave, Count Karel Chotek. Hers was more of a passionate nature. She did not abound in beauty –quite the opposite– but her keen was that she was more passionate. “In all dramatic situations of life, Terezie was too exalted. [...] Her excitement was ill-suited to the peace of mind that Ypsilantis had acquired through six years of suffering.”¹⁶

In September 1827, the three ladies were granted leave to visit Ypsilantis in Terezin, where the Prince told them about his lot and his troubles. Only after numerous requests did Vienna permit the brothers to set themselves up in prison bearably, at their own expense. According to the memoirs of Countess Thürheim, Alexandros passed time during his long imprisonment by writing memoirs. But when he was to hand them over to his jailors for preventive censorship he preferred to burn them. Another problem for Alexandros was the ill-advised behaviour of his brothers Georgios and Nikolaos. Different in character and incapable of noble thought, they blamed their eldest brother Alexandros for his and their position with bitterness that grew by the day. According to Josef Dostál “by their pettiness, they themselves made their captivity wretched. In this regard, Nikolaos stood out among the brothers, having behaved dismissively for two-and-a-half years. It was only when Alexandros’ health deteriorated dangerously that the brothers become closer.”¹⁷

In her memoirs, Lulu Thürheim devotes a great deal of space to a description of her “painful encounter” with Alexandros Ypsilantis in the Terezin fortress. She recalled that, when the two sisters met him in

¹⁵ Dostál, op.cit., 491.

¹⁶ Thürheim, *Mein Leben*, 270-89. In her memoirs, chapter 36 of the third volume is devoted to Ypsilantis, titled “Ypsilanti, seine Gefangenschaft und sein Tod.”

¹⁷ Dostál, op.cit., 489.

Russia before, he was young, beautiful, and in an excellent position. Now, before her was a one-handed man, pale as death, broken, with a greying beard and colourless lips, whose eyes were the only thing that retained their old beauty. When the two sisters were relaxing in the nearby spa town of Teplice (Teplitz), Russian Ambassador in Vienna Tatischev got a command from the Tsar to ask the Austrian government to release the imprisoned brothers. As soon as the Ambassador informed the sisters of these news, they ran to Terezin with the joyful message. Subsequently, the sisters managed to get a permission to have Alexandros treated in Teplice for several days.¹⁸

Information about Ypsilantis' stay in Teplice, where he went accompanied by his secretary Georgios Lassanis, which lasted from 26 September to 6 October, can be found in a report which a Councillor of Teplice, Mr. Lenhart, sent to the City Governor Josef von Hoch in Prague. He reported that Ypsilantis had been accommodated in the Prince Ligne inn where the Razumovskys were also lodging. Ypsilantis was unable to leave the house because both his legs were swollen. When Governor Hoch gave his report about his stay to the Police Minister Sedlnitzky, he explained the ailment away by Ypsilantis' disorderly life and affinity for alcohol ("zu geistigen Getranken").¹⁹ The question of the origins of Alexandros Ypsilantis' medical problems is the subject of frequent speculations by people who oversaw him and who were to decide about the terms of his release. For example, the Burgrave of the Kingdom of Bohemia Karel Chotek considered Ypsilantis confused or mentally ill (*gemütstrank*), attributing this to the long imprisonment, the feeling of restriction, and other related circumstances.²⁰

¹⁸ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 491.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Subsequently, it was discovered that the disease from which not only Alexandros Ypsilantis, but also his brothers suffered, is myotonic dystrophy as it is known today. This disease is considered the most frequent hereditary muscular disorder occurring in adulthood. It had not yet been discovered in the first half of the 19th century. For interesting information about this hereditary disease in the Ypsilantis family, see the dissertation of Konstantina Sotiriadou, *Μυοτονική δυστροφία: υποθέσεις και δεδομένα γύρω από τη νόσο των αδελφών Υψηλάντη* (Myotonic dystrophy: hypotheses and data on the disease of the Ypsilantis brothers) (PhD diss., University of Patra,

It is evident that the decision to release the Ypsilantis brothers in the autumn of 1827 is the result of a combination of two factors: a) the rapid deterioration of Alexandros Ypsilantis' health and b) the change in the attitudes of the three main powers towards the Greek issue. The situation in 1827 differed significantly from that of 1821.²¹ The new Russian Tsar, Nicholas I, had already agreed with Britain in 1826 to form an independent form of state in Greece. Metternich's diplomatic isolation worsened when France joined the Anglo-Russian alliance in July 1827. At the same time, these three countries' fleets were preparing to leave for the rebellious southern Greece in order to force the Sultan to accept their conditions for the settlement of the "Greek issue."²²

These were the circumstances in which Emperor Francis II of Austria decided to release Ypsilantis on 16 October 1827, at the request of the Russian Tsar Nicholas. But even at that time, "release" did not mean a complete release of the Ypsilantis brothers, but simply their transfer to another town in the Habsburg monarchy, conditioned on them "giving their word that they will not leave their chosen place of residence without obtaining prior consent."²³

The largest portion of Prague documents is comprised of correspondence between Police Minister Josef Sedlnitzky, Karel Chotek, who worked in Prague as the Highest Burgrave of the Kingdom of Bohemia, and General Major Chiessa, the commander of Terezin. These three representatives were to agree on the conditions subject to which the Ypsilantis brothers were to be released. Chotek's report sent to Police Minister Sedlnitzky emphasises, above all, the urgency to release the eldest of the Ypsilantis brothers due to Alexandros' deteriorating health. "Due to the cruel fate of Count Ypsilanti, his present condition is regrettable and makes every person feel sorrow," notes the Highest Burgrave. With a reference to information provided to him by the com-

1988), <https://thesis.ekt.gr/thesisBookReader/id/0714#page/92/mode/2up> (accessed 6-5-2021).

²¹ Papageorgiou, *op.cit.*, 177-88.

²² Giannis Kotsonis, *Η Ελληνική Επανάσταση και οι αυτοκρατορίες* (The Greek Revolution and the Empires) (Athens: Alexandria, 2020), 107-48.

²³ Enepekides, *op.cit.*, 167.

mander of Terezin Count Chiessa, he states that he cannot imagine that Alexandros could make a full recovery.²⁴

The Burgrave's communication indicates that he had no illusions about Ypsilantis' state of health and that his only hypocritical concern, so typical for bureaucrats of his type, was that they would not be accused of negligence in the future. That is why he writes, rather cynically: "The main concern is to keep Count Ypsilantis alive long enough that there is no risk of a complaint that he was not given due care and medical treatment at the place of his stay, resulting in his premature death (that nobody could blame us of releasing the prisoners from the Terezin fortress too late)." That is why the Highest Burgrave proposed to Sedlnitzky that Ypsilantis should be moved to the nearby town of Litoměřice (Leitmeritz), about a half-hour ride from Terezin. In connection with Sedlnitzky's concern that Ypsilantis may flee, Chotek noted that such an attempt is out of the question because "he is not capable of traveling by himself, and even in the event of his transfer to a new place that is designated, he will only be able to travel under medical supervision and on very short trips only, not taking more than one day."²⁵

But even Chotek's and Chiessa's repeated assurances about Ypsilantis' serious condition could not dispel the professional distrust of Sedlnitzky. At the end of October, Metternich approved a temporary relocation of the Ypsilantis brothers to Teplice, where there were no spa guests at that time. Nevertheless, Sedlnitzky asked Chotek to arrange, in agreement with Chiessa, the requisite police surveillance from the time the brothers leave Terezin. Historian Dostál gives a very accurate and vivid description of the "competition" between the different commanders of the almighty empire to put their "own spy" or informer on him, who would offer adequate professionalism, resilience, and discreteness in following the seriously ill Ypsilantis during his stay in the deserted town of Teplice.²⁶ Undoubtedly, these reports, in combination with similar reports stated by Polychronis Enepekides in his book, give

²⁴ SÚA, fond PGT sign. 1819-1848, Kníže Ypsilanti Alexander. Letter of Chotek to Sedlnitzky dated 30 October 1827.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 492.

a sufficient account of the abusive, repressive, and conservative nature of the Austrian monarchy and its ossified bureaucracy.

Whereas the Prague administration (Gubernium) considered the Teplice Burgrave Wolfram to be the most appropriate person to follow Ypsilantis, Prague Governor Hoch had serious reservations because he was of the opinion that Wolfram was much more of a composer than a Burgrave. "Music is far closer to his heart than service," objected Hoch, who also questioned the possibility of using soldiers as censors in Teplice, responsible for overseeing the contents of Ypsilantis' correspondence. Hoch informed Sedlnitzky about his reservations with respect to Wolfram and on his initiative, the task of following the dying Ypsilantis was taken over by the retired police officer Eichler. Eichler assured his superior, Hoch, that this service has an appeal of old times for him. With respect to his "rival," Burgrave Wolfram, he made a snide remark that he is a good burgrave, but he lacks one quality that is required for police service: keeping his mouth shut.²⁷

Finally, on 20 November, the retired police officer was able to take charge of his mission and sent a detailed report to Hoch about the visit of secretary Lassanis in Teplice, where he rented a flat in an inn at Prince Ligne for six weeks. After lunch, according to Eichler's report, he spoke at the post office about how the Ypsilantis brothers have been freed but would remain in Teplice for several weeks. Lassanis also inquired whether the locals knew that the Turks had been totally defeated in the naval battle of Navarino and have no navy left. According to Lassanis, Greece should be free within weeks, whereas the Turkish Empire will ultimately collapse if the Sultan does not immediately consent to Tsar Nicholas' demands. According to the same report, this political narration of secretary Lassanis continued in the evening in the Eiche pub, where among the people listening to him were the above-mentioned Burgrave Wolfram, Lieutenant colonel Scholz, city Councillor Lenhard, and a baker named Laube.²⁸

Lassanis again repeated that the Counts Ypsilantis were free but did not know where they should go. They would prefer travelling to Venice or to France from where they could sail to Greece, to their brother De-

²⁷ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 493.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

metrios. Ypsilantis' secretary foresaw the inevitable demise of the Turkish Empire in Europe and in Asia and the end of the hated Sultan due to an uprising. Every time any of the listeners expressed concern about the fate of Christians in Constantinople after the battle of Navarino, Lassanis responded with an assurance that there was a significant number of Russian boats berthed at the port of Constantinople that were passing off as merchant boats, but in fact were armed and had soldiers hiding below decks.²⁹ The report of the retired police officer tells us that the news of the victorious battle of Navarino boosted the morale of the Counts who had been held prisoner until the day before. At the same time, however, they raised excessive, as it turned out later, expectations not only with respect to the decision of the powers to destroy the Turkish empire, but also as to the extent of the freedom that had been newly granted to them.

In the meantime, the General in charge of Prague, Count Ignatius Gyulai, received an instruction from Vienna that the Ypsilantis' release was final and the Commander of Terezin, Count Chiessa, received orders to release the prisoners and let them go to Teplice on the basis of their word of honour. Indeed, the younger brothers Georgios and Nikolaos arrived in Teplice on the afternoon of 22 November. According to Eichler's new report, they came to the same pub that night to have dinner. They were very quiet; they ate and drank wine with water. One of them, too, seemed ill and suffering. They spoke Greek between themselves, and it seemed to the agent following them, who reportedly only understood individual words, that they only spoke about Teplice. According to Lassanis' report, Alexandros was to arrive in Teplice the next day, on 23 November.³⁰ Nevertheless, this relocation of Alexandros never happened because, in the meantime, Metternich's decision arrived in Terezin commanding that could the brothers choose between Verona and Vicenza as their next place of residence. General Chiessa was to inform the brothers about the contents of that decision and find out which city they chose. Chiessa was to deliver the necessary docu-

²⁹ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 493.

³⁰ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 494.

ments to the Highest Burgrave Chotek in order to have passports issued.³¹

Indeed, general Chiessa did send a description on the following day, stating the following about Alexandros: “Alexander, Count Ypsilantis, born in Constantinople, a Russian subject, 35 years old, living in Kiev, of Greek Orthodox religion, tall figure, long face, brown hair and brows, black eyes, a large and crooked nose and large, flat ears, slim, long chin, black beard and moustache, speaks Greek, French, and Russian, is nearly bald, and is missing his right hand.”³² Similar descriptions were written for the two younger brothers, Georgios (33 years) and Nikolaos (31 years). Chiessa wrote this letter for another two persons who served the siblings from the first day of their flight to the Austrian Empire and were to accompany them all the way to Vienna: Secretary Georgios Lassanis (33 years)³³ and valet Konstantinos Kavaleropoulos (55 years).³⁴

After six weeks of bureaucratic delays, General Gyulai informed Chotek on 24 November that the next day the Counts were slated to leave Terezin, accompanied by an officer, and arrive in Prague in the evening. At that point, Ypsilantis had not yet informed them of his decision whether he would prefer Verona or Vicenza. Subsequently, the Highest Burgrave mandated Hoch to take care of police supervision as soon as the Counts arrive in Prague, and to give him regular reports.³⁵

Upon their arrival in Prague, the Ypsilantis brothers found lodging at the Black Horse inn at Na Příkopě, which now is in the busiest commercial district of Prague. According to the notice filed by the inn (*Billet d’annonce*), completed by the innkeeper Hübsch, the Ypsilantis were to carry on in their journey to Verona and the box stating the length of

³¹ Enepekides, *op.cit.*, 168.

³² SÚA, fond PGT sign. 1819-1848, Kníže Ypsilanti Alexander.

³³ “Georg Laszanes, born in Olympus in Greece, 33 years old, Greek Orthodox religion, single, short, long face, black hair, eyes, and eyebrows, eagle-like nose, small mouth, longish chin, shaven, moustache, speaks Greek, French, German, and Italian.”

³⁴ “Constantin Cavaleropolo, born in Kiev, 55 years old, let, Greek Orthodox religion, single, medium-height, stout, round face, grey hair, black eyes and eyebrows, small nose and mouth, roundish chin, green beard and moustache, speaks Greek and Russian.”

³⁵ SÚA, fond PGT sign. 1819-1848, Kníže Ypsilanti Alexander. Letter of General Gyulai to Chotek dated 24 November 1827.

their stay said: “*ungewisz*,” unknown.³⁶ According to the report of the Prague police agent, Alexandros looked very exhausted and ill. When he got out of the carriage, he was propped up by Lassanis and Kavaleropoulos. Immediately after their arrival, all the passengers ate in their room and Alexandros laid down to rest. Once he woke up, he sent Lassanis to Chotek to request the issuance of passports for their voyage to Verona.³⁷

According to the police agent’s report, the ailing Ypsilantis was visited by two persons the following day. The first one was Prince Dietrichstein, whose visit was “merely a courtesy call.” The Prince invited Alexandros Ypsilantis for lunch but he declined the invitation pointing to his infirm health. The second visitor was the Greek businessman Veldaris, who was a daily guest at the Black Horse. There, he met the younger brothers who passed the time waiting for their passports walking along Na Příkopě and Nová alej streets.³⁸ Then he met Alexandros as well. According to the reports, they “never mentioned politics” during their talk which was probably conducted in Greek. Veldaris talked about his business and family matters, about how he came to Bohemia, about Greeks living in Prague and settled in Bohemia.³⁹

During the brief stay of the Ypsilantis brothers in Prague, Chotek and Hoch, highest representatives of the city, were to set a precise itinerary for their travel from Prague to Vienna and, above all, to make a decision concerning a police escort for the liberated men. This was demanded from them urgently by Police Minister Sedlnitzky, who stated explicitly in his letter to Chotek, dated 27 November, that the person who will accompany the Counts all the way to Vienna is to be chosen

³⁶ Ibid. Notification report of general Chiessa dated 24 November 1827.

³⁷ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 495.

³⁸ Today known as Národní třída (National Avenue).

³⁹ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 495. This report contains an important note about the presence of Greeks in Prague and in Bohemia, because to this day there was no confirmation of the existence of a Greek community in Prague or in Bohemia. It is, however, questionable to what extent we can derive the presence of a larger number of Greeks solely from this report of a police agent.

carefully, be of an appropriate rank and possess the requisite expertise.⁴⁰

The always suspicious and distrusting Sedlnitzky emphasised to Chotek very courteously but clearly that the Counts were released from Terezin on their good word and hence it should be repeated to them that they “do not have permission to leave their future place of residence during an appointed time, or to secretly leave the empire. For reasons of caution, I deem it appropriate for Your Excellency to designate the passports for a specific route via Čáslav (Csslau), Jihlava (Iglau), and Znojmo (Znaim), and to command that the passports be signed and registered at police authorities at the points mentioned above.” Nevertheless, Chotek, aware of Alexandros’ fragile health, did not deem it necessary for the Counts to be accompanied on their voyage by a police agent travelling in his own car.⁴¹

Ypsilantis himself liberated him from this difficult situation. In his letter to Chotek of 26 November concerning the issuance of passports, he also asked him to make his voyage to Vienna easier. Chotek took advantage of the opportunity and proposed to Alexandros that they could be accompanied to Vienna by one of his officers who was to travel to Vienna “for holidays” at that point and who had agreed to take the same route as the Counts and take care of any necessities that may arise. That man was Konstantin Lorensi, the passport officer of the City Governor’s Office who mastered several major foreign languages. Lorensi got instructions from Chotek to keep a journal during the trip, to never leave the Princes, and to accompany them to their place of residence in Vienna. There, he should report to the police commander and hand in his journal. At the same time, Chotek gave a recommendation to Lorensi that gave him the right to seek assistance from both civilian and police authorities along the way. After receiving the passports, Ypsilantis thanked him “first of all for his kindness and helpfulness with which you have decided to take care of and facilitate our trip” and for the escort assigned to them.⁴²

⁴⁰ SÚA, fond PGT sign. 1819-1848, Kníže Ypsilanti Alexander. Letter of Sedlnitzky to Chotek dated 27 November 1827.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Dostál, *op.cit.*, 495.

The Counts and their escorts left Prague on 27 November and, according to the itinerary, they were to reach Vienna a week later. Their first stop was Český Brod (Bohmisch Brod), where they stayed overnight. Then they reached Deutsch Brod.⁴³ In a report which was sent by the local Mayor Joseph Rukutschka to his superiors a day later, he notes that “the counts Alexander, Georgios, and Nikolaos Ypsilantis arrived here yesterday at 6 in the afternoon and were accommodated at the Golden Stag inn, which is also known as the postal corner. [...] On the basis of an order from the District Authority, on the ground floor and on the first floor, in two well-heated rooms, and the necessary facilities were provided to them to ensure their comfort.

The official accompanying the Counts arrived an hour earlier and was provided with support by the author of the letter that was required for his further stay.

The official asked the author of the letter to make sure that the esteemed travellers are not required to pay an excessive price for over-nighting or that prices are not too low. Today, 30 November of this year, at 1 o’clock, the counts left and according to information from the official escorting them, they were satisfied with their accommodation at the inn and with the services, which I obediently report in accordance with the District order of 26 November No. 46.”⁴⁴

Another stop the Ypsilantis brothers made was in Moravské Budějovice. Alexandros was awake for most of the night because he kept coughing. Doses of quinin permitted him to carry on their way to Znojmo (Znaim). According to Lorensi’s report, Alexandros’ condition had worsened so seriously that it ruled out any hope of absolute recovery. A large part of his body was swollen, which he considered to be a warning sign. The Count wished, wrote Lorensi, to see a doctor in Vienna and to stay for about eight days. Then he would like to go to a country with milder weather.⁴⁵

Another report of Lorensi, dated 10 December, i.e., after the trip to Vienna, summarises the trip from Znojmo to Vienna. “The night of 3

⁴³ Today’s Havlíčkův Brod.

⁴⁴ SÚA, fond PGT sign. 1819-1848, Kníže Ypsilanti Alexander. Report of Mayor Joseph Rukutschek of 30 November 1827.

⁴⁵ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 496.

December was far more peaceful for count Alexandros than the previous nights along the way, which gave him significant strength and us some hope. At 10 o'clock, they left for Guntersdorf. Everything took place quickly, at 3 o'clock they arrived at Hollabrunn, where we spent the night. Even though it was not particularly cold, the trip was demanding due to the fresh snow. The trip was very taxing for the count. When we arrived at the inn, the count had to lean on his servant while walking and then we had to carry him to his room."⁴⁶

In the same report, Lorensi proposes that the servant Johann Zberlitzky, who joined them in Čáslav, only accompany them to Vienna due to the demanding service for the eldest of the Ypsilantis brothers. He also reports that the older servant, Konstantinos Kavaleropoulos, who has been the Count's servant for several years, does not want to accompany him all the way to Verona and, with Prince Alexandros' permission, he intends to ask the Russian Ambassador for a passport to travel to Russia, where he had served as a soldier in the Tsar's army for 20 years. Lorensi notes that Alexandros' valet was irreplaceable for Prince Alexandros because he was able to fulfil his every wish.

Furthermore, Lorensi mentions the continuation of their trip via Hollabrunn and Schönborn, to Stockerau. During this section of the trip, most of Alexandros' nights were sleepless and he was in a poor state. In Enzersdorf, Ypsilantis received the much-awaited report from Count Razumovsky, which said that he would have accommodation arranged at the Golden Pear inn (Zur goldenen Birne) in order to have an opportunity to rest. Nevertheless, Lorensi added another warning about the poor condition of the main protagonist of this sad journey: "If he is given peace, he can stay alive for a long period of time, but he could as easily die suddenly. By the way, it is evident that the count is despondent, only from time to time his bitter laughter can be heard, which can be linked to his poor condition. He needs peace but he cannot feel his heart anymore, it is the beginning of the likely end of his life. He is alone in the world, without his own will, without love. His brothers have respect for him, but one cannot feel their internal compassion or tenderness. I do not even want to point to Count Georgios, who responded

⁴⁶ SÚA, fond PGT sign. 1819-1848, Kníže Ypsilanti Alexander. Report of K. Lorensi of 10 December 1827.

coldly to the information that his brother might die during the trip and that the transport of his body through the country is not permitted for many reasons. The prolonged duration of his illness has made him indifferent.”⁴⁷

According to Lorensi, their escort reached Vienna on 5 December.⁴⁸ In his last report, he stated that strong doses of quinine gave a boost of energy to the weakened Alexandros. He also assured his superiors that the troubles of the trip could not outweigh the honour bestowed on him by being entrusted with such a task. Only on 16 December did Sedlnitzky inform Lorensi that his mission was over and he could return to Prague.

The Ypsilantis brothers lodged at the Zur goldenen Birne inn in which Ludwig van Beethoven had played the piano at one time. In that inn, Count Alexandros did not enjoy his freedom very long and died a month and a half later. Cared for by the sisters Konstantina Razumovska and Lulu Thürheim, he exhaled for the last time on 31 January 1828. The latter described the last moments of Prince Alexandros Ypsilantis in her memoirs. She also recorded the famous words of a Turk who, along with three more of his countrymen, watched Alexandros’ remains being placed on a hearse. According to Lassanis, who understood Turkish, this Turk stated “Let us look at this unfortunate fellow. He is the victim of the poor Tsar Alexander, who wanted to do us much evil through the deceased, and then he left him to his own devices.”⁴⁹

The day after New Year’s, and one month before his demise, Ypsilantis wrote from Vienna to the new Russian Tsar Nicholas. This letter constitutes not only a document of “utmost political significance,” in which he explains the motivations that had led him to take over the leadership of the “Society of Friends” (Filiki Etaireia) and of the Greek Uprising, but also very personal testimony, from which we can draw certain conclusion about Ypsilantis’ social status, his political opinions, and about the environment that had formed his personality. It also gives very important testimony of his controversial relationship with his compatriot Ioannis Kapodistrias, who in 1821, as the Tsar’s Minister of For-

⁴⁷ Ibid. See also Enepekides, *op.cit.*, 170.

⁴⁸ Professor Enepekides, probably erroneously, mentions 9 December.

⁴⁹ Thürheim, *op.cit.*, 289.

eign Affairs, delivered to him a condemnation of his uprising in the Danubian Principalities, but at the time when Ypsilantis was writing this letter, Kapodistrias was sailing to Greece to become its first Governor.⁵⁰

In his letter to Tsar Nicholas, Ypsilantis expresses his obligation to thank the Tsar for his liberation after six years of imprisonment. He also informed the Tsar that his liberation was “incomplete because the government of Austria demanded, and obliged me to swear, that I will not leave its territory.” Furthermore, Ypsilantis stresses that he only accepted this humiliating condition not only because of the lamentable state of his health but, above all, on the hope that he would enjoy strong protection from the Tsar. In a very dramatic tone, he writes that he prefers death to potential abandonment and indifference on the part of His Majesty.⁵¹

Furthermore, Ypsilantis states in this informal political testament that in 1820 he took over the leadership of the revolutionary association “Society of Friends,” with the full awareness and consent of Kapodistrias and the former Tsar, Alexander. He refers to the talks that he had had with the previous Tsar Alexander in St. Petersburg and Tsarskoye Selo about the liberation of the Greeks, where he “always spoke very generally, but with such kindness that raised stronger hopes in me and converted them into a more certain future.” Under the influence of this “prophetic echo that resounded in all corners of Greece,” he himself concluded that he had to light the fire of revolution to fight for the freedom of the Greeks.

Concerning the accusation that he started the uprising in Danubia prematurely, Ypsilantis states that he did this under the pressure of the excitement that was caused among his countrymen by the revolution in Naples and Piedmont and of the favourable conditions established by the war between the Porta (the Ottoman government) and the rebellious Ali Pasha of Ioannina, but also because of the risk of disclosure of the revolutionary plans to the Sultan. In order to avert potential preventive measures by the Ottoman government, he decided to launch an uprising

⁵⁰ Ioannis Kapodistrias arrived by boat in Nafplion, the first capital of the semi-independent Greece, on 18 January 1828.

⁵¹ Enepekides, *op.cit.*, 176-80.

in the Danubian Principalities to give other parts of Greece more time to better prepare for the revolution.

At the end of his letter, Ypsilantis calls “fraud and unheard-of cheek” the initiative of the Austrian diplomacy to show to Tsar Alexander the “insidious correspondence” that Ypsilantis allegedly exchanged with “Parisian liberals.” On the basis of this false information, the Russian Tsar “surprised us all when he left me exposed to the hatred of Austria and the Nation exposed to Turkish revenge.” As an old soldier, but also a man who has experienced many years of hardship, Ypsilantis turned to the Tsar as a “strong image of God on Earth” to plea for justice and protection.⁵²

Professor Enepekides refers to the letter as a “document of human tragedy and sincere testimony of a departing hero.” Neither six years of imprisonment nor the very fact that he was facing death could force Ypsilantis to give up his romantic, politically unrealistic, and illusory ideas that had accompanied him and to which he remained faithful his whole life. Historian Thanos Veremis aptly characterised him as a “courageous, romantic, and honest man, but without decent political thought.”⁵³ Countess Lulu Thürheim, also an Ypsilantis’ admirer, saw Alexandros as the victim of his own illusions and kept, in a note that she left in the manuscript of her memoirs, the inscription on the Prince’s tomb: “Unhappy in his hopes—noble in his willpower—great in self-control. Deceived—unrecognised—mourned.”⁵⁴

Even though Ypsilantis had been excommunicated by the Patriarchate of Constantinople for his revolutionary activities, the last farewell took place in Vienna’s Orthodox church of St. George. He was first buried at the Sankt Marxer cemetery. The sad news of Alexandros’ death was relayed to his brother Demetrios, who was fighting in Greece at that time, by Nikolaos and Georgios. In a short letter Nikolaos wrote that “His end was angelic, his suffering martyrlike.” He also reported that, in line with Alexandros’ last wish, his heart was removed to be transferred at a later point and laid to rest in his homeland which he

⁵² Enepekides, *op.cit.*, 176-80.

⁵³ Veremis, «Αλήθειες και ψέματα».

⁵⁴ Dostál, *op.cit.*, 497.

himself had not seen.⁵⁵ Alexandros' heart was only transferred to Greece in 1843. Today, it is deposited in a gold-plated lekythos in the historical city of Mesolongi.⁵⁶

To the extent that we are able to reconstruct the last days of Alexandros Ypsilantis' life, we undoubtedly owe this not as much to the famous thoroughness of Austria's bureaucracy as to the prejudiced hypocrisy and excessive worries of the police apparatus of Chancellor Metternich. Thanks to prior work on material from archives, in particular those in Vienna but in part also the ones in Prague, we have detailed information about the reactionary nature of Metternich's regime and its important, as well as the less important, representatives, but also about Ypsilantis himself, his era, and the character of the people around him. It confirms the transient nature not only of his era, but also of himself. Flourishing romanticism and lyrical ideas about freedom and obligation to one's homeland affected a large part of European, primarily Russian, aristocracy of the era in which Ypsilantis grew up and by whose values he was influenced. His case also shows that it is nearly impossible for a person to entirely free himself of the factors that have played an integral role in forming his personality and identity.

His last letter to Tsar Nicholas speaks not only of his intentions, but also of the naive and paradoxical nature of his initiative to take over the leadership of a conspiratorial organisation that had very little in common with his environment. The revolutionary "Society of Friends" aimed to depose the Sultan and decompose the gigantic Ottoman Empire. It is hard to imagine with what Alexandros Ypsilantis would have replaced it had his "primitive uprising"⁵⁷ in the Danubian Principalities succeeded and what role he would have played in the first independent Greek state had he not died prematurely in Vienna. It is hard to evaluate whether he would have been a better ruler for the Greeks than his pragmatic and realistic "rival" Ioannis Kapodistrias. But because these ques-

⁵⁵ Enepekides, *op.cit.*, 171-2.

⁵⁶ On the voyage of Ypsilantis' heart, see Ilias Pantazis, «Η καρδιά του Υψηλάντη» (The Heart of Ypsilantis), *Athinea*, (27-4-2017), <https://a8inea.com/ypsilantis/?fbclid=IwAR24Pegz9aemrrgGIRfBIBlnNLhomSaSRTHu0dxfyMwVYejNtu8CYgLuutQ>.

⁵⁷ Here I refer to the term used by Spyros Asdrachas, *Πρωτόγονη Επανάσταση* (Primitive Revolution) (Patra: Elliniko Anoichto Panepistimio, 2019).

tions take us to the uncertain fields of “if history,” we will limit ourselves to the positive role that this romantic hero played in sparking up a revolutionary movement with uncertain aims that eventually led to the formation of the first independent state of the Greeks, which, at the same time, was the first independent nation-state in the Eastern Mediterranean and all the Balkans.

*Ioannis S. Papafloratos**

English Plans about Kefallinia at the Beginning of the 20th Century

The geostrategic importance of the Ionian Islands has been known since antiquity. In the course of history, many conquerors passed through these islands. The last, and by many the most cruel, were the British. They annexed the Ionian Islands (for their own reasons) to Greece in 1864. However, from the beginning of the 20th century, other thoughts began to be expressed in London. The British government, however, could not reclaim all the islands. Therefore, it focused its attention on Kefallinia. This article will show how close the British came to achieving their goal.

From the middle of the 19th century, London considered that the strategic importance of the Ionian Islands had diminished, as Great Britain gave more weight to Malta, while it penetrated more and more into Egypt. The road to India seemed secured, while the occupation of the Ionian Islands absorbed a lot of funds, as their inhabitants did not have friendly feelings towards the new rulers. In the Greek kingdom, King Otto had proved to be an unpleasant surprise to British interests. His attitude during the Crimean War, and in many other cases (i.e., the Pacifico incident),¹

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¹ The incident took place in Athens, on the feast of Easter, in 1847. The British citizen (of the Jewish religion) David Pacifico claimed that his house was severely damaged during the ritual of “the burning of Judas” and asked the diplomatic support of the British Government. London demanded excessive compensation, but Athens refused until justice ruled on the matter. The latter did not confirm Pacifico’s allegations. The British government was outraged and –in collaboration with the corresponding French– imposed a naval blockade of Piraeus for 42 days (in January 1850). Finally, the case was settled amicably next July. Pacifico received only 3,750 drachmas (instead of the 886,736 drachmas he requested) and left Greece. For more details, see Dionysios Kokinos, *Ιστορία της Νεωτέρας Ελλάδος* (History of Modern Greece) (Athens: Melissa,

had clearly shown that he was an independent monarch who was not easily manipulated and did not discipline the advice and “persuasions” of foreigners. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, the dissolution of the three parties (pro-English, pro-French, and pro-Russian) had dealt a severe blow to British influence in Greece. However, London, through its representatives and numerous agents, made every effort to reduce the prestige of the King of Greece, whom the British considered an instrument of the Russians and in some cases of the Austrians.

After several years, the British efforts succeeded and the fragmented opposition coordinated its actions, resulting in the outbreak of successive uprisings. Eventually, King Otto resigned voluntarily after the emergence of another movement in October 1862 and the question of electing a new monarch arose. The British knew that most Ionians (with the sole exception of some Kefallinian radicals) did not accept anything less than their unconditional union with Greece. They had also expressed their will to the British government envoy William Ewart Gladstone, who had visited the islands in 1859. After the failure to establish an “Ionian Hegemony” (which would include Thessaly, as well) with Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria, as ruler, London changed its policy, without deviating from the goal of increasing its influence in Greece. To this end, circles of the British government approached the Greek envoy to London, Charilaos Trikoupi, and explained to him their intention to return the Ionian Islands to Greece on the condition of electing a ruler they liked. Trikoupi informed Athens, which was initially positive of the idea. However, this soon changed, as the British government set as an inviolable condition the neutralization of the Ionian Islands and the demolition of the medieval fortresses of Corfu.

On November 5, 1863, the Treaty of London was signed, according to which the consent of the three protecting Powers (France, Great Britain, and Russia) was given to unite the “Ionian State” with the Kingdom of

1970), v. I, 512-5; Spyros Markezinis, *Πολιτική ιστορία της νεωτέρας Ελλάδος* (Political History of Modern Greece) (Athens: Papyros, 1966), v. III, 26-7.

Greece. On November 14, 1863, a new treaty was signed, establishing the permanent neutrality of the islands and stating that “no naval or military armed forces would ever be allowed to concentrate or remain on the island’s territory or within its territorial waters, except for a few men who are absolutely necessary to maintain public order and ensure the collection of state taxes.”² This term provoked the reaction of the Greek government, which complained that it constituted an immediate restriction of its sovereign rights. This reaction of Athens resulted in the amendment of the aforementioned treaty through a protocol, which was signed in London on January 25, 1864. This text was included in the treaty of March 29, of the same year, among the three protecting Powers and Greece with the consent of Austria and Prussia and limited neutrality only to Corfu and Paxoi islands.³

In the coming years, London sought to strengthen its position in the Middle East. In addition to securing the road to India, the British sought to limit in any way the development of Russian power in the context of the so-called “The Big Game.” Anglo-Russian rivalry spread throughout the East during the last decades of the 19th century. To this end, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire became a dominant dogma of British foreign policy. However, this territorial integrity was seriously jeopardized after the defeat of the troops of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. In fact, the Russians managed to impose their terms on the panicked Sultan, during the negotiations that began to end the war. These took place in Agios Stefanos (St. Stephen), a suburb of Constantinople, under the barrels of Russian weapons. The development of military operations was such that it made it very difficult for the Great Powers to intervene in favor of the Turks. The Russians tried to speed up the signing of the treaty to prevent such an intervention, as the

² St. Seferiadis, *Μαθήματα Διεθνούς Δημόσιου Δικαίου* (Courses of Public International Law) (Athens: Makris, 1925), v. I, 243.

³ Seferiadis, *op.cit.*, 244; St. Nicoglou, *L'affaire de Corfu et la Société des Nations* (Dijon: Librairie Générale Felix Ray, 1925), 43-4.

British had begun to move actively in the background. Finally, on February 19/March 3, the treaty of Agios Stefanos was signed, the terms of which provoked the reaction of London and Vienna.

The actions of the governments of the two Great Powers led to the convening of the Berlin Conference with the aim of revising the aforementioned treaty. Behind the scenes, the British began negotiations with the Russians to resolve the issue. At the same time, London tried to take advantage of the negotiations with St. Petersburg to reap the benefits of the Sultan. The British diplomacy took care to inform its Turkish counterpart “about the intense struggle it was waging with the Russians in order to revise the Treaty of St. Stephen and to preserve the integrity of the Sultan's territory.” The British also expressed their desire to fight in the interests of the Turks at the next congress. However, they demanded in return to rent of Cyprus. Abdul Hamid was found under pressure, and he was forced to retreat. The price was later set at 92,799, 11 shillings and 3 pence. London's original intention was to turn the island into an arsenal. As a result, the vast majority of administration officials were military officers during the early stages of the occupation. Later, however, the British governments changed their mind, with the result that the island was considered by many Prime Ministers to be of minor importance to British interests, in the early 20th century.

In September 1911, the Italo-Turkish war broke out. Although London declared its neutrality as the two countries were considered friendly to Germany, behind the scenes it tried to use Rome as a counterweight to limit the influence of its ally the French government! Soon, however, the British realized that the Italians were not willing to play their game but aimed solely at serving their own interests. This was demonstrated by the occupation of the Dodecanese the following spring. The possible settlement of the Italians in the region posed a potential threat to British interests, as Italy was linked by alliances with both Austria-Hungary and Germany. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Edward Grey,⁴ expressed

⁴ His full name was Edward Grey, First Viscount Grey of Fallodon.

his displeasure to the Italian ambassador in London and recommended that a peace treaty with the Turks should be signed as soon as possible. Indeed, it was signed in Ouchy, Switzerland, on October 15, 1912. The text stated, among other things, that Rome would temporarily occupy the islands until the last Ottoman soldier left the Cyrenaica.

Three days after the signing of this treaty, the First Balkan War broke out. The Italians used the breaking of the war as a pretext in order to cancel their departure from the Dodecanese, causing the intense indignation of their inhabitants. The fears and worries of the latter could not be amused even by the Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, who in his repeated statements once declared that “the occupation of the islands was not a goal but a means; Italy will return them to Europe who will solve the problem as best it can” and sometimes that “Italy never thought of annexing the islands, creating conditions of redemption contrary to its traditions. They were occupied for purely military reasons. [...] It does not occupy these islands on behalf of the Ottoman Empire and has not made any relevant secret commitment.” His remarks, however, did not convince the British, who sought a counterweight to the region. Soon, they decided to approach Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, whose troops had already scored some impressive victories over the Ottomans.

In November 1912, the first hints were made by Finance Minister David Lloyd George to his friend, the young lawyer John Stavridis. The latter was a high-ranking diplomat at the Greek embassy in London and a friend of Venizelos. The British proposed the provision of port facilities to their fleet in Kefallinia in exchange for the concession of Cyprus to Greece. Most of the information about this “strange” case is contained in Stavridis’ diary. There, he briefly recorded various important events of his life in London, as he was associated with many important figures of British high society. Among his friends were many politicians and diplomats, such as Lloyd George, who had been Treasury Secretary since 1908. On November 18, 1912, the British politician reported that First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Spencer Churchill was looking for a port on the Adriatic to be used as a naval base. After all, at that time, Italy was

officially an ally of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Therefore, the Adriatic would be a blocked naval zone for the British navy in the event of war. In addition, Rome would acquire the first dreadnought type vessel very soon, while Vienna would do the same by early 1915. The aforementioned events would dramatically change the balance of power in the Mediterranean Sea, where the Austrian fleet had already made its appearance on the occasion of the Balkan Wars.

Initially, Lloyd George spoke of Corfu, ignoring the special regime under which this island was found at that period. Stavridis hurried to point this out to him, a fact that made the British minister more careful. The latter wanted to know whether Athens was willing to discuss the whole issue and he received the answer that it depended on the price offered by the British. To this day, it remains unclear whether Stavridis was authorized to go so far. However, Lloyd George noted that the idea belonged to Churchill and he simply agreed with it, indicating that he did not want to be committed. However, the next moment he went a step further, talking about the concession of Cyprus in exchange for one of the islands of the Ionian Sea. At that time, Stavridis realized the seriousness of the issue and he was reluctant to convey the British proposals to the Greek government.⁵

Churchill took over as First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911. Inspired by strong anti-German sentiment, he considered Berlin his country's primary enemy. Great Britain had to find a way to stop Germany's naval program, the full implementation of which could threaten its sovereignty at sea. So, it had to cooperate with any country that would oppose German aspirations, even if it was (the eternal enemy) France or (the constant rival in the East) Russia. The British politician was not afraid of a conflict in the Atlantic or on the high seas, but if this were to happen in the Mediterranean, the situation would be complicated, as British power might not be enough. As a result, the cooperation with the other major naval pow-

⁵ John Koumoulides, "Cyprus, the Enosis Struggle and Greece: Sir John Stavridis and the British Offer of 1915," *Journal of Modern Hellenism* 4 (1987): 101.

er in the Mediterranean Sea, France, became imperative.⁶ Finally, an informal naval alliance was concluded between the two countries in 1912.⁷

On the afternoon of November 18, Lloyd George arranged for Stavridis to meet with Churchill at the House of Commons. Earlier, the First Lord of the Admiralty spoke with his colleague in Finance and told him about his plans (which were approved by Paris) to block the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets in the Adriatic in a possible war. A necessary condition was the securing of a port, in which ten (10) to twenty (20) torpedo boats and destroyers as well as some submarines would be chartered. Finally, Churchill mentioned the port of Argostoli in Kefallinia.⁸

He then reiterated his views briefly to the Greek diplomat, who stressed that it was not a concession to the island. “Note what I will tell you: I am not talking about a transfer or even a lease, and not a single resident will change nationality or homeland, while the flag will remain Greek. What I am asking for is use and only use, that is, whenever the British government deems it necessary in time of war or peace, to have the right to use Argostoli as a port, as a naval base for its fleet, in whatever way he considers it better,” he stated characteristically. Opinions differ on whether the British minister spoke about the construction of a naval base, as Venizelos argued (see below) or not. However, it is an indisputable fact that some fortification works would be carried out, the cost of which would be borne by London. Finally, Churchill insisted on the secrecy of the negotiations.

Stavridis hastened to assure his interlocutor of the consent of the Greek government and also asked for London’s support at the forthcoming Peace

⁶ It must be mentioned that these views were shared by other British leaders, e.g., the ambassador to Madrid (and later to Vienna) Sir Maurice William Ernest de Bunsen had stated: “Malta has old fortifications unable to withstand modern weapons.” See Ed. Driault–M. Lheritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours* (Paris: 1925-6), 67-8.

⁷ Randolph Churchill, *Winston Churchill, The Young Statesman, 1901-1914* (London: Heinemann, 1967), 590, 597.

⁸ M. Llewellyn-Smith, *To όραμα της Ιωνίας* (The Ionian Vision) (Athens: MIET, 2002), 52.

Conference (especially on the issues of Thessaloniki and the Aegean islands). At that time, Lloyd George intervened, saying that it would be difficult for the British to support diplomatically the aspirations of Athens, because the Russians were opposed to the concession to Greece of the islands at the exit of the Dardanelles. He asked Churchill how he would justify the transfer of Cyprus to the public, as long as everyone's intention was to keep strict secrecy. It was well known that London did not give the slightest thing in return. Stavridis recalled the past of the Ionian Islands, but the British Minister of Finance replied that the times were no longer the same. Churchill did not seem to worry about public opinion and tried to lighten the atmosphere, recounting memories from his visit to Cyprus. He added the characteristic phrase that if it were up to him, he would take care to administer justice, implying the union of Cyprus with the Greek kingdom. It should be noted that both British politicians demanded the personal commitment of the Greek diplomat to maintain absolute secrecy on the matter, at least until the Prime Minister Henry Herbert Asquith and their Foreign Minister Lord Grey.

The latter two agreed to continue the negotiations and Lloyd George asked Stavridis to wait until all the details were settled. Until then, Venizelos should not have been informed either! After the end of the hostilities of the First Balkan War, the Greek diplomat should go to Athens and inform the Greek Prime Minister personally. Stavridis agreed and proposed the signing of a more general alliance treaty. After all, just a few weeks ago the Greek fleet had liberated the Aegean islands, one of which could be an anchorage for the British fleet. Lloyd George refrained from committing himself, promising to pass the proposal on to officials. However, he reiterated that everything had to be covered by a veil of secrecy.

On November 20th, 1912, Bulgaria (on behalf of both Montenegro and Serbia) signed an armistice with the Ottomans. On the contrary, Greece (at the insistence of the Commander in Chief Prince Constantine) refused to sign the text, but agreed to send representatives to London, where negotiations would be held for the final settlement of the issue. The British sought to transfer of the Greek Prime Minister himself to their capital ap-

parently to start direct negotiations on this issue. They made sure to make it clear to both the ambassador of Greece Ioannis Gennadios and Stavridis. In fact, on November 29, the British Minister of Finance told the latter that Venizelos' arrival in London, where the fate of the Balkans would be decided, was a matter of life or death for Athens. There, in essence, two conferences would take place, one among the belligerents and one of the Great Powers, which formed the Conference of Ambassadors.⁹

On December 10, London changed its policy slightly as Lloyd George informed his interlocutor that Asquith, Lord Grey, and Churchill agreed with the master plan but did not want to start negotiations before the end of the work of the two aforementioned conferences. In addition, they did not want to have contact with the Greek Prime Minister on this issue and referred him to the Minister of Colonies, Lewis Vernon Harcourt, First Viscount Harcourt on the pretext that Cyprus fell within his remit. However, the negotiation for the mainland was one part of the agreement. There was also the part of Kefallinia, for which the British politician made no mention. Finally, an appointment was settled between Venizelos and Harcourt for December 13.

Venizelos arrived in London the day before and, of course, he refused to meet with the Minister of Colonies. It was to be preceded by a meeting with his British colleague, or at least with Lord Grey. As a result, the appointment with Harcourt was canceled. However, the Prime Minister of Greece intended to decouple the issue of Kefallinia from the conclusion of a wider Greek-British agreement. On December 16, a breakfast took place at the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, at 11 Downing Street. Venizelos, Lloyd George and Stavridis sat in it. From the beginning, the good atmosphere was established, as the Greek politician expressed himself in very warm words for the British. However, the British minister was more cautious, citing the difficulties that would arise with the opposition and public opinion in England if they kept the horse trading for Ar-

⁹ The Conference of Ambassadors existed since the 19th century and was a commonly accepted diplomatic forum for discussing and resolving any disputes. See G. Pink, "The Conference of Ambassadors," *Geneva Studies* 12, no. 4-5 (February 1942): 207-46.

gostoli secret. Venizelos agreed not to make the case public, provided there were clear results while he was still in London, while Lloyd George made it clear that British policy was to avoid a continental commitment. Nevertheless, a bilateral agreement could be concluded, just as it had been done with France. Venizelos agreed and they decided to continue the talks the next day.

It must be mentioned that Churchill and Prince Louis Alexander von Battenberg¹⁰ also attended the meeting. Churchill developed the plan for Argostoli, emphasizing the geostrategic importance of his port. Venizelos had no objections, but they had to look at the matter from the point of view of International Law. The British proposed the publication of the issue, a proposal which the Cretan politician accepted on the condition that the signing of a general agreement would follow. It was clear that the Greek side changed its position, trying to connect the two issues, a fact that was not accepted by the British. Churchill politely stated that he was willing to discuss this issue as well, provided that he would not be confused with the issue of Argostoli. The first concerned the other two members of the Triple Entente (i.e., France and Russia), according to the British minister, while the issue of Argostoli was a strictly Greek-British affair. Venizelos stepped down and Churchill pledged to discuss the issue with his colleagues at the Council of Ministers. Although the meeting was held in a good atmosphere, the silence of the other British officials made an impression.

Nevertheless, the Greek government did not weigh this parameter properly and was left overwhelmed by excessive optimism. Churchill realized the Greek “euphoria” and hurried to “advise” the Greek Prime Minister to cancel the order of a large battleship at the German shipyards Vulcan. At the same time, the British politician did not stop praising the importance of the Greek navy and overemphasizing the role he could play on the side of the Anglo-French if the latter were involved in a major conflict.

¹⁰ Later he changed his name in Louis Alexander Mountbatten.

On January 5, 1913, the next meeting between Lloyd George, Venizelos, and Stavridis took place. The British minister said that Churchill was working on a broader plan, which would be considered by the French. Although he did not know the details, he tried to obtain the permission of the Prime Minister of Greece in order to discuss this during the forthcoming visit of the First Lord of the Admiralty to Paris. He vaguely spoke of a general alliance, which would change the balance in the Mediterranean. In essence, however, he was not able to show anything tangible to his Greek interlocutors. Therefore, this meeting was also fruitless.

Two days later, the talks resumed in the presence of Churchill and Prince von Battenberg. In it, it was found that the plan that had been elaborated by the British First Lord of the Admiralty did not concern the case of Kefallinia, but the Greek Navy! This fact probably angered the Greek officials. However, it is certain that the discussion soon focused on the issue of Argostoli and the conciliation with France. Churchill expressed his confidence in the positive response of the French to the Greek alliance with the Triple Entente. He went on to say, however, that both Asquith and Lord Grey were now in favor of making the issue public in order to limit reactions to the handover of Cyprus. This publication was to take place after a reasonable period of time after the signing of the treaty, which would end the war between the four Christian states of the Balkans with the Sultan. Venizelos, fearing that this argument could lead to the collapse of the whole negotiation, agreed, but stressed that this period should not exceed three or at most four months.¹¹

In the next weeks, everyone's attention was focused on the negotiations for the end of the First Balkan War. During this period, Churchill traveled to the French capital, where he had contacts both with his French colleague Théophile Delcassé and with other French officials. On January 29, the Anglo-Greek talks resumed, but Churchill had changed his mind on the matter. The issue of the concession of Argostoli had to be part of a

¹¹ Koumoulides, *op.cit.*, 112.

more general agreement, which would be obvious, but would also contain some secret articles.¹²

It was obvious that the French had made a decisive contribution to the change of policy on the part of the British politician, who hastened to amuse the impressions, noting that Paris was willing to accept Greece's accession to the Triple Entente. In addition, he presented the Greek Prime Minister with a copy of the memorandum, which he had given to the French regarding the future role of the Greek navy. In fact, fearing a possible leak of the document, he had removed the indication that it came from the British Admiralty. He called on Venizelos to exert all his influence on the military for its faithful implementation. Apparently, he foresaw the reactions that would erupt in Athens, if a shipbuilding program of "small and flexible boats" was implemented, that is, the previous dogma of acquiring warships was abandoned (on which the "Averoff" buying was based).

Venizelos did not react and stated that he had to inform King George about the results of the talks. Churchill, however, "advised" that the monarch not know many details, and the ministers not to be informed at all! Venizelos noticed that the King of Greece was extremely confidential but eventually withdrew. He would tell George exactly what Churchill had recommended to him, that is, "that various informal discussions had taken place, that a basis for a possible future settlement had been found, and that after the signing of the peace the negotiations might resume." During his departure, Venizelos heartily thanked Stavridis for everything he had done.

Stavridis noted in his Diary that the Cretan politician "felt happy at the thought that our negotiations would result in a settlement with England and possibly France, and that the future of Greece would be very different from the past [...] there would be such a force in the East that no one could ignore. Referring to Lloyd George, he compared him to the proph-

¹² G. Pikros, *Ο Βενιζέλος και το Κυπριακό* (Venizelos and the Cyprus Question) (Athens: Philippotis, 1980), 7.

ets of the Old Testament and expressed his great admiration for his extraordinary abilities and for his understanding of people and events.”¹³

Two days later, Venizelos met Lord Grey, personally. The latter unequivocally stated that no discussion of “future political arrangements” could take place as long as the conflict in the Balkans lasted. He was quite vague as to what he said, simply focusing on the need to maintain an excellent climate in bilateral Anglo-Greek relations. It is written that that “his (Lord Grey’s) aspirations in Turkey, which he sought to keep away from Germany, albeit neutral, would hardly be reconciled with maintaining excellent relations with Greece.”¹⁴

Venizelos returned to Greece full of enthusiasm. He informed King George and later Prince Constantine, when the latter ascended the throne after the assassination of his father (on March 5, 1913). Much later (in November 1931), the Cretan politician described what was happening in the English capital in a memorandum to his then (i.e., in 1931) British ambassador to Athens Sir Patrick William Maule Ramsay. In it, he stated that by accepting the British plan, he had stated to his interlocutors that “in case of a general European war, if I am the governor of Greece, I will place it on the side of Great Britain.” He added that, “in exchange for Cyprus, I prefer to cede the port of Argostoli to English sovereignty in time of peace, subject to the sovereignty in favor of Greece, the sovereignty of the cities within the port and the right of free use of the port in time of peace.”¹⁵

Ramsay himself, referring to his superiors as “Private and Secret,” wrote, among other things, that the proposal came from Lloyd George. The Greek Prime Minister accepted it: “[...] because a war for England in the Mediterranean would probably mean a more general war, in which Greece would definitely be involved on the side of England [...] England would definitely use all the Greek ports [...]” However, Ramsay noted that Lord Grey was unaware of the case! During the same period, an in-

¹³ Llewellyn-Smith, *op.cit.*, 59-60.

¹⁴ Pikros, *op.cit.*, 8.

¹⁵ Pikros, *op.cit.*, 9.

ternal search was carried out in the archives of the British Foreign Office. Unfortunately, no document was found in this case. In fact, a relevant report states that no evidence was found to certify that Cyprus had ever been offered to Greece in exchange for port facilities in Argostoli! Below, the author of the document remarked that “whenever the use of this naval base was required, it was done without the permission of the Greek state.”

In the next months, the issue faded. The Balkans made peace after the end of the Second Balkan War, during which Greece with Serbia (mainly) and Romania with the Ottoman Empire (secondarily) defeated Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the Aegean islands (and Mount Athos) were not definitively awarded in Greece, as the Treaty of London (of May 30, 1913) stipulated that it was up to the Great Powers to decide their future.

Venizelos returned to London in January 1914. On January 20, he instructed Stavridis to ask Lloyd George if a conversation with Lord Grey on the Kefallinia affair was possible. Lloyd George said he had no objections but considered that the culmination of the crisis in Ireland was not a good time for the plan to succeed. Nevertheless, the Greek Prime Minister raised the issue with the British Foreign Secretary during their meeting the next day. To his great surprise, the head of British diplomacy was completely negative because he “considered it premature to consider a separate settlement of this kind between the Powers.” Venizelos at least asked for the guarantee of the Great Powers for the Greek occupation of the Aegean islands, but Lord Grey refused again, recommending him to go to Berlin!

The Cretan politician was surprised and tried to investigate the causes of the change in English policy. The opportunity was given to a new meeting between the old negotiators, namely Churchill, Lloyd George, Prince von Battenberg and Stavridis, which took place on January 22, 1914. In it, he mentioned his discussion with Lord Grey noting that he had not raised the issue of Argostoli but only that of Greece’s participation in the Triple Entente. He reiterated that he was in London to negotiate the terms of the agreement. However, both Lloyd George and Churchill considered any discussion on this issue unnecessary. “However, the

meetings that had taken place had allowed them to get to know each other better, to gain trust in each other, paving the way for further negotiations as soon as the Irish problem was settled. Churchill proposed to meet again in July or August, and Venizelos promised to return to complete the negotiations.”¹⁶

It was an obvious excuse for the British leaders to express the wreckage of the plan. Unfortunately, neither Venizelos nor Stavridis understood that this was a personal idea of Churchill, which was overtaken by the current political news, rather than an official British initiative. Only if circumstances made it absolutely necessary to serve the interests of Great Britain would it be possible. Moral doubts played a much lower role. However, the Greek Prime Minister refused to accept the failure of this plan and later blamed Foreign Minister George Strait, who was considered pro-German and did not want Greece to be so closely associated with Great Britain.

However, a sober assessment of the facts proves that this proposal could be detrimental to Greece, as claimed by the then supporter of the Greek Prime Minister Colonel Ioannis Metaxas, who was informed of the content of the negotiations by Venizelos himself.

“Suddenly he asks me: ‘What would you say, Mr. Metaxas, if we ceded Kefallinia as a naval base to the English?’

I replied: ‘Do you not mean, of course, Mr. President, to cede the island, because that would be monstrous, but to give the English the right to have a naval base in Kefallinia?’

He hastened to answer: ‘Of course not to give the island. Although, Mr. Metaxas, you know, they would be willing to exchange it with Cyprus’ and they looked at me questioningly and subtly.

I felt the indignation boiling inside me. I replied: ‘Concession of a Greek island, in exchange for any consideration, is not possible. As for the right to set up a naval base there, I can’t understand that either. If we are

¹⁶ G.B. Gooch–H.W.W. Temperley (ed.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1914-1918* (London: 1926-30), v. II, 85.

allies with the British, they can use, as allies, all our naval bases. If they want to have a naval base in Kefallinia, let them give us the financial means to build it ourselves, as our own, so they can use it as well.'

He hurried to tell me that this would be a good solution. However, I didn't feel him completely honest with me when he assured that he had rejected any idea of concession or exchange of Kefallinia."¹⁷

Nowadays, very few people are aware of this case. The First World War and his consequences in the Greek political scene (the so-called "national division") pushed it into the oblivion of history. Considering what the Greek Cypriots suffered in the next decades, one might believe that this was another lost opportunity for a fair settlement of the Cyprus problem. However, the plan was not carried out under the responsibility of the British. In 1914, it is sure that the conditions had not been matured and the invocation of the Irish problem was merely an excuse from the British side. Nevertheless, Venizelos wrote that "unfortunately the Great War broke out before the conference was adjured and time was given for the said concession to take place."¹⁸ However, the fate of the inhabitants of Kefallinia remains doubtful, if the British settled again on their island, just 49 years after their departure from it.

¹⁷ Ioan. Metaxas, *Ημερολόγιον* (Diary) (Athens: Govostis, 1910-14), v. III, 234.

¹⁸ Kon. Svolopoulos, «Η στάση της ελληνικής κυβερνήσεως κατά την κυπριακή κρίση του 1931» (The Position of the Greek Government during the 1931 Cyprus Crisis), *Επιστημονική Επετηρίς Παντείου Ανωτάτης Σχολής Πολιτικών Επιστημών* (1978): 482-511, 505.

*Ioannis S. Papafloratos**

English Plans about Kefallinia at the Beginning of the 20th Century

The geostrategic importance of the Ionian Islands has been known since antiquity. In the course of history, many conquerors passed through these islands. The last, and by many the most cruel, were the British. They annexed the Ionian Islands (for their own reasons) to Greece in 1864. However, from the beginning of the 20th century, other thoughts began to be expressed in London. The British government, however, could not reclaim all the islands. Therefore, it focused its attention on Kefallinia. This article will show how close the British came to achieving their goal.

From the middle of the 19th century, London considered that the strategic importance of the Ionian Islands had diminished, as Great Britain gave more weight to Malta, while it penetrated more and more into Egypt. The road to India seemed secured, while the occupation of the Ionian Islands absorbed a lot of funds, as their inhabitants did not have friendly feelings towards the new rulers. In the Greek kingdom, King Otto had proved to be an unpleasant surprise to British interests. His attitude during the Crimean War, and in many other cases (i.e., the Pacifico incident),¹

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¹ The incident took place in Athens, on the feast of Easter, in 1847. The British citizen (of the Jewish religion) David Pacifico claimed that his house was severely damaged during the ritual of “the burning of Judas” and asked the diplomatic support of the British Government. London demanded excessive compensation, but Athens refused until justice ruled on the matter. The latter did not confirm Pacifico’s allegations. The British government was outraged and –in collaboration with the corresponding French– imposed a naval blockade of Piraeus for 42 days (in January 1850). Finally, the case was settled amicably next July. Pacifico received only 3,750 drachmas (instead of the 886,736 drachmas he requested) and left Greece. For more details, see Dionysios Kokinos, *Ιστορία της Νεωτέρας Ελλάδος* (History of Modern Greece) (Athens: Melissa,

had clearly shown that he was an independent monarch who was not easily manipulated and did not discipline the advice and “persuasions” of foreigners. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, the dissolution of the three parties (pro-English, pro-French, and pro-Russian) had dealt a severe blow to British influence in Greece. However, London, through its representatives and numerous agents, made every effort to reduce the prestige of the King of Greece, whom the British considered an instrument of the Russians and in some cases of the Austrians.

After several years, the British efforts succeeded and the fragmented opposition coordinated its actions, resulting in the outbreak of successive uprisings. Eventually, King Otto resigned voluntarily after the emergence of another movement in October 1862 and the question of electing a new monarch arose. The British knew that most Ionians (with the sole exception of some Kefallinian radicals) did not accept anything less than their unconditional union with Greece. They had also expressed their will to the British government envoy William Ewart Gladstone, who had visited the islands in 1859. After the failure to establish an “Ionian Hegemony” (which would include Thessaly, as well) with Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria, as ruler, London changed its policy, without deviating from the goal of increasing its influence in Greece. To this end, circles of the British government approached the Greek envoy to London, Charilaos Trikoupi, and explained to him their intention to return the Ionian Islands to Greece on the condition of electing a ruler they liked. Trikoupi informed Athens, which was initially positive of the idea. However, this soon changed, as the British government set as an inviolable condition the neutralization of the Ionian Islands and the demolition of the medieval fortresses of Corfu.

On November 5, 1863, the Treaty of London was signed, according to which the consent of the three protecting Powers (France, Great Britain, and Russia) was given to unite the “Ionian State” with the Kingdom of

1970), v. I, 512-5; Spyros Markezinis, *Πολιτική ιστορία της νεωτέρας Ελλάδος* (Political History of Modern Greece) (Athens: Papyros, 1966), v. III, 26-7.

Greece. On November 14, 1863, a new treaty was signed, establishing the permanent neutrality of the islands and stating that “no naval or military armed forces would ever be allowed to concentrate or remain on the island’s territory or within its territorial waters, except for a few men who are absolutely necessary to maintain public order and ensure the collection of state taxes.”² This term provoked the reaction of the Greek government, which complained that it constituted an immediate restriction of its sovereign rights. This reaction of Athens resulted in the amendment of the aforementioned treaty through a protocol, which was signed in London on January 25, 1864. This text was included in the treaty of March 29, of the same year, among the three protecting Powers and Greece with the consent of Austria and Prussia and limited neutrality only to Corfu and Paxoi islands.³

In the coming years, London sought to strengthen its position in the Middle East. In addition to securing the road to India, the British sought to limit in any way the development of Russian power in the context of the so-called “The Big Game.” Anglo-Russian rivalry spread throughout the East during the last decades of the 19th century. To this end, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire became a dominant dogma of British foreign policy. However, this territorial integrity was seriously jeopardized after the defeat of the troops of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. In fact, the Russians managed to impose their terms on the panicked Sultan, during the negotiations that began to end the war. These took place in Agios Stefanos (St. Stephen), a suburb of Constantinople, under the barrels of Russian weapons. The development of military operations was such that it made it very difficult for the Great Powers to intervene in favor of the Turks. The Russians tried to speed up the signing of the treaty to prevent such an intervention, as the

² St. Seferiadis, *Μαθήματα Διεθνούς Δημόσιου Δικαίου* (Courses of Public International Law) (Athens: Makris, 1925), v. I, 243.

³ Seferiadis, *op.cit.*, 244; St. Nicoglou, *L’affaire de Corfu et la Société des Nations* (Dijon: Librairie Générale Felix Ray, 1925), 43-4.

British had begun to move actively in the background. Finally, on February 19/March 3, the treaty of Agios Stefanos was signed, the terms of which provoked the reaction of London and Vienna.

The actions of the governments of the two Great Powers led to the convening of the Berlin Conference with the aim of revising the aforementioned treaty. Behind the scenes, the British began negotiations with the Russians to resolve the issue. At the same time, London tried to take advantage of the negotiations with St. Petersburg to reap the benefits of the Sultan. The British diplomacy took care to inform its Turkish counterpart “about the intense struggle it was waging with the Russians in order to revise the Treaty of St. Stephen and to preserve the integrity of the Sultan's territory.” The British also expressed their desire to fight in the interests of the Turks at the next congress. However, they demanded in return to rent of Cyprus. Abdul Hamid was found under pressure, and he was forced to retreat. The price was later set at 92,799, 11 shillings and 3 pence. London's original intention was to turn the island into an arsenal. As a result, the vast majority of administration officials were military officers during the early stages of the occupation. Later, however, the British governments changed their mind, with the result that the island was considered by many Prime Ministers to be of minor importance to British interests, in the early 20th century.

In September 1911, the Italo-Turkish war broke out. Although London declared its neutrality as the two countries were considered friendly to Germany, behind the scenes it tried to use Rome as a counterweight to limit the influence of its ally the French government! Soon, however, the British realized that the Italians were not willing to play their game but aimed solely at serving their own interests. This was demonstrated by the occupation of the Dodecanese the following spring. The possible settlement of the Italians in the region posed a potential threat to British interests, as Italy was linked by alliances with both Austria-Hungary and Germany. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Edward Grey,⁴ expressed

⁴ His full name was Edward Grey, First Viscount Grey of Fallodon.

his displeasure to the Italian ambassador in London and recommended that a peace treaty with the Turks should be signed as soon as possible. Indeed, it was signed in Ouchy, Switzerland, on October 15, 1912. The text stated, among other things, that Rome would temporarily occupy the islands until the last Ottoman soldier left the Cyrenaica.

Three days after the signing of this treaty, the First Balkan War broke out. The Italians used the breaking of the war as a pretext in order to cancel their departure from the Dodecanese, causing the intense indignation of their inhabitants. The fears and worries of the latter could not be amused even by the Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, who in his repeated statements once declared that “the occupation of the islands was not a goal but a means; Italy will return them to Europe who will solve the problem as best it can” and sometimes that “Italy never thought of annexing the islands, creating conditions of redemption contrary to its traditions. They were occupied for purely military reasons. [...] It does not occupy these islands on behalf of the Ottoman Empire and has not made any relevant secret commitment.” His remarks, however, did not convince the British, who sought a counterweight to the region. Soon, they decided to approach Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, whose troops had already scored some impressive victories over the Ottomans.

In November 1912, the first hints were made by Finance Minister David Lloyd George to his friend, the young lawyer John Stavridis. The latter was a high-ranking diplomat at the Greek embassy in London and a friend of Venizelos. The British proposed the provision of port facilities to their fleet in Kefallinia in exchange for the concession of Cyprus to Greece. Most of the information about this “strange” case is contained in Stavridis’ diary. There, he briefly recorded various important events of his life in London, as he was associated with many important figures of British high society. Among his friends were many politicians and diplomats, such as Lloyd George, who had been Treasury Secretary since 1908. On November 18, 1912, the British politician reported that First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Spencer Churchill was looking for a port on the Adriatic to be used as a naval base. After all, at that time, Italy was

officially an ally of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Therefore, the Adriatic would be a blocked naval zone for the British navy in the event of war. In addition, Rome would acquire the first dreadnought type vessel very soon, while Vienna would do the same by early 1915. The aforementioned events would dramatically change the balance of power in the Mediterranean Sea, where the Austrian fleet had already made its appearance on the occasion of the Balkan Wars.

Initially, Lloyd George spoke of Corfu, ignoring the special regime under which this island was found at that period. Stavridis hurried to point this out to him, a fact that made the British minister more careful. The latter wanted to know whether Athens was willing to discuss the whole issue and he received the answer that it depended on the price offered by the British. To this day, it remains unclear whether Stavridis was authorized to go so far. However, Lloyd George noted that the idea belonged to Churchill and he simply agreed with it, indicating that he did not want to be committed. However, the next moment he went a step further, talking about the concession of Cyprus in exchange for one of the islands of the Ionian Sea. At that time, Stavridis realized the seriousness of the issue and he was reluctant to convey the British proposals to the Greek government.⁵

Churchill took over as First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911. Inspired by strong anti-German sentiment, he considered Berlin his country's primary enemy. Great Britain had to find a way to stop Germany's naval program, the full implementation of which could threaten its sovereignty at sea. So, it had to cooperate with any country that would oppose German aspirations, even if it was (the eternal enemy) France or (the constant rival in the East) Russia. The British politician was not afraid of a conflict in the Atlantic or on the high seas, but if this were to happen in the Mediterranean, the situation would be complicated, as British power might not be enough. As a result, the cooperation with the other major naval pow-

⁵ John Koumoulides, "Cyprus, the Enosis Struggle and Greece: Sir John Stavridis and the British Offer of 1915," *Journal of Modern Hellenism* 4 (1987): 101.

er in the Mediterranean Sea, France, became imperative.⁶ Finally, an informal naval alliance was concluded between the two countries in 1912.⁷

On the afternoon of November 18, Lloyd George arranged for Stavridis to meet with Churchill at the House of Commons. Earlier, the First Lord of the Admiralty spoke with his colleague in Finance and told him about his plans (which were approved by Paris) to block the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets in the Adriatic in a possible war. A necessary condition was the securing of a port, in which ten (10) to twenty (20) torpedo boats and destroyers as well as some submarines would be chartered. Finally, Churchill mentioned the port of Argostoli in Kefallinia.⁸

He then reiterated his views briefly to the Greek diplomat, who stressed that it was not a concession to the island. “Note what I will tell you: I am not talking about a transfer or even a lease, and not a single resident will change nationality or homeland, while the flag will remain Greek. What I am asking for is use and only use, that is, whenever the British government deems it necessary in time of war or peace, to have the right to use Argostoli as a port, as a naval base for its fleet, in whatever way he considers it better,” he stated characteristically. Opinions differ on whether the British minister spoke about the construction of a naval base, as Venizelos argued (see below) or not. However, it is an indisputable fact that some fortification works would be carried out, the cost of which would be borne by London. Finally, Churchill insisted on the secrecy of the negotiations.

Stavridis hastened to assure his interlocutor of the consent of the Greek government and also asked for London’s support at the forthcoming Peace

⁶ It must be mentioned that these views were shared by other British leaders, e.g., the ambassador to Madrid (and later to Vienna) Sir Maurice William Ernest de Bunsen had stated: “Malta has old fortifications unable to withstand modern weapons.” See Ed. Driault–M. Lheritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours* (Paris: 1925-6), 67-8.

⁷ Randolph Churchill, *Winston Churchill, The Young Statesman, 1901-1914* (London: Heinemann, 1967), 590, 597.

⁸ M. Llewellyn-Smith, *To όραμα της Ιωνίας* (The Ionian Vision) (Athens: MIET, 2002), 52.

Conference (especially on the issues of Thessaloniki and the Aegean islands). At that time, Lloyd George intervened, saying that it would be difficult for the British to support diplomatically the aspirations of Athens, because the Russians were opposed to the concession to Greece of the islands at the exit of the Dardanelles. He asked Churchill how he would justify the transfer of Cyprus to the public, as long as everyone's intention was to keep strict secrecy. It was well known that London did not give the slightest thing in return. Stavridis recalled the past of the Ionian Islands, but the British Minister of Finance replied that the times were no longer the same. Churchill did not seem to worry about public opinion and tried to lighten the atmosphere, recounting memories from his visit to Cyprus. He added the characteristic phrase that if it were up to him, he would take care to administer justice, implying the union of Cyprus with the Greek kingdom. It should be noted that both British politicians demanded the personal commitment of the Greek diplomat to maintain absolute secrecy on the matter, at least until the Prime Minister Henry Herbert Asquith and their Foreign Minister Lord Grey.

The latter two agreed to continue the negotiations and Lloyd George asked Stavridis to wait until all the details were settled. Until then, Venizelos should not have been informed either! After the end of the hostilities of the First Balkan War, the Greek diplomat should go to Athens and inform the Greek Prime Minister personally. Stavridis agreed and proposed the signing of a more general alliance treaty. After all, just a few weeks ago the Greek fleet had liberated the Aegean islands, one of which could be an anchorage for the British fleet. Lloyd George refrained from committing himself, promising to pass the proposal on to officials. However, he reiterated that everything had to be covered by a veil of secrecy.

On November 20th, 1912, Bulgaria (on behalf of both Montenegro and Serbia) signed an armistice with the Ottomans. On the contrary, Greece (at the insistence of the Commander in Chief Prince Constantine) refused to sign the text, but agreed to send representatives to London, where negotiations would be held for the final settlement of the issue. The British sought to transfer of the Greek Prime Minister himself to their capital ap-

parently to start direct negotiations on this issue. They made sure to make it clear to both the ambassador of Greece Ioannis Gennadios and Stavridis. In fact, on November 29, the British Minister of Finance told the latter that Venizelos' arrival in London, where the fate of the Balkans would be decided, was a matter of life or death for Athens. There, in essence, two conferences would take place, one among the belligerents and one of the Great Powers, which formed the Conference of Ambassadors.⁹

On December 10, London changed its policy slightly as Lloyd George informed his interlocutor that Asquith, Lord Grey, and Churchill agreed with the master plan but did not want to start negotiations before the end of the work of the two aforementioned conferences. In addition, they did not want to have contact with the Greek Prime Minister on this issue and referred him to the Minister of Colonies, Lewis Vernon Harcourt, First Viscount Harcourt on the pretext that Cyprus fell within his remit. However, the negotiation for the mainland was one part of the agreement. There was also the part of Kefallinia, for which the British politician made no mention. Finally, an appointment was settled between Venizelos and Harcourt for December 13.

Venizelos arrived in London the day before and, of course, he refused to meet with the Minister of Colonies. It was to be preceded by a meeting with his British colleague, or at least with Lord Grey. As a result, the appointment with Harcourt was canceled. However, the Prime Minister of Greece intended to decouple the issue of Kefallinia from the conclusion of a wider Greek-British agreement. On December 16, a breakfast took place at the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, at 11 Downing Street. Venizelos, Lloyd George and Stavridis sat in it. From the beginning, the good atmosphere was established, as the Greek politician expressed himself in very warm words for the British. However, the British minister was more cautious, citing the difficulties that would arise with the opposition and public opinion in England if they kept the horse trading for Ar-

⁹ The Conference of Ambassadors existed since the 19th century and was a commonly accepted diplomatic forum for discussing and resolving any disputes. See G. Pink, "The Conference of Ambassadors," *Geneva Studies* 12, no. 4-5 (February 1942): 207-46.

gostoli secret. Venizelos agreed not to make the case public, provided there were clear results while he was still in London, while Lloyd George made it clear that British policy was to avoid a continental commitment. Nevertheless, a bilateral agreement could be concluded, just as it had been done with France. Venizelos agreed and they decided to continue the talks the next day.

It must be mentioned that Churchill and Prince Louis Alexander von Battenberg¹⁰ also attended the meeting. Churchill developed the plan for Argostoli, emphasizing the geostrategic importance of his port. Venizelos had no objections, but they had to look at the matter from the point of view of International Law. The British proposed the publication of the issue, a proposal which the Cretan politician accepted on the condition that the signing of a general agreement would follow. It was clear that the Greek side changed its position, trying to connect the two issues, a fact that was not accepted by the British. Churchill politely stated that he was willing to discuss this issue as well, provided that he would not be confused with the issue of Argostoli. The first concerned the other two members of the Triple Entente (i.e., France and Russia), according to the British minister, while the issue of Argostoli was a strictly Greek-British affair. Venizelos stepped down and Churchill pledged to discuss the issue with his colleagues at the Council of Ministers. Although the meeting was held in a good atmosphere, the silence of the other British officials made an impression.

Nevertheless, the Greek government did not weigh this parameter properly and was left overwhelmed by excessive optimism. Churchill realized the Greek “euphoria” and hurried to “advise” the Greek Prime Minister to cancel the order of a large battleship at the German shipyards Vulcan. At the same time, the British politician did not stop praising the importance of the Greek navy and overemphasizing the role he could play on the side of the Anglo-French if the latter were involved in a major conflict.

¹⁰ Later he changed his name in Louis Alexander Mountbatten.

On January 5, 1913, the next meeting between Lloyd George, Venizelos, and Stavridis took place. The British minister said that Churchill was working on a broader plan, which would be considered by the French. Although he did not know the details, he tried to obtain the permission of the Prime Minister of Greece in order to discuss this during the forthcoming visit of the First Lord of the Admiralty to Paris. He vaguely spoke of a general alliance, which would change the balance in the Mediterranean. In essence, however, he was not able to show anything tangible to his Greek interlocutors. Therefore, this meeting was also fruitless.

Two days later, the talks resumed in the presence of Churchill and Prince von Battenberg. In it, it was found that the plan that had been elaborated by the British First Lord of the Admiralty did not concern the case of Kefallinia, but the Greek Navy! This fact probably angered the Greek officials. However, it is certain that the discussion soon focused on the issue of Argostoli and the conciliation with France. Churchill expressed his confidence in the positive response of the French to the Greek alliance with the Triple Entente. He went on to say, however, that both Asquith and Lord Grey were now in favor of making the issue public in order to limit reactions to the handover of Cyprus. This publication was to take place after a reasonable period of time after the signing of the treaty, which would end the war between the four Christian states of the Balkans with the Sultan. Venizelos, fearing that this argument could lead to the collapse of the whole negotiation, agreed, but stressed that this period should not exceed three or at most four months.¹¹

In the next weeks, everyone's attention was focused on the negotiations for the end of the First Balkan War. During this period, Churchill traveled to the French capital, where he had contacts both with his French colleague Théophile Delcassé and with other French officials. On January 29, the Anglo-Greek talks resumed, but Churchill had changed his mind on the matter. The issue of the concession of Argostoli had to be part of a

¹¹ Koumoulides, *op.cit.*, 112.

more general agreement, which would be obvious, but would also contain some secret articles.¹²

It was obvious that the French had made a decisive contribution to the change of policy on the part of the British politician, who hastened to amuse the impressions, noting that Paris was willing to accept Greece's accession to the Triple Entente. In addition, he presented the Greek Prime Minister with a copy of the memorandum, which he had given to the French regarding the future role of the Greek navy. In fact, fearing a possible leak of the document, he had removed the indication that it came from the British Admiralty. He called on Venizelos to exert all his influence on the military for its faithful implementation. Apparently, he foresaw the reactions that would erupt in Athens, if a shipbuilding program of "small and flexible boats" was implemented, that is, the previous dogma of acquiring warships was abandoned (on which the "Averoff" buying was based).

Venizelos did not react and stated that he had to inform King George about the results of the talks. Churchill, however, "advised" that the monarch not know many details, and the ministers not to be informed at all! Venizelos noticed that the King of Greece was extremely confidential but eventually withdrew. He would tell George exactly what Churchill had recommended to him, that is, "that various informal discussions had taken place, that a basis for a possible future settlement had been found, and that after the signing of the peace the negotiations might resume." During his departure, Venizelos heartily thanked Stavridis for everything he had done.

Stavridis noted in his Diary that the Cretan politician "felt happy at the thought that our negotiations would result in a settlement with England and possibly France, and that the future of Greece would be very different from the past [...] there would be such a force in the East that no one could ignore. Referring to Lloyd George, he compared him to the proph-

¹² G. Pikros, *Ο Βενιζέλος και το Κυπριακό* (Venizelos and the Cyprus Question) (Athens: Philippotis, 1980), 7.

ets of the Old Testament and expressed his great admiration for his extraordinary abilities and for his understanding of people and events.”¹³

Two days later, Venizelos met Lord Grey, personally. The latter unequivocally stated that no discussion of “future political arrangements” could take place as long as the conflict in the Balkans lasted. He was quite vague as to what he said, simply focusing on the need to maintain an excellent climate in bilateral Anglo-Greek relations. It is written that that “his (Lord Grey’s) aspirations in Turkey, which he sought to keep away from Germany, albeit neutral, would hardly be reconciled with maintaining excellent relations with Greece.”¹⁴

Venizelos returned to Greece full of enthusiasm. He informed King George and later Prince Constantine, when the latter ascended the throne after the assassination of his father (on March 5, 1913). Much later (in November 1931), the Cretan politician described what was happening in the English capital in a memorandum to his then (i.e., in 1931) British ambassador to Athens Sir Patrick William Maule Ramsay. In it, he stated that by accepting the British plan, he had stated to his interlocutors that “in case of a general European war, if I am the governor of Greece, I will place it on the side of Great Britain.” He added that, “in exchange for Cyprus, I prefer to cede the port of Argostoli to English sovereignty in time of peace, subject to the sovereignty in favor of Greece, the sovereignty of the cities within the port and the right of free use of the port in time of peace.”¹⁵

Ramsay himself, referring to his superiors as “Private and Secret,” wrote, among other things, that the proposal came from Lloyd George. The Greek Prime Minister accepted it: “[...] because a war for England in the Mediterranean would probably mean a more general war, in which Greece would definitely be involved on the side of England [...] England would definitely use all the Greek ports [...]” However, Ramsay noted that Lord Grey was unaware of the case! During the same period, an in-

¹³ Llewellyn-Smith, *op.cit.*, 59-60.

¹⁴ Pikros, *op.cit.*, 8.

¹⁵ Pikros, *op.cit.*, 9.

ternal search was carried out in the archives of the British Foreign Office. Unfortunately, no document was found in this case. In fact, a relevant report states that no evidence was found to certify that Cyprus had ever been offered to Greece in exchange for port facilities in Argostoli! Below, the author of the document remarked that “whenever the use of this naval base was required, it was done without the permission of the Greek state.”

In the next months, the issue faded. The Balkans made peace after the end of the Second Balkan War, during which Greece with Serbia (mainly) and Romania with the Ottoman Empire (secondarily) defeated Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the Aegean islands (and Mount Athos) were not definitively awarded in Greece, as the Treaty of London (of May 30, 1913) stipulated that it was up to the Great Powers to decide their future.

Venizelos returned to London in January 1914. On January 20, he instructed Stavridis to ask Lloyd George if a conversation with Lord Grey on the Kefallinia affair was possible. Lloyd George said he had no objections but considered that the culmination of the crisis in Ireland was not a good time for the plan to succeed. Nevertheless, the Greek Prime Minister raised the issue with the British Foreign Secretary during their meeting the next day. To his great surprise, the head of British diplomacy was completely negative because he “considered it premature to consider a separate settlement of this kind between the Powers.” Venizelos at least asked for the guarantee of the Great Powers for the Greek occupation of the Aegean islands, but Lord Grey refused again, recommending him to go to Berlin!

The Cretan politician was surprised and tried to investigate the causes of the change in English policy. The opportunity was given to a new meeting between the old negotiators, namely Churchill, Lloyd George, Prince von Battenberg and Stavridis, which took place on January 22, 1914. In it, he mentioned his discussion with Lord Grey noting that he had not raised the issue of Argostoli but only that of Greece’s participation in the Triple Entente. He reiterated that he was in London to negotiate the terms of the agreement. However, both Lloyd George and Churchill considered any discussion on this issue unnecessary. “However, the

meetings that had taken place had allowed them to get to know each other better, to gain trust in each other, paving the way for further negotiations as soon as the Irish problem was settled. Churchill proposed to meet again in July or August, and Venizelos promised to return to complete the negotiations.”¹⁶

It was an obvious excuse for the British leaders to express the wreckage of the plan. Unfortunately, neither Venizelos nor Stavridis understood that this was a personal idea of Churchill, which was overtaken by the current political news, rather than an official British initiative. Only if circumstances made it absolutely necessary to serve the interests of Great Britain would it be possible. Moral doubts played a much lower role. However, the Greek Prime Minister refused to accept the failure of this plan and later blamed Foreign Minister George Strait, who was considered pro-German and did not want Greece to be so closely associated with Great Britain.

However, a sober assessment of the facts proves that this proposal could be detrimental to Greece, as claimed by the then supporter of the Greek Prime Minister Colonel Ioannis Metaxas, who was informed of the content of the negotiations by Venizelos himself.

“Suddenly he asks me: ‘What would you say, Mr. Metaxas, if we ceded Kefallinia as a naval base to the English?’

I replied: ‘Do you not mean, of course, Mr. President, to cede the island, because that would be monstrous, but to give the English the right to have a naval base in Kefallinia?’

He hastened to answer: ‘Of course not to give the island. Although, Mr. Metaxas, you know, they would be willing to exchange it with Cyprus’ and they looked at me questioningly and subtly.

I felt the indignation boiling inside me. I replied: ‘Concession of a Greek island, in exchange for any consideration, is not possible. As for the right to set up a naval base there, I can’t understand that either. If we are

¹⁶ G.B. Gooch–H.W.W. Temperley (ed.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1914-1918* (London: 1926-30), v. II, 85.

allies with the British, they can use, as allies, all our naval bases. If they want to have a naval base in Kefallinia, let them give us the financial means to build it ourselves, as our own, so they can use it as well.'

He hurried to tell me that this would be a good solution. However, I didn't feel him completely honest with me when he assured that he had rejected any idea of concession or exchange of Kefallinia."¹⁷

Nowadays, very few people are aware of this case. The First World War and his consequences in the Greek political scene (the so-called "national division") pushed it into the oblivion of history. Considering what the Greek Cypriots suffered in the next decades, one might believe that this was another lost opportunity for a fair settlement of the Cyprus problem. However, the plan was not carried out under the responsibility of the British. In 1914, it is sure that the conditions had not been matured and the invocation of the Irish problem was merely an excuse from the British side. Nevertheless, Venizelos wrote that "unfortunately the Great War broke out before the conference was adjured and time was given for the said concession to take place."¹⁸ However, the fate of the inhabitants of Kefallinia remains doubtful, if the British settled again on their island, just 49 years after their departure from it.

¹⁷ Ioan. Metaxas, *Ημερολόγιον* (Diary) (Athens: Govostis, 1910-14), v. III, 234.

¹⁸ Kon. Svolopoulos, «Η στάση της ελληνικής κυβερνήσεως κατά την κυπριακή κρίση του 1931» (The Position of the Greek Government during the 1931 Cyprus Crisis), *Επιστημονική Επετηρίς Παντείου Ανωτάτης Σχολής Πολιτικών Επιστημών* (1978): 482-511, 505.

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Divided Memories in Greece: Veterans, War Representations, and Political Conflict in the 1920s

Introduction. Europe: War Memory divided

Interwar Europe developed various versions of the memory of the Great War. The “myth of war experience” formed by war veterans of their wartime sacrifices (George Mosse) was used by states to embellish mass death, prevent social upheavals, and promote national unity, while anti-war movements and social uprisings were developing under the influence of the Bolshevik revolution.¹ Reference point of this mythology was the worship of the fallen through memorial services, centered on the erection of imposing monuments such as the “Unknown Soldier.”²

In victorious countries, rituals that accompanied its erection associated war sacrifice with victory. The lead in organizing these events was taken, for example in Great Britain, by local communities, busi-

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¹ George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3-11.

² Mosse, *op.cit.*, 70-106.

nesses, the clergy, charities, voluntary organizations and veterans' associations.³ In societies dominated by a "victory culture," the questioning and boycotting of commemoration ceremonies by war veterans who demanded social rehabilitation was a marginal phenomenon.⁴ For example, in France it was associated with the pacifism and patriotism promoted through commemorative rituals by the united veterans' movement.⁵ Although the communist organization of French veterans did not reject the symbolic worship of the dead, its appeal was limited, arguably because it refused war's necessity and claimed special rights for working-class veterans and not for all veterans in general.⁶

Interwar Yugoslavia faced more complex problems in managing the memory of the war. This memory in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was double, divided between two camps and two cultures. The memory of victory for Serbs of Old Serbia and Montenegrians contrasted with the memory of defeat for many ex-subjects of Austria-Hungary who fought on the side of the Central Powers. During the 1920s, veterans were dominated by the Association of Reserve Officers and Soldiers, a league that promoted the Serbian national idea and the "pure bond of veterans" in opposition to "ruthless party demagoguery." One of its aims was to prevent "this state acquired by blood from becoming a place of experimentation for Russian utopians."⁷

³ Deborah Cohen, *The War Come Home. Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914-1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 15-60, 101-48.

⁴ Eric. J. Leed, *No Man's Land. Combat and Identity in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 202-3; David Englander, "The National Union of Ex-Servicemen and the Labour Movement, 1918-1920," *History* 76 (1991): 28.

⁵ Antoine Prost, *In the Wake of War: "Les Anciens Combattants" and the French Society 1914-1939* (Oxford: Berg, 1992), 51-80.

⁶ Chris Millington, "Communist Veterans and Paramilitarism in 1920s France: The Association Republicaine des Anciens Combattants," *Journal of War & Cultural Studies* 8, no. 4 (2015): 300-14.

⁷ Danilo Sharenach, *Топ, војник и сећање. Први светски рат и Србија 1914-2009* (The Weapon, the Soldier and the Memory. The First World War and Serbia 1914-2009) (Belgrade: Институт за савремену историју, 2014), 158-68.

Similar was the picture in Romania, where many Transylvanian males had fought in the Austro-Hungarian army.⁸

In defeated countries the formation of a common national memory proved to be a difficult task. Social-democratic organizations in Germany, such as the *Reichsbund* and the *Reichsbanner*, organized their own rituals, resisting narratives and myths put forward by nationalist circles and the far Right. Despite contradictions in their political practices and ideological discourse, they supported the Weimar Republic as a political project.⁹ The Communist Party rejected plans to erect a national memorial to the fallen and opposed to funding for local memorials or for commemorative ceremonies, asking to use the money for relief of the wounded and the war victims.¹⁰

Steeped in the “culture of defeat,” official Germany sought answers for the future by looking back to a heroic past.¹¹ It defined the term “war memorial” (*Kriegerdenkmaler*) by emphasizing the soldier as a heroic warrior cut off from civil society. Commemoration ceremonies promoted manhood, youth, sacrifice, and comradeship of the trenches. Renewing feelings of national enmity, they promoted the fallen soldiers as beacons for the violent revision of the Treaty of Versailles by the living.¹²

Italy was among the victors of the war but did not secure territorial gains at the Peace Treaties. Thus, the formation of a “culture of victory” and the legitimization of the war effort faced serious obstacles.¹³ A

⁸ N. Voukov, “Память и монументальная репрезентация Великой войны: балканские проекции” (Memory and the Monumental Representation of the Great War: Drafts), *Метаморфозы Истории* 9 (2017): 61.

⁹ Benjamin Ziemann, *Contested Commemorations. Republican War Veterans and Weimar Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹⁰ Sean A. Forner, “War Commemoration and the Republic in Crisis: Weimar Germany and the Neue Wache,” *Central European History* 35, no. 4 (2002): 520.

¹¹ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat. On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery* (New York: Picador, 2003), 189-288.

¹² Mosse, *op.cit.*, 101-3; Forner, *op.cit.*, 513-49; Stefan Goebel, “Re-Membered and Re-Mobilized: The ‘Sleeping Dead’ in Interwar Germany and Britain,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 39, no. 4 (2004): 491-6.

¹³ John Horne, “Beyond Cultures of Victory and Cultures of Defeat? Inter-War Veterans,” in *The Great War and Veterans’ Internationalism*, ed. Julia Eichenberg–John Paul Newman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 219.

polarized society interpreted differently the meaning of war sacrifices, further feeding political and social conflict. The diplomatic outcome of the war was seen as a defeat necessitating a revisionist foreign policy as much as the fascist overthrow of parliamentary norms.¹⁴

In all countries, the myth of the war experience, and in particular the cult of fallen soldiers, seems to have turned into a major handicap for the Left. Often it enabled liberals and conservatives to integrate and defuse political polarization¹⁵, while fascism secured significant political gains by incorporating it into its political activism and ritual.¹⁶

The Soviet Union was a special case. The worship of the fallen of First World War, promoted as early as 1915 by the tsarist regime,¹⁷ was rejected and replaced by honoring the heroes of revolution and the civil war.¹⁸ Commemorations of the war underlined the danger of a new imperialist war against the Soviet Union and were used to mobilize against it.¹⁹ Numerous organizations of Russian emigres, however, promoted intensely the memory of the Russian soldiers' sacrifices. Most were former soldiers who had fought in the European war and were then defeated in the Russian civil war. Various inter-linked organizations glorified the memory of Russia's "military greatness" and tried to promote, through commemorating war sacrifices, the restoration of capitalist Russia.²⁰

¹⁴ An example of conflict is the memorization of the Battle of Caporetto. Vanda Wilcox, "From Heroic Defeat to Mutilated Victory: The Myth of Caporetto in Fascist Italy," in *Defeat and Memory. Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era*, ed. Jenny Macleod (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 48-9.

¹⁵ Bob Bushaway, "Name upon Name: The Great War and Remembrance," in *Myths of the English*, ed. Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 136-67.

¹⁶ Mosse, *op.cit.*, 106.

¹⁷ Karen Petrone, *The Great War in Russian Memory* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2011), 1-4.

¹⁸ Catherine Merridale, "War, Death, and Remembrance in Soviet Russia," in *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jay Winter–Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 67-8.

¹⁹ Aaron J. Cohen, "Oh That! Myth, Memory, and World War I in the Russian Emigration and the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* 62, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 79-83.

²⁰ V. A. Avdeev, "Первая мировая война глазами русского зарубежья" (The First World War through the Eyes of the Russian Diaspora), in *Последняя война*

The memory of the Great War was shaped by many factors: national specificities, military victory or defeat, conditions of veterans' demobilization, social conditions, expectations of those who survived, political and ideological aspirations.²¹ The "culture of war" was maintained in the years 1918-24 and the cult of the dead prevailed. The Treaty of Locarno (1925), however, accelerated the "cultural demobilization," i.e., the conscious acceptance of peace and of the efforts to build it.²²

Conflicting "War cultures" in Greece, 1912-22

The above developments touched Greece too but the perception and memory of war was determined by particular factors that also shaped Greek interwar period. War meant for Greeks, at the front or in the rear, an almost uninterrupted decade of conscription (1912-22) topped by a slow demobilization (1922-24).²³ The irredentist Great Idea having collapsed with military defeat, the return of conscripts, and the arrival of refugees ushered to a deep and multifaceted crisis. The state and its agents, aiming to legitimize war sacrifice, forged their own myths about the war experience. There was no single version of war memory in 1920s' Greece.

The worship of fallen heroes, mainly anonymous, was established after the 1897 defeat, on the initiative of the Athens University. The first Greek monument to the fallen of the Greco-Turkish war was a

Российской империи: Россия, мир накануне, в ходе и после первой мировой войны по документам российских и зарубежных архивов: материалы международной научной конференции (The Last War of the Russian Empire: Russia and the World on the Eve, During and After the First World War through Documents from Russian and Foreign Archives: Materials of an International Scientific Conference) (Moscow: Наука, 2006), 39-48.

²¹ John Horne, "The Living," in *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), vol. III: Civil Society, 592-617.

²² Laurence Van Ypersele, "Mourning and Memory, 1919-1945," in *A Companion to World War I*, ed. John Horne (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 576-90.

²³ The classes of 1919-20 were dismissed after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, that of 1921 in December 1923 and the one of 1922 in June 1924. *Empros*, 4-8-1923; *Efimeris ton Balkanion*, 23-12-1923; *Skrip*, 9-6-1924.

memorial stele for 28 students killed, unveiled at the Propylaea on the anniversary of the national holiday, March 25th, 1901. Adopting the cult of the dead, the university shaped its characteristics so as to embellish, sacrifice, and promote glorious death for the fatherland as an example for youthful emulation.²⁴

The educational system also prepared the ground, from the earliest stages, for the acceptance of myths. Primary school reading materials from 1914 onwards cultivated reconciliation with the domesticated and familiarized idea of heroic death on the battlefield.²⁵ A law of February 1915 introduced nationalistic boy scouts in schools. Curriculum provided for “short and simple narratives of contemporary war and military history.” Discipline, virtue, and loyalty to the country and its laws were defined as civic duties.²⁶

Officers and the clergy in the 1912-22 wars, through speeches of patriotic content, promoted a culture of war and heroic death, self-negating acceptance of sacrifice and virile manhood, while targeting enemies, both internal and external.²⁷ Orthodox Christian motifs, such as sacrifice and atonement, linked to nationalist ideas, fostered hatred of national neighbors. Priests attached to military units actively promoted war sacrifice as sacred national salvation, through sermons,

²⁴ Giorgos Margaritis, «Πανεπιστήμιο και ηρωικός θάνατος (1897-1919). Ιδεολογία, συμβολισμοί, τελετουργίες» [University and heroic death (1897-1919). Ideology, symbolism, rituals], in *Πανεπιστήμιο: ιδεολογία και παιδεία. Ιστορική διάσταση και προοπτικές* (University: ideology and education. Historical dimension and perspectives), ed. Ch. Loukou (Athens: IAEN, 1989), 277-85.

²⁵ Giorgos Margaritis, «Οι περιπέτειες του ηρωικού θανάτου 1912-1920» (The adventures of the heroic death 1912-1920), *Μνήμων* 12 (1989): 92-4.

²⁶ Christina Koulouri, *Αθλητισμός και όψεις της αστικής κοινωνικότητας. Γυμναστικά και αθλητικά σωματεία 1870-1922* (Sport and aspects of urban sociality. Gymnastics and sports clubs 1870-1922) (Athens: IAEN, 1997), 73.

²⁷ Spyros Tsoutsoumpis, “Morale, Ideology and the Barbarization of Warfare during the Balkan Wars,” *Mars & Clio* 36 (Spring 2013): 77, 80-1; Georgios Fessopoulos, *Αι διχόνιαι των αξιωματικών μας και η διάλυσις του Στρατού στη Μικρά Ασία* (The divisions of our officers and the dissolution of the Army in Asia Minor) (Athens: 1934), 89-90; Fontas Ladis, *Χαίρε μέσα από την μάχη. Μακεδονία–Θράκη–Μικρασία 1918-1922* (Hail from within the battle. Macedonia–Thrace–Asia Minor 1918-1922) (Athens: Τροχαλία, 1993), 69, 71, 105, 126, 128-9, 132, 142.

admonitions, and regular communication with soldiers.²⁸ After the victorious Balkan Wars, the state actively legitimized war sacrifice through mass erection of monuments, and also micro-managing rituals for the fallen and funding war-themed art projects.²⁹

The Greek Army experienced the First World War on the Macedonian front, where the idea of “heroic death” was put to a harsh test. The state adapted quickly, erecting monuments to the fallen and organizing commemorative ceremonies in order to substantiate national claims on disputed areas. Hero worship, no longer an individual or communal affair, became a state duty for the masses.³⁰ For example, six months before the Asia Minor front collapsed, the General Administration of Lesvos erected in Mytilene a monument to fallen heroes, specifically to the unburied soldiers of the battles of Eski-Shehir and Saggarios. The Commander General explained in his commemorative speech that this imperative obligation of the living was not only a token of gratitude for past glories, but also an example to follow, preparing the “greatness of the future.” Similar monuments should adorn all Asia Minor, so that “victorious enthusiasm immortalizes the names of the fallen.”³¹ Thanks to the unburied heroes, the sacred territory of Eski-Shehir and Saggarios was demarcated as part of the national space.³²

The projection of this mythical war experience also created reactions. In October 1921, while newspapers published endless lists of names of soldiers lost in the battle of Saggarios, the Socialist Communist Labor Party [SEKE(K)] criticized the erection of monuments to the “Unknown Soldier” in the rest of Europe. Through its newspaper, *Rizospastis*, it denounced this practice as bourgeois warmonger-

²⁸ Tsoutsoumpis, op.cit., 78.

²⁹ Christina Koulouri, *Φουστανέλες και χλαμύδες. Ιστορική μνήμη και εθνική ταυτότητα 1821-1930* (Skirts and chlamys. Historical memory and national identity 1821-1930) (Athens: Αλεξάνδρεια, 2020), 258-63.

³⁰ Margaritis, «Οι περιπέτειες», 95-116.

³¹ *Skrip*, 16-2-1922.

³² On the territorialisation of memory and its connection with nationalism see Spyridon Ploumidis, *Έδαφος και μνήμη στα Βαλκάνια. Ο «γεωργικός εθνικισμός» στην Ελλάδα και στη Βουλγαρία (1927-46)* [Soil and memory in the Balkans. “Agricultural nationalism” in Greece and Bulgaria (1927-46)] (Athens: Πατάκης, 2010), 191, 202-11.

ing aimed at containing or preventing social uprisings and revolutions. Integrating the popular strata through nationalism, it appeased their anger and indignation for the war and its consequences.³³

Leftist anti-war activism and arguments fell on fertile ground. The total war experienced in conditions of prolonged conscription and the broken promises of a social new deal in exchange for war sacrifices collapsed the “economy of sacrifice”³⁴ and brought forward demands for peace and demobilization. Conscripts and reservists serving at the frontline rejected theories and sermons legitimizing war sacrifice. Battle fatigue and the harsh living conditions squashed attempts to boost morale, and even the officers themselves, who were supposed to encourage privates, were not unaffected. Th. Kiakidis, who served in the XII Division, describes the situation shortly before the start of the operations for the attack to Ankara: “Despite all victories, the morale of our soldiers is beginning to be depressed by fatigue, miserable weather conditions and lack of proper food. The Gounaris government, having perceived the change of heart, issues an order, obliging the officers to boost troop morale in every way possible. But they too lack the previous vigor, and speak of our glorious nation, national aims, and great ideas in a lukewarm manner, which instead of bringing the desired results has a negative effect on the soldiers’ morale.”³⁵

The admonitions of the clergy faced similar reactions, although religion contributed to the soldiers’ endurance. In his memoirs of the Balkan Wars, Polycarp Zachos mentions several cases of soldiers, and even officers, “if not atheists and materialists, at least religiously indifferent,” while many privates and officers treated army clerics “with scorn and contempt.”³⁶ Archimandrite Parthenius preached to no avail to the soldiers of the 15th Infantry Regiment of the XII Division. Hardships,

³³ *Rizospastis*, 30-10-1921.

³⁴ For “sacrifice economy” see Leed, *op.cit.*, 204-10; Adrian Gregory, *The Last Great War. British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 112-51.

³⁵ Theodoros Kiakidis, *Το ημερολόγιο του Στρατιωτικού μου βίου. Μικρασιατική Εκστρατεία 1920-1922* (The diary of my military life. Asia Minor Campaign 1920-1922) (Δήμος Νέου Σιδηροχωρίου: 2010), 40.

³⁶ Polykarpou I. Zachou, *Πολεμικά. Μέρος Β΄. Πολεμικά Σελίδες* (War. Part B. War Pages) (Εν Αθήναις: 1915), 139-40.

fear and prolonged operations after the capture of Eski-Shehir, Kutahya and Afion Kara Hissar made them indifferent and apathetic.³⁷

The hopes of longer-serving reservists for an armistice were inflamed and immediately dashed after the November 1920 general elections. The Asia Minor Campaign was continued by the anti-venizelists who invested politically in conflicting “war cultures” –both peace and war– strengthened anti-war sentiment. The reservists of the old classes, especially those of 1916, found themselves in a political and social deadlock unprecedented for them. The demand for peace and demobilization resonated with them and their families.³⁸ The unprecedented political and social deadlock, in deteriorating living conditions, fed popular discontent. Particularly provocative for conscripts and their families was speculation, a central issue in reservists’ discourses and in demands of veterans and the labor movement in these times of burgeoning inflation and rising prices of basic commodities. Indifferent state policies undermined the legitimacy of the sacrifices asked from citizens.³⁹

At the homefront, a movement of disabled, wounded and war victims developed in big cities in 1921-22, linked to the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) and SEKE(K). Denouncing tendencies “to create new wars,” it rejected national symbols and adopted class struggle as a means of promoting demands for social welfare and work.⁴⁰ As the war in Asia Minor continued and the number of casualties increased, the wounded now perceived the war as “irresponsible”: they

³⁷ Kiakidis, *op.cit.*, 41-2.

³⁸ Georgios V. Chraniotis, «Το κίνημα των Παλαιών Πολεμιστών στην Ελλάδα την περίοδο του Μεσοπολέμου: παλαιοί πολεμιστές, εργατικό και κομμουνιστικό κίνημα στην Ελλάδα, 1922-1928» (The Old Warriors’ Movement in Greece during the Interwar Period: Old Warriors, Labour and Communist Movement in Greece, 1922-1928) (PhD diss., Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2021), 281-8.

³⁹ For protests against the obscenity of the disabled, war victims and wives of reservists, especially those working in the military clothing industry see *Rizospastis*, 10-4-1921, 18-3-1922, 30-3-1923.

⁴⁰ *Rizospastis*, 18-11-1921; Historical Archive of Macedonia [hereafter HAM], Archive of Wills and Associations, Statute no. 273, “Association of Wounded and Disabled War Veterans of Thessaloniki,” 4-1-1922.

had been sacrificed and destroyed without even knowing why. Consequently, they welcomed desertions as acts of reason and prudence.⁴¹

Wives and daughters of reservists also opposed the war, together with disabled and wounded war veterans who had returned home, thus turning the issue of family protection into a burning social problem.⁴² Often families proved unable to fill the economic gap left by the drafted men. Worsening poverty, combined with the perpetual postponement of the promised armistice and demobilization, triggered mobilization.⁴³ The Military Victims Associations after 1922 combined social demands with a strong anti-war discourse.⁴⁴

Political Disputes over War Memory, 1922-26

i. State Cultivation of the Mythical War Experience

The public debate on the erection of a national monument to the fallen condensed the contested meanings and significations of the war period.⁴⁵ Greece, however, would only have its “Unknown Soldier” in 1932.⁴⁶ The inauguration ceremonies, organized by state and local authorities, focused on the army. Military processions and reviews, parades under the sounds of the national anthem, fiery patriotic speeches and religious ceremonies accompanied the ritual worship of the war dead.⁴⁷ The 1922 defeat, however, having been destroying the Great Idea, threatened also to cancel the mythical war experience. It was quite difficult to justify and explain the heavy price paid by Greek society for the wars.

⁴¹ *Rizospastis*, 30-3-1921.

⁴² *Rizospastis*, 30-1-1922, 13-1-1923.

⁴³ *Rizospastis*, 7-2, 4 and 18-3 and 22-7-1922.

⁴⁴ *Rizospastis*, 20, 23 and 25-6-1923.

⁴⁵ Eleni Kouki, «Ο Άγνωστος Στρατιώτης της Αθήνας και η αναζήτηση ενός νέου μαζικού μνημειακού ύφους στο Μεσοπόλεμο» (The Unknown Soldier of Athens and the Search for a New Mass Monumental Style in the Interwar Period), *Αρχαιοτάζιο* 13 (Ιούνιος 2011): 152-64.

⁴⁶ In March 1926, during the Pangalos dictatorship, the study for the construction of the monument was announced. Ploumidis, *op.cit.*, 211.

⁴⁷ *Efimeris ton Balkanion*, 10-9-1923; *Makedonia*, 8-10-1924, 9 and 23-3 and 25-6-1925; *Empros*, 16-11-1925, 22-3-1926; *Skrip*, 25-3 and 3-4-1926.

The myths formed before 1922 around mass death were preserved, now serving ambiguous functions. Spyridon Plumidis argues that “the cult of heroic death in interwar Greece was not associated with subversion, but with the defense of order at the frontier.”⁴⁸ In 1925 however the metropolitan bishop of Kozani proclaimed, on the anniversary of the Revolution of 1821, that “Fatherland follows the orders of its great dead, and with the impetus of their remembrance it will once again become the mistress of two continents and five seas.”⁴⁹

Revisionist tendencies seem to be latent in the official rhetoric exploiting the cult of the dead to secure territorial boundaries. Characteristically, at the conference of Reserve Officers (Athens, October 1923), it was stated that the fallen were sacrificed “for the fatherland and the service of national ideals and dreams,”⁵⁰ while new wars were not excluded: “the children of the fatherland will soon be called to arms, to live again the days of glory.”⁵¹

The dream of reclaiming lost homes also remained alive among the refugees. For example, in March 1925 the annual nationwide memorial service for the fallen took place in Thessaloniki, at the church of Agia Sophia. With representatives of the state and all local society attending, the President of the Asia Minor Union of Athens recited the oath of the refugees: “incessant and merciless struggle until the sacred lands of Asia Minor are liberated.”⁵²

During the Pangalos dictatorship irredentism became more intense. Speaking at the official memorial service for the fallen students at the Propylea (November 1925), the Rector of the University of Athens indirectly, but clearly, identified Asia Minor as Greek territory, secured through the bones of the fallen students. The Minister of Education, also addressing the students present, called them worthy successors of the fallen, ready to undergo any sacrifice “for the honor and

⁴⁸ Ploumidis, *op.cit.*, 213.

⁴⁹ *Makedonia*, 29-3-1925.

⁵⁰ *Empros*, 13-10-1923.

⁵¹ *Rizospastis*, 16-10-1923.

⁵² *Makedonia*, 9-3-1925.

greatness of the homeland,” and thus upkeep the traditional university contribution to the nation.⁵³

The worship of the victims of the war was also used after the Asia Minor defeat for mobilizing passions and political feelings similar to those that supported the fascism developing in Europe. They ranged from national and religious hatred and revenge to racial and cultural denigration of other groups, cultivated in Greece before 1922.⁵⁴ In the October 1924 wreath-laying ceremony for the fallen soldiers of the Macedonian front, at the Allied Cemetery of Zeytinlik, a French General and the General Commander of Macedonia officially expressed their gratitude to the dead who fought “for justice... and against barbarism” and “saved civilization.”⁵⁵

Similarly in a memorial speech a few years later, the Mayor of Athens, Patsis, addressing Ministers of the Pangalos dictatorship together with schoolchildren and their teachers, plus assorted associations of reserve officers and soldiers, stressed that the ceremony was not held to mourn the fallen, but to commemorate their “bravery” and “heroism” so as to demonstrate “to all civilized peoples” that Greece “since it appeared in the world, has always been ready for any sacrifice for freedom.” It always boasted brave children who “transmit civilized soul and spirit to the barbarian peoples, through their sacrifice.” The prayers to God of those killed in the field should “inspire the highest and noblest of minds, so that the vision of a great, happy and civilized Fatherland may never leave us.”⁵⁶

As in other European countries, the cult of virility and war experience as proof of manhood were strongly promoted.⁵⁷ Celebrating the erection of the monument to the fallen at the Allied cemetery of Zeytinlik (May 1925), the Consul of Fascist Italy in his speech for Greco–Italian fraternization identified the “heroes” with the words engraved on the monument: “Silence–Duty–Death.” The General

⁵³ *Empros*, 16-11-1925.

⁵⁴ Spyros Marchetos, *Πώς φίλησα τον Μουσσολίνι! Τα πρώτα βήματα του ελληνικού φασισμού* (How I Kissed Mussolini! The First Steps of Greek Fascism) (Athens: Βιβλιόραμα, 2006), 61-89.

⁵⁵ *Makedonia*, 8-10-1924.

⁵⁶ *Empros*, 22-3-1926.

⁵⁷ Mosse, *op.cit.*, 59-64.

Commander and the Mayor of Thessaloniki, Ioannis Kannavos and Petros Syndikas, praised “heroism,” “supreme self-sacrifice” and the “performance of duty,” that were among the “finest ideals of humanity.”⁵⁸ As in Germany, soldiers were presented as warriors and never as citizens endowed with rights.⁵⁹

The separation of the “fallen heroes” from the rest of society was combined with the perception that reservists were a privileged class. It had not been created by the class struggle, the Viceroy Byron Karapanaghiotis stressed at the parliament (20 February, 1924), but by “the long struggles of the Tribe [...] which had written indelibly our rights, with the spilled blood of our people’s children.”⁶⁰ The worship of the dead, leavened with anticommunist sermons,⁶¹ was used to discursively integrate the veterans in the national body by authoritarian strongmen Theodoros Pangalos and Georgios Kondylis,⁶² as well as by venizelist organizations.

ii. Venizelist Organizations and War Memory

The questions of whether on a symbolic level the war had ended and how would be dispelled its ghosts in people’s consciousness were of great concern to veterans. The royalist faction, burdened with the guilt of defeat, failed to attract reservists of the Asia Minor Campaign.⁶³ The early reservist organizations of the venizelists however presented responses with several ambiguities.

The memorials to the fallen organized by the local National Salvation Associations (NSA)⁶⁴ that supported the venizelist military re-

⁵⁸ *Makedonia*, 15-5-1925.

⁵⁹ *Makedonia*, 15-7-1926.

⁶⁰ Marchetos, *op.cit.*, 68.

⁶¹ *Makedonia*, 9-3-1925.

⁶² Ploumidis, *op.cit.*, 200-1.

⁶³ The Constitutional Youth in February 1924 unsuccessfully attempted to attract soldiers of the class of 1922 with the promise of immediate demobilization. Despoina Papadimitriou, *Από τον λαό των νομιμοφρόνων στο έθνος των εθνικοφρόνων. Η συντηρητική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα 1922-1967* (From a Nation of Legalists to a Nation of Nationalists. Conservative Thought in Greece 1922-1967) (Athens: Σαββάλας, 2006), 75.

⁶⁴ *Kampana*, 3-4 and 17-7-1923.

gime had political symbolism. As Jay Winter argues, commemoration ceremonies were not innovative, in the sense that they reproduced traditional patriotic patterns of remembrance developed prior to World War I,⁶⁵ and the same holds for the NSA ceremonies. The fallen were “beautiful” and “brave guys” who sacrificed their lives for the nation, sprinkling with their blood the foundations of the motherland.⁶⁶ Hiding the harsh reality of war, they acted as stabilizers for the preservation of dominant social values.

Commemorative practices of the venizelist organizations focused on the moral dimension of death and the comradeship of fallen warriors. Indeed, this comradeship was presented as a necessary condition for national unity,⁶⁷ the resolution of social and political problems and the rebirth of the nation.⁶⁸ Despite the defeat, sacrifices were not in vain, as the living had the obligation to emulate the dead soldiers’ responsibility towards community and nation. The fallen who sacrificed for the nation were “ideal citizens,” therefore the living had to imitate the dead to become ideal citizens too.

Secondly, despite the participating members of local communities, these ceremonies reflected the military and war culture. Unlike what happened in Great Britain,⁶⁹ members of the civil society were not commemorated nor any reference to their sacrifices was made. Working women, in particular, were seen as a cause of the frontline collapse and, worse, they limited the prospects of veterans reintegrating into the labor market.⁷⁰ The central figures of the memorial columns and monuments to heroes that the NSA attempted to erect were always dead soldiers.⁷¹

Thirdly, the memory was used politically, mainly against royalists and the Left. Letters from reservists were published in Crete, when the

⁶⁵ Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2-5, 93.

⁶⁶ *Kampana*, 10-4-1923.

⁶⁷ *Kampana*, 17-7-1923.

⁶⁸ *Kampana*, 15-12-1923.

⁶⁹ Alex King, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain. The Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance* (New York: Berg, 1998), 198-9.

⁷⁰ *Kampana*, 27-3-1923.

⁷¹ *Kampana*, 25-9 and 20-11-1923; *Efedrikos Agon*, 24-3-1926.

press attempted to garner the demobilized soldiers' support in favor of the 1922 Revolution.⁷² The royalist former government was the "traitorous regime" responsible for the loss of "irredeemable homelands," while the reservist pioneers of the "Revolution" had to secure the border with Turkey at Thrace. Volunteers would strengthen "the internal front" by maintaining internal security to "consolidate the national spirit." Other traitors were "those teaching anti-military lessons and refusing to serve" the fatherland, i.e., deserters and communists. The reservists were presented as "the future of society, necessary for its progress," while politicians were described as sly exploiters and incompetent. Similar arguments were developed by the first fascist movements in the defeated countries of the Great War.⁷³

While veterans shifted towards the Left and the labor movement,⁷⁴ the cult of the fallen promoted by venizelists highlighted an ideal citizen detached from social and economic needs. The Mytilene committee of the Lesvos NSA presented the reservists as "legalists."⁷⁵ A reservist candidate to the 1923 elections stressed that the reservists shunned the revolutionary overthrow of the social regime, wishing to struggle for social responsibility and justice, respecting the established state.⁷⁶ Similarly, the *Efedrikos Agon* newspaper in Chania sought "good administration" and "peace" in order to heal "the wounds of the wars."⁷⁷ This of course did not preclude claiming privileges, such as the right to vote for reservists who were excluded from participating in the 1923 elections, or pensions.⁷⁸ Reservists in all countries perceived themselves as deserving a "sense of entitlement" thanks to their wartime sacrifices.⁷⁹ Social consensus however posed definite limits.⁸⁰

⁷² *Efedrikos Agon*, 4 and 6-3-1926.

⁷³ *Nea Efimeris*, 22-10, 9 and 11-11 and 10-12-1922.

⁷⁴ Chraniotis, «Το κίνημα των παλαιών πολεμιστών στην Ελλάδα», passim.

⁷⁵ *Kampana*, 24-7-1923.

⁷⁶ *Kampana*, 15-12-1923.

⁷⁷ *Efedrikos Agon*, 16-9-1924.

⁷⁸ *Kampana*, 15-5 and 23-10-1923; *Efedrikos Agon*, 31-5-1924.

⁷⁹ M. Crotty–M. Edele, "Total War and Entitlement: Towards a Global History of Veteran Privilege," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 59, no. 1 (2013): 15-32.

The rejection of war and the acceptance of defeat were related to “cultural demobilization.” This process was primarily determined by the acceptance of peace and the rejection of new wars.⁸¹ These, considered as necessary conditions for the reconstruction and consolidation of democracy, were combined with the policy of national defense.⁸² Expressing some kind of patriotic pacifism, rather similar to the French veterans,⁸³ the Lesvos Reservist Associations who joined the socialist Alexandros Papanastasiou after the December 1923 elections, disagreed that “as soon as [Greece] gets back on its feet, the wind of revenge will blow once again on the Asia Minor plains.” On the contrary, they supported with Venizelos’ position that the country’s post-war mission was to be peaceful.⁸⁴ Demanding that no war of aggression should be declared unless approved by a strengthened parliamentary majority,⁸⁵ they advocated a “people’s democratic army” and armaments to protect the borders.⁸⁶

Future conflicts, however, were not ruled out despite the constant calls for Greece to remain neutral in the event of a new war. At a memorial service for the fallen organized by the Association of National Salvation of Megalo Chorio, in Lesvos, the main speaker contrasted the liberals with the pro-royalists as follows: “The one was burning [in Asia Minor], the other was spoiling. The unjust killing in Sangarios of a hundred thousand brave men, with the unspeakable devastation that ensued, feeds the revenge that has been boiling in Greek breasts since [the fall of Constantinople in] 1453 and continued to boil until 1912, 1913, 1918, 1919, 1920.”⁸⁷

⁸⁰ At the Second Pallesbian Reserve Congress, members were advised not to make “extreme” social and economic claims against the representatives of the island’s elite. *Kampana*, 17-7-1924.

⁸¹ John Horne, “Demobilizing the Mind: France and the Legacy of the Great War, 1919-1939,” *French History and Civilization* 2 (2009): 101-19.

⁸² *Kampana*, 5-6, 10-7 and 18-9-1923.

⁸³ Prost, *op.cit.*, 79-93.

⁸⁴ *Kampana*, 1-1-1924; *Efedrikos Agon*, 24-10-1924.

⁸⁵ *Kampana*, 11-3-1924.

⁸⁶ *Kampana*, 29-4 and 10-8-1924.

⁸⁷ *Kampana*, 17-7-1923.

The Union of National Defense Reservists of Chania (UNDRC) called on the government to act immediately on the issue of Northern Epirus, in the present-day Southern Albania, that had been kept outside the national borders. It considered unthinkable the acceptance of the loss of “national territory and the surrender of [...] Greek populations to foreigners.” The Peace Treaties settlement was not considered final. At the right moment the villages given to Albania would be recovered, together with all Northern Epirus.⁸⁸ In a proclamation to recruits, the presence of the Greek army in Asia Minor was considered “glorious,” while “the shame and contempt of the homeland” should be washed away.⁸⁹ Thus popular revisionism, denying post-war territorial settlements, demanded reversal of the 1922 defeat.

War culture also informed the attitude towards the “internal enemy.” Venizelist reservist organizations exploited the memory of the national wars to marginalize the royalist faction. Its members were denounced “as petty fugitives” who “demolished” the edifice of Greater Greece.⁹⁰ Before the elections of December 1923, the defeat of 1922 was contrasted with the victories of 1918 as sufficient reason for abolishing the monarchy.⁹¹ As the referendum on the Republic approached, references to the war became more frequent. Reservists were urged to remember that they had been turned into “fodder for voracious monarchism,” and used as “slaves of the most dreadful despotism.”⁹²

Memories of front-line incidents with royalist officers, real or fabricated, were enlisted in order to convince reservists to vote for constitutional change. The abandonment of wounded soldiers and violent behavior were exclusively linked to the political identity of the responsible officers.⁹³ In the 1926 elections, UNDRC argued that Greece under Venizelos, representing the “glorious past [...] had the good fortune to arrive at the gates of Agia Sophia,” while the royalists were responsible for national disasters, from the defeat of 1897 to the

⁸⁸ *Efedrikos Agon*, 27-5-1924.

⁸⁹ *Efedrikos Agon*, 17-10-1927.

⁹⁰ *Kampana*, 11-9-1923, 6-3-1924.

⁹¹ *Kampana*, 20-11-1923.

⁹² *Efedrikos Agon*, 7-4-1924.

⁹³ *Kampana*, 11-3-1924; *Efedrikos Agon*, 7-4-1924.

1915 surrender of Fort Rupel to Bulgaria and the uprooting of Asia Minor Hellenism.⁹⁴ Defeat was seen as an opportunity to carry out radical reform.⁹⁵ In short, political present and dreams of a glorious future overdetermined the memory of the 1919-22 Greek-Turkish war.

Venizelist reservists projected intensely in their memories the pairs New Greece–Old Greece, refugees–natives, small but honorable Greece–Greece of the two continents and five seas.⁹⁶ The role of the refugees was positive, since they supported the National Defense movement and as “giants,” together with natives and sharing the common experience of sacrifice, they brought the 1920 Treaty of Sevres and “held the front in Asia Minor,” while soldiers from Old Greece appropriated their lands. The refugees were thus connected with the reservists.⁹⁷

Those who avoided conscription (conscientious objectors, deserters, discharged), considered as internal enemies, were not recognized as citizens of the nation.⁹⁸ Blaming the civil society for indifference to the frontline soldiers’ sacrifices, a reservist from Mytilene noted the role of women: “Our old women only knew how to boast about their lover, their friend, their fiancé. Just words, while he was fighting at the front. They did not even care to support them with a simple letter, with a bunch of newspapers, with a box of cigarettes.”⁹⁹

Patriarchal and conservative notions were widespread. Women’s rights were approached in terms of war sacrifices. Granting civil rights to them was considered impermissible, as reservists were “spilling their guts on barbed wire” during the war.¹⁰⁰ The Lesvos Reservists’ Union demanded that women’s suffrage should only apply to mothers of reservists, who “gave their children to their country.”¹⁰¹ UNDRC systematically attacked working girls as “fleeing birds.” They had to

⁹⁴ *Efedrikos Agon*, 4-11-1926.

⁹⁵ *Efedrikos Agon*, 13-5-1924.

⁹⁶ George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic. Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece 1922-1936* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

⁹⁷ *Kampana*, 4-12-1923.

⁹⁸ *Kampana*, 27-3 and 4-9-1923.

⁹⁹ *Kampana*, 12-6-1923.

¹⁰⁰ *Kampana*, 17-12-1923.

¹⁰¹ *Kampana*, 18-3-1924.

do women's work, as they were not the "glorified soldiers of the battlefields."¹⁰² The "office ladies" were denounced for their involvement in cases of abuse: "Throw out of public offices the silk stockings," which "poison and paralyze state institutions."¹⁰³

In addition to bashing the internal enemy, venizelist reservists took a similar attitude towards the former external enemy. The Turks were still considered barbarians.¹⁰⁴ The prominent author Stratis Myrivilis and others proposed at the Second Congress of the Lesvos Reserve Associations to organize a memorial for the fallen of both armies but did not move the delegates.¹⁰⁵ In commemorative albums for the fallen, emphasis was placed on the achievements of the dead Greek soldiers against both Turkish irregulars and the disciplined army.¹⁰⁶

The selective memory, as regards the officers' actions in the war and their post-war role, shows, among other things, how difficult it was to reject wartime attitudes. The authoritarian Nikolaos Plastiras was a hero, an "honest and manly" leader who had undertaken the "moral cleansing of our land," and moreover kept the island of Lesvos "Greek."¹⁰⁷ The fascist General Georgios Kondylis was recognized as a "worthy soldier" who had performed "miracles" at the front.¹⁰⁸ The Association of Refugee Reservist Soldiers of Thessaloniki recognized General Pangalos' as a gifted and victorious soldier who successfully commanded the army in 1920 and reorganized the defeated army at the River Evros border with Turkey.¹⁰⁹ Although the Lesvos Reservist Associations called for limiting the jurisdiction of the courts martial¹¹⁰ and the abolition of the military salute to off-duty senior officers,¹¹¹ they saw reservists as potential career officers and proposed elevating

¹⁰² *Efedrikos Agon*, 4-8-1924.

¹⁰³ *Efedrikos Agon*, 14-8-1924.

¹⁰⁴ *Kampana*, 11-9-1923.

¹⁰⁵ *Kampana*, 5-6-1924.

¹⁰⁶ *Efedrikos Agon*, 13-10-1926.

¹⁰⁷ *Kampana*, 9-10 and 10-12-1923.

¹⁰⁸ *Kampana*, 4 and 15-12-1923.

¹⁰⁹ *Makedonia*, 13-9-1923.

¹¹⁰ *Kampana*, 27-11-1923.

¹¹¹ *Kampana*, 17-12-1923.

them to officer ranks sidelining the permanent staff.¹¹² Officers who participated in violent military coups were considered, despite their authoritarian tendencies more “honest patriots” than local cadres who were simply “petty politicians and rabble”¹¹³ or the other “herd of politicians who pollute the atmosphere of Athens.”¹¹⁴

Accepting that the war had ended was also used to promote the so-called “reservist war ideology.”¹¹⁵ Reservists claimed an active post-war political role on top of the observance of the “national war contract” that would accord material and moral recognition of their war-time sacrifices.¹¹⁶ The NSA, since their foundation, presented reservists as a unitary class due to their common war experience, especially in the victorious wars until 1921. Styling themselves as the indestructible “new world,” pitted against “vicious political parties,” the “aristocracy of abundant money” and the “ex-combatants.” They invoked a soteriologic mission of national regeneration.¹¹⁷ Claiming to present the 1912-22 generation as self-sacrificed, that saved nation and state, and themselves as the elite of the national idea, they demanded “stronger rights to political power.”¹¹⁸

The age dimension was central to the public discourse of reservists who rallied to the NSA commemorating the wars. The “youthful idea” opposing “senescent minds” signaled a shift to the political Right harmonized to early fascist movements and reinforced by the view that reservist-based national organization had to overcome social classes with strong versions of patriotism and nationalism as its main characteristics, or “philopatry and ethnolatry” in their own dialect. Traditional politicians were called “political flip-flops” and “political party drones” bereft of masculinity and accused even of “feminized” at the crucial moment of defeat. In their moral discourse masculinity

¹¹² *Kampana*, 27-11-1923.

¹¹³ *Kampana*, 4-12-1923; *Efedrikos Agon*, 17-9-1924.

¹¹⁴ *Kampana*, 29-4-1924.

¹¹⁵ Ploumidis, *op.cit.*, 200-1.

¹¹⁶ Joshua Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation. Military Conscription, Total War and Mass Politics, 1905-1925* (Chicago: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 20-43.

¹¹⁷ *Kampana*, 27-3 and 4-4-1923; *Efedrikos Agon*, 28-5-1924.

¹¹⁸ *Kampana*, 3-7-1923.

embodied the values of honor, bravery, and honesty while “rude politicians” represented “corruption,” “degeneracy” and clientelism.¹¹⁹

Such ideas were fuelled all over Europe by radical Right associations of war veterans. They wished to create a new man who would build a society based on the war experience of comradeship.¹²⁰ More massive until 1925 was, however, the veterans’ movement associated with the communist that used memory to express opposition to war and militarism and its explicit disgust for army institutions.

“War against War”: Communist Veterans and War Memory

The delay in “cultural demobilization” can be ascribed to many factors. Explicit or implicit denial of defeat, refusal to recognize the external enemy, positive acceptance of war and the army, refusal to rehabilitate deserts and political opponents, but mainly the absence of official symbolic recognition of war sacrifices, that only came in 1925 with the establishment of an annual national memorial of the fallen and the erection of Syntagma Square monument to the “Unknown Soldier” (1932). The anti-war feelings of a good part of Greek society however were maintained and even strengthened by leftist veterans’ movements that promoted “cultural demobilization.”

The First Founding Congress of Old Warriors and Victims of the Army, held in May 1924 in Athens, denounced the atrocities committed by troops on both sides while the enemy, especially the ordinary Turkish soldier or citizen, was restored to a human dimension. Treated as an equal, he was presented as equally victim of nationalist myths cultivated by the leaderships of both countries: “We were even accustomed to crime. How many of us –let us not forget this– did not commit savage acts against innocent populations, just out of habit, without any particular intent, similar to the barbaric Turks! Acts for which they now repent, of course. And yet many of us still find it difficult, even now to expose that lie about our population (i.e., that it was ethnically superior), which we certainly saw even then.”¹²¹

¹¹⁹ *Kampana*, 3 and 24-7 and 4-9, 23-10-1923, 1-1-1924.

¹²⁰ *Mosse, op.cit.*, 34-69.

¹²¹ *Πόλεμος κατά του Πολέμου. Αποφάσεις του Πρώτου Πανελλήνιου Συνεδρίου Παλαιών Πολεμιστών και Θυμάτων Στρατού* (War against War. Resolutions of the First

Equally it was emphasized that the war, instead of leading to liberation destroyed the country and all its peoples, without racial, ethnic or religious partiality.¹²² Admitting the atrocities and underlining the real causes of the war and the unjust sacrifices made became prerequisites for organizing a movement to prevent a new war. Defeat and the war experience were to be turned into opportunity for social and political liberation: “People cannot free itself neither from tyranny, nor from deprivation and exploitation, nor from the threat to its life unless it exposes the lie and begins its struggle by telling the truth first and foremost, no matter how surprising, no matter how much it may surprise, no matter how much it may conflict with the traditional and the ordinary.”¹²³

The Greek Communist Federation of Old Warriors and Victims of the Army joined the International of Old Warriors and Victims of War, essentially accepting to transform an eventual war into a revolution. In other words, the unequivocal condemnation of war was topped by planning and organized struggle to fight militarism with its own weapons. It proposed, in essence, the mobilization of all social forces in the cause of anti-militarism and social revolution. Both war culture and pacifism were rejected.¹²⁴

Memorials to the fallen, however, were not rejected. George Mosse’s view of the weakness of the Left as regard the worship of the dead side step communist veterans’ organizations that organize nationwide commemorative ceremonies with ideological content opposite to those of the state and conservative or liberal organizations. They adopted these ceremonies as part of their political praxis and through them they advanced ideological and political interventions.

Initially, the occasion to project their particular war memories was given by funerals of murdered members of local veterans’ associations. On March 14, 1924, a member of the Piraeus Old Warriors’

Panhellenic Conference of Old Warriors and Army Victims) (Athens: Έκδοση Παλαιού Πολεμιστή, 1924), 37.

¹²² *Πόλεμος κατά του Πολέμου*, 38.

¹²³ *Πόλεμος κατά του Πολέμου*, 37.

¹²⁴ Henry Barbusse, «Το επαναστατικό κίνημα των Παλαιών Πολεμιστών» (The Revolutionary Movement of the Old Warriors), *Κομμουνιστική Επιθεώρησης* (1924): 194-8.

Union was murdered while placing posters for a political meeting. At the meeting his fellow fighters erupted with anger on learning the murder. Organized in four-person groups with black flag to symbolize mourning plus simple wreath, veterans paraded through the city, accompanied invalid ex-servicemen and war widows. Singing the somber march “You fell victims, brothers and sisters, to an unequal battle and struggle” and shouting “Revenge! Revenge!,” “Down with the war!” and similar slogans headed for the cemetery where the funeral was to be held. Their speeches emphasized that “the murderous weapons that killed Kokkinas are the same weapons that the veterans faced on the various fronts.”¹²⁵ The murder was a strong signal that war violence continued. The resolution adopted unanimously by the union’s general assembly before the funeral identified the movement’s objectives. While glorifying the memory of those who died in the wars they would not allow any government to “bleed anew the people.”¹²⁶ However, the honoring of the dead differed both in the meaning of death and in the interpretation of the wars.

The Associations of Old Warriors and Victims of the Army (AOWVA) through commemoration ceremonies offered a different, a marxist interpretation of the events, focusing especially on the Ukrainian and Asia Minor campaigns. Characteristically, the memorial speeches in commemorations of the fallen that took place in Nikaia of Larissa and Nemea in the Peloponnese, in September 1924, deconstructed the metaphysical and religious explanations that the wars were “God-willed” and that the dead were “victims of nature or of Death.” The wars were imperialist and that were organized by the bourgeoisie for profit.¹²⁷

In all these commemoration ceremonies the fallen were presented as “unjustly killed,” “slaughtered,” “victims who fell serving the interests of the plutocracy and the imperialists.” Death was neither “nice” nor “heroic” but unjust and illegal instrument of exploitation to serving the profitability of capital. The blood and bones of the fallen, the unburied bodies “[...] lying in the valleys and deserts of the

¹²⁵ *Rizospastis*, 17-3-1924.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Rizospastis*, 13 and 22-9-1924.

Ukraine and Asia Minor”¹²⁸ defined for the communist old warriors not any national space but bourgeoisie’s enrichment and the exploitation of the working-class.

Apart from deconstructing the idea of “heroic death,” the commemoration ceremonies opposed nationalism and militarism. At the funeral of an old warrior in Arachova (18 January 1925), the speakers stressed that the homeland was the “bait by which the various exploiting plutocrats manage to send the poor workers and peasants to all sorts of massacres in order to serve their own interests, thus making them kill their own brothers and sisters workers and peasants of other countries.”¹²⁹ A few months earlier, in Iasmos, near Komotini, the Union of Old Warriors prevented the delivery of “patriotic speeches” by the local garrison governor and a civil servant.¹³⁰ The explicit rejection of national chauvinism and the promotion of internationalism¹³¹ however did not mean abandonment of patriotism. In their conception, struggling for workers, peasants and soldiers or confiscating the property of the rich who benefited from the war and protecting the poor aware patriotic act.¹³²

In contrast to the mythical war experience, mass death, suffering and hardships were highlighted with particular intensity in the radical rituals and memories. Mourning for the war dead thus took on a crucial political meaning being translated into anger and indignation at the consequences of the war and also into political demands bringing forward oaths for revenge and restitution for the unjust distribution of war sacrifices.¹³³ Through the memory of the war workers and peasants were to learn how to demand and how to fight.

Apart from the experience of the war itself, the memory of the war also shaped by the difficult reintegration into Greek society, a factor making necessary the holding of memorial services for the fallen. The main concerns, determining the veterans’ behavior, were social isola-

¹²⁸ *Rizospastis*, 13 and 22-9, 28-11 and 21-12-1924.

¹²⁹ *Rizospastis*, 25-1-1925.

¹³⁰ *Rizospastis*, 9-9-1924.

¹³¹ See the obituary of Anatole France, activist of the anti-militarist movement. *Rizospastis*, 15-10-1924.

¹³² *Rizospastis*, 23-12-1924.

¹³³ *Rizospastis*, 21-12-1924.

tion and marginalization, as well as the feeling of abandonment by the state, plus unemployment and economic difficulties.¹³⁴ In the columns of *Rizospastis*, descriptions of personal stories focused on the fact that the victims of the war came from the popular strata.¹³⁵ In general, ex-soldiers were not presented as warriors, heroes cut off from society and lacking any notion of their own rights, but as citizens whose embodied pain and suffering constituted a new force that objectively furthered class struggle.¹³⁶

The UOWVA also treated war widows and orphans as citizens who enjoyed fundamental and unalienable rights. Their commemorative rituals highlighted issues such as unemployment, the obscene post-war poverty and the speculation on the price of items necessary for workers' survival or the provision of pensions and social protection for war victims. Recruiting of representatives of the UOWVA in the committees to combat speculation in commodity prices and currency exchange rates or forcing employers to hire unemployed reservists and war victims show focus on controlling these processes.¹³⁷

Images of the invalid veterans decorated with medals on their chests begging in the streets or of unemployed old warriors and their contrast with privileged strata who had benefited from the war, rendered invalid the notions of "heroic death" and sacrifice. The widespread sense of social injustice was also expressed by sections of the conservative press.¹³⁸ Even military authorities occasionally justified it as based on state indifference: "It was therefore natural to think that the State, consisting of plutocrats, was indifferent to the misery of the reservists and that the overthrow of the present regime and its replacement by a working-class regime would be the best solution to achieve their rights."¹³⁹

¹³⁴ *Rizospastis*, 9-3-1925.

¹³⁵ *Rizospastis*, 11-10-1924, 25-1-1925.

¹³⁶ *Rizospastis*, 4-10-1924.

¹³⁷ *Rizospastis*, 17-3-1924, 1-1 and 9-3-1925.

¹³⁸ *Empros*, 13-10-1923.

¹³⁹ General State Archives [hereafter GSA], Archive Political Office of the Prime Minister [hereafter APOPM], 995: "Communist Bulletin of the First Fifteenth of December 1925," 7.

For popular strata it was clear that the contradictions and injustices of bourgeois society continued after abandoning citizen life for the front line. A tobacco worker, referring to the tobacco merchants' tactics of sustaining unemployment through exporting unprocessed tobacco, could say: "[...] we the poor gave our own blood for five years in order to guard the factories and the fortunes of those few who have become powerful by drinking the workers' blood and sweat." The same could also add regarding the attitude of the state: "[...] thus, we remain for whole months without work, for months and months without any provision being made by society for us, the unemployed people. They remember us only, when they send us to the various Fronts in order to protect them from the enemy."¹⁴⁰

An unemployed reservist decried, in 1924, the state's indifference for the employment of veterans and the futility of war sacrifices: "[...] Those who became rich when we suffered in the Dag and all other glorious and destruction now continue their plunder while we are starving! None hears our voice! What would they need us now?"¹⁴¹

Commemorative ceremonies were used to link the anti-war sentiment with the prevailing feeling of social injustice. Condemnations of war were not limited to the initial demands for peace.¹⁴² The slogan "War against War" dominated these rituals expressing a passionate call for revolution and the radical overthrow of the capitalist system that caused wars. The ceremonies addressed survivors with a future-oriented rhetoric while memorials to the fallen were used for advancing the establishment of workers', poor peasants', and soldiers' power. This rhetorical orientation contrasted with the worship of the fallen countering the slogan "eternal memory" with the slogan "eternal revenge."¹⁴³

The commemorations of the fallen organized by the UOWWW were characterized by a specific ritual, rich in symbolism, which highlighted the meanings and messages of the commemorative speeches. They were held on Sundays in local churches and in the metropolitan

¹⁴⁰ *Rizospastis*, 23-9-1923.

¹⁴¹ *Rizospastis*, 29-4-1924.

¹⁴² HAM, Statute no. 314, "Federal Mutual Aid Association of Old Warriors of Thessaloniki," 27-12-1922.

¹⁴³ *Rizospastis*, 13-9, 17-10, 30-11, 21 and 23-12-1924.

churches of the cities. Considering the Communist Party's attitude towards official church this choice is perhaps surprising. However, local associations respected the Orthodox tradition of commemorating the dead, grafting on it their own messages. Instead of seeking to promote their own positions on religion they displayed here a flexible and successful tactic. Churches being the main places where poor people met and communicated, especially in villages, they were ideal spaces for mass intervention.

The organization of the ritual reflected militant workers' demonstrations. In Livadia the commemoration was programmed for October 5, 1924. The local Veteran Association propagated the memorial the previous day covering the town with wall posters, while on the planned day four old warriors sounded with trumpets the appeal for mass participation of the people. Assembling at the offices of the Veterans Association lined up forming a quasi-military parade and then marched to the local church and the cenotaph of the fallen. The procession's head was decorated with a black flag and the banner of the union, while solemn music sounded and the old warriors uncovered their hands in mourning. The relatives of the fallen stood in front of the cenotaph while old warriors orderly lined up on both sides in full order discipline.¹⁴⁴

Similar scene witnessed in many other commemorative ceremonies. Processions were usually organized in lines with four marchers each, while a decorated wreath accompanied the black flag.¹⁴⁵ Prominent participants were veterans, widows, and orphans of the war. The ceremonies usually marked by broad participation of the local community,¹⁴⁶ were combined with gestures of solidarity to the war victims,¹⁴⁷ protests against state repression, campaigns to organize workers in trade unions¹⁴⁸ or the reservists in the UOWVA.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴ *Rizospastis*, 17-10-1924.

¹⁴⁵ *Rizospastis*, 28-9 and 28-11-1924, 1-1-1925.

¹⁴⁶ *Rizospastis*, 28-9 and 17-10-1924, 1-1-1925.

¹⁴⁷ *Rizospastis*, 13-9-1924.

¹⁴⁸ *Rizospastis*, 28-9-1924.

¹⁴⁹ *Rizospastis*, 2-2-1925.

Church and police authorities, however, fought the organization of such memorials. In the town of Amfissa, announced the local veterans' association local clerics called on the police to ban the memorial service, but without success.¹⁵⁰ In Fichtia, the parish priest tried to expel mourners from the church while a counter demonstration of "indignant citizens" organized outside the church "shouted" during the ceremony.¹⁵¹ In Aigio, the police ban was followed by arrests of members of the veterans' association while church authorities forbade all clergymen to perform the holy service, an act which disturbed the crowd.¹⁵² Reacting to ecclesiastical offence, the veterans demanded respect for the dead who had "shed their blood for the homeland that now belongs to exploiting drones."¹⁵³

State repression culminated in the metropolis of Athens in December 1924. The Michalakopoulos ministry banned a memorial service organized by the Athens and Piraeus UOWVA. Using water cannons, it broke up the initial veterans' gathering in Omonoia Square. The veterans reacted by distributing leaflets and calling on the crowd to head to the metropolis, which they did. The end of the commemoration was followed by extensive police violence with cenotaphs broken, wreaths trampled and veterans beaten. Eventually the police opened fire and widows and war orphans were wounded. Seventeen old warriors, widows, and orphans, as well as the president of the Athens Bourse de Travail and the secretary of the General Confederation of Workers of Greece were arrested and imprisoned. Characteristically, even the Union of Reserve Officers proclaimed its protest stressing that the government deprived the veterans even of their right to honor their own dead in a religious way.¹⁵⁴

In conclusion, the commemorative practices and rituals of the UOWVA were determined by the brutal war, the harsh social and economic living conditions of the poor and political polarization and repression. They accepted as their members women and orphans in-

¹⁵⁰ *Rizospastis*, 28-9-1924.

¹⁵¹ *Rizospastis*, 3-11-1924.

¹⁵² *Rizospastis*, 14 and 23-12-1924.

¹⁵³ *Rizospastis*, 22-9 and 3-11-1924.

¹⁵⁴ *Skrip*, 22-12-1924.

cluding them in collective actions. In particular, they tried, as shown by the ceremonies, to transform the trauma of war from a shameful burden into an important social, political, and cultural asset to further their egalitarian demands and, more generally, their revolutionary class struggle. Their anti-war sermons advanced far beyond the demonstration of moderate pacifist opinions. While they did not develop into a paramilitary organization, they used a military-style discipline before and during the commemorations, as well as a military terminology in their slogans and speeches. The communist movement tried to familiarize the popular strata and workers through the UOWVA and the commemorative ceremonies with disciplined organization and structured collective action.

With the dissolution of the Old Warriors' Unions by Pangalos dictatorship and the decline of the movement in 1925 commemoration ceremonies faded away. In the 1930s, the discussion on the commemoration of the war centered on the erection of the monument to the "Unknown Soldier." The Communist Party opposed it considering that it distracted workers from their real problems and prepared them to accept new wars.¹⁵⁵

Conclusion

The Asia Minor Campaign with its inglorious and tragic ending turned the management of the war memory in interwar Greece into an important field of contestation. Its politicized management, directly linked to the objectives and social agendas of state institutions, political and social organizations, and the war veterans themselves resulted in the fragmentation of the war memory. All three major political camps –royalists, venizelists, and leftists– developed their own versions. Contrary to what happened in the rest of Europe, the version of memory expressed by communist-led organizations initially dominated Greek reservists. It weakened only gradually after 1925, as official bodies assumed responsibility for memory management and the state violently repress veterans' organizations.

¹⁵⁵ *Rizospastis*, 26 and 27-3-1932.

*Lazaros Vasileiadis**

**The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (1923) and the Greek Council Act (1931):
How these Legal Instruments defined the Fate of the Greeks
in the Soviet Union and the Stalinist Regime in the 1920s-1930s**

The Greeks in the Soviet Union and the Convention (1923)

For centuries, Tsarist Russia became a hospitable environment and a place of settlement for many Greeks in the Ottoman Period. The resettlement of Greeks from Pontus and Asia Minor to Russia was continuous from the 15th to the 20th century and its pace corresponded to the unstable state of Russo-Turkish relations and the constantly disturbed relationship between the Greek state and the Ottoman Empire. This *migration path* was largely influenced by the conditions prevailing in the Ottoman Empire, but also by the promising conditions in the host country as an extremely extensive colonization program of the Tsarist regime aimed at the economic development and social empowerment of the regions of Southern Russia and the Caucasus. This circumstance prompted large groups to leave the Ottoman Empire with the aim of escaping political and religious oppression.¹ In addition to the mass emigration, many Greeks also moved to Russia intending to find better working conditions. These workers did not settle permanently at Tsarist Russia, but they worked there when they could not find work in their homeland. This seasonal immigration, which often resulted in perma-

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¹ Konstantinos Fotiadis, *Ο Ελληνισμός της Ρωσίας και της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης* (The Hellenism of Russia and the Soviet Union) (Thessaloniki: Herodotos, 2003), 17-39; Panaretos Topalidis, *Ο Πόντος ανά τους αιώνες* (Pontus throughout the centuries) (Drama: n.p., 1929), 238; Isaak Lavrentidis, *Οι εκ Σοβιετικής Ενώσεως Έλληνες ποντιακής καταγωγής και τα εκ της συνθήκης της Λωζάνης δικαιώματά των* (Greeks of Pontic Origin from the Soviet Union and their Rights according to the Treaty of Lausanne) (Athens: The Committee of Pontian Studies, 1986), 15-17.

nent settlement, gradually led to a further increase of the Greek proportion in the Russian Empire.²

A typical example of mass and forced emigration of Greeks took place during the First World War, when a large part of the Greek population decided to leave the nearest provinces of the Ottoman Empire and settle on the Russian borders. This situation became more extensive over time, partly due to the terrible persecutions and expulsions of the Greek population from the coastal towns of the Black Sea into the interior of Turkey, and partly due to the advance of Russian troops into the Turkish provinces. After the social unrest of the October Revolution, the Russian troops left the Ottoman territory following the Soviet peace program that supported the idea of “no annexations or indemnities.” The Russian withdrawal caused nearly 85,800 Greeks to abandon their homes and property and follow the Russian army for fear of Turkish aggression.³

This group of people settled in various parts of the Caucasus and in Southern Russia near their relatives and countrymen who had fled there in previous emigrations. Another group of more than 60,000 Greeks from the Kars district tried to escape the Turkish attacks in March 1918 by leaving their villages and fleeing to Georgia. 40,000 of them fled to North Georgia, while the rest reached Caucasus, Kuban, and the Russian coast of Black Sea.⁴ The Greek state estimated that nearly 150,000

² Artemis Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou, «Μεταναστεύσεις Ελλήνων στον Καύκασο κατά τον 19^ο αιώνα» (Emigrations of Greeks to the Caucasus in the 19th Century), *Δελτίον Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Μελετών* 10 (1993): 105, <https://doi.org/10.12681/deltiokms.97>.

³ Artemis Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou–Ioannis K. Hasiotis, «Ο Α΄ Παγκόσμιος Πόλεμος και οι Έλληνες της Ρωσίας και του Πόντου» (The First World War and the Greeks of Russia and Pontus), in *Οι Έλληνες της Ρωσίας και της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης* (The Greeks of Russia and the Soviet Union), ed. Ioannis K. Hasiotis (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press 1997), 175-184, 562; Topalidis, *Ο Πόντος ανά τους αιώνες*, 208-09, 213, 222-24, 225.

⁴ Fotiadis, *op.cit.*, 98; Lavrentidis, *op.cit.*, 13.

Greeks had fled to Russia since 1912,⁵ while there were numerous estimates that put the number even higher (160,000).⁶

After the unsuccessful Greek military presence during the Ukrainian campaign in 1919 and the final Bolshevik domination in the southern Russian region, the Russian hospitable environment turned into an unsafe and problematic environment for the Greeks. Due to this disorderly and hostile situation, many Greeks were forced to abandon the Russian land and flee their homes or temporary accommodation. In April 1919, a part of the Greeks of Southern Russia left in order to enter the Greek state. Their number amounted to 9,015 and settled in: Syros 366, Pravion 99, Chios 300, Piraeus 2,608, Imvros 5, Lemnos 95, Nafplio 12, Aegina 277, Athens 426, Kefallinia 140, Trikala 320, Volos 1,153, Mytilene 251, Thessaloniki 1,473, Hydra 196, Lavrio 858, Spetses 436.⁷

On the other hand, the fact that the Armenians decided to enter into an armed conflict with the Turks, put great pressure on the Greek population of Anti-Caucasus and, in conjunction with the expansion of the Bolsheviks, they decided to emigrate to Greece at any cost.⁸ Under these circumstances, from May 1920 to the end of February 1921, 52,878 Greeks fled to Thessaloniki. Most of them came from Armenia, the rest from Georgia. The first 10,000 of these refugees settled in various parts of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, while a large group settled in Central Macedonia. In general, the Greek population settled in the following areas: Thessaloniki, Pella, Kilkis, Drama, Veroia, Nigrita, Yannitsa, Kavala, Sidirokastro, Kozani, Tirnavos, Soufli, Kypseli, Serres, Saranda Ekklesies, Elassona, Lagada and other areas. The deplorable

⁵ Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter DIAYE), Archive of the Central Service, 1934, B/13/A/10, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Political Affairs to the Ministry of the Interior, Directorate of Urban Police, 27 January 1934.

⁶ Andreas Zapantis, *Ελληνο-Σοβιετικές Σχέσεις 1917-1941* (Greek-Soviet Relations 1917-1941) (Athens: Estia, 1989), 25.

⁷ Michail Ch. Ailianos, *Το έργο της ελληνικής Περιθάλψεως* (The Work of the Greek Ministry of Welfare) (Athens: Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1921), 58.

⁸ Grigorios Tilikidis, *Οι Καυκάσιοι Έλληνες. Προ και μετά την Ρωσικήν Επανάστασιν. Με πίνακα στατιστικής του πληθυσμού και της σχολικής κινήσεως* (The Caucasian Greeks before and after the Russian Revolution. With a Table of Population and School Statistics) (Athens: Frantzeskaki and Kaitatzi, 1921), 12.

state of health of some Caucasian refugees infected with the causative agent of exanthematic typhus prompted the Greek Ministry of Welfare to buy out the British hospitals established during the military operations in Macedonia. In particular, the 43rd, 50th and 52nd British hospitals of the Kalamaria and the 28th hospital of the Harman-Kioi district were purchased.⁹

After the end of the so-called War Communism 1918-1921 in Russia, the Greeks who stayed behind tried to adapt to the New Economic Policy and the emergence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Greeks in the Soviet Union composed of three main categories: the holders of Soviet citizenship, the Greek Orthodox population expelled from Pontus and considered Greek nationals according to the Convention, and the old inhabitants of Russia who were Greek nationals.¹⁰ The implementation of NEP prevented –somehow– their tendency to flee. Also, the regime's tolerance of the existence of small property and the emergence of small businesses and shops provided some rudimentary freedom in the economic sphere. The Greek population was particularly important to the Soviet Union since the majority of those Greeks were peasants and constituted the tobacco planters of the region, an extremely useful group for the needs of the Soviet economy. The Greeks of Soviet Union knew how difficult life was in Greece, they had the intuition that they should not leave their homes, and as long as they could live in peace, they tried to be useful to their relatives in Greece instead of going to the Greek state and being a burden to them.¹¹

Moreover, the failed Greek campaign in Asia Minor, the abandonment of the Treaty of Sèvres and the renegotiation at Lausanne, and the general political and economic problems of the Greek state became fur-

⁹ Ailianos, *op.cit.*, 59, 467; Alexandros Garyfallos–Paraskevas Savvaidis–Dimitrios Christodoulou, «Οι υγειονομικές υπηρεσίες στο Μακεδονικό Μέτωπο» (The Health Services on the Macedonian Front), in *Thessaloniki during the First World War*, ed. Giannis Megas (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2015), 44-46.

¹⁰ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1925, 4.6, From the Director of the Exchange Office A. Fokas to the Political Office of the Prime Minister, 17 December 1925.

¹¹ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1935, B:2/P/3, Gr. Grammatikopoulos presented some basic facts about Hellenism in the Soviet Union, as well as the general situation in which this population was in during this period with a series of publications in the newspaper *Vradini*.

ther reasons for the Greeks who lived in the Soviet Union to stay where they were. The framework of Lausanne Peace Conference (November 20, 1922-July 24, 1923) represented the new balance of power between Greece and Turkey and established the new legal conditions for the co-existence of the two states. The Acts agreed upon in Lausanne clarified and organized border, property and administrative issues and determined the fate of millions of people who had to abandon their homes and properties. The Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was signed at Lausanne on January 30, 1923. This Convention stipulated that from May 1, 1923, there had to be a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion residing in Turkish territory and Greek nationals of the Muslim religion residing in Greek territory. These persons did not have the right to return to Turkey or Greece without the permission of the Turkish Government and the Greek Government, respectively.¹²

Article 3 of the Convention stated that the Muslims who had already left Greece and Greek Orthodox who had already left Turkey were to be considered part of the population exchange. The Convention mentioned those Greeks and Muslims who had left the territories since October 18, 1912. According to this article, every single Greek Orthodox, who had come to the Russian territory from Asia Minor and Pontus since that date and until 1923 should have been included in the population exchange. The Greek population that had decided to leave the nearest Turkish provinces and settle on the Russian borders, as well as many Greeks who had left Russia between 1919 and 1921 and settled in Greece, fulfilled the requirements of the Convention, which defined the cases that were eligible for the exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations.

Under Article 7 of the Convention, the emigrants would lose the nationality of the country they left and would acquire the nationality of the country of their destination on their arrival in the territory of the latter country. Emigrants who had already left one country or other and

¹² Nikos Zaikos, «Το Προσφυγικό ζήτημα στην Ελλάδα. Η διεθνής δικαιοκή προοπτική» (The Refugee Issue in Greece. The International Legal Perspective), in *Refugees in Macedonia: From tragedy to epopee*, eds. Ioannis S. Koliopoulos and Iakovos D. Michailidis (Athens: Society for Macedonian Studies, 2009), 30-31.

had not yet acquired their new nationality acquired that nationality on the date of signature of the Convention.¹³ Accordingly, the article proved that Greeks who had fled to the Russian territories had acquired the right to become Greek nationals since January 30, 1923. The Greek Law 3098/1924, which was essentially based on the Exchange Convention, established the procedure that the displaced refugees had to follow in order to acquire Greek citizenship. The Greeks, who had fled abroad from Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace, and Pontus since October 18, 1912, had the right to be registered in the civil registers of the Greek state. For the displaced Greek population who had settled in the Soviet Union, the procedure required the in-person presence of the applicants at the Greek Embassy in Moscow, as an oath had to be taken before the application could be submitted. The consular authority would then forward the documents to the Ministry of the Interior and then to the competent Greek Prefectures to complete the registration.¹⁴

In addition, Article 10 provided that the movable and immovable property of persons, who had already left the territory of the High Contracting Parties and were deemed to be included in the population exchange in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, was to be liquidated. That liquidation was about to be carried out independently of any measures of any kind whatever, under the laws passed and the regulations of any kind enacted in Greece and Turkey since October 18, 1912, and they had resulted in any restriction on rights of ownership over the property in question. As regards expropriated property, it was incumbent on the Mixed Commission to carry out a revaluation of such property, if it had been expropriated since October 18, 1912, having previously belonged to persons liable to the exchange of populations in the two countries, and was situated in territories to which the exchange applied. The total amount of this compensation had to be carried to the credit of these owners and to the debit of the Government on whose territory the expropriated property was situated. On the terms of this Article, the displaced refugees of the Soviet Union were entitled to

¹³ "Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations," *The American Journal of International Law* 18, no. 2, (Apr. 1924): 84-86, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212847>

¹⁴ On the acquisition of Greek citizenship by Greeks of Asia Minor and Thrace who are refugees abroad, 3098/1924 (Greek Law), Arts.1-8.

compensation for their liquidated and expropriated property if they managed to enter the Greek state.¹⁵

In 1924, the Greek state established normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. After two months of negotiations in Berlin, Greece de jure recognized the USSR on March 8, 1924. When Eleftherios Venizelos returned to Greece in December 1923, he acknowledged that the Greek state should have established diplomatic relations with the Soviet government much earlier, not only because of the general interests of the country, but also for the sake of the large Greek community in the USSR. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states had a palliative effect on the lives of Greeks in the Soviet state.¹⁶ An example of the restoration of diplomatic relations and a factor of cooperation between the Greek state and the Soviet Union was the exchange of 3,000 Armenians living in Greece with 3,000 Greek refugees who had settled in the Soviet Union.¹⁷ The special agreement was signed between the Greek state and the Soviet Union on October 8, 1925. The same policy was repeated during the new government of Eleftherios Venizelos 1929-1933, when about 7,000 people emigrated from USSR to Greece. During the same period, several thousand Armenians left Greece and settled in Soviet Armenia. On December 30, 1931, the first group of Armenians, about 1,500 people, left Piraeus for Batum. It is estimated that a total of 8,000 to 10,000 Armenians settled in the Soviet Union during 1931-1932.¹⁸

After the normalization of relations between the Greek state and the Soviet Union, the Greek population felt more comfortable continuing to live in the Soviet state. However, many states that resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union much later than Greece rushed to sign a consular agreement at the same time and open consulates in at least some cities other than Moscow something which was avoided by Greece. The problem was that the lack of consular representations de-

¹⁵ "Convention Concerning the Exchange," 84-86.

¹⁶ Zapantis, *op.cit.*, 136-37.

¹⁷ DIAYE, Central Service Archive, 1926,14:3, According to the Archive, in November 1925, 3,019 Armenians living in Greece were transferred to Soviet Armenia, following the special agreement between the Greek and Soviet governments.

¹⁸ Ioannis K. Hasiotis, "Armenians," in *Minorities in Greece. Aspects of a plural society*, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), 97.

prived the Greek population in inaccessible and remote areas of their right to turn to a Greek consulate in case of need. For example, if a displaced refugee wanted to be registered in the civil registry of a Greek town, he had to travel a long way to reach the only consulate in Moscow. The consequences of this flawed policy led to a host of problems for the Greek population. Local authorities began to regard Greeks as no longer foreigners, and the first violations of the law against Greeks took place without any reaction or direct consular protest. This gave the impression that Greeks could be subjected to pressures that were certainly more difficult to apply in other cases and to other population groups.¹⁹

At the end of 1931, the Soviet government declared to the Greek Embassy that those who claimed to be foreign nationals had to present the necessary documents to the local Soviet authorities. Greeks scattered throughout Russia may not have been aware of this serious provision, and thus the existence of some consular authorities became an unfulfilled necessity, since the consular service, which was supposed to provide information to compatriots, was never sufficient. The Soviet authorities took advantage of the difficulties of the Greek population in obtaining the necessary documents and began to force them to obtain Soviet certificates. This situation became increasingly difficult during the Stalinist regime.

The Stalinist Exclusive Rule in the 1920s-1930s

It is a well-known fact that during the Stalin Era (1928-1953) everything in the USSR had been radically transformed and this alteration happened in every single sector of the society. From an agrarian country with small individual agriculture, the Soviet Union transformed into an intensive industrial country with collective, large scale mechanized agriculture, and the Stalinist system can best be summed up as a blend of bolshevism and one-party rule, industrialization, mobilization, and total control, Stalinism paranoia and the use of Terror. Stalin and the Party used three fundamental instruments to ensure the Soviet people's par-

¹⁹ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1935, B:2/P/3.

ticipation in their domestic policies by using persuasion, incentive, and coercion.²⁰

The Stalinist economic model and the Five-Year plans succeeded in developing heavy industry, which was essential to the survival of the Soviet Union during World War II, but the goal of running an industrial program that was exempt from foreign investment completely compromised the agricultural way of life. Peasants had to sacrifice their property and land for industrial plans. Stalinist Russia had focused on controlling the peasantry to support the industrialization program which became a high priority issue. The acceleration of collectivism and the elimination of the kulaks as a class became one of the main goals of Stalinist Russia and collectivization was organized to provide the necessary investment funds and cheap food for the industrial working class.²¹ According to this statement, if someone tries to find an answer to the question “Who paid for the Soviet industrialization?” the answer is quite simple, probably the peasants did because most of them lost their property through confiscation and had to work in labor camps.²²

Mass repression became a useful tool and one of the main means by which the authorities dealt with social unrest and the changing character of repression in the 1930s reflected the changing character of the Soviet state. Campaigns of mass repression were directed against different groups at different times and became a weapon of the totalitarian regime and a perfect means of targeting hostile elements of the society. During the collectivization and industrialization process, mass repression was used as part of the class struggle to establish the Soviet power of the dictatorship of the proletariat, while after the victory of socialism, this kind of repression of people had changed and became a constitutive part of Soviet nation-building. Once the class enemies were defeated, the

²⁰ Richard Sakwa, *The Rise and the Fall of the Soviet Union 1917-1991* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 193; Steven J. Lee, *Stalin and the Soviet Union* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 29; John M. Thompson, *Russia and The Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present* (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2009), 250.

²¹ John Paxton, *Leaders of Russia and the Soviet Union: From the Romanov Dynasty to Vladimir Putin* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 109; Sakwa, *op.cit.*, 179.

²² Peter Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 96.

mass oppression techniques targeted an increasingly vast range of social and then ethnic groups.²³ Of course, the class war did not begin under Stalin's regime, but he was responsible for various brutal measures directed against the majority of people who were considered enemies of the state.

Dekulakization became the first paradigm that led the Stalinist regime to organize, test, and witness the first mass deportation of countless people. The main goal was to force the peasants to join the *Kolkhozes*, using the weapon of fear to make them surrender their land to the collectives. "It was a second civil war, this time against the peasants."²⁴ The Party demanded the land that the Revolution had given to the same peasants. This class war became an attempt by the state to destroy class resistance in the countryside. With dekulakization, the Stalinist regime had its first experience of uprooting and removing millions. Party and police officials targeted supposedly rich peasants and other anti-Soviet elements.²⁵

In January 1928, Stalin visited Siberia, where, despite a good harvest, little grain could be procured, and decided that was necessary to declare the class war against the prosperous peasants.²⁶ The Party had debated this question for years, but only reached a consensus under Stalin's leadership in late 1929. Stalin first announced the elimination of the kulaks as a class in December 1929 and the Politburo and the Internal Security Police took collectivization and dekulakization even more seriously in 1930.²⁷ What happened in late 1929 and 1930 was radical. The Stalinist leadership roiled the peasants by following a systematic policy toward the agrarian population. The authorities targeted first certain regions and later the whole country. By 1937, at the end of the sec-

²³ David Shearer, "Social Disorder, Mass Repression and the NKVD during the 1930s," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 42, no. 2 (April-December 2001): 519.

²⁴ Alexandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956*, abridged by Edward Ericson Jr. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc, 2002), 428.

²⁵ Michael Gelb, "An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans," *The Russia Review* 54, no. 3 (July 1995): 389, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/131438>

²⁶ Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution in Russia 1928-32," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 1 (January 1974): 40, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/260267>

²⁷ Lynne Viola, "The Other Archipelago: Kulak Deportations to the North in 1930," *Slavic Review* 60, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 733-34, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2697493>

ond Five-year Plan, private ownership of land was abolished. Simultaneously with the collectivization campaign, Stalin announced the abolition of the kulaks as a class. However, there was never a precise definition of the term *kulak*, something which played a crucial role because that term was used by the government as a political weapon against those who tried to resist. When the authorities defined peasants as kulaks and they were believed to have had a surplus, they took away their property. Accordingly, many peasants accepted life on the collective farms for fear of being labeled kulaks. What was clear is that collectivization related to dekulakization and dekulakization was exactly like a constant robbery.²⁸

The Stalinist leadership tried to ignite and intensify the class war in the villages by luring the poor peasants with privileges and material interests. Material interests led the poor peasants to denounce their richer neighbors for concealment because many tried to hide what they owned, but concealment was a crime. The eradication of the so-called kulaks, merchants, and the supposedly rich, inevitably led to the destruction of the social identity of these people and the creation of another social class of stigmatized, exiled, and imprisoned people who were considered enemies of the Soviet Union. These circumstances forced workers to seek for better working and survival conditions and thus to change jobs. The state met the above problems with cruelty. With the introduction of the compulsory work booklet and the reintroduction of the so-called internal passport, the Soviet authorities took care not only to restrict the free and constant movement of the labor force but also to reduce and control the mass movements of society as a whole.²⁹

Stalin achieved the hitherto impossible; to incite a class struggle in the village and to eliminate once and for all the cases of private land ownership and capitalist economic forms. The peasants' resistance was exclusively passive, as they were unable to protect themselves. In many cases, they slaughtered their domestic animals. It is estimated that between 1928 and 1933, peasants slaughtered 46.6% of cattle, 47% of

²⁸ Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR 1917-1991* (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1992), 166.

²⁹ Gianna Katsovska-Maligkoudi, *Ιστορία της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης (1917-1991)* [The History of the Soviet Union (1917-1991)] (Thessaloniki: Gutenberg, 2012), 146.

horses, and 65.1% of sheep. The slaughter of the cattle led to a significant reduction in population because of the famine.³⁰

After 1933, the Soviet authorities focused on securing the country's major cities, new industrial centers, and other strategically important regions. New campaigns were organized to crack down on the socially dangerous elements and protect not only the cities but also the borders of the Soviet Union.³¹ Stalin's directed prosecutions, against the administrative, technical and financial strata of the managers and directors of factories and industries, led to the complete replacement of the old workforce, which came from the old tsarist urban environment, with employees brought up by Bolshevism and were preferably coming from the working class.³²

Some researchers support that the ethnic target groups played a minor role before 1937, as "the Gulag's tastes were cosmopolitan rather than racist."³³ Even though collectivization was not supposed to have an ethnic dimension, there are numerous examples that prove otherwise. The period between 1936 and 1938 became a period of staged trials and arrests aimed at destroying any potential enemy of the Soviet Union. Soviet ethnic cleansing was transformed from partial removal of stigmatized ethnic groups into a total removal in 1937. Since July 1937, Stalin had targeted almost everyone, attacking every single person who might be a potential enemy. The order issued in July 1937, had been formulated against kulaks, criminals, and anti-Soviet enemies. On November 7, 1937, Stalin declared that enemies should be eliminated as the kinship of groups. According to this, if someone was targeted as a hostile element, it could affect their relatives.³⁴ These brutal measures became a practice of collective responsibility because in many cases, when one member of the family was stigmatized, the other family mem-

³⁰ Martin McCauley, *The Rise and the Fall of the Soviet Union* (London: Routledge, 2013), 145.

³¹ Pavel Polian, *Against their Will: The History and Geography of Forced Migrations in the USSR* (New York: Central European University Press, 2004), 93.

³² Katsovska-Maligkoudi *op.cit.*, 150.

³³ Gelb, *op.cit.*, 391-92.

³⁴ Golfo Alexopoulos, "Stalin and the Politics of Kinship: Practices of Collective Punishment, 1920s 1940s," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 1 (January 2008): 92, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27563656>

bers were also affected. NKVD Order No. 00486 provided for a practice whereby wives were necessarily punished along with their husbands. This practice was ended by the new Order No. 00689 in October 1938. Campaigns against anti-Soviet elements continued into the 1940s. Since class was no longer a primary criterion, repression of social and then ethnic groups became the primary means of dealing with what was seen as social disorder. Under Stalin, mass repression became the essential means of Soviet nation-building.³⁵

The Greek Refugees on the Run

All the above considered, it was quite palpable why both the Greek displaced refugees from Turkey and the rest of the Greek population of the Soviet Union tried to find an immediate way to Greece. The issue of the so-called *repatriation of the Greeks from the Soviet Union* and the various public debates on this subject came to the fore again in 1929-1930, after the implementation of the Soviet law on agrarian reform. The compulsory agricultural collectivism affected the Greek population of the Soviet Union as arable land was taken away from the peasants, several plots of land belonging to the wealthy peasants were confiscated, and those who remained were forced to join the collective farm cooperatives. The Greek Embassy in Moscow was pressured by Greek peasants, tobacco planters and refugees to issue their passports. Applications were made either exclusively by the applicants themselves to the Greek Embassy, or through petitions from their relatives who assured that they were able to accommodate and financially support their relatives.³⁶

The Embassy sought support from church and communal bodies to reassure the rural population. The uproar was great among the Greek displaced refugees, and the other Greek inhabitants of the Russian territories, who were asking by thousands to be issued with passports and to be allowed to leave for Greece. There were some exceptions of persons, but the Embassy was asked to further reduce the exceptions to a

³⁵ Terry Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," *The Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 4 (December 1988): 837, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/235168>; Paxton, *op.cit.*, 109; Shearer, *op.cit.*, 534.

³⁶ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1940, B16/B/P/B Πολιτική, Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

minimum, and as it was difficult to define precisely all the exceptional cases of these refugees, and consequently of the old peasants and tobacco planters, it was decided that the Embassy should not be empowered to issue passports unless they were demonstrably wealthy.³⁷

The Greek state needed time to make important decisions, as it had to take into account another factor namely, the question of the transfer of the Greeks' deposits, which were in Soviet banks if they left the country. On this question, the Embassy informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that according to the decision made by the Soviet authorities on February 19, 1929, the amount of money to be granted to those who were about to leave the Soviet Union was fixed and related exclusively to the immediate costs of departure and not to the export of money or property. According to the Soviet authorities, anyone wishing to dispose of assets could do so only within the boundaries of the Soviet Union and under Soviet jurisdiction.³⁸

Under this condition, the Greek families that came to Greece were deprived even of the absolute minimum of subsistence, while the lack of land, housing, and settlement posed enormous problems for the Greek state. Another reason which prevented the Greek government from approving of the arrival of a large number of Greek applicants was the danger of the transmission of communist ideas, because according to the government, the emigrants from the Soviet Union tended towards communism, since they were large families whose children had been educated and brought up in Soviet schools, and who –according to many beliefs in Greek public opinion– had been influenced by the principles of Bolshevism.³⁹ All these questions troubled the Greek government, and there was discussion as to whether it would be possible to transfer Greeks who could afford to have 1,000 dollars for their settlement. A large nominal list of names of Greeks who were to emigrate with their families was sent to the Embassy in Moscow by the Ministry of the Welfare. However, this idea was abandoned, and it was decided

³⁷ Zapantis, *op.cit.*, 247-48.

³⁸ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1934, B:13/A/4, the Embassy informed the Foreign Ministry about the decision of the Soviet authorities concerning the amount of money that was granted to those who were leaving the Soviet Union, The Soviet authorities made that decision on February 19, 1929.

³⁹ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1934, B:13A F. 5th 20.000-25.000.

to allow a limited number of persons under exceptional circumstances and after strict control.⁴⁰

The most important question which the Greek government had to resolve was that of the displaced Greek refugees who had fled to Russian territory and who were considered part of the population exchange program under the terms of the Convention. There was an ongoing discussion on two main issues. The first issue was the procedure that the displaced refugees had to go through in order to obtain Greek citizenship according to the Greek Law 3098/1924.⁴¹ The second one was the decision on whether they should have been allowed to settle in Greece. The issuance of the Certificate from a Greek Municipality or Community confirming the individual's registration in the male registry records was also a necessary factor for receiving the compensation claimed for the property they had abandoned in Turkey.

Initially, meetings were held to simplify the law and help the Greek refugees. Discussions concerned the circumvention of the submission of that certificate for the beneficiaries of compensation of those who were living in Russia at that time. The refugees were only required to present the certificate of nationality issued by the Greek consular authority in Moscow, instead of the above-mentioned certificate. The simplification of the Greek law would be the perfect solution for the displaced Greeks because those who were registered in foreign civil registers were recognized by the Soviet authorities as regular Greek citizens and received a temporary residence permit, which was renewed every year.

This question, however, was closely connected with the other question of their will to settle in Greece. After repeated consultations in 1929-1930, the Greek government agreed that the simplification of the formalities of Law 3098 should be postponed. The main reason for this was that Greeks would have had the right to apply for settlement in Greece without prior permission from the government, if the certificate issued by a Greek Municipality or Community confirming the person's entry in the men's registers, and no Greek consular authority could have refused to issue passport. According to the Greek state, only the ex-

⁴⁰ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1934, B:13/A/10 35/000-38/000.

⁴¹ On the acquisition of Greek citizenship by Greeks of Asia Minor and Thrace who are refugees abroad, 3098/1924 (Greek Law), Arts-1-8.

changeable population was estimated at 150,000. They were struggling in the Soviet Union, and it was certain that they would seek a better fate and live near their relatives. Moreover, there was a strong possibility that they would ask the Greek state to take care of their needs, as was the case with the rest of the population that settled there after the signing of the Convention.⁴²

On February 5, 1930, two deputies of Pontic origin, Iasonidis and Nikolaidis, met Venizelos and asked him to allow the repatriation to Greece of at least certain categories: first, those who were demonstrably wealthy and had means to settle in Greece without, of course, being in the least dependent on the assistance of the Greek state; second, those who had been left in the Soviet Union without a protector, since they had all been rehabilitated in Greece; and third, those who had disposed of all their property. Those belonging to the third category, which according to the Ministry of the Welfare included about 1,200 families, were to be re-examined to check whether they had in fact sold their property and, on the other hand, their freedom of movement was to be in parts of 100 family passports.⁴³

The Greek Council Act (1931) and its Outcome

The Greek Council of Ministers reached agreement on that important issue affecting the Greek population of the Soviet Union and decided on January 24, 1931, that individuals and families would be permitted to come and settle in the Greek state if they met some essential requirements. More precisely, these requirements had to be humanitarian, since Greek public opinion was not in favor of admitting an unlimited number of refugees, fearing that this would lead to unrest in Greece. According to the Council Act signed that day, some special cases had the right and permission to emigrate such as married couples that one spouse remained in the Soviet Union, while the other had already settled in Greece and the elderly and defenseless people (sisters, children, and other close relatives) whose guardians were in Greece and who had no one left in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it was decided that those who

⁴² DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1934, B/13A/10.

⁴³ Zapantis, *op.cit.*, 249; DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1934, B:13/A/10 35/000-38/000.

had been sentenced to exile or imprisonment by the Soviet authorities should also be allowed to enter Greece. It was decided that the above cases fell within the jurisdiction of a committee composed of senior officials of the Welfare, Foreign Affairs, and Interior Ministries. This committee had an advisory role, and the final decision on cases rested with the Minister of Welfare. At the same time, the Welfare Department had to inform the President of the Government when there were special and well-grounded cases of affluent families, who could decide on any particular case.⁴⁴

The oppressive situation of the rural population induced many Greeks to settle in Persia, as settlement in Greece was almost impossible. Thus, the Persian countryside became a welcome environment for many peasants of Greek origin who decided to leave USSR from 1931 to 1932. However, on October 2, 1933, the Greek Embassy in Moscow informed the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs that despite the fact the Persian state used to accept Greek peasants from the Soviet Union, the Persian government had recently decided to refuse to accept any more Greeks, since many of the Greeks had gone there as farmers and tobacco planters without even knowing this profession, and therefore they were living in extreme poverty and the Persian state had to provide for them economically, causing many problems in the state budget. According to the Persian government, if the Greek government was able to pay compensation for the families' expenses, the Persian government would have no objection to accepting the resettlement of the Greek population from the Soviet Union if it had such a guarantee.

The Greek Embassy in Moscow proposed a specific program for solving the problem, according to which a passport would be issued to a small number of families, for example 300, after ascertaining whether they were indeed capable and suitable for tobacco cultivation, and if they succeeded in settling there, the same procedure would be followed with other families. According to this plan, once the first group had been admitted, the settlement of the second group could be organized, and so on, without placing an excessive burden on the Greek State budget. The Greek government reacted negatively to the Embassy's pro-

⁴⁴ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1933, B:13/A2 20/000-30/000, the Act of the Ministerial Council No Prot. B/14:1931 signed on January 24, 1931.

posals, stating that the Greeks who applied to emigrate to Persia ultimately aimed to settle in Greece, since only a few Greeks who had emigrated to Persia eventually settled there.⁴⁵

On May 7, 1933, the Greek Embassy in Moscow sent a letter to Prime Minister Panagis Tsaldaris informing him that the total number of Greeks registered in the consular registers from 1924 to 1933 was 100,000. Taking into account the Greeks who were not registered, the number of Greek nationals amounted to nearly 110,000, of which 85,000 were rural and 15,000 urban. According to the Embassy, since the restoration of Greek-Soviet relations in 1924, 50,000 people had left Soviet Union by 1933. The Consul appealed to Tsaldaris to take measures for the Greeks of the Soviet Union, since the barbaric measures—as the Consul mentioned—presented the Greeks of the Soviet Union with numerous problems on the part of the Soviet authorities.

Under these circumstances, it was requested that the Embassy should have been granted the right to issue at least the passports of the Greek urban population, since they were in great danger. If they were sentenced to imprisonment or banishment by the Soviet authorities, it would be extremely difficult for the Embassy to apply for their expulsion, since the Soviet Government generally followed the principle that foreign nationals sentenced by the Soviet authorities and the Soviet courts had to remain in prison for a considerable time before their expulsion could be accepted. It was obvious that this Soviet principle was equivalent to certain death. The Consul added that some Greeks of the rural population had deposits so that they could settle in Greece. He also asked for permission to propose to the Soviet Government not to deport the Greek nationals, but to expel them to their country, Greece.⁴⁶

The Greek state did not yield to change its policy on this question, in spite of the efforts of the consul. On the contrary, another Greek Law 6076/1934 provided for the civil rehabilitation of Greek nationals who had settled in the Greek State since 1912, following the Agreement on Population Exchange. The law became the deadline for the expelled

⁴⁵ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1934 /B:8/A/3, the Greek Embassy in Moscow informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the Persian Consul's response, October 2, 1933.

⁴⁶ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1937, 71.1, information from the Greek Embassy to Panagis Tsaldaris, 7 May 1933.

Greek refugees of the Soviet Union. A few years later, the Royal Decree 330/60 clarified that the Greek population that came from Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria, and Northern Epirus met the requirements for civil rehabilitation if they had settled in the Greek state between 1912 and 1934. When the deputy of the Greek Parliament, Isaac Lavrentidis, asked a question in 1983 about the municipal rehabilitation of some refugees from Russia who lived in the district of the municipality of Acharnes, he received as an answer that according to Royal Decree 330/60 the basic condition for the civil rehabilitation of this group was the fact that they had to have fled to the Greek state by 1934.⁴⁷

On June 15, 1937, Greek Embassy in Moscow informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the number of Greek nationals in Soviet Union, that the number of Greek nationals in Soviet Union, who were registered in the consular lists, was 55,000 and that to this number should be added 5,000 more who were registered in the old lists but not in the new lists. According to Greek Embassy, many Greeks were pressured to have Soviet citizenship certificates issued. Moreover, the number of registered persons was certainly lower than the earlier estimates of 110,000. Of the registered persons, 37,745 had declared themselves as farmers, while 17,221 were given as residents of rural areas. The exact number of registered Greeks was thus 54,966.⁴⁸

In 1938, the members of the Association of Greeks who came from Russia in Athens tried to convince the Greek Government to find a final solution to the massive problem of the Greeks of the Soviet Union. They mentioned that: “The previous governments had avoided addressing the issue of the gradual incorporation of the Greek refugees from Soviet Union. On the contrary, these governments created very tight borders that did not allow a family that had relatives in the Greek state to permanently enter the Greek territory until the family members had been expelled from the Soviet Union [...]” The Association asked the Permissions Committee to allow the entry and settlement without restrictions of any refugee family whose members had relatives in Greece

⁴⁷ Lavrentidis, *op.cit.*, 55. On the rehabilitation of the displaced persons, 330/60 (Royal Decree), art.2.

⁴⁸ DIAYE, Archive of the Central Service, 1937, 71.1, The number of Greek nationals in the Soviet Union, June 15, 1937.

who were able to provide for their accommodation and financial support. In addition, the Greek state had to accept the members of refugee families who had deposits or valuables on Greek Embassy or in Greek banks. They also mentioned that the committee could hold meetings twice a week to speed up the process of accepting these Greeks.⁴⁹

Despite the Greek Association efforts, it was too late for all the Soviet Union Greeks. The Stalinist policy of ethnic cleansing against the Greeks had as its milestone December 17, 1937, for on that day the Soviet authorities began to arrest all Greeks who did not live in Greek communities. After that, arrests of Greek adult males occurred in the Greek communities in the greater Mariupol area. Many men were arrested and taken to labor camps. The Greeks of Mariupol were accused of trying to establish an independent Greek state in southern Russia. A report from Greek Embassy to the ministry Foreign Affairs, dated April 14, 1938, states that the number of those arrested amounted to 2,400.⁵⁰

The situation of the Greek population was extremely critical and there was a danger of a massive oppression of the Greek part of the Soviet Union. This fact forced the Greek state to take decisive measures to protect the persecuted Greeks and all those who were threatened with imprisonment or even execution. On October 20, 1938, the Ministry Foreign Affairs informed Greek Embassy in Moscow that it was authorized to issue passports to the families of prisoners and displaced persons, to those wanted by the Soviet police and their families, to those deported by the Soviet government and their families, and to all those to whom the Embassy granted permission to enter the Greek state. This decision underlines the role of the Embassy to protect as much as possible the Greek part of the region that was in danger. On July 30, 1940, the Department Passport Control of the Ministry Public Security informed the Ministry Foreign Affairs that from January 1938 to June 1940, 20,572 Greeks from Soviet Union had settled in Greece.⁵¹

⁴⁹ DIA YE, Archive of the Central Service, 1938, B19/B16a/P F. 2.

⁵⁰ DIA YE, Archive of the Central Service 1938, B13/B/3/P.

⁵¹ DIA YE, Archive of the Central Service 1940 46.1; DIA YE, Archive of the Central Service, 1940/46.4, Tables of Greek nationals who expelled from the Soviet Union.

Conclusions

The Convention on the Exchange of Greeks and Turkish Populations was signed in Lausanne on January 30, 1923 and established the obligatory subjects of the compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion residing in Turkish territory and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion residing in Greek territory. This Convention gave the Greeks, who had fled Turkey before the Lausanne Peace Conference, the right to be considered as part of the population to be exchanged and as Greek nationals. According to the provisions of the Convention, the displaced refugees who remained in Soviet Union were entitled to compensation for their liquidated and expropriated property.

Despite the difficulties, they tried to survive in a time of constant change and turmoil, each claiming what they could gain in order to live. The revolutionary period in Russia, which saw confiscations, requisitions, and attacks based on the revolutionary laws, shook the Greek population and forced many of them to flee their homes and temporary shelters in 1919-1921. Shortly after, the adoption of the New Economic Policy 1921-1927 reduced the need for Greeks to flee to Greece, but this was short-lived and ended during Stalin's exclusive rule of Soviet Union. The phenomenon of mass oppression transformed into many different forms in the 1920s and 1930s; from class oppression, the target moved to social oppression and then transformed to ethnic oppression. If one were to summarize what happened in the late 1920s and 1930s, one could easily say that every single group was marginalized or politically suspect at some point during this period. The kulaks, socially excluded populations, and ethnic minorities became victims and targets of the Soviet authorities.

In the 1930s, the Greek state was unable to take in more refugees and immigrants from Soviet Union and set up a well-organized plan for the settlement and integration of another large number of Greeks. Greece was a defeated, deeply divided, economically and socially devastated country, which also faced an acute refugee problem combined with the hygiene problem of the great masses, as well as a food problem, since almost all of its rudimentary production infrastructure had been destroyed. As a result, the government used various restrictions to prevent a new significant wave of Greek population from settling there. In

the following years, the Greek population of Soviet Union was at the mercy of Stalinist actions against the various ethnic groups, which had begun a few years before the eve of the World War II.

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**The Role and the Importance of the Dodecanese Islands
in the Strategic Planning of Britain and Italy
during the Period 1935-1939^{*****}**

Introduction

During the Italo-Turkish war (1911-1912), the Italian troops occupied the Dodecanese Islands (April-May 1912). What began as a tactical maneuver, it was evolved in a military occupation that lasted until the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) which ceded the Islands to the victorious Italy.¹ The British expressed their concern about the occupation of the Islands, owing to their strategic position close to the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits.² However, the First World War brought Italy to

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¹ Brian R. Sullivan, “The Strategy of Decisive Weight: Italy, 1882-1922,” in *The Making of Strategy*, eds. Murray Williamson–Knox MacGreagor–Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 324-326, 345.

² R.J.B. Bosworth, “VI. Britain and Italy’s Acquisition of the Dodecanese, 1912-1915,” *The Historical Journal* 13, no. 4 (December 1970): 686-691, http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0018246X00009468; P.J. Carabott, “The Temporary Italian Occupation of the Dodecanese: A Prelude to Permanency,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 4, no. 2 (July 1993): 285-312, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299308405886>

the side of the British and their allies and London agreed in 1915 to cede the Islands to Rome as a war prize. Nevertheless, when the post-war negotiations began, the British and the Americans, for ethnographic, diplomatic, and military reasons opted to grant the Islands to Greece rather to Italy. Yet, the defeat of the Greek expeditionary force in Asia Minor, the firm attitude of the new Italian Prime Minister, Benito Mussolini and the change of the British government after the election of 1924, led to the annexation of the Islands by Rome when the Lausanne Treaty officially came into force on 6 August 1924.³

In the following years, the Islands became the only Possession, “Il Possedimento” of Italy and a diplomat, Mario Lago, was appointed governor of Dodecanese on 28 August 1924.⁴ Lago initiated a policy of Italianisation and urban development in order to demonstrate the beneficial aspect of Italian colonialism. At the same time, the Italian Navy (Regia Marina) began development of a naval base on the island of Leros.⁵ The Islands were of strategic importance to Italy. Their proximity to Asia Minor, the Dardanelles, the Suez Channel and the Middle East enhanced the Italian presence and diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Initially, until 1927, the primary function of the Islands was that of a base of operations against the new-born Republic of Turkey. However, the domestic stabilisation of the new state forced Italy to abandon its aggressive policy and pursue a more Ankara-friendly one.⁶ Their strategic position close to the Dardanelles enabled the Ital-

³ Aggeliki Sfika-Theodosiou, *H Italia στον Πρώτο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο. Οι σχέσεις της με τις μεγάλες δυνάμεις στην Ελλάδα* (Italy in the First World War. The Relations with the Great Powers and Greece) (Athens: Papazisis, 2004), 27-28, 345, 347, 350-351, 369-373.

⁴ Regio Decreto Legge (hereafter RDL), no. 1355, 28/08/1924, *Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno d'Italia* (hereafter *GU*), no. 214, 11-9-1924.

⁵ RDL, no. 1854, 15-10-1925; *GU*, no. 258, 06/11/1925; RDL, no. 1355, 28/08/1924; *GU*, no. 214, 11/09/1924; Sfika-Theodosiou, *op.cit.*, 373-374; Simona Martinoli–Eliana Perotti, *Architettura coloniale italiana nel Dodecaneso 1912-1943* (Torino: Edizioni Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1999), 36-37; Nicholas Doumanis, *Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean. Remembering Fascism's Empire* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1997), 44-45.

⁶ Prokopis Papastratis, “Balkans Revisited: Great Powers Penetration and Conflict in the Interwar Period and the Mediterranean Connection,” in *The Seas as Europe's External Borders and the Role in Shaping a European Identity*, eds. Marta Petricoli–

ian forces to monitor the Italian sea routes in proximity and as a result, the Islands were mostly a place of naval interest.⁷

Initially, the occupation of the Dodecanese Islands by Italian military forces brought British supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean into question, but it was not until the second half of 1935 that Britain began to consider the Italian Mediterranean policy as a threat to its interests in the region. Until then, Britain's position in the Mediterranean could not be disturbed as long as her naval bases in Gibraltar and Malta and the control of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea guaranteed free passage to the oil fields of the Near East and to India. After the end of the First World War (1918), Britain's aims were fulfilled by the assignment of mandates by the League of Nations for Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. As a consequence, she secured the control of the Suez Canal's neighboring territories lying northwards. Furthermore, Imperial Airways inaugurated flights from London to India through territories which were exclusively under the guardianship of the British Crown (for example airports were established in Basra, air and naval bases in Bahrain).⁸ Hence the British enjoyed a sense of stability and tranquility in the Mediterranean basin, while in Europe the Covenant of the League of Nations and the expectations that the Locarno Treaties had created, guaranteed European peace and security.

The Dodecanese during the Abyssinian Crisis (1935-1936)

i. Britain, the Abyssinian Crisis and the Dodecanese

The British view that the Mediterranean route served as a safe link between Home Waters and the Far Eastern Dominions remained un-

Antonio Varsori (Florence: Lothian Foundation Press, 1993), 106-108; Dilek Barlas, "Friends or Foes? Diplomatic relations between Italy and Turkey, 1923-1936," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, no. 2 (May 2004): 232-243; RDL, no. 379, 14/04/1932; *GU*, no. 99, 29/04/1932.

⁷ Maria Gabriella Pasqualini, *L'esercito italiano nel Dodecaneso 1912-1943. Speranze e realtà* (Roma: Stato Maggiore Esercito, 2005), 242.

⁸ Diplomatic and Historical Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter DIAYE)/1936/64/5, No. 1065, Vasileios Dendramis (Cairo) to MFA, 6-4-1936; David Omissi, "The Mediterranean and the Middle East in British Global Strategy, 1935-39" in *Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-39*, eds. Michael Cohen–Martin Kolinski (Basingstoke, 1992), 3.

changed until the second half of 1935. As a result of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute (1934-1936) and Mussolini's intention to upset the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean, London started to re-evaluate the country's political priorities and its naval strategy in the region, in order to face a possible Italian attack effectively. At the same time, both countries started to consider the possibility of an escalation and even of war between them.

The preventive measures taken by the British government were: "1. The strengthening, in men and material, of the defences of Malta. 2. The despatch of the Mediterranean Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean and its reinforcement by certain units of the Home Fleet. 3. The despatch of some naval units and one air unit to Gibraltar. 4. The reinforcement of the Royal Air Force in Egypt."⁹ In addition, the British government imposed an embargo on the exports of war material both to Italy and Ethiopia, while on 29 August 1935 the Mediterranean Fleet left its naval base in Malta and proceeded to Alexandria, where it was stationed up to July 1936.¹⁰ In response, significant reinforcements were shipped by metropolitan Italy to its overseas territories and among them, Dodecanese.¹¹

During August and September 1935, London in its exploratory contacts with the governments of the Balkan Pact (Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Rumania) tried to secure their support regarding the application of economic sanctions against Italy, according to article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.¹² With respect to the Mediterranean members of the Balkan Entente –namely Greece and Turkey– the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) had concluded that the two countries could assist

⁹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939* (hereafter *DBFP*), II/XIV/586, No. 458 (J 4667/I/I), Sir S. Hoare to Sir E. Drummond (Rome), 19-9-1935.

¹⁰ Arthur Marder, "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36," *The American Historical Review* 75, no. 5 (June 1970): 1331, <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/75.5.1327>.

¹¹ Nir Arielli, *Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 1933-1940* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 43; Rosaria Quartararo, "Imperial Defence in the Mediterranean on the Eve of the Ethiopian Crisis (July-October 1935)," *The Historical Journal* 20, no. 1 (March 1970): 193-194, 208-209.

¹² Manolis Koumas, "Britain, the Ethiopian Crisis and the Balkan Entente, 1935-1936," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 10, no. 2 (2010): 177, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2010.486946>

British air and naval forces. In the case of Greece, it was suggested that Navarino Bay –the so-called Port “X”– could be used as an operational base since Malta was vulnerable to an air attack and since it was in the same distance from Libya and from the Italian air base on Leros. But this option was finally abandoned and Alexandria was chosen as a more suitable candidate for a naval base. Consequently, the strategic value of Greece was diminished.¹³ Besides, if the British occupied Navarino then Greece might seek recompense from them, for example their approval for the incorporation of the Dodecanese into Greece in the case of an Italian defeat or a guarantee of her territorial integrity in the event of an Italian attack.¹⁴

Turkey, in contrast, was intended to play a more important role than Greece in British defence policy and during this period Turko-British relations began to rapidly improve. In its reports the Sub-Committee of the CoS mentioned that Turkey’s geographical position –close to the countries of the Middle East and especially Iraq– was of significant strategic importance for British communication arteries in the Eastern Mediterranean and imperial interests in the Middle East, India, and the Far East. Moreover, Turkey was opposed to Italy’s intention to control the Eastern Mediterranean and supported actions taken by the members of the Balkan Entente against Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy. Therefore, from this point of view, British and Turkish interests were identical, for the Italian naval and air bases in the Dodecanese threatened Turkish territorial integrity and British lines of communication to an equal degree.¹⁵

Greece and Turkey promptly noticed the Italian actions in the Dodecanese. For instance, in January 1936, according to information provided to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs by fugitives from the Islands, the Italian authorities in Rhodes were spying the activity at the

¹³ Koumas, op.cit., 176, 179.

¹⁴ James Barros, *Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions. Ethiopia 1935-1936* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1982), 93.

¹⁵ Süleyman Seydi, *The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers: From the Montreux Convention to the Early Cold War, 1936-1947* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2003), 40; Koumas, “Britain,” 176.

Greek and the British Consulates there.¹⁶ On the other hand, the local Italian authorities suspected the Greek and the Turkish consulates for espionage. In its part Turkey was alarmed by the military built up in the Islands. The correspondence of the Italian diplomatic staff shows that Turkey throughout the 1930s was afraid of the Italian activity because of Rome's aggressive initiatives in the previous decade. Even though Rome was repeatedly trying to reassure Ankara that the fortifications of the Islands were nothing more than "a preventing action against possible British enemy activity," the Turks were unconvinced.¹⁷ Consequently, Turkey turned to London in order to protect itself from a possible Italian attack.

ii. Britain, Turkey, and the Dodecanese

In November 1934, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras stated to the Lord Privy Seal and Minister for League of Nations Affairs Anthony Eden that "the Turkish and Greek Governments had decided to increase their naval force so as to double the defensive power of their two fleets." Aras added that the two governments would prefer to place the shipbuilding orders in Britain and would also require a loan. London refused to grant a loan for armament purposes, which would be used as a countermeasure against Italian policy in the Dodecanese. Aras also maintained to the ambassador of Britain to Ankara Sir Percy Loraine that the equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean "has meanwhile been disturbed to Turkey's disadvantage during the last five years by Italian Government's action in arming and fortifying certain islands of the Dodecanese in close proximity to Turkey mainland, and later still by decision of Italian Government to build two 35,000-ton battleships." But both Loraine and Eden explained to the

¹⁶ DIA YE/1937/2/9, no. 79, Consulate of Smyrna to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31-1-1936.

¹⁷ Barlas, op.cit., 232-233, 237; *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* (hereafter *DDI*), Serie 8, Vol. I, doc. 812, Mussolini to Galli, 25-8-1935, 843; II, doc. 125, Suvich to Mussolini, 16-9-1935, 111-112; doc. 170, Galli to Mussolini, 24-9-1935, 152-154; doc. 171, Mussolini to Galli, 25-9-1935, 154-155; III, doc. 689, Galli to Mussolini, 17-4-1936, 740-741; IV, doc. 111, Galli to Mussolini, 26-5-1936, 130; V, doc. 278, Bastianini to Ciano, 24-10-1936, 320-323; VI, doc. 94, Ciano to Mussolini, 27-1-1937, 116-117; Papastratis, op.cit., 112-113.

Turkish Minister that if Turkey and Greece proceeded to expand their navies, then there would be “the danger of competitive naval construction on the part of Italy” and discouraged him from putting this plan into action. Loraine particularly assured Aras “that the fears of the Turkish Government in respect of Italian naval construction were exaggerated, and that Italy’s intentions were entirely pacific.”¹⁸

At the end of September 1935 during the League Assembly in Geneva, the Turkish Minister informed Eden that “Italian activity in fortifying the Dodecanese was considerably preoccupying the Turkish Government. In particular, the construction of aerodromes was causing them some anxiety, and would compel them to increase their own air force and undertake costly works of defence on the coast of Anatolia.”¹⁹ According to a secret report written by the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Greek Foreign Ministry Panayiotis Pipinelis it appeared that Turkey had tried by bargaining with the British to elicit from them not only their advance consent on the question of the fortification of the Straits, but also on a favorable settlement on the Dodecanese issue in return for Turkey’s assistance in Palestine or in Egypt, in the event where these two areas were under attack by Italian forces.²⁰ Aras had suggested to Eden that the most preferable choice could be the granting of autonomy to the Dodecanese “in the event that these were liberated as a result of war operation against Italy.”²¹

Continuing his report, Pipinelis described the meeting between Aras and Maximos on 28 September 1935. In parallel with his discussions

¹⁸ For an account of these conversations see DIAYE/1934/A/3/12, no. 2629 (secret), Sakellaropoulos (Ankara) to Maximos, 9-12-1934; *British Documents on Foreign Affairs* (hereafter *B DFA*), II/B/33/152, No. 46 (E 30/30/44), Sir P. Loraine (Angora) to Sir John Simon, 26-12-1934; II/B/33/157, No. 13 (E 477/30/44), Consul (Geneva) to Sir John Simon, 21-1-1935; II/B/33/151, No. 60 (E 854/854/44), Sir P. Loraine (Angora) to Sir John Simon, “Turkey: Annual Report 1934,” 31-1-1935; II/B/33/198, No. 54 (E 933/933/44), Sir P. Loraine (Angora) to Mr. Eden, “Turkey: Annual Report 1935,” 31-1-1936; Dilek Barlas-Seçkin Barış Gülmez, “Turkish-British Relations in the 1930s: From Ambivalence to Partnership,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 54, no. 5 (May 2018): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1462163>

¹⁹ *B DFA*, II/B/33/198, No. 54 (E 933/933/44), *ibid.*

²⁰ DIAYE/1935/AAK24, Panayiotis Pipinelis to Panagis Tsaldaris, Athens, 3-10-1935.

²¹ Constantinos Svolopoulos, *The Dodecanese Question During the Second World War. Greece, Turkey and the Allies* (Athens: Academy of Athens, 2013), 20.

with Eden, Aras had also approached the Greek Foreign Minister in order to find a joint solution regarding the Dodecanese. Turkey's Foreign Minister mentioned to Maximos that it would be advisable to request from Italy without delay, the assurance of disarmament of the Islands and the security of their inhabitants, if a war erupted in the near future. He also confided to him that he had previously discussed the matter with the Italian government. Aras continued saying that his primary interest lay in the disarmament of the Dodecanese and the establishment of a three-mile sea zone around the Turkish coasts. For these reasons, he added, Turkey intended to buy out all the islets adjacent to Asia Minor's coastline, including Castellorizo. Maximos on his part, could not agree with the above-mentioned Turkish schemes. He pointed out to Aras that the issue of the Dodecanese would be brought up for discussion after the end of an eventual war and stressed that Greece would obviously demand the integration of the Dodecanese into Greek territory. Finally, both agreed not to raise the issue in any form.²² But in November Aras again proposed to Loraine that the settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis should be completed with a general Mediterranean agreement, "one of his principal lines of argument being connected with the Italian position in the Dodecanese."²³

As mentioned above, the initiatives taken by Turkey in the diplomatic field aimed not only at securing her Asia Minor coast from a possible Italian attack from the Dodecanese, but also at using the fortification of these Islands as a pretext in order to achieve the remilitarization of the Straits. Eden, the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, had understood that "the Turkish Government wished to raise the question of the Dardanelles, and to discuss that in relation to the fortification of the Dodecanese, with a view [...] to either both the Dodecanese and the Straits being unfortified or the Turkish Government being given permission to refortify."²⁴

Finally, in April 1936 Britain gave her consent to the remilitarization of the Straits and with the conclusion of the Montoux Convention (20

²² DIAYE/1935/AAK24, *ibid*; Svolopoulos, *op.cit.*, 19-20.

²³ *BDFA*, II/B/33/198, No. 54 (E 933/933/44), *ibid*.

²⁴ *DBFP*, II/XVI/489, No. 118 (E 1654/26/44), Mr. Eden to Sir P. Loraine, Foreign Office, 24-3-1936.

July 1936), Turkey acquired the control of the area.²⁵ Justifying his decision, Eden wrote in his memoirs that “this action was right. Mussolini’s recent fortification of the Dodecanese and his avowed intention to upset the Mediterranean balance of power increased Turkey’s significance.”²⁶

iii. The Italian Military Strategy in the Dodecanese

During the preparations for the invasion in Ethiopia, the *Possedimento* was an intermediate station for the Italian troops and ships that were heading to the colonies of Eritrea and Somalia. Its forces were limited in number and their role was to protect the Italian interests from the Dardanelles to Suez.²⁷ Already in November 1934 Ettore Manca, the commanding officer of the army units stationed in the Islands, submitted a new defence plan. The plan was approved in June 1935 and emphasized the importance of Leros and its naval base. The defence of Rhodes was also of great political importance, as it was the biggest, the most populated island and the seat of the Governor as well. However, due to the deterioration of the relations between Italy and Britain, a new military plan that would take into consideration the possibility of war between the two countries was urgently needed.²⁸

The development of the military forces there could permit Italy to carry out a more aggressive and effective policy in the region. Rome could threaten the British marine routes and bases, such as Alexandria, Suez, Haifa, and Cyprus. The presence of powerful military units on the Islands would also permit a more decisive diplomacy in bilateral relations with Greece and especially Turkey and would strengthen Italy’s position in the negotiations for the status of the Dardanelles. At the same time, the Italians were far more capable of protecting their own marine routes and interests. It is worth noting that 76% of Italy’s oil

²⁵ A.L. Macfie, “The Straits Question: The Conference of Montreux,” *Balkan Studies* 13, no. 2 (1972): 208.

²⁶ The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Avon K.G., P.C., M.C., *The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators* (London: Cassel & Company, 1962), 419-420.

²⁷ DIAVE/1937/59/9, no. 26321/A, Embassy of Belgrade to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17-12-1937; 1936/38/4, no. 75, Embassy of Warsaw to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16-1-1936.

²⁸ Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 297-308, 312.

imports were transferred through the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea. The transportation of Italian troops in Ethiopia and the development of the British Fleet increased even more the strategic importance of the Islands during the summer of 1935.²⁹

However, the British military preparation in the Eastern Mediterranean alarmed the Military Command in Rome. They believed that the Islands were extremely vulnerable. They feared that a combined British task force with Greek and/or Turkish units would possibly attack and conquer the Italian *Possedimento*. They also believed that the British intended to seize one of the Islands (probably Astypalaia), establish a military base there and practically neutralize the whole Archipelago. As a result, the strengthening of the Italian defence seemed an urgent priority.³⁰

In response, the Italian Command on the Islands decided to elaborate the new defence plan in order to make the best use of the existing forces. During 1936 Manca and the Army Military Command was processing the details. Soon they concluded that Leros and Rhodes must be sufficiently reinforced in terms of both resources and men. The forces in the Islands had to be able to defend the *Possedimento* in case of attack for a considerable period, at least as much as it was needed for the metropolitan forces to support them. Thus, new barracks should be constructed, more goods and materials should be shipped, and more men should be transferred. In addition, the Military Command decided that the forces of Kalymnos, Astypalaia and Karpathos had to be strengthened, as they estimated that these Islands were important for the efficient protection of Leros and Rhodes from possible attacks directed from Crete.³¹

On its part, the Italian Navy Command decided, as soon as possible, to heavily fortify Leros and transfer more units to the Islands. As it was mentioned above, Dodecanese were considered a place of naval interest. For this reason, the Commanding Officer of the naval units was also

²⁹ Esmonde M. Robertson, *Mussolini as Empire-builder: Europe and Africa 1932-1936* (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1977), 145-146; Quartararo, *op.cit.*, 197-200, 208-209.

³⁰ Arielli, *op.cit.*, 82; Robert Mallett, *The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935-1940* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), 207-212, 214.

³¹ Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 320, 343-346, 358-359, 363-368, 373-376, 382-386.

the Commander of all military forces stationed in the *Possedimento*.³² During summer of 1935 the Navy Command believed that Leros was insufficiently protected, and urgent measures should be taken. Therefore, they promptly sent the retired vice admiral, Francesco Bertonelli to the Islands to supervise the improvement of the defence capabilities and infrastructure.³³ More importantly, the arrival of new army forces and military material in Leros meant that the base was safer and thus the operational capability of the naval units was increased. Hence, the Navy was able to undertake both defence and limited offensive tasks from its reinforced base in Leros. During May 1939, when the last Defence Plan, before the breakout of the World War II, was submitted, the *Regia Marina* had permanently assigned to the Islands' Navy Command four destroyers, four torpedoed units, four submarines, eight MAS,³⁴ five auxiliary ships of various types and two squadrons of seaplanes.³⁵ These were light units, capable of fast deployment, escort and reconnaissance missions, surprise attacks and counter attacks and able to conduct naval guerilla warfare. Although these units had limited combat capabilities, they had to been taken into consideration by potential enemies.

The significance of the Italian Air Force was also increased. Until then, the aerial units simply consisted of seaplanes based in Leros. However, in 1935 a new airfield was constructed in the area of Maritsa (Filerimos) in Rhodes.³⁶ Thus, not only the Italian Air Force was able to deploy different types of units, but also Rhodes acquired an increased military importance. In April 1936, the Air Force Command sent to the island Pietro Pinna, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force Command. The mission of Pinna was to investigate the possibility of further advancement of the Island's capabilities. The report he submitted contributed to the formation of the Aegean Air Force Command (*Aeronautica Egeo*) a year later. In addition, the construction of two other

³² Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 313-315.

³³ Mallett, *op.cit.*, 208-209.

³⁴ *Motoscafo Armato Silurante* (Torpedo-Armed Motorboat).

³⁵ Academy of Athens/Research Center of Modern Greek History/Italian Seized Records (hereafter AoA/RCMGH/ISR), T821/347/De Vecchi's Defence Plan/681.

³⁶ General Archives of State (hereafter GAK), Archive of the Italian Administration of the Dodecanese, *Decreti Governatoriali*, no. 209, 16-11-1935.

reserve airfields in Rhodes was decided, specifically in Kattavia (South) and Gaddura (East).³⁷ In May 1939, in the Islands were stationed in total 76 aircrafts of various types (bombers and fighters) and two new airfields were under construction in Karpathos and Kos.³⁸ Although the types of the aircrafts were not the most recent ones,³⁹ this fast growth in equipment and overall capabilities of the Air Force in the *Possedimento* meant that it was no longer a place of naval interest only. In addition, the Army Command had to further reinforce Rhodes to protect its airfields from possible landings and aerial attacks.⁴⁰ As a result, the Island evolved to the main base for offensive operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, as from there the Italian Air Force could hit within hours the most important bases and targets of Italy's enemies in the region.⁴¹

The increased strategic importance of the Islands caused changes in other sectors too. Until 1936 the governor of the *Possedimento* and the military commander of the forces there were two different persons, a civilian and an officer respectively. Under the new circumstances, the Military Command in Rome proposed both military and civil powers to be accredited to the same person. Thus, the administration of the Islands and the forces stationed there would be unified and more effective.⁴² Indeed, in November 1936, a new Governor, Cesare Maria De Vecchi, was appointed to the Dodecanese, assuming both civil and military powers.⁴³ While supervising the military development, De Vecchi sug-

³⁷ Arielli, *op.cit.*, 82-83; Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 359, 375.

³⁸ AoA/RCMGH/ISR, T821/347/De Vecchi's Plan/682, 700; Spyridon Ploumides, "The British plan to conquer Dodecanese, 1940-1941," *Clio* 4 (December 2007): 84.

³⁹ Later, during the war newer types of fighters and bombers stationed in the Islands such as Cant. Z 1007 and Savoia-Marchetti SM.82 *Marsupiale*.

⁴⁰ Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 340.

⁴¹ AoA/RCMGH/ISR, T821/347/De Vecchi's Plan/667-8.

⁴² Ibid, 330-333, 363-365, 368, 375-376.

⁴³ RDL, no. 2025, 22-11-1936, *GU* no. 278, 1-12-1936. According to the formula that was agreed he was responsible for the defence of the Islands but obliged to follow the orders of Military commanders in Rome in case of defensive and most importantly offensive operations. Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 381, 383, 385-388. Lago officially was considered over-aged but unofficially it is said that he was inadequate to insure the Italian interests in the Islands. The reason was a series of social unrests in Symi (1934), Castellorizo (1934) and Kalymnos ("The Stonewar," 1935). Although they were successfully intercepted Rome was skeptical about Lago. For more see Alexis Rappas, "The Transnational Formation of the Imperial Rule on the Margins of Europe: British

gested that his predecessor had not done enough to promote fascism on the Islands and thus initiated a more aggressive policy of Italianization of the local Greek population and intensified fascist reform of the administration and society. He also created a local branch of blackshirts, the legion *Conte Verde*, composed by the local Fascist Party members under his direct orders.⁴⁴ Given the fact that De Vecchi was one of the most prominent figures of the Fascist regime and that fascist ideology promoted the militarization of society, it could be argued that the new Governor's policy was one more aspect of the increased militarized role and importance of the Dodecanese to the Italian strategy.

This rough policy alienated the islanders from the Italians and highly enhanced their will to preserve their religious faith and Greek national character. Although even Venizelos, back in 1931, had declared the issue of the Dodecanese as an internal Italian matter, the new intense process of denationalization of its fellow-patriots in the Dodecanese worried Athens and protested to the Italian government.⁴⁵ However, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Galeazzo Ciano, ignored the protests of the Greek government.⁴⁶ Yet, the protests of the Dodecanesians' communities in Piraeus and Alexandria were far more vocal and successful enough to irritate De Vecchi.⁴⁷ Their criticism was so intense that the Italian Foreign Minister officially complained to the Greek Government, who had to restrain the local communities in order to avoid the deteriora-

Cyprus and the Italian Dodecanese in the Interwar Period," *European History Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (2015): 482; Doumanis, *op.cit.*, 55, 67-72; Lena Divani, *Η εδαφική ενοποίηση της Ελλάδας (1830-1947)* [The Territorial Integration of Greece (1830-1947)] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2010), 658, 660.

⁴⁴ Rappas, *op.cit.*, 484; Divani, *op.cit.*, 659; Kostas Tsalachouris, *Η οικονομική πολιτική της Ιταλίας στα Δωδεκάνησα* (Italian Economic Policy in the Dodecanese) (Athens: Trohalia, 2000), 19-20, 24; Zacharias N. Tsirpanlis, *Ιταλοκρατία στα Δωδεκάνησα 1912-1943: Αλλοτρίωση του ανθρώπου και του περιβάλλοντος* (The Dodecanese under the Italians 1912-1943. Alienation of People and Environment) (Rhodes: Office of Medieval City of Rhodes, 1998), 257-260; Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 411.

⁴⁵ *DDI*, 7, XI, doc. 77, Bastianini to Grandi, Athens 19-11-1931, 130-136.

⁴⁶ See, for example: *DDI*, 8, V, doc. 251, Boscarelli to Ciano, 20-10-1936, 283; XIII, doc. 165, Grazzi to Ciano, 22-8-1939, 110; Divani, *op.cit.*, 656-659.

⁴⁷ *Messaggero di Rodi*, f. 165, 22-7-1937; Tsalachouris, *Italian policy*, 25.

tion of the bilateral relations.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, the Governor was of the opinion that the population of the Islands was peaceful and the local *Carabinieri* forces were sufficient to restore law and order, if needed.⁴⁹

Thus, it could be argued that domestic policy of De Vecchi reflected the new, militarized role of the Islands and of the fascist foreign policy generally. Consequently, a strategic transformation of the Islands took place during the years 1935-1936. The utilization of them as an intermediate station during Ethiopian war and the presence of the British Fleet in Alexandria, too close to the Islands, increased their military value. First, the Islands had to be protected from possible enemy attacks. Thus, they had to be supplied sufficiently and to utilize effectively the already existing forces. Secondly, from the bases of the Dodecanese, the Italians could strike the enemy forces and bases, attack their marine routes while protect the Italian ones. Therefore, they were able to perform both a defensive and an offensive role. In fact, the new military plan of 1936 (accepted in February 1937) confirmed for the first time the role of the Islands as a base of offensive operations into a system consisted of Leros, Rhodes and Tobruk.⁵⁰ As a result, it can be argued that the thought of the Italian Military Command can be summarized as follows: “protect-supply-attack.” This procedure did not have distinct parts. All of these processes were conducted concurrently, and it seems that the fear of the British played a major role.

The Question of the Dodecanese in British and Italian Policy between 1936-1939

i. The Revaluation of the Mediterranean by Britain

The conquest of Addis Ababa by the Italian army on 9 May 1936 not only consolidated Mussolini’s domination of that country and brought about the consequent removal of sanctions by the League in July 1936,

⁴⁸ Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Η ιταλική επίθεση κατά της Ελλάδος. Διπλωματικά έγγραφα* (The Italian Offensive against Greece. Diplomatic Documents) (Athens: 1940), no. 45, Metaxas to Grazzi, 29; Divani, *op.cit.*, 659; Tsalachouris, *Italian policy*, 24-26.

⁴⁹ Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 329.

⁵⁰ *DDI*, 8, III, doc. 689, Galli to Mussolini, 17-4-1936, 740-741; Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 350-354, 358, 362, 371-372, 375, 380-381, 384.

but also compelled Britain to reconsider her position in the Mediterranean. In a memorandum dated 11 June 1936, Eden conveyed his anxieties about Britain's Mediterranean situation plainly and suggested "the possibility of a restricted naval defensive agreement, under League auspices, between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey."⁵¹

On 23 June 1936, the Minister for Co-ordination for Defence Sir Thomas Inskip invited the CoS Sub-Committee to "consider and report on the proposals [...] for an Eastern Mediterranean understanding with Turkey and Greece", according to the decision taken at the cabinet meeting.⁵² Subsequently, the CoS Sub-Committee instructed the Joint Planning Sub-Committee (J.P.) to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of these proposals and, in addition, to examine the possibility of establishing an "additional naval, military, and air base in Cyprus."⁵³

The J.P. Sub-Committee in their report of 21 July 1936 ascertained that "in future the danger of Italy might become acute with very little notice at any moment – particularly after the lapse of time necessary for the consolidation of Italy's present gains," while stressing the vulnerability of British communications in the Western Mediterranean and the Red Sea and the need for the establishment an "Eastern base," because Gibraltar was far from the Eastern Mediterranean for ships operating in that sea, whereas Malta was not adequately defended and it was 80 miles away from Italian air bases. Moreover, "by developing Naval and Air bases in the Dodecanese, Italy is extending her Naval and Air Power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Air bases in the Dodecanese are within 500 miles from Alexandria, Haifa and Cyprus, so that even with their present aircraft the Italians could reach our Naval base, wherever we might locate it in the Eastern Mediterranean." Consequently, Britain "in a single-handed war against Italy at the present time" would not be in

⁵¹ PRO/CAB 24/262/55, C.P. 165/36 (Secret), Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs entitled "Problems Facing His Majesty's Government in the Mediterranean As a Result of the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute," Foreign Office, 11-6-1936.

⁵² PRO/CAB 23/84/14, Cabinet 43 (36), 23-6-1936.

⁵³ PRO/CAB 24/263/41, CoS 506 (Secret), Memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee entitled "Eastern Mediterranean: Understanding with Turkey and Greece," 29-7-1936.

position to “bring any decisive pressure to bear on Italy for a considerable period.”⁵⁴

As regards to the construction of a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, the J.P. Sub-Committee examined the possibilities of Haifa, Alexandria and Cyprus, concluding that the latter’s potentialities met requirements for the development of British military, naval and air services. Apart from the establishment of a naval base at Famagusta, “aerodromes could be constructed,” so that “aircraft based in the island could counter-attack any Italian forces in the Dodecanese, while at the same time being within easy flying range of Egypt if required to concentrate in that area.” However, if the government concluded on the necessity of establishing a naval base in Famagusta, this would oblige Britain to protect the whole island and, thus, to undertake a “permanent additional military commitment.” Additionally, Cyprus was 70 miles away from the Asia Minor coast and “if Turkey came under the domination of a hostile first-class air power the position of Cyprus would be geographically almost as weak as that of Malta.” Hence, British-Turkish political relations would be affected on a permanent basis.⁵⁵

With reference to an understanding with Greece and Turkey, the J.P. Sub-Committee believed Britain should not be committed to military obligations towards Greece, explaining that she had little to gain, for Greece lay “so close to Italian aerodromes that a heavy scale of air attack could be directed by Italy against any military bases established in that country.”⁵⁶

On the other hand, an agreement with Turkey would present considerable benefits for Britain. Through Turkey’s friendship, Britain “could develop Cyprus into a Naval, Air and Army Base.” The use of ports and aerodromes in Cyprus and Turkey would enable Britain “to neutralise the Italian base in the Dodecanese.” In the event of war, Turkey had “the power to control all shipping passing through the Dardanelles.” Apart from military advantages, Turkey having “undoubtedly been impressed by the recent successes Mussolini has achieved in the face of the League opposition...will be driven to conclude some form of defensive agree-

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

ment with some major Power in the near future.” For this reason, the J.P. Sub-Committee suggested that Britain might “shoulder the commitment which an understanding with Turkey must imply” and thus prevent the Soviet Union from becoming “a guarantor of Turkish integrity.”⁵⁷

Nevertheless, the CoS in their conclusions underlined that at present the “first desideratum” was a secure Mediterranean, so “the acceptance of fresh military commitments” was not advisable. They also recommended that Britain’s primary consideration should be the restoration of Anglo-Italian relations, although they added that “everything possible should be done to maintain friendly relations with Turkey” and “to avoid an unfriendly Greece in time of war.”⁵⁸

Subsequently, the British government followed the CoS recommendations and since then made efforts to re-establish friendly relations with Italy. From 1937 to 1939 the two countries concluded a “Gentleman’s Agreement” (2 January 1937) and signed the so-called “Easter Accords” (16 April 1938), by which they committed each other to recognise their respective rights and interests and respect the status quo in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.⁵⁹ Continuing its policy of appeasement towards the Rome-Berlin Axis, on 31 October 1939 Britain recognized the Italian annexation of Albania (7 April 1939). The annexation violated not only the Covenant of the League of Nations, but also the agreement of 1938, in which Italy had engaged to respect “the status

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid. For the CoS report see also Manolis Koumas, “Patterns of the Future? British Mediterranean Strategy and the Choice Between Alexandria and Cyprus 1935-38,” *The International History Review* 33, no. 3 (September 2011): 493-494, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2011.595239>; John Koliopoulos, “Anglo-Greek Relations During the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935-1936,” *Balkan Studies* 15, no. 1 (1974): 104-105; Lawrence R. Pratt, *East of Malta West of Suez. Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939* (Cambridge University Press, 1975), 37-38. For the Mediterranean problem of Britain see the reports of the Greek Embassy in London in the DIAVE/1936/35/6, no. 1506 and no. 1507, Simopoulos to MFA, 11-6-1936; 1936/65/2, no. 1652, Simopoulos to MFA, 26-6-1936; 1936/35/1, no. 2331, Simopoulos to MFA, 7-9-1936; 1936/35/5, no. 2483, Simopoulos to MFA, 22-9-1936.

⁵⁹ Frank C. Willard, Jr., “The Spanish Civil War and the Coming of the Second World War,” *The International History Review* 9, no. 3 (1987): 390, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1987.9640449>; William A. Podmore, “The Making of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, 1937-1938,” *Italian Studies* 49, no. 1 (1994): 122-123, <https://doi.org/10.1179/its.1994.49.1.111>

quo as regards the national sovereignty of territories in the Mediterranean area.”⁶⁰

Due to the escalating Italian hostility, the Admiralty and the CoS had come to the conclusion after the spring of 1939 that the defence of the Mediterranean should be given higher priority than that of the Far East.⁶¹ Meanwhile, with the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance (26 August 1936) Britain had succeeded in securing military control of the Suez Canal⁶² and in 1938 Alexandria was selected as the main naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean instead of Cyprus.⁶³ Diplomatic initiatives were also taken by London in order to create a united front against Axis aggression in South-Eastern Europe. On 13 April 1939 Britain guaranteed the territorial integrity of Greece and Roumania and a month later (on 12 May) Britain and Turkey signed a joint declaration, in which they engaged to assist each other in the Mediterranean in the event of war.⁶⁴ A similar Franco-Turkish declaration was signed on 23 June, following the cession of Hatay to Turkey.⁶⁵

ii. The Italians and the Dodecanese after Abyssinia and the British Military Plans

The foreign correspondence indicates that Dodecanese were an organic part of the Italian policy in the region. During the first months of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Italians and the Germans allegedly discussed the possibility of creating a German base on the Islands for operations against the Soviets but this project was never implemented.⁶⁶ Later, during a meeting in Milan (February 1937) with the Turkish Min-

⁶⁰ David Britton Funderburk, “Nadir of Appeasement: British Policy and the Demise of Albania, April 7, 1939,” *Balkan Studies* 11, no. 2 (1970): 299-300.

⁶¹ Omissi, *op.cit.*, 11-12.

⁶² DIA/1936/64/5, no. 2262, Simopoulos to MFA, 28-8-1936.

⁶³ The construction of a naval base in Cyprus was rejected due to strategic and financial reasons. See Koumas, “Patterns,” 494-497.

⁶⁴ Pratt, *op.cit.*, 159; Omissi, *op.cit.*, 12-13; Yücel Güçlü, “Turco-British Rapprochement on the Eve of the Second World War,” *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* 27 (1997): 91-92, <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/1569/17036.pdf>

⁶⁵ Güçlü, *op.cit.*, 100.

⁶⁶ *DDI*, 8, IV, doc. 692, Berardis to Ciano, 6-8-1936; Thanasis D. Sfikas, *H Ελλάδα και ο ισπανικός εμφύλιος πόλεμος* (Greece and Spanish Civil War), (Athens: Stahi, 2000), 241.

ister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Ciano clarified that the Dodecanese Islands were a significant base for the Italian imperial routes and therefore the Italians had every right to reinforce them, exactly as the British used to do with their territories.⁶⁷ In July, while the Great Palestinian revolt (1936-39) was ongoing, the Italians were secretly discussing with the Palestinian leader, Musa Alamy, the possibility of providing arms to the revolutionaries. According to a document dated 23 July 1937, Rhodes was proposed as the place of the transaction. However, the initiative never took place.⁶⁸ Finally, in January 1938 the Italian ambassador in Turkey, Carlo Galli, discussed with Aras the hypothetical scenario of a Mediterranean war between Italy, Britain, and France. The ambassador clarified that the Straits of the Dardanelles were of great importance to Italy and the Italian forces would ensure the continuation of their operation no matter the cost. Of course, the closest Italian bases in the region were at the Dodecanese.⁶⁹ These events prove that the Dodecanese were strategically vital for the Italian interests in the Middle East, the Straits and generally in the Eastern Mediterranean.

For its part, Greece was worried. In addition to the denationalization policy of De Vecchi in the Islands, the Regime of General Metaxas in Athens was concerned about Leros too. Throughout the Spanish Civil War, Italian submarines based there conducted patrols and even attacked neutral ships carrying supplies to the Spanish Republican forces. In a classified report of August 1939, the Hellenic Navy Command urged the need of foreign reinforcements if it was to confront Italy in sea. At all costs, one of the first and urgent measures in case of war was the “Bombardment of the Dodecanese and especially of Leros.”⁷⁰ As a result, Greeks were anxious to appease Rome but also to counter a possible Italian threat.⁷¹

⁶⁷ *DDI*, 8, IV, doc. 124, Ciano to Mussolini, 4-2-1938, 159.

⁶⁸ *DDI*, 8, VII, doc. 118, Enderle to Ciano, 23-7-1938; Arielli, *op.cit.*, 112-120.

⁶⁹ *DDI*, 8, VIII, doc. 63, Galli to Ciano, 20-1-1938, 70-77.

⁷⁰ GAK, Metaxas Papers, File 88, Greek Naval Staff Study 45, Assessment on the situation during the initial phase of War, 23-8-1939, no. 3731.

⁷¹ Sfikas, *op.cit.*, 132-133, 233, 259-260, 265-266, 279.

The occupation of Albania, in combination with the Italian activity in the Dodecanese, brought Italian troops even closer to the Straits.⁷² During the summer of 1939, ten Turkish divisions were transferred to Smyrna, in a short distance from the Islands, and they were repeatedly trained in counter-landing and landing operations. The Italian authorities were informed about the Turkish actions. Both the Italian embassy in Sofia and the one in Ankara had telegraphed the Turkish army movements to Rome. What is more, Rome and Rhodes were well-informed (through espionage and phone-tapping) about the possibility of a British operation (probably with Turkish assistance) against the *Possedimento*, although they did not know when or how the enemy would act.⁷³

From 1935 to 1939 the size of the military forces of all branches on the Islands increased from 1,500 to almost 25,000 men in total. In addition, there were units of the *Guardia di Finanza* and the *Carabinieri* responsible for maintaining public order, combating, smuggling and defending the minor Islands.⁷⁴ Moreover, from April 1937 to February 1939, more than 16,000,000 liras were spent for the military development of the Islands. It is worth noting that military spending in September 1937 was five times higher than in April of the same year (3,000,000 and 600,000 liras respectively).⁷⁵

In May 1939, De Vecchi developed and a new defence plan, which was submitted and soon accepted by the Military Command in Rome. De Vecchi considered the Islands as “bastions.” Each Island could serve as a platform to support nearby Islands. An interesting fact about De Vecchi’s plan is his statement about the strategic importance of the Islands. According to his words, “the Islands were a significant national vanguard in the Eastern Mediterranean, in terms of the Navy and Air Force, a strategic base for deterring enemy forces, monitoring Italian

⁷² DDI, 8, XI, doc. 712, Berio to Ciano, 16-5-1939, 827; 9, X, doc. 259, Guariglia to Bastianini, 24-4-1943, 338-339; Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 72.

⁷³ DDI, 8, XII, doc. 690, De Peppo to Ciano, 26-7-1939, 524 and doc. 699, Talamo to Ciano, 27-7-1939, 529; Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 413-415; Manuela A. Williams, *Mussolini’s Propaganda abroad, Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935-1940* (New York: Rutledge, 2006), 178-180.

⁷⁴ Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 298, 312, 382, 411, 433.

⁷⁵ Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 432.

marine routes and controlling the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean basin". De Vecchi's Plan was the one in force when the War broke out.⁷⁶

On the other hand, the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish declarations paved the way for the negotiations for the formation of a tripartite Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty. Among other clauses of the draft text of the treaty, Article 3 of the annexed secret military convention stipulated that in case of a hostile action on the part of Italy, Turkish forces with the collaboration of British and French naval and air forces would operate against the Dodecanese, in order "to isolate the islands in question, and to immobilize their garrison," while the plans to be adopted for the execution of these operations "will be drawn up in the course of discussion between the Staffs concerned when the present military convention has been put into force."⁷⁷

Discussions about the Dodecanese region took place during the summer and autumn of 1939 between the Allied and Turkish military authorities. During the negotiations at Ankara between the French General Charles Huntziger and the Turkish military staff in August, "reference was made to a proposal to conduct a thorough study of the plans for operations against the Dodecanese with particular reference to Article 3 of the Draft Convention."⁷⁸

Subsequently, on 13 September the War Cabinet authorized "Local Commanders in the Middle East to discuss certain outstanding points with the Turkish authorities,"⁷⁹ among them plans for the "contemplated action by all three Services to harass Italian forces in the Dodecanese" were laid down.⁸⁰ The J.P. Sub-Committee in an aide-mémoire had underlined Turkey's strategic value pointing out that, with Turkey as an ally, "Italian supplies from the Black Sea can be completely inter-

⁷⁶ AoA/RCMGH/ISR/T821/347/De Vecchi's Defence Plan/667, 669, 673.

⁷⁷ PRO/CAB 66/2, W.P. (39) 63, Turkey, Results of Treaty Negotiations with: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1-10-1939.

⁷⁸ PRO/CAB 80/4/1, CoS (39) 83, Plans for the Capture of the Dodecanese, 13-10-1939.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ PRO/CAB 80/2/1, CoS 39 (22), Report on Staff Conversations with Turkey, 12-9-1939.

rupted, and the Italian forces in the Dodecanese could be to some extent neutralised, and the Dodecanese eventually captured.”⁸¹

It had been suggested that the seizure of Leros and Rhodes was a highly important operation and should come first, as the two Islands were considered the most militarily reinforced areas, since the existence of naval and air bases on them could undermine the Allied naval and air forces, interrupt the Allies’ maritime communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and threaten the Greek and Turkish coastlines.⁸² Since 1938 the British had become increasingly concerned about the fortification of Leros,⁸³ while in May 1939, British and French military experts had decided that the encirclement of Italy could avert further reinforcement of these fortifications.⁸⁴ Nonetheless despite these concerns, when war erupted, the military units of the Italian garrison in the Dodecanese had been increased between “20% and 50% above the normal war establishment.”⁸⁵

The above talks had taken place before the Second World War broke out, “when the hostility of Italy was assumed in the event of our [i.e., the British] becoming engaged in war against Germany.”⁸⁶ However, the negotiations for the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty came at a time when London was still trying to find ways of keeping Italy out of the war.⁸⁷ The British and French Permanent Military Representatives proposed to the War Cabinet (28 September) that the latter’s policy

⁸¹ PRO/CAB 80/2/3, CoS (39) 37 (J.P), 18-9-1939.

⁸² For an account of these operation plans see Hazal Papuççular, “War or Peace? The Dodecanese Island in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy (1923-1947)” (PhD diss., Boğazici University, 2015), 279-285.

⁸³ Svolopoulos, *op.cit.*, 27.

⁸⁴ Svolopoulos, *op.cit.*, 27-28.

⁸⁵ PRO/CAB 66/2, CoS 39 (55), Weekly Resumé No. 4 of the Naval, Military and Air Situation (21-28 September 1939).

⁸⁶ PRO/CAB 80/4/1, CoS (39) 83, Plans for the Capture of the Dodecanese, 13-10-1939.

⁸⁷ Italy had declared its neutrality on 1 September 1939. About Italian policy between September 1939 and June 1940, see Harry Cliadakis, “Neutrality and War in Italian Policy 1939-40,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 3 (July 1974): 171-190, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F002200947400900307>

“should be to maintain the neutrality of Italy, and to consolidate the Balkan states into a benevolently neutral bloc.”⁸⁸

In their joint report of 28 September 1939, the Allied Military Representatives had suggested that in the case of Italy being hostile and if “no German attack has been developed in the Balkans,” the main concern of the Allies should be the co-operation with Turkey “in attacking the Italian trade and the Dodecanese and to give Greece, directly or indirectly, any help possible against Italian aggression.” With the collaboration of Turkey “Italian trade with the Black Sea would be completely severed, operations against the Dodecanese could be undertaken, and Greece could be assisted by Turkish forces.” But if Turkey remained neutral, the difficulties facing the Allies “would be greatly increased, since control of the sea routes to and from the Black Sea would be more difficult and operations against the Dodecanese might have to be delayed.”⁸⁹

After the invitation of the Cabinet (6 October) to examine ways of approaching Italy “with a view of mutual withdrawal of troops from North Africa, and the establishment of a *détente* in the Mediterranean,”⁹⁰ the CoS recommended that the Italian neutralization could be achieved through a Mediterranean *Détente*,⁹¹ while the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Spencer Churchill, pointed out that a naval arrangement in the Mediterranean could be attained, if Britain, France and Italy could agree to the prohibition of Germany’s U-boats in the Mediterranean.⁹² Taking into consideration the CoS and the Admiralty’s analyses, the Cabinet concluded that for the time being “no approach to the Italian Government should be made with regard to the military questions.”⁹³

For these reasons the CoS, following the suggestion of the J.P. Subcommittee, had decided that “in view to the delicate position vis-à-vis

⁸⁸ PRO/CAB 66/2, W.P. (39) 70, Military Strategy to be adopted in the Near East including the Balkans, 28-9-1939.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ PRO/CAB 65/1, W.M. (39), War Cabinet 39 (39), 6-10-1936.

⁹¹ PRO/CAB 66/2, W.P. (39) 85, Possible *détente* with Italy in the Mediterranean, Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 17-10-1939.

⁹² PRO/CAB 66/2, W.P. (39), 92, Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty, 18-10-1939.

⁹³ PRO/CAB 65/1, W.M. (39), War Cabinet 52 (39), 19-10-1939.

Italy, the Chiefs of Staff [...] thought the item dealing with attack on the Dodecanese should be deleted on the instructions issued to our [i.e., the British] commanders for their talks with the Turkish authorities and this was done.”⁹⁴

Thus, on the occasion of General Mehmet Kâzım Orbay’s visit to London in October 1939, the J.P. Sub-Committee proposed that he should be informed:

“a) That we [i.e., the British] do not consider it necessary to discuss actual plans at the moment.

b) That, if and when a favourable opportunity for an attack occurs, the limiting factor in the time to stage it is likely to be the provision of equipment.

c) That it would therefore be to the advantage of the Turks if he [i.e., General Orbay] could place an order for landing craft and other equipment now, and that these could be provided.

d) And that he might like to take the opportunity now to discuss with the appropriate British authorities the arrangements that might be made for training if and when the time comes.”⁹⁵

Although General Orbay was assured that Britain would provide Turkey with a newly constructed motor landing craft,⁹⁶ the CoS again stressed that “it was of great importance not to undertake conversations of a kind which would have a most unfavorable effect, if they reached the ears of the Italians” and “that for the present, no further discussion, either official or unofficial should be held with the Turkish Authorities about plans for the capture of the Dodecanese; and that conversations with the Turkish Mission concerning landing craft for use in such operations should be discontinued.”⁹⁷

Indeed, soon after the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty on 19 October 1939, no definite operation plan for the seizure of the Dodecanese had been decided on, although the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Marshal Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak, had affirmed that the Dodecanese was

⁹⁴ PRO/CAB 80/4/1, CoS (39) 83, Plans for the Capture of the Dodecanese, 13-10-1939; PRO/CAB 80/2/3, CoS (39) 35 (J.P.), Staff Conversations with Turkey: Report by the Joint-Planning Sub-Committee, 16-9-1939.

⁹⁵ PRO/CAB 80/4/1, CoS (39) 83, *ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ PRO/CAB 79/1/51, CoS (39), 51st Meeting, 18-10-1939.

a highly important matter, even in the event of Italy's neutrality.⁹⁸ However, although Çakmak had emphasized that a final and immediate decision should be taken on the question of operations,⁹⁹ the Turks –according to the British view– except in the case of a sudden attack, had neither prepared a plan nor they had realized the consequences of this operation.¹⁰⁰

But, apart from that, a divergence of opinion between the British and French General Staffs regarding Allied policy in the Middle East and the Balkans, hampered the formulation and the realization of an attack against the Dodecanese. For instance, the French authorities claimed that under Article 3 of the Tripartite Military Convention, the contracting Powers should collaborate on the seizure of the Dodecanese “within the shortest possible time” and that the contribution of France in this operation would “include air formations withdrawn from Syria for the use of which bases are to be provided on Turkish soil before hostilities break out.” The British on their side commented that “in point of fact, Article 3 of the Turkish Convention makes no provision for the capture of the Dodecanese “within the shortest time.” On the other hand, the development of aerodromes which would be required for this operation is equally necessary for any operations in support of the Turks in Thrace or in Anatolia.”¹⁰¹

Assuming Italy's hostility and the active intervention of that country against the Allies, the CoS underlined that in such an event Britain's “first preoccupation in the Middle East and Mediterranean area would be the defeat of Italy and the resumption of full use of the Mediterranean.” Summing up, the CoS underlined that the difficulties arising from an Italian embroilment were the following:

“a) The route through the Mediterranean and the route through the Red Sea would be liable to interruption.

b) The British “should have to provide for the defense, as well as for the internal security, of Egypt, Aden, the Sudan, Somaliland and Kenya.

⁹⁸ Brock Millman, *The Ill-Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations 1934-1940* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), 296, 332.

⁹⁹ Svolopoulos, *op.cit.*, 32.

¹⁰⁰ Millman, *op.cit.*, 333.

¹⁰¹ PRO/CAB 80/6/1, CoS 39 (147), Policy in the Balkans and the Middle East, Annex: Anglo-French Policy in the Middle East, 5-12-1939.

c) It would be necessary for Britain to eliminate the danger to its sea communications from the Dodecanese before she “could provide effective support to Turkey or Greece.

d) Italian invasion of Greece from Albania might be added to German and/or Russian attacks in the Balkans.”¹⁰²

Regarding the elimination of the danger coming from the Dodecanese, the CoS reckoned that it “should be well within our capacity if, by the time we are required to undertake it, our air resources in the Middle East can be reinforced in adequate strength and provided that we can operate from Turkish bases in conjunction with the Fleet. Although the Anatolian railways cannot maintain any but small allied land forces in Turkey, it would be possible to establish and maintain the air forces necessary for this purpose.” Nevertheless, the conclusion of the CoS left no margins on the chances of success of the operation against the Islands, for there were “too many uncertain factors to assess how long this operation might take.”¹⁰³

One of these “uncertain factors” that the interested parties should take notice of was the future status of the Dodecanese, since Greece and Turkey “both harbor revisionist claims against Italy in the Dodecanese.”¹⁰⁴ In November 1940, Halifax wrote in a memorandum that “the question of the ownership of the Islands if captured from Italy is likely to raise burning issues between the Greeks and the Turks, and it is obviously essential to ensure that there should be no quarrel between them over the prize when captured.”¹⁰⁵ In order to avoid a Greek-Turkish dispute over the Islands, the Foreign Secretary suggested that before any operation took place, the Greek and Turkish governments should be informed confidentially “in due time” that the Dodecanese should be kept “under British administration until the end of the war” and “that a decision as to the future status of the Islands should be deferred till the peace settlement.” The British, he continued, “should insist at the peace set-

¹⁰² PRO/80/6/1, CoS 39 (146), Review of Military Policy in the Middle East, 5-12-1939.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ PRO/CAB 66/1, W.P. (39) 25, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs entitled “Position in the Balkans”, Foreign Office, 12-9-1939.

¹⁰⁵ PRO/CAB 66/13/44, W.P. 40 (464), The Dodecanese: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 27-11-1940.

tlement that the Greeks and Turks should try to agree themselves as to the future of the Islands. For instance, they might agree either to a division, or more improbably, to an autonomous régime under joint Graeco-Turkish protection.” Of course, he concluded, this plan, could be overridden “if the Italian garrison were to surrender to the Turks.” In that case, the political situation would be difficult; so, Britain would have to handle the situation as best it could.¹⁰⁶

Conclusions

Britain had not appreciated the Dodecanese as a strategic factor in her Mediterranean policy at least until the outbreak of the Second World War. For example, during a meeting which had taken place in December 1935 between German naval experts and Turkish officials, both had agreed that Britain had no particular interest in taking these Islands from Italy, because she “was safeguarded by her triangular base of Suez-Haifa-Cyprus and would attach no importance to the possession of the Dodecanese.”¹⁰⁷

It is also significant that although in February 1924, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald had stated in the House of Commons that “the inhabitants of these Islands ethnologically belong to Greece, and that their continued severance from that country is hardly conducive to that general tranquility which His Majesty’s Government have so much at heart,”¹⁰⁸ Britain did not actually take steps to press Italy for a solution to this issue, even when Mussolini proceeded to fortify the Islands. Two years later, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Sir Austen Chamberlain answering to a question regarding the sovereignty of the Dodecanese and whether Italy was obliged to cede these Islands to Greece, he closed the matter, clearly declaring that “the international status of the Dodecanese is now governed by Article 15 of the Treaty of Lausanne, in virtue

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, C/IV/449 (8631/E 604846-47), Keller (Ankara–Istanbul) to the Foreign Office, 6-12-1935.

¹⁰⁸ Hansard/House of Commons/170/29, 25-2-1924 at <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1924-02-25/debates/c90569b9-cae8-475f-a434-bc27611a4637/Jubaland?highlight=dodecanese#contribution-3ff73c49-ddc9-4902-94ec-d43cd91a50b1>; Svolopoulos, *op.cit.*, 13.

of which Turkey renounced in favour of Italy all her rights and titles over the islands. The answer to the second part of the question is in the negative.”¹⁰⁹

Thus, until the second half of 1939 the British regarded the Dodecanese issue as closed and their efforts were concentrated in securing their interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, while in parallel they followed a policy of appeasement towards Italy, even when the Second World War had erupted. For these reasons, London was reluctant to operate against the Dodecanese in order not to provoke Italy, as long as the latter maintained its neutrality. Hence, relative discussions for the capture of the Dodecanese between the British and the Turkish military experts were discontinued.

It is also obvious that the Dodecanese issue depended on the political and strategic goals that the Allies had posed as a priority and on the ambiguous attitude of Italy, which had been taken “as varying from benevolent neutrality to open hostility.”¹¹⁰ In particular, while the French favored “a forward policy in the Balkans,” Britain was not in position “to undertake any adventures” in that region, since “the over-riding consideration of Italy’s neutrality has not yet been achieved.”¹¹¹ For the British, their “principal strategic interests in the Middle East” as had been set out in the C.O.S. memorandum were as follows: a) the Sea Route through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea to the Far East, b) the Anglo-Iranian Oil-fields, c) the North-West frontier of India.¹¹² In order to secure these interests, Britain should therefore defend Turkey and Iraq, which were of the “greatest military importance” and build up a “Middle East reserve”, on the condition that the additional land and air forces needed would not be at the expense of

¹⁰⁹ Hansard/House of Commons/191/1535, 15-2-1926 at [https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1926-02-15/debates/a5e055df-df8b-4eaf-bdad8c9db82b48d0/Dodecanese\(InternationalStatus\)?highlight=dodecanese#contribution-2da757ff-998e-4678-b7f8-35e1bf025384](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1926-02-15/debates/a5e055df-df8b-4eaf-bdad8c9db82b48d0/Dodecanese(InternationalStatus)?highlight=dodecanese#contribution-2da757ff-998e-4678-b7f8-35e1bf025384)

¹¹⁰ PRO/80/6/1, CoS 39 (146), Review of Military Policy in the Middle East, 5-12-1939.

¹¹¹ Ibid, (147), Policy in the Balkans and the Middle East, 5-12-1939.

¹¹² Ibid, (146), Review of Military Policy in the Middle East, 5-12-1939.

Britain's "essential requirements in the West" or its "ability to defend Singapore."¹¹³

The significance of Turkey and its key-role for the defence of the imperial interests had been recognized by Britain since the outbreak of the Ethiopian crisis. Besides, Turkey, as Lord Halifax underlined, "is anxious on general grounds lest Italy shall become the predominant Power in the Mediterranean" and that "it must be remembered that Turkey's primary and over-riding reason in undertaking collaboration with His Majesty's Government is her fear of Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean."¹¹⁴

Indeed, the most important fact was that Italy had created almost a "stronghold" in the Eastern Mediterranean, capable of both defensive and offensive operations. Until 1935 the major competitor of Rome in the Mediterranean was France. Relations with the British were friendly, so the possibility of a military confrontation with London was not taken into consideration. When this possibility came true, the Italians had to reorder their military infrastructure. As a result, the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean was increased. Thus, Italy urgently needed to strengthen its presence in the region and therefore had to take advantage of their *Possedimento* and its strategic potentialities.¹¹⁵

Italy and its interests were safer due to the military development of the Islands. Although the process was still in progress when the World War broke out and the forces stationed in the Dodecanese were not capable of conducting large-scale operations, they were nevertheless sufficient to avoid being ignored by the enemy.¹¹⁶ The British had to consider the Italian forces there. *Regia Marina* and *Regia Aeronautica* units were able to inflict significant damage on enemy convoys and bases, such as Alexandria and Haifa, which were repeatedly bombed during the Second World War, as it was provided in the Plan of 1936 and 1939. In addition, the presence of numerous army forces on the Islands was a deterrent factor. This meant that resources, men and time had to be committed by the British in order to overcome the "problem" of the Dodec-

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ PRO/CAB 66/1, W.P. (39) 25, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs entitled "Position in the Balkans," Foreign Office, 12-9-1939.

¹¹⁵ Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 295, 307, 409-410.

¹¹⁶ Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 318-319.

anese. Even though the reinforcement of the Islands was always difficult and during the Second World War the Dodecanese had a severe shortage of provisions, the military development of the previous years proved sufficient to repulse all British attacks there. Moreover, the Italian forces were able to conquer the Cyclades Islands and land in Crete during May 1941.¹¹⁷

There was also a significant impact in terms of diplomacy and politics. Italy became such an important player in the Eastern Mediterranean that it could influence the policy of the neighboring countries, particularly that of Turkey and Greece. Italy's actions on the Islands posed a threat to the security of both countries. As a result, Athens and Ankara, while trying to appease Italy, persuaded a closer collaboration with the British. Thus, it could be argued that the military precautionary measures of Rome in the Islands created more determinant potential enemies.

Consequently, the most important ramification of the advanced strategic role of the Islands was on the Islands themselves. The military precautionary measures against British, the radicalization of the Italian foreign policy and its fascist turn forced the Islands' administration, institutions and society to become fascist too. They also turned the *Possedimento* as one of the most important targets of Italy's enemies in the region. This is probably the most significant evidence of the strategic value of the Islands: Italy's rivals were anxious to neutralize Rome's forces there. Although not powerful enough and mostly ill armed to be a proper stronghold, in five years (1935-1939), Dodecanese developed into Rome's most significant military base in the region, capable of both offensive and defensive operations, even though of limited scale. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Islands also emerged as one of the primary targets of French, British, Turks and Greeks in case of war with Italy.

¹¹⁷ For the shortages see: Pasqualini, *op.cit.*, 379, 430, 434; Ploumides, *op.cit.*, 86; Marc' Antonio, Bragadin, *The Italian Navy in the World War II* (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Instituted, 1957), 78-80. For the operations in the Cyclades and Crete see: Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Segreteria Particolare del Duce, Carteggio Riservato (1922-1943), Bollettini-informazioni, BB. 241-244.

*Athanassios Bravos**

**The Yugoslavia–Axis Negotiations, in 1940-1941,
and the Question of Ceding Thessaloniki¹ to Yugoslavia**

The Yugoslav Government, in order to protect its country from the destruction which ravaged Europe,² decided to join the Axis Powers³ by acceding to the Tripartite Pact,⁴ on 25 March 1941. The Yugoslav leaders

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¹ The term “Thessaloniki” will preferably be used instead of “Salonika” as it accurately attributes the Greek word *Θεσσαλονίκη*. “Salonika” will be used wherever is a cited term – some authors, however, write it as “Salonica”.

² After the defeat of France and the absolute predominance of Germany in Europe, Belgrade’s rulers felt that there was no other way to save the country than to reach the Axis. J.B. Hoptner, *Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941* (New York–London: Columbia University Press, 1962), 298; “Yugoslavia–The Tragedy of Honor,” *The Round Table* 31, no. 123 (1941): 496.

³ However, Milan Gavrilović, minister of Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union (1940-1941), had suggested to Sir Richard Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador there (1940-1942) that Yugoslavia (and particularly the Croatian element) might be won over if London recognized Yugoslav claims to Istria and the Italian islands off the Dalmatian coast. Although British Government had determined that no territorial changes were to be discussed during the war, they decided however to make an exception to the rule by accepting to offer Yugoslavia –after the war had been ended– support at the peace conference for a revision of her frontiers with Italy. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, “Momčilo Ninčić and the European Policy of the Yugoslav Government in Exile, 1941-1943: II,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 62, no. 4 (1984): 531; The same about British assurances at the future peace Settlement, David A.T. Stafford, “SOE and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’État of March 1941,” *Slavic Review* 36, no. 3 (1977): 404; nevertheless, the territorial concessions to which Britain was willing to consent to were not enticing enough to “move” Belgrade; besides, the Axis was in the apogee of its power, while Britain, already expelled from the continent, struggled for its very survival. Samo Kristen, “Rojstvo tragedije iz duha farse: domnevna in resnicna ozemeljska zagotovila Velike Britanije Kraljevini Jugoslaviji v letih 1936-1941” (The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Farce: Dubious and Real Territorial Assurances by Great Britain to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the 1936-1941 Period), *Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies* 66 (2011): 64-104.

⁴ It is also known as the Berlin Pact. It was a defensive military alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan signed in Berlin on 27 September 1940. To that agreement

of that time had succeeded in securing very favorable terms when signing the agreement in question. However, one of these terms referred to a major portion of central Greek Macedonia, including the city of Thessaloniki. The Yugoslav government asked the Germans to pledge that by the end of the war, Yugoslavia would then be permitted to occupy the aforementioned territory. The Italians also consented to the agreement that would allow for Yugoslavia to occupy a majority of Greek Macedonia.⁵ The war did not have a good end for the Axis Powers, so the stipulation in question was never applied, however it was not forgotten.⁶ Notwith-

joined also Hungary, Romania and Slovakia (20, 23 and 24 November 1940 respectively), Bulgaria (1 March 1941) and Yugoslavia (25 March 1941).

⁵ At the meeting that Hitler had with count Galeazzo Ciano, in Berghof, on 18 November 1940, –Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister was present– he presented to the Italian foreign minister what he was going to offer to Belgrade in order for the latter to accede to the Tripartite Pact: except for the guarantee of the Yugoslav borders, the second offer concerned Thessaloniki, which would be granted to Yugoslavs. Hitler asked Mussolini's view on the aforementioned proposals in a letter he sent with Ciano. on 20 November 1940, when he met with the latter in Vienna on the occasion of Hungary's accession to the Tripartite Pact. Mussolini lost no. time to reply, on 22 November, that he was in accord with the German proposals, namely the guarantee of the Yugoslav borders and the concession of Thessaloniki. *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (hereafter *DGFP*) 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945), vol. XI (The War Years, September 1, 1940-January 31, 1941), no. 366 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961); Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers* (London: Odhams Press, 1948), 410; *Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946*, XI (The Initial Triumph of the Axis) (London–N. York–Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1958), 342; Ernst L. Presseisen, “Prelude to ‘Barbarossa:’ Germany and the Balkans, 1940-1941,” *The Journal of Modern History* 32, no. 4 (1960): 364.

⁶ The Americans, in 1944, did not fail to underline that Yugoslav territorial claims to Greece were a threat. It was of importance the fact that in January 1945 “the mass of soldiers in Skopje demonstrated against their transfer to the North, asking to occupy Salonika instead.” The Assistant Military Attaché in Athens Captain William H. McNeill, in mid-1945, reported to Washington about escalation of the Yugoslav aggression against Greece. And even though Yugoslavia's claims for annexation of Greek Macedonia, submitted in the Paris Peace Conference (29 July-15 October 1946), were turned down, the American ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh (1933-41 and 1943-47) reported to Washington, in December 1946, that “Belgrade and Sofia were still seeking to annex Northern Greece.” Charalampos Minasidis, “American Diplomats and Officials on Macedonia and the Macedonian Question during the 1940s,” *Macedonian Studies Journal* 1, no. 1 (2014): 85, 86, 90, 91.

standing that modern historiography⁷ (Yugoslav/Serbian⁸ one included)⁹ did not fail to refer to the policy pursued by Yugoslavia before the German invasion of April 6, 1941. Thessaloniki's agreed concession and the backstage bargaining for securing it is incidentally referred to as something among many others that just happened without further analysis. There are however, two exceptions which are presented by Professor Radoje Knežević of Serbia and the Croatian historian Bogdan Krizman. Professor Knežević (Knejevitch)¹⁰ published an article in

⁷ It is true that there are only a handful of articles referring directly to this topic. Except for Knežević's and Krizman's articles, which are mentioned below in notes 10 and 11, the "overall production" on this topic could be presented in note 8.

⁸ A comment should be made about the terms "Serbian" and "Yugoslav(ian)" in order to avoid a certain confusion in the usage of them. After the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in 1918, the term "Serbian" was used in order to state whatever related to the Triadic Kingdom and that continued throughout the interwar period: for example, in the Annual Reports of the British Legation in Athens for the years 1923-1928 the British diplomats carried on using the term "Serbian" in lieu of "Triadic Kingdom" or "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes"; Hitler, enraged after he was informed about 27 March 1941 *coup d'état* in Belgrade, said "The Serbs [not Yugoslavs] were a pack of conspirators." *DGFP*, vol. XII (The War Years, Feb. 1-June 22, 1941) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), no. 371, 584. Most probably that may have been due to the dominance of the Serbian element in the government machinery of the newly founded state; and that gets us to the fundamental cause which was the notion that the Triadic Kingdom was seen to have evolved from the old Serbia. Although, indeed, from 1929 onwards the official title "Yugoslavia" – with its derivative forms – was widely used, still people –especially in Greece– continued to speak of "Serbia," "Greek-Serbian relations" etc.

⁹ Dragan Bakić, "The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1919-1941," *Balkanica* 43, (2012):191-219; Boško I. Bojović, "'Qui habet tempus habet vitam.' La question de Thessalonique et la crise dans les Balkans. La Yougoslavie au seuil de la guerre: entre diplomatie et coup d'État (octobre 1940-mars 1941)," *Balkan Studies* 44, no. 1 (2003): 95-108; Hoptner, *op.cit.*; Technically, Hoptner doesn't belong to modern Yugoslav/Serbian historiography since he is an American historian (of Slovene origin though); however, his seminal monograph on Yugoslav foreign policy under the regency was the first of the kind; *Survey of International Affairs*, *op.cit.*, 341-356.

¹⁰ Radoje Knežević was a key member (the link between the military conspirators and the politicians) of the group that organized the *coup d'état* of 27 March 1941 that deposed the Prince/Regent Paul and overthrew the Government of Dragiša Cvetković (Tsvetkovitch).

1951¹¹ in which he disclosed that after month-long talks between the Yugoslav and German governments, the latter agreed to allow Belgrade to have Thessaloniki. On the other hand, Bogdan Krizman published an article in 1976¹² in which he clearly stated that the sources he used were based upon facts recorded and stored in the political archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the archival records the bargaining about Thessaloniki was clearly documented.

In preparing the articles both authors researched and referenced historical information sourced from the original German documents.¹³ It is without doubt that the two authors' research contributed to restoring the historical truth. After all, where would one looking to find out what actually happened go if not to the official records of those directly involved in the pledge?

¹¹ R.L. Knéjévitch, "Prince Paul, Hitler, and Salonika," *International Affairs* 27, no. 1 (1951): 38-44.

¹² Bogdan Krizman, "Završni Pregovori o Pristupu Jugoslavije Trojnom Paktu 1941" (The final negotiations on the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact in 1941), *Historijski Zbornik* 29, (1976): 517-527.

¹³ That especially applies to Krizman's article who, following the array of documents as they presented in volumes XI and XII of *DGFP*—namely from October 1940 up to March 1941—, clearly shows the bargaining about Thessaloniki. Bakić, it is true, used widely (documents of) the volume XI as they were translated and published in two voluminous collections under the name, Dušan Gvozdenović (ed.), *Aprilski rat 1941* (The April 1941 War) (2 vols.) (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski Institut, 1969). He, however, presented almost exclusively what happened in November 1940, when the bargaining had not yet started—the two sides still being on the stage of sounding out each other intentions—, and only one reference for December (an estimation of the German Supreme Command about Yugoslavia's participation in the planned attack on Greece). When he refers to March 1941, there are three mentions in the 2nd vol. of the three-volume edition titled April War 1941 (*Aprilski rat 1941*) (essentially to documents of volume XII of German Official Documents) that have to do with Hitler's promise about Thessaloniki and the (secret) stipulation on it in the treaty of 25 March 1941—the third one referring to the attempt of the British Government for a non-attacking clause against Thessaloniki to be included in the text of the forthcoming agreement that would confirm the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact. No mention though about the "back and forth" of the negotiations and the great deal of effort on the Yugoslavian part for the agreement to be written in such a wording that it would indisputably secure their rights on Thessaloniki and the area of [Greek] Central Macedonia after the war was ended.

In Greek historiography, on the other side, there are only two books that deal with the topic: the first, by Achilles A. Kyrrou;¹⁴ the second by the seasoned diplomat B. P. Papadakis.¹⁵ The authors of the above papers both researched and referenced the same official German document that Knežević relied on. It should be noted however, that while both the aforementioned books made explicit reference to that official German document, the monumental *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους* (History of the Greek Nation),¹⁶ makes only two brief mentions. These being only two lines, located, on two different pages: “Yugoslavia was negotiating its accession to Tripartite Pact in exchange for Thessaloniki” (434) and “after Yugoslavia signed it she would take Thessaloniki – at least that was what the Yugoslav government wanted” (444).

This article, using both German¹⁷ and the Italian¹⁸ published documents, will focus on the question of Thessaloniki – “the bribe of Salonika,” as W.M. Medlicott put it.¹⁹ The bribe of Salonika is not widely known²⁰ and it deserves greater attention and discussion by both schol-

¹⁴ Achilles A. Kyrrou, *Η αποφασιστική καμπή του πολέμου* (The Decisive Turning Point of the War) (Athens: Aetos, 1946).

¹⁵ B.P. Papadakis, *Διπλωματική ιστορία του ελληνικού πολέμου 1940-1945* (Diplomatic History of the Greek War 1940-1945) (Athens, 1957)

¹⁶ *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους* (History of the Greek Nation), vol. 15 (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1978).

¹⁷ *DGFP*, vols XI and XII; Siebtes Weißbuch der Deutschen Regierung, *Dokumente zum Konflikt mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland*, Auswärtiges Amt 1939/41 Nr. 7 (Berlin: 1941) available at <https://www.scribd.com/doc/208378640/Auswartiges-Amt-Weissbuch-Nr-7-Dokumente-zum-Konflikt-mit-Jugoslawien-und-Griechenland-1941> (accessed January 2018).

¹⁸ Muggeridge, *op.cit.*; Hugh Gibson (ed.), *The Ciano. Diaries: 1939-1943. The complete, unabridged diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1945).

¹⁹ The renowned historian W.M. Medlicott, reviewing the 12th volume of the *DGFP*, 1918-1945 underlined: “The most notable new material in this volume is, however, a large collection dealing with the negotiations with Yugoslavia for her adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a *bribe of Salonika*, and then with the German reaction to the *coup d’état* in Belgrade,” *The English Historical Review* 79, no. 312 (1964): 643.

²⁰ It is characteristic that in an article like Stafford’s, *op.cit.*, 402, the German White Book no. 7 is referred and mention of “military clauses” (of 25 March 1941 agreement) is made, there is no. mention though of Thessaloniki.

ars and students of history. This article intends to establish that Thessaloniki's acquisition-in the future by Yugoslavia, as stipulated on 25 March 1941 agreement, was not something that just came up but was the result of a premeditated and well-played diplomatic game. In fact, the bargaining game undertaken was made only for those with nerves of steel. The entire planning and bargaining process demonstrates the truthfulness of Knežević's statement that "this deed was not in reality an act of weakness,²¹ but the issue of a conspiracy planned for several years."²² In other words, Yugoslavia's intentions towards Thessaloniki were based on past strategic military planning and economic calculations²³ and aspirations.

Ottoman Macedonia²⁴ was a region characterized by a wide mix of different people and cultures. Immediately prior to the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) Thessaloniki (the "coveted city" as it was once called)²⁵ was the most typical paradigm of this state of affairs. Turks, Greeks, Slavs, and Sephardic Jews made up its population, the last group being the largest.²⁶ The Greeks, who incorporated the city into their state in 1912, were only the third largest group at that time, while the Turks were the second largest. By 1916, the Greeks were the largest group with a marginal difference of approximately 7,000 individuals to Sephardic Jews

²¹ Conversely, several scholars have argued that the decision of the Yugoslav Government to join the Tripartite Pact was not the result of its hopeless position but that of a fruitful brinkmanship. Paul Shoup, "Review on J.B. Hoptner's book," *Balkan Studies* 6, no. 2 (1965): 432; Presseisen, op.cit., 367; *Survey of International Affairs*, 346.

²² Knéjévitch, op.cit., 43.

²³ Iain Lauchlan, "The Serbian Struggle in Macedonia, 1890-1910," *The South Slav Journal* 15, no. 1-2 (1992): 65.

²⁴ It was constituted by three administrative districts (vilayets): Salonica, Monastir and that of Kosovo.

²⁵ As it is mentioned in William Miller, "Salonika," *The English Historical Review* 32, no. 126 (1917): 161 (note 1).

²⁶ Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: A Short History* (New York: Modern Library, 2002), 165; "Salonica is neither Greek, nor Bulgarian, nor Turkish; she is Jewish" maintained during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) David Florentin, a journalist and the vice president of the Maccabi Club of Salonica. Devin Naar, *Jewish Salonica: Between the Ottoman Empire and Modern Greece* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 1.

– the Turks had dropped to third place.²⁷ Ever since, the Greek element prevailed demographically in this part of Ottoman Macedonia which was integrated into the Greek Kingdom. These demographic changes occurred after the Treaties of Neuilly (1919) and Lausanne (1923) which imposed an exchange of ethnic populations in the area. The Serbs, however, seemed to aspire to control Thessaloniki,²⁸ even after the city had become part of Greece. It is well known that the Serbs were forced by the domineering Dual Monarchy to turn focus from the Adriatic towards the Aegean.²⁹ The Serbs started to nurture their desire, as

²⁷ Iakovos D. Michailidis, “Ο αγώνας των στατιστικών υπολογισμών του πληθυσμού της Μακεδονίας” (The Statistical Battle for the Population of Greek Macedonia) and Loukianos I. Hassiotis, “Μακεδονία, 1912-1923: Από την πολυεθνική αυτοκρατορία στο εθνικό κράτος” (Macedonia, 1912-1923: From the Multinational Empire to Nation State), in *Ιστορία της Μακεδονίας* (History of Macedonia), ed. Ioannis Koliopoulos (Thessaloniki: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 2007) available at <http://www.imma.edu.gr/imma/history/12.html> and <http://www.imma.edu.gr/imma/history/11.html> respectively (accessed January 2018).

²⁸ Lukáč (of the Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade) informs us that “Thessaloniki for decades was the object of aspirations by Serbian bourgeoisie”. Dušan Lukáč, “Aggression of Italy against Greece and the consequences of failure of Italian expansion,” *Balkan Studies* 23, no. 1 (1982): 89, 90.

²⁹ According to the Austro-Serbian Secret Treaty of 1881, Belgrade forced to renounce its claims over Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi Pazar. As a return to this, the article VII of the secret treaty made clear that “If [...] Serbia were in a position to make territorial acquisitions in the direction of her southern frontiers (with the exception of the Sanjak of Novi-Pazar), Austria-Hungary will not oppose herself thereto, and will use her influence with the other power for the purpose of winning them over to an attitude favourable to Serbia.” Furthermore, when the Treaty of 1881 was prolonged in 1889, an additional article was incorporated stipulating: “[...] Austria-Hungary will recognize, and support with other Powers, the recognition in favor of the Kingdom of Serbia of the territorial extension [...] in the direction of the valley of the Vardar as far as circumstances will permit.” Thus, the provisions of the abovementioned secret treaty essentially “canalized” Serbian aspirations towards Macedonia. Vladislav Sotirovic, *Serbia, Montenegro and the “Albanian Question,” 1878-1912* (Lap Lambert, 2015), 256-257; Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2012* (Toronto: Anansi, 2012), 148; Vemund Aarbakke, *Ethnic Rivalry and the Quest for Macedonia, 1870-1913* (Boulder Colorado: East European Monographs/New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 86; Lauchlan, op.cit.; Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans* (vol. 2: Twentieth Century) (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 92; L.S. Stavrianos, *The Bal-*

early as the 1880s,³⁰ to expand to the vilayets of Kosovo. Which integrated the notion of “Old Serbia,” (Monastir and Salonika) the latter being, in its greater part, the area that later constituted the Greek Macedonia.³¹ There is some evidence that Serbian statesmen were fostering,

kans since 1453 (New York: Rinehart, 1958), 450, 513; Wayne Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West: The Events of 1903-1908* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), 25; H.R. Wilkinson, *Maps and Politics. A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1951), 94-95.

³⁰ Two decades earlier anyway, Ilija Garašanin, prime minister (1861-67) and twice foreign minister (1852-1853, 1861-67) of the Principality of Serbia (1830-1878), claimed that only Serbia, among the Balkan states, was entitled to succeed the Ottoman Empire and create its own. Petros Sioussiouras–Constantinos Arvanitopoulos, “Geopolitical designs and realities in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy: the issue of access to the sea,” *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 33, no. 2 (2005): 143; Edislav Manetovic, “Ilija Garasanin: Nacertanije and Nationalism,” *La Revue Historique* 3 (2007): 162; Maja Miljkovic, “The Serbian view of Macedonia,” *The South Slav Journal* 21, no. 3-4 (2000): 19, 21.

³¹ Basil C. Gounaris, “‘A Mysterious Bond forged by History’: The Making of Greek-Serbian Traditional Friendship in 19th Century Greece,” *Balkan Studies* 45, no. 1 (2004): 14; Although before 1885 could be found only few –certainly only Serbs– who actually believed that the Serbs were really an important minority south of the Šar Mountains, in 1889 Spiridon Gopčević (a diplomat and a scholar) brought the novel idea that the most of the three vilayets consisting Ottoman Macedonia were inhabited by Serbs – Serres, Kastoria and Edessa were situated, according to his ethnographic map, in Serbian land. And that whetted the appetite for more “updated” ethnographic ideas like those which contributed to the production of 1891 map developed by the scholars of the High School at Belgrade. Their claims about Serbian presence in the area in question were more striking than that of Gopčević’s: the Serbs extended “over the whole of the western Balkans, from Shkodra down the Dril valley to Konitsa in the west, to Kastoria, Veria, Salonika and Drama to the south, and in the east, as far as a line through Drama, north to the Danube, including Sofia. There were no important minorities within their alleged Serbian territory.” Wilkinson, *op.cit.*, 99, 102, 106-107; Lauchlan, *op.cit.*, 71 (note 46). Based on these ethnographic “data” Serbia claimed and opened consular office at Thessaloniki in 1887, and in 1899 had a consular office at Serres also. Vucinich, *op.cit.*, 25, 28; Jelavich, *op.cit.*, 92. Nikolaos Vlachos, a Greek scholar, who based his account on Greek Consular reports, in his book, *To Μακεδονικόν ως φάσις του Ανατολικού ζητήματος, 1878-1908* (The Macedonian Question as a Phase of the Eastern Question) (Athens: Gertroudis S. Christou, 1935), wrote that “Serbian proselytism was not restricted to the northern part of Macedonia, but extended as far south as Salonica, Serres and the Chalkidiki peninsula,” as it is referred in Aarbakke, *op.cit.*, 87-88; for the intense Serb propaganda activity in Serres see Ioannis A. Bakas, «Σερβικές κινήσεις στην ανατολική Μακεδονία στα

even as late as the 1920s, aspirations to take over Greek Macedonia. Vojislav Marinković, Foreign Minister (1924, 1927-1932) and Prime Minister (1932), underlined the desire to “reduce Greece to her real ethnographic frontiers.” Dragan Bakić observes that the aforementioned phrase is part of an undated manuscript bearing the title “A plan for a state policy;” but he concludes that since the document in question is not dated, it must have probably been written before the massive Greek refugee population, coming from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, flooded Greek Macedonia.³² Nevertheless, even if that were the case, it would be rather difficult to explain the fact that about a decade after the incorporation of [Greek] Macedonia and Thessaloniki into the [Greek] national body, the Serbian expansionist aspirations to the south had never ceased to exist. Certainly, one could say that it was a single undated minute in the life of one Yugoslav politician of Serbian origin, handwritten sometime in the early 1920s, never published and forgotten (?) immediately after the Greek catastrophe in Asia Minor. Or it was just an adventurous statement of a politician which obviously never carried weight. It is not so simple though; one could conclude that by stressing that a politician who served as (twice) Foreign Minister and

τέλη του 19ου αιώνα και η αντιμετώπισή τους» (Serbian Activity in Eastern Macedonia in the late 19th century and the Reaction to it), *Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα* 11, (1999-2000): 223-233. The following books and articles highlight the dimension of the Yugoslav (Serbian) policy's expansionist ideal, on the part of Greek scholars: Asterios K. Tsiourvas, «Η Γιουγκοσλαβία του Μεσοπολέμου μέσα από τη ματιά των Ελλήνων διπλωματών» (Interwar Yugoslavia seen from the Perspective of Greek Diplomats), in *Έθνος, κράτος και πολιτική: μελέτες νεοελληνικής ιστορίας αφιερωμένες στον Γιάννη Σ. Κολιόπουλο* (Nation, State and Politics: Studies of Modern Greek history dedicated to Yannis S. Koliopoulos), ed. Basil C. Gounaris (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2009); Sioussiouras-Arvanitopoulos, *op.cit.*, 141-59; Loukianos Hassiotis, «Η σερβική προπαγάνδα στη Θεσσαλονίκη κατά τη διάρκεια του Α' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου» (Serbian propaganda in Thessaloniki during the First World War), in *Πρακτικά του ΙΗ' Πανελληνίου Ιστορικού Συνεδρίου* (Proceedings of the 18th Panhellenic Historical Congress) (1998): 375-88; Miranda Stavrinou, *Ξένη προπαγάνδα στη Θεσσαλονίκη την παραμονή της συνδιάσκεψης της Λωζάννης* (Foreign Propaganda in Thessaloniki on the Eve of the Lausanne Conference), in *Πρακτικά του ΙΕ' Πανελληνίου Ιστορικού Συνεδρίου* (Proceedings of the 15th Panhellenic Historical Congress) (1995): 313-34.

³² Bakić, “The Port of Salonica,” 194-95.

Prime Minister, he was namely a top politician and his thoughts obviously carried weight. The Serbian politicians did believe that “Aegean Macedonia was predominantly populated by Slavs.”³³ It is known that during the conference in Bucharest, 1913, the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić declared that “In the territories liberated by Serbian troops in Macedonia there is no one who is not a Serb.”³⁴ A decade before, the Serbian Consul in Thessaloniki assured the French politician and diplomat Victor Bérard that “en vérité, Salonique est serbe,”³⁵ the magazine of the Serbian organization *Narodna Odbrana* (National Defence), whose honorary president was King Alexander, supported the reasoning behind Pašić’s aforementioned assertion, writing in 1926: “Throughout the whole of Greek Macedonia until the Balkan wars, not even a thousand national Greeks dwelled there, in contrast to 310,000 of our compatriots who lived there as a predominant element among the Turks, the Jews, the Gypsies, etc. [...]”³⁶

The demographic evidence, nevertheless, showed something totally different: Bérard, after having thoroughly examined the claims of the Serbian Consul, had concluded that “Salonika does not appear to be Serbian. Except for the Consul, the two interpreters, two or three kavasis [concierge or clerk] and some traveling Serbian merchants, there are no Serbs in Salonika;”³⁷ after all, the last Ottoman census of 1905/

³³ As Bakić presents it, it becomes quite obvious that it is solid evidence that Slavs (either Serbs or Bulgarians) constituted the overwhelming majority of Salonika and Monastir administrative districts (vilayet) even up to 1922.

³⁴ Theodoros Voudiclaris, *Η βαλκανική εμπλοκή* (The Balkan Entanglement) (Athens: 1962), 80; even in 1867, on the occasion of the II Congress of the United Youth, the then-young Nikola Pašić stressed that “Albania and Macedonia must be deemed Serb lands.” Miljkovic, *op.cit.*, 21-22.

³⁵ Victor Bérard, *La Macédoine* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1900), 181.

³⁶ Antonis Koulas, «Οι ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικές σχέσεις από το 1923 έως το 1928» (Greek-Yugoslav Relations from 1923 to 1928) (PhD diss., Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2007), 176.

³⁷ Bérard, *op.cit.*, 182; I. Michailidis, “From Christians to Members of an Ethnic Community. Creating Borders in the City of Thessaloniki (1800-1912),” in *Frontiers and Identities: Cities in Regions and Nations*, ed. Lud’a Klusáková and Laure Teulière (Pisa: Plus-Pisa University Press, 2008), 173; nevertheless, writes that in the early 20th century operated in Thessaloniki 20 Greek schools (out of 86 existed in total) with 3,857 pupils, whereas there were only 4 Serbian ones with just 240 pupils; As far as Gopčević’s claims, Bérard found them utterly ridiculous. Aarbakke, *op.cit.*, 86.

1906 (performed from May to August 1905) recognized for Salonika and Monastir vilayets Greeks to be the second largest population group behind Turks,³⁸ while the overall Slav population, under the millet of Bulgarians,³⁹ was less than the Greeks by 108,171 and 88,913 individuals for the vilayets of Salonika and Monastir respectively. Furthermore, just before the first Balkan war broke out, Mehmet Tevfik (Bilge) Bey, professor of History of Mustafa Kemal at the Monastir Military School, wrote in his book “History of the Monastir Administrative District” (Manastır Vilayetinin Tarihçesi, Manastır: Beynelmillel Ticaret Matbaası, 1911) that “in Monastir there were 393 Greek schools with 28,147 students and 76 Serbian with 3,745 students;”⁴⁰ last, but not the least, what Ioannis Kokotakis, the Greek Consul General in Skopje, reported, in April 1930, about the demographic synthesis of the city of Monastir,⁴¹ undoubtedly it was a slap in the face for the credibility of the Serbian Prime Minister’s and the Serbian magazine’s aforementioned assertions.

It was precisely this kind of “aspect” that a part of the Serbian world held about the region of Thessaloniki that the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* in Rome commented about in August 1925, by reporting that “Belgrade’s eyes were obsessively turned to Thessaloniki.”⁴² Indeed, one year later the magazine *Narodna Odbrana* made clear how this “obsession” should be understood, since it delineated the “[Serbian] ethnographic boundaries” to the south in such a way as to incorporate Greek Macedonia.⁴³

In the final analysis, could Yugoslavia –with Old Serbia as its core element– be counted among potential enemies of Greece?⁴⁴ Could this

³⁸ Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 166.

³⁹ Turks recognized four millets, namely Greeks, Bulgarians, Roman Catholics and Jews; consequently, in their censuses no. distinction was drawn between Serbs and Bulgarians.

⁴⁰ Voudiclaris, *Η βαλκανική εμπλοκή*, 80.

⁴¹ “Out of the city’s 25,000 residents –10,000 of whom were Greeks– Serbs were few and most of them were civil servants.” Tsiourvas, op.cit., 289.

⁴² Tsiourvas, op.cit., 285.

⁴³ Koulas, «Οι ελληνογιογκοσλαβικές σχέσεις», 176.

⁴⁴ In Gounaris, “A Mysterious Bond,” 21-22, it is referred that, although this notion was present before the Balkan wars, no. one deliberately highlighted it.

way of thinking and this way of propagating this kind of expansionist dreams constitute a threat to Greece? Utilizing Serbian archives, Loukianos Hassiotis asserts that any propagandistic action did not come from the official state, and that most of the documentation point to low-ranking Serbian officers as responsible for that.⁴⁵ He concludes that, as much as there were still some incidents of Serbian propaganda,⁴⁶ the status quo, as it had been formed after World War I, did not permit changes in the Balkans. However, it was undeniable that Serbian circles (even within the state apparatus) had not ceased to envision expansion to the south to provide a desirable exit to the Aegean. Nevertheless, they had no power to determine their country's foreign policy.⁴⁷

The foregoing analysis could be considered correct, provided the "system" of balance remained in place. If, however, the Serbian/Yugoslav leadership at some point felt that the status quo which "did not permit changes in the region" was non-existent, they could believe that an opportunity may develop that would allow the desired descent to the Aegean. Given this situation there may be both support and desire to acquire what had been lost. Thessaloniki would then fall to Yugoslavia regardless of the fact that the city had by then become in no uncertain terms Greek territory. This article believes that what seems to have triggered a new course of action on the part of Yugoslavia was the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 and the laborious efforts of the Third Reich not only to secure Yugoslavia's non-involvement in the war but also to draw her into the "New Order" German orbit. The status quo was about to change; the governing elite in Belgrade felt the time opportune to achieve the longed-for descent to the south, to the Aegean. The German minister in Yugoslavia Viktor von Heeren put it aptly, when he reported to his foreign minister, Ribbentrop, on 14 November 1940: "The Italo-Greek war has reawakened the old Serbian desire for a free outlet to the Aegean through Salonika."⁴⁸

Indeed, Professor Radoje Knežević revealed that on 28 October 1940, the very day of Italy's attack on Greece, the Yugoslav leaders reached

⁴⁵ Hassiotis, «Η σερβική προπαγάνδα», 380-81.

⁴⁶ Hassiotis, «Η σερβική προπαγάνδα», 386.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ *DGFP* XI, no. 334.

the decision to attack Greece and take possession of Thessaloniki⁴⁹ – in order to save it from the Italians since “it is better for Greece herself to have us instead of Italy in Salonica.”⁵⁰ He maintained that what he disclosed was supported by official documents,⁵¹ which contained reports of meetings that took place among Prince/Regent Paul and the principal members of his government. Furthermore, the author disclosed that after month-long talks between the Yugoslav and German governments, the latter agreed to allow Belgrade to have Thessaloniki.⁵² Indeed, the fact that the signature of the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941 was combined with Thessaloniki’s acquisition by Yugoslavia convinced him that this deed “was not in reality an act of weakness, but the issue of a conspiracy planned for several years.” Certainly, the then Prime Minister Cvetković rushed to vehemently refute these accusations in an article of his own, categorically stating that “Neither on 25 March nor at any other date have I put my signature to an instrument which promised to give us Salonika.”⁵³ Unfortunately for Cvetković, the Germans kept detailed minutes of the talks which clearly shows the Yugoslav policy makers’ bazaar-attitude about Thessaloniki. Certainly, this kind of response on Cvetković’s part is both not surprising and understandable; modern Yugoslav/Serbian historiography, however, backs Cvetković’s point of view, making serious effort to defend the policy that Prince/Regent Paul and his government planned on the cession of Thessaloniki immediately after the Italian invasion of Greece. For them, the fact that Knežević was a political opponent to Yugoslavia’s pre-war regime and one of the chief architects of the military coup of 27 March 1941, which

⁴⁹ Knéjévitch, op.cit., 42; the same view in *Survey of International Affairs*, 345.

⁵⁰ The phrase is quoted both by Knéjévitch, op.cit., 42 and Bakić, “The Port of Salonica,” 206, with the latter attributing it to Milan Antić, the Minister of Court. Knežević implies that it was said on October 28, 1940, when the attack on Greece and the occupation of Thessaloniki was decided after a long and arduous debate; on the contrary, Bakić clearly states that it was said the next day by Antić who was trying to calm down the “very depressed” Regent Paul.

⁵¹ Radoje Knežević himself writes that these documents –some of them are drafted entirely in the handwriting of the witnesses– were discovered after the *coup d’état* of 27 March.

⁵² Knéjévitch, op.cit., 43.

⁵³ Dragisha Tsvetkovitch, “Prince Paul, Hitler, and Salonika,” *International Affairs* 27, no. 4 (1951): 466.

deposed the government and the regency. This made him to seem as if he was inaccurate or, worse, false. In this line of thinking, Bakić attributes Knežević's "anti" view specifically to his resentment for not being allowed to return home after the imposition of the communist regime and to his effort to justify the 27 March coup d'état.⁵⁴ Certainly, the rejoinder to this argument would be that what Knežević said about Yugoslavia's pre-war regime "misdeed" should not necessarily be considered wrong just because he was a political opponent to it. Furthermore, that the essence of his assertion is verified by the German official documents. Regardless of whether or not Knežević's account is considered reliable, what is an incontestable fact is that he brought to light the German White Book No. 7, which disclosed the concession of Thessaloniki to Yugoslavia.

In any case, modern Yugoslav/Serbian historiography must acknowledge that Belgrade viewed this Greek city not only from an economic standpoint⁵⁵ but also from a military-strategic one. In a nutshell, the Greek city of Thessaloniki with its port never ceased to be a matter of security for Yugoslavia.⁵⁶ As the Yugoslav prime minister Milan Stojadinović admitted to the Italian foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano during their interview in Venice, in June 1938, "the question of an outlet to the Aegean [he meant through Thessaloniki] [...] is always present to the Yugoslav people."⁵⁷ This continuous 'presence' seems to

⁵⁴ Bakić, "The Port of Salonica," 213.

⁵⁵ That had to do with the diligent and pressing efforts of Belgrade's government to secure the so called "Serbian zone" in the port of Thessaloniki which aroused so much tension and caused a great deal of problems in the Greek-Yugoslav relations throughout the 1920s.

⁵⁶ Dragan Bakić, "The Great War and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Legacy of an Enduring Conflict," *Balkanica* 49 (2018): 160; the same, "The Port of Salonica," 217.

⁵⁷ Muggeridge, *op.cit.*, 214; In 1925, the Russian general Vygran of the Wrangel army told to the Greek consul in Skopje that the officers of III Corps of Yugoslav army "They were asleep and awake dreaming of Thessaloniki;" indeed, he continued saying that a year ago, in the spring of 1924, the aforementioned officers had received secret orders to be ready to march towards Thessaloniki. Historical Archives of (Greek) Ministry for Foreign Affairs (hereafter YDIAYE), 1925, Γ/62/α, 3423/82, G.A. Tzivoglou to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Skopje, 2 March 1925; After signing the Greek-Serb Conventions in 1929, George Melas, the director of the Political Department of Foreign Ministry, put it bluntly "the old and clearly conquering manifestations of Belgrade had disappeared [...] [but] of course no. action can eliminate the subconscious

have steered the government in Belgrade towards the decision to openly negotiate the acquisition of Thessaloniki, among other conditions, as a prerequisite to adhere to the Tripartite Pact. Yugoslav/Serbian historiography, nevertheless, opposes this view: "Throughout these turbulent events Prince Paul and his government did not demonstrate an inclination to exploit the situation in order to achieve territorial aggrandizement but rather reacted with restraint being vitally concerned that neither Italy nor Germany took possession of Salonica and thus encircled Yugoslavia completely leaving her at their mercy," wrote Bakić.⁵⁸ Moreover, to make this more conceivable, he reveals that even when Italy accepted, on a German proposal, that Thessaloniki should be offered to Yugoslavia, "Prince Paul adamantly stood against taking part in the partition of an allied country,"⁵⁹ concluding that Yugoslavia certainly viewed the city as a point of security, but never wished its acquisition.⁶⁰

Boško Bojović, on the other hand, downgrades this dealing (namely, the negotiations about Thessaloniki's cession) to a "tactical maneuver" when he states: "It appears that this question (the Salonika question), which has repeatedly surfaced throughout the lengthy negotiations between Yugoslav leaders and those of the Axis powers, represented a tactical maneuver rather than a real strategic⁶¹ issue."⁶²

chauvinistic feeling of the Serbs as a people." YDIAYE, 1934, AAK 9, 5576, Athens, 20 June 1933; Furthermore, George N. Kofinas (president, in 1939, of the Hellenic-Yugoslav Association of Athens) informed Nikolaos Mavroudis (Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) that in 1930 Živković, the then Consul General of Yugoslavia in Thessaloniki, kept saying "Salonique, nos portes, nos fenêtres." YDIAYE, 1940, A/Iđ, (without number), Athens, 19 July 1939.

⁵⁸ Bakić, "The Port of Salonica," 191.

⁵⁹ Bakić, "The Port of Salonica," 210.

⁶⁰ Bakić, "The Port of Salonica," 216-7.

⁶¹ Bojović's attempt to demote the dealing about Thessaloniki to merely "a tactical maneuver" simply overturns the established view of the strategic importance for Serbia/Yugoslavia of the passage through the Vardar Valley in the Aegean (read Thessaloniki). It should be remembered the constant view of the Yugoslav politicians after World War I that is echoed in Minister of Court Milan Antić's saying "Salonica entered into strategy and became an integral part of operational necessity of our army in defence of the country". Undated Antić's note in Antić Papers, as it cited in Bakić, "The Port of Salonica," 196.

⁶² Bojović, *op.cit.*, 104.

Furthermore, J.B. Hoptner, who, in 1962, was the first to defend the foreign policy pursued by Prince/Regent Paul and his main associates⁶³ during the eve and the beginning of World War II, states that both the Germans and the Allies were left with the impression that the Yugoslavs were not at all interested in Thessaloniki.⁶⁴ In fact, because of the continuing Greek victories over Italy, according to Hoptner, the issue of Thessaloniki came to the forefront. It was now necessary for Germany to intervene in order to get its ally out of the difficult position, and the offer of Thessaloniki was used as bait to bring Yugoslavia into the Axis camp.⁶⁵ At this point, it is necessary to recall the aforesaid categorical refusal by the then Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković, who, together with Foreign Minister Aleksandar Cincar-Marković, handled the question of their country's accession to the Tripartite Pact: "Neither on 25 March nor at any other date have I put my signature to an instrument which promised to give us Salonika."

Undoubtedly, had one read what the aforementioned authors wrote, one would easily conclude that either such a question was virtually moot or at most consisted of nothing more but tactical moves on the part of the Yugoslav leaders to merely deal with the dangerous embrace of the Axis and to prevent encirclement of the country that would result in interrupting its access to the sea.

However, had one read the German and the Italian documents, one couldn't form the same conclusion of the situation in question. These documents are the contemporary record of the thoughts, consultations and negotiations of the period from the Italian attack on 28 October 1940 to the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941, and the German attack on both Greece and Yugoslavia two weeks later, on 6 April. It becomes obvious that these sources do not want (neither do they seem to attempt) to justify or to embellish the negotiations for the concession of Thessaloniki to Yugoslavia, nor the motives that led to it.

⁶³ Kruno Meneghello-Dinčić, "La Politique Étrangère de la Yougoslavie (1934-1941)," *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale* 15, no. 58 (1965) :57.

⁶⁴ Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 209-10, 228.

⁶⁵ Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 190.

In addition, Danilo Gregorić's⁶⁶ book "Thus ended Yugoslavia" ("So endete Jugoslawien"), published in Leipzig in 1943, although it constitutes a piece of secondary literature, it offers a valuable testimony on the negotiations between the two parties, confirming thus what stemmed from the German documents. Gregorić, who was Cvetković's confidant,⁶⁷ was authorized by him to go to Berlin to sound out the German intentions, becoming thus an informal (nevertheless important) conveyor of the Yugoslav prime minister's messages to Ribbentrop.

The die had been cast. The detachment of a part of Greek territory and its concession to 'friend and ally' Yugoslavia was now one of the *sine qua non* conditions in order to bring the German-Yugoslav negotiations to fruition; and they finally did in mid-March 1941. The Third Reich agreed to the Yugoslav demand that all assurances the latter wanted be given in written form. Thus, the final text of the agreement, that Ribbentrop sent to the German ambassador to Rome Hans Georg von Mackensen in order to have the consent of the Italian government as well, provided for the following:⁶⁸

- i. "Respect at all times of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia"
- ii. "The Axis Powers will not address the demand that Yugoslavia permit the passage or transportation of troops through its territory"
- iii. Yugoslavia was to be exonerated from any military contribution.⁶⁹ Thus, "Should the Yugoslav government at any time consider it to be in its own interest to participate in the military operations of the powers of the Tripartite Pact, it will be left up to the Yugoslav government to make the necessary military agreements for this with the powers of the Tripartite Pact"

⁶⁶ As characteristically wrote the seasoned diplomat Papadakis, Gregorić was the main agent and adherent of the Germans in Yugoslavia trying as hard as he could to stress the need for Yugoslavia to join the Axis powers, using his position as Director of the Belgrade newspaper *Vreme*. Papadakis, *op.cit.*, 133.

⁶⁷ Neither Bakić, "The Port of Salonica," 209 nor Bojović, *op.cit.*, 98 question this fact.

⁶⁸ *DGFP* XII, no. 178, 313-4; Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 240; *Survey of International Affairs*, 347-8.

⁶⁹ Ribbentrop originally claimed that the specific stipulation should apply only to the fighting against Greece; in the end though it was Ribbentrop who was obliged to yield. *Survey of International Affairs*, 346.

iv. Consent on the future concession of Salonika, providing: “In the new settlement of the frontiers in the Balkans the interests of Yugoslavia in a territorial connection with the Aegean Sea, through extension of her sovereignty to the city and harbor of Salonika, are to be taken into account.”

Regarding the 4th stipulation, it should be emphasized that neither the wording nor the acceptance of it was imposed⁷⁰ on the Yugoslav government by its German counterpart. Quite the contrary. Three times, during March 1941, and before Belgrade eventually decided to join the Axis, the former asked Berlin (along with changes regarding the other three stipulations) to rephrase the term referring to Thessaloniki for the territorial extension over it to be guaranteed. On the 7th, 12th and 17th of March 1941 the Yugoslav side asked the Germans to change the wording regarding Thessaloniki: from, “Yugoslavia’s interests *in free outlet* to the Aegean Sea through Salonika will be taken into account in the reorganization of Europe”⁷¹ to “In the new settlement of the frontiers in

⁷⁰ However, both Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 221, and Bojović, *op.cit.*, 105, file the same testimony (product of personal interview with Croat leader Vlatko Maček who was present at the meeting): Cincar-Marković, at the meeting of 6 March 1941, in order to persuade the Crown Council on the necessity of joining the Tripartite Pact, argued that “refusal of the Germans’ offer of Salonika would cause them to doubt Yugoslavia’s sincerity.” He obviously implied that if Yugoslavia wanted to survive, it had to accept to integrate Thessaloniki. However, they don’t seem to bother about the problematic logic that lies behind it: why Belgrade’s possible retreat to the issue of the imminent incorporation of the Greek port would cause doubts about its sincerity to stand by the Axis? Perhaps if the Yugoslavs appeared at that moment nonchalant regarding Thessaloniki –the concession of which they had asked themselves from the very beginning– they would seem as if they were not serious about the negotiations, especially after so many bargains and so many concessions the Germans had made theretofore? In that case, they should have disappeared as an obstacle.

⁷¹ *DGFP* XII, no. 131, 233; Krizman, *op.cit.*, 518.

the Balkans, account will be taken of Yugoslavia's interest *in a territorial connection*⁷² with the Aegean Sea through Salonika"⁷³ and finally to "In the new settlement of the frontiers in the Balkans, account is to be taken of Yugoslavia's interest *in a territorial connection* with the Aegean Sea through *extension of her sovereignty* to the city and harbor of Salonika."⁷⁴ Three times also on the 9th, 14th and 18th of March 1941, Ribbentrop rushed to fully comply with Belgrade's requests.⁷⁵

At this point it should be mentioned that an information had already reached the government in Athens, received by third-party embassies, that the forthcoming agreement between Germany and Yugoslavia stipulated the concession of Thessaloniki to the latter.⁷⁶ To the inquiry

⁷² Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 228, informs us that "Cincar-Marković exceeded his instructions when on March 12th he raised the Yugoslav demand from 'free access' to 'a territorial link' with Salonika;" at the same time, he makes known to us that it was minister of Court Antić who introduced the subject of "a territorial link" with the Greek city at the meeting of the crown council on that day. Despite the fact, though, that Cvetković reacted –as Hoptner assures us– to that decision making clear that the government "was interested only in making certain that Yugoslavia's rights in the free zone of Salonika would not be denied if the port should fall to the Germans," he authorized Cincar-Marković to continue to negotiate this issue with the Germans; and even though he made crystal clear to him what should be the guiding principle of their policy apropos Thessaloniki, five days later "extension of (Yugoslavia's) sovereignty" over that "mere" territorial connection with the Aegean Sea was demanded. The simple question that arises here is, since Cvetković and Prince Paul asserted both Allies and Axis that they had (only) a restrained interest in that Greek port, then what power pushed the whole thing to the point of Yugoslavia's official acquisition of Thessaloniki?

⁷³ *DGFP* XII, no. 156, 281-2; Krizman, *op.cit.*, 521.

⁷⁴ *DGFP* XII, no. 173, 303-4; Krizman, *op.cit.*, 523.

⁷⁵ *DGFP* XII, no. 144, 156, 178, 256, 293, 314; Krizman, *op.cit.*, 519, 522.

⁷⁶ Papadakis, *op.cit.*, 159-160; *Greek Diplomatic Documents 1940-41* (Athens: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980), no. 183: N. Mavroudis to Ch. Simopoulos (Minister in London), Athens, 21 March 1941: "Priorité absolue. We are transmitting to you the following telegram from the embassy in Bern; we are kindly asking you to report it to the Foreign Office inquiring them if the information in question, namely about Thessaloniki, has come to them also, because we refuse to believe its accuracy. 'I have the honor to inform you that the Ambassador of France has entrusted me that the Ambassador of Yugoslavia has told him that he has received a telegram from his government informing him that an agreement is imminent between Yugoslavia and Germany according to which, among others, Thessaloniki is granted to Yugoslavia. It should be noted that the ambassador of Yugoslavia also told the ambassador of France that he

posed by R. Rossetis, the Greek minister in Belgrade, whether there was any truth in this piece of information, the Yugoslav government categorically denied any rumors regarding Germany's promises to them about exiting the Aegean through Thessaloniki; Cincar-Marković, although denied any chance of joining forces with Greece against the expected invasion by Germany, however, asserted Rossetis that "Greece could count on Yugoslavia's friendship."⁷⁷ The Greek government was puzzled with the obvious inconsistency: how the expected occupation of Thessaloniki by Germany (after her expected invasion of Greece) would be reconciled with the continually repeated statement that "only its possession by Greece was a guarantee for Yugoslavia?"⁷⁸ However, what Hitler verbatim stated, while addressing Reichstag on May 4, 1941,⁷⁹ as well as the official statement of his government two days later,⁸⁰ may reveal the reason why the Yugoslav government was not concerned about the expectedly disturbing turn of events regarding Thessaloniki: it was them who were going to get it!

knew that Bulgaria too had achieved to extract from Germany a promise of exit to the Aegean (It was about those parts of Greek territory known as western Macedonia and western Thrace which until the defeat of Germany had been incorporated in Bulgaria). No. such information was received by the Foreign Office. The notion that Germany had proposed the cession of Thessaloniki to Yugoslavia in return for accession to Tripartite Pact was very likely, but even them (the Foreign Office), they refuse to believe that Yugoslavia would reach such a point of moral depravity to accept such a proposal; On receiving the information, on 21 March, about the Yugoslav Government's decision to sign the Tripartite Pact, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, noted in his diary that the "Yugoslavs seem to have sold their souls to the Devil." Stafford, *op.cit.*, 403.

⁷⁷ *Greek Diplomatic Documents*, no. 186, Belgrade 23 March 1941.

⁷⁸ *Greek Diplomatic Documents*, nos 186 and 187 (Belgrade 23 March 1941).

⁷⁹ "Yugoslavia, after a specific and well-founded request of its government, received the assurance that, in the event of territorial changes in the Balkan Peninsula, it would be granted a territorial outlet to the Aegean Sea, which would be subject to the sovereignty of the Yugoslav State and which, among others, it would include the city of Thessaloniki." Papadakis *op.cit.*, 132.

⁸⁰ German White Book No. 7. Official Reich Government Statement of 6 April 1941, 7; Papadakis, *op.cit.*

Conclusion

After the citation of the information presented by the aforementioned documents, even a well-meaning reader would be tempted to think that Cvetković did not recall events accurately. It seems that, when he declared ‘heroically’ in his article that his government’s position on Thessaloniki issue was that they would not accept for it to fall into Italian, Bulgarian or *German* control,⁸¹ he did not remember that both he and Prince/Regent Paul had repeatedly told Arthur Bliss Lane and Sir Ronald Ian Campbell, US and British ambassadors respectively, that “the German occupation of Salonika would not be (for Yugoslavia) a cause for war;⁸² its Bulgarian and Italian occupation was another matter.”⁸³ It seems that he did not remember that during the crown council meeting on 6 March 1941, seized by rebellious delirium, he declared that “above all Salonika must not be occupied by Axis forces [...] he repeated that Salonika would have to be defended and that if Yugoslavia were faced with the prospect of war, then the Yugoslavs would fight.”⁸⁴ It seems that he did not remember that both Ribbentrop and Ciano had sent to him, on 25 March 1941, a letter confirming the Axis intention, as a consequence of Yugoslavia’s accession to the Tripartite Pact on that day, to agree to the occupation of Thessaloniki by Yugoslavia.⁸⁵ He did not remember the answer he himself had sent to Ribbentrop on the same day, confirming that he had received all the German statements – certainly, and that about Thessaloniki.⁸⁶ He did not remember Hitler’s comment during the conversation they had on the same day, when the latter described “the *acquisition* (as it is mentioned in the original document) of access to the Aegean would probably be

⁸¹ Tsvetkovitch, *op.cit.*, 466.

⁸² However, Cvetković did not seem to know that his Foreign Minister had argued (also) “heroically” in mid-February 1941 –in full contrast to Regent’s and his prime minister’s declared view– that it was better for Yugoslavia to fight the Germans than to let them have Salonika, because in that case they would “strangle us completely.” Bakić, “The Great War,” 162.

⁸³ Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 228.

⁸⁴ Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 219-220.

⁸⁵ *DGFP* XII, no. 205, 353; “Tajna Nota o Solunu” (The Secret Note on Salonika), *Poruka* 19 (1954): 1.

⁸⁶ *DGFP* XII, no. 206, 353-4.

considered the most successful act of Yugoslav foreign policy and would go down in history as a kind of vindication for those who today had to reach difficult decisions which were not understood or were felt to be painful by some Yugoslavs.”⁸⁷ He did not remember the content of his unconditional enthusiasm expressed to Danilo Gregorić on the return journey after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, when he was stating jubilantly: “No other country has won what we have achieved. [...] It is complete in this protocol the assurance that we will be given Salonika. This is a great opportunity and great luck for our homeland. When we acquire Salonika and then adapt our economy to the German economy, we will have tremendous potential for growth.”⁸⁸

Such memory ‘gaps’ could certainly do History a disservice and would definitely not be possible to be covered either by interviews with those who “did the wrongdoing” or by recalling what they wrote several years later. These ‘gaps’ could be bridged only through studying the German documents; besides, only so would it be possible to have the full “picture” of the German–Yugoslav negotiations.⁸⁹ At this point it should be emphasized how unfortunate it was, indeed, that the article of Bogdan Krizman was not included in the bibliography used both by Bakić and Bojović.⁹⁰ Therein the author clearly states that the sources he used were drawn upon the political archive of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs; coincidentally, the bargaining about Thessaloniki is deployed there unembellished.

The principal argument of Yugoslav/Serbian historiography is that there were no plans at all for territorial expansion at the expense of Greece; it was only Belgrade’s government strategic preoccupation

⁸⁷ *DGFP* XII, no. 207, 355.

⁸⁸ Papadakis, *op.cit.*, 137.

⁸⁹ The truth is that would be very difficult for Hoptner to get the insight of Belgrade’s bargaining attitude about Thessaloniki in its negotiations with Axis, since, for achieving it, he should have studied the 11th volume of the *DGFP* which was published in 1961; no. question, indeed, for the twelfth one which was published in 1962. Therefore, it is not strange that the list of the volumes studied by him stops at the ninth one.

⁹⁰ It should be underlined here that Krizman was one of the most renowned experts on Yugoslavia’s pre-1941 diplomatic history; together with Zivko Avramovski, probably the most quoted expert in this field during the 1970s and 1980s.

with the city/port of Thessaloniki that lay behind negotiations with Germany in 1940-1941. They wanted to take it in order to prevent any possibility of blocking Yugoslavia's access to the Aegean Sea in case that other powers (namely Italy and Bulgaria) tried to detach it from Greece. They did know, however, that Italy hadn't ceased to try to direct Yugoslavia *towards* Thessaloniki and not to *exclude* her from it,⁹¹ while they undoubtedly had been informed by the Germans that Mussolini considered Thessaloniki "natural and vital outlet to the Mediterranean for Yugoslavia,"⁹² a statement that he repeated in his letter to Hitler himself on 22 February 1941.⁹³ As far as Bulgarians are concerned, they had declared, already on 31st of October 1940, after Berlin had exerted considerable pressure on them, their intention not to interfere in the Greek-Italian war, i.e. to keep the neutrality status,⁹⁴ remaining thus "out of the game" about Thessaloniki. Besides, Hitler himself, writing to Hungarian Regent, admiral Miklós Horthy in early April 1941, had made it crystal clear that he "had promised them [to Serbs, he wrote, meaning by that the Yugoslav government] Salonika at Bulgaria's expense."⁹⁵

Why so much fuss over a territory which Yugoslavia had only "a restrained interest" for or a territory which the latter never ran the risk of seeing it in other hands than those of the Greeks? This being the case, why didn't they do the only logical thing: since they had declared *urbi et orbi* that only its possession by Greece was a guarantee for Yugoslavia, why didn't they strive to secure its continuous possession by Greece? Obviously, as one certainly could deduce from what has been presented above, there could be an easier *quid pro quo* to extract from the Germans than what they did; and for the justification of that deed, based on the so called "blocking avoidance principle," "hard to believe" arguments have been employed, like that one Cincar-Marković developed during the crown council meeting on the 12th of March 1941 about

⁹¹ Triadic kingdom's foreign minister, Momcilo Ninčić had said to Venizelos: "Yes, the Italians have been trying to direct us towards Salonica." Record by Mr. Nicolson of a conversation with Mr. Venizelos, Foreign Office, January 22, 1925. *Documents on British Foreign Policy (1919-1939)*, First Series, vol. 27 (London: HMSO, 1986), 29.

⁹² *DGFP* XII, no. 15, 85 (February 5 and 24, 1941, respectively).

⁹³ *DGFP* XII, no. 76, 137-138.

⁹⁴ Lukáč, *op.cit.*, 89.

⁹⁵ *DGFP* XII, no. 371, 584.

the peculiar “come and go” of Thessaloniki between Greece and Yugoslavia, his belief about ultimate defeat of Germany (!), and his “profound” conception of “peace without victory.”⁹⁶

In the end, if one judiciously examined what had been presented, one might consider the leaders of Belgrade at the time as adventurers⁹⁷ (if Knežević’s accusation of “conspirators” is too harsh) in stark contrast to other Yugoslavs’ stance/reaction on this question at that time,⁹⁸ like

⁹⁶ Yugoslav foreign minister believed that “In the long run, Germany would lose the war. In that case, Salonika would be given back to Greece and Yugoslavia would have its original privileges there. But if the war reached a stalemate or ended in “peace without victory,” Salonika should be in Yugoslav hands. Then it could be returned to the Greeks when Europe was once more tranquil.” Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 229.

⁹⁷ How else could the Belgrade leaders be described when, on the one hand, they seemed to help Greece against the Italians (Bakić, “The Port of Salonica,” 211; Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 191-2) and on the other they secretly negotiated the detachment of a part of her?; indeed, Prince/Regent Paul theatrically was stating about “his inner torments” when they decided on 28 October 1940 to attack his wife’s country – Princess Olga was a granddaughter of King George I of Greece. Even if one would like to emphasize only on Danilo Gregorić’s secret mediation as Cvetković’s confidant, thus leaving aside Prince/Regent Paul, both the Germans and the Italians underlined that a confidential representative of his, Vladislav Stakić, a lawyer of the Italian Legation in Belgrade, visited Rome once in November 1940 and twice during February 1941 for discussing the accession to the Tripartite Pact and the concession of Thessaloniki. *DGFP* XII, no. 15, 23; *DGFP* XII, no. 85, 158-9; Gibson, *op.cit.*, 309; Bakić, “The Port of Salonica,” 211; Bojović, *op.cit.*, 98.

⁹⁸ However, it should be strongly underlined that the decision of the Yugoslav army, consisting mainly of Serbs, to overturn the regime that had allied to the Germans had nothing to do with Thessaloniki; they simply didn’t know anything about it: as the German foreign minister had explicitly defined, the stipulation regarding Thessaloniki should be kept strictly secret and the Yugoslav Government would make them (the secret note about Thessaloniki along with that concerning military assistance) public only in agreement with the Governments of the Axis Powers. *DGFP* XII, no. 144, 205, 206; Besides, as Bojović, *op.cit.*, 103, and *Survey of International Affairs*, 347, admit, the reaction of the people –expressed in the coup d’état of 27 March 1941– was directed solely against the alignment with Axis.

Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik⁹⁹ and Ivo Andrić.¹⁰⁰ In any case, even if the dilemma “were the Germans first to propose the concession of Thessaloniki or the Yugoslav government instead?” was to be put aside, what shouldn’t be ignored is the fact that for the latter, who had entered formal and completely secret¹⁰¹ negotiations with the Axis, the detachment of a part of their ally’s territory was –among others– one quid pro quo for Yugoslavia’s accession to the Tripartite Pact. In that case, one could barely consider the Yugoslav–German negotiations for Thessaloniki as something that occurred for saving Greece by her neighbors’ predatory schemes, or as something that lacked real importance and possibly something that didn’t happen at all.

⁹⁹ Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik, the Yugoslav military *attaché* in Berlin, was ordered to sound out the German intentions about the possibility of Yugoslavia taking Thessaloniki; that order came to him as a result of the decision taken on 28 October 1940 (Bakić, “The Port of Salonica,” 206; Bojović, *op.cit.*, 98; Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 183; Knéjévitch, *op.cit.*, 42.) When it became obvious, though, that the Italians failed to defeat the Greek army, Vauhnik, acting with honour, rushed to take back the proposal about Thessaloniki pointing out to colonel, Von Mellenthin, the liaison officer with foreign military *attachés*, that “Salonika no longer had any real pertinence since the Greeks were chasing the Italians out of their country.” Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 186.

¹⁰⁰ When Vauhnik informed Ivo Andrić, the Yugoslav (of Croatian descent) minister in Berlin, on the question of taking Thessaloniki, the minister exploded with anger, arguing that “That was an act of treason against Greece, Yugoslavia’s ally.” Bojović, *op.cit.*, 98; Hoptner, *op.cit.*, 184.

¹⁰¹ Belgrade Government appears to have left in the dark even its minister in London, who –as Papadakis attests– “had a sympathetic attitude towards England.” Thus, the Greek minister there, Ch. Simopoulos, on 18 March 1941, was confidentially informed by his Yugoslav colleague that no. pressure –via ultimatum– had been exerted upon Yugoslavia by Germany, and therefore there was no. case for his country to accede the Tripartite Pact. Even on 26 March 1941, the Yugoslav minister kept saying to Simopoulos that he was convinced that rumors about Yugoslavia’s exit to the Aegean were groundless and that their desire was for Thessaloniki to remain Greek. Papadakis, *op.cit.*, 159-160, 166.

*Evangelos Katsaras**

**The Way to Conciliation:
The Greek–Bulgarian Agreements of December 1953**

In 1953, after decades of fierce rivalry and warlike conflict, Greece and Bulgaria resolved to look past their bitter differences and resume diplomatic relations. Ceaseless border tension coupled with unsustainable overspending on an endless arms race played a part in dictating this seminal shift in Greek–Bulgarian affairs; indeed, a serious border skirmish in the summer of 1952 had nearly sparked a veritable armed clash between the two countries. Besides, in the early 1950s, the confrontation of the two Cold War opposing camps had shifted in other areas of the world, enabling the Balkan states to embark on a policy of peaceful coexistence. Consequently, both sides took gradual steps to reach some sort of understanding. To this end, an agreement for the settlement of border disputes was signed on December 30, 1953, followed by a trade agreement. In their wake, negotiations continued in Paris, aiming at normalising diplomatic relations further, which culminated in a joint declaration on May 22, 1954. The present article intends to review Greek–Bulgarian diplomatic relations after World War II and deal mainly with the two agreements of December 1953, which paved the way for Greek–Bulgarian conciliation and the exchange of Ambassadors in 1964.

I.

On April 23, 1941, Greek Ambassador to Sofia Panagiotis Pipinelis delivered a memorandum to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry announcing the rupture of Greek–Bulgarian diplomatic relations. Before leaving the premises, Ambassador Pipinelis remarked to the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs Ivan Popov (1940–42): “You have often complained to me of the treacherous way Rumania stabbed Bulgaria in the back in 1913 when you were at death grips with Serbia and Greece and that Bulgaria would never forget this act of Rumania. Let me inform you that Bulgaria’s treacherous act in assisting the German troops in their

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attack on us, your neighbour, and your occupation of a part of my country after twenty years of peaceful and friendly relations will never be forgotten by Greece.”¹ In the Greek Government’s consideration, this had been the third instance of unprovoked, Bulgarian aggression against Greece within thirty years after the Second Balkan War, in 1913, and during World War I, in 1917.

Greek–Bulgarian relations deteriorated critically due to World War II Bulgarian occupation of Greek soil and the subsequent, fierce persecution of Greeks populating it. According to estimates, more than 100,000 Greeks were forced to flee Bulgarian-occupied territories, seeking refuge in adjacent districts under Italian and Nazi-German occupation. Bulgarian authorities applied methods tested in the past: Bulgarian settlers were introduced to fill the void of Greeks expelled or arrested and sent off to concentration camps, while Greek schools and churches were shut down. In the climactic summer of 1942, Bulgaria issued its notorious “Law on Citizenship” (10-6-1942), expelling anyone still upholding their Greek citizenship, and confiscating their property.² Such harsh measures caused outrage among Greeks, whose revolt in Drama (September 1942) was ferociously quelled by the Bulgarian army.³ As Barbara Jelavich aptly pointed out, “the repression of this period largely justifies the post-war tension between Bulgaria and Greece,”⁴ while according to Misha Glenny, “the Bulgarian occupation

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1941, vol. II, Europe (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), doc. 716, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v02/d716> (accessed 8-2018).

² Diplomatic and Historical Archives of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter YDIAYE), File 1.1/1944, Bulgarian Atrocities in Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. Report of the Committee of Professors of the Greek University, n.d. After the Greek population’s reaction and action taken by the Greek Government-in-Exile, implementation of the Law was initially suspended until November 1943 and was eventually abandoned. See YDIAYE, File 4.1/1944, Law on the Enforcement of Bulgarian Citizenship.

³ On Bulgarian occupation and atrocities committed against the Greek population, see Xanthippi Kotzageorgi-Zymaris, *Η βουλγαρική Κατοχή στην Ανατολική Μακεδονία και τη Θράκη 1941-1944* (The Bulgarian Occupation in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 1941-1944) (Thessaloniki: 2002); see also Barbara Jelavich, *Ιστορία των Βαλκανίων. 20^{ός} αιώνας* (History of the Balkans. 20th Century) (Athens: 2006), 393-5; Richard Crampton, *Bulgaria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 258-61.

⁴ Jelavich, *op.cit.*, 395.

of Western Thrace was one of the harshest occupying regimes in Europe.”⁵

Considering foregoing, the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty on February 10, 1947, did less than little to restore bilateral relations. The fact that the Bulgarian delegation had claimed Western Thrace during the Conference (29 July-15 October 1946) was a further cause for Greek concern, more so as Bulgaria could now count on active Soviet support. Adding insult to injury, Sofia’s active assistance to the Democratic Army’s communist guerillas during the Greek Civil War (1946-49) and the refusal to implement the disarmament clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty further exacerbated the long-standing hostility dominating Greek-Bulgarian relations.⁶ Greece was forced to respond by appealing to the United Nations accusing Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania of sheltering and training rebels, and, in so doing, of threatening world peace.⁷ On December 19, 1946, the United Nations Security Council unanimously resolved to set up the Commission for the Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to examine the accuracy of the Greek complaints. The Commission initiated its investigation on January 30, 1947, and, after conducting ninety-one meetings in Athens, Thessaloniki, Sofia, Belgrade, Geneva, and New York, delivered its report on May 23, 1947. Pursuant thereto, the Security Council was tasked with

⁵ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans, 1804-1999. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers* (London: 1999), 481.

⁶ Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Greece and Bulgaria, 1949-1964: The Unspoken Assumptions,” *Balkan Studies* 33, no. 1 (1992): 143-53, 145, 147.

⁷ Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation (hereafter KKF), Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archives, File 17.1/1946, doc. 17/1/28/1, Thanasis Aghnides to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, 3-12-1946; see also Stephen Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers 1944-1947. Prelude to the “Truman Doctrine”* (Thessaloniki: 1963), 432; Spyros Markezinis, *Σύγχρονη πολιτική ιστορία της Ελλάδος (1936-1975)* [Contemporary Political History of Greece (1936-1975)] (Athens: 1994), vol. 2, 273; Georgi Daskalov, *България и Гърция от разрыв към помирение, 1944-1964* (Bulgaria and Greece from rupture to conciliation, 1944-1964) (Sofia: 2004), 152; George Paleopoulos, *Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος. Μέσα από την έρευνα της Διερευνητικής Επιτροπής των Επεισοδίων στα Βόρεια Ελληνικά Σύννορα του ΟΗΕ και τον Τύπο της εποχής (1946-1947)* [The Greek Civil War. Through the investigation of the UN’s Commission for the Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents and the Press (1946-1947)] (Thessaloniki: 2013), 78-9.

recommending that the Balkan States establish good neighbourly relations by signing new border conventions, abstaining from any action likely to increase the tension, banning any political and military activity amongst the refugees and, finally, by encouraging the exchange of minority populaces on a voluntary basis.⁸ On October 27, 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) was created and deployed in Northern Greece to investigate the four Balkan governments' compliance with the General Assembly's recommendations and also to assist them in their implementation.⁹ However, despite the UN's sincere efforts to abate tensions and secure peace in the region, there was no sign of improvement. Both the aforementioned Commission and the Special Committee set up by the United Nations examined the problems preventing Greece and Bulgaria from reaching common ground, suggested solutions, but failed to contribute to the normalisation and restoration of bilateral relations.

On November 10, 1948, on the initiative of Dr. Herbert Evatt, Australia's Minister of External Affairs, the United Nations Political and Security Committee established a Conciliation Committee tasked with settling differences between the Balkan States. The Evatt initiative began on the 2nd of November and continued its work until the Third General Assembly adjourned on the 12th of December 1948, at which point Dr. Evatt expressed his gratitude for the considerable progress made and his intention to resume discussions when the General Assembly would reconvene in April 1949. His proposal comprised an eight-point

⁸ Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, Christoforos Chalkias Archives, Report by the Commission for the Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council, Geneva, 23-5-1947; see also Harry N. Howard, "Greece and its Balkan Neighbours (1948-1949): The United Nations Attempts at Conciliation," *Balkan Studies* 7, no. 1 (1966): 2; Markezinis, *op.cit.*, 288-9; Thanasis D. Sfikas, *To «Χωλό Άλογο»: Οι διεθνείς συνθήκες της ελληνικής κρίσης, 1941-1949* (The "Lame Horse:" The International Dimensions of the Greek Crisis, 1941-1949) (Athens: 2007), 226-7; Paleopoulos, *op.cit.*, 138-41.

⁹ United Nations, *Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly. Resolutions. 16 September-29 November 1947* (New York: 1948), 12-4, <https://digital-library.un.org/record/228968?ln=en> (accessed 1-2020); see also Howard, *op.cit.*, 3; Amikam Nachmani, *International Intervention in the Greek Civil War. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, 1947-1952* (New York: 1990), 36-7.

program: 1) diplomatic exchanges; 2) immediate in-principle agreement to draw up new or revised frontier conventions; 3) mutual patrol on frontiers; 4) assistance by United Nations observers; 5) acceptance of existing frontiers as definitive; 6) accelerating the repatriation of Greek children who had been removed across the border; 7) agreement in principle to regulate questions regarding refugees and minorities once diplomatic relations had first been restored; 8) establishment of a small body for good services or mediation. Additionally, the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, previously mandated by the General Assembly with a conciliatory scope, had to step down, respecting Dr. Evatt's initiative.¹⁰

The UN General Assembly's Spring Session convened on April 6, 1949, in Lake Success, New York. On the 19th of April, Dr. Evatt chaired the Conciliation Committee, which resolved to meet separately with representatives of each of the four Balkan governments in order to determine any improvements since the December meetings.¹¹ However, the representatives of the three communist states, i.e., Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, rejected the Conciliatory Committee's proposals, thereby refusing to normalize their diplomatic relations with Greece. Earlier in January, the Bulgarian Government had accused the General Assembly of acting on false charges and the Conciliation Committee of promoting the Greek Government's alleged imperialist intentions, claiming the latter to be held accountable for the failure of the discussions. On May 19, 1949, the day after the General Assembly Third Session ended, Dr. Evatt, in a statement released to the press, highlighted the progress made towards the reconciliation of the Balkan States and announced the end of the Conciliation Committee's work.¹² Six months after it first convened, the Evatt initiative had ended with no concrete outcome.

¹⁰ KKF, Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archives, File 36.1/1949, doc. 36/1/21/1; Howard, *op.cit.*, 4-7; Nachmani, *op.cit.*, 23-4; Rumyana Todorova, "Възстановяване на дипломатическите отношения между България и Гърция след втората световна война" (Restoration of the Diplomatic Relations between Bulgaria and Greece after World War II), *Исторически преглед* 2 (1993): 66-7.

¹¹ KKF, Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archives, File 36.1/1949, doc. 36/1/21/74; Howard, *op.cit.*, 11.

¹² *Ibid*, doc. 36/1/21/106; Howard, *op.cit.*, 9, 15.

The Conciliation Committee's failure reactivated the conciliatory mandate of the Special Committee on the Balkans: on May 27, 1949, it dispatched communiqués to the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia reminding them of its good services' continual availability to them and stating its readiness to assist in eliminating all and any points of friction. In the case of Greece and Bulgaria, such points—in the former's point of view leastways—involved the faithful implementation of the Paris Peace Treaty, the respect for the frontiers established thereby, the cessation of Bulgarian assistance to Greek Civil War communist guerillas, and the repatriation of Greek children snatched and carried off to Bulgaria. On the other side of the fence, Sofia demanded that Athens renounce any territorial aspirations against Bulgarian soil and cease border violations;¹³ an impasse, yet again. A month later, on the 28th of June, the Bulgarian Government, dismissing the UN Special Committee on the Balkans' legitimacy, directly addressed a long letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasil Kolarov (Васил Коларов, 1947-49) to the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, rebuffing any responsibility for failure in the negotiations with Greece.¹⁴

The final United Nations effort towards reconciliation and restoration of the Greek-Bulgarian relations was assumed by the Fourth General Assembly, which convened in September 1949, and coincided with the defeat of the Greek communist guerillas and their subsequent retreat in Albania and Bulgaria. On the 28th of September under the auspices of the United States Delegation, Australian Ambassador Norman Makin proposed the establishment of a new Conciliation Committee, consisting of the President of the General Assembly, General Carlos Romulo, UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, Chairman Lester Pearson and Vice-Chairman Selim Sarper of the Political Committee.¹⁵ The proposal was unanimously approved on the 29th of September and the new Committee convened on October 4, 1949, with the objective to resolve

¹³ See Howard, *op.cit.*, 17-8; Todorova, *op.cit.*, 77.

¹⁴ United Nations Archives 1949, S-0472-0101-06, no. 29893, Kolarov to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Sofia, 28-6-1949; Todorova, *op.cit.*, 77-78.

¹⁵ United Nations, *Summary Record of the 270th Meeting: 1st Committee*, New York, 28-9-1949, 3, 4, 6, 7, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1638801?ln=en> [accessed 8-2018]; see also KKF, Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archives, File 36.2/1949, doc. 36/2/38/1, Press Release GA/PS/230, New York, 28-9-1949.

peacefully Greece's outstanding disputes with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the basis of the proposals by the previous Commission.¹⁶ It held twenty-nine meetings from the 4th to the 22nd of October, whose outcome was a series of "Tentative Suggestions for Draft Agreements between Greece and each of her Northern Neighbors based on conversations with the parties concerned," as presented to all delegations.¹⁷ Once again Albania and Bulgaria's intransigence led negotiations to a stalemate. On the 18th of October, the Chairman of the Conciliation Committee, General Romulo, expressed regret that, despite persistent efforts, the Committee had failed to produce any basis of conciliation and therefore it was forced to suspend its activity.¹⁸ The Commission's final report to the First Committee of the United Nations was presented on the 22nd of October, holding Albania and Bulgaria responsible for rejecting UN proposals for restoring diplomatic relations with Greece.¹⁹

Such was the state of Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic affairs in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when two significant events created new circumstances, paving the way for conciliation. The first one was the signing, on February 28, 1953, of the Balkan Pact²⁰ between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, which isolated Sofia and forced her to seek rapprochement with Athens. The second event was the death of Joseph Stalin on the 5th of March of that same year, prompting the entire Soviet bloc to reconsider much of its policies. Already in August, following the Soviet example, the Political Bureau of the Bulgarian Communist

¹⁶ KKF, Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archives, A/C.1/506, doc. 36/2/57/1, Report of the Conciliation Committee, New York, 22-10-1949; Howard, op.cit., 19, 20; Todorova, op.cit., 79.

¹⁷ KKF, ibid.; Howard, op.cit., 20, 21; Todorova, op.cit.

¹⁸ KKF, Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archives, A/C.1/503, doc. 36/2/53/9, Letter dated 18th October 1949, addressed to the Chairman of the First Committee by the President of the General Assembly, New York; Howard, op.cit., 24.

¹⁹ KKF, Konstantinos Tsaldaris Archives, A/C.1/506, ibid; Howard, op.cit., 24; Todorova, op.cit., 79.

²⁰ On the Balkan Pact see John Iatrides, *The Pact of Ankara. A test case of collective security in Southeastern Europe* (The Hague: 1959); Milan Terzić, *Balkanski Pakt 1953-1954. Zbornik dokumentata* (The Balkan Pact 1953-1954. Collection of documents) (Belgrade: 2005).

Party decided to restore diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.²¹ The next step was the normalisation of relations with Athens, since the latter had concluded a trade agreement with Moscow, and negotiated the restoration of their diplomatic relationship, which, ever since 1946, had been relegated to the level of chargé d'affaires.²²

II.

By 1953, Greece was spending 42% of its annual budget on defense. Securing a sense of safety for its northern territories, which were heavily struck by the Civil War, was considered essential for the country's economic growth. Nevertheless, this burden was untenable for an economy struggling to stand on its feet. It was a vicious circle which had to be resolved; reconciliation with Bulgaria was deemed indispensable. After all, economic development was one of the primary targets of any Greek government after the end of the Civil War.²³ In November 1952, the rise to power of a strong, single-party government under Alexandros Papagos, along with the doctrine of peaceful coexistence which emerged in the wake of Stalin's demise (March 1953), allowed the Greek government to implement its initiative for the improvement of its relations with Bulgaria.

Likewise, Sofia itself was as eager to improve relations with Athens. Successive UN resolutions had condemned Bulgaria for her support to the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) throughout the Greek Civil War, resulting in the dismissal of its petition to join the United Nations Organization.²⁴ Furthermore, the signing of the Balkan Pact in February

²¹ See John Koliopoulos-Iakovos Michailidis, *Το Μακεδονικό στα ξένα αρχεία. Απόρρητα έγγραφα Γιουγκοσλαβίας και Βουλγαρίας (1950-1967)* [The Macedonian Question in Foreign Archives. Top Secret Documents from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (1950-1967)] (Athens: Society for Macedonian Studies, 2008), 142.

²² Spyros Linardatos, *Από τον εμφύλιο στη χούντα 1952-1955* (From Civil War to the Junta 1952-1955) (Athens: 1978), vol. 2, 89.

²³ Hatzivassiliou, op.cit., 144, 147.

²⁴ The first Bulgarian petition to join the United Nations (26-7-1947) was rejected on 21-8-1947 due to the negative votes of the Security Council's Permanent Members. United Nations, *Security Council. Official Records. Second year: 190th meeting* (New York: 21-8-1947), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/541908?ln=en> (accessed 1-2020). On 22-9-1948, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister reiterated the petition, to no

between Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece had renewed Bulgarian paranoia of likely aggression by its Balkan neighbours. It was, therefore, essential for Sofia to come to terms with Athens.²⁵

With the mediation of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-61), the Greek Government introduced on May 6, 1953, a proposal for the establishment of a joint Greek–Bulgarian Border Committee, tasked with regulating the frontier line across the river Evros (Bulg. Марица) and restoring damaged border markers (pyramids) along the rest of the border. On the 22nd of June, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) approved a letter by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mincho Neychev (Минчо Нейчев, 1950-56) to the UN Secretary General, in which the Bulgarian government accepted the Greek proposal and expressed its desire for a peaceful settlement of all border disputes.²⁶ Athens seized the opportunity; on the 25th of June, Alex Kyrou, the Greek UN delegate, announced Greece's readiness to appoint two representatives for a preliminary meeting, whose purpose would be to determine the composition of the Committee and to plan its work. The meeting was to take place in the vicinity of Nevrokopion on the 10th of July. Bulgaria appointed Colonel Dimitrov and Major Iliev as her representatives, while Greece nominated Colonel Zalahoris and Major Vradis.²⁷

At 10 a.m. on July 10, 1953, at the Greek outpost of Exohi (Εξοχή), the two delegations had a meeting, which lasted until 4 p.m. They agreed to continue meeting in turns on Bulgarian and Greek soil, their next meeting to be held in the town of Svilengrad on the 1st of August. After the meeting, a communiqué on the outcome was issued by the Greek Third Army Corps. On the next day, the Greek press made extensive references to the meeting, indicating both the Greek public's

avail. Министерство на Външните Работи на НРБ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria], *Външна Политика на Народна Република България* (Foreign policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria), 136-8. On the final attempt during this period (30-6-1952), which was also unsuccessful, see *op.cit.*, 174.

²⁵ Todorova, *op.cit.*, 84.

²⁶ Централен Държавен Архив (Central State Archives) (hereafter ЦДА), File 1Б/6/1822; See also Todorova, *op.cit.*, 84; Daskalov, *op.cit.*, 205.

²⁷ *Eleftheria*, 9-7-1953, 6; *Embros*, 4-7-1953, 4; see also Todorova, *op.cit.*, 84; Daskalov, *op.cit.*, 205.

strong interest in the event and the importance attached to the Greek-Bulgarian relations.²⁸

The Greek-Bulgarian rapprochement received new momentum in July, when Bulgarian Prime Minister Valko Chervenkov (Вълко Червенков, 1950-56) visited Moscow and secured, during his talks with the Soviet leadership, its approval for the ongoing negotiations with Athens.²⁹ Thereafter, the Foreign Ministry set the Bulgarian stipulations to be raised in the forthcoming bilateral talks. The idea of insignificant territorial concessions regarding the islets of the Evros river was discussed. These concessions included the granting of the islets “Eastern” (Gamma) and “Western” (Beta), while the preservation of the “Upper Island” (Alpha) was deemed non-negotiable. But first, the Bulgarian delegation had to defend Article 1 of the Paris Peace Treaty, which stipulated that the borders would remain as they were on the 1st of January 1941. The Foreign Ministry’s proposals along with those on the formation and structure of the Bulgarian delegation were presented to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the BCP. Their approval on the 21st of July constituted the final step towards normalising Greek-Bulgarian relations. Nine years after the end of World War II, Sofia seemed determined to improve its relations with Athens.³⁰

In this spirit, the Joint Greek-Bulgarian Committee began its meetings on the 1st of August. Right from the first and preliminary meeting the agenda was set. The Greek delegation consisted of Major General C. Gerogiannis, Colonel G. Carahalios, Major N. Boua, and Demetrius Velissaropoulos of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Bulgarian one was accompanied by the head of the “International Organizations” department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sava Popavramov. Two days later, the second meeting took place, this time on Greek soil, near border pyramid no. 340. As anticipated, difficulty arose on the demarcation of the river Evros. Primarily, the two sides argued about the status of the three islets situated in the middle of the river. The two delegations visited the areas in question to form an informed opinion, while

²⁸ YDIAYE, File 12.6/1953, Joint Greek-Bulgarian Commission. On the interest of the Greek press, see *Eleftheria*, 11-7-1953, 4; *Embros*, 11-7-1953, 4.

²⁹ ЦДИА, File 1Б/5/122.

³⁰ ЦДИА, File 1Б/6/1835; see also Daskalov, *op.cit.*, 206-7.

Lieutenant General Ketseas, commander of the Greek Third Army Corps, arrived on the spot to oversee the progress of the negotiations.³¹

The third meeting began on the morning of the 4th of August. After its conclusion, the two sides decided to suspend their work for three days in order to inform their respective governments and receive approval on how to continue the ongoing negotiations. Mincho Neychev, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, met with the Bulgarian delegation and reiterated that its primary goal should be the establishment of a permanent border along the river Evros. Furthermore, he stressed that preserving the “Upper Island” (Alpha) was non-negotiable. Moreover, the Bulgarian delegation was empowered to raise the question of demilitarization of the border zone, access to which was to be granted to civilians alone, from either side.³²

Negotiations resumed on the 7th of August to examine the question of damaged border markers. This presented no significant hindrance and was promptly settled. The agreement was confirmed at the meeting of the 10th of August, held at the train station of Svilengrad. The border area was divided into four parts, each side assuming the obligation to restore the exact same number of border markers. The restoration would be assigned to a technical committee, consisting of an officer, a geodesic inspector, and a technician. One of the Joint Commission’s two problems had found its solution.³³

The sixth meeting took place on the 12th of August, engaged in defining the boundary along the river Evros, a problem which dominated the Joint Commission’s next three meetings. Finally, on the 23rd of August, both sides agreed in principle that the boundary should go through the middle of the river. As far as the islets were concerned, the “Upper Island” remained in Bulgarian possession, the “Western” in Greek, while the “Eastern” was divided in equal measure between the two countries. The Commission then drafted a protocol to be approved by their respective governments. On the 24th of August, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister informed the Politburo, while Major General Gerogiannis met with Lieutenant General Kitrilakis, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

³¹ YDIAYE, File 12.6/1953, *ibid*; ИДИА, File 1Б/6/1835.

³² ИДИА, File 1Б/6/1835; see also Daskalov, *op.cit.*, 208-9.

³³ YDIAYE, File 12.6/1953, *ibid*; ИДИА, File 1Б/6/1835.

and the next day with Defense Minister Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (1952-55).³⁴

The Joint Commission resumed on the 1st of September and, ten days later, all necessary technical steps were completed (measurement and aerial photography of the region). On the 12th of September, the representatives of the two States signed off the final protocol delineating the boundary along the river Evros, which was approved by the Politburo on the 21st of September.³⁵ On the 30th of October, the Bulgarians concluded the restoration of the border markers, followed a few days later by the Greeks. On the 30th of December, at 2 p.m., the two delegations signed in Thessaloniki the Final Protocol for the frontier delimitation and the restoration of the border markers. In a statement to the press, made on the following day, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs Stefanos Stefanopoulos (1952-55) underscored the agreement's significance in establishing a favourable context for the restoration of bilateral diplomatic relations.³⁶

III.

As the meetings of the Joint Commission drew to a close, Sofia and Athens embarked on negotiations to resume their trade relations. The time was propitious; the Soviet and the Western bloc alike looked poised to explore options in smoothing rough edges. The first contact in that direction occurred on July 6, 1953, when the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce expressed its willingness to sign a new trade agreement with Greece.³⁷ Athens welcomed the proposal and the two sides entered preliminary negotiations. On the 2nd of September, Greek Minister of Commerce Thanos Kapsalis (1952-53) confirmed the ongoing negotiations and revealed that Greece awaited the Bulgarian suggestions for the venue and nature of the agreement.³⁸ In October, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Trade proposed opening official negotiations in Athens. Indeed, on the 3rd of November, a Bulgarian delegation under A. Brani-

³⁴ YDIAYE, *ibid*; See also Daskalov, *op.cit.*, 209-10.

³⁵ ЦДИА, File 1Б/6/1881.

³⁶ *Eleftheria*, 31-12-1953, 1; *Kathimerini*, 31-12-1953, 1; See also Todorova, *op.cit.*, 90.

³⁷ Daskalov, *op.cit.*, 214.

³⁸ *Eleftheria*, 3-9-1953, 1.

chev (А. Браничев), an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, arrived in the Greek capital.³⁹ Two days later, the delegation had its first meeting with its Greek counterpart and on that same day they visited the Secretary General of the Greek Ministry of Commerce, with whom they looked into the prospect of an agreement.⁴⁰

The negotiations progressed in amicable and collaborative atmosphere and were concluded on December 5, 1953, when the Kingdom of Greece and the People's Republic of Bulgaria signed a trade agreement. The document was ratified in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the representatives of the two countries and comprised seven articles. Under Article 7, it would be effective for a year, until the 31st of December 1954, with the option of prolongation if it was not denounced by the contracting parties. It stipulated the formulation of a Joint Commission to monitor compliance with the agreement and to resolve any disputes that might arise. The predicted transactions amounted to \$1.8 million, while two lists were drawn up for the products to be exchanged. The first one defined the products to be imported by Greece (meat, poultry, fertilizers, chemicals) and the second one those to be imported by Bulgaria (olive oil, citrus fruits, raisins, agricultural products, minerals).⁴¹

Following the signing of the Final Protocol for the delimitation of the border, another significant obstacle –that of the restoration of trade relations– had been successfully lifted. The path looked thenceforward open for Athens and Sofia to deepen their dialogue towards a full normalisation of their diplomatic relations. The two sides fully grasped this opportunity, having understood that it was in their mutual best interest to restore diplomatic relations. Indeed, in less than six months Athens and Sofia managed to complete two vital agreements on their way to reconciliation. This reconciliation was effectuated on May 22, 1954, in the Greek embassy in Paris, where Greek Ambassador R. Raphael and Bulgarian Ambassador A. Nedyalkov signed a Joint Declaration restoring, if yet not fully, Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic relations.⁴² And, as it

³⁹ *Eleftheria*, 3-11-1953, 6.

⁴⁰ *Eleftheria*, 6-11-1953, 4.

⁴¹ YDIAYE, File 82.1/1953, Bulgaria-Greece. Trade relations; Daskalov, *op.cit.*, 214.

⁴² See the Joint Declaration of 22 May 1954 in Министерство на Външните Работи на НРБ, *Външна Политика на Народна Република България*, 183-4; see also Basil

turned out, good relations between Greece and Bulgaria became one of the most important stabilising factors in Southeastern Europe for the following years.⁴³

IV.

It is clear from the above-mentioned that, after the termination of the Second World War, the prospects for Athens and Sofia to work out their differences and embark on a policy of friendship and good neighbourly relations were poor. Long-standing enmities and the latter's failure to provide concrete proof of its sincerity to reconcile with Greece forced the Greek government to adopt a cautious and hostile attitude. The situation worsened after the outbreak of the Greek Civil War and the active assistance provided by Sofia to the communist guerillas. Athens appealed to the United Nations accusing Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania of sheltering and training the rebels. This move inaugurated the involvement of the international organization in the so-called Greek problem. But both the UN Commissions sent to investigate the disturbing situation along the northern Greek frontiers and the prolonged negotiations between the two sides under the auspices of the Secretary-General proved fruitless. Neither side was ready to compromise.

In the early 1950s, Greek-Bulgarian relations showed no improvement. Ceaseless border incidents⁴⁴ and the abduction of Greek children to Bulgaria renewed tension between Athens and Sofia. This tension

Kondis et al., *Σοβιετική Ένωση και Βαλκάνια στις δεκαετίες 1950 και 1960. Συλλογή εγγράφων* (The Soviet Union and the Balkans in the 1950s and 1960s. Collection of Documents) (Thessaloniki: 2003), 16-7.

⁴³ Hatzivassiliou, op.cit., 153.

⁴⁴ For an account on the border incidents of this period, as reported by the Bulgarian military authorities, see Tasos Hatzianastasiou–Evangelos Katsaras, «Διαρρηγνύοντας το παραπέτασμα: συνοριακά επεισόδια μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Βουλγαρίας από 1^η Αυγούστου 1949 μέχρι τέλη Φεβρουαρίου 1950» (Breaking the Curtain: Border incidents between Greece and Bulgaria from 1st August 1949 to the end of February 1950), <https://clioturbata.com/%CE%B1%CF%80%CF%8C%CF%88%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/%CF%84%CE%AC%CF%83%CE%BF%CF%82-%CF%87%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B6%CE%B7%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%83%CE%AF%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%B5%CF%85%CE%AC%CE%B3%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%82-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%84/>.

reached its peak in the summer of 1952 when the two countries came close to an armed clash. But, at the same time, this period marks a significant turning point towards the reconciliation between Greece and Bulgaria. The conclusion of the Balkan Pact by Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey in February 1953 and the death of Joseph Stalin in March created new political and diplomatic circumstances in the Balkan peninsula. The two sides fully grasped this opportunity, having understood that it was in their mutual interest to restore diplomatic relations. A new era, both politically and diplomatically, had risen in this turbulent region of Europe.

Emmanouil Emmanoulidis – Ioannis D. Stefanidis***

**Probing the Silk Road.
Greek Contacts with the People's Republic of China
during the Early Post-Mao Era**

Bilateral Background and International Context

On the occasion of the People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping's state visit to Greece, in November 2019, the two governments signed a joint statement, reaffirming their 'comprehensive strategic partnership' established in 2006 as part of the general framework of relations between the rising Asian power and the European Union. The two sides also pledged to enhance co-operation at every level, paying tribute to the fortieth anniversary of the scientific and technology co-operation agreement signed at the time of Greek prime minister's Konstantinos Karamanlis' visit to Beijing, in November 1979. During these forty years, the PRC has developed into a major trading partner of Greece, ranking 5th in terms of exports, helping to generate 5.55% of Greece's overall foreign trade, and, through a state-owned shipping and logistics services company, COSCO, methodically turning Piraeus into the primary hub of Europe's trade with East Asia.¹

This article attempts to offer an introduction to relations between Greece and the PRC, decades before the 'Red Dragon' set its eyes upon the minor power of South-East Europe, strategically located at the intersection of three continents and a important waterways. The Sino-Greek rapprochement occurred in the early 1970s, and it was a relatively delayed manifestation of a general trend in relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and non-communist states around the globe. The most famous example of the PRC's emergence

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¹ Data from <https://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr/en/greece-today/why-greece/trade>. On the Greek-PRC joint statement of 11 November 2019, see <https://www.ekathimerini.com/246349/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-china-sign-joint-statement-on-strengthening-partnership>.

from the isolation, into which it had sunk after its break with Moscow and the ‘Cultural Revolution’ of 1966,² was the improvement in Sino-American relations. This development, which was confirmed by President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing, in February 1972, led to a major shift in the Cold War balance of power.³ It also helped to stimulate contacts between the PRC and a number of US allies, including Greece.

Following the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Greece, in summer 1974, Sino-Greek relations remained in the back burner. During the first term of the conservative government under Karamanlis (1974-77), the lasting impact of the Turkish invasion and the de facto partition of Cyprus, the festering Greek-Turkish dispute over rights in the Aegean, and the ensuing difficulties in relations with the United States and the Atlantic Alliance kept Karamanlis’ hands full. The Greek prime minister’s energies were largely absorbed by his primary foreign policy objective, that of securing Greece’s full membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), which Karamanlis envisaged as not only a zone of economic co-operation and co-prosperity, but also as a potential political agent, capable of guaranteeing its members’ democratic institutions and enhancing their external security. At the same time, communist China was experiencing its dramatic transition into the post-Mao era, the so-called ‘interregnum,’ which began with the defeat of the hard-line ‘Gang of Four’ around the deceased Chairman’s last wife, and the uneasy co-existence between the conservatives around Mao’s heir apparent, Hua Guofeng, and the forces of reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.⁴ By late 1978, while maintaining the Maoist façade, Deng’s ascending faction was determined to push through economic change as a matter of vital priority. Market-orientated reform and an ‘open door’ to foreign investment were the twin pillars of a policy aimed at combating stagna-

² Richard Curt Kraus, *The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

³ See, *inter alia*, Chris Tudda, *A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972* (Louisiana: Baton Rouge & Louisiana State University Press, 2012).

⁴ Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü, *China Without Mao: The Search for a New Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 12-56; Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism,” in *The Politics of China*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 308-318.

tion and poverty. In this context, increased economic rapport with the West, the EEC member states in particular, was deemed essential.⁵

Still, both countries mattered to each other's foreign policy, though not for identical reasons or to the same extent. Having built up a self-image for the PRC as the main target of Soviet 'expansionism' since the early 1960s, its leaders deemed the existence of a strong united front of anti-Soviet states stretching from the Baltic to the Iranian plateau as a vital counter against the perceived Soviet military pressure. In this context, Chinese officials repeatedly indicated to both Athens and Ankara their interest in the settlement of Greek-Turkish disputes and the restoration of Allied unity, which had fractured following Greece's withdrawal from the military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in reaction to the events in Cyprus, in August 1974. In the same vein, they would later express approval for Greece's integration into the EEC.⁶ Rather than sharing the same threat perception from the Soviet bloc, Athens felt threatened by Turkey and was inclined to explore the path of détente to the full. It was also becoming aware of the PRC's enhanced international role and its impact on important Greek foreign policy issues, including relations with Albania (a regional ally of the PRC until 1978) and the Cyprus question, the course of which the PRC could influence, at least in theory, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council after 1971.⁷ Publicly commenting on Mao's death, in September 1976, Ka-

⁵ On the PRC's transition from the Maoist era to the "reform and opening-up" course under Deng Xiaoping see Julian Gewirtz, *Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists, and the Making of Global China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), 15-63. As its title reveals, the book also discusses Hua and Deng's use of "foreign" economic ideas in their effort to extricate China from economic underdevelopment. On the EEC connection, see Harish Kapur, *China and the European Economic Community: The New Connection* (Dordrecht et al.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), 23-43; Martin Albers, *Britain, France, West Germany and the People's Republic of China, 1969-1982: The European Dimension of China's Great Transition* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 87-142.

⁶ Dionysios Chourchoulis, "Greece and the People's Republic of China in the Cold War, 1972-1989," in *Europe and China in the Cold War. Exchanges Beyond the Bloc Logic and the Sino-Soviet Split*, ed. Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl et al. (Brill, 2008), 63, 70-73.

⁷ Chourchoulis, op.cit., 67, 69-73.

ramanlis predicted that, for good or ill, the PRC was destined to play a leading part on the international stage,⁸ a prospect which Greek diplomacy could not afford to ignore.

For Karamanlis, there was a further, domestic, factor which would in time help to revive Sino-Greek contacts and raise them to the highest level. His government had taken over amidst widespread popular disenchantment with Greece's Western allies, in general, and the US, in particular. The Americans were scapegoated for the disastrous course of events in Cyprus, including both the coup against President Makarios, engineered by the Greek junta, and the subsequent Turkish invasion. Moreover, the toleration and, after Nixon's election, the co-operation between Washington and Athens had persuaded most Greeks that the unpopular regime, if not masterminded by Americans, owed its seven oppressive years in power largely to US support. These assumptions were shared and exploited by the –fragmented and fractious– Greek communist Left and, much more importantly, a new radical force, Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), whose Marxist, *tiers-mondist* rhetoric blended with a mass-appealing populist agenda. If the pro-Moscow communists dreamt of Greece's inclusion in the Soviet camp, Papandreou preached a non-aligned course of 'national independence,' which, among other things, antagonized Karamanlis' policy of reintegration into NATO and full membership of the EEC.⁹

Despite popular anti-Westernism and stiff opposition in parliament, Karamanlis did not hesitate to repeat that 'Greece belongs to the West'. His pursuit of integration into the EEC, reintegration into the NATO military command and a new agreement on the status of the

⁸ Statement by the Greek Ministry to the Government's Presidency, 9 September 1976. Athenian News Agency tel., 9 September 1976. At least once, Karamanlis quoted Chairman Mao, perhaps in an effort to dumbfound the leftist opposition. During a parliamentary debate on foreign policy in May 1977, he recalled the PRC leader's dictum to the effect that "politics is bloodless war and war is bloody politics:" *Official Minutes of [Greek] Parliament* (hereafter *OMP*), 1st Period, Session III, plenary meeting of 20 May 1977, 5396-5425.

⁹ An overview of Papandreou's attitude on Greece's foreign relations and the eventual adaptation of his radical rhetoric to the requirements of pragmatic policymaking see in Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Foreign Policy Since 1974: Quest for Independence," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 6, no. 1 (1988): 55-78, esp. 61ff.

US military bases essentially confirmed continuity in the country's international position since World War II. At the same time, Karamanlis took care to stress that his government was seeking to diversify its foreign relations, to an extent, of course, compatible with Greece's existing commitments and top priorities. His hope was that increased contacts with both the Soviet camp and non-aligned countries would not only improve Greece's international status, enhance its position vis-à-vis its major regional rival, Turkey, and, perhaps, produce some economic benefits, but might also offset Papandreou's criticism of his foreign policy as one of single-minded attachment to the West. The vigorous promotion of closer ties and regional co-operation with all Balkan states, brisk contacts with the Arab world, and, once Greece's entry into the EEC looked secure, a series of high-level exchanges with communist states, including the Soviet Union and China, might help to give credence to Karamanlis' claim that, while preserving Greece's strategic orientation towards the West, his government was pursuing a diversified or 'multidimensional' foreign policy beyond ideological boundaries. Indeed, in his contacts with communist leaders, the Greek prime minister liked to make a point of the need, in line with the spirit of *détente*, for increased rapport between countries with different politico-economic systems or foreign orientation.¹⁰ On this score, as will be shown later, he was at one with Deng, the rising star of the Communist Party of China.

Significantly, Karamanlis' high level contacts with the two communist giants took place following his re-election in November 1977 and the conclusion of his intense diplomatic campaign which, in May 1979, led to the signing of Greece's accession to the EEC as its tenth member state. That was a period of steady improvement in relations with most Soviet bloc countries, a development which apparently caused some unease to observers from the PRC, as did the occasional flare-ups of the Greek-Turkish controversy over Cyprus and, increasingly, the Aegean Sea. Chinese diplomats and military officers are recorded to express their anxiety about the volatile situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the opportunities arising thereof for greater

¹⁰ Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, "*Détente* as a Strategy: Greece and the Communist World, 1974-9," *The International History Review* 35, no. 5 (2013): 1053-5, 1058-9.

Soviet presence and influence. At the same time, as if they had the debilitated southern flank of NATO in mind, they stressed the need for increased Western vigilance against the perceived Soviet threat.¹¹

The PRC's interest in a united Western front covering the Soviet approaches to South-East Europe and the Middle East inevitably presupposed a powerful Turkey. This in turn dictated an attitude of 'equal distance,' at the least, when it came to the festering disputes between that country and its only Western neighbour and nominal ally, Greece. The Chinese position was made amply clear to Athens, though the latter was probably unaware of Beijing's occasional attempts, as early as 1974, to urge a more conciliatory attitude on Ankara, too.¹² For the Greeks, it was unfortunate that, as permanent member of the UN Security Council, the PRC had not condemned the Turkish invasion and occupation of part of Cyprus in 1974. Equally unfortunate was the fact that, when confronted with the Greek-Turkish dispute over the delineation of the continental shelf in the Aegean, Chinese officials urged bilateral negotiations, a method which Ankara espoused and Athens rejected in favour of recourse to the International Court of Justice.¹³

A further complicating factor was the increased diplomatic activity of the PRC in the Balkans, which targeted both non-aligned Yugoslavia and Warsaw Pact member Romania – the latter under the Ceaușescu regime already following a policy of 'pin-pricking' Soviet hegemony. During 1977-78, there was a series of high level contacts between these two countries and the post-Mao regime. In the latter's view, in addition to challenging Soviet influence, these moves might offset the loss by mid-1978 of the PRC's regional outlet, Albania.¹⁴ This activity, com-

¹¹ Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation (hereafter KKF), Evangelos Averoff Papers, File 27/15, Averoff to (Greek) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter MFA), memorandum of conversation between Defence Minister Averoff and Chinese Ambassador He Yang, 18-10-1975; *ibid.*; Φ.30/15, memorandum of conversation between Defence Minister Averoff and Deputy Chief of the People's Liberation Army of China, general Hu Chuan, 1-7-1977. Cf. Chourchoulis, *op.cit.*, 70, 73.

¹² Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the MFA (hereafter DHA), File 4/3-1977, MFA to Washington et al., enclosure: Beijing Embassy memo. on Chinese foreign policy, 12-10-1976. Cf. Chourchoulis, *op.cit.*, 71.

¹³ Chourchoulis, *op.cit.*

¹⁴ Chourchoulis, *op.cit.*, 73; Michael Yahuda, *End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao* (London: Macmillan, 1983), 191-192. There were also other in-

bined with overtures to allies of the West, such as Greece, Iran and Turkey, caused unease in Athens, to the extent that it threatened to sow discord between Belgrade and Bucharest, on the one hand, and Moscow's surrogate, Sofia, on the other. It was a time when Karamanlis was pursuing his two-track policy of better relations between Greece and its communist Balkan neighbours and multilateral co-operation aimed at improving regional security and, possibly, furthering economic interdependence among the states of South-East Europe.¹⁵

In the economic field, it was encouraging that the PRC established diplomatic relations with the EEC and signed a trade agreement with Brussels, in 1975 and 1978, respectively.¹⁶ At the same time, Beijing expressed support for the enlargement of the EEC southwards, to include Greece, Spain and Portugal.¹⁷ These were important developments, which Athens and Beijing ought to take into account in their bilateral contacts: Greece's eventual integration into the Common Market was certain to alter its terms of trade with non-EEC states, and this prospect might have played a part in the PRC officials' hesitance to reciprocate the eagerness of their Greek counterparts to expand economic relations. Besides, Greece was a small market and had little to offer in terms of technology and know-how in the sectors of civilian and defence industry as well as agriculture, which primarily interested the Chinese leaders in their effort to stimulate what still was a highly centralised, planned economy.¹⁸

Athens, for its part, realized that the three agreements on civil aviation, shipping, and commerce and payments, signed in May 1973, needed revision and adjustment to the changing international context. Already in autumn 1974, the Karamanlis government sought to extend

centives behind these selective contacts with countries of South-East Europe. PRC leaders, including Deng, wished to explore the "secrets" behind the (officially projected) high growth rates of these two states: Gewirtz, *op.cit.*, 31-34.

¹⁵ See, *inter alia*, Kourkouvelas, *op.cit.*, 1057-8.

¹⁶ Kapur, *op.cit.*, 37-43.

¹⁷ Ji Pengfei (ed.), *Appearances and Activities of Leading Chinese Officials during 1978: a Reference Aid* (Washington: National Foreign Assessment Center), 424.

¹⁸ Gene Hsiao, *The Foreign Trade of China: Policy, Law, and Practice* (San Francisco: University of California Press, 1977), 71ff.; DHA, Tokyo Embassy Series, File 3/2 (Section 2), Chrysanthakopoulos (Beijing) to MFA, no. 3028/Φ. 32/A 14, 20-10-1980.

the shipping agreement in order to cover Greek-owned ships under 'convenience flags.'¹⁹ It also ratified the civil aviation convention of 1973, and, a year later, it concluded a commercial and industrial trademark agreement.²⁰ During 1976, the Greek government succeeded in having the 1973 commercial agreement revised with a view to boosting bilateral trade, the value of which did not exceed a paltry four million dollars from 1973 to 1975.²¹ In January 1977, Athens was included in PRC Foreign Trade minister Li Qiang's itinerary of western capitals. The Greek side expressed its interest in promoting the export of its principal agricultural product, tobacco, a difficult task given that the PRC was also a tobacco-producing country.²² The Chinese pressed for an increase of their overall exports. Though no agreement was signed, Li invited the Greek minister of Trade to visit the PRC. This duly happened in April 1978. Other than the export of a token 500 tones of Greek tobacco to the PRC, the visit reaffirmed a familiar pattern of good intentions and meagre results.²³

The Prelude to the 1979 Summit

It was in this context that, on 21 September 1978, a foreign minister of the PRC officially visited Athens for the first time in history. Huang Hua's visit, which took place at very short notice, was formally related to the signing of an agreement of cultural co-operation, the first of its kind between the PRC and a West European state. However, the timing of the trip owed much to Sino-Soviet antagonism. Beijing had announced Huang's despatch to Athens on 4 September, while Greek Foreign minister Georgios Rallis was visiting Moscow. Huang's invitation to both Rallis and Karamanlis to come to Beijing was also not unrelated to Rallis' trip and the fact that the Soviets had already invited the Greek prime minister to visit Moscow. Finally, the formal break-up of Sino-Albanian relations in July of that year perhaps facili-

¹⁹ Law 73/1975, in *Government Gazette of the Hellenic Republic* (hereafter *GGHR*) no. 140/A/16-7-1975.

²⁰ Law 242/1975, in *GGHR*, no. 295/A/30-12-1975.

²¹ Law 561/1977, in *GGHR*, no. 77/A/12-3-1977.

²² Greek Radio Television Archive (hereafter *GRTA*), document code 0000015897.

²³ Chourchoulis, op.cit., 73; *Kathimerini* (Greek daily), 22-9-1978.

tated a move which Beijing's former Balkan ally was certain to view with suspicion.

The Sino-Greek agreement of 22 September 1978 was in keeping with the increasing educational and cultural contacts between Greece and communist countries, which had culminated in the Greek-Soviet cultural convention signed by Rallis in Moscow, only eighteen days earlier. The Greek press chose to interpret it as symbolic of the two nations' unique historic contribution to world civilisation.²⁴ It provided a framework for the mutual exchange of scientists and artists over a five-year period which could be successively extended. It also aimed to facilitate co-operation between news agencies, electronic media and athletic teams. As a first step, the Peking Opera was to participate to the annual Athens festival and, in return, a Greek theatre company and a team of archaeologists and academics would tour China.²⁵

Huang, a seasoned diplomat trusted by Deng to enhance the PRC's diplomatic profile, sought to present the agreement as a foretaste of bigger things, describing it as 'a landmark for the further development of friendly relations and co-operation.'²⁶ His meetings extended to the highest level, including receptions by Prime Minister Karamanlis and President of the Republic Konstantinos Tsatsos.²⁷ Following these

²⁴ [Greek] National Audio-Visual Archive (hereafter NAA), document code D1847, subject code T8964, signing of Sino-Greek Agreement of Cultural Co-operation, 22-9-1978; *ibid.*, document code D1847, subject code T8962, meeting between minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC Huang Hua and president of the Republic Konstantinos Tsatsos, 22-9-1978; Law 931/1979, in *GGHR*, no. 148/A/5-7-1979.

²⁵ Law 931/1979, in *GGHR*, no. 148/A/5-7-1979; The National Archives of the United States, Access to Archival Databases, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7-1-1973-12-31-1979 (hereafter NARA, AAD, DS), D780535-0341, 1978ATHENS11237, Haratunian to Secretary of State, "Annual Report of Specified Communist Information and Cultural Activities, 1978," 27-12-1978.

²⁶ NARA, AAD, DS, D780391-1253, 1978ATHENS08348, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 25-9-1978.

²⁷ *Kathimerini*, 21-9-1978; Konstantinos Svolopoulos (ed.), *Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής: Αρχείο, Γεγονότα και Κείμενα* (Konstantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Facts, Texts) (hereafter *KK4*) (Athens: Konstantinos Karamanlis Foundation-Kathimerini, 2005), vol. 10, 329; NAA, document code D1847, subject code T 8962, meeting between Hua and Tsatsos, 22-9-1978.

contacts, Huang stated that the views of the two sides ‘coincide[d] on many major subjects’, both bilateral and international.²⁸

Huang’s statement fairly accurately reflects the record. Apart from a general willingness to promote bilateral exchange in various fields, both sides appeared to share a number of principles which they could interpret in ways suiting their particular agendas: respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-intervention in a state’s domestic affairs. At a time of Soviet and Cuban involvement in local wars in Angola and the Horn of Africa, Rallis specifically referred to the need for non-intervention in the affairs of African states and positively commented the role of non-aligned states. Both references were designed to ingratiate his guest. Huang responded by praising Greece’s efforts to join the EEC and forge co-operation among the states of the Balkans and the Mediterranean. He particularly stressed the contribution ‘a united and powerful Europe’ could make as a factor of world peace and European security.²⁹ As Karamanlis would tell the Americans a few weeks later, Huang had ‘openly supported’ his foreign policy goals, including the reintegration of Greece in the military command of NATO.³⁰ Rallis also apprised his guest of the Greek positions on relations with Turkey, the Cyprus question, and the Greek drive towards the Balkans and the Arab world.³¹ Apparently at the request of his hosts,³² Huang avoided explicitly anti-Soviet statements in public. In private, however, he gave the Greeks ‘an earful about “socialist hegemonism.”’³³

Huang also gave his hosts a taste of the way his country was moving into the post-Mao era. Its new leadership, he confided, aimed to fully modernize industry and agriculture within the following twenty years and to attract foreign investment in new technologies including the defence sector. Cultural agreements of the kind just signed with

²⁸ NARA, AAD, DS, D780391-1253, *ibid.*

²⁹ NARA, AAD, DS, D780391-1253, *ibid.*; *Kathimerini*, 22-9-1978.

³⁰ NARA, AAD, DS, D780434-1025, 1978ATHENS09189, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 23-10-1978.

³¹ NARA, AAD, DS, D780391-1253, *ibid.*; *Kathimerini*, 22-9-1978.

³² NARA, AAD, DS, D790411-0346, 1979ATHENS08015, Mills to Secretary of State, 7-9-1979.

³³ NARA, AAD, DS, D780391-1253, *ibid.*

Greece were intended to facilitate the transfer of know-how from abroad. In this context, Huang made a point by visiting one of the few Greek industries which might have something to offer, the shipyards at Skaramanga which had a tanker building capacity.³⁴ Both sides acknowledged the potential contribution of Greek shipping and ship-building to the PRC's increasing foreign trade needs. Tourism was also a sector in which the Chinese delegation appeared to be interested in Greek know-how.³⁵

The PRC foreign minister's visit stirred considerable interest in the Greek media. In its report on the event, the US Embassy noted that Greek newspapers had universally welcomed Huang's presence. The obvious exception was *Rizospastis*, the mouthpiece of pro-Soviet KKE, which virtually ignored the visit. The Americans also took care to note Papandreou's reaction. While acknowledging the positive side of the visit, the leader of the main opposition party deprecated Huang's anti-Soviet rhetoric during his recent trip to Yugoslavia, which Papandreou considered 'destabilizing' in the Balkan context. From a broader perspective, the PASOK leader claimed that the rapprochement between the PRC and the US was imperiling world peace in so far as it threatened Soviet security.³⁶ It was a view echoing the official Soviet line, according to which the US was discarding détente in favour of a strategy of encirclement of the Soviet Union based on a common front between the US, Western Europe, Japan and China. This line would be repeated to Karamanlis during his visit to Moscow in October 1979.³⁷ Yet it is equally valid to assume that Papandreou's criticism was intended to detract from the government's foreign policy record rather than consciously advance the Soviet line.

Some forty days after Huang's departure, Karamanlis chose to expatiate on Chinese matters for the benefit of US deputy secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was visiting Athens. The Greek prime

³⁴ NAA, document code D1847, subject code T8965, visit by the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua to the Skaramanga shipyards, 22 to 24-9-1978.

³⁵ *Naftemboriki* (Greek daily), 23-9-1978.

³⁶ NARA, AAD, DS, D780391-1253, *ibid*.

³⁷ NARA, AAD, DS, d790476-0764, 1979ATHENS09273, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 16-10-1979; *ibid*, D790506-526, 1979STATE287769, Secretary of State to Athens, 3-11-1979.

minister described the exit of the PRC from isolation as ‘the single most important development of this period.’ He attributed this to both a realization that Maoist autarchic policies did not pay off and a ‘deep-seated fear and hatred of the Soviet Union.’ The Greek leader spoke of the Sino-Soviet rivalry as a welcome diversion which eased Soviet pressure on the West. However, he sounded circumspect about the future, warning of a ‘very difficult situation’ if the two communist giants ever patched up their differences. He mentioned the Lin Biao incident (the suspicious death of the PRC minister of Defence and his entourage in a plane crash, in 1971) as indicative of both the existence of pro-Soviet tendencies within the Chinese communist party and the fear such tendencies inspired to its current leadership. In Karamanlis’ view, the West ought to do its best to keep the wedge between Moscow and Beijing in place.³⁸

Karamanlis’ visit to the PRC was announced in late December 1978. The Greek government spokesman placed it within the framework of Greece’s overtures to Balkan, Arab and Eastern countries. He explicitly linked the eleven-month hiatus between the event and its announcement to the government’s preoccupation with the final stage of negotiations for Greece’s accession to the EEC. He also took care to note that these overtures did not prejudice the country’s commitments vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance and its prospective EEC partners; rather, with its place secure within the Western fold, Greece aspired to serve as a ‘connecting link’ between East and West.³⁹ Speaking in parliament a few weeks later, Karamanlis referred to the invitations to visit foreign capitals, such as Moscow and Beijing, as a sign of appreciation for his ‘multidimensional’ foreign policy on the part of non-western states. He also indicated that the PRC’s emergence from isolation, which he once more described as ‘the greatest or most significant development’ of recent times, was not an unmitigated blessing: Karamanlis noted the potential of Sino-Soviet antagonism spilling

³⁸ NARA, AAD, DS, D780434-1025, 1978ATHENS09189, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 23-10-1978.

³⁹ *Kathimerini*, 24-12-1978.

over into the Balkans, a threat which his policy of bilateral and regional co-operation was meant to deter.⁴⁰

Karamanlis also discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his visits to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria, in March-April 1979. To both the Yugoslavs and the Romanians the Greek prime minister expressed his anxiety lest the support which the PRC flaunted for these two countries generated friction in their relations with Bulgaria, Moscow's faithful satellite in the region. His hope was that Greek diplomacy might help defuse local tensions to the extent that it kept an open line with both Moscow and Beijing, particularly in view of Karamanlis' forthcoming visits.⁴¹ However, his hosts did not seem to share his concerns. Marshal Tito welcomed the increased Chinese activity in South-East Europe,⁴² while in Nicolae Ceauşescu's view such interest should provoke no-one. He even interpreted Soviet criticism of Chinese 'penetration' in the light of Moscow's tendency to treat the Balkans as a zone of exclusive interest. The Balkan states, he quipped, 'should not ignore China just because its presence annoys Russia.'⁴³

Greek concern was more in line with the views prevailing in Sofia. During his meeting with Karamanlis, in April 1979, a resentful Todor Zhivkov accused his Romanian counterpart of false bravado: despite his flirting with Beijing, he told Karamanlis, Ceauşescu would not dare to leave the Eastern bloc.⁴⁴ During his visit to Moscow, on 2-4 October 1979, Karamanlis listened to his Soviet counterpart, Alexei Kosygin, to blame Sino-Soviet differences on the Chinese misinterpretation and misapplication of Marxist-Leninist tenets. As examples of this, he cited Chinese claims on Soviet territory plus the view, echoing both Mao and Stalin, that war was inevitable if communism was to prevail worldwide. Karamanlis seemed to share the Soviet dislike for Chinese inroads in the Balkans, even if for different reasons.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Svolopoulos, *op.cit.*, vol. 11, 20.

⁴¹ *Kathimerini*, 7-3-1979.

⁴² KKF, Konstantinos Karamanlis Archive (hereafter KKF, KKA), File 52B, Karamanlis' talks in Yugoslavia, 16 to 18-3-1979.

⁴³ KKF, KKA, Karamanlis' talks in Romania, 19 to 26-3-1979.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, Karamanlis-Zhivkov talks, 29-4-1979.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, minutes of talks between Greek and Soviet delegation in Moscow, 2 to 4-10-1979.

He was also impressed by the Soviets' apparent preoccupation with the spectre of a quadrilateral 'front' among the United States, Western Europe, Japan and the PRC.⁴⁶ This impression he subsequently tried to convey to both the Americans and the Chinese. At the same time, his government was determined to avoid taking sides in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, as indicated by its refusal to contemplate anti-Chinese allusions in the Moscow visit communiqué.⁴⁷

There is also evidence that, at a time when it was negotiating its return to the NATO military wing, Athens appreciated the potential of the PRC to counterbalance Soviet influence elsewhere, especially in the Far East. Talking to the political counselor at the US Embassy on the eve of Karamanlis' visit to Beijing, the official in charge of Far Eastern and Pacific Affairs at the Greek Foreign Ministry, Ioannis Retalis, described the Chinese attack on Vietnam, in February 1979, as a useful 'lesson' for the Vietnamese which could well be repeated, if Hanoi did not terminate its intervention in Cambodia. The same official described Karamanlis' impending trip to China as a 'natural development', along the path taken by Nixon and other Western leaders.⁴⁸ According to another Greek diplomat, the timing of the visit was not unrelated to the Moscow trip. It was intended to balance relations with the two communist great powers.⁴⁹ Finally, Retalis took care to dismiss press speculation to the effect that the visits to Moscow and Beijing put into question Greece's close ties with Washington.⁵⁰

Last but not least, Athens remained keen to explore the 'huge' prospects which the opening of the Chinese market seemed to offer. High-ranking Greek officials, such as the Governor of the Bank of Greece, had already spoken optimistically of Greece's chances to serve as a 'natural bridge' or gateway for commerce between Western Europe and

⁴⁶ NARA, AAD, DS, d790476-0764, 1979ATHENS09273, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 16-10-1979; *ibid*, D790506-526, 1979STATE287769, Secretary of State to Athens, 3-11-1979.

⁴⁷ NARA, AAD, DS, D790411-0346, 1979ATHENS08015, Mills to Secretary of State, 7 September 1979.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*.

⁴⁹ NARA, AAD, DS, D790524-0397, 1979ATHENS10279, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 13-11-1979.

⁵⁰ NARA, AAD, DS, D790411-0346, *ibid*. Cf. Kourkouvelas, *op.cit.*, 1061.

the Middle and Far East, especially once the country attained full membership of the EEC.⁵¹

Karamanlis in China

The strengthening of Greece's overall diplomatic position and the furthering of economic interests, especially in the fields of shipping and energy were paramount in Karamanlis' mind as he arrived at Beijing on 12 November. The visit was preceded by a stop-over at Bangkok and it came six weeks after his well publicised tour of Moscow, Prague and Budapest. In the Chinese capital, he had two lengthy meetings with Deng, whose official title as 'chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference' obscured his leading role in the CPC and the state. According to Greek sources, Deng 'seemed very sure of himself' and both surprised and impressed his guests with his frankness. By contrast, Hua Guofeng, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and premier, who subsequently received his Greek counterpart, appeared 'much more circumspect.'⁵² With hindsight, one is tempted to interpret this contrast as reflecting not only a difference of personalities but also the diverging political fortunes of the two men and their respective factions after December 1978, when Deng's reformists decisively outmanoeuvred their conservative rivals within the CPC Central Committee.⁵³

At the outset of their talks, both sides rather stereotypically referred to the contribution of their nations to world civilization. They also reaffirmed their interest for greater exchanges in the political, economic and cultural fields. Deng, in particular, sought further affinities between the two nations in their struggles for liberty and against fascism. Like Huang a year earlier, he stressed his country's interest in scien-

⁵¹ Speech by Angelos Angelopoulos, governor of the National Bank of Greece, to the General Meeting of Shareholders, *Naftemboriki*, 25-5-1978. Greece would indeed become a "bridge" or "hub" for European-Chinese trade, following strategic investment by the PRC company, COSCO, in the port of Piraeus, under a 35-year lease agreement approved in 2009. Of course, from the perspective of 1978, all this looked a rather long shot.

⁵² NARA, AAD, DS, D790553-0871, 1979ATHENS10741, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 28-11-1979.

⁵³ MacFarquhar, *op.cit.*, 317-322.

tific and technological co-operation. He then turned to international issues. As anticipated by his guests, Deng played up the theme of Soviet 'hegemonism' and warned that, through arms limitation schemes, Moscow was trying to lull the West 'into a false sense of security.' Egged on by Karamanlis, he forcefully rejected any prospect of reconciliation between the Soviet Union and the PRC. In addition to Soviet hegemonism, Deng cited the Soviets' going back on their agreement to discuss the border disputes which had led to the clashes of 1969. He added, however, that China did not claim territories ceded in times past; rather, it was seeking not merely peaceful co-existence but solid co-operation even with countries with a different socio-political system. The Chinese leader also expressed concern with the Soviet-aided military build-up of Vietnam. Karamanlis asked Deng whether he would envisage some form of co-operation between his country, the US, and Japan, perhaps modeled on the EEC. The Chinese leader professed readiness to co-operate with both countries as well as Western Europe, though, he added, even this might not suffice to deter a 'provocative' Soviet Union. To that end, Deng even appeared willing to countenance Japanese rearmament.⁵⁴

At Beijing, Karamanlis was gratified to hear both Deng and Hua expressing themselves strongly in favour of Greece's entry into the EEC, particularly as a contribution to European security. This tallied with the Greek leader's long-standing approach of the EEC as a factor of not only economic but also political significance. Deng was in turn happy to hear that Greece, as EEC member, would continue 'to oppose and speak out against Soviet expansionism.' Moreover, Karamanlis did not fail to stress the potential role of the PRC as a balancing factor in world politics.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ MacFarquhar, *op.cit.*, 317-322; *Kathimerini*, 13-11-1979; KKF, KKA, File 52B, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 13 November 1979; *ibid*, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 14 November 1979; *ibid*, Note, "Prime Minister's meeting with Hua Guofeng in Beijing," 15-11-1979.

⁵⁵ NARA, AAD, DS, D790553-0871, 1979ATHENS10741, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 28-11-1979; KKF, KKA, File 52B, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 14-11-1979; *ibid*, Note, "Prime Minister's meeting with Hua Guofeng in Beijing," 15-11-1979. According to the Greek minutes of the meetings, Deng seemed perplexed by

Even though a complete identity of views was unrealistic, both sides appeared to share a desire for easing international tensions, especially the East-West confrontation, and the need for universal respect of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Karamanlis particularly targeted the arms race as the root of tension and expressed pessimism in the capacity of the United Nations to offer practicable solutions to international disputes. He mentioned the Cyprus and Palestinian questions as examples of this, before turning to one of his favourite subjects, regional co-operation in the Balkans. Karamanlis was apparently encouraged by positive references of the state-controlled Chinese press to his Balkan initiatives and Greece's potential as an intermediary in the region.⁵⁶ Deng expressed the hope that the promotion of this policy might 'have some effect on Bulgaria', in the sense of attenuating its solid pro-Soviet orientation.⁵⁷ The Greek prime minister had already singled out Bulgaria as a delaying factor to his Balkan project, owing to the Soviet fear of exactly the effect which Deng was wishing for. At the same time, however, he expressed concern lest 'extra-Balkan antagonisms' –meaning the Sino-Soviet rivalry– disturb his efforts for multilateral co-operation. This project, he clearly implied, was corresponding to Deng's position in favour of co-operation between countries with different socio-economic systems or political orientation.

Turning to Yugoslavia, Deng identified it as a possible soft spot where the Soviets might try their hand in case that Tito's death unleashed nationalist antagonisms among its constituent republics, though he also appeared to trust in the ability of the Yugoslav communist party to avert this. He added that the Western powers should do their best to prop up Yugoslav unity. This offered Karamanlis the opportunity to refer to the Macedonian question. Greece, he said, was prepared to do its best to support the stability of Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslavs kept harping on that issue which constituted a thorn in their

European institutional proliferation, confusing the European Council with the Council of Europe.

⁵⁶ *KKA*, vol. 11, 308, citing commentary in the European press.

⁵⁷ According to the Greek minutes of the meeting of 13 November, Deng described Bulgaria as the "local republic of the USSR": *KKF*, *KKA*, File 52B, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 13 November 1979.

relations with both Greece and Bulgaria. If that issue was removed, the Greek prime minister assumed that Sofia might become more forthcoming on Balkan co-operation.⁵⁸

During his two tête-à-tête meetings with Deng, Karamanlis proceeded with a more detailed presentation of his foreign policy on issues of particular Greek interest. He somewhat expanded on the Cyprus question, drawing a parallel between the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, in 1978, which had triggered a 'punitive' Chinese operation a few months later. He further illustrated his argument telling Deng that, as a result of the Turkish occupation of its north, the Republic of Cyprus was facing a refugee crisis which, if adjusted to PRC demographics, would be tantamount to the displacement of 300 million people. As Deng admitted little knowledge of the issue, Karamanlis went on to present the Greek case on the problem of the continental shelf which also bedeviled Greek-Turkish relations. Deng's response reaffirmed the affinity of Beijing's approach to that of Ankara, i.e. that small offshore islands belonging to neighbouring states were mere extension of the adjacent mainland. He urged his guests to be 'flexible' and consider negotiating with Turkey on the basis of the joint exploitation of underwater resources – an anathema to Greek foreign policy as was Deng's linkage between the settlement of the bilateral Greek-Turkish disputes and the solution of the Cyprus issue.

Deng also seized the opportunity to warn Karamanlis that, by professing support for the Republic of Cyprus, the Soviet Union was trying to sow the seeds of discord between two NATO allies. The Greek delegation drew little comfort from Deng's admission that the PRC was too distant from the scene to aspire to a role, besides its policy of improving relations with Turkey as well as Greece. It is not known whether the Chinese leader was impressed by Karamanlis' retort that, if Turkey's strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union suffered on

⁵⁸ NARA, AAD, DS, D790553-0871, 1979ATHENS10741, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 28-11-1979; KKF, KKA, File 52B, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 14 November 1979.

account of the Greek withdrawal from the NATO military command in 1974, it only had itself to blame.⁵⁹

Criticism of the Soviet Union was a staple of the PRC leaders' repertoire in their talks with foreign visitors. Deng attempted to reverse Moscow's encirclement argument, interpreting the Soviet presence and influence in Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and Indochina as part of a design to hem in Western Europe, which, in his view, was the primary target of a Soviet offensive, followed by the PRC. In order to counter that threat, he repeated, the PRC supported a strong 'united Europe.' Karamanlis limited himself to pointing out that a united Europe and a resurgent China could alter Cold War bipolarity, by changing the balance of power between the superpowers. As he had done with foreign minister Huang a year earlier, he enquired about the likelihood of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, only to provoke Deng's categorical rejection of such a prospect. In the latter's view, Soviet 'hegemonism' was the only threat facing his country and dismissed what Karamanlis referred to as Soviet warnings against the menace which a powerful PRC could pose for the West as a mere rehearsal of the discredited 'yellow peril' stereotype. Finally, both sides condemned Soviet support for anti-Western movements and regimes, especially in Africa and the Middle East. In the latter region, in particular, they agreed that a future settlement ought to provide for the security of Israel, its recognition by the Arab states, and the right of the Palestinian people for a national homeland in the (occupied) western bank of river Jordan.⁶⁰

Karamanlis met premier Hua once, on 15 November. The latter sounded even more alarmist than Deng in his tirades against the Soviet Union. Repeating that his country had no territorial claims against the Soviet Union, Hua accused Moscow of seeking to dominate the entire South-East Asia as part of a strategy for global hegemony. Asked by his guest to define 'hegemonism,' Hua responded that the Soviets were using the 'family of socialism' as a pretext in order to control all socialist states. He even invoked the alleged concurrence of West European leaders with his view that Moscow was methodically

⁵⁹ KKF, KKA, File 52B, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 13 November 1979.

⁶⁰ Ibid and minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 14 November 1979.

building up positions in Asia and Africa, whence it planned to dominate Europe without war. The two men accepted the conventional arms build-up in Western Europe as inevitable response to Soviet preponderance, though, as Deng had indicated, the Chinese were in principle averse to the deployment of new nuclear weapons anywhere on the globe.⁶¹ Finally, like Deng, Hua ruled out any prospect of Sino-Soviet rapprochement and dismissed as groundless the Soviet preoccupation with the spectre of a quadrilateral front comprising the USA, Western Europe, Japan and the PRC. Soviet conventional forces, he claimed, outnumbered those of the other four powers combined.⁶²

With regard to economic matters, which should be high on the Greek agenda, the PRC leaders appeared reluctant to enter into detailed discussion. According to a Greek diplomat, Deng admitted that his country was only beginning to ‘come out of a period of economic chaos’ and, therefore, he could see ‘little room’ for economic exchange. The Greek side still hoped for some concrete steps which could pave the way for future co-operation, such as the opening of a PRC office for chartering Greek shipping and the use of Greek construction firms for joint ventures.⁶³ It also wished to explore the possibility of importing petrol from China, at a time of renewed global energy crisis. Although Chinese petrol was of poor quality in comparison with what it imported from Iraq, Libya and, increasingly, the Soviet Union, Athens was seeking to diversify its sources, build up deposits, and, hopefully, secure better prices.⁶⁴

Karamanlis also mentioned a possible deal on maritime transport and ship-building, sectors in which Athens perceived comparative advantages. He further suggested that Greek construction companies, already active in Arab countries, might be contracted for public works in the PRC. He even raised the issue of Greek tobacco exports – an issue dear to his heart given his descent from a tobacco-trading family

⁶¹ KKF, KKA, File 52B, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 13 November 1979.

⁶² KKF, KKA, File 52B, Note, “Prime Minister’s meeting with Hua Guofeng in Beijing,” 15-11-1979.

⁶³ NARA, AAD, DS, D790553-0871, 1979ATHENS10741, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 28-11-1979.

⁶⁴ Press conference by Minister of Co-ordination Konstantinos Mitsotakis, *Kathimerini*, 21-12-1978.

in a tobacco-producing region of Greek Macedonia. He finally turned to the issue of oil, apparently hoping that its obvious political ramifications might attract his hosts' attention. Karamanlis elaborated on the likely impact of rising oil prices on the western states' finances, their ability to sustain defence spending, and, hence, their capacity to match the alleged Soviet military preponderance. He recommended that the PRC exercise a moderating influence on the Arab states which were leading the latest energy crunch, and enquired about the likelihood of the PRC increasing its own oil production and exporting some quantities to western countries, including his own. No record of Hua's reaction has been found. Deng, for his part, was evasive: though the PRC oil reserves were estimated at 65 billion tones, current production scarcely satisfied local needs. Having already manifested his predilection for high policy topics, he chose to relegate economic matters to a bilateral committee of experts. Making a virtue out of necessity, Karamanlis declared: "I have not come for commercial business. I am here to make your acquaintance, to exchange thoughts on the international situation. We are not so developed in order to trade like the big (countries)."⁶⁵

The Greek government did not expect the visit to be crowned by a joint communiqué.⁶⁶ Indeed, there was none. The Greek delegation did not fail to notice that, during the talks, their Chinese hosts made no reference to two long-standing issues: Beijing's 'one China' policy which claimed Taiwan as an integral part of the PRC; and its claim to the British colony of Hong Kong.⁶⁷ The immediate result of Karamanlis' visit was a scientific and technological co-operation agreement. In this connection, a Greek diplomat apparently surprised a US colleague, when he appeared optimistic that Greece might be able to supply 'high technology' of the sort the Chinese were interested in. More-

⁶⁵ KKF, KKA, File 52B, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 13 November 1979; *ibid*, minutes of Sino-Greek talks of 14 November 1979. Tea is not mentioned in the minutes. Until recently, the consumption of this staple Chinese export was conspicuously low in the scale of Greek drinking habits.

⁶⁶ NARA, AAD, DS, D790411-0346, 1979ATHENS08015, Mills to Secretary of State, 7-9-1979.

⁶⁷ NARA, AAD, DS, D790553-0871, 1979ATHENS10741, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 28-11-1979; *Kathimerini*, 13-11-1979.

over, Athens continued to hope for more concrete steps which could pave the way for future co-operation, such as the opening of a PRC office for chartering Greek shipping and the use of Greek construction firms for joint ventures.⁶⁸

Following Karamanlis' return, Petros Molyviatis, the prime minister's diplomatic adviser, and Stavros Roussos, the deputy director general of the Greek Foreign Ministry, briefed the US ambassador, Robert McCloskey, on the trip to Beijing. The latter interpreted this as 'another step' in Karamanlis' effort to build up his image as a 'world statesman' and as more than a balancing act in relations with the two communist giants – an allusion to the future potential of Sino-Greek contacts.⁶⁹ Last but not least, according the Greek diplomats, Karamanlis' team left Beijing particularly impressed by Deng's performance and with considerable 'admiration for the Chinese, whom Roussos described as 'a people with a purpose.'⁷⁰

Reporting on Karamanlis' visit to Beijing, foreign newspapers drew attention to the sustained effort of his government to diversify Greece's foreign relations with overtures towards the Arab world, the Eastern bloc, and the PRC. Their general view was that such moves were benefiting Greece and added to its value as a prospective EEC partner. *Le Monde* did not fail to notice Beijing's support for Greece's membership of the Community, while West German newspapers drew a parallel between the Greek *Ostpolitik* and its German precursor. Finally, the Turkish *Milliyet* contrasted the diplomatic spree of the Karamanlis government to the introversion of its Turkish counterpart. It also expressed the hope that the former would not exploit its recent contacts, particularly with communist countries, to the detriment of Turkish interests.⁷¹

⁶⁸ NARA, AAD, DS, D790553-0871, *ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *KKA*, vol. 11, 308-310, citing commentary in the European and Turkish press, including *Le Monde*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *La Suisse* and *Milliyet*.

Appraisal and Aftermath

For Karamanlis, his visit to Beijing, like the preceding one to Moscow and the frequent contacts he enjoyed with Balkan and Arab leaders, was clearly meant to diversify Greece's foreign relations, promote understanding of its positions and objectives on a number of international issues, and explore paths to mutually beneficial, mainly economic, co-operation, within the context of the country's pro-Western orientation. The disputes between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and, more recently, the Aegean continental shelf, the strains on Greek–American relations bequeathed by the bitter legacy of the military dictatorship and the dramatic events of summer 1974, plus the thorny issue of Greece's reintegration into the military command of NATO, wove the backdrop of security dilemmas facing Greece. Ironically, the so-called 'peril from the North,' which combined long-standing disputes between competing Balkan nationalisms with the more recent legacy of Soviet bloc involvement in the Greek civil war, had receded into the background. This was the result of Greece's acute sense of threat from Turkey and the dramatic improvement in its relations with Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union itself. And while repeating Greece's fundamental attachment to the West, its conservative government was apparently not averse to cultivating an impression of having other options open, primarily vis-à-vis a domestic public receptive to Papandreou's anti-Western rhetoric, but also as an element of calculated uncertainty in its negotiations with the United States, NATO and even the EEC.

Greek foreign policy-makers could also hope to gain some tangible benefits from dealing with both sides of the divide within the communist world. As a US Embassy official quipped on the eve of Karamanlis' trips to Moscow and Beijing, '[t]he Greeks have rather enjoyed the attention the two communist giants have showered on their country recently.'⁷² At the same time, Karamanlis was anxious to ensure that the Sino-Soviet antagonism did not upset his policy of Balkan co-operation.

As indicated by his personal involvement in the negotiation process leading to Greece's accession to the EEC, Karamanlis valued summit

⁷² NARA, AAD, DS, D780391-1253, 1978ATHENS08348, McCloskey to Secretary of State, 25-9-1978.

meetings as an instrument of foreign policy. If anything, he believed that they contributed to a clearer understanding of each party's positions. Summing up the results of his Eastern tour in parliament, he expressed appreciation for the opportunity to have first-hand accounts of both the Soviet and the PRC positions and for being able to present Greece's case on matters of national interest.⁷³ Finally, the dense programme of high level meetings at home and abroad, in stark contrast with their near complete absence during the preceding seven-year dictatorship, added to the prestige of Karamanlis and his country. The exchanges with the Soviet Union and the PRC, in particular, were breaking new ground for Greek diplomacy and helped defuse domestic criticism of the conservatives' 'unidimensional' pro-Westernism. However, when faced with the leftist opposition's demands for stronger ties with non-western, especially non-aligned, states, Karamanlis did not hesitate to dismiss such an alternative to his strategic choice to try and meet Greece's security dilemmas within the Western camp.⁷⁴

Conversing with the Greek prime minister for three days in autumn 1979, the PRC rulers, and Deng in particular, apparently considered that no country was too small to be neglected in the escalating contest with the Soviet Union for influence across the globe. Greece already played a significant role in the Balkans, where Chinese diplomacy had gone into high gear during the preceding few years. The Chinese supported Karamanlis' initiatives for Balkan co-operation to the extent that this policy could curb Soviet influence by encouraging the autonomous course of Yugoslav and, especially Romanian foreign policy, and facing pro-Soviet Bulgaria with the dilemma of participation or isolation.⁷⁵ Above all, the PRC rulers appreciated Greece's Balkan and Mediterranean status in so far as that country remained part of the Western bloc and, as such, constituted an obstacle to the expansion of Soviet influence. As they amply made it clear to their Greek counterparts, they wanted Greece fully integrated into both NATO and the EEC, which they viewed as indispensable counters to the perceived Soviet military preponderance. To that end, Beijing advocated the patch-

⁷³ *OMP*, 2nd Period, Session III, plenary meeting of 11 January 1980.

⁷⁴ *OMP*, op.cit.

⁷⁵ *Kathimerini*, 23-9-1978.

ing up of Greek-Turkish differences in favour of NATO cohesion and effectiveness.

At the same time, there were inherent limits to the ability of both governments to promote co-operation in practical, especially economic, matters. The Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs had no Sinologist, and its Chinese counterpart probably faced a similar problem. The post of commercial attaché at the Greek Embassy in Beijing was created only in August 1978, more than five years after the establishment of diplomatic relations.⁷⁶ As late as October 1980, the outgoing Greek ambassador was complaining that he was obliged to act as his own secretary and typist.⁷⁷ Greece would soon have to reappraise and adjust its terms of foreign trade to the EEC rules and the PRC was facing the rigours of economic reform after the stagnation and setbacks of the Maoist period. The same Greek ambassador estimated that the transition of the PRC from ill-conceived autarchy to a mixed type of economy would be a long process and no breakthrough should be expected in its ability to trade for many years to come.⁷⁸ On that score, he clearly underestimated both the potential of the country and the determination of its leaders.

Finally, both sides were apparently prepared to live with the fact that each of them avoided to take sides on issues which the other considered paramount: the Greeks on the Sino-Soviet controversy, the Chinese on Greek-Turkish disputes. It was the unavoidable price that needed to be paid in order to facilitate a rapprochement based on strategic and economic considerations, rather than the, arguably obsolescent, ideological divide of the early Cold War decades.

Some six months after his trip to the PRC, Karamanlis moved on to the presidency of the Hellenic Republic. Under his successor, Rallis, no major developments occurred in Greek-PRC relations, until, in October 1981, Papandreou's PASOK replaced the conservatives in pow-

⁷⁶ Presidential Decree 615/1978, in *GGHR*, no. 132/A/26-8-1978. Until then, the PRC was handled through the commercial bureau of the Tokyo Embassy, as were the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan.

⁷⁷ DHA, Tokyo Embassy Series, File 3/2 [Section 2], Chrysanthakopoulos (Beijing) to MFA, no. 3028/Φ. 32/A 14, 20-10-1980.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

er. By then, Greece had become the tenth member of the EEC and was reintegrated in the military command of NATO.

Despite his past anti-Western rhetoric, Papandreou did not deviate from the main contours of his predecessors' foreign policy.⁷⁹ However, on an ad hoc basis, he chose to differentiate Greece's attitude from that of its European and transatlantic partners. The examples included the military coup in Poland, in 1981, the shooting down of a Korean airliner by Soviet air defences, in 1982, and Papandreou's active part in the so-called 'six-nation initiative' for peace and disarmament in 1984.⁸⁰ In that context, the PASOK government played up its contacts with non-western states, including the PRC, in order to project Greece's profile as a 'socialist' country within Western economic and security structures.

Papandreou became the second Greek premier to go to China in April 1986. His visit was reciprocated by prime minister Zhao Ziyang three months later. Karamanlis' successor in the presidency, Christos Sartzetakis, also visited the PRC in April 1988, about a year before political instability in Greece, the Tiananmen crackdown in the PRC and the EEC reactions to it prevented further high level contacts until the mid-1990s.⁸¹ Meanwhile, despite inherent handicaps owing to the low complementarity of their products and the restrictive EEC policy vis-à-vis non-market economies, the value of trade between Greece and the PRC rose from \$20 million in 1979 to a non-negligible \$104.8 million in 1989. It was this field that held much promise for the future, at a time when the international environment, transformed by the end of the Cold War, dictated new priorities for both Beijing and Athens.

⁷⁹ For an early and perceptive appraisal of Papandreou's foreign policy during his first two terms in office, see: Theodore A. Couloumbis, "PASOK's Foreign Policies, 1981-1989: Continuity or Change?," in Richard. Clogg (ed.), *Greece 1981-1990, the Populist Decade* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1993), 113-30.

⁸⁰ Eirini Karamouzi-Dionysios Chourchoulis, "Troublemaker or peacemaker? Andreas Papandreou, the Euromissile Crisis, and the policy of peace, 1981-86," *Cold War History* 19, no. 1, 39-61, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2018.1497014

⁸¹ Chourchoulis, op.cit., 76-81; Yingchao Qian, "PASOK's Foreign Policy during the 1980s" (Post-graduate diss., Department of Political Science, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2013), 62-77.

Tian Jianjun * – *Mariana Tian* **

The International Scene during the Last Decades of the Cold War and the Bulgarian–Chinese Relations

The Soviet–Chinese armed conflict left its mark not only on the domestic political situation, but also radically affected the foreign policy of both countries. Going so far as to declare Moscow its main adversary, Beijing is turning to Washington to normalize relations with the United States, despite the “Taiwan problem.” Considering that the “Sino-Soviet contradictions” are greater than the Sino-American ones, and the Soviet-American ones are more insurmountable than the Sino-Soviet ones,¹ the Chinese Communist government began the process of resuming China–US relations by undertaking a round of negotiations at ambassadorial level in Warsaw (December 1969–February 1970). However, these negotiations were temporarily suspended due to US military intervention in the civil wars in Indochina, which led to the military coup in Cambodia (March 18, 1970) and the massive air bombardments of the US air force in Laos (January–April 1971).

The American intervention in Indochina stopped the implementation of the “triangular diplomacy” conceived by Richard Nixon (USA–USSR–PRC). Apparently, this is the main reason why Mao Zedong appealed to Eastern European countries to normalize interstate relations with them during a meeting with the heads of diplomatic missions in Beijing (May 1, 1970). As a result of this meeting, in the second half of

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¹ As early as 1964–1965, Mao Zedong declared the USSR a “dangerous enemy,” even more dangerous than the United States, which was carrying out a “counter-revolution and restoration of capitalism.”

1970, the Warsaw Pact countries again agree to exchange ambassadors with China.

However, the “differentiated approach” to each of the Eastern European countries remains a hallmark of China’s foreign policy. Considering the tendency of China to normalize its relations with the socialist countries, the Bulgarian state leadership, represented by the Bulgarian Communist Party, is rethinking its policy towards the Asian country, especially with regard to trade and economic contacts, as evidenced by declassified documents from the Diplomatic Archives.² Fragmentary information about this period can be found in the report of Krum Bosev, temporarily acting head of the Bulgarian embassy in Beijing.³

An important moment in the history of Bulgarian–Chinese relations from this period is the proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivan Bashev for normalization of the bilateral interstate relations Bulgaria–China, adopted by a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (no. 588) of September 17, 1970.⁴ The proposal emphasizes the need “in the future to avoid rough attacks against the state and party leaders of the PRC,” to try to “strengthen ties in the economic field and scientific and technical cooperation,” in expanding trade and resumption of the exchange of the two academies of sciences – the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.⁵

² Jordan Baev, *Drugata studena voĭna: Sŭvetsko-kitaĭskiiat konflikt i Iztochna Evropa* (The Other Cold War: Soviet-Chinese Conflict and Eastern Europe), (Sofia: Military Publishing House 2012), 184-185, note 4. From the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivan Bashev to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Tano Tsolov (from July 20, 1970) it is read: “There is an order from Comrade Todor Zhivkov to make a Program of measures and events for the development of economic relations with China in connection with the emerging tendencies for China to normalize its relations with the socialist countries, by state, mainly trade line.” *Diplomatiĭeski Arhiv na Ministerstvoto na Vŭnshnite raboti* (hereafter DA), inventory 27, a.u. 1627.

³ DA, inventory 26, a.u. 3330.

⁴ Centralen Dŭrzhaven Arhiv na Republika Bŭlgariya (hereafter CSA), fund 1-B, inventory 35, a.u. 1664.

⁵ Baev, *op.cit.*, 185.

Relying on the decision of the Bulgarian Communist Party, in December the new Bulgarian ambassador Lyuben Stoyanov left for Beijing, handing over his credentials to the Vice President of the People's Republic of China Sun Qinglin, and on a reciprocal principle, ambassador Zhao Jing arrived in Sofia, where he was welcomed personally by Todor Zhivkov. During the meeting, the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party clearly emphasized: "[...] there are no obstacles to the development of relations between our countries. And we will do everything possible to develop these relations favorably."⁶

Meanwhile, shortly after the withdrawal of US military units from Cambodia (July 30, 1970), China's state elite began probing opinions on the prospects for resuming talks with the United States. Henry Kissinger's secret mission to Beijing (July 9-11, 1971) and his subsequent visit (October 20-26), which paved the way for Richard Nixon's official visit to China (February 21-28, 1972), also played a favorable role. Quite logically, the first visit of an American president to China is followed with great interest all over the world, including Bulgaria as a Warsaw Pact country, and the comments on the Washington–Moscow–Beijing strategic triangle in the *Rabotnichesko Delo* newspaper, press body of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, can be summarized in the words of the Bulgarian Ambassador Lyuben Stoyanov, who in one of his reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that “the intransigence of the Chinese leadership towards the USSR” is the reason for “searching common contact points between the United States and China.”⁷

In contrast to the cold relations with the Soviet bloc countries, in the early 1970s the People's Republic of China began to increase its political ties with Western Europe, developing with them active cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology, and trade.⁸

⁶ DA, inventory 27, a.u. 1615

⁷ DA, inventory 28, a.u. 1649.

⁸ Until 1969, the PRC maintained diplomatic relations only with Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and France.

Concerned about China's growing military power, which in 1964 became a nuclear power and began to play a new role in the balance of superpowers, occupying an important strategic place in US policy and the subsequent "ping-pong diplomacy"⁹ in the early 1970s, on the one hand, as well as a whole range of other factors, including concerns about the resumption of previous Chinese policy activity (since the early 1960s) towards Third World countries and the focus of its sphere of influence on new, more distant regions such as Latin America, on the other, together with the ongoing "differentiated approach" to the countries of the socialist camp, the Eastern Bloc countries are taking joint steps towards political coordination on the so-called "Chinese question."

For this purpose in different capitals of the Warsaw Pact countries, international coordination meetings at the level of heads of international departments of the ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe began to be convened annually, which were held in a propaganda and ideological atmosphere until 1975.¹⁰ They are all united thematically by the "Chinese question" and political propaganda against Maoism. Sofia is hosting the Fourth such meeting, which took place in February 1971, and one of the main topics is the discussion on the issue of formulating specific foreign policy goals and actions towards China.

Meanwhile, in view of the internal situation in the PR of China and the Chinese Communist Party's foreign policy, at its meeting in March

⁹ The "ping-pong diplomacy" is a term in international relations that appears in connection with the beginning of the process of resumption of Sino-US negotiations. The reason for his appearance was the visit of the American national table tennis team to China (April 1971), which was the first visit of an American sports delegation after the founding of the PRC. On October 16, 1964, the People's Republic of China made its first atomic bomb experiment and has been in the ranks of the "nuclear states" ever since. For China's nuclear power, see "Veche 50 godini Kitaĭ e yadrena dŭrzhava–podrobnosti za yadreniya mu arsenal" (China has been a nuclear power for 50 years–details of its nuclear arsenal), Atominfo.Bg. The Bulgarian nuclear site, 21.10.2014, <http://atominfo.bg/?p=30155> (accessed 15.11.2015).

¹⁰ The first was in Moscow, the second in East Berlin (January 1969), and the third in Warsaw (March 1970); the fifth in Prague (July 1972); the sixth in Moscow (May 1973); the seventh in Budapest (March 1974) and the eighth in Ulaanbaatar (June 1975).

1969 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to establish a section China at the Political Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹¹ Furthermore, during its meeting on April 24, 1970, a Special Research Group on China was founded at the Institute for Contemporary Social Theories.¹²

In its formation, the Research Group called “Critique of Maoism” consisted of three sinologists, but in the course of its work it was transformed into a Group on Problems of Modern China, attracting more researchers and its number in the late 70s years reaches a dozen people. This is how the core of Bulgarian sinologists of this generation was formed in Sofia. Shortly after the coordination meeting in Prague (July 3-5, 1972), Bulgarian experts on the “Chinese question” faced the challenge of finding and preparing materials on “Foreign Policy of the Maoists in the Balkans.”

The responsible task assigned by the highest state and party level and adopted by decision no. 896 of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on August 15, 1972, was entrusted to collaborators from several research units: the Institute for Contemporary Social Theories, the Institute of History of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Institute for Foreign Policy and the Center for Asia and Africa. In addition, it has been confirmed that trained experts on maoism issues should be sent to Bulgarian diplomatic mission in Beijing.¹³

Next year, following the directives of the next international meeting in Moscow (May 1973), the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to establish a Coordinating Scientific Council on China, situated at the Institute for Contemporary Social Theories, which began its work on October 18, 1973.¹⁴

¹¹ CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 35, a.u. 602.

¹² CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 35, a.u. 1364.

¹³ CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 36, a.u. 2368.

¹⁴ Decision no. 401 of 25 June 1973. See CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 35, a.u. 4202.

The exceptional influence of the “Chinese question” on the socio-political life in Bulgaria at that time is evidenced by the scale of the project. The Council is staffed by personnel from the Foreign Policy and International Relations and Propaganda and Agitation Departments at the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, representatives of the Committee for Science, Technical Progress and Higher Education at the Council of Ministers, research associates from the Academy of Social Sciences and Social Management,¹⁵ researchers from the Institute for History of the Bulgarian Communist Party, from the Ivan Bashev Institute for Foreign Policy, the Center for Asia and Africa, as well as editors of the press body of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party: *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Workers’ affairs) newspaper, *Novo Vreme* (New Time) magazine, along with their colleagues from other party publications, *Narodna Mladezh* (People’s Youth) newspaper, *Narodna Armiya* (People’s Army) newspaper, journalists from the Bulgarian News Agency (BTA), Radio Sofia.

The process of training Bulgarian sinologists includes sending students and post graduate students to various universities in the Soviet Union: at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in Moscow, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Institute of International Labor Movement, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the Institute for Eastern Studies, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Thus, practically the whole generation of Bulgarian sinologists from this period was created and trained by the Soviet Sinological School. They had the opportunity to work on joint international projects on the issues of Chinese politics, economics, modern history, the problems of maoism and others together with their colleagues from the institutions

¹⁵ The Academy of Social Sciences and Social Management originates from the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, established (1945) as the Central Party School and renamed the Higher Party School “Stanke Dimitrov,” then transformed into the Academy of Social Sciences and Social Management in 1969. The Academy was closed in 1990.

and the Coordinating Scientific and Expert Units on the Problems of China, which arose in a similar way in the other socialist countries.¹⁶

Another field of activity of sinologists from research institutes in Bulgaria are the international forums on the “Chinese question,” held behind closed doors. During the Constituent Session of the Joint Coordinating Scientific Council for China, held in Moscow (March 20-22, 1974), it was decided that they would be held two or three times a year in different Eastern European countries. The results of their assigned research activity are published in the thematic collections *Critique of Maoism*, printed in a limited edition and only “for official use.” Completely in the spirit of the era, the publishing activity of the Bulgarian sinologists, which is expressed in confidential materials, propaganda literature, informational and analytical articles, etc. are published with “literary pseudonyms.”¹⁷ For the period 1973-1978, for example, Bulgarian sinologists held several “Closed Seminars” and prepared a series of secret materials and analytical reports, united by the topic of Chinese policy in the Balkans.

The talks at the highest level between Todor Zhivkov and the Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko during the so-called “Crimean meetings” also refer to the Bulgarian–Chinese relations from this period. These meetings testify again the consistent behavior and actions of the Bulgarian leader on the “Chinese issue” during this period of history and in particular his criticism of the “policy of the Chinese leadership” and his concern about the possibility of becoming “anti-Soviet” and “pro-Chinese” bloc in the Balkans.¹⁸

¹⁶ At the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, for example, a special section for Chinese studies has been created.

¹⁷ Baev, *op.cit.*, 200.

¹⁸ CSA, fund 378-B, inventory 1, a.u. 360. For T. Zhivkov’s criticism of the “Chinese leadership” during the Third Crimean Meeting (July 30-31, 1973) and the tension that arose between the Bulgarian leader and his Romanian counterpart Nicolae Ceausescu, see CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 35, a.u. 4300.

For example, we'll cite documents from the Diplomatic Archives, including the material Considerations in connection with the increased foreign policy activity of the PR of China in the Balkans, prepared for the First Crimean Meeting (August 2, 1971) by Bulgarian experts sinologists on the "growing Chinese influence" in the Balkans. where instructions are given for "monitoring" of "any Chinese activity" in this region.¹⁹

This category also includes Zhivkov's proposal made at the Crimean Summit to the Seven Fraternal Parties to form a Coordination Center for Combating Maoist Ideology, as well as much of his report on the international situation during the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (October 4, 1971), which also concerns the "Chinese question" and the PRC's policy towards the Balkan states. The emphasis in the speeches was mainly on the consequences of the possible convergence, of rapprochement between the United States and China. Todor Zhivkov defended his thesis about the need to create such a coordination center, using as an argument the compulsion of the socialist community to fight on two fronts – world imperialism and Chinese maoism.²⁰ The danger of creating the Tirana–Belgrade–Bucharest–Beijing axis on the basis of "anti-Soviet" and "anti-Bulgarian" motives, as well as his position that the Chinese political elite "opens a second front" against Bulgaria,²¹ the Bulgarian state leader continues to stand up for later: at the Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Advisory Committee (January 25-26, 1972), and during the Third Crimean Meeting (July 30-31, 1973), and in his confidential talks with Brezhnev at the Voden Government Residence (September 1973), during which the aim was again directed against maoism, which "must be broken down theoretically and practically as an anti-marxist and anti-leninist tendency hostile to the international revolutionary movement."²²

¹⁹ DA, inventory 22-II, a.u. 89.

²⁰ CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 35, a.u. 2499.

²¹ Ibid.

²² The quotation is from Baev, *op.cit.*, 205.

Information from the declassified archives concerning the special activities of the secret services and their close coordination with their Eastern European partners also played a role in revealing the nature of the Bulgarian–Chinese relations during the Cold War and their comprehensive understanding, especially after the formulation of the “second front” China’s policy towards the USSR and its loyal satellites from the Eastern bloc, including Bulgaria in the first place.²³

While in Bulgaria, and throughout Eastern Europe, all kinds of initiatives were being taken with full force to “expose and discredit” the “military bureaucratic dictatorship of the Mao group,” in August 1973, the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held on the other side of the world, with which started a New Course in the domestic politics of the country, after several years of interpersonal struggles in the Party. Thanks to Deng Xiaoping, who gradually rose to become Deputy Chairman of the State Council (October 1974) and later held the posts of Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Chief of General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army PLA (January 1975), colossal changes in the government’s economic policy were started, aimed at overcoming the failures of the first period of the Cultural Revolution, accompanied by military–administrative reforms.

The deaths of three party and state leaders in China in 1976 –Zhou Enlai (January 8), Zhu De (July 6) and the Head Mao Zedong (September 9)– re-unleashes internal political confrontation again.

The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 encouraged the arrest and conviction of the Gang of Four²⁴ and the rehabilitation of repressed party staff. These significant events lead to the normalization of socio-political and economic life in the country and encourage Chinese leaders to rethink their weaknesses and mistakes and seek a new path of

²³ In his book *Drugata studena voĭna*, prof. Yordan Baev pays special attention to the information from the intelligence reports. See Baev, *op.cit.*, 206-210.

²⁴ The Gang of Four was a political faction composed of four Chinese Communist Party officials.

development, finding it in pursuing a policy of reform and opening up to the world. As a result of the New Course, China's relations with other countries are gradually developing and opening up new markets, a circumstance that ensures the external conditions for the successful implementation of the "Chinese model."

The start of the reforms and the opening was given at the end of 1978, at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (after the 11th Congress), with the rejection of the thesis of the "continuing class struggle" and the decision to emphasize the Party's activities and state efforts to focus on economic development, which must shake off the weaknesses of the "Soviet-style planned economy" and "open up" to foreign innovative technologies and experience.

In the late 70's-early 80's of 20th century (1978-1982), thanks to active legislative activity, the regulatory normative base on which the new type of economy is built is being built. The "family lease" began to function as the main economic system in the villages, and the industrial enterprises in the cities turned to such necessary modernization.

In March 1979, Deng Xiaoping defined his theoretical idea for the Four Modernizations: in the industry; in the agriculture; in the science and technology; in the defense power of the country. One of the most important goals in the modernization of the economy is the opening of the country to international markets and the establishment of joint ventures. In the field of trade and economic relations with foreign countries, a number of changes are observed, including the introduction of world advanced technologies, techniques and equipment. The beginning of the study of modern management methods and the use of foreign capital started. A very important point is the emergence of joint ventures created with foreign capital, as well as the creation of special economic zones in coastal areas, the so-called Economic and technological development zones.

In China's foreign policy, after Mao's death, it continued the Course against the "Soviet military threat," which was considered a major irritant

to national security and the trend toward more active relations with the United States and Japan is becoming more and more clearly noticeable.²⁵

As for China's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, there is a clear interest in the "Yugoslav model" of socialist development and in Yugoslavia, at the expense of other countries in the region. The first visits at the highest level were exchanged namely with Yugoslavia (1977), followed by Romania (1978).²⁶

The international situation in this period is quite complex, and in different parts of the world even tense. And the main players in it, in one way or another, are the socialist giants – the USSR and China.

The escalating military crisis in Southeast Asia – the Cambodian civil war, the establishment of the Pol Pot military regime and the Khmer Rouge, supported by Beijing, on the one hand and the military clashes between Vietnam and Cambodia, on the other, along with the signing of a Mutual Assistance Agreement between Vietnam and Laos (July 18, 1977) and Vietnam and the USSR (November 3, 1978),²⁷ followed by growing Soviet financial support for both countries (Vietnam and Laos), which did not satisfy Chinese foreign policy, led to a serious

²⁵ Examples of this are the talks between Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda during his visit to Beijing (August 1978), which are based on the need for joint action to "Restrain the Soviet expansion," as well as the later signed Japanese–Chinese Treaty for peace and friendship. In the same spirit are the Meeting in Beijing (May 20–22, 1978) between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Hua Guofong; Deng Xiaoping and Huang Hua; as well as during Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington (January 1979), when the issue of establishing Sino-US military cooperation was discussed. And later during a visit to Beijing by US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (January 1980). See Baev, *op.cit.*, 212–213.

²⁶ The intensity of Sino-Yugoslav visits increased during the period. Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito visited the Chinese capital on August 31, 1977, and Hua Guofeng returned the visit on August 21, 1978. In December 1979, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and in 1980, the Prime Minister Vesselin Djuranovic (Chairman of the Executive Council) visited Beijing, followed in 1981 by Foreign Minister Josip Varhovets. Details of the meetings, as well as the Sino-Romanian visits, see Baev, *op.cit.*, 223–224.

²⁷ The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Vietnam and the USSR is for a period of 25 years.

deterioration in relations between China and Vietnam, escalated into “punitive” Chinese military intervention (February 17-March 18, 1979).

Two high-level meetings were held to draw up a common position of the Warsaw Pact countries on the Sino-Vietnamese military conflict: A Coordination Meeting of experts on the “Chinese question” was convened in Moscow, and later, on May 14-15, 1979, a meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers was held in Warsaw, where a General Agreement was reached for the allied countries to commit to additional support for the “fraternal peoples” of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, opposing “aggressive” Chinese policy.

Bulgaria’s reaction to the bloody events in Vietnam is completely identical to that in other Eastern Bloc countries and is expressed in protests in front of the Chinese embassy and “condemnatory” declarations.²⁸ One of the declassified documents kept in the Central State Archives relating to this period contains information on the guidelines for the experts on China in Eastern Europe: Chinese studies should not be divided into “pure” and “party” (supporting the communist party doctrine), and there must be no sinologists “who do not stand clearly in hard unwavering communist party positions.”²⁹ In connection with the issues under consideration, the hosting of Bulgaria (October 27-28, 1980) at the Meeting of the Member States of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, CMEA) entitled Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation with China, held in Lovech, also deserves attention.³⁰

²⁸ Beijing’s military intervention in Vietnam has been strongly condemned by Bulgaria’s ruling Communist Party and is reflected in a special propaganda brochure published by the Military Publishing House: *Agresiyata na Pekin sreshtu Vietnam (propagandna broshura)* [Beijing’s aggression against Vietnam (propaganda brochure)], (Voenno izdatelstvo 1982).

²⁹ CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 101, a.u. 305. It’s about an analysis by Oleg Rachmanin (Deputy Head of the Socialist Countries Department at the Central Committee of the The Communist Party of the Soviet Union CPSU) for participants in the Meeting of the International Commission on the Far East with reference to the Directive to Soviet Ambassadors to Socialist Countries, approved by Protocol no. 210/4 during the Meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU (March 4, 1980).

³⁰ For more details on this meeting see Baev, *op.cit.*, 222.

On the other hand, the Chinese decision (April 1979) not to renew the 30-year Soviet–Chinese treaty of February 1950, together with the fruitless round of political consultations between both countries on this issue, and all this placed in the context of the situation in South and South-West Asia – the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (January 1978–February 1979) and the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan (which began in December 1979) increased tensions between the Kremlin and Beijing and gave additional impetus to Sino–US relations. Meanwhile, on December 15, 1978, the US Congress approved a decision to establish diplomatic relations with China, which caused great concern in Moscow, especially in its part concerning Sino-US military cooperation, a topic that began to be hotly debated during Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Washington (January 1979).

With regard to Bulgarian–Chinese relations, it can be said that despite the events on the International scene, in the late 1970s, the ice is already beginning to crack slightly. As early as September 1978, a Chinese delegation arrived in Bulgaria to participate in the autumn Plovdiv Fair. And in May 1981 the Deputy Minister of Education of Bulgaria visited the PRC.³¹

The last decade of the Cold War, which tentatively covers historical events from 1982 to 1991, coincides with the Second stage in the development of reforms and the opening of China to the world. It can be said that it is marked by the decisions of the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party CCP (1982) the volume of the Chinese economy to quadruple and the average GDP per capita to reach \$ 1,000 until the end of the century. It was during the 12th Congress of the CCP that Deng Xiaoping formulated for the first time the need to build “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” in which the thesis of “xiaokang” –the creation of a middle-class society in China– played a decisive role.³²

³¹ “Zhongguo he Baojialiya de wenhua jiaoliu” (Sino-Bulgarian Cultural Exchange), *Zhongguo wenhua wang* (June 8, 2004), http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/cn_world/2004-06/28/content_49438.htm. (accessed 15-8-2020).

³² For more on the theoretical basis and justification of socialism with Chinese

The 1980s marked the beginning of the reform of the social security system, based on social assistance and social security, and the focus is on care for the elderly, health care and care for the lowest income people.

In the second half of the 1980s, the Chinese economy reached a new stage, during which innovative forms and ways of development were sought, and market economy orientation and changes in the ownership structure became a priority. The construction of new Economic and Technological Development Zones, which was launched in the early 1980s, continues in full force, with a total of fourteen appearing in just four years (from 1984 to 1988) in the cities of Tianjin, Qingdao, Dalian, Ningbo, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Qinhuangdao, Yantai, Lianyungang, Nantong, Minhang, Hongqiao, Caohejing and Zhangjiang. Until 2002, there were two more stages in the opening of such areas, and currently their number exceeds 100. In addition to the Economic and Technological Development Zones, which begin their activities in coastal areas, at a later stage – in seaport cities, then – in the areas along the banks of the rivers, in the border regions of the country and finally in regions in the mainland, a new type of zones is opening. Among them are the Free Trade Zones or Bonded Zones, located near seaports, whose main activity is re-export, and their number reaches 15. With the adoption of the Program for Scientific and Technical Development “Torch,” in 1988 the construction of Zones for the Development of High-tech Industries was launched, which to benefit from customs and tax reliefs. Their purpose is based on scientific and technical advances to create production oriented to local and foreign markets, and their establishment is associated with attracting foreign investment, most often from the Chinese diaspora.

Thus begins a New Stage, during which the development of Chinese industry is placed on the solid foundations of scientific achievements.

specifics see the article by Alexander Lilov, “Teoritichnite idei na kitajskata modernizatsiya” (Theoretical Ideas of Chinese Modernization), *Ponedelnik* 13, no. 1-2 (2010): 10-14.

Over the years, the number of this type of zone in the PRC has increased, reaching 53 at the state level. Similar areas at the provincial level, better known as Science and Technology Parks, are also emerging.

In the course of the development of the economy, two more types of zones began to be built – Cross-border Economic Cooperation Zones and Export Processing Zones. As the name suggests, the First type of Zones (Cross-border Economic Cooperation Zones) develop border trade in some of the cities along the border,³³ and the Second type (Export Processing Zones) are completely export-oriented, and the purpose of their construction is to counteract of the illegal sale of duty-free goods. The main purpose of all these Special Economic Zones, the number of which is gradually increasing over the years, is to attract foreign investment, to stimulate exports and the development of High technologies.³⁴

During the period 1982-1991, the reforms covered not only the economy and politics, but also science, education and practically all areas in the Socio-economic life of the country.

In 1991, the PRC joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), one of the fastest growing economic regions in the world, covering almost half of the world's population.

Internationally, this period corresponds to the last years of the Cold War (1981-1984) and the subsequent Helsinki Process for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1985-1990), which led to the fall of the Iron Curtain.

This is also the time when, thanks to Deng Xiaoping's extremely far-sighted foreign policy, the principle of "One country, two systems"³⁵

³³ This special type of zones have been created in the border areas. On the northern border with Russia are: Manzhouli, Heihe, Suifenghe and Hunchun. In Xinjiang on the border with Central Asian countries are: Horgos, Yulin, Bole, Tacheng. Along the border with Mongolia is Erliang-Hoto, and to the east in Liaoning Province is the Dandong area. In addition, along the southern border are built such areas in Zhuli, Pingxiang, Wanding, Hekou, Dongxing.

³⁴ See The Industrial Development Zones, <http://www.cadz.org.cn/>

³⁵ There is a lot of research in Chinese historiography on the origin, development, and realization of Deng Xiaoping's theory of "One country, two systems." One of the

was formulated and upheld. Deng Xiaoping's idea for this phenomenon dates back to the 1970s. The first thing the Chinese leader is committed to is regulating relations with the United States and Japan, and then immediately set about resolving a "permanent" settlement of the issue of Hong Kong (Chinese Xianggang) and Macau (Chinese Aomen), which have been returned to China as Special Administrative Regions, on 1 July 1997 and 20 December 1999 respectively. The essence of the principle of "One country, two systems" consists exactly in the "special status" of both regions, which are administrative-territorial units within the PRC, and this "feature" is expressed in the high degree of autonomy, which is used in various fields of economics, culture, science, sports and almost all other areas of socio-economic life, with the exception of foreign policy and defense. Many Chinese researchers, including Gong Yuzhi and Shi Zhongquan, describe the "One country, two systems" principle as a "compromise option," based on their statistics, that "as many as 98.4% of Hong Kong's population is defined as ethnic Chinese (vs. 0.6% English)."³⁶ However, according to Gong and Shi, although a "compromise," this is the "only" option that makes it possible returning back to China of Hong Kong, and later of Macau.³⁷ Not to be overlooked is the circumstance that the negotiations for the return of China's leased territory of Hong Kong for a period of 99 years, led by Deng Xiaoping's team and himself, are by no means easy. The issue was first discussed in October 1979, during Hua Guofeng's official visit to Brit-

most comprehensive is the article "History and Significance of Deng Xiaoping's Theory 'One country, two systems'" by the professors Gong Yuzhi and Shi Zhongquan, published in Chinese in the thematic journal *Studies of Socialism with Chinese Specifics* [Gong Yuzhi–Shi Zhongquan, "Deng Xiaoping 'yi guo liang zhi' lun de youlai he yiyi" (History and Significance of Deng Xiaoping's Theory of an "One country, two systems"), *Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi yanjiu* 2 (1995): 2-9]. Taiwan, which is also an integral part of the PRC and to which the Chinese government has repeatedly proposed a Special Administrative Regime, even with a greater degree of autonomy than Hong Kong and Macao, but these proposals have been rejected by Taiwanese authorities, has a connection to this issue too.

³⁶ Yuzhi–Zhongquan, op.cit, 2-3.

³⁷ Yuzhi–Zhongquan, op.cit., 8.

ain, and then in 1981 was again the subject of a conversation between Deng Xiaoping and British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. In the following 1982, during the negotiations with the “Iron Lady” within her visit to Beijing, Deng Xiaoping convincingly substantiated his definition of “One country, two systems,” vigorously defending his uncompromising position on the final transition of Hong Kong to the PRC on 1 July 1997, despite British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s insistence on “British rule” and after that date. A bilateral agreement between the PRC and the United Kingdom on the Hong Kong issue, which was considered a “huge success” for Chinese diplomacy, was reached in December 1984.³⁸

On the other hand, one of the main features of this period is the “layer shifting.” In this regard, the change of political authority in the United States with the coming to rule of President Ronald Reagan (January 20, 1981), which was accompanied by an increasing the military and economic power of the country, reinforces Moscow’s fears of a “US military threat” and leads to the first steps toward normalizing relations with Beijing. As an initial maneuver in this direction Researchers cited Leonid Brezhnev’s speech during a visit to Tashkent (March 24, 1982), when China was called a “socialist” country, and the Chinese leadership’s response to the Soviet signal to brighten up of bilateral relations.³⁹ The transformation of China’s foreign policy toward the USSR was legitimized during the Twelfth Congress of Chinese Communist Party (September 1-11, 1982), and thus the turn from “tension and confrontation” to “enlightenment and dialogue” has already been formally undertaken. Strengthening the position of the Reformist Wing, led by

³⁸ Yuzhi–Zhongquan, *op.cit.*, 9. On the issue of the dates of the negotiations and the specific arrangements at each stage, as well as the negotiations on Macau, see also “Xianggang huigui” (The Return of Hong Kong), *Haosou Baike Encyclopedia*, <http://baike.haosou.com/doc/5366792.html> and Fu Guangping, “Tedian, tezheng, tese–Aomen huigui he Xianggang huigui de bijiao yanjiu” (Comparative studies on the return of Macau and Hong Kong–Features, Properties, Characteristics), *Heilongjiang sheng shehui kexueyuan xuebao* 2 (1999).

³⁹ Baev, *op.cit.*, 229-230.

Hu Yaobang (Secretary General of the CCP Central Committee), Zhao Ziyang (Chairman of the Council of State) and Qian Qichen (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, directly responsible for relations with the USSR and Eastern European countries), the decisions of the XII Congress of Chinese Communist Party have played a significant role in warming relations between the PR of China –the USSR, and hence the PR of China– the PR of Bulgaria.

The breakthrough in Soviet–Chinese relations continues with a series of talks between the two governments, with bilateral visits and meetings, including the first dialogue for the last twenty years at the level of foreign ministers between Huang Hua and Andrei Gromyko during the funeral of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow (November 10, 1982), which opened the further Annual meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the PRC during the sessions of the UN General Assembly in New York. In this context, the call of the Soviet delegation addressed to Beijing, during the extraordinary meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the member states of the Warsaw Pact (June 28, 1983), for “joint action” with the aim of “preserving world peace and the security of the socialist countries” is also included.⁴⁰ During the short term of Yuri Andropov (November 12, 1982–February 9, 1984), the Chinese proposal to expand trade relations and strengthen trade and economic and scientific-technical cooperation was implemented.⁴¹

This shakes the strategic balance in the Moscow–Washington–Beijing geopolitical triangle and, despite the “three obstacles” (Afghanistan, Vietnam, Mongolia), opens a “new era” in Soviet–Chinese relations after 1985,⁴² a circumstance that also reflects on the bilateral relations

⁴⁰ CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 67, a.u. 2120. The call is for the deployment of missiles in Western Europe.

⁴¹ Between 1982 and 1985, trade between the USSR and the PRC increased sevenfold, reaching \$ 1.6 billion (Baev, *op.cit.*, 231).

⁴² As a “forerunner” of the “new era” in Soviet–Chinese relations, researchers point to the “great attention” paid by Mikhail Gorbachev to Deputy Chairman of the State

between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the People's Republic of China.

Since the early 1980s, both Bulgaria and China have taken a number of initiatives to normalize relations. Indicative in this regard are the recommendations of the Bulgarian Ambassador to Beijing Naiden Belchev on the need to "rethink" relations with China, having regard to the "new political situation," set out in his annual report for 1981, as well as the statement of Ambassador Doncho Donchev that "the level of economic relations between Bulgaria and China is lower than China's relations with other Eastern European countries," made in its annual reports for 1984 and 1985.⁴³

During the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Prague (4-5 January 1983) Todor Zhivkov personally welcomed "the normalization of bilateral relations with the PRC," taking into account the "initial dialogue" with the Chinese government and "progress" in the development of economic cooperation.⁴⁴

Bilateral relations between ministries, departments and other state institutions, and also between creative unions gradually begin to renew.

From Yordan Baev's book *Drugata studena voïna* (The Other Cold War) we learn that "the first contacts and consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and China took place in the form of informal fact-finding missions of senior diplomatic officials."⁴⁵ These include the visit to Sofia of Ma Xusheng, head of the Department for the USSR and Eastern Europe at the Chinese Foreign Ministry (June 1983), followed by a visit to Beijing by the head of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Parvan Chernev in October of the same year (1983).⁴⁶

Council Li Peng during the death of Konstantin Chernenko (March 10, 1985).

⁴³ The quotation is from Baev, *op.cit.*, 238.

⁴⁴ CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 67, a.u. 1664.

⁴⁵ Baev, *op.cit.*, 238.

⁴⁶ There is information about Parvan Chernev's visit to Beijing at the end of October 1983 and his impressions of China's economic development and CCP policy, which

The contractual and legal basis of the relations is strengthened and expanded with the signing of various agreements. A great success is the establishment of a Bulgarian–Chinese Intergovernmental Joint Commission (in short, the Joint Commission) for economic, scientific and technical cooperation and the growth of bilateral trade. The Joint Commission held its first meetings in the first half of 1985. In April of the same year (1985), the Chinese side welcomed the exposition of Bulgarian goods in the field of mechanical engineering, which opened new horizons for Sino-Bulgarian trade relations.⁴⁷

The year 1984 was very fruitful for our bilateral cultural and educational contacts. Then a cultural exchange program was signed for the period 1985-1986 and the exchange of students was resumed. Furthermore the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Higher Education signed in 1986 and the Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Educational Diplomas and academic degrees signed in 1990 give a strong impetus to scientific and educational exchange.⁴⁸

Many delegations began to exchange during the period. The first step in this direction was the visit to Beijing of the head of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Parvan Chernev in October 1983 (discussed above), followed by several visits to China by Bulgarian delegations led by:

- the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Petar Bashikarov (February 1984). During this visit, two Cooperation Protocols were signed. One refers to the building in China of a factory for Bulgarian electric trucks, and the second is for the construction in China of a winery using Bulgarian technologies;
- the Minister of Industry Ognyan Doinov (May 1985);

he provides in the form of a "report." See CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 101, a.u. 848.

⁴⁷ Chen Jie, "Zhong Bao liang guo jingmao guanxi jiang jinyibu fazhan–Zhuhe Baojialiya 1985 nian jixie zhanlanhui zai Beijing juxing" (Chinese–Bulgarian Trade Relations will Continue to Develop–We Welcome the Exhibition of Bulgarian Machines in Beijing in 1985), *Guoji maoyi* 4 (1985): 15-16.

⁴⁸ "Zhongguo he Baojialiya", op.cit.

the Minister of Foreign Trade Hristo Hristov (November 1985);
the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade P. Pashkalov;
the Deputy Chairman of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry P. Ignatov.

The culmination of the development of Bulgarian–Chinese relations at the political level in the first half of the 1980s was the visit to China of the Chairman of the National Assembly of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria Stanko Todorov (November 5–11, 1985), who met with his Chinese counterpart Peng Zhen, Chairman of the The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (NPC). For the first time, a contact is being made at the party level. On November 8, 1985, the Bulgarian top statesman is welcomed by the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang at the Zhongnanhai Government Residence.⁴⁹ During the talks between them, Peng Zhen emphasizing China’s efforts to “expand its ties with foreign countries” and noted that relations between our two countries (Bulgaria and China) were developing in an “upward direction.”⁵⁰

About a year later, in October 1986, Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov visited China and was received by the President of the PRC Li Xiannian (see photo no. 1).⁵¹

The number of official visits of the highest rank from the Chinese side is also increasing. During this period, delegations arrived in Bulgaria, led by:

Deputy Chairman of the State Council and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Chen Muhua (June 1984);
Deputy Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China Qian Qichen (June 1984);

⁴⁹ More about the meeting see *Zhongguo he Baojialiya jianjiao 60 zhounian* (60 years of diplomatic relations between China and Bulgaria), (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2009), 32.

⁵⁰ CSA, fund 1-B, inventory 101, a.u. 1202.

⁵¹ Details of this meeting see *Zhongguo he Baojialiya*, 34.

Minister of Electronics and future Secretary General of the CCP Central Committee and President of the PRC from 1989 to 2002 Jiang Zemin (November 1984);
 Vice President of the State Council Li Peng (December 1985);
 Liao Hansheng, Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (September 1986);
 Member of the Council of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian (March 1987);
 Secretary-General of the CCP and Chairman of the State Council Zhao Ziyang (June 1987);
 Vice-Chairman of the CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) Wang Enmao (September 1987).⁵²

The first meeting between the foreign ministers of our two countries –Bulgaria and China– took place on October 29, 1983, during the 38th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, and after that such Summits began to be held also in the following Annual sessions of the UN General Assembly.

Already during the first Chinese official visit to the People's Republic of Bulgaria (in the 1980s) – that of the Vice President of the Council of State and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Chen Muhua, during her visit to Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR and Bulgaria), important bilateral protocols for economic and scientific-technical cooperation have been signed. And on December 19, 1985, in Sofia, during Li Peng's visit, a five-year interstate trade agreement was signed.

This ascending order leads to the implementation of the highest-ranking visit. During Andrei Lukanov's visit, the Chinese side made an

⁵² For the listed meetings and their results see Zhongguo tong Baojialiya de guanxi (Sino-Bulgarian relations). Website of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Bulgaria, March 2015), <http://www.chinaembassy.bg/chn/zbgxs/sgbx/2015> and Doncho Donev, "65 godini diplomaticheski otnosheniya mezhdu Bŭlgariya i Kitaj" (65 years of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and China), *Kitaj dnes* 5, no. 22 (11-18-2015).

official invitation to the first Bulgarian party and state leader, Todor Zhivkov, to visit China. The long-awaited visit took place from May 5 to 9, 1987, and Zhivkov had the opportunity to meet with all the first leaders of China – with Chinese President Li Xiannian, with the CCP Central Committee Secretary General and Chairman of the State Council Zhao Ziyang, with Peng Zhen, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Parliament, and with Deng Xiaoping (see photo no. 2).⁵³ The real result of the state visit was the signing of a Cultural Cooperation Agreement and a Consular Convention between the governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Bulgaria (May 6, 1987). The conversation takes place under the motto "Let's forget the past, let's look to the future," and during the meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin (May 11, 1987), immediately after his Chinese visit, Zhivkov expressed the view that "China will establish itself as a strong political force in international relations and in the world" and in this regard launched the need for the Warsaw Pact states to create a "new concept for China" that only a few days later it was approved unanimously by all countries during the meeting of the Political Advisory Committee.⁵⁴

Only a month after Todor Zhivkov's visit to Beijing, Zhao Ziyang returned the visit, visiting Bulgaria. His delegation also included Wen Jiabao, then head of the Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and later prime minister of China (2003-2012).

Following the chronology, should be noted the official visits to the huge Asian country of the member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the National Committee of

⁵³ However, if we analyze the visits to Beijing of the heads of state of other Eastern European countries, then Zhivkov's visit is neither the first nor is it repeated. By comparison, only during the period under review (1980s), Romanian party and state leader Nicolae Ceausescu undertook three official visits, in April 1982, October 1985 and October 1988, respectively, and Wojciech Jaruzelski and Erich Honecker (respectively in September and October 1986) undertook their visits before the Bulgarian leader (Baev, *op.cit.*, 237).

⁵⁴ Baev, *op.cit.*, 241-243.

the Patriotic Front Pencho Kubadinski in May 1988 and the friendly visit to Bulgaria of a military delegation led by Deputy Chief of the People's Liberation Army General Political Department, Colonel-General Guo Linxiang in September 1989 (see photo no. 3).⁵⁵

A few days before the events of November 10, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov (November 5-7, 1989) has taken an official visit to China, to meet with CCP Central Committee Secretary General Jiang Zemin. Soon after these events a high-ranking Chinese delegation led by Qiao Shi – a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party, visited Bulgaria. His delegation included Hu Jintao who at that time was the head of the Tibetan Autonomous Region and later General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee and President of the People's Republic of China.⁵⁶

During this period, opportunities were sought for “breaking the ice” in the spiritual sphere and cultural exchange. Three Bulgarian government delegations in the field of culture were officially welcomed in the PRC (in 1985, 1986 and 1987), and in March 1987 the Minister of Culture Wang Meng personally headed a Chinese delegation to the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which was received by the Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council Todor Zhivkov. In 1988, the Director of the Directorate for International Cultural Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also visited the PRC. In addition to the Intergovernmental Agreement for Cooperation in the field of Science and Culture signed during Todor Zhivkov's state visit (May 6, 1987), Agreements for cooperation in the field of media (radio and television) and the Intergovernmental Program for Cultural Cooperation for the period 1987-1988 were also signed. In November 1988, the foreign ministers of the two countries signed in Beijing a Program for the

⁵⁵ *Zhongguo he Baojialiya*, 36-37.

⁵⁶ Details of the meetings of the Chinese delegation in Bulgaria see *Zhongguo he Baojialiya*, 38-39.

Implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Culture between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the People's Republic of China for the period 1989-1990.⁵⁷

The events of 1989 in both countries have an imprint in both in their domestic and in their foreign policies. In China, Zhao Ziyang was elected General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee, and in 1993 he became President of the PRC. Li Peng was elected prime minister.

Only a few months later, on November 10, 1989, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov was relieved of the post of Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and later as chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. However, the elected new leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the state did not stay in power for long either.

In the context of the historical situation in the next decade – the 90s of the 20th century, both in Bulgaria and in China, the activity of contacts between the two countries receded into the background. In China at that time the third stage of reforms was taking place (1992-2000). A period characterized by the building of the system of the Socialist market economy and the diversification of the structure and forms of ownership. During the period an Intergovernmental Agreement in the field of traditional medicine and pharmacy and the program for cooperation in the field of science between the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences for the period 1991-1995⁵⁸ were signed, but the issue goes beyond the chronological scope of the present study and will not be considered.

⁵⁷ “Zhongguo he Baojialiya”, op.cit.

⁵⁸ For more details on the contracts and exchanges between the two Academies of Sciences, see the monograph by the professor at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Mariana M. Tian, *Bŭlgaro-Kitajski otnosheniya v sŭvremenniya period* (The Bulgarian-Chinese Relations in the Modern Period), (Sofia: S. Izdatelstvo Gutenberg 2015), 81-101.

In conclusion, it can be summarized that at that time the Bulgarian–Chinese relations were already placed on a pragmatic basis and there was a desire to avoid the ideological attitudes of the past. Both Bulgaria and China mutually recognize the right of the other country to choose its own path of development, and Bulgarian policy categorically stands behind the position of “one China” and resolutely defends it to this day.



1. Meeting in Shanghai of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Andrei Lukanov with the President of the People's Republic of China Li Xiannian, October 19, 1986.



2. The historic meeting between the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov with the Chairman of the Commission of Councilors at the Central Committee of the Communist Party Deng Xiaoping, May 7, 1987, at the House of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (NPC).



3. Meeting of the member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the National Committee of the OF (Patriotic Front) Pencho Kubadiniski with the deputy Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Wang Renzhong, May 1988.

Vemund Aarbakke*

The 1989 Exodus of Bulgarian Turks Revisited

Introduction

I spent the summer of 1989 (July-August) in Istanbul on my second Turkish language course. At the time I was working on a Master-degree in Balkan Studies at the University of Copenhagen and had studied both Bulgarian and Turkish, although I still read quite slowly with the help of a dictionary. I sensed the importance of the political confrontation between Bulgaria and Turkey related to the Bulgarian Turks and followed the developments during the summer day by day. My main source of information was the press and in particular I followed the large mainstream newspaper *Milliyet*. I had planned to go to the Balkan conference in Sofia in the beginning of September, but after the border closed on 22 August it was not possible to book a regular ticket.¹ Eventually I crossed the border on 30 August at Kapıkule/Kapitan Andreevo and stayed in Sofia until 6 September. In Sofia a friend of mine supplied me with press clippings from the party newspaper *Rabotnichesko Delo*, which became my main Bulgarian source for the period in question.²

In his recent book Tomasz Kamusella refers to the expulsion of Muslims from communist Bulgaria as the “forgotten 89.”³ At the time it can hardly be said to have gone unnoticed. It was routinely referred as the largest population movement in Europe since the Second World War. On the other hand, it is understandable that it quickly came in the

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¹ I was in a class for advanced student and my classmate Janos Hovari tried to secure a place for me on a Hungarian tourist bus he was taking to the conference. This fell through so eventually I took the train to Edirne, a taxi to the border, walked across the border, hitchhiked to Svilengrad train station and took a train to Sofia via Plovdiv. Janos Hovari later served as Hungary’s ambassador to Turkey 2012-2014.

² Vemund Aarbakke, “Eksodus fra Bulgaria sommeren 1989” (Exodus from Bulgaria in the summer of 1989), *Nordisk Øst-Forum*, 1 (1990): 3-20. In this paper all translations into English are my own.

³ Tomasz Kamusella, *Ethnic Cleansing During the Cold War: The Forgotten 1989. Expulsion of Turks from Communist Bulgaria* (Abingdon, Oxon and New York, 2019).

shadow of the sweeping changes that took place in the heart of Europe just a few months later and culminated in the fall of the Berlin wall. The event led later to a lot of soul searching in Bulgaria and recently there has been many commemorative conferences in Turkey.

Population movements between Bulgaria and Turkey is nothing new. There were large waves of Muslims fleeing Bulgaria in connection to the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) and the First Balkan War. Bulgarians were forced out of Eastern Thrace during the Second Balkan War and today no one remains, while there is still a sizeable Turkish minority in Bulgaria hovering around 10% of the population.⁴

The Bulgarian “Rebirth”

The events of 1989 have their roots in the so-called “process of rebirth” (or “process of revival”) that culminated in the name-changing campaign of 1984-1985. The Bulgarian obsession with creating a “homogeneous” nation is not unique. It is partly related to general developments in Europe during the last couple of centuries. In its Balkan version it is also troubled by the woes of going from empire to nation-states and national identities imbued with a strong religious component. We can, for example, see many similarities with the Bulgarian case in the Greek and Turkish national models. After the population exchange in 1923 each of them sought to assimilate co-religionists into a Greek and Turkish identity respectively, while those who adhered to other religions were never fully embraced as proper citizens.

The Bulgarian policies during the period 1984-1989 are consequently not totally unprecedented, but they represent an extreme form of this procedure. They were based on an overestimation of the possibilities of an authoritarian state to impose a policy by force and a disregard of the human and social factors involved. There are various previous Bulgarian instances of forced conversion or pressure on the Muslims. I can briefly mention the forced conversion campaign of the Pomaks in 1913, the activities of the Rodina society on the eve of WWII

⁴ For a concise overview in English, see the chapters by Nikolai Vukov and Ahmet İçduygu & Deniz Sert in Hans Vermeulen et al. (ed.), *Migration in the Southern Balkans, From Ottoman Territory to Globalized Nation States* (Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London: Springer Nature, 2015).

and the forced mass migration in 1951 during the early phase of communist rule. The so-called “rebirth campaign” attempted nothing less than to eradicate every vestige of Turkish presence in Bulgaria. This included the use of Turkish in public places, traditional Muslim clothes, Islamic traditions and rituals connected with *Bayrams*, marriage, circumcision, etc.⁵

While an authoritarian top-down approach is not uncommon in many countries, it may be questioned why it took on such an extreme form in the Bulgarian case. It can best be described as a combination of insecurity, an authoritarian tradition and ideological inflexibility. Some of the factors that have been put forward to explain this insecurity were the recent Cyprus invasion (1974) and the relatively high Muslim birth rate with the concomitant effect this would have on the ethnic balance in Bulgaria.⁶ An additional factor may have been the need for scapegoats to divert attention away from inherent problems of the regime.

Independently of outside factors, however, we should keep in mind the innate authoritarian character of Bulgarian socialism and nationalism. The “reconstruction of Bulgarian names” originated supposedly in a voluntary and spontaneous desire to obtain Bulgarian names as a sign of rebirth into the Bulgarian nation. The intensity of the campaign was related to the 1985 census and represented a bureaucratic obliteration of the Turkish presence in Bulgaria. The name-changing campaign was carried out with great brutality. Within two months –late December 1984 to February 1985– they changed the names on some 800,000 persons. In rural districts this happened at gunpoint after soldiers surrounded the villages early in the morning. Islam was not explicitly outlawed, and those concerned were henceforth referred to as “Bulgarian Muslims” or “reborn Bulgarians.” The campaign was directed more specifically against the Turkish identity.

A less discussed issue is the lack of resistance within the Communist Party and the role of those who supported the rebirth process. The regime was able to mobilize part of the Bulgarian intelligentsia to provide

⁵ For a critical assessment, see Mihail Gruev–Alexei Kalionski, *Възродителният процес. Мюсюлманските общности и комунистическият режим* (The Revival Process. Muslim Communities and the Communist Regime) (Sofia, 2008), 106-176.

⁶ Professor Orlin Zagorov, “The Ideology of Revanchism and Expansionism,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 1-7-1989.

credibility to the Rebirth Process. Interestingly, the Party also involved the Muslim elite in its campaign. Part of the Muslim leadership, including the Head Mufti Nedim Gendev, and part of the secular Turkish elite also complied and played an active role.⁷ Some “local muftis” even insisted on the official Bulgarian propaganda to a fact-finding mission by the Council of Europe in mid-July 1989 as the exodus unfolded, contrary to what could be ascertained on the spot.⁸ The Communist Party had, of course, since the time it came into power created a Muslim elite according to its own preferences.⁹ In some cases we can observe the same persons transfer from serving Bulgarian state interests to serving Turkish state interests in the time span of a couple of years. For example, in Bulgaria Hüseyin Memişoğlu wrote about subjects such as the “The contribution of the Bulgarian Turks against capitalism and fascism” or “The Bulgarian Turks’ involvement in the building of socialism,” while after moving to Turkey he would provide titles such as “The Bulgarian oppression in a historical perspective.”¹⁰

The heavy-handed approach of the Communist Party led naturally to strong reactions from the Turkish minority. It would probably have been difficult to carry out such a programme under any circumstances, although many authoritarian regimes have difficulties with understanding the limits of what can be imposed on the population. We must, however, also factor in the changes in the international system in order to explain subsequent developments. Bulgaria does not seem to have kept on top of the important changes that were about to come into effect.

⁷ Mary Neuburger, *The Orient Within. Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria* (Ithaca and London: 2004), 77-78.

⁸ House of Commons Debates 28 July 1989, vol. 157, cc1474-81.

⁹ Ali Eminov, “Islam and Muslims in Bulgaria: A Brief History,” *Islamic Studies* 36, no. 2/3 (1997): 228-229.

¹⁰ Yusein Memishev, *Участието на българските турци в борбата против капитализма и фашизма 1919-1944 г.* (The Participation of the Bulgarian Turks in the Struggle against Capitalism and Fascism 1919-1944) (Sofia: 1977); Yusein Memishev, *Заедружно в социалистическото строителство на родината (Приобщаване на българските турци към изграждането на социализма)* [Together in the Socialist Construction of the Homeland (Involvement of the Bulgarian Turks in the Building of Socialism)] (Sofia: 1984); Doç. Dr. Hüseyin Memişoğlu, *Bulgar zulmüne tarihi bir bakış* (A Historical Look at Bulgarian Oppression) (Ankara: 1989).

Outside Reactions

The campaign did not pass unnoticed, although Bulgaria did its best to conceal it. Turkey would naturally be the first country to be alarmed about the atrocious treatment of the minority and try to attract international attention. Reports started to appear in the western press immediately following the name changing events. The Council of Europe requested the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in a resolution from September 1985:

- a. to put an immediate end to this repressive policy, and to restore their rightful names to all members of the Turkish minority who have been obliged to change them by threat or by force;
- b. to put an end to the violation of the rights of members of the ethnic and Muslim minorities in Bulgaria in social, cultural and religious matters;
- c. to allow the members of these minorities to enjoy fully the rights stipulated in international agreements and in the Bulgarian Constitution;
- d. to allow journalists of the international press as well as diplomats accredited in Bulgaria to visit the areas concerned;¹¹

It should be pointed out that the Council of Europe at this time had limited leverage since Bulgaria was not yet a member. Many other organisations were soon to follow up the criticism. We can mention the reports by Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International.¹² This resulted also in a US Congress hearing.¹³ The US State Department's human rights report for 1988 pointed out very clearly several features of the forced assimilation campaign such as: "Beginning in 1984, the Govern-

¹¹ Council of Europe. Resolution 846 (1985) adopted by the Assembly on 26 September 1985 (10th Sitting). The British MP, David Atkinson had prior to this authored the report: Situation of ethnic and Muslim minorities in Bulgaria. Doc. 5444, 24-7-1985.

¹² Jeri Leiber, *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Bulgaria* (New York N.Y: Helsinki Watch, June 1986); Bjørn Cato Funnemark, *The Repression of the Turkish and Islamic Minority in Bulgaria* (Oslo: Den Norske Helsingforskomite, 1987); Amnesty International, *Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks: Human Rights Abuses During the Forced Assimilation of the Ethnic Turkish Minority* (New York: Amnesty International USA, April 1986).

¹³ Marvine Howe, "Bulgaria Accused of Persecuting Ethnic Turks," *NY Times*, 15-2-1987.

ment has compelled members of the minority to change their Turkish given and family names to Bulgarian names, banned the use of the Turkish language in any public place including mosques, and banned the traditional forms of dress and some religious practices, such as circumcision.”¹⁴

Bulgarian–Turkish Diplomatic Relations

Turkey’s complaints about Bulgaria in international forums had limited success. However, the climate of detente between east and west in the second half of the 1980’s raised expectations for negotiated solutions. When the foreign ministers of the Balkan countries met in Belgrade 24–26 February 1988, Bulgaria and Turkey signed an agreement to secure free mutual visits of members from separated families. This gave new hopes to Bulgarian Turks who were considering emigration. They started to apply for immigration even before the signing of an agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey. Several subsequent meetings took place between working groups up until January 1989. However, the Belgrade protocol had little practical impact. Later when the exodus started, Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz maintained that it was wrong of Turkey to expect a sincere dialogue with Bulgaria. He concluded that Bulgaria attempted to use the dialogue process, not to solve the problems, but as a device to get them off the international agenda.¹⁵

It is important to view some of the central issues in a larger context. The demand for free travel was not only a Bulgarian–Turkish issue. It held a prominent place in the propaganda war between east and west in the period before 1989. A central criticism against the socialist countries concerned the lack of freedom to travel. A country like Bulgaria was very closed to outside visitors and Bulgarian citizens had difficulties in obtaining permission to travel abroad. Radio Free Europe –which was in the frontline of western propaganda towards the socialist block– would regularly mention the problem of free travel. After 1990 the international situation reversed and it was no longer a question of lobby-

¹⁴ U.S. Senate by the Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and Committee on Foreign Relations*, Vol. 1988 (January 1, 1989): 991.

¹⁵ Derya Sazak, “No miscalculation,” *Milliyet*, 2-7-1989, 10.

ing for travel papers to a few dissidents, but to prevent unrestricted travel by large population groups. The events in summer 1989 occurred before this shift, which should be taken into account when discussing the calculations of the Turkish decision makers. In the period 1985-89 Turkey demanded repeatedly free and regulated opportunities for migration as well as guaranteed minority rights for those who remained. Bulgaria, on the other hand, claimed steadfastly that there would be no mass migration. The situation in Bulgaria grew gradually tenser as time passed by and those who reacted against the oppression would be empowered by general developments in the international human rights regime.

The “revival process” was severely criticised in the Vienna meeting of CSCE in January 1989. A particularly sticky point for Bulgaria was the recognition of national minorities and basic rights. Bulgaria had simply defined all its citizens as Bulgarians and would not recognise national minorities within its territory.¹⁶ Pressure started to build up during the first half of the year. By now various activists within Bulgaria had picked up on the changes in political climate. The Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Bulgaria (IADHR), founded in January 1988, would among other things also put the plight of the Turkish minority on the agenda and later include members from the minority. In late 1988 and January 1989 members of the Turkish minority founded two organisations for civil rights: “The Democratic League for the Defence of the Rights of Man,” and “The Association for the support of Vienna 1989” (ASV89). The two organisations cooperated and staged various demonstrations during May and communicated with Radio Free Europe.

The May Events

It all culminated in the so-called “May events” of 1989, when police forces suppressed violently mass demonstrations in the main minority regions. Later, hunger strikes included demands for the restitution of the Muslim names and civil rights according to the Bulgarian constitu-

¹⁶ Fatme Myuhtar, *The Human Rights of Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Politics since 1878* (Sofia: Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2003), 78-79.

tion and international treaties. The regime responded with mass detentions and the deportation of prominent activists.

These events coincided with changes in the Bulgarian passport regime. Bulgaria ratified a new passport law in early May that was to take effect from September. The new passport law had been in the making for a long time and considered to be part of a democratisation process that should bring Bulgaria more in line with international human rights developments. The passports were issued for a 5-year period and would make it easier for Bulgarian citizen to go abroad and return.

As pressure built up it became clear that the Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, sought to “solve” the problem by expelling the perceived “troublemakers.” He announced already on 7 June in a session of the Politburo that it would be necessary to expatriate 200-300,000 persons from the minority. The main motivation was fear of a significant increase in the minority proportion of the Bulgarian population. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was ordered to organise the expulsion of the prominent activists and incite the emigration of others. It was also decided to limit the possibilities to liquidate their property and bring with them valuables.¹⁷

Since the border to Turkey was closed the first protesters were sent to Yugoslavia and Austria. Later, they would in most cases find their way to Turkey.

On 29 May Zhivkov made his fateful appeal to make Turkey open the borders: “Afterward the directors of the anti-Bulgarian campaign brought up the issue of emigration. They publicly announced that Turkey is ready to accept all Bulgarian Muslims who want to emigrate. In this context, on behalf of the Bulgarian Muslims and on my personal behalf as chairman of the State Council, I would like to appeal most ardently to the relevant Turkish authorities. Open the borders for all Bulgarian Muslims who would like to go to Turkey on a temporary basis, or to stay and live there! The time for games is over. Turkey must open its borders to the world in accordance with the international norms and agreements, precisely as the People’s Republic of Bulgaria did.”¹⁸

Turkey had seriously miscalculated the situation. Experts in the

¹⁷ Myuhtar, *op.cit.*, 81-82.

¹⁸ *Daily Reports from Eastern Europe* (FBIS), 30-5-1989.

Turkish MFA insisted that Zhivkov was bluffing and expected no more than 20,000 to come.¹⁹ By early July more than 90,000 had already arrived and further development evolved into a standoff between Bulgaria and Turkey. It seems as if neither government were fully aware of the forces they had set in motion. Officially Bulgaria followed up its international obligations and allowed all Bulgarian citizens to obtain international passports. In practice only the Turks obtained passports immediately and as the crisis evolved various efforts were made to incite the Turks to emigrate such as psychological pressure, threats by the local authorities, etc.

When looking at the phenomenon of migration it is common to speak of “push and pull factors.” As we have seen, there were strong push factors originating from Bulgaria, but we should also have in mind the effects of Turkey’s patronage. The refugees had strong cultural ties to Turkey and many had relatives there. The PM Turgut Özal took a tough stand from the outset. The Özal government had lost popularity on the domestic scene prior to the opening of the border. The economy was not performing well and he was under pressure from the opposition. This may have been a contributing factor to his high-handed approach. Özal made bold statements such as: I will force Zhivkov to the negotiation table; I will smother Zhivkov; We will put him under such pressure that he cannot resist; The Bulgarians are bluffing; We will make them regret what they have done; I told them to send the Turks and they were at loss about what to do; It would be no problem if they sent 100-200,000 more since Turkey is a rich country.²⁰ In Turkey many reacted to Özal’s brinkmanship and advocated a more cautious approach. He appeared undaunted and said he could have used even stronger language. He did not see any problems with the massive arrivals of refugees since Turkey was a great country that should be able to find work to them. On a more sober note he stressed the “moderate and legitimate” demands to Bulgaria: The immediate return of the minority and human rights to the Turks and a migration agreement for the kinsmen (*soydaş*)

¹⁹ “Özal lost his temper,” *Milliyet*, 23-8-1989.

²⁰ “Özal met our kinsmen the refugees. ‘I will smother Zhivkov,’” *Milliet*, 2-7-1989, 1, 11.

who wanted to migrate.²¹ A frequent motive in Özal's statements was that Bulgaria could send as many refugees it wanted. It would make no difference to Turkey if 2 millions arrived. Özal supposedly called Zhivkov's bluff and claimed there was no possibility that Turkey would close the border as had happened in 1950 during the last large migration wave. Özal kept up a tough and challenging rhetoric until the exodus came to a halt with the closing of the border 22 August. Many of Özal's statement would then come back to haunt him.²²

The Public Discourse on the Events.

It is time to discuss the portrayal of the events in Turkish and Bulgarian press during the crisis. As we have already seen by the examples involving Özal, the writings in the domestic press in each country had quite a different character than the diplomatic discourse. It can roughly be described as a confrontation between Bulgarian and Turkish nationalism. My Bulgarian material is very one-dimensional, which can be explained by the type of government at the time. There was apparently a more uniform control of the press and after all my main material came from the party newspaper. The Turkish material was more diverse. There was a mixture of highly emotional anti-Bulgarian writings, straightforward reportage and more in-depth analysis. It goes without saying that Turkey too has gone through periods with tighter control of the press both before and after these events.

Much of the Turkish newspaper reports were characterised by slogan-like expressions such as: "Our kinsmen who have been expelled from Bulgaria." The Train No. 481, which brought the refugees, was referred to as the "Train of Shame." Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz used phrases such as: "a shameful crime" "a serious and massive violation of human rights, "cultural genocide," "crime against humanity." The newspapers had pictures of people kissing the Turkish flag and Turkish soil on arrival. In the beginning it was stressed that Turkey as a rich country was ready to receive them with open arms. Bulgaria was

²¹ "Prime Minister Özal thinks he has been mild in his criticism of the Bulgarian leader," *Milliyet*, 6-7-1989, 14.

²² See the summary of Özal's rhetoric in Altan Öymen, "From I opened to I closed," *Milliyet*, 22-8-1989, 1.

accused of various guileful devices such as splitting families on purpose. Other reports portrayed the adventures of people who had fled miraculously. Some of the problems could of course have reasonable explanations. It is for example not so strange that persons who were about to do their military service were not granted passports. The Bulgarian Turks had certainly no reason to trust their government after the recent events, but accusations of radioactive injections and killing of infants were without basis in reality.²³ In fact the question of radioactive injections was brought before the World Health Organisation, which later could confirm that they did not find other substances in the Bulgarian Turks than those that were part of the regular vaccination programme.²⁴ Gradually, more sober evaluations of the government policy appeared and many commentators were critical to the lack of preparations before the borders opened and the insufficient support for those who had arrived.²⁵ We can also observe more bellicose exclamations that could only fan the flames of the already tense situation. A report from protest meeting in Samsun and İzmit mentions slogans such as: “Zhivkov is a murderer,” “We want weapons against the Bulgarians,” “People and Army hand in hand to Sofia.”²⁶ There was also talk about territorial compensation, which supposedly would rectify land losses from the Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878)!²⁷ On the other hand we also had admonitions against this kind of clamour. The journalist Mehmet Ali Birand warned against the bad impression this could present to outsiders.²⁸ Another commentator also considered slogans like “send the army to Sofia” totally out of place, but only because Bulgaria was under the protections of the Soviet Union. He claimed that if some-

²³ Asuman Aydan, “The substance the Bulgarians injected has been identified ‘radioactive vaccination,’” *Milliyet*, 2-7-1989, 14.

²⁴ “WHO repudiates rumours of lethal injections. The fears of misuse are without basis,” *Politiken*, 10-10-1989.

²⁵ For characteristic examples, see Sami Kohen, “The other side of the refugee question,” *Milliyet*, 3-8-1989, 11; Altan Öymen, “Refugee impressions...,” *Milliyet*, 4-8-1989, 1.

²⁶ Aydan, op.cit., 14.

²⁷ “Yılmaz wants joint action by the Muslims countries. There will be demands for compensation to Sofia,” *Milliyet*, 19-7-1989, 13.

²⁸ M. Ali Birand, “We will not be able to enforce an economic embargo,” *Milliyet*, 4-7-1989, 9.

thing similar had happened to the Turkish minority in Western Thrace (Greece), then the structure of the NATO alliance would not prevent Turkey from responding with armed intervention.²⁹ After the closing of the border the senior diplomat and politician, Kâmrân İnan, criticised Mesut Yılmaz for the lack of determination in the early stages. He claimed that Turkey could have made a stronger stand and carried out military manoeuvres in Thrace.³⁰

On a more sober note, Özal and Turkish diplomacy tried to use the available opportunities to advance their cause in international forums. Turkey attempted to corner Bulgaria by appealing to international law. Özal would question how long Bulgaria could continue with this “crime against humanity” and avoid negotiations with Turkey. He reckoned that Bulgaria would not be able to withstand international pressure since the entire western world except for Greece condemned Bulgaria.³¹

The Bulgarian press mirrored the Turkish press. The two sides would remain polar opposites as the events unfolded. In the beginning the Bulgarian press had difficulties with explaining why there was such a great exodus. It was ascribed to some kind of collective madness, or peer pressure. The newspapers were rife with articles about poverty, lack of social security and political oppression in Turkey. Particular mention was made of Pan-Turkism and Turkish expansionism. Gradually many stories appeared concerning people who resisted strongly against leaving the country or went into hiding in order to avoid pressure to leave. A journalist mentioned young girls who committed suicide in order to remain in the place they were born. He made grim predictions about what kind of life was in store for girls who went to Asia Minor.³² Similarly the newspapers hosted stories of parents who were not able to persuade their children to join them since they were satisfied with their life in Bulgaria: “The bond to the fatherland was greater than the bond to their parents.”³³ There are many other stories of children who resisted

²⁹ Coşkun Karca, “Is there no solution?,” *Milliyet*, 19-7-1989, 9.

³⁰ “Özal lost his temper,” *Milliyet*, 23-8-1989, 12.

³¹ “Prime Minister Özal,” 14.

³² Dimitar Deliyski, “Pictures from the border 10 days ago,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 1-7-1989.

³³ Stoyko Kafov, “A Family story. But the two sisters stayed...,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 10-7-1989.

social norms in order to avoid leaving.³⁴ Workers in the tobacco fields proclaimed proudly “We will stay to live and work in Bulgaria.”³⁵

Later when people started to return to Bulgaria, many were reportedly shocked by what they saw in Turkey of economic exploitation and child labour.³⁶ There were reports of harassment on the Turkish side before they left.³⁷ Returning refugees made pathetic declarations that they would pay for their mistakes by hard work and devotion towards Bulgaria. Not only would the newspapers stress that the Bulgarian Turks had been deceived, they claimed that many who remained in Turkey wanted to return but were scared by claims that they would get into trouble with the Bulgarian authorities if they went.³⁸

A special place was reserved for lambasting the Voice of Turkey broadcasts. It was claimed to have surpassed any level of disinformation, lies, slander and immorality. It came with seditious appeals and allusions such as: “You must not discontinue your resistance, you must not lose faith. In order to be strong it is not always enough to be right. You, our kinsmen, are right and strong because Turkey speaks up for you and your struggle is obtaining an international dimension.”³⁹ The article further accused Turkey of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and stressed that the new political climate demanded correct behaviour in international relations. The “Voice of Turkey” was said to serve opposite goals. It was used to present accusations against Bulgaria about terror and oppression – a country that guaranteed her citizens the right to travel freely abroad and return. The article continued with repeating the Bulgarian claim of voluntary “unification of the

³⁴ Temenuzhka Raduloba, “The wedding was cancelled,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 7-8-1989.

³⁵ Ninko Gruev, “Workers from the village Pokrayna. ‘Where can we find more prosperity? We are staying,’” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 10-7-1989.

³⁶ Nikolay Golemanov, “Those whom Ankara betrayed return home,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 24-8-1989.

³⁷ Nikolay Golemanov, “A planned move,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 22-8-1989.

³⁸ Nikolay Kolev, “Will the closing of the border shut out the delusions as well?,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 6-9-1989. See also *Sofia News*, 4-10-1989.

³⁹ Mihail Yanchev, “Why does the ‘Voice of Turkey’ spread hatred?,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 23-8-1989.

Bulgarian nation” and castigated Turkey for oppressing the Kurds and persecuting violently the left.⁴⁰

Another Bulgarian strategy was to counter Turkish accusations by referring to reports on Turkey’s human rights practices. This highlights the practice of selective use of human rights reports with no real commitment to the spirit of them. In early July a Bulgarian newspaper referred to an article in the International Herald Tribune where the lawyer and Vice President of Helsinki Watch, Alice H. Henkin, expressed her discontent with the US in the CSCE conference on the Human Dimension in Paris. She thought the US should have taken a firmer stand when it came to the issue of torture in Turkey. She accused the US of having double standard and avoiding criticism of allies no matter how bad the violations were.⁴¹ When representatives from Helsinki Watch together with US senators and congressmen visited the Bulgarian-Turkish border, their Bulgarian counterparts had the audacity to portray the closing of the border by Turkey as an inhuman act.⁴²

The Closing of the Border

The question of closing the border emerged already in May. By early August the strains were apparent on both sides. The stream of refugees could not continue and Bulgaria complained about delays at the border. The special train that brought the Bulgarian Turks after mutual agreement –the so-called “Train of Shame”– was cancelled on 17 August. Bulgarian customs officials could also tell that Turkish authorities from time to time would slow down the border procedure on purpose. The Bulgarian newspapers gloated over the Turkish problems with handling the stream of refugees and the broken promises. They claimed that now the Bulgarian Turks could see what was their real homeland and stressed that thousands of people were left stranded after the Turkish government decided unilaterally not to accept more Bulgarian citizens. Reports from the border point showed incredulous refugees on their way to Turkey who could not believe that Turkey went back on its words. A

⁴⁰ Yanchev, “Why does.”

⁴¹ Nenko Seymenliyski, “Rhetorics and ‘double standard,’” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 11-7-1989.

⁴² “Visit to the Border Crossing,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 22-8-1989.

perplexed elderly man exclaimed in disbelief that he could not understand how Özal reneged on his promises he had heard himself on Turkish radio. The journalist concluded that Özal did not give a damn about them and the difficulties they encountered. Özal was simply using them as a tool against Bulgaria.⁴³

Turkish newspapers complained about the bad organisation of the refugee reception. Among other things it became clear that the government had no idea where 100,000 of them had settled. Disapproval of Özal's handling came to the forefront after the border closed. It was seen as a big defeat and a loss of face. The opposition newspapers levelled strong criticism against the government. They thought Turkey had lost credibility towards the international society and the Bulgarian Turks and reminded Özal about his big words. Or as a newspaper wrote: "After Germany and England, the last country to demand visas from Turks is... Turkey."⁴⁴

A senior commentator called the refugee conflict a "war of attrition." A confrontation to show who was strongest. He considered it a test for both the domestic and foreign policy of the two countries. According to him Bulgaria won and Turkey lost face because of the irresponsible approach of the government. Zhivkov had allegedly planned to get rid of those minority members he could not assimilate and thus close the minority issue. Turkey's first mistake was to cancel the visa requirement, which opened the door to the unmanageable wave. Bulgaria soon felt the harm to the economy when much of the workforce left. It could even have led to the fall of the regime if the wave had continued for a couple of more weeks. In the end, however, it was not the weak Bulgaria but the strong Turkey that threw in the towel following a decision by the PM. The main reasons were the chaotic situation and the public reactions, in other words domestic politics. Zhivkov could now reap the benefit. The wave stopped and he could tell the "kinsmen" that Turkey did not want them. The remaining minority members would lose all illusions and after a while the case would be over. It gave the impression that Turkey was not a fatherland to be trusted and Turks abroad, with

⁴³ Nikolay Golemanov, "The polite invitation was revoked," *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 23-8-1989.

⁴⁴ Melih Aşık, "Who called whoms bluff?," *Milliyet*, 22-8-1989, 9.

the Western-Thrace Turks first in line, could no longer put their hope in Turkey.⁴⁵ This happened after Turkey had presented itself as a saviour to the minority that would under no circumstances close the border.

Diplomatic initiatives – Council of Europe

At first Turkey claimed that Bulgaria refused any negotiations. However, it was not so simple. Gradually it became clear that Bulgaria refused negotiations where Turkey had set the agenda.⁴⁶ Attempts at negotiations stranded partly because Bulgaria insisted to include issues that were sensitive to Turkey. When Turkey asked for a meeting in May to discuss family reunions, Bulgaria wanted to include issues such as the human rights situation for Kurds, publication of the Vienna final Act document in Turkey, as well as the general situation for human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁴⁷ This made Turkey cancel the meeting. Bulgaria accused Turkey of attempting to exploit the Vienna final act in bilateral meetings in order to obtain one-sided advantages.⁴⁸ Turkish political commentators were also acutely aware of possible pitfalls if Turkey went on a human rights campaign.⁴⁹ During the summer Turkey generally argued for a predefined agenda for talks, while Bulgaria argued for an open agenda. In short Turkey made attempts to obtain rights over the minority in Bulgaria, and Bulgaria refused to comply. The diplomat Bilâl N. Şimşir presented succinctly the Turkish perspective previous to the events: “Their [The Bulgarian Turks’] problems are not an interior matter solely for Bulgaria; Turkey, too, has authority, responsibility and rights over these people. This has been the case since the Bulgarian Principedom was founded.”⁵⁰

⁴⁵ M. Ali.Birand, “Who won?”, *Milliyet*, 22-8-1989, 9.

⁴⁶ “Prime Minister Özal,” 14.

⁴⁷ This was a tricky issue in Turkey and generally avoided, with some notable exceptions such as Aziz Nesin, *Bulgaristan’da Türkler, Türkiye’de Kürtler* (The Turks of Bulgaria, the Kurds of Turkey) (Istanbul: 1989).

⁴⁸ Nikolay Golemanov, “The polite invitations was revoked,” *Rabotnichesko Delo*, 23-8-1989.

⁴⁹ M. Ali Birand. “We have reached a crossroad in the Bulgaria policy...,” *Milliyet*, 22-7-1989, 9.

⁵⁰ B. N. Simsir, *Glimpses on the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria* (Ankara: 1986), 19.

This was also more or less the sticking point for Bulgaria. Bulgaria would not grant Turkey the right to formally act as the patron of the minority. It should be noticed that Bulgaria and Greece kept a common policy towards Turkey during the 1980s. The Ankara correspondent of a major Greek newspaper identified immediately the problem as Turkish attempts to obtain special rights by taking on the role as the protector of the minority.⁵¹

Soviet diplomacy became involved without any tangible results. Most of the Turkish ministers considered Moscow's initiative a tactical game. It was claimed that entering negotiations only after an oral assurance could lead to unpredictable developments and ultimately become a repetition of the Belgrade protocol. In that case it would only benefit the Bulgarian side. If discussions took place the international pressure would abate.⁵²

The press complained about lack of western support and ascribed it to the fact that they were Turks and Muslims. Turkish attempts to gain support from Muslim countries, however, did not meet with more success. It is not correct so say that there was no pressure on Bulgaria and it may not have been of primary importance that Turkey was a Muslim country. During this period condemnation of communist human rights abuse was high on the agenda and targeted more systematically than "western" Turkey. On the other hand, Bulgaria took advantage of the new thaw in east-west relations and tried at the same time to expose Turkey's problems with neighbours. According to Bulgarian claims, refugees were settled in Kurdistan and North Cyprus.

In order to obtain a better picture of the international factor we can look in more detail at the role of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe had been involved since the early days of the Bulgarian name campaign as in the aforementioned Resolution 846.⁵³ In 1985, however, the Bulgarian authorities did not respond to requests for a fact-finding visit. Only in 1989, when Bulgaria realised that the parliamentary assembly would debate a report, did the Bulgarian authorities finally

⁵¹ Gerasimos Zarkadis, «Η έξοδος της μουσουλμανικής μειονότητας από τη Βουλγαρία» (The Exodus of the Muslim Minority from Bulgaria), *To Vima*, 2-7-1989, 19.

⁵² Nur Batur, "In the diplomacy corridor," *Milliyet*, 20-7-1989.

⁵³ Council of Europe, Resolution 846 adopted by the Assembly on 26 September 1985 (10th Sitting).

agree to a visit. On 21 June, Britain invoked the first stage of the human dimension mechanism established under the Helsinki process. A Commission of Inquiry consisting of David Atkinson (conservative–UK), together with Manuel Nunez (Socialist–Spain) and Friedrich Probst (Liberal–Austria) visited Bulgaria for a week in early July. At this time the Council of Europe would also express its alarm because of the increasing number of refugees of Bulgarian nationality belonging to an ethnic and Muslim minority and called for a constructive dialogue between Bulgaria and Turkey.⁵⁴

David Atkinson spoke in the British parliament about his experiences already on 28 July before the official report appeared. According to him Britain had emphasised repeatedly to the Bulgarian Government that it should reverse its policy. The desire to leave the country was an indication of the pent-up frustration. There was no chance of succeeding with the assimilation process and it was in Bulgaria's own interest to resolve the matter fairly. He had been at the border himself a week earlier and portrayed his impressions primarily as a human tragedy and humanitarian disaster. He stressed that the Bulgarian Turks were in effect refugees and not tourists as Bulgaria claimed. He put the blame squarely on Bulgaria and stressed the need for reversing the policy: "I believe that this tragedy was avoidable. Despite all the rhetoric and propaganda from both sides, it stems principally from the Bulgarian Government's policy to assimilate. I appreciate that they describe that as a process of national consolidation. However, they want to assimilate, integrate and regulate the ethnic Turkish population at the expense of its identity, culture and way of life. To the Turks, that represents their self-respect, indeed their very soul."⁵⁵

He would, however, also mention the aggravation caused by inflammatory broadcasts of the Voice of Turkey encouraging resistance and offering a haven to all. Finally, he pointed out that at the end of the day the problems could only be resolved bilaterally between the Bulgarian Government and the Turkish Government. An agreement should result

⁵⁴ Council of Europe, Recommendation 1109. Situation of refugees of Bulgarian nationality in Turkey. Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 6 July 1989.

⁵⁵ House of Commons Debates 28 July 1989, vol. 157, cc1474-81.

in safeguarding the rights of those who wanted to leave as well as those who desired to stay.⁵⁶

The Council of Europe report would appear in September, but already in early August comments to the first draft appeared in the Turkish press. The report criticised Bulgaria but tried concurrently to be “even handed.” According to the draft report the Turks were not forced to flee Bulgaria. They went at their own wish because of restrictions on their religion and the name change campaign in 1984-1985. However, the report made clear recommendations to Bulgaria about the need of providing education in the minority language, securing possibility of return for those who desired so, etc. Bulgarian claims that the Turks were Bulgarians who had been converted by force in previous centuries were dismissed as ridiculous. The disturbances were thought to be partly influenced by the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in Paris in June as Bulgaria passed a new passport law within the framework of the Vienna final act. The report accused Turkish politicians, newspapers and TRT for aggravating the crisis. The Voice of Turkey encouraged the Bulgarian Turks to apply immediately for passports so that they could see that it would only be given to Christians at a time when the new passports were not ready in the municipalities. In the early phase of the exodus Turkish radio also talked incessantly about the migrants’ success in finding jobs and housing. In other cases exaggerated claims by Turkey could be dismissed after inquiries in Bulgaria. Of the alleged hundreds of deaths related to the demonstrations, only three could be confirmed. Turkish exaggerations probably damaged the overall credibility of Turkey and made it easier to confront the accusations with counter arguments. Some of the finer points may have been lost on the committee. Bulgaria was sometimes able to mislead the Commission by employing more credible arguments than the Turkish side. A case in point is the question of circumcision. The Bulgarian interlocutors convinced the Commission that circumcisions were carried out freely according to Bulgarian law as long as it was done according to proper medical procedures, but could not be done by unqualified persons. The commission found no concrete proof of restrictions on civil rights. It was considered that all the problems started from the name changing

⁵⁶ Ibid.

campaign in 1984-85. The Austrian rapporteur, Friedrich Probst, also displayed a critical attitude towards Turkey and mentioned the lack of tolerance towards minorities and the denial of Kurdish identity.⁵⁷

The Council of Europe finally adopted Resolution 927 on 26 September. The exodus was labelled a major human tragedy caused by “the serious denial of their rights –name-changing, ban on speaking Turkish and restrictions on the practice of their religion– and because they are encouraged by offers of resettlement through the Turkish media.” It was observed that the Belgrade protocol had not been implemented and encouraged a constructive dialogue between the Bulgarian and the Turkish Governments with a view to establishing more satisfactory neighbourly relations that would lead to a migration agreement between the two countries. The Council of Europe appealed to the governments of member states to provide concrete and co-ordinated aid to Turkey in order to settle the exiles. The resolution urged the Bulgarian Government to end immediately its policy of forced assimilation and grant its ethnic and Muslim minority the rights of a minority in the spirit of the concluding document adopted by the Vienna CSCE review meeting of January 1989. It also urged the Turkish authorities “as a gesture of goodwill, to avoid any propaganda element in its information services to the ethnic and Muslim minority in Bulgaria.”⁵⁸

Representatives from Bulgaria and Turkey met in Kuwait 30 October for a last-ditch attempt before the subsequent regime change in Bulgaria. Bulgaria was more or less compelled to accept Turkey’s invitation after its international standing had reached an all-time low. Turkey was looking for a way to regulate the relations after struggling to accommodate the massive influx. The main concerns of Turkey were to secure the ethnic Turks their religious freedom, the right to use their mother tongue and the opportunity to recover their traditional names. The Bulgarian side was dragging its feet and did not display any sincere interest in settling the issue. Bulgaria refused adamantly to comply to

⁵⁷ Ali H. Yurtsever, “The Council of Europe’s Bulgaria Report is Ready. Sofia’s Claims are Ridiculous,” *Milliyet*, 8-8-1989.

⁵⁸ Council of Europe, Resolution 927, Situation of the ethnic and Muslim minority in Bulgaria. Assembly debate on 26 September 1989.

Turkish demands for a comprehensive bilateral emigration agreement and to recognise the existence of a Turkish minority in Bulgaria.⁵⁹

After Zhivkov fell from power on 10 November, Bulgaria commenced on a new path with greater respect for human rights. However, when Bulgaria reinstated the minority rights it was according to Bulgarian law and international agreements and not as a result of bilateral negotiations.

In Closing

The Bulgarian assimilation campaign is an example of an authoritarian regime's failure to impose a policy by force. The wholesale assault on the culture and traditions could hardly have succeeded under any circumstances, but the changes in the international order during the second half of the 1980's also caught up with Bulgaria and contributed to the downfall of the regime. Looking back at the handling of the crisis by Bulgaria and Turkey, the first thing that springs to mind is how far the public debate in each country was removed from the spirit of the new developments in human rights. This was maybe most evident in the Bulgarian case because of the tight control of the totalitarian regime. However, the Turkish press was also dominated by traditional stereotypes and repetition of slogans. It resembled most of all a confrontation between Bulgarian and Turkish state interests where the human dimension took a second place. Özal's decision to open the border was ill conceived and probably ill advised. Both countries tried to outmanoeuvre each other diplomatically, but showed serious deficiencies in their handling of the situation on the ground. In Bulgaria's case the nationalist fervour of the communists had not taken into account the disruption to the economy and the social cohesion. In Turkey the press excelled in condemning Bulgaria, but ineffectiveness in the reception of the refugees soon became apparent. The state centred approach came to the forefront once more when Turkish newspapers exclaimed "Bulgaria won" after Turkey felt compelled to close the border 22 August. In that respect international organisations such as the Council of Europe took a more humanitarian approach to the issue and placed the plight of the

⁵⁹ Myuhtar, *op.cit.*, 84.

refugees at the forefront. Bulgaria was also able to exploit Turkey's lack of commitment to human rights domestically when Turkey came under scrutiny. Turkey's insistence on a predefined agenda for negotiations could not be realised in practice and gave Bulgaria the necessary leeway to avoid negotiations altogether for most of the period in question. This happened in spite of that Bulgaria came under considerable pressure from international organisations since this pressure could not be tailor-made to Turkish diplomatic priorities. Although in August the Turkish press named Bulgaria the "winner" of the confrontation, the damage to Bulgaria was probably much greater in the long run. I am not thinking only in material terms, but to the whole fabric of society.

There has now passed 30 years from the 1989 Exodus and this has been commemorated duly in Turkey. To return to the initial claim of Tomasz Kamusella about the "forgotten 89" it is not only a question of commemoration, but how it is commemorated and by whom. Germany is probably the country that has taken most seriously the question of dealing with its past in a constructive manner and coined the word *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* for this purpose. It was also compelled to do so because of the savagery associated with National Socialism. When it comes to countries such as Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey the interest in human rights violations is immensely greater when it concerns the neighbouring countries and not themselves. It is often regarded to be a political tool that can be used in confrontations related to other issues. When Turkey tried to raise awareness for the plight of the Bulgarian Turks, Sofia dug really deep to find ammunition against Turkey. For the first time we were presented with an English translation of excerpts from Lyubomir Miletich classic book on Turkish atrocities in the Second Balkan War (1913).⁶⁰

The Bulgarian transition to democracy was not without problems as the anti-Turkish propaganda had left its scars. Bulgarian readiness to grant the Turks minority rights in January 1990 gave rise to nationalist

⁶⁰ The complete title of this version was: *TURKISH ATROCITIES committed against Thracian Bulgarians. From a poll conducted by Professor Dr Lyubomir Miletic on the ruin of the Thracian Bulgarians in 1913* (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1987), <http://macedonia.kroraina.com/en/lm/lm.htm> (accessed 31-5-2021). From Lyubomir Miletic, *Разорението на тракийските българи през 1913 година* (The Ruin of the Thracian Bulgarians in 1913) (Sofia: 1918).

demonstrations. Much of the writings that criticised unsavoury aspects of Bulgarian nationalism did not emanate from a desire within Bulgarian society to face the past but was inspired by various foreign democracy institutions.⁶¹ It should, however, be noticed that the Bulgarian parliament passed a declaration in 2012 that condemned the Revival process and the attempt of forced assimilation of the Bulgarian Muslims. It considered the events of 1989 as a form of ethnic cleansing.⁶²

As mentioned briefly before, Greece played a role in obstructing condemnation of Bulgaria in international forums. Although these two countries belonged to different alliance systems they cooperated closely in the 1980' and was sometimes referred to as an axis against Turkey. Greece discrimination of its Muslim minority was more low-key than the Bulgarian version and usually referred to as "administrative harassment" after the Mitsotakis government revised the Greek policy in 1991. On the other hand, the Turkish "deep state" interfered massively in Greece in the late 1980's and in particular in the election of 18 June 1989.⁶³ When the minorities are used as a foreign policy tools, the chances of normal integration in their country of residence deteriorate markedly. The confrontation between Greece and Turkey by dubious forces

⁶¹ This is for example the case with one of the first such publications: Valeri Rusanov, *Семинар– Аспекти на етнокултурната ситуация в България и на Балканите, 8-10 ноември 1991 г., София* (Seminar–Aspects of the Ethno-cultural Situation in Bulgaria 8-10 November 1991 Sofia) (Sofia: Centre for democracy research–Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, 1992). The same can be said for the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee or Antonina Zhelyazkova of The International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR). The site of the centre in Sofia has suffered several attacks by nationalists.

⁶² The Bulgarian Parliament adopted the declaration on 11 January 2012, <https://www.parliament.bg/bg/declaration/ID/13813> (accessed 10-5-2020).

⁶³ Minority members who did not fall into line were put on a "Blacklist" and prevented from entering Turkey. This took on such proportions that news about it also reached the mainstream Turkish press. See the articles by Yılmaz Akkılıç, *Olay*, 27-1-1989, and Oktay Akbal, *Cumhuriyet*, 9-2-1989. When TRT promoted Sadık Ahmet in the elections, Greece started to jam the broadcasts from Turkey (*Pontiki*, 16-6-1989). Another factor influencing Greek policies has been the depletion of the Greek minority in Turkey. For the heavy-handed treatment of the minority in Gökçeada, see Alexis Alexandris, "Imvros and Tenedos: A Study of Turkish Attitudes Toward Two Greek Island Communities Since 1923," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 7, no. 1 (1980): 5-32.

in each country came to a head with the Öcalan affair in 1999. The Greek journalist Alexis Papahelas recounted a meeting with PM Bülent Ecevit shortly after. He commented that Ecevit was quite restrained in his demeanour, but after exchanging some low-key pleasantries he fixed his eyes on the journalist and said: “In my opinion this tragedy should mark the beginning of a new period in our relations. [...] For example, the two directors of our secret services could open all their files so both parties could ascertain that we do not support terrorists or other organisations that have the goal to hurt our countries.”⁶⁴

As mentioned previously the creation of homogenous nation states from empires has not been kind to the minorities and none of the successor states have a clean record. The greatest problem in this regard is probably that this process has been dominated by ethnocentric elites that were inherently hostile to minorities. Ultimately the resulting policies have not only been damaging to the minorities, but also to the normal functioning of the host countries.

⁶⁴ Alexis Papahelas, «Τα πρόσωπα μιας κακοστημένης επιχείρησης» (The Characters of an Ill-conceived Operation), *To Vima*, 24-11-2006.

*Basil K. Gounaris**

**Does Greece belong to the West?
Reassessing Greek Anti-westernism in the Twentieth Century****

In Greece, public and academic debates over historical questions, especially over history text-books, are no less heated than political discussions.¹ One could argue that in a state called ‘Hellas,’ built mostly on historical arguments and less on civil rights, it is quite natural for history to be valued exceedingly and citizens to become sentimental when they assess their past. Yet this does not explain the controversial character of such historical debates, nor the frequency and the publicity they have enjoyed during two full centuries of state independence. There is a good reason why it is so: The Greek trouble with the past is rooted in the still on-going debate whether Greece belongs to the East or to the West. Even if Greece was a separate case, a go-between East and West, a verdict is needed to decide whether in principle it is more Eastern or Western. Its ambivalent position in this bipolar scheme has affected the image of the Greek people, reflected in the past and in the future. Therefore –and most importantly– it has also affected the Greeks’ relation with Europe, to the extent that Europe is the original West and an indispensable ingredient of the western world. If the Greek past was ‘Hellenic’ in the European fashion and not Roman/

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¹ Charis Athanasiadis, *Τα αποσυρθέντα βιβλία. Έθνος και σχολική ιστορία στην Ελλάδα 1858-2008* (The Withdrawn Books. Nation and School History in Greece 1858-2008) (Athens: Alexandria, 2015).

Romeic (i.e., Greek-Orthodox) in the Byzantine fashion,² then it was natural for the new state to follow a modernizing course and pursue a European future. If not, alternative 'eastern' routes and options should be and have been considered.

Because of the fundamental nature of their difference, the two perspectives of Greece's identity and mission have and continue to be easily turned into or correlated to crucial political debates. In this paper, it will be argued that during the 20th century the familiarity of the Greeks with this identity debate and their irreducible sensitivity over their past have turned this discussion into a handy instrument of political mobilization; a currency which has been spent lavishly and effectively by politicians to win over voters' allegiance, and inflated by public, party and academic historians. In brief, despite Greece's steady western and pro-European political orientation, reservation and occasionally even contempt for western culture has prevailed in the long run in various forms of fear of others, from the Jews and the Catholics to Europe and globalization; fears that touch upon delicate issues of self-determination. In other words, Europhobia, Euroscepticism and Europhilia have been and are still connected to unresolved historical questions that lie at the core of Greek national identity. Anti-westernism of every kind took on the function of a process suitable for the negative determination of Greekness. In a way, this negation of Europe and the West sounds like an indirect yet explicit proposal for re-fashioning an alternative Greek present and future, to be justified necessarily by an alternative Greek past.

I.

During the long 19th century, the quest for its true past marked Greek intellectual and political life in various ways. In theory, it was the quest for ethnic continuity and the choice of a future mission. Unable and unprepared to opt for a civic and hospitable Hellenic identity, as the radical democrat Rigas Feraios had envisioned in the aftermath of the French Revolution, the Greeks had to define the ethnic content of

² "Romeic" is a medieval Greek term. It was the most common self-designation but has steadily declined since the Greek state was named "Hellas," and been replaced by the adjective "Hellenic."

their nation. To inherit the glory of the Ancients and secure their position as the genuine cradle of Europe, Modern Greeks had to disassociate themselves from their Byzantine tradition, conceal their Russophilia, alienate themselves from their Balkan Orthodox Slav brethren, and purify their spoken language. This was a demanding task. Then, the Greeks would illuminate the East in the same way they had illuminated the West after the Roman conquest. This was in principle the Greek Great Idea, officially pronounced by Premier Ioannis Kollittis in January 1844.³ Essentially this eastern assignment was the bait for voluntary westernisation, i.e., for integration into the hitherto alien European world. Despite being covered with the mantle of a civilizing mission, it was widely perceived as a potential scheme of militant irredentism. In any case, westernization as a prerequisite for the eastern mission was almost undisputed by intellectuals throughout the 19th century.⁴ In practice, however, as an elitist project of modernization, fashioned in the West, imported by diaspora intellectuals and promoted by the Bavarian Catholic rulers, westernization was not shared by all Greeks inside their young kingdom; at least not with an open heart. What modern Greeks really were, was contrary what Europe expected them to become. Expressions of Europhobia inherited from the Byzantine and post-Byzantine past included Orthodox reaction to early Protestant educational initiatives in Greece (1835-48) and to the Bavarian planned ecclesiastical autonomy from the Ecumenical Patriarchate (1833-52). But there were other issues of domestic and foreign policy which were even more crucial to the cultivation of anti-western feelings: Reaction to administrative centralization, which was identified with the Bavarian rulers and the non-local Greek bureaucrats who sported European education, manners and dress; protest against the theory of Greek Slavic descent, coined by Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer in the 1830s; outcry against the Bavarian absolutist administration and the European creditors, after the 1843 bankruptcy;

³ Dimitris Livanios, "The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, Nationalism, and Collective Identities in Greece, 1453-1913," in *Hellenisms. Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to Modernity*, ed. Katerina Zacharia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

⁴ Elli Skopetea, *Το «πρότυπο βασίλειο» και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα. Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830-1880)* (The "Model Kingdom" and the Great Idea. Aspects of the National Problem in Greece) (Athens: Polytypo, 1988), 171-8.

humiliation following the demand for neutrality, issued by the Powers during the Crimean War (1853-56); indignation over European indifference during the 1866 Cretan revolt and in many similar cases of insurgency in Macedonia during the Eastern Crisis (1877-78).⁵

All these expressions of reaction and antipathy to the West, whether directed at Protestants and Catholics, the Great Powers of Europe as a whole, Britain in particular, or western morals in general, shaped Greek policy, domestic and foreign. In other words, the debate over the predestined eastern mission of Greece was intertwined with the predicaments of state modernization and hectic irredentism. This confusion was inevitable for an additional reason: In the third quarter of the 19th century Greece's relation to the East was reinforced by historians. The Byzantine missing link was hellenized and reinstated through the new cultural notion of Hellenic Christianity (*Ellinochristianismos*). This was not without criticism from westernizing historians, the second generation of the Greek Enlightenment, who resisted the direct involvement of religion in this academic debate over continuity. It was also criticized by those historians who favoured the medieval ecumenical ideal *versus* Greek nationalism.⁶ This choice also had practical consequences: Byzantium had no friends and only foes in the Slavic Balkans and the Catholic West. Would they become the enemies of Modern Greece as well?

In theory, the endorsement of its eastern medieval past and culture did not derail Greece from its west-oriented track. In practise, to reconquer the East was an impossible mission for any politician or state official. Costly irredentism to the North-East was incompatible with modernization and not approved by Greece's protecting powers and

⁵ Cf. Lina Louvi, *Η Ευρώπη των Ελλήνων. Πρότυπο, απειλή, προστάτης 1833-1857* (The Europe of the Greeks. Model, Threat, Protector 1833-1857) (Athens: Alexandra, 2020).

⁶ K.Th. Dimaras, *Νεοελληνικός Διαφωτισμός* (Modern Greek Enlightenment) (Athens: Ermis, 1989), 397-410; Dimitris Stamatopoulos, «Ο Μανουήλ Γεδεών και η επαναδιοργάνωση του οικουμενιστικού μοντέλου» (M. Gedeon and the Reorganization of the Ecumenist Model), in *Μνήμη Άλκη Αγγέλου. Τα άφθονα σχήματα του παρελθόντος: ζητήσεις της πολιτισμικής ιστορίας και της θεωρίας της λογοτεχνίας, Πρακτικά Ι΄ Επιστημονικής Συνάντησης* (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2004).

creditors. Yet it was the only mission fit for a nation established on and nourished by the pre-modern manly ideas of honour (*filotimo*) and unconditional bravery (*palikaria*).⁷ If Europe was an impediment to this mission, then Greece could do without. For decades, the public discussion about the contempt, mockery and scorn with which the Greek vision was met by the Powers and their preferential treatment of the Balkan states – ‘states without history’ – reflected the troubled relationship Athens had with its neighbours, who turned from brethren into competitors and foes, as well as the hardships Greece faced to adjust to the capitalist and technological western paradigm.⁸

Unravelling the articulation of socio-economic criticism against Europe during the last quarter of the 19th century is of particular importance for our analysis. The selfish and brutal capitalism of Europe, it was argued, had overshadowed unselfish philhellenism. Greece was not related to ‘this old continent, which was torn apart by economic interests’ and ‘inflamed by monetary questions.’⁹ At the same time, the hitherto shining social and economic model of the USA was also criticised on cultural grounds, to discourage mass emigration.¹⁰ Inside Greece, wealth and state protection had favoured the rise of a new class, oriented towards western ideals, which had disrupted the unity and cultural homogeneity of the Greek people. In 1893, Theodoros Deligiannis, former Premier and then leader of the opposition, stated in Parliament that it was in Greece’s best interests to decelerate the adoption of new social morals and manners that were altogether alien

⁷ John K. Campbell, *Honour, Family, and Patronage. A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 268-74, 278-81.

⁸ Vasilis K. Gounaris, *Τα Βαλκάνια των Ελλήνων από το Διαφωτισμό έως τον Α΄ Παγκόσμιο* (The Balkans of Greece from the Enlightenment to World War I) (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2007), 587-96.

⁹ Georgios Varouxakis, “The Idea of ‘Europe’ in Nineteenth-Century Greek Political Thought,” in *Greece and Europe in the Modern Period*, ed. Philip Carabott (London: King’s College Centre for Hellenic Studies, 1995), 27.

¹⁰ Kostas Diogos, «Το όραμα των Ελλήνων για την Αμερική, από τον Νεοελληνικό Διαφωτισμό μέχρι τον Α΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο» (The Vision of the Greeks for America from the Greek Enlightenment to World War I) (PhD diss., Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2019), 396-408.

to and incompatible with Greek traditions.¹¹ Deligiannis was the leader of the National Party (*Ethnikon Komma*), which had absorbed the Russophiles, and the opponent of the Anglophile Modernist Party (*Neoterikon Komma*) of Charilaos Trikoupis.

Party names were not accidental. Behind the formation of the National Party one can trace a parallel and well-known ideological process of paramount importance: The emphasis placed on the common people (*laos*) as the guarantor of Greek cultural originality, compared to the aforementioned imitators of the West, i.e., the European-educated intellectuals and the rising bourgeois class, unable to resist luxury and the temptation of the stock-market. This process, the Greek version of the German-inspired Occidentalism, included the making and rise of folk-science, as well as the shift from the purified Greek language (*katharevousa*) to the vernacular spoken by the people (*demotiki*). The language question was important for an additional reason: Greece had to decide which form of language was the most appropriate to disseminate its culture and to introduce the non-Greek speakers of the *irredenta* to Greek nationalism. The importance placed on the value of the common people was not only so as to bypass the cultural disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the unattainable paradigm of the West. Next to romantic nationalism Greek Socialism was also growing, fully dedicated to the demotic vernacular and federalism. The latter movement was against the involvement of the Great Powers in the politics of the East, not even as protectors of small nations.¹² From the Greek point of view, it was a transformation of the Byzantine imperial vision adapted to European federalism. Moreover, federalism reintroduced, from the left, the omnipotent and handy democratic vision of Rigas Feraios, conceived in the days of the French Revolution.

¹¹ Gunnar Hering, *Τα πολιτικά κόμματα στην Ελλάδα, 1821-1936* (Political Parties in Greece, 1821-1936), vol. I, n. 167 (Athens: Morfotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezis, 2008), 591.

¹² Loukianos Chasiotis, *Η ανατολική ομοσπονδία. Δύο ελληνικές φεντεραλιστικές κινήσεις του 19ου αιώνα* (The Eastern Federation. Two Greek Federalist Movements of the 19th Century) (Thessaloniki: Vantias, 2001).

2.

For two decades before the Great War, Greece experienced a deep crisis. Instead of revitalizing the East, the 'model Kingdom' had languished: Bankruptcy (1893), a humiliating defeat by the Ottoman Empire (1897), international public debt administration, corrupt parliamentary practices, a tough controversy with Bulgaria and Romania over Macedonia, worse relations with the Powers.¹³ The Great Idea project, it was lamented, seemed doomed, because of the inability of the state to modernize and catch up with its neighbours' achievements. This new kind of domestic critique, which explicitly set modernization as a prerequisite of effective irredentism, was extremely severe. Not even the King remained untouched. Greece, it was argued, needed deeds, strength, vigor, power, pure heroes, an ambitious vision, a challenging future, a strong executive power and a leader king. It was a quality step forward, but it did not imply that the required reforms should be modelled on the West. To achieve their goals, the Greek people needed to return to their roots, rediscover their own potential, and delve into their own cultural resources. They should revisit and inspect their past with the eyes of Makrigiannis, the recently (1907) discovered illiterate hero of the 1821 revolution, a religious man, anti-elite and anti-European. Greeks needed to get rid of the Public Debt Administration mechanism, arm themselves to the teeth, and hate their enemies with passion. They should expect nothing from Europe. Their duty was to fight against subordination to the West, xenomania and slavishness, repel the materialism of a comfortable life, and decline Jewish-type cosmopolitanism. This was the view of the Demoticists fighting against stagnation and for revitalization; but it was also the view of the anti-Liberal Nationalists.¹⁴

¹³ Jerry Augustinus, *Consciousness and History: Nationalistic Critics of Greek Society, 1897-1914* (New York: East European Quarterly, 1977); George Leontaritis, «Εθνικισμός και Διεθνισμός: Πολιτική Ιδεολογία» (Nationalism and Internationalism: Political Ideology), in *Ελληνισμός και Ελληνικότητα*, ed. D. G. Tsoussis (Athens: Estia, 1983), 27-35.

¹⁴ Gounaris, *Τα Βαλκάνια των Ελλήνων*, 520-5; Thanasis Bochotis, *Η ριζοσπαστική Δεξιά. Αντικοινοβουλευτισμός, συντηρητισμός και ανολοκλήρωτος φασισμός στην Ελλάδα 1864-1911* (The Radical Right. Anti-parliamentarism, Conservatism and Incomplete Fascism in Greece 1864-1911) (Athens: Vivliorama, 2003), 451.

These ideas were best expressed by two passionate intellectuals, Periklis Giannopoulos and Ion Dragoumis. Giannopoulos wrote: 'It is impossible to generate Greek life, as long as all things and all ideas, from the cradle to the grave, are foreign. Striking xenomania is the first move, the first struggle for those who desire to fight for a fresh Greek start. Xenomania is crudity. It is vulgar. It is foolish. It is dishonour. It is denial of patriotism. It is vanity. And it is ignorance.'¹⁵ Xenomania was commonly identified as frankism (*frangismos*). This was a much older accusation and a very popular expression of scorn and shame, an implicit allegation that someone was denying Orthodoxy for Catholicism. A famous poet of the time, Kostis Palamas, tried to distinguish 'frankism' from 'Europeanism', the former being a pejorative term and the latter a substantial ingredient of Hellenism. But this was not easy at the time.¹⁶ Dragoumis, on the other hand, declined both Western ideals and the Hellenic state. The latter, a by-product of the Jewish influenced European culture, had been forced, through classicism and the choice of an artificial vernacular, to live a false life. Inspired by his passion to liberate Macedonia from Bulgarian influence, Dragoumis created his own native and self-contained Greek cultural prototype; not to Hellenize the East but to integrate Greece and the East into a single entity, an Eastern Empire.¹⁷

After the military coup of 1909, the reforms introduced by Premier Eleftherios Venizelos and the victorious campaigns of the Balkan Wars, both modernizers and their opponents felt –and perhaps were– justified in their choices and ready for another round of triumphs in the East. By then, they were all inspired by bourgeois nationalism superbly serving modernization and irredentism.¹⁸ But this match did not imply that Greece's relations with the West had been decided. All these recent glories in the battlefield had a double reading: For some it

¹⁵ Periklis Giannopoulos, «Η Ξενομανία» (Xenomania), *O Noumas* 1, no. 5 (1903): 4.

¹⁶ Constantinos Th. Dimaras, *Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος* (Constantinos Paparrigopoulos) (Athens: Ermis, 1986), 67.

¹⁷ Varouxakis, op.cit., 28.

¹⁸ Giorgos Th. Mavrogordatos, «Βενιζελισμός και αστικός εκσυγχρονισμός» (Venizelism and Bourgeois Modernization), in *Βενιζελισμός και αστικός εκσυγχρονισμός*, ed. G.Mavrogordatos–Ch. Hatziosif (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 1988), 10.

was a triumph of the true Greek spirit. This triumph included the deeds of the Greek brigands against Bulgarians in Macedonia; the abandonment of the embarrassing “impeccable stance,” i.e., the peaceful foreign policy persistently demanded from impoverished Greece by the Powers, in favour of the honourable alternative, aggression and war; the glory of the kilt-wearing *evzon* fighter, avenger of the nation’s foes, the heart and honour of the Greek soldier, a combination of pious soul and bloodthirsty superman; the Balkan Orthodox alliance against the crescent that Rigas Feraios would have blessed; the glory of King Constantine I, the soldier king, future emperor, chasing the primordial enemies of the nation to accomplish his mission in the East. Seen from a different angle, victory in the Balkan Wars was simply the triumph of urban rationalism, which, in a western manner, had provided for the suitable military and diplomatic preparation of the state. The initiative of the journal *Grammata* [Letters] in 1913, to address an open letter to well-known educated Greeks asking for their views on the future mission of Greece and its relationship with Europe, and the variety of responses it received clearly reveal that this relationship had not been resolved yet. Most answers were in favour of disassociation with the West or of selective contacts. ‘We shall borrow whatever we need but we shall be free debtors, not the helots of a foreign culture’, replied the radical intellectual Petros Vlastos, a keen supporter of the demotic vernacular. Professor of Theology Gregorios Papamichail, in his reply, stressed that ‘the European standard is entirely unsuitable for measuring our own affairs.’¹⁹

3.

Dragoumis’ vision of Empire contradicted the liberal vision of Venizelos, despite the quality services the latter had offered to Greek irredentism. In part, it also clashed with the socialist vision. Nationalists and Socialists shared contempt for foreign morals and the artificial *katharevousa*, but not admiration for German militarism. Nationalist Demoticists and romantic Nationalists placed their allegiance in the Party of the National Minded (*Komma Ethnikophronon*), which was

¹⁹ *Έρευνα για τις μελλοντικές κατευθύνσεις της φυλής* (Research for the Future Direction of the Race) (Alexandria: Grammata, 1919), 55, 80.

founded in 1915 by Dimitrios Gounaris to fight in Venizelos what they saw as the revival of the elitist and plutocratic reforms of the late Trikoupis. This does not imply that Gounaris' party was truly anti-European, despite occasional anti-western slogans; or that Gounaris embraced Dragoumis' vision of an Eastern Empire. He cared for the promotion of Greekness as a value, for the traditions of a 'small but honourable Greece.' His party, which in 1920 was renamed the People's Party (*Laikon Komma*) invested this particular concern with a strong, easily retrievable anti-western rhetoric that was adaptable to circumstance. This rhetoric, as we have argued elsewhere,²⁰ was crucial for the ideological development of the National Schism during the Great War (1915-17). It conveyed the impression that the choice between neutrality, supported by King Constantine and Gounaris, and participation in the cause of the Entente, supported by the Liberals of Venizelos, had a deeper meaning and far more important connotations.

The rhetoric of *Laikon Komma* against the Entente made use of slogans against western culture and its imitation. It stressed the substitution of philhellenism by financial interests, called for resistance to the will of the Powers and for the end of subordination. It criticized imperialism, colonialism, the Jews and the Greek plutocrats. A good example can be found in an article by Spyridon Melas in the *Neon Asty*:

"Venizelism is nothing but *frankism* [the imitation of the 'Franks'] in politics. Under the healthy surface lies hidden the most dangerous disease: Under the pretext of realism, [Venizelism] traded Greece as if it were a boat full of onions. Under the sign of progress, it excited individualism and mass opportunism. Under the pretext of renaissance, it tried to negate tradition. Under the pretext of alliance, it sought to settle the Frank in the heart of the country."²¹

²⁰ Gounaris–Christopoulos, op.cit.

²¹ Thanasis Bochotis, «Εσωτερική Πολιτική 1900-1922» (Domestic Politics 1900-1922), in *Ιστορία της Ελλάδας του 20^{ου} αιώνα*, ed. Ch. Chatziiosif (Athens: Vivliorama, 2009), 96.

To the dedicated Greek Germanophiles, Germany stood for an imperial culture enriched with high humanist ideals, which had been forged through the deep and long contact of the Germans with the ancient Greek civilisation.²² Germanism, like Hellenism, was the outcome of large-scale cultural dissemination. Unlike British culture, Germanism was focused not on the individual but on the whole nation.²³ Moreover, for them, the German Empire –even if it was part of the West– was the best model for an Eastern Greek Empire. In other words, the cultural advantages of Germany were its Greek roots and the imperial paradigm, most appropriate for the reunification of the East in the Byzantine fashion. Germanophilia, as a theory, clearly did not back the idea of western superiority; it was a mild expression of Greek chauvinism.

On the other hand, the most solid ideological argument of those who supported participation in the war alongside the Entente was the condemnation of the German militaristic, greedy and arrogant model of progress, seasoned with references to the threat it posed for small nations. They stressed negative characteristics similar to those attributed by the Germanophiles to the Anglo-French and their capitalist western civilisation. This view was shared by all the Entente states: German civilisation was the archetypical enemy of liberal democracy.²⁴ ‘The most typical imperialism of our times is the German one’, wrote George Papandreou, future Prime-Minister, ‘because it combines the tradition of Prussian feudalism with the vertigo of unleashed modern German progress.’²⁵ Apparently, anti-Germanism of this kind did not favour the image of Europe in general either.

²² K. Sokolis, *Αυτοκρατορία* (Empire) (Athens: Angyra, 1915), 84-6.

²³ Vlas Gavrilidis, *Δύο Πολιτισμοί* (Two Civilisations) (Athens: Akropolis, 1917), 70, 128; the same, *Η Αγγλική Πολιτική και ο Ελληνισμός υπό πρώην Διπλωμάτου* (British Politics and Hellenism Written by a Former Diplomat) (Athens: Akropolis, 1917).

²⁴ Despoina Papadimitriou, «Ο Τύπος και ο Διχασμός 1914-1917» (The Press and the Schism, 1914-1917) (PhD diss., National and Capodistrian University of Athens, 1990), 260-4.

²⁵ Georgios Papandreou, «Η Ευρώπη προ του Πολέμου» (Europe on the Eve of the War), *Επιθεώρησις των Κοινωνικών και Πολιτικών Επιστημών* 1, no. 1-2 (1916): 46-70.

All these were the terms of the on-going debate between nationalists, Socialists and Demoticists, which, of course, had to be adapted, sometimes improperly, to the military alliances of the time. In our view, this not unknown debate played an essential role in the making of the Greek National Schism. It is not speculative to argue that, with all its intensity and simplicity, it subdued and assimilated Greece's diplomatic and political war dilemmas in the East-West scheme and strengthened the anti-West critique at a time when liberalism seemed to be triumphing. It bequeathed to the Greek national imagination experiences and arguments which affected, to a certain degree, the interwar debate on what it meant to be Greek and European.²⁶

In fact, in the 1920s, criticism of Europe, represented by Britain and France, intensified because of the negative role they played during the Asia Minor campaign and catastrophe (1921-22). Their 'betrayal' was due to financial interests that weighed heavier than their principles. King Constantine, himself, wrote to his Italian mistress in 1921 from Smyrna that 'the idiot European audience can not comprehend that we are fighting here for the freedom of our co-nationals.'²⁷ A year later the Press was no less aggressive: 'today's France, totally indifferent to old France that had once won the sympathy of the whole world, cares only for money. Christian brotherhood, peace in the world, prosperity in the East are values which have been kept outside the stock market of French political morals. French consciousness is only sensitive to the influence of gold.'²⁸ In fact, the Press remarked, it was not just the French who were interested in the riches of Syria or the British in the oil of Mosul, but all the big capitalists of Europe who trusted that Kemalist Turkey would prove 'obedient and willing to make concessions' like the Ottoman Empire of Abdul Hamid had been in the past.²⁹ All these bankers had placed their bets on the warring Greeks and Turks as if it was a bullfight.³⁰ Unfortunately, poor

²⁶ Gounaris–Christopoulos, op.cit.

²⁷ Giorgos Th.Mavrogordatos, *Τα γράμματα στην Πάολα. Τι μας λένε για τον Κωνσταντίνο Α'* (The Letters to Paola. What they tell us about Constantine I of Greece) (Athens: Patakis, 2019), 107.

²⁸ *Kathimerini*, 13-1-1922.

²⁹ *Kathimerini*, 23-1-1922.

³⁰ *Kathimerini*, 17-3-1922.

Greece lacked coal, oil or Indians,³¹ so its defeat was predestined. After the bombardment and brief occupation of Corfu (1923), Italy and Mussolini also fell into disfavour, accused of “kaizerist imperialism and fascist greed.”³² The material culture of the USA did not escape criticism either, for they had failed to protect democracy and liberty.

It is also worth keeping in mind that anti-westernism of the lower strata was affected in the 1920s by the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar. The implementation of the new calendar overlapped with the abolition of the monarchy, thus promoting the idea that Greek tradition was being uprooted by the liberal, anti-royalist modernizers. For the Old Calendarists conformity with the West meant subordination to the Pope and denial of the ‘pure Greek element’ that had prevented religious assimilation in the past.³³ As one citizen put it: Since the Greek Orthodox Church had been subordinated to Rome ‘we will turn into Francs and Protestants, who don’t believe in saints, then we shall lose our faith in Christ and God; we shall end up atheist Free Masons.’³⁴

The same strong antipathy for the West was expressed by the recently (1918) established Greek Socialist, and by then (1924) Communist, Party (*Kommounistikón Komma Ellados* or KKE), in rather similar and familiar rhetoric, despite the different phrasing. The Communist Party was against the Imperialism of the West, against the Entente powers strangling the rights of the Eastern People, and against the Greek bourgeois class, obedient and humble servant of the English and French, guardian of European and American capitalist interests alike. This view was given the necessary historical depth by Gianis Kordatos, a communist historian, in his book on the social meaning of the 1821 Greek Revolution (1924). The emphasis he placed on the so-

³¹ *Kathimerini*, 28-9-1922.

³² *Makedonia*, 23-9-1923.

³³ Alkis Rigos, *Η δεύτερη ελληνική δημοκρατία 1924-1935. Κοινωνικές διαστάσεις της πολιτικής σκηνής* (The Second Greek Republic 1924-1935. Social Dimensions of the Political Scene) (Athens: Themelio, 1988), 215; *Phoni tis Orthodoxias*, 1-4-1928.

³⁴ Nikolaos Kasdaglis, «Ο αντίκτυπος του ημερολογιακού εκκλησιαστικού ζητήματος στον Τύπο της Αθήνας (1924)» (The Impact of the Calendarist Ecclesiastical Question on the Press of Athens) (MA diss., Aristotle University of Thessaloniki & National Capodistrian University of Athens, 2018), 55.

cial motives of the uprising was widely perceived as a serious challenge to the omnipotent will of the nation as the driving force of history. It foreshadowed subjugation to the Soviets' ideology and policy, and cost him an assassination attempt. Britain topped the list of Kordatos' and the KKE's enemies, as the primary suspect of a future attack on the Soviet Union. For the Communists, Venizelos was nothing more than a humble lackey of the English, French and American capitalists. Germany was added to the list of people's enemies after the rise of the Nazi Party (1933), as was Italy, following its attack on Ethiopia (1935). Indeed, for the KKE, neither of the two military alliances under formation was any less evil. The communist critique of Capitalism became identical to anti-westernism, as the Soviet Union motherland transformed into the indisputable eastern cradle of the Balkan nations and the sponsor of their federation. Moreover, the Communists expropriated both the traditional contempt of the lower class for wealth and luxury, and the bitterness all Greeks harboured for the role the powers had played in the Asia Minor catastrophe. All in all, in the light of the Greek-Turkish War and the interwar financial crisis, antipathy for the West and for Europe increasingly cut across all political parties, taking full advantage of existing negative stereotypes.³⁵

4.

Reconsidering the National Schism as an episode within the broader Greek quest for equilibrium between the East and the West facilitates comprehension of the search for *hellenicity*, which the bourgeois generation of the 1930s launched; a magnificent effort to repair the lost cohesion of the Greek nation by bringing up its cultural authenticity. Europe was not dismissed as capitalist or corrupt. Instead, Greece was challenged to compare its own cultural impact and prove itself, if not superior, at least an equal partner in the making of European culture. Greece was no longer perceived as a student of the West, but able and

³⁵ KKE, *Επίσημα Κείμενα* (Official Documents), vol. I: 12, 83, 124, 163, 196, 254-55, 382; vol. II: 52, 183, 292, 370, 418; vol. III: 37, 141-42, 147; vol. IV: 13-34, 132-6, 227, 232-5, 326-7.

destined to lead the cultural refashioning of Europe.³⁶ This was the ambition of German-educated intellectuals like Konstantinos Tsatsos and Panayotis Kanellopoulos. The idealistic, anti-materialistic and utopic vision of Hellenism produced by this generation of artists and intellectuals was expected to heal the wounds that old-fashioned, chauvinistic nationalism and irredentism had caused the nation and, at the same time, check the alternative remedy, communist-inspired class solidarity. However, this new idealism, as Katerina Pa-pari has argued, supported a new ideological schism that would soon become political. The new vision or illusion of idealism went along-side with loyalty to the monarchy, restored in 1935, and fierce anti-Communism. If there were ‘true Greeks,’ who shared idealism, there were obviously false one too, i.e., the Communists, favouring materialism. This narrative of idealistic Greekness, and especially of Greek cultural superiority, was constructed in the 1930s of such durable materials that it survived thereafter and was selectively exploited by various subsequent regimes.³⁷

The dictatorial regime of Ioannis Metaxas (1936-41) was the first to be inspired by the prospect of Greek cultural superiority. Metaxas himself acknowledged the technological superiority of the West and was positively inclined towards the transfusion of technology to Greece. But he was set against the West in all matters of morals, art and culture, having in mind his own dream of a third Greek civilization, following the ancient and the medieval stages: ‘We do not want foreign cultures. We want a culture of our own in this corner of Europe, which we shall push forward and make superior to all others’, he declared.³⁸ Greeks lacked self-confidence and appreciated as artistic

³⁶ Dimitris Tziovas, *Ο μύθος της γενιάς του Τριάντα. Νεοτερικότητα, ελληνικότητα και πολιτισμική ιδεολογία* (The Myth of the 1930s Generation. Modernity, Greekness and Cultural Ideology) (Athens: Polis, 2011), 256-9.

³⁷ Katerina Papari, *Ελληνικότητα και αστική διάνοηση στον Μεσοπόλεμο. Το πολιτικό πρόγραμμα των Π. Κανελλόπουλου, Ι. Θεοδωρακόπουλου και Κ. Τσάτσου* (Greekness and Bourgeois Intellectuality in the Interwar Period. The Political Programme of P. Kanellopoulos, I. Theodorakopoulos and K. Tsatsos) (Athens: Asini, 2017), 105-6.

³⁸ Georgia Kontou, «Η πολιτική και κοινωνική ιδεολογία της 4^{ης} Αυγούστου και ο τρόπος με τον οποίο αυτή επηρέασε την εκπαίδευση και τη νεολαία (ΕΟΝ)» (The Political and Social Ideology of the 4th of August Regime and the Way it Affected Education and the Youth) (PhD diss., University of Ioannina, 2013), 275.

only what was imported from Europe. There was no desire for works which expressed Greek feelings, he complained.³⁹ Yet, despite his confidence in Greek culture, his regime was unable to resist the temptation of anti-western stereotypes, most appropriate in assuring the support of peasants and the working classes. In the monthly review *To Neon Kratos* there are frequent hints, inserted by intellectuals supporting Metaxas, against loose western morals, impurity in sexual relations, suffragettism and feminism. There are also warnings against the 'infection' of Greece by western intellectuals and the growth of Communism as a by-product of Liberalism, in the context of the wider Metaxist condemnation of western parliamentarianism and capitalism.⁴⁰ Metaxas argued: 'This democracy is an expression either of Communism or of Capitalism. It is the instrument with which the will of Capitalism is presented as the will of the people.'⁴¹ Immorality in the West as a result of either Communism or Capitalism, and the need to restore morality in Greek society, were the arguments favoured by high school professors of Theology and various religious organizations in the interwar period, to achieve the social integration of the petty-bourgeois strata. It has been argued that this was a substitute to divert social struggles and a perfect means to adjust the natural conservatism of the lower classes to the ideological needs of the dictatorial regime.⁴²

5.

Given the interwar development of anti-westernism, German propaganda in occupied Greece did not have to invent new material against the western allies. The Anglophile regime of Metaxas was accused of

³⁹ Ioannis Metaxas, *Λόγοι και σκέψεις* (Speeches and Thoughts) (Athens: Ikaros, 1969), vol. I, 434.

⁴⁰ Kontou, *op.cit.*, 117, 120, 140-152, 195-7, 215-20, 286-88; Panagiotis Noutsos, «Ιδεολογικές συνιστώσες του καθεστώτος της 4^{ης} Αυγούστου» (The Ideological Components of the 4th of August Regime), *Τα Ιστορικά* 3, no. 5 (1986).

⁴¹ Metaxas, *op.cit.*, vol. II, 439.

⁴² Polykarpos Karamouzis, «Κράτος, εκκλησία και εθνική ιδεολογία στη νεότερη Ελλάδα: κλήρος, θεολόγοι και θρησκευτικές οργανώσεις στον μεσοπόλεμο» (State, Church and National Ideology in Modern Greece: Clergy, Theologians and Religious Organizations in the Interwar Period) (PhD diss., Panteion University of Athens, 2004).

co-operating with the 'Jewish league of Freemasons' and the 'London plutocrats', those well-known usurers who had been exploiting Greece since 1821. In fact, the Germans employed all anti-British assertions used in the National Schism era and beyond: The Don Pacifico naval blockade (1850), English oppression in the Ionian Islands, military intervention in 1915, the 'betrayal of Smyrna', the occupation and colonization of Cyprus.⁴³ The negative image of rotten British-dominated Europe was counter-posed against "Das neue Europa" of the third Reich, a true crusader against Asiatism, Bolshevism and its Jewish agents, the enemies of true Europe.⁴⁴ Greece had a role to play in a national-socialist Europe, the enemy of Panslavism and of the American capitalists, because this German-ruled Europe was the product of ancient Greek thinkers. That is what Premier George Tsolakoglou wrote to Hitler, seconded by his minister of Finance Sotirios Gotzamanis.⁴⁵ It is interesting that, in this bizarre pro-European rhetoric of the Naziphiles, one can trace the implicit anti-western argument which had been articulated during World War I by the Germanophiles: Greek culture would only shine and be acknowledged in a German-ruled world. Skythic Bolshevish and Anglosaxonism were its mortal enemies.⁴⁶ It was a struggle of idealism against materialism, after all, and the place of Greece in this tug-of-war had been crystalized long ago. Capitalism and Socialism could not substitute the will of the nation.

The Greek Communist Party would only partly disagree with this conclusion. Since the beginning of the war against Italy (Oct. 1940), it had not altered its anti-British (and French) attitude, because it was London that had dragged Greece into a war against Italy. Greece, in

⁴³ Hagen Fleischer, «Η ναζιστική προπαγάνδα στην κατοχή: Ένα διφορούμενο όπλο» (Nazi Propaganda during the Occupation: An Ambiguous Weapon), in *Ελλάδα 1936-1944. Δικτατορία, κατοχή, αντίσταση*, ed. H. Fleischer–N. Svoronos (Athens: Morfotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezis, 1990).

⁴⁴ Alexandra Patrikiou, «Απεικονίσεις της γηραιάς ηπείρου: Ο διάλογος για την Ευρώπη στην Ελλάδα, 1941-46» (Images of the Old Continent. The Debate about Europe in Greece, 1941-46) (PhD diss., Panteion University of Athens, 2012), 100-59.

⁴⁵ Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece. The Experience of Occupation 1941-44* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1993), 80; Patrikiou, op.cit., 121.

⁴⁶ Patrikiou, op.cit., 148.

the KKE's view, should have remained neutral in co-operation with the Balkan states and the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ Of course, after the German attack against the USSR, the Party turned against the German-Italian fascist axis and in favour of the 'great allies.' But it never attributed to the Westerners any merit other than their war achievements. No mention whatsoever was made of their liberal regimes struggling against fascism. Such courtesy was in short supply.

6.

When the war was over, defeated Germany and Italy, despised by all for their monstrosities, posed no threat and needed no attention or pre-emptive verbal attacks by KKE.⁴⁸ They were done with. Therefore, it was extremely easy for the Communist Party to train its fire on Britain anew and re-restart its anti-British, interwar campaign. This time London was accused of allying itself with the 'Black Front', the monarch-fascists (i.e. the royalists) and the quislings, to accomplish the long-standing Anglosaxonic mission, which was to turn Greece into a colony of the Empire. In 1946, Gianis Kordatos published his study "English Interventions in Greece", repeating one by one all the anti-British accusations manufactured by the Germanophiles in both world wars. As Greece delved into a civil war and the USA took over its maintenance and defence, the Americans replaced the British in all communist slogans. The pejorative terms 'American masters', 'Americanocracy' and 'American imperialism' frequented any text produced by the KKE. The American gangsters were robbing Greece and treating her like a financial enterprise. They wanted this land as an instrument of their rural policy, a market for their products without any industry, a colony to provide them with meat for their canons. This was the view of the KKE when the Greek Civil War was over and did not change at all in the following decades.⁴⁹

To put it bluntly, the ocean of anti-Americanism in the 1950s and 60s by far exceeds the limits of the communist Press. It has been ar-

⁴⁷ KKE, *op.cit.*, vol. V, 11-34.

⁴⁸ Maria Kallitsi, «Η εικόνα του γερμανού κατακτητή στην ελληνική λογοτεχνία» (The Image of the German Conqueror in Greek Prose) (PhD diss., University of Crete, 2007), 46-175; *Embros*, 28-6-1946, 3.

⁴⁹ KKE, *op.cit.*, vol. VI, 20-30, 79-80, 136-7, 145-7, 168-9, 174-5, 218-24.

articulated by Ioannis Stefanidis (2007) that the widespread anti-western explosion, which targeted first Britain and then the USA, followed the failure of post-World War II irredentism, chiefly disappointment over the Cyprus Question. This ‘little Great Idea’, the annexation of Cyprus, had brought Greeks out into the streets, demonstrating against their former and present allies, accusing their politicians of subordination or *rayathism* (from the Turkish *raya* meaning the passive flock). It was a handy slogan with explicit references to the shameful fear of revolting against the Ottomans in the pre-1821 era. The Left, in the light of the Cyprus Question, Turkish aggression and American military presence in Greece, made extensive use of it in the 1950s and 60s. It provided a unique opportunity to accuse the liberal and conservative royalist governments, i.e., the Right, with the use of patriotic slogans, without any reference to class interests. It easily connected anti-imperialism with nationalism and patriotism, based on the assumption that whatever was western was imperialistic and therefore in conflict with national/patriotic interests. This was a crusade that continuously appealed to the Greek sense of honour: Greece was not a pathetic receiver of slaps, nor some poor relative, bowing to the will of NATO. The governments of the Right, argued the Left opposition, were handling Greek national questions by cowering and bending their back.⁵⁰ This shameful practice had to stop; but joining the European Common Market was not going to help in that direction. According to the leftist *Avgi*⁵¹ membership was to prove ‘a grand slam to full economic and political subjugation to foreign monopolies.’ The future of the country, it warned, would be grim, because Greece was destined to become fodder for the powerful west European trusts. There was, however, in the 1960s, behind this rhetoric of ‘independence,’ another implicit

⁵⁰ Ioannis D Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation. Political Culture. Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 110-123; Zinovia Lialiouti, *Ο Αντιαμερικανισμός στην Ελλάδα 1947-1989* (Anti-americanism in Greece 1947-1989) (Athens: Asini, 2016), 130; Andreas Pantazopoulos, «Για το λαό και το έθνος». *Η στιγμή του Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου 1965-1989* (“For the People and the Nation.” The Moment of Andreas Papandreou 1965-1989) (Athens: Polis, 2001), 103-8.

⁵¹ *Avgi*, 29-7-1959.

demand.⁵² The unqualified identification of the government and the Palace with American policy legitimized the Left and Centre-Left parties to portray themselves as the true defenders of Greek honour. The restitution of Greek honour, however, implied and at the same time justified demands for social modernization and democratization. Eventually this tactic of anti-Americanism in defence of national honour effectively challenged the post-Civil War anti-communist, national-minded ideology (*ethnikophrosyni*).

Stefanidis⁵³ has studied the public speeches of the Centre-Right Parties against the USA and Lialiouti⁵⁴ has increased the documentation through the study of the Press. It is clear that Centre-Right allegations were very similar to those of the Centre-Left. They focused on Greek national pride and honour, insulted by the nouveau riche attitude and unrefined behaviour of American military personnel in Greece exploiting the rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Yes-men politicians of the Right were unable to defend the nation against daily insults or, more importantly, extract support from the USA, as tension with Turkey was growing. In the aftermath of the September 1955 pogrom in Istanbul, the centre-wing newspaper *Ta Nea* commented with sarcasm:

“As they saw us flat broken, they gave us pocket money in memory of our struggles for civilization and liberty, but at the same time they fumbled our ground, as if it was land without a fence, to find convenient shelter [...] they gave us a few pounds, a few dollars, they acquired military installations, they settled in our own house, they run our politics, they administer our economy, they decide when we shall talk and when we shall not, when we shall get angry and when we shall be appeased...”⁵⁵

⁵² Lialiouti, *O Antiamerikanισμός*, 144-6.

⁵³ Stefanidis, *op.cit.*, 169-90.

⁵⁴ Lialiouti, *O Antiamerikanισμός*, 81-91.

⁵⁵ Lialiouti, *O Antiamerikanισμός*, 87.

Invoking insult obviously did not imply support for communist ideology. It was a well-understood reference to Greek values, violated by the Westerners.

Whatever was the political origin of anti-Americanism in the 1950s and 60s, it had an additional quality. It was not only fighting against national dependence and humiliation but it was also protecting the nation from acculturation. Greeks were encouraged by the KKE to engage in an unyielding struggle against 'this new Great Idea which was wearing an American suit and was propagating the American way of life.' This 'servile Great Idea' meant 'the negation of national traditions, national subjugation, catastrophic cosmopolitanism and intellectual darkness.' There ought to be 'a relentless struggle against the organised attempt of Americanocracy to corrupt our people with abundant literature promoting pornography, gangsterism and warmongery; a struggle against corrupting "intellectual" output and film production.' In the Second Plenum of the KKE (April 1952), the Greek people were urged to 'condemn and boycott American gangster books, magazines, films and theatre, all of which disseminated the decadence of the plutocrats and American corruption.' This was, above all, the responsibility of Greek women, 'who would fight against corruption and defend our traditions and homes from violation by the American gangsters.' It was the people's responsibility, the Communists claimed, to negate the influence of Sunday Schools and Scouts, which were trying to alienate the youth from the Greek people's fighting tradition and to insert submission by promoting the American way of life. It was the exclusive duty of the people to fight against acculturation, because 'the bourgeois class, the plutocrats, more and more often, more and more clearly were moving away from the nation's interest, from the nation itself.' This social class was turning into an 'anti-national, cosmopolitan puppet of American imperialism.'⁵⁶ The same warning, the separation of the bourgeois class from the nation's body, had been expressed as early as 1878.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ KKE, *op.cit.*, vol. VI, 318-25, 339-40, 458-63; VII: 16, 21, 26, 52, 65-7, 76, 200, 214-26, 327.

⁵⁷ Skopetea, *op.cit.*, 242.

Public opinion polls reaffirmed the overwhelming influence of American culture, the role of cinema and music in the shaping of a positive American image; therefore, the concern of the Left over this matter was justified.⁵⁸ The hard-core anti-American slogans of the KKE were produced chiefly from exile. Inside Greece, the Leftist newspaper *Avgi* was not short of contempt, but in a more subtle way. In 1955, it described American society as being full of hatred and lamented the poisoning of Greek traditions and family values by American cultural influence.⁵⁹ In 1958, it wondered sarcastically at the culture of American military personnel, 'men getting drunk, inclined to indulgence, provocative, disrespectful to Greece, to our women, our morals, our tolerance, to the patience of Romios,' i.e., the archetypical pre-modern Greek-Orthodox. These Americans had legal rights only inside the bars and brothels of the Troumba region next to the port of Piraeus. 'But outside Troumba,' *Avgi* warned, 'there is the Greek family, the struggle to make ends meet, thirst for quiet and moral living.'⁶⁰

Not surprisingly, in the early 1960s such views against hollow cosmopolitanism and the blue-jean culture were shared by the Leftist Lambrakis Democratic Youth Organisation, headed by composer Mikis Theodorakis, constantly worrying about musical acculturation and Americanisation. In 1957, it was estimated that 35% of Greeks thought that American music was a bad influence and preferred Greek folk and pop songs. Most likely among them were not only voters of the Left. Stefanidis⁶¹ mentions an article in the state-sponsored magazine *Gnoseis* which condemned the mimicking of American culture because it threatened Greek tradition. This was not exceptional. In fact, the Left and the Centre were not alone in their struggle against the Americans. The conservative Right was also concerned with the rejuvenation of Greek youth, drifting away from tradition, adopting foreign habits and manners and turning, in a word, into "teddy boys;"

⁵⁸ Stefanidis, *op.cit.*, 247.

⁵⁹ Lialiouti, *Ο Αντιαμερικανισμός*, 265.

⁶⁰ Lialiouti, *Ο Αντιαμερικανισμός*, 266-7.

⁶¹ Stefanidis, *op.cit.*, 248-51.

a term identifying them automatically with the specific British subculture, which already had a record of illegal and violent activities.⁶²

Right-wing intellectuals, in general, judged that western materialism was unable to counter-balance the influence of communist ideology and was opposed by nature to the idealism of Hellenic Christianity.⁶³ Back in the days of the Civil War, the powerful and popular brotherhood of theologians ‘Zoe,’ famous for its social activism in favour of the unprivileged, combined anti-communist rhetoric with a wider critique of the materialist Enlightened West, which had undermined Christianity and paved the way for atheism. Although ‘Zoe’ did express a kind of favourable neutrality towards the liberal regimes of the West and to the USA, it never ceased to disapprove of urban, cosmopolitan liberalism and never hid its preference for the lower social strata, the common people, who were the real agents of Hellenic-Christian culture. For the true Christians there could be no compromise with either Communism or Capitalism.⁶⁴ For Professor Christos Giannaras, the expression of mild anti-western conservatism of ‘Zoe’ and other para-church organizations in the early 1960s constituted their reaction to a growing yet profound debate over the future direction of Greek theology.⁶⁵ Father Georgios Metallinos wrote that in

⁶² Despoina Papadimitriou, *Από τον λαό των νομιμοφρόνων στο έθνος των εθνικοφρόνων: η συντηρητική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα 1922-1967* (From the Law Obeying People to the Nation of the National Minded. Conservative Thought in Greece 1922-1967) (Athens: Savvalas, 2006), 283-4.

⁶³ Meletis Meletopoulos, *Ιδεολογία Του Δεξιού Κράτους 1949-1967. Επίσημος πολιτικός λόγος και κυρίαρχη ιδεολογία στην μετεμφυλιακή Ελλάδα* (The Ideology of the Right-wing State 1949-1967. Formal Speech and Dominant Ideology in Post Civil War Greece) (Athens: Papazisis, 1993).

⁶⁴ Maria Siganou, «Ιδεολογικές συνιστώσες του θρησκευτικού λόγου στον Εμφύλιο πόλεμο: Το παράδειγμα της Ζωής» (The Ideological Components of the Religious Speech during the Civil War. The Case of Zoe), *Τα Ιστορικά* 48 (2008); Vasileios N. Makrides, “Orthodoxy in the Service of Anticommunism: The Religious Organization ‘Zoe’ during the Greek Civil War,” in *The Greek Civil War. Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences*, ed. Ph. Carabott–Th.D. Sfikas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 168; Giorgos Papathanasopoulos, *Εμφύλιες μάχες ιδεών. Ο ιδεολογικός εμφύλιος πόλεμος στην Ελλάδα 1946-1960* (Civil Battles of Ideas. The Civil War of Ideas in Greece 1946-1960) (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2018), 63-73.

⁶⁵ Christos Giannaras, *Ορθοδοξία και Δύση στη νεότερη Ελλάδα* (Orthodoxy and the West in Modern Greece) (Athens: Domos, 1992), 436-7.

1959, when the process for Greece to become an EEC member was initiated, some theologians and clergymen sensed the spiritual and cultural impact of this integration and the potential devaluation of theology in the eyes of the political leadership, which was only concerned with technological innovation. That was the reason why in 1962 they demonstrated vigorously for more theology teaching positions in high schools.⁶⁶ The convention of Orthodoxy with the Left was forthcoming. The meeting point was the fight against the ideological hegemony of the West.

The 1967 dictatorship, the so-called Junta, suspended for seven years the widespread political convergence over anti-Americanism, for an obvious reason: The basic slogan, "National Independence," could no longer be expressed in public. Strong anti-American slogans were heard again only in the rallies of November 1973, during the uprising of the Polytechnic School. Meanwhile, in the context and aftermath of the May 1968 turbulence in Paris, the dictators preserved intact all existing reservations about western culture. They fitted in perfectly with their own ideological slogan "Hellas of Greek Christians" (*Hellas Hellinon Christianon*) and they were shared by all Greeks alike, Leftists and church-goers. The argument used by the dictators' first Foreign Minister, the diplomat Panayotis Pipinelis, when Greece withdrew from the Council of Europe in late 1969, to avoid condemnation and expulsion for the use of torture is most indicative. Anarchic and revolutionary tendencies, he said, were corrupting the social and intellectual power of the West, they have paralyzed its resistance and endangered western culture and democracy. Greece, however, was resisting these tendencies and would shape its 'new republican construction,' making use of its own 'national peculiarities.'⁶⁷ Ioannis Ladas, Minister of Interior, talked about 'the rotten foreign youths, sinking into the marsh of drugs, pansexualism, decadence and degeneration, wandering astray in the streets of big cities, without dreams, ideals, hopes, without future'. His rhetoric was full of hatred for the

⁶⁶ Georgios Metallinos, *Για την Ευρώπη μας με αγάπη* (To our Europe with Love) (Athens: Akritas, 2004), 19-20; the same, *Θεολογικός Αγώνας, 1962. Ιστορία* (Theological Struggle, 1962. History) (Athens: Parousia, 1989), 130-5; Papadimitriou, *Από τον λαό των νομιμοφρόνων*, 283.

⁶⁷ *To Vima*, 16-10-1969, 6; 21-12-1969, 2.

West, support for those who had demonstrated against the British and the Americans and in favour of the union of Cyprus with Greece, outbursts of national pride, illusions of grandeur, and criticism against foreign music. In the speeches of Georgios Georgalas, the most well-known theorist of the dictatorial regime, criticism of western consumerist societies was linked to their tendency towards Communism which could only be checked by enlightened anti-Communism. In the writings of Professor Dimitris Tsakonas, Minister of Culture, western parliamentarism was judged unsuitable for Greece. He suggested enlightened despotism with a national policy, sensitive to Orthodoxy, oriented to the East, following the example of Ion Dragoumis.⁶⁸

7.

After the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, criticism against the western parliamentary system stopped. Anti-Americanism, however, was restored to its former track. The quest for political independence was the meeting point of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) with the recently legalized KKE and all the other parties of the Centre and Left. Contempt for the American way of life, from disco to fast food, and care for the protection of Greek morals was the meeting point of PASOK with conservative voters. In the aftermath of a dictatorship, allegedly masterminded by the CIA, all political parties exploited anti-Americanism to reach the sentiments of the common people. With the political dominance of PASOK and the global renunciation of post-war *ethikofrosyni* in the 1980s, this patriotic rhetoric turned into fully-fledged populism. Andreas Papandreou, party leader and Prime-Minister, focused on the uniqueness and loneliness of the Greek nation, its culture of resistance, which had been eternally threatened by conspiracies, forged in the West, and demanded the re-hellenisation of Greece. Thus, anti-Americanism turned into an ingredient of Greek nationalism and a challenger of American-inspired, post-modernist vagueness and

⁶⁸ Meletis Meletopoulos, *Η δικτατορία των συνταγματαρχών. Κοινωνία, ιδεολογία, οικονομία* (The Colonels' Dictatorship. Society, Ideology, Economy) (Athens: Papazisis, 1996), 187-92, 211-34, 243-55; Richard Clogg, «Η ιδεολογία της 'Επανάστασης της 21^{ης} Απριλίου 1967'» (The Ideology of the '21st April 1967 Revolution'), in *Η Ελλάδα κάτω από στρατιωτικό ζυγό*, ed. Giorgos Giannopoulos–Richard Clogg (Athens: Papazisis, 1972), 81-112.

uncertainty.⁶⁹ It is interesting to note that this anti-Americanism, expressed in the popular slogan ‘EEC and NATO belong to the same syndicate,’ also fuelled resistance to union with the European Economic Community. PASOK and KKE agreed that this western, NATOist Europe was a puppet of the American monopolies and trusts; unwanted by the workers. The EEC was going to keep Greece fastened to the track of capitalism; it was a pit of lions, the doom of Greek economy. After the demise of *ethnikofrosyni*, the historical paradigm was adjusted accordingly. It was the time for writing social history, time for the people’s heroes to be granted state pensions and be introduced into history schoolbooks, from Makrygiannis to the WWII resistance fighters and the Civil War communist guerrillas.⁷⁰

In this context, the final convergence of Orthodox and Socialist criticism of the EEC was not a coincidence. The late Bishop of Florina, Avgoustinos Kandiotis, perhaps the most conservative bishop in the post-war era, stated in 1977 that for Greece the EEC was as negative as NATO and American military bases had been. All of these resulted, in his view, in the invasion of Greece by lovers of evil, adventurers, materialists, and the godless.⁷¹ His aggressive anti-western style was unmatched. Yet it was the Greek neo-Orthodox approach, the product of an exchange between Leftist intellectuals and theologians at its peak in the 1980s, that influenced the quality of anti-

⁶⁹ Lialiouti, *Ο Αντιαμερικανισμός*, 313 ff.; Zinovia Lialiouti, *Ο άλλος Ψυχρός Πόλεμος. Η αμερικανική πολιτιστική διπλωματία στην Ελλάδα 1953-1973* (The Other Cold War. American Cultural Diplomacy in Greece) (Irakleio: Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2019); Andreas Pantazopoulos, *Λαϊκισμός και εκσυγχρονισμός, 1965-2005. Απορίες και κίνδυνοι μιας μαχητικής συμβίωσης* (Populism and Modernization 1965-2005. Questions and Risks of a Symbiosis with Fights) (Athens: Estia, 2011), 57-91; Pantazopoulos, «Για το λαό και το έθνος», 142-8.

⁷⁰ *To Vima*, 14-10-1977, 5; *Ta Nea*, 15-11-1977, 11; 16-11-1977, 7; 14-4-1980, 19; *Rizospastis*, 13-6-1975, 1, 7; Giorgos Antoniou–Eleni Paschaloudi, «‘Το άψογο πρόσωπο της ιστορίας θολώνει:’ Η αναγνώριση της Εαμικής αντίστασης και το πολιτικό σύστημα (1945-1995)» [‘The Impeccable Facade of History is Blurred:’ The Recognition of EAMist Resistance and the Political System (1945-1995)], in *Ηρωες των Ελλήνων. Οι καπετάνιοι, τα παληκάρια και η αναγνώριση των εθνικών αγώνων, 19ος-20ός αιώνας*, ed. V.K. Gounaris (Athens: Idryma tis Voulis, 2014).

⁷¹ See <https://www.augoustinos-kantiotis.gr/?p=40986> and <https://choratouaxoritou.gr/?p=65967>, where extracts of his sermons and articles.

westernism the most. It re-introduced the importance of the Byzantine tradition of St Gregory Palamas and re-enforced criticism of western rationalism. In 1985, father Mettalinis, the most renowned representative of Greek neo-Orthodoxy, expressed his views as a Eurosceptic rather than as an Orthodox fundamentalist. In the introduction of his book *Tradition and Alienation* he stated that his apparent anti-westernism did not imply real aversion to the West, whatever the meaning of West was. He was not against meeting and co-operating with the West, provided the prerequisites, the targets and the expectations of such a meeting were clearly set out and qualified. He was in favour of such a meeting, provided that the Greeks were able to choose and were fully aware of their own cultural and spiritual heritage. His conclusion was that the quality of this meeting would be linked to Greek self-respect and dignity; in other words it was a matter of honour to resist the charms of the West and to approach it from a position of superiority.⁷² This elegant reservation was widely disseminated through the sneer of Euro-hunger/ry (*evroligouris*), a pejorative term coined by Kostas Zouraris, a communist neo-Orthodox, encompassing all the negative components of mimicking the West that had once characterised the despised and servile Levantines.

8.

During the last thirty years, after the collapse of the bipolar system and the shift of Greek Socialists towards the European Union and the Eurozone, anti-Americanism became less militant. Its political face-value was depreciated, since Russophilia and Balkanophilia became legitimate options for Communists and Conservatives alike, but by no means did it become extinct. It was upgraded to resistance to globalization. This new fear of the so-called 'roller coaster of globalization,'⁷³ which is expected to crush individuals, nations and cultures, has incorporated all previous aspects of anti-westernism: fear of modernization and post-modernization at the expense of Greek Orthodox tradition; as well as fear of dependence, in this case of subjugation to

⁷² Georgios Metallinos, *Παράδοση και αλλοτρίωση* (Tradition and Alienation) (Athens: Domos, 2001), 20.

⁷³ Metallinos, *Για την Ευρώπη μας*, 102.

the neo-liberal 'New World Order.' The latter threat includes the legacy of all earlier fears of imperialism, colonialism, capitalism, and Jewish-Freemasonry, even scepticism for the United Nations.⁷⁴

Fine examples of these fears are the debates which took place in the 1990s and 2000s for the revision of traditional historical approaches concerning the Macedonian Question, resistance during World War II and the Greek Civil War.⁷⁵ The assumption was that a new historical approach, put forward by neo-liberal historians, was aimed against national and social history in order to undermine and degrade both nations and social phenomena. To strengthen this assumption, post-modernist approaches were arbitrarily connected to American historiography, because it was in the USA that the cultural approach was developed, in favour of a global point of view rather than a national one.⁷⁶ In this trend, post-modernist historical approaches were equated with the intentional deconstruction of Greek national history. No less severe was the attack of the revisionists by Marxist historians who accused them of recycling anti-Communism to undermine the ideological hegemony of the Left and de-politicize the struggle of the Greek people against the Germans, the British and the Americans in the 1940s. The blame was put on the West, one way or another. During the same period Euroscepticism, a notion clearly overlapping with anti-globalization, followed and qualified the model which had been initiated in the 1970s by PASOK. It was not an outright rejection of Europe but a conditional approval: "I want Europe, but not this Europe." This quest developed into a trend in favour of a new utopia: Europe of the immigrants and the minorities juxtaposed to the dystopian Europe

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http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_el_nat.pdf 2007, 17.

⁷⁵ Vasilis K. Gounaris, *Το μακεδονικό ζήτημα από τον 19ο έως τον 21ο αιώνα. Ιστοριογραφικές προσεγγίσεις* (The Macedonian Question from the 19th to the 21st Century. A Historiographical Approach) (Athens: Alexandreia, 2010), 115-31; Polymeris Voglis-Ioannis Nioutsikos, "The Greek Historiography of the 1940s. A Reassessment," *Südosteuropa* 65 (2017): 2.

⁷⁶ Ioanna Laliotou, «Ιστοριογραφία και αντιαμερικανισμός» (Historiography and Anti-americanism), *To Vima*, 24-11-2008.

of the ultra-right and the neo-liberals. This is the trend currently promoted by the party of SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left).

Through the channel of neo-Orthodoxy discussed above, the official Church of Greece was easily in tune with the Eurosceptics, projecting its own vision of a Christian Europe, the enemy of Islam, closed to Muslim immigrants. Its interest in politics, fully fledged in the days of the late Archbishop Christodoulos, pushed the Church of Greece down the road of national populism, which had been opened wide by PASOK in the 1980s.⁷⁷ This is how the late Archbishop expressed his views on Europe:

“The most severe threat is the emergence of an ideology which bypasses reality and, in the name of so-called modernization, seeks to forget that the roots are not the past of a tree but a factor in favour of its survival. I am referring to those who want to cross out the Christian character of Europe and turn the continent into a hollow hostel of ideologies, turn us into beings without tradition and therefore without resistance and without prerequisites.”⁷⁸

This hostel was in his view a ‘false Europe;’ the ‘malignant ideology’ was modernization.⁷⁹ Professor Christos Giannaras, another eminent neo-Orthodox, in 2003 accused the European Union of an inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* the nouveau riche primitivism of the USA. The EU, he claimed, was trading off its tradition and achievements to imitate the American prototype.⁸⁰ It was in the same year that father Metallinos (and not some communist leader) wrote that the Yugoslav wars had amply shown, even to the most adamant Greek supporters of Europe, that the EU essentially was serving the interests of its most powerful members and required the unconditional surrender of small nations to its will. Next to the Yugoslav wars more diplomatic crises

⁷⁷ Giannis Stavrakakis, “Religious Populism and Political Culture: The Greek Case,” *South European Society and Politics* 7, no. 3 (2002).

⁷⁸ <https://archxristodoulos.gr/index.php/2012-12-07-11-01-14/324-europa-nostra>

⁷⁹ <https://archxristodoulos.gr/index.php/2012-12-07-11-01-14/315-2012-12-07-10-40-04>

⁸⁰ *Kathimerini*, 14-9-2003.

could be added which were perceived by the Greeks as insulting and humiliating their soul.⁸¹

During the last decade the on-going economic crisis has deeply embedded the view that Greece is being constantly punished, insulted and humiliated by Europe without mercy. Taking full control of the Greek economy topped the list of insults. In a way, the memoranda imposing specific economic and financial policies symbolized the end of the old dilemma. Greece was compelled to choose and to state her future path; it could no longer balance between the East and the West. It was clear that the Greek nation had been exhausted chasing Europe, had failed to catch up with the EU, and had crashed loudly and embarrassingly, as Professor Giannis Voulgaris pointed out.⁸² A failure of that size was unbearable. It could not but increase contempt for Europe, with anti-Germanism as the most convenient spearhead and alibi of this trend. Fused with the fear of globalization, anti-Europeanism quickly evolved into the new Great Idea; not only of SYRIZA, but of at least twenty Greek political parties, from the far Left to the Naziphiles. Twelve years after father Metallinos, SYRIZA Minister Sia Anagnostopoulou, a professor of History, declared: 'Because I have always been a European, I no longer want this Europe. I do not need to prove that I am a European. They need to prove they are and they should hand their proof to us.'⁸³

9.

To conclude: When Greece entered the 20th century, anti-westernism had been fully shaped as a parameter of Greek political ideology and the USA was already a part of it. Antipathy for the West was a core ingredient of its permanent identity crisis, the outcome of Greece's unstable and undecided position between East and West, an element of its romantic nationalism, full of contradictions and dilemmas. This

⁸¹ Metallinos, *Για την Ευρώπη μας*, 16.

⁸² Giannis Voulgaris, *Η μεταπολιτευτική Ελλάδα, 1974-2009* (Greece after the Dictatorship, 1974-2009) (Athens: Polis, 2013), 442-3.

⁸³ Petros Papasantopoulos, «Αντιευρωπαϊσμός, η μεγάλη ιδέα του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ και όχι μόνο» (Anti-Europeanism, the Great Idea of SYRIZA and Others), *The Books Journal*, 23-3-2017, <http://booksjournal.gr/παρεμβάσεις/item/2543-antievrvpaismos-big-idea>

stance was not an exclusively Greek phenomenon. It was nourished by arguments provided by the general criticism of western culture and civilization, coming both from the Right and the Left, as well as by Occidentalism, that is the critique of the West with arguments forged in the West. Anti-westernism, dismissive, competitive or selective in its expression, was a point of convergence and compromise between the traditional religious Orthodox identity and modern Greek nationalism. It was an unsteady point of balance on which Greek utopian idealism was gradually built. In terms of social development, it was a point of resistance against the transformation of the local cultural identity of the Greeks into a civic one, of the western sort.⁸⁴ By its nature, anti-westernism was an expression of the lower strata, not of the elites. Therefore it focused on a dual threat or fear, to recall the terms of Rena Stavridou-Patrikiou:⁸⁵ (a) the primordial fear that Eastern Orthodoxy and its tradition would be corrupted by western modernization, social and political – the parliamentary system included as an instrument of capitalism; (b) the threat/fear of dependence upon the Great Powers of the West which would destroy the prolonged Greek irredentist vision, as it was incompatible with the Turkophile policy of the West and the Panslavist policy of Russia. The latter threat of dependence (and the necessary foreign policy to achieve independence) was complicated by the former, the fear of corruption, because Russia and the Balkans were Orthodox brethren and appropriate allies in the anti-western struggle, yet despised foes at the same time.

During the 20th century Greece faced serious challenges both in domestic and foreign affairs: participation in two world wars, the course of irredentism before and after the Asia Minor Catastrophe (from Macedonia to Cyprus and back to Macedonia), relations with Communism and the Soviet Union, as well as Greece's place in the post-World War II bipolar power system, the European Union, and the global market. These challenges caused repeated domestic crises, political and economic. Sometimes they took the form of dilemmas,

⁸⁴ D.G. Tsaousis, «Ελληνισμός και Ελληνικότητα» (Hellenism and Greekness), in *Ελληνισμός, ελληνικότητα. Ιδεολογικοί και βιωματικοί άξονες της νεοελληνικής κοινωνίας*, ed. D.G. Tsaousis (Athens: Estia, 1983), 15-25.

⁸⁵ Rena Stavridi-Patrikiou, *Οι φόβοι ενός αιώνα* (The Fears of a Century) (Athens: Metaichmio, 2008).

‘with the East or with the West?’; ‘tradition or modernity?’ It was not only in Greece that these questions were presented in this form.⁸⁶ Sometimes the choice was indeed between East and West. What makes the Greek case interesting and more sentimentally charged, yet not exceptional, is (a) the constant, systematic correlation of anti-westernism with social and economic problems so that parties and policies could gain the support of the lower and less educated social strata with greater ease; (b) the significant and deliberate correlation of anti-westernism with issues of national identity and religious consciousness, and (c) as a result of (b) the deep impact of anti-westernism on the shaping of the historical paradigm. None of these factors was a 20th century novelty. But their impact was deeper because the terms and the ways in which the public debate and political confrontation evolved in Greece from the end of the 19th century onwards changed a lot. Anti-westernism in 20th century Greece was neither uniformly expressed by an elite, nor was it an exclusively grass-root movement. Yet, during the prolonged integration crisis of the Greek nation and compared to the 19th century, it had many more opportunities and ways to be expressed and qualified either by intellectuals or by the common people.⁸⁷

The exploitation of anti-westernism in the 20th century involved both constituent threats to Modern Hellenism, alienation and dependence, which are recalled selectively but steadily, always invested with a lot of sentiment and expressed through stereotypes within different political contexts. Materialism, which is the most effective cause of alienation, has been attributed to the Entente allies of World War I and to colonial Britain in particular, but also to German Militarists, to Communism (manufactured in the West), to Capitalists and Imperialists, to the USA, Europe, the EEC and EU and to the western culture in general. The Jews are explicitly connected to all these threats; therefore, anti-Semitism is an organic ingredient of Greek anti-westernism.

⁸⁶ Mikael af Malmberg-Bo Stråth, “The National Meanings of Europe,” in *The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention within and among Nations* (Oxford–New York: Berg, 2002), 1–25.

⁸⁷ Cf. Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, *Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece* (Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, 1994).

Even Germanophilia during both world wars, although it was a western choice, was projected as a weapon to defend idealism and therefore justify Greek cultural identity and its superiority over Capitalism and Communism alike. Dependence upon the unholy alliances of the Westerners, the second threat, constitutes an insult to Greek honour, a mockery of a brave nation, exploitation of its love for honour (*filotimo*), betrayal of its impeccable principles, framing of its great ideas by endless conspiracies. In many cases Greek anti-western campaigns for independence imply alternative choice of allies, mainly Russia and the Balkans. Be they Orthodox kingdoms, members of a communist federation, socialist states or just profitable export markets in the vicinity, these lands are closely related to Greek dreams of expansion and Orthodox reunion under Greek leadership, spiritual if not political.

In brief, Greek idealism, invested with many pre-modern virtues (resistance, *palikarism*, *filotimo*, humanity, autarchy) and portrayed as a rival to the greedy capitalist West, inspired interwar urban nationalism; the third Hellenic civilization of Ioannis Metaxas; ‘Hellas of Greek Christians’ (the vision of the 1967 dictators); the anti-imperialist struggles of Greek Communists; and the irredentist struggles of the nationally-minded Greeks, the Orthodox and neo-Orthodox intellectuals fighting against dependence, mutation and alienation. In the context of Greek 20th century political confrontations, Royalists and Venizelists, Communists and Conservatives, dictators and Socialists all exploited with confidence similar if not identical arguments; they invoked the same fears and easily won the support of the lower strata – and, in the 21st century, not only of the lower strata. Even if all of them do not have the support of the Greek Church, it is clear to the people that they share the Orthodox view of Greekness (i.e., the notion of Hellenic-Christianity), the Orthodox objections to modernity, even popular Christian anti-Semitism. The selective relationship with the Church legitimizes politicians, regardless of their ideology, as exponents and representatives of the people, a notion invested with national purity, thus justifying their fight against the alienated, servile and false Greeks. Historians, public and party historians in particular, back them up by canonizing the fighters and movements that resisted de-

pendence on the West, thus building the proper history for a nation of *palikaria*, not as the West wanted it to be but as it has always been.

I believe that all those who wonder why the leftist culture has so easily prevailed in the post 1974 era should consider the full exploitation of Greek idealism by the Left, expressed as a constant fight against dependence on the West; a stance which charms all Greeks and can recruit allies in any political party. Therefore, this attitude has easily undermined post-war *ethnikofrosyni* and even more easily pro-Europeanism. Anti-westernism is the common denominator of anti-Imperialism, anti-Americanism, Euroscepticism and, in our days, of the generalized fear of globalization. Even defeat in this struggle, be it defeat in the Civil War in 1949 or in the 2015 mid-summer night negotiations between the EU and Premier Tsipras, has an element of heroism which bestows a moral advantage to the loser. This is why Pantazopoulos⁸⁸ has named the 2015 summer referendum, for or against EU, as the 'new national resistance,' the old one being that against the Nazis.

As a matter of fact, the rival ideology, sympathy for the West, has almost never been documented in depth in any shape, pro-western, pro-European or pro-American. To the extent it was documented, either in the nineteenth or the 20th century, it was the work of a few individuals, which was not widely disseminated; nor was it ever conceived by the Greeks as an essential convergence with the West in principles. Pro-westernism was always considered the result of bargaining, as an exchange which implied territorial, financial or security gains and promises. In its most popular and comprehensible form, friendship to the West was connected to anti-Communism; but even in this sense, as stated above, Communism, an expression of atheist materialism, was essentially of western (and Jewish) origin. Greek pro-Europeanism, in particular, has been dependent to a great extent on the Hellenic and Christian premises of Europe. It is narcissism under cover. What Greece admires in Europe is its own reflection. It is also a trap. Whenever Europe diverts from its Greek principles, the Greeks

⁸⁸ Andreas Pantazopoulos, *Ο αριστερός εθνικολαϊκισμός. Από την αντιπολίτευση στην εξουσία* (National Populism of the Left. From the Opposition to the Government) (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2016), 127-30.

need to disassociate themselves to protect their own values and image. If the continent takes a wrong turn, the Greeks are the par-excellence jury to restore it to the correct course.

Perhaps it is meaningless to evaluate the quality of Greek arguments for and against the West. What is crucial is to comprehend that this dispute is of marginal political importance. In term of ideology, Greece has been and is still flirting openly with the East; yet in terms of politics it has steadily been engaged to the West. It should also be kept in mind that this dispute is being exploited in Greek domestic politics as a matter of principles, as a choice related to values, but in reality, it has always been an expression of national populism or demagoguery. It is the mantle to cover up all Greek shortcomings, a Great Idea suitable for every use. There are many uses, many users and users who alternate and shift camps. The camps are defined, restructured and acquire special meaning through the expression of anti-westernism or the adjustment of anti-westernism to the circumstances. In the Greek imagination, Europe in particular and West in general, as processes investing meaning rather than as clearly defined and widely acceptable analytical categories, acquire so many shapes and contents as are necessary to determine Greek identity in negative terms. The West is simultaneously whatever we are not, we wouldn't or we would like to be, and we shall never become.

*Kyriakos D. Kentrotis**

**The Governance of the Abnormal: The Balkan Chalk Circle
within the Circle of European Integration****

*Hear now the story of the trial
concerning Governor Abashvili's child
and the determination of the true mother
by the famous test of the Chalk Circle.*

– Bertolt Brecht, *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*

Introduction

In the period between the First and Second World Wars Charles-Édouard Jeanneret-Gris (1887-1965), better known as Le Corbusier, published *La Ville Radieuse*,¹ his vision of the city of the future with its towering high-rise housing blocks. The apartments in these “Unités d’habitation” would be distributed according to the size and requirements of each family. Each Unité would have its own gyms, swimming pools, sandy beaches, sports grounds, gardens, and parking areas. The city would be organised following a hierarchy of production and administration. At the base of the pyramid, workers and engineers would run the factories as a team. Each sector would correspond to a

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¹ First published in 1933, in French. See Le Corbusier, *The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to be used as a Basis of our Machine-Age Civilization* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).

level of administrative responsibility. The hierarchy of administration would replace the polity.

At a time when decorative symbols had become an end in themselves for egocentric Europeans in nation-states, Le Corbusier broke with decoration in architecture, offering instead space and practical solutions to the governing of the “radiant city,”² based on its capacity for speed. Speed is freedom: freedom to meet, to tune in, to exchange, to transact.³

An analogous “radiant city” rising from the ruins of Europe was envisioned by the architects of the plan for European integration. Above and beyond self-centred ornamental national symbols, the new European polity would be based, like Le Corbusier’s city, on free rapid movement: of goods, services, capital and citizens.

This paper is rooted in the *sui generis* dialogue between visions of and architectural plans for the European states in the aftermath of WWII. Plans for the construction of an abnormal political entity among the normal nation-states with their symbols and their ornaments, and also plans for their citizens, with its programmes for integration and inclusion in nation-states both within the European heartland and also on the Balkan perimeter. It presents their progress from the normal in every instance to the abnormal, and vice versa. Its principal interlocutors are a set of “abnormal individuals,” Michel Foucault and Bertolt Brecht, Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, together with all European politicians and citizens, normal or otherwise. What emerges as its principal conclusion is the adaptive re-alignment of power relations between the *Zeitgeist* and the *genius loci* in Europe and the Balkans for the governance of European integration.

² Familiar as the “modern city of three million inhabitants” designed by Le Corbusier for the centre of Paris and presented for the first time in November 1922 at the Paris Salon d’Automne. Le Corbusier adapted his plan for other cities, including Algiers, Barcelona, Buenos Ayres, Brasilia and Sao Paolo. See Marylène Montavon-Koen Steemers-Vicky Cheng-Raphaël Compagnon, “‘La Ville Radieuse’ by Le Corbusier once again a case study,” PLEA2006–The 23rd Conference on Passive and Low Energy Architecture, Geneva, Switzerland, 6-8 September 2006 (accessed 31-1-2021), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/37434408_La_Ville_Radiouse_by_Le_Corbusier_once_again_a_case_study

³ William J.R. Curtis, *Modern Architecture since 1900* (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1982), 206-10, 286-90.

The Normality of the Nation-state: "Signs and Wonders"

"In the centre of Europe, amid the highlands of Europe, rises a tower of reason and solid faith", as Jorge Luis Borges so forcefully affirms, and in 1291 the Swiss "took the curious decision to become reasonable,"⁴ conspiring against the other Europeans shut up in their fortresses. With the Reformation, the mediaeval fortresses were demolished by the "cannons of reason" of the Westphalian state; the Peace of Westphalia, Hans Morgenthau argued, established the primacy of the sovereign state as the cornerstone of the modern state system which, in its turn, vanquished the representatives of God and the divinely-ordained monarchs.⁵

The French Revolution would establish the logic of the forgotten underclasses, giving meaning to the new normality of the nation-state, which now stands as the new architectural model for all. The democratic state with its mechanistic equality is proclaimed. Its basic priority is the nationalisation of the organisation of the individual in pursuit of the present and progress. Specifically, it enshrines total state surveillance and regimentation of the unreformed individual into a disciplined citizen through the microphysics of observation⁶ and treatment within the nation-state while at the same time providing security and progress with the Westphalian diplomacy of war. It colonises time and space, altering everyday life so that the citizens live within it, beyond the unwelcoming feudal fortresses of the chosen few.⁷

From the 18th century on, according to Michel Foucault, governance of the nation-state of disciplined soldiers and citizens consolidated on an axis of observation, discipline and normalisation, where power is maintained and developed through mechanisms that construct, create and produce. "The Governor's palace is at peace. But why is it a

⁴ From the poem by Jorge Luis Borges, "Los Conjurados" (The Conspirators), in *Obras Completas 1975-1985* (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1989), 501.

⁵ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf), 161.

⁶ See Michel Foucault, *Power Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*, ed. James D. Fabion (New York, NY: The New Press, 2001).

⁷ See Christopher Alan Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914. Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

fortress?”⁸ It is a power that fuses prison and hospital through scientific knowledge. Every activity is normalised with the appraisal of medical knowledge by the appropriate judge.⁹

In France,¹⁰ from Bicêtre¹¹ outside Paris to Mettray¹² near Tours, in Berlin’s Charité hospital and in correctional institutions as “Besserungsmaschinen”¹³ in Prussia and the Reich, expert assessors have the power to protect the normal nation-state. The dilemma is not “either prison or hospital, either atonement or cure.” The basic desideratum is “to justify the existence of a sort of protective continuum throughout the social body ranging from the medical level of treatment to the penal institution strictly speaking, that is to say, the prison and, if it comes to it, the scaffold.”¹⁴

For the others, the abnormal individuals, the new nation-state has provided special places for incarceration, observation and treatment. To them are brought the monsters as juridico-natural exceptions, the unreformed of every kind and all those, children and adults, who do not control their urges within the body of the family and society.¹⁵ Medical and legal knowledge is applied to all these so that the normative power may rule everywhere through techniques for the normalisation of transgressors. For Foucault, there have always been monsters seeking their prey, but their shape changes with the history of know-

⁸ Lines spoken by the Singer, Bertolt Brecht, *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, trans. Eric Bentley (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1966), 33.

⁹ Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at Collège de France 1974-1975*, trans. Graham Burchell (London: Verso, 2003), 25-26, 32-33.

¹⁰ See Patricia O’Brien, *The Promises of Punishment. Prisons in Nineteenth Century France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

¹¹ Operated successively as military hospital, orphanage, prison, asylum, and hospital, south of Paris. Its most famous inmate was the Marquis de Sade; see Michel Foucault, *History of Madness*, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).

¹² “It was the first training college in pure discipline,” Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995), 295.

¹³ See Thomas Nutz, “Strafanstalt als Besserungsmaschine.” *Reformdiskurs und Gefängniswissenschaft 1775-1848* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001).

¹⁴ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 33.

¹⁵ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 328.

ledge.¹⁶ The reigning discourse of applied politics is constituted from the specialised knowledge and unlimited powers of technology for states and institutions presenting new positions as “natural.” This is a reversal of the doctrine that knowledge is power. In this new type of power, all available tools, techniques, processes, possibilities and purposes constitute its new “natural” anatomy. The technology of power builds up a constantly shifting network of productive relations and actions that is not based simply and solely on obedience through repression.¹⁷

This, then, was the path trodden from 1648-1945 by the nation-states of Europe’s heartland, carrying the fringes along with them into the new normality. “Where are you, General, where are you? Please, please, please, restore order!”¹⁸ Up to the end of WWII the nation-state, combining the roles of gaoler and policeman, finds itself with its productive body in constant conflict with the unnatural body of subject-citizens whose desires¹⁹ and ideas do not conform to the architecture and technology of its normality.

From Normal Europeans to Abnormal European Integration

i. Ogres and Tom Thumbs

“[T]he history of abnormal individuals (les anormaux), begins quite simply with King Kong; that is to say, from the outset we are in the land of the ogres.”²⁰ From its inception and throughout its modern and contemporary history the nation-state has not been based solely and simply on the technology of blood and violence. Just as every fairy tale has its ogre which is redeemed in the end, so the nation-state has monsters, demons and ghosts at its disposal, to defend like guardian

¹⁶ Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in *Unifying the Text: A Poststructuralist Reader*, ed. Robert J.C. Young (London: Routledge, 1981), 60.

¹⁷ Jon Simmons, *Foucault and the Political* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 27-30.

¹⁸ Lines spoken by the village recorder Aztak and the policeman Shauwa, Brecht, *op.cit.*, 109.

¹⁹ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 236.

²⁰ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 109.

angels its threatened sovereign existence, both against other states and within its own legal order.²¹

Amid the ruins of WWII states old and new seek to regain their normality. On the personal level normal Europeans seek their identity in the military hospitals, the orphanages, the prisons, the asylums of the defeated nation states. From these will emerge “the dynasty of abnormal Tom Thumbs [which] has its roots in the figure of the ogre [and] [h]istorically they are his natural descendants.”²² Abandoned in the forest by their normal parents, the nation-states, playthings of the man-eating ogre that terrified Europe. Until his defeat in the bloody shambles of WWII, they had admired his image and his works. Victory in the war brought about the burial of Fascism and Nazism together with the great ogres that engendered them. In the post-war era of the victors, the new normality of the reconstructed nation-states cannot rely on old-style ogres and monsters. Such Tom Thumbs, as Jean Monnet observed, men like Robert Schuman, began “to build Europe brick by brick,”²³ changing the life given them by their parents for another that would not breed monsters.²⁴ There emerged then a very small circle of political and industrial elites presenting a new type of abnormal governance, mutually profitable and at the same promising a corresponding circle of prosperity and rights for the broad normal strata of the populace. These are the abnormal Europeans of a “radiant” modern federal Europe which to avoid scaring the other –normal– states designs and constructs bridges and neighbourhoods between mortal enemies, forming “virtuous circles” of promises and benefits.

“[A]t last Georgi has decided to start building the east wing. All those wretched slums are to be torn down to make room for the gar-

²¹ See Richard Devetak, “The Gothic scene of international relations: ghosts, monsters, terror and the sublime after September 11,” *Review of International Studies* 31, no. 4 (2005): 621-43; Richard Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters. Interpreting otherness* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

²² Foucault, *Abnormal*, 109.

²³ François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet—The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Co., 1994), 86.

²⁴ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 109-10.

den.”²⁵ Thus after 1951 the abnormal city began to be built alongside and between the normal nation-states. The result of the plans of the architects and engineers who inspired it was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which aroused deep suspicion, primarily among the French (who belonged to it) and those of like mind, as an administrative monster of an uncontrolled non-state technocratic Authority.²⁶ The British rejected Le Plan (the ECSC)²⁷ and in 1955 at Messina were distrustful of those who had met to discuss the formation of the EEC.²⁸

The European Plan progressed under the watchful eye and constant challenge of the other normal nation-states. An unfinished “radiant city” needing many gifts and offerings –as Monnet said, ‘via money’²⁹– to win the confidence of the normal states and their citizens. To be certified as normal and no danger to the nation-states. The structure of the Community relied on trade and economics for its normalisation. Expectations of economic growth and prosperity on the supranational level were balanced by the lavish provision of rights and freedoms within the nation-states, bringing together the “enemy” beyond the borders. Community integration served the entrenchment of sovereign national securitization in the Cold War period even as it served the abnormal discourse of the ruling Community elites. New Treaties and the production of Community law³⁰ substantiate the steady upgrading of the Community edifice with its characteristic economic strengths. Ambitious European leaders plan the step-by-step integration of the European Union, content with a minimum of tacit consent from the citizens. “Shauwa, [...] For a long time now I have held you in the iron curb of reason, and it has torn your mouth till it bleeds. I have

²⁵ Exchange between the Governor’s wife Natella and Prince Arsen Kazbeki, Brecht, *op.cit.*, 29.

²⁶ Alexander Werth, *France 1940-1955* (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1957), 550.

²⁷ Werth, *op.cit.*, 481.

²⁸ See Kyriakos Kentrotis, “60 Years after Messina: ‘The Double Life’ of the European Integration,” in *Liber Amicorum Stelios Perakis*, eds. Jean-Paul Jacqu  , Florence Beno  t-Rohmer–Panagiotis Grigoriou–Maria Daniella Marouda (Athens: I. Sideris, 2017), 241–50.

²⁹ Duch  ne, *op.cit.*, 312.

³⁰ See Erik Jones, “The Economic Mythology of European Integration,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 1 (2010): 89–109.

lashed you with reasonable arguments, I have manhandled you with logic.”³¹ In the framework of reform and certification programmes, the abnormal institutions –wrestling with isolation and self-complacency– cultivate the new vision in the cloistered environment of Cold War international relations: that is, treatment and reward for the Europeans for continuous economic growth with perpetual consumption and accountability.

ii. The Tom Thumbs Grew

From the 1990s on, the normal nation-state and the abnormal “radiant city” of European integration shared the normality in the framework of the interplay of mutual benefit and the concomitant adaptation of the Westphalian tradition to the new conditions of open economic borders.³² This was in effect a *sui generis* co-existence owing to the economic strength of the preceding decades of European integration that was returning to the nation-states with new techniques of governance in the role of regulatory power controlling the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* and its practical counterpart of economic convergence.³³

The Community structure gradually evolved into a mechanism for rationalising decisions and implementing policies. The technology of economic governance and its related know-how spread through the entire spectrum of productive policy. This is reflected in the new dogma of the Cold War period: “Here, laissez-faire is turned into a do-not-laissez-faire government, in the name of a law of the market which will enable each of its activities to be measured and assessed.”³⁴ The

³¹ Spoken by the village recorder Aztak, Brecht, *op.cit.*, 108.

³² See James A. Caporaso, “The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-modern,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34, no. 1 (1996): 29-52.

³³ See Sibylle Scheipers–Daniela Sicurelli, “Normative power Europa: A credible utopia?,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 45, no. 2 (2007): 435-57; Andrea Biondi–Piet Eeckhout–Stefanie Ripley (eds.), *EU Law after Lisbon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

³⁴ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at Collège de France, 1978-79*, trans. Graham Burchell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 247.

acquis communautaire redefines governance; “[i]t is a sort of permanent economic tribunal confronting government.”³⁵

Led by the economy and the *acquis communautaire*, states and citizens find themselves not only equivalent to corporations and clients but also relentless competitors in the financial markets. In the new *Zeitgeist*, the prevailing normality develops as a new kind of governmental mechanism for European integration, the nation-state and the citizens defining every activity of politics and society through a labyrinthine system of practices of certification and evaluation. The continuous concurrence/confrontation of national gaoler and supranational architect has succumbed to the all-seeing accountant. It is he who now cures and secures states and citizens with his assessments, providing certified panopticon-type techniques of redeeming self-criticism, unending competition and perpetual surveillance. What we have is in essence “a great and new instrument of government,”³⁶ with which “the little abnormal individuals, the abnormal Tom Thumbs, end up devouring the great monstrous ogres who served as their fathers.”³⁷ In the evolution of the abnormal European integration, “the species of great exceptional monstrosity end up being divided up into this host of little abnormalities, of both abnormal and familiar characters.”³⁸

From the Unconformable Balkan Citizens to the Abnormal Western Balkan States

i. Divergent from Birth

The geography of the Balkans is seen as a congenital appendage and aberration from that of Europe as a whole. Their history is written by the passage of innumerable armies. The gradual ethnic emergence of the Balkan countries in conjunction with the interests of each successive set of Great Powers has indelibly established an image that not only lacks natural boundaries with Western Europe but has more of

³⁵ Foucault, *The Birth*, 247.

³⁶ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 206.

³⁷ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 109.

³⁸ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 110.

the barbarous and primitive mentality that does not bow to normal European political and cultural discourse.³⁹

The Balkans are burdened with countless pages of medico-legal assessment of a bad reputation that constitutes a permanent risk of contamination for European normality. The enduring search for national identity in the Balkans will experience the whole prevailing system of discipline and normality in the framework of the corresponding national European. For countless centuries the abnormal Balkan peoples and their states have been the monsters, unreformed misfits with urges of every kind beyond all permissible limits. “What has been emphasized about the Balkans is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as normative by and for the civilized world.”⁴⁰

The history of the Balkan peoples since the age of their Ottoman conquest underlies the position of local societies with regard to their habit of considering anything connected with state authority as an object of suspicion, foreign, non-controllable, and in part inimical to the sanctity of the narrow individual and family *acquis*. “And now, with your liberation, you will soon be able to follow your natural inclinations, which are low. You will be able to follow your infallible instinct, which teaches you to plant your fat heel on the faces of men.”⁴¹ The non-conforming Balkan people continue to resist the established European model of “family snugness” in politics as a way of life in the structures of the national state and its institutions.

The normal Western model of governance has operated in the Balkans as prison and hospital. Local interests experience confinement and adaptation to the corresponding conflicting interests of the Great Powers. The structure of the national Balkan state, unfinished compared to the Western prototypes imitated, follows prescribed regimens for normality, wrestling with antiquated economic structures, the desire to Europeanise local societies, and a defensive nationalism vis-à-vis its neighbours. In addition, the Balkans suffer a side effect of their

³⁹ See Dusan I. Bjelić–Obrad Savić (eds.), *Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation* (Cambridge, MA/London: The MIT Press, 2005).

⁴⁰ Maria Todorova, *Imaging the Balkans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3.

⁴¹ Spoken by the village recorder Atzak, Brecht, *op.cit.*, 108.

enduring sequestration and on-going therapeutic regime, in continued victimization within their own community.

ii. From Confinement to Certificates of Treatment

“We marvel that His Excellency intends to build. There are disquieting rumors that the war in Persia has taken a turn for the worse.”⁴² After 1990, the “radiant” European polity needed both living space and human resources. The Balkans were ideal in terms of geographical and historical proximity. In the post-Cold-War period, the new Balkans remained synonymous with corruption and abuse of power, a place where mistrust and suspicion of the state and its institutions were ingrained in the population. A rapid course of treatment and certification based on the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 enabled the old historic Balkan states to enter the European Union’s mutual benefit game, and the EU in its turn was obliged by global competition to accept them as part of itself, projecting onto them its desires, hopes and anxieties.

“I’ll make a test. Shauwa, get a piece of chalk and draw a circle on the floor.”⁴³ For the newer states of the Western Balkans, the main problem is their long confinement in institutions to prepare them for inclusion. The architecture is ready with medical and legal assessment to allow states and citizens of the Western Balkans to move from exclusion to inclusion and treatment. The EU has the means and the methods to handle the new monsters and the unreformed from the Western Balkans, with all their urges. The future accession of the Western Balkans to the EU comprises a multitude of stages: in general outline these are the preparatory mechanisms of discussion and preparation for accession, feasibility studies, negotiations for the signing of Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA), signature of an Interim Agreement on trade and related matters, implementation of the SAA when these enter into effect, application for adhesion, opinion of the Commission, and negotiations on admission with regard to the chapters of the *acquis communautaire*.

⁴² Exchange between one of the Architects and the Adjutant, Brecht, *op.cit.*, 34.

⁴³ The village recorder Aztak addressing the policeman Shauwa, Brecht, *op.cit.*, 126.

“Stamps make all the difference. Without something in writing the Shah couldn’t prove he’s a Shah.”⁴⁴ The states of the Western Balkans have to enter their own chalk circle, wrestling with their identity between solidification of their ethnic memory and securitisation through the normal and rational Euro-Atlantic institutions and models. This is a perpetual and painful tug-of-war of adaptation to the dogma: “Distribute bodies with the greatest possible distance between them.”⁴⁵ They do not have the option of pulling the Western Balkan states out of the circle or of laying claim to them. “There is a campaign against shared bedrooms, against parents and children, and children “of a different sex,” “sharing the same bed.” The Western Balkans have room only for “the well-known small house with three rooms: a living room for all, a room for the parents and a room for the children, or even a room for the parents and a room for boys and a room for girls.”⁴⁶ The Western Balkans with their historic tradition of incest from having the whole family living in a single room are now required to adapt to new circumstances. “The essential thing is to prevent the promiscuity between parents and offspring and between the older and younger that could make incest possible.”⁴⁷

The “radiant” polity is ruled by “a particular regime of truth which is a characteristic feature of what could be called the age of politics and the basic apparatus of which is in fact still the same today. When I say regime of truth I do not mean that at this moment politics or the art of government finally becomes rational.”⁴⁸ The European Union’s expert assessors implement the most severe normalisation practices in the Western Balkans, starting with the exposure of these societies, deficient in any tradition or memory of liberal democracy, to the principles of neoliberal economics. The countries of the Western Balkans are in the equivalent of Mettray, a correctional institution with young inmates locked up “as in the eighteenth century, as an alternative to paternal correction.”⁴⁹ Their admission to the major Euro-Atlantic in-

⁴⁴ Lines spoken by Lavrenti Vashnadze and his sister Grusha, Brecht, *op.cit.*, 68.

⁴⁵ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 270.

⁴⁶ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 270.

⁴⁷ Foucault, *Abnormal*, 271.

⁴⁸ Foucault, *The Birth*, 18.

⁴⁹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 296.

stitutions of the Western world demonstrates their multilevel function as institutions of confinement and treatment for the purpose of normalisation, just as Mettray was at once a prison, a reformatory and a boarding school. “It was the most famous of a whole series of institutions which, well beyond the frontiers of criminal law, constituted what one might call the carceral archipelago.”⁵⁰ How could the Western Balkans constitute an exception to the general global trend where it is not only the national flag that follows the flag of convenience of the neoliberal economy, but democracy itself?⁵¹

Anti-epilogue

Its enduring economic and normative plus-value has enabled the evolving European polity to become part of the more general European normality. It develops its *sui generis* model of multilevel governance, where through unity in diversity “at the centre of this city, and as if to hold it in place, there is, not the ‘centre of power,’ not a network of forces, but a multiple network of diverse elements – walls, space, institution, rules, discourse.”⁵² Thus the EU became normal and familiar for the nation-states (its members and the rest), for international organisations, and for ordinary citizens.

Within this framework, the EU covers up its dual correctional mission: on the one hand it “‘naturalizes’ the legal power to punish,” while at the same time “it ‘legalizes’ the technical power to discipline” its member states. In this way it will homogenise them in a normative power of rationality through the establishment of new objectivities where the principle of uniformity will prevail.⁵³ In the technical governmentality of the EU, solidarity is exercised selectively, always having its own useful abnormal individuals –like the Western Balkans– in a chalk circle. A solidarity indissociably connected with the correctional reform of the abnormal states and their awareness that

⁵⁰ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 297.

⁵¹ See Michael Smith, “Does the Flag Follow Trade: ‘Politicisation’ and EU Foreign Policy,” in *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP*, eds. John Peterson–Helene Sjursen (London: Routledge, 1998).

⁵² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 307.

⁵³ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 302, 307.

they are above all guilty for their condition of non-convergence with normal models.

On the other hand, the trial of the chalk circle is being inflicted upon that same “radiant” European Union by the nation-state, naturally unconformable to modern architectures of survival. The nation-state, when it senses that its living space is in danger of being squeezed within the new indeterminate spaces of the modern architecture of the “radiant city,” draws a chalk circle around it, reducing the circle of its own survival to its own normality. And the whole cycle begins afresh. The “new radiant city” is not meant for normal people seeking to regain the national security of the ordinary normal city.

Kleoniki Gkioufi – Vasileios Spanos***

**Balkans' Urban Planning Through Space and Time:
Pristina, Sofia and Bucharest**

Concepts of Urbanization in the Balkans

The Balkan Peninsula is a crossroad, a bridge between Central and South Europe, due to its geographical position. A group of factors, such as geographical conditions, state borders changes, ethnical and cultural divergences and political reformations have deeply affected the formation of the Balkan cities.

As stated, the Balkans have been a periphery throughout the centuries with unique multiculturalism aspects that have influenced urban and regional space and as a consequence, different types of towns were formed in different cultural zones of the area. The particularity of the natural environment has either facilitated or hindered urban networking among cities and regions. Moreover, the difficulties of topographic relief, unstable border regions, and a multitude of languages, formalities, and bureaucracies, all create obstacles which result in a selective and extenuated diffusion of information, knowledge, and technical know-how into the spatial economics of the Balkan countries.¹ It is obvious that the region has always been in a state of transition, bearing traces of various historic and cultural periods, which have formed the identity of the place and thus the image of urban centers. At this level, an adequate understanding of the dynamics of the area, should formulate new policies towards reconstructing Balkan centers.²

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¹ George Petrakos–Dimitris Economou, “The Spatial Aspects of Development in South-eastern Europe,” *Spatium* 8 (January 2002): 1-13, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/47658401_The_spatial_aspects_of_development_in_South-eastern_Europe (accessed 20-9-2020).

² Szilárd Rác, “Urban Network, Capital Regions and Spatial Development in the Balkan States,” in *Economical Environment Changes in the Carpathian Basin*, ed. Beáta Kadar–Ede Lázár (Miercurea-Ciuc: Editura Status, 2014), 206-27, <http://www.>

Balkan cities have undergone a series of transformations, mostly because of social and political factors that have shaped their present state. The co-existence of different historical, political, socio-economic, and cultural assets has left permanent traces on the contemporary urban image. Especially in the capitals, there are a lot of differences in an urban scale, even between neighboring areas or places in the same region; it is their particularities in time and space that have attracted attention and research.³

The complexity of the Balkan area, as a result of political, socio-economic, and environmental transformations, provides an appropriate environment in the field of urban and regional planning. Additionally, they are characterized as places with specific cultural reserve, architectural monuments and historic values and traditions. Despite the efforts to integrate into the wider European urban space, the above factors are part of their contemporary image, defining their identity. In that case, urban resilience could be perceived as the ongoing transitioning process of Balkan centers, as a way to recover from constant political, socio-economic, cultural and migration turbulent flows and define urban identity and space morphology, in local and regional level.⁴

The main objective is to develop a functional strategical plan that would provide for economic growth, accessible urban structures, and enhancement of cultural and touristic aspects. Moreover, the urban development policy guidelines in the Balkan area should relate to the establishment of new social economic operators, the creation of new organizational structures and feasible local planning through urban and architectural design. The aim is to institutionalize planning mechanisms

regscience.hu:8080/jspui/bitstream/11155/757/1/racz_urban_2014.pdf (accessed 10-2-2020).

³ Maria Todorova, "Introduction: Learning Memory, Remembering Identity," in *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, ed. Maria Todorova (New York: NYU Press, 2004), 1-24.

⁴ Eleni G. Gavra, *Cultural Reserve and Architectural Heritage in the Balkans. Management in the Context of European Integration* (Thessaloniki: Publications Kyriakidis, 2004), 11-4.

and development agencies for the proper management and enhancement of local identity and evaluation of cultural heritage.⁵

In the new era, contemporary urban policies require for a framework that is based on culture, tourism, social cohesion, and environmental protection. Furthermore, cities should target on social participation in decision making, economy diversification, and effective environmental strategies. In order to build effectively on urban sustainability, strategic planning is used as a key development tool for cities, based on innovation and quality of space.⁶

Under that framework, research examples, capital centers of the west and eastern Balkans are explored and compared in terms of planning through space and time, in an attempt to evaluate perspectives towards EU spatial integration.

Pristina

i. Urban Profile

Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, is located in the north-eastern part of the Republic of Kosovo, in the valley of Fushë Kosova, characterized by mountainous landscapes, covered by forests and greenery. The capital's proximity to other Balkan capitals, such as Belgrade, Tirana, Skopje, Sofia and Thessaloniki, and its central geographical location in the western Balkans render the city an important center in the Balkan Peninsula.⁷

⁵ Saja Kosanović–Tadej Glažar–Marija Stamenković–Branislav Ljubiša Folić–Alenka Fikfak, “About Socio-Cultural Sustainability and Resilience,” in *Sustainability and Resilience: Socio-spatial Perspective*, ed. Alenka Fikfak–Saja Kosanović–Miha Konjar–Enrico Anguillari (Delft: TU Delft Open, 2018), 89-102, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327043774_About_socio-cultural_sustainability_and_resilience (accessed 11-3-2020).

⁶ Aspa Gospodini, “European Cities in Competition and the New Uses of Urban Design,” *Journal of Urban Design* 7, no. 1 (February 2002): 59-73, DOI: 10.1080/13574800220129231 (accessed 10-10-2020).

⁷ “Municipal Profile 2018 Prishtinë/Priština Region Prishtinë/Priština,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), <https://www.osce.org/kosovo/13127?download=true> (accessed 10-11-2020).

The municipality of Pristina covers an area of approximately 572 km² in central Kosovo, and includes Prishtinë/Priština city, the largest and most densely populated among 38 municipalities. Pristina constitutes the administrative, political, economic and cultural center of Kosovo with a total population of around 200,000, the youngest in Europe, according to the 2011 Kosovo Population and Housing Census. The region is subjected to United Nations, previously including United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), whereas KFOR, the NATO-led peace implementation force, provides military security.⁸

The capital of Kosovo, a western Balkan center, is an example of a city in transition due to socio-political transformations and conflicts; it presents a contradicting urban image based on complex planning regulations. Despite the difficulties of the process from a socialist to a market driven economy, Kosovo is a potential candidate country for future enlargement of the EU, a process that will reform and determine the capital's identity.⁹

ii. Historical and Spatial Overview

The area of Pristina has been inhabited for many centuries, initially by the Illyrians and then by the Romans, while it grew as a military center. After a destroying earthquake, the Byzantine Emperor Justinian rebuilt the city and renamed it Justiniana Secunda; the name Pristina was first mentioned in the 11th century. Later in the 14th and 15th century, following the Serbian Empire and later the Ottoman rule, the city developed as a center of crafts, trade, and mining, due to its geostrategic position. After the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Pristina enforced its position as an important administrative center, up until the early 1900s, when Kosovo came under Serbian rule as part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Shortly

⁸ "Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2020," Kosovo Agency of Statistics, <http://ask.rks-gov.net/en/kosovo-agency-of-statistics> (accessed 10-11-2020).

⁹ Kobe Boussauw, "Challenges, Threats and Opportunities in Post-conflict Urban Development in Kosovo," *Habitat International* 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 143-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.habitatint.2011.06.011 (accessed 20-12-2020); Frank D'hondt, "Re-Creating Kosovo Cities," in *42nd ISoCaRP Congress Cities between Integration and Disintegration, 14-18 September 2006* (Istanbul: Yildiz Technical University, 2006), http://www.isocarp.net/data/case_studies/912.pdf (accessed 20-12-2020).

after WWII, the capital of the province of Kosovo was transferred from Prizren to Pristina, a small city of only 20,000 inhabitants at that time.¹⁰

The 20th century found Kosovo under the communist regime of Tito, in an entirely new state-directed political status and modern-socialist development. Pristina emerged from a small town to an industrial center that attracted thousands of migrants from various parts of the region, bringing together a mixture of ethnic and religious identities. The city lost a great part of its heritage and cultural identity, due to a program of planned destructions that was based on the radical movement of the 1950s-1960s, "Destroy the Old, Build the New."¹¹ The destruction of the historic Old Bazaar, the construction of bulk housing blocks and the establishment of large, monumental structures were the most prominent features of the city's urbanization during that period.¹²

A number of municipal and public buildings were built, such as the National Library, the Palace of Youth and Sports, the Rilindja Tower, the hotel "Grand Pristina," constituting the new urban landmarks. Furthermore, the city's rivers flows were covered and transformed into a sewage system, altering the relief of the region. The development of the new city stretched towards the plains of Fushë Kosove, including the new neighborhoods of Ulpiana, Dardania and Bregu i Diellit (Sunny Hill).¹³

¹⁰ Milot Berisha, *Archaeological Guide of Kosovo* (Pristina: Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport Archaeological Institute of Kosovo, 2012), 7-8, https://www.mkrs-ks.org/repository/docs/drafti_i_guides_-anglisht_final.pdf (accessed 10-11-2020); Robert Elsie, *Historical Dictionary of Kosova* (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 1-17.

¹¹ "A future for Pristina's past," European Stability Initiative (ESI), https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_future_of_pristina%20booklet.pdf (accessed 10-11-2020).

¹² Florina Jerliu-Vlora Navakazi, "The Socialist Modernization of Prishtina: Interrogating Types of Urban and Architectural Contributions to the City," *Mesto a Dejiny* 7 (January 2019): 55-74, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330245151_The_Socialist_Modernization_of_Prishtina_Interrogating_Types_of_Urban_and_Architectural_Contributions_to_the_City (accessed 10-10-2020).

¹³ Teuta Jashari-Kajtazi-Arta Jakupi, "Interpretation of Architectural Identity through Landmark Architecture: The Case of Prishtina, Kosovo from the 1970s to the 1980s," *Frontiers of Architectural Research* 6 (September 2017): 480-6, DOI: 10.1016/j.foar.2017.09.002 (accessed 10-10-2020).

Urban planning of that era was used as an administrative tool of the central government in order to gain political and social control. Planning approaches to regulate local and regional development were expressed through a number of plans and documents, namely the Regulative Plan, the General Urban Plan, and the Traffic Directive Plan. Despite that, the city expanded, with uncontrolled and arbitrary constructions taking over agricultural land. A small portion of the urban area consisted of collective housing, whereas the majority was used for individual housing. However, the situation changed after 1989, when political decentralization and societal self-management required for a more liberal planning approach, beyond any hierarchical system.¹⁴

During the Kosovo War in 1998-99, rural settlements were subjected to severe damages, resulting in a large number of dwellings being destroyed and a significant part of population being settled in towns. Specifically, since the ethnic conflict ended in 1999, the country had to deal with unprecedented urbanization processes due to post-war migration, housing destruction, and unemployment. Although reconstruction started immediately after the war with the financial support of international donors and transmittances, it was based on partial and unorganized actions; informal settlements became a common practice in the suburban area of cities. As a consequence, a number of problems occurred concerning property rights and spatial management issues, typical of a post-conflict situation.¹⁵ The capital sustained a great number of post-war casualties with the majority of the residents abandoning their properties, fleeing away or being deported. Added to those, mass population migration from rural areas to the capital led to overpopulation and urban sprawl; the city was transformed into a huge construction site with numerous illegal settlements. Apart from the emergent housing needs, the city had to deal with institutional and administrative issues, a

¹⁴ Eliza Hoxha, "Planned Development in Kosovo—Case of Prishtina," in *Proceedings of the CPUD '16 International City Planning and Urban Design Conference—DAKAM, 8-9 April*, ed. Hande Tulum (Istanbul: Metin Copy Plus, 2016), 20-33, https://www.academia.edu/28527751/Planned_development_in_Prishtina_Kosovo (accessed 10-10-2020).

¹⁵ Richard Norman, "Shifting Experiences of Places in Prishtina," *Dérive* 54 (February 2014): 37-43, <https://www.eurozine.com/shifting-experiences-of-places-in-prishtina/> (accessed 10-10-2020).

fragile socio-economic framework with outdated practices of laws and public services. Planning, based on ad hoc activities and regardless of the previous plans and regulatory documents, required for an overall reformation.¹⁶

Under the UNMIK administration, the city became the main attractor for international organizations that brought along new governance models and socio-economic structures.¹⁷ In 2008, after a long period of negotiations, discussions, and political disputes, the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared the state independent, inaugurating a new era for Pristina, as the newborn capital of the youngest state in Europe. Generally, the post-war state was marked by a dynamic population shift along with a market driven economic change that caused mass migration of rural population into the city and abrupt urban sprawl.¹⁸

On the other side, in the post-war period new planning approaches appeared, involving economic, social, and environmental practices, whereas social participation was considered essential.¹⁹

¹⁶ Besim Gollopeni–Alban Kurtishaj, “Challenges of Spatial Planning in Kosovo in Transition Time,” in *Proceedings of the University for Business and Technology International Conference (UBT)*, 7-8 November 2014, ed. Edmond Hajrizi (Pristina: University of Business and Technology, 2015), 49-58, DOI: 10.33107/ubt-ic.2014.5 (accessed 10-11-2020).

¹⁷ Arta Basha-Jakupi–Violeta Nushi, “International Aid Community, its Presence in the Post-conflict Reconstruction and Impact on Urban Legacy–Case Study of Prishtina,” *Sociologija i Prostor* 55, no. 3 (209) (December 2017): 315-32, DOI: 10.5673/sip.55.3.4 (accessed 10-10-2020).

¹⁸ Ilirjana Mejzini, “The Phenomena of Urban Sprawl–Study Case of City of Prishtina,” in *Proceedings of the University for Business and Technology International Conference (UBT)*, 7-8 November 2014, ed. Edmond Hajrizi (Pristina: University of Business and Technology, 2015), 34-40, DOI: 10.33107/ubt-ic.2014.5 (accessed 10-11-2020).

¹⁹ Besim Gollopeni, “Urbanization and Socio-Urban Developments in Prishtina in Post-Conflict Period,” in *Proceedings of the University for Business and Technology International Conference (UBT)*, 1-2 November 2013, ed. Edmond Hajrizi (Pristina: University of Business and Technology, 2013), 127-33, DOI:10.33107/ubt-ic.2013.12 (accessed 10-11-2020).

iii. Contemporary Planning

The Municipality of Pristina in 2004, and specifically the Directorate of Planning, Urbanism and Construction, has drafted the Urban Development Plan, a strategic document with a vision towards 2020, consisting of the following targets: i) building a livable and attractive city, ii) promoting a sustainable urban economy, iii) providing a sustainable urban environment, iv) developing a sustainable mobility network.²⁰

Furthermore, the city's Strategic Vision aims to address urban issues, such as housing, urban sprawl, land use, and urban mobility, as well as protection of natural and agricultural areas. The plan has also a regulatory character for specific areas of interest, such as historic parts of the city center, commercial and industrial suburban zones, green areas, and protected sites. The implementation lies on the responsibility of the Municipality in elaborating an appropriate planning system.²¹

Sofia Profile

i. Urban Profile

Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, is a contemporary Balkan center that has undergone a series of changes, throughout socialist and post socialist era, evident in its urban pattern and image. Nowadays, Sofia is a dynamic, contemporary urban destination with rich cultural heritage, a highly rated academic center, among other European ones, attracting a significant number of students, academics, and researchers. The city's image is also enhanced by its strong historical and cultural assets, Balkan traditions, and aesthetics, as parts of its local identity.

²⁰ "Strategic Planning and Sustainable Development," Prishtina Online, <https://prishtinaonline.com/en/drejtorete/strategic-planning-and-sustainable-development> (accessed 10-11-2020).

²¹ Ibrahim Ramadani, "Territorial-Spatial Organization of the Municipality of Prishtina with its Suburbs and Metropolitan Development Opportunities," *Micro Macro & Mezzo Geo Information* 1 (December 2013): 1-10, http://mmm-gi.geo-see.org/wp-content/uploads/MMM-GI_1/Ramadani_I.pdf (accessed 10-10-2020); Vjosa Vela, "Legislation in Urban Developments in Kosovo," *European Magazine: Urban Development* 6 (February 2012): 49-50, <https://doczz.net/doc/2969779/urban-development%C2%BB--kosovo-foundation-for-open-society> (accessed 10-11-2020).

The capital is situated in the western part of Bulgaria on the elevated Sofia plain, covering an area of 1,300 km² surrounded by mountains, with Vitosha being the nearest to the city's outskirts. The Valley of Sofia is rich in mineral deposits whereas a number of shallow rivers cross the territory, with Boyanska, Vladaiska, Perlovska and Iskar running through the city. The city's location in a traffic junction of several international routes, renders the region as an important Balkan center, with close proximity to the Black Sea, the Adriatic, and the Aegean, as well as, to other important Balkan centers.²²

The Municipality of Sofia is the largest district of Bulgaria and comprises of 38 localities, including the city of Sofia which is accordingly divided into 24 districts; the district is an administrative-territorial unit, whereas in the case of Sofia it has the status of a region. Sofia's municipal authorities are responsible for the development and implementation of policies regarding economy, environmental protection, public law, socio-economic cohesion, social infrastructures, environmental issues, cultural and educational provision, spatial planning, etc.²³ The population is around 1.2 million people, almost entirely urbanized with high density rates and young population growth in recent years.²⁴

ii. Historical and Spatial Overview

The capital is one of the oldest European cities with a rich historical background that combines traces from the Neolithic and Thracian, Ancient Greek and Roman, Slavic, Bulgarian and Ottoman period. Dating back almost seven thousand years ago, Sofia was an ancient Thracian settlement firstly known as Serdica in the 8th century BC, then as Ulpia Serdica during the roman era, renamed as Triaditsa in the Byzantine times and later as Sredets; a Slavic name acquired in the early 9th century, when it became one of the most important feudal towns of the

²² "Geographical Characteristics," Sofia Municipality, <https://www.sofia.bg/bg/web/sofia-municipality/start> and <https://www.visitsofia.bg/en/> (accessed 15-11-2020).

²³ "Administrative-territorial Division," Sofia Municipality, <https://www.sofia.bg/en/web/sofia-municipality/administrative-territorial-structure> (accessed 15-11-2020).

²⁴ "Basic Demographic Indicators," in *Sofia in Figures 2015* (Sofia: National Statistical Institute Publications, Library and Archive Department), 39, https://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/publications/SOFIA_2015.pdf (accessed 15-11-2020).

Bulgarian state. The name Sofia was given afterwards, during the Ottoman Empire, in the late 14th century. The spatial structure of Sofia was imposed to several phases that defined its regional character and contemporary urban identity. The capital's urban history could be divided in the following phases, according to political, cultural, and socio-economic conditions of each period: the antique roman period, the ottoman period, the after-liberation period (1878-1918), the interwar period, the Communistic era, and the post-socialist after 1989.²⁵

To begin with, the Thracian dwelling Serdika spread around thermal springs, at a crossroad linking Western Europe with Asia Minor and the Middle East, and the Baltic Sea with the Aegean Sea, nearly at the center of the Balkans. When the city became part of the Roman Empire, it was renamed as Ulpia Serdika and recognized as an autonomous organization, a municipium, designed according to the *cardo-decumanus* planning layout, with a fortified urban layout. During the Byzantium era, the town was an important center, where Christianity was recognized as an official religion, while later on, under the Justinian the Great, it was established as a regional capital of the Eastern Roman Empire. In the 7th century, the city, known as “Sredets,” indicative also of its central geographical location, developed into the political, military, economic, and cultural center of the First Bulgarian Empire. The city retained its economic and cultural prosperity, throughout the Second Bulgarian Empire, adopting the characteristics of a Byzantine town plan, up until in 1382 when it was conquered by the Ottomans; the name “Sofia” appeared for the first time, named after the Basilica St. Sofia.²⁶

Until the 18th century Sofia was an imperial center, known as the “European capital” of the Ottoman Empire, with a significant Muslim population that retained the Roman baths and Christian temples, while transformed a great part of churches into mosques. After the Russian-Turkish Liberation War of 1877-78, Bulgaria obtained its political independence and Sofia, a small Ottoman styled settlement with a popu-

²⁵ Chad Staddon–Bellin Mollov, “City Profile: Sofia, Bulgaria,” *Cities* 17, no. 5 (October 2000): 379-87, DOI: 10.1016/S0264-2751(00)00037-8 (accessed 15-11-2020); Raymond Detrez, *Historical Dictionary of Bulgaria* (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 1997), xxi-ixiv; R.J. Crampton, *Bulgaria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6-18.

²⁶ Staddon–Mollov, *op.cit.*, 379-87; Detrez, *op.cit.*, xxi-ixiv; Crampton, *op.cit.*, 6-18.

lation of 18,000 inhabitants, was declared the capital of the new Bulgarian state. The first planning attempts focused on the redesign of the city, based on an orthogonal street layout according to the existing radial one, with the provision for open spaces and squares around religious and public buildings as points of reference.²⁷

Apparently, the city's structure was formed mostly in the end of 19th century, when Sofia became the capital of Bulgaria. By the beginning of the 20th century, the city's architectural image comprised of civic buildings, residential mansions, and trade shops of eclectic style. During the interwar period, the city evolved following a Europeanized planning model with a road and railway network, wide boulevards, eclectic styled facades, large parks, and urban gardens. It was that period of time, also when the first Master Plan was elaborated, known as the Musmann Plan, which set the basis for urban planning. However, the subsequent WWII left the city in an unprecedented state of socio-economic turbulence and urban chaos.²⁸

Sofia's urban image changed dramatically after the WWII, with the prevalence of communism represented by the leader Todor Zhivkov, who remained in power for over 30 years. Massive migration, land collectivization, and intensive industrialization required for urgent restructuring measures that affected the capital's planning and development. A considerable portion of the building stock was destroyed and replaced

²⁷ Petar Iokimov, "Sofia in two Centuries. Part B," in *Proceedings of the Inter-Balkan Congress: Balkan Capitals from the 19th to the 21st Century—Urban Planning and the Modern Architectural Heritage*, 12 December 2005, ed. Helen Fessas-Emmanouil (Athens: Academy of Athens—Bureau of Architectural Research, 2006), 44-50, https://www.academia.edu/32873838/BALKAN_CAPITALS_FROM_THE_19th_TO_THE_21st_CENTURY_-_PROCEEDINGS_Urban_Planning_and_the_Modern_Architectural_Heritage (accessed 10-12-2020); Petar Iokimov—Ljubinka Stoilova, "'Sofia'—Urban Development from the End of 19th Century until WWI," *Centropa* 1 (January 2001): 43-55, https://www.academia.edu/13840309/_Sofia_-_Urban_Development_From_the_End_of_19th_Century_Until_WW_I (accessed 10-12-2020).

²⁸ Hristo Ganchev—Grigor Doytchinov, "Sofia before World War II: Urban Design as a Cultural Implication," in *Planning Capital Cities: Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia*, ed. Grigor Doytchinov—Alexandra Dukić—Catalina Ioniță (Graz: Verlag der Technischen Universität Graz, 2015), 98-119, <https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-398-6> (accessed 10-12-2020).

by bulk constructions, large scale collective housing and totalitarian styled buildings. The establishment of Sofia as the capital of the People's Republic of Bulgaria was defined by socialist architectural landmarks and symbols of totalitarian power, in public spaces and central parts of the city.²⁹

In the planning sector, the formulation of a new Master Plan in 1945 introduced a polycentric model with sub-centers and functional urban zoning, focused on the development of an underground transportation system and the increase of green areas. Further planning amendments resulted in the General Urban Development Plan in 1975, which included a district territorial development plan, a general urban development plan and a transport plan. According to it, the main part of the city spread beyond the traditional core and evolved along the main boulevards, resulting in the formation of metropolitan centers; the road network abandoned its former radial form for a typical tangential one.³⁰

The fall of communism in 1989 brought a period of instability throughout the 1990s with the city trying to adapt to a new, market oriented, competitive environment. Increased population growth required for housing reforms that involved regulation plans for the city's suburbanization, following the underground network expansion.³¹

²⁹ Irina Grigova, "The City and the Nation: Sofia's Trajectory from Glory to Rubble in WWII," *Journal of Urban History* 37 (January 2011): 155-75, https://www.academia.edu/928717/The_City_and_the_Nation_Sofias_Trajectory_from_Glory_to_Rubble_in_WWII (accessed 10-12-2020).

³⁰ Grigor Doytchinov, "Designing Sofia's City Core in the Context of the Changing Ideological Paradigm 1945-1989," in *Planning Capital Cities*, 140-59, <https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-398-6> (accessed 10-12-2020); Ljubinka Stoilova, "Sofia in two centuries. Part A," in *Proceedings of the Inter-Balkan Congress*, 38-43, https://www.academia.edu/32873838/BALKAN_CAPITALS_FROM_THE_19th_TO_THE_21st_CENTURY_-_PROCEEDINGS_Urban_Planning_and_the_Modern_Architectural_Heritage (accessed 10-12-2020); Sonia Hirt, "Post-Socialist Urban Forms: Notes From Sofia," *Urban Geography* 28, no. 5 (August 2006): 464-88, DOI: 10.2747/0272-3638.27.5.464 (accessed 10-12-2020).

³¹ Sasha Tsenkova, "Reinventing Strategic Planning in Post-socialist Cities: Experiences from Sofia," *European Planning Studies* 15 (April 2007): 295-317, DOI: 10.1080/09654310601017133 (accessed 10-12-2020); Yani Valkanov, "Suburbanisation in Sofia: changing the spatial structure of a post-communist city," in *Planning Capital Cities*, 248-63, <https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-398-6> (accessed 10-12-2020).

iii. Contemporary Planning

The elaboration of the new Master Plan of Sofia Municipality, first amended in 1998 and completed in 2003, went through a number of processes and legal claims until it was finally approved in 2006, later enforced in 2007. Generally, after 2000, and especially with Bulgaria's accession to the EU in 2007, a new era has been inaugurated for Sofia, the city that "grows but doesn't age."³²

Regarding contemporary planning, the valid document is the Master Plan, firstly elaborated in 1998 and completed in 2003. After a long period of planning stagnancy due to socio-economic changes, it was further revised in 2007 and amended in 2009, currently known as the General Urban Development Plan (GUDP).³³ Among the strategic objectives, the most important is developing a sustainable strategy based on innovative and smart technologies, while involving local actors in order to address issues of urban growth within the EU spatial environment. Furthermore, the Municipality of Sofia seeks an integrated urban development as a key factor in reinforcing city's urban image and historical identity.³⁴

Overall, the Bulgarian capital envisions of becoming a highly competitive and sustainable place for businesses, residents, and visitors, with an aim to build on urban resilience and sustainability. Despite the fact that the city has undergone a number of urban changes over times, it has managed to overcome the impacts, setting each time the prerequisites for spatial evolvement. Proper governance, active social participation, and efficient networks among field experts and relevant stakeholders are essential factors to be considered towards sustainable and

³² Atanas Kovachev–Aleksandar Slaev–Yordan Lyubenov, "Polycentricity as an Instrument of Balanced Urban Development in Sofia's Master Plan," *Architecture and Modern Information Technologies* 4, no. 37 (December 2016): 179-90, <https://marhi.ru/eng/AMIT/2016/4kvart16/Kovachev%20Slaev%20Lyubenov%20untitled.php> (accessed 10-11-2020).

³³ Anders Zeijlon–Sasha Tsenkova–Kremena Ionkova–Jane Ebinger–Nisha Chatani Rizvi, "Sofia's New Master Plan," in *Sofia City Strategy* (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2003), 46-9, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/451121468224987239/Sophia-city-strategy> (accessed 10-12-2020).

³⁴ "Vision Sofia 2050," Sofia Municipality, <https://vizia.sofia.bg/vision-sofia-2050/> (accessed 10-11-2020).

resilient urban growth, in compliance with EU aims. Parallel to these, integrated plans for urban planning and development constitute a key factor in reinforcing Sofia's urban profile.

Bucharest Profile

i. Urban Profile

Bucharest is the administrative, economic, cultural, and industrial center of Romania, in the southeast of the country, on the banks of River Dambovită. The capital is a densely populated city with around 1.8 million inhabitants based on the recent census of 2011. In an EU scale, Bucharest is the sixth largest city in the EU, located at the junction of the main Pan-European transportation corridors. Added to that, its proximity to the Danube River and its position among the Black Sea and the Baltic area are key geostrategic features.³⁵

The Municipality of Bucharest is part of the Bucharest–Ilfov Region, consisting of Bucharest Municipality and Ilfov County, with a total area of almost 230 km². The city is divided into six territorial–administrative units, known as sectors, each of which has its own Mayor, city hall and city council that are responsible for local issues; there is also a general Mayor for a seventh type sector with a general city hall and council responsible for all six sectors.³⁶

The capital, in particular, foresees to achieve polycentric development through urban networks and regional cooperation under the umbrella of EU programs. Increasing accessibility and attracting investments are among measures to be taken towards urban regeneration and sustainability. The Bucharest–Ilfov Regional Development Agency is responsible for planning and management of EU cohesion projects and

³⁵ "Date geografice București," Primăriei Capitalei, <http://www.pmb.ro/> (accessed 10-11-2020); "Populația," Direcția Regională de Statistică a Municipiului BUCUREȘTI, <http://www.bucuresti.insse.ro/> (accessed 10-11-2020).

³⁶ "Bucharest–Ilfov Region," Bucuresti Ilfov Regional Development Agency, <https://www.adrbi.ro/about/bucharest-ilfov-region/> (accessed 10-11-2020); "Primării de Sector," Primăriei Capitalei, <https://www.pmb.ro/> (accessed 10-11-2020).

funds in line with national strategies and governmental policies for territorial cohesion.³⁷ Following EU directions, the Municipality of Bucharest participates in a number of projects for addressing urban challenges such as demographic fluctuations, socio-economic segregation, urban sprawl, and environmental degradation.

ii. Historical and Spatial Overview

Bucharest's urban structure has been strongly affected by the country's various accumulations of political and socio-economic layers throughout times. Compared to the country's history, the city's historic background is relatively new, whereas its urban form evolves around different historic periods and planning trends, both from Central-East and Western European origins. That kind of mix and match is evident in the city's image and identity, balancing between Balkans and Europe. In general, Romania went through a rigid totalitarian era, compared to other communist countries, with rapid transformation of rural areas into urban ones, followed by radical restructuring of towns and cities, with Bucharest being the most characteristic one.

To start with, the first historical references for the city of Bucharest date back in 1459, although the area was inhabited since ancient times. During the Byzantine–Ottoman period, the city started to grow from a village to a town, following an organic pattern, without fortification and a specific center, around maidans. In the Middle Ages, during the rule of Prince Vlad the Impaler, the city quickly developed into an important political, commercial, and economic center of Wallachia; Curtea Veche (Old Princely Court) and Strada Lipscani (Lipscani Street) were the main landmarks of the historical quarter, delineating the Old Town of Bucharest until today.³⁸

In the following centuries, Bucharest underwent the Russian occupation and Hapsburg domination, as well as a long period of Greek administration under the Phanariots. Later in the 19th century, when Bucharest became the capital of the Principality of Romania, the city's

³⁷ "Regional Programs," Bucuresti Ilfov Regional Development Agency, <https://www.adrbi.ro/regional-programs/rop-2014-2020/> (accessed 10-11-2020).

³⁸ "Date istorice," Primăriei Capitalei, <https://www.pmb.ro/orasul/utile/2> (accessed 10-11-2020).

image was significantly changed. Specifically, after a great fire, in 1847, that destroyed most of the city's medieval architectural heritage, the urban and architectural environment was rebuilt, according to West-European modernization trends; eclectic buildings, French styled boulevards and European cultural trends defined the modern Bucharest, a European cosmopolitan capital, characterized also as "little Paris." The National Museum of History, CEC Palace, the former Chamber of Commerce, the Athenaeum, the royal palaces, the Arch of Triumph, the National Bank of Romania, Casa Capşa and the thoroughfare Victory Avenue are indicative monuments of that era.³⁹

Bucharest reached its modernization peak during the interwar period, also when the first systematic planning approaches appeared, along with urban policies for the city's development. The first urban plan of the capital was elaborated in 1935, after a long historic gap in planning, constituting a structural project, which affected also other European spatial models of that era.⁴⁰

The Europeanisation of the city was interrupted abruptly after the WWII, a milestone in the country's history, which also strongly affected the capital. Bucharest was heavily bombed and destroyed, yet the years that followed were even more devastating, under a communist regime that totally changed the political, socio-economic, and urban environment of the city.

³⁹ Anca Bratuleanu, "Bucharest in the 19th and 20th Centuries. The Evolution of the Urban Scale," in *Proceedings of the Inter-Balkan Congress*, 32-7, https://www.academia.edu/32873838/BALKAN_CAPITALS_FROM_THE_19th_TO_THE_21st_CENTURY_-_PROCEEDINGS_Urban_Planning_and_the_Modern_Architectural_Heritage (accessed 10-12-2020); Monica Sebestyen, "Urban Image and National Representation: Bucharest in the 19th and the Beginning of the 20th Century," in *Planning Capital Cities*, 44-61, <https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-398-6> (accessed 10-12-2020).

⁴⁰ Andreea Udrea, "The First Urban Plans of Bucharest in the Rise of the 20th Century," in *Planning Capital Cities*, 62-79, <https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-398-6> (accessed 10-12-2020); Gabriel Pascariu, "Overview of Romanian Planning Evolution," in *Proceedings of the 26th Annual Congress of the Association of European Schools of Planning (AESOP): Planning to Achieve/Planning to Avoid: The Need for New Discourses and Practices in Spatial Development and Planning*, ed. Murat Balamir–Melih Ersoy–Ela Babalik Sutcliffe (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, 2012), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301731689_Overview_of_Romanian_Planning_Evolution (accessed 10-11-2020).

The communist system brought along the nationalization of the country's economy, collectivization of agriculture and the industrialization of the suburban area, while mass groups of people were displaced from rural areas to the cities. Shelter needs increased, resulting in intense urbanization, mostly characterized by collective housing and common life. Particularly during the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu, the capital's population almost doubled, while its urban structure was reformed with bulk apartment blocks and socialist styled monuments.⁴¹

Planning, like in other cases of Central and Eastern Europe, became even more imperative, by enforcing a top-down approach under a totalitarian state control. In order to cater for the fast-growing needs of industrialization and urbanization, most of the land became state property, while urban plans were coordinated by a central authority.

Moreover, the introduction of the "systemization law," imposed rigid economic measures, regarding state ownership, while restraining any private initiative. The results were the destruction of a large part of the built heritage together with mass urban space interventions. Especially, after the big earthquake in 1977, Ceausescu found the opportunity to rebuild the city, by demolishing numerous historical monuments and architectural buildings. Strongly influenced by the Chinese and North-Korean socio-economic system of that time, he envisioned a Romanian society driven by nationalistic ideologies and state control.⁴²

Apart from the development of the subway, the most remarkably intervention was the demolition and rebuild of the Civic Center (Centru

⁴¹ Duncan Light–Craig Young, "Reconfiguring Socialist Urban Landscapes: The 'Left-Over' Spaces of State-Socialism in Bucharest," *Journal of Studies and Research in Human Geography* 41 (January 2010): 5-16, http://humangeographies.org.ro/articles/41/4_1_10_Light.pdf (accessed 15-10-2020); Vlad Moghiorosi, "Ceausescu's Bucharest: Power, Architecture and National Identity" (MA thesis, Central European University, 2017), 17-25, <https://sierra.ceu.edu/record=b1243517> (accessed 15-10-2020).

⁴² Maria De Betania Uchoa Cavalcanti, "Urban Reconstruction and Autocratic Regimes: Ceausescu's Bucharest in its Historic Context," *Planning Perspectives* 12, no. 1 (December 2010): 71-109, DOI: 10.1080/026654397364780 (accessed 10-12-2020); Miruna Stroe, "Bucharest's Urban Planning Instruments during the Communist Regime: Systematization Sketches, Plans, Projects and Interventions," in *Planning Capital Cities*, 116-39, <https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-398-6> (accessed 10-12-2020).

Civic). Ceausescu erased almost three quarters of the city's historic center in order to construct the House of the Republic (Casa Republicii), a monumental structure, one of the most imposing totalitarian landmarks worldwide. Accordingly, the surrounding area was transformed with the layout of a boulevard, named Union Avenue (Bulevardul Unirii), connecting the House of the Republic, current Parliament Palace, with the rest of the city's urban core.⁴³

The violent upsurge in 1989 marked the end of communism in Romania, also leaving Bucharest in an unstable socio-economic state. A great part of Ceausescu's plans was left incomplete, while the period that followed brought major changes in the whole political and socio-economic structure with repercussions, also, to urban environment. Decentralization, property privatization and private interest were the basic operators of the transition to a market oriented socio-economic model, with a profound impact on the administrative and legislative system.⁴⁴

Besides the ideological shift, the transitional period caused a state of haze and confusion in dealing with the new requirements. In many cases, spatial planning and urban development were not properly regulated, creating gaps in planning and legalization. The general chaotic situation was reflected also in the city's structure, where urban sprawl and building hyperactivity led to regional disparities and thus, to socio-economic segregation. Although there were efforts to set up a new planning system with institutional provisions and revised principles, the

⁴³ Maria Duda, "Shifts. A Brief History of Public Plazas in Central Bucharest," in *Planning Capital Cities*, 44-61, <https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-398-6> (accessed 10-12-2020); Gabriel Simion-Constantin Nistor, "Spatial Structure Changes inside Post-communist Capital City of Bucharest," *Journal of Studies and Research in Human Geography* 6 (May 2012): 79-89, http://humangeographies.org.ro/articles/61/6_1_12_10_simion.pdf (accessed 10-12-2020).

⁴⁴ József Benedek, "The Spatial Planning System in Romania," *Romanian Review of Regional Studies* 9 (January 2013): 23-30, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306153384_The_spatial_planning_system_in_Romania (accessed 10-12-2020); Mircea Munteanu-Loris Servillo, "Romanian Spatial Planning System: Post-Communist Dynamics of Change and Europeanization Processes," *European Planning Studies* 22, no. 11 (September 2013): 1-20, DOI:10.1080/09654313.2013.830696 (accessed 10-12-2020).

need for a functional, autonomous, and decentralized system still remained.⁴⁵

The economic boom in 2000, though, worsened the situation since there were no adequate administrative control and sufficient planning mechanisms. However, after the country's admission to the EU in 2007, Bucharest entered a prosperous period, benefiting from programs and funds for spatial cohesion and urban regeneration. Since then, planning has been reformed according to EU framework, bringing a number of changes in spatial legislation, institutional levels, and urban policies.⁴⁶

iii. Contemporary Planning

The capital was deprived of a strategic vision for almost 20 years, until 2000, when the General Urban Plan, named PUG, was established for the entire territory of Bucharest City.⁴⁷ Moving towards an updated Master Plan, PUG 2015-25, the Municipality of Bucharest has initiated the Bucharest Strategic Concept 2015-35 (CBS 2035), a planning framework for the long-term development of the city.⁴⁸ The CBS 2035

⁴⁵ Liliana Dumitrache–Daniela Zamfir–Mirela Mariana Nae–Gabriel Simion–Ilinca Valentina Stoica, "The Urban Nexus: Contradictions and Dilemmas of (Post)Communist (Sub)Urbanization in Romania," *Journal of Studies and Research in Human Geography* 10 (May 2016): 38-50, DOI: 10.5719/hgeo.2016.101.3 (accessed 10-12-2020); Angelica Stan, "Urban Expansion in Bucharest, after 1990: Errors and Benefits," in *Planning Capital Cities*, 224-33, <https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-398-6> (accessed 10-12-2020).

⁴⁶ Hanna Derer, "Building Urbanity in Bucharest," *Sita* 3 (June 2015): 48-63, https://sita.uauim.ro/f/sita/art/04_Derer.pdf (accessed 10-12-2020); Tiberiu Florescu–Andrei Mitrea, "Romania," *disP–The Planning Review* 51, no. 1 (May 2015): 64-5, DOI: 10.1080/02513625.2015.1038070 (accessed 10-11-2020).

⁴⁷ Alexandru-Ionut Petrisor, "The Theory and Practice of Urban and Spatial Planning in Romania: Education, Laws, Actors, Procedures, Documents, Plans, and Spatial Organization. A Multiscale Analysis," *Serbian Architectural Journal* 2 (January 2010): 139-54, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/284802182_The_theory_and_practice_of_urban_and_spatial_planning_in_Romania_education_laws_actors_procedures_documents_plans_and_spatial_organization_A_multiscale_analysis (accessed 10-12-2020).

⁴⁸ "Conceptul Strategic București 2035," Bureau of Urban Studies, https://issuu.com/almihai/docs/concept_strategic_bucuresti_2035 (accessed 10-12-2020); "Planul urbanistic general," Primăriei Capitalei, <https://www.pmb.ro/orasul/harti/static/planul-urbanistic-general> (accessed 10-12-2020).

provides a toolkit, an interactive study platform for dialogue and exchange of good planning practices among urban actors and citizens of Bucharest. Taking into consideration the city's urban structure, socio-economic and environmental aspects combined with contemporary urban trends, the municipality of Bucharest aims at a participatory and transparent planning process, with small scale interventions in regional and local level, so as to improve urban quality of life.

Furthermore, in an attempt to develop partnerships and exchange of good practices and ideas among other European capitals, Bucharest is a potential partner in urban networks and regional platforms, like URBACT and METREX.⁴⁹ On the other hand, insufficient funding, improper taxation, inadequate infrastructure and public services, complicated bureaucratic processes and high-rise market competition remain problems of high priority in the city's urban agenda.

Empirical Urban Analysis

In an attempt to compare the three Balkan cities, it is important to define under what context the comparison is carried out. The terms urban image and identity could be interpreted variously depending on the spatial transformations and urban planning.

Apparently, the Balkan region bears a lot of different historical, cultural, and ethnological layers, laden with political and migration flows and faced with identity disorientation. The accumulation of various socio-economic and urban aspects is strongly reflected, mostly, in the evolvement of the Balkan centers.

Starting with, all three urban centers, Pristina, Sofia, and Bucharest, have undergone various historical, political, and cultural layers: the Ottoman rule, the modernization era during the 19th century, and a communist regime in the mid-20th century followed by the 90s market driven urbanism, according to global trends. Towards the millennium, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU family in 2007, whereas Kosovo, still not an EU member country, declared its independence, a year after,

⁴⁹ "Bucharest," URBACT, <https://urbact.eu/city/bucharest> (accessed 10-12-2020); "Municipality of Bucharest," METREX-The network of European metropolitan regions and areas, https://www.eurometrex.org/member_profile/bucharest/ (accessed 10-12-2020).

in 2008. Under that presumption, all capital cities have entered in a new state of political, administrative, and socio-economic conditions with direct impact on the urban environment and contemporary image.

Taking a brief look at the cities' spatial background, similarities could be found in the way they developed through time; from ancient settlements to regional towns and then to capital centers.

A great part of their structure was defined during the Ottoman Empire, a decisive period in urban planning. The main spatial unit of "mahala," around which the settlement evolved, following the topographic relief of the area, is a key structural element in all three cities; traces of the former organic form could be detected in the contemporary urban space in one way or another. In Pristina, the old historic center is organized in Ottoman styled neighborhoods with bazaars and maidans, whereas in Sofia, Ottoman heritage is traced down to a central mosque next to the city's former Turkish baths. In Bucharest, the "mahala" pattern is maintained, in a way, in the inner part of city blocks, behind high-scale structures of modernism and socialism. In any case, the Ottoman legacy is a specific characteristic that distinguishes them from the Western European ones.

However, differences due to geopolitical location and socio-economic factors resulted in a different pace of modernization during the 19th century. For most of the cities registered, the period before WWI was marked by rapid urban growth and planning transformations. Following the political and socio-economic models of the Western European cities, the urban image had changed. The reorganization of the street network, the elimination of the Ottoman patterns and the construction of monumental buildings and structures as the new landmarks of an established state reshaped the Balkan capitals.

Moreover, the implementation of the European planning principles varied for each capital city, related to political context and urban scale. Pristina emerged from a town to an important administrative and industrial center with significant population growth; the capital of Sofia was modernized according to European planning trends, with urban parks and public spaces; Bucharest reached its modernization peak, following Central European trends and an eclectic style in the city's architecture.

Furthermore, the split historical paths, between the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires, led to a different approach and integration

of the modernized practices, best materialized especially in Bucharest's urban evolvement; new boulevards, eclectic buildings, and green spaces interfered with parts of the old Ottoman structure, creating a mixed urban and architectural morphology.

Following the destructive consequences of the WWII, the capitals had to confront issues concerning unprecedented growth, socio-economic disparities, and planning discordance. The prevalence of the socialist system, differently applied to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania, strongly affected the capital's structure and planning. The pre-war urban image of Pristina was almost totally changed, under the Yugoslav communist slogan "Destroy the Old, Build the New," with the destruction of large parts of the historic center, including the bazaar, mosques, churches, and Ottoman neighborhoods. In opposite, Sofia and Bucharest were subjected to a soviet oriented model of urbanism and architecture, with bulk housing blocks and emblematic socialist buildings. Particularly in Bucharest, the socialist period was the most rigid one, with the introduction of "systemization law" and with large scale interventions mostly in the Civic Center.

Planning during the socialist period, in all three capitals, was used more as a political act of power rather than as a strategic tool. Though, the production of Master Plans, General Urban Plans, and policy documents of that era were a considerable effort towards regulating spatial issues and setting the basis for urban development.

The fall of communism in 1989 brought major changes in political, administrative, cultural, and architectural level. The rapid transition to a market economy led to population growth, decentralization, and property privatization with direct effects in the capitals' structure. Besides that, urban sprawl and socio-economic segregation defined the new urban patterns, introduced by international trends and the capitalist system.

Moreover, the situation in the 1990s' required for emergent solutions driven by the needs for housing shelter and administrative reform. Pristina, especially after the Kosovo War in 1998-99, had to deal with unprecedented migration flows and illegal construction caused by spontaneous interventions; the arrival of the "internationals" changed the urban image dramatically. In Sofia and Bucharest, the post-socialist era brought a period of instability and uncertainty in administration and

planning, with efforts concentrating mostly on the amendment of the existing urban plans.

After a long period of political and economic stagnation, the Millennium inaugurated a new era for all three capitals; Pristina has been reborn with the country's declaration of independence, whereas Sofia and Bucharest have been profited with a number of programs and funds, since their countries' EU accession membership.

Conclusions

In conclusion, urban space in the Balkans has undergone significant transformations throughout the last decades; political, socio-economic changes and migration flows have a strong impact on urban centers of the area. Furthermore, the transition process from a socialist to a market driven socioeconomic system has also affected urban environment, with considerable consequences in the development of Balkan cities and thus of the capitals.

Regarding the research objects, capital cities of the western and eastern Balkans, it is obvious that they share common factors in spatial history and planning, whereas differentiations in urban development and contemporary structure render the process of comparison intriguing. In a long-term perspective, all three capitals have a shared vision focused on sustainable urban development and economic growth, through an inclusive planning approach based on participatory practices. Apart from a couple of differentiations regarding each capital's urban specificities, the set of objectives and actions are related to each other. Particularly, providing a sustainable urban environment through a balanced territorial development and an inclusive socio-economic system is a top priority for each urban center.

The identity of a place relates to the historical-heritage background and to the particularities of a region. As a consequence, it is important to identify and build on distinctive local features.

A proper planning strategy should aim at creating a functional and dynamic urban system, relating to European capitals while trying to enhance Balkan features of different historical periods and architectural trends.


On the other hand, the Balkan cities, either of the western or eastern regions, have a long way towards an integrated urban identity. As cities in transition, they are laden with inner political and administrative weaknesses and faced with external economic threats and identity disorientation. In the context of EU spatial integration, there are opportunities for ensuring sustainability of the area, whereas each city and region should give priority to its individual strengths concerning Balkan traditions and values.

Overall, rebranding Balkan cities could take advantage of this transitional state and profit of EU cooperation programs and high-profile projects. Prior to this, Balkan cities should pay attention to reforming and implementing feasible planning scenarios for local and regional development.


Policy strategies should tackle issues such as judicial reform, cross border migration and social justice. Green innovation, entrepreneurship and sustainable development are also fundamental in enhancing urban identity.

The main objective is to develop a functional strategic plan that would provide for economic growth, accessible urban structures, through connectivity networks. After all, democratic, inclusive, and cohesive planning holds the key in ensuring resilience and enhancing long-term development goals in compliance with EU aims; arising from the need for the area to reinforce its urban dynamics, Balkan capitals are the new epicenters.


It remains to be seen whether related or contradicted aspects of the reference examples could produce ideas and practices towards an integrated strategic approach for the development of the Balkan space.




1914-1936



1937-1952



1952 - 1980




1980-2000




Spatial evolution (top)
(source: Municipality of Prishtina, Directorate of Strategic Planning and Sustainable Development, 2020).

Architecture of different periods (middle)
(source: Municipality of Prishtina field trip, 2018).



Strategic Plan (bottom)
(source: Municipality of Prishtina - Directorate of Strategic Planning and Sustainable Development, 2020).



Municipality of Prishtina – Directorate of Strategic Planning and Sustainable Development, available at: <https://prishtinaonline.com/drejtorite/ekonomi-dhe-zhvillim-lokal/sektori-i-planifikimit-hapesinor> (in albanian) (accessed November 10th, 2020).




Urban plans (19th-20th century)
(source: Stara Sofia-Стара София, 2020, available at: <http://stara-sofia.com/> (accessed November 15th, 2020)).



Historical and architectural landmarks
(middle)


1. Monument Tsar Osvoboditel,
 2. Vasil Levski National Stadium, 3. Serdica,
 4. Sofia Court House
 5. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,
 6. Russian Church of St Nicholas,
 7. Synagogue,
 8. Banya Bashi Mosque
- (source: Sofia Municipality, 2020· field trip, 2018).

Urban development plan (left)
(source: Sofia Municipality – SOFPROECT, 2020, available at: <https://sofproect.com/en/home/> (accessed November 15th, 2020)).



Planning evolution 19th-20th century

(source: Idei Urbane Idei Urbane, 2020, available at <https://www.ideiurbane.ro/> (in romanian) (accessed December 15th, 2020); Conceptul Strategic București 2035, available at: <https://www.csb2035.ro/> (in romanian) (accessed December 15th, 2020)).



Historical and architectural landmarks (middle)

1. Colțea Hospital, 2. CEC Palace,
 3. National History Museum, 4. Equestrian Statue of Carol,
 5. Romanian Athenaeum, 6. Manuc's Inn, 7. Carul cu Bere Restaurant,
 8. Headquarters of the Romanian Union of Architects, 9. Casa Capșa historic restaurant
- (source: Primăria Municipiului București, 2020· field trip, 2019).



Zonal Urban Plan - PUZ

(source: Primaria Municipiului Bucuresti – Primăria Sector 3, 2020, available at: <http://www.pmb.ro/> (in romanian) (accessed December 15th, 2020)).