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**The Tolerant Policy of the Habsburg Authorities
towards the Orthodox People from South-Eastern Europe and
the Formation of National Identities (18th-early 19th Century)**

The modern concept of tolerance is a result of the Age of Enlightenment.¹ Although the problem of how to deal with the ‘Other’ was by no means new –after all, Greeks, Jews, Christians, heretics and Muslims had found ways to coexist in antiquity, the Roman era and the Middle Ages– it was inherited by the Enlightenment as a set of critical issues specifically rooted in the tumultuous history of the early modern era. A crucial group of terms interwoven with the salient forms of collective identification, are those relating to migration in the framework of multi-ethnic states (such as the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires): identity (religious, social, political, ethnic, national), naturalization, migration and diaspora.

The real aim of our paper is to shed light on the developing national self-consciousness of Orthodox groups established in Habsburg territories in the Central Europe of the eighteenth century. Note that these people came from an Empire, the Ottoman, in which they were organized into a *millet* system according to their religion; in this system the Sultan granted them, on certain conditions, the right to worship.² The core problem, however, were the

1. The first version of this article was presented at the International Congress of Europeanists in Amsterdam, June 2013. We would like to thank the NGUA of the University of Athens and the Special Account for Research Grants of the Democritus University of Thrace for supporting this research.

2. From the rich literature on the subject, see: Gunnar Hering, “Das islamische Recht und die Investitur des Gennadios Scholarios (1454)”, *Balkan Studies* 2 (1961), pp. 231-256; Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity: a Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1968; Paraskevas Konortas, *Οθωμανικές προσεγγίσεις για το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο*:

Tolerance-edicts of 1781 promulgated by the Enlightened Habsburg Emperor, Joseph II – namely the Tolerance-edicts issued for the various *Hereditary Lands* and for Hungary and Transylvania. These edicts were part of the complex philosophical and political theory and praxis of Josephinism. Our interest will also be focused on another parameter of ‘coexistence’: the tolerance or intolerance displayed by the various groups of South-Eastern European migrants established in the Habsburg countries (for instance, the Protestant ‘Saxons’ and the Greek Orthodox in Braşov, Sibiu) as a consequence of the privileges granted to them by the emperors.

To better understand the era we will be discussing, we shall provide a brief introduction to the subjects of Josephinism and of tolerance. In the context of Enlightened Despotism, an era of reform known as Josephinism began in 1780, when Joseph II, as the sole ruler of the Habsburg Monarchy (1780-1790), attempted to legislate a series of drastic reforms to remodel his Empire in the form of the ideal Enlightened state.³ One might point out that the Maria Theresa reforms, especially after 1760, were also aimed at the organization of a centralized state in terms of administration, and particularly of the economic and fiscal aspects of gov-

βεράτια για τους προκαθημένους της Μεγάλης Εκκλησίας, 17^{ος}-αρχές 20^{ού} αιώνα, Athens: Alexandria, 2003; concerning the Jewish people, see Sneschka Panova, *Die Juden zwischen Toleranz und Völkerrecht im Osmanischen Reich. Die Wirtschaftstätigkeit der Juden im Osmanischen Reich (die Südosteuropaländer vom 15. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert)*, Frankfurt a. M.–Berlin–New York–Wien: Peter Lang, Europäische Hochschulschriften, III/752), 1997.

3. Helmut Reinalter, “Josephinismus als Aufklärer Absolutismus – ein Forschungsproblem? Gesellschaftlicher Strukturwandel und thesianisch-josephinische Reformen”, in Wolfgang Schmale–Renate Zedinger–Jean Mondot (eds.), *Josephinismus–eine Bilanz/Échecs et réussites du Joséphisme/Jahrbuch der österreichischen Gesellschaft zur Erforschung des 18. Jahrhunderts* 22 (2007), pp. 19-34, discusses critically the previous rich literature referring to the Enlightened Despotism and to the Josephinian reforms; see also Idem (ed.), *Der Josephinismus. Bedeutung, Einflüsse und Wirkungen*, Frankfurt a. M. 1993. For the time of Joseph II. see the rich exhibition catalogue: Johannes Gründler et al. (eds.), *Österreich zur Zeit Kaiser Josephs II. Mitregent Kaiserin Maria Theresias, Kaiser und Landesfürst*, Stift Melk, 29. März-2. November 1980, Niederösterreichische Landesausstellung, Wien 1980.

ernance. But her son, Joseph II, would continue to pursue these reforms very actively. Guided by a dogma of *Alles für das Volk, nichts durch das Volk* [Everything for the People and nothing through the People], the Emperor sought mainly to centralize the bureaucracy. One of his purposes was also to establish compulsory school attendance for all children and a centralized schools inspection system. He also undertook measures to relax censorship [=Zensurpatent, 1781], regulate matrimonial relations through the Patent of Marriage [=Ehepatent, 1783], abolish serfdom, redefine relations between State and Church, reform the legal system through the introduction of both general criminal (*Allgemeines Strafgesetzbuch*, 1787) and civil codes [*Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*, 1787], establish German as the official language of the Empire (with some exceptions, such as the free-port of Trieste), and –most significantly– to establish a series of measures concerning the unification of the customs system [=Zollsystem]. Josephinism has been examined as a system, both because of the philosophical trends of the time and because of its practical political applications.⁴ It was still “nicht nur eine Sonderform der praktischen Aufklärung, sondern eine gesamtgesellschaftliche und politisch-kulturelle Bewegung”,⁵ but the radicality and rapidity of Joseph’s reforms –and of his church policy, in particular– still provoked powerful reactions, though covered by an enlightened, progressive ideal.

For our argument, we will focus particularly on his tolerance policy, as the secularization of the state’s power and of state theory was a first step towards a pluralistic society.⁶ A pluralistic society

4. Reinalter, “Josephinismus als Aufgeklärter Absolutismus”, *op.cit.*, pp. 28-31, where he discusses the aspects of Fritz Hartung (1955), Karl O. Freiherr von Aretin (1970s), Manfred Kossok (1985), Johannes Kunisch, Hans-Ulrich Wehler et al.

5. *Op.cit.*, p. 32.

6. Ursula Stephan-Kopitzsch, *Die Toleranzdiskussion im Spiegel überregionaler Aufklärungszeitschriften*, series: Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe III, Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften, vol. 382, Frankfurt a. Main–Bern–New York–Paris 1989, p. 17.

could not be content with the principle of ‘cujus regio eius religio’, and enlightened precepts on the autonomy of the individual and the relativity of the knowledge of truth⁷ could be conducive to a sufferance of religious minorities. The tolerance policy could also help deal with population growth. As Charles O’Brien has noted: “Religious toleration in the 18th century is usually associated with Protestant England, Holland and Prussia. It is less well known that, shortly before the French Revolution, the Habsburg monarchy became the first Catholic state to extend full civil rights to most non-Catholics. In the Edict of Toleration, Oct. 13, 1781, Joseph II. initiated this reform”.⁸

Before proceeding with a presentation of this particular policy, we shall consider the various terms and nuances surrounding ‘tolerance’. “There is a tendency in the literature today to reduce toleration to generalized multiculturalism on the one hand, or freedom of belief/choice on the other. But this reduction leaves it incapable of addressing many confrontations”.⁹ One of the standard definitions of toleration emphasizes the “restraint of oneself from imposing one’s reaction”.¹⁰ The specific term ‘toleration’ and its associated concepts (‘Recognition’, ‘Privileges’, ‘Permission’, ‘Sufferance (*souffrir*)’, ‘Freedom of Conscience’, ‘Freedom of religion’, ‘political Freedom’, ‘commercial Freedom’, ‘Coexistence’ etc.) had come into being and been re-determined in the religious and

7. Ibidem.

8. Charles H. O’Brien, “Ideas of Religious Toleration at the Time of Joseph II. A Study of the Enlightenment among Catholics in Austria”, in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge*, New Series-Volume 59, part 7 (1969), p. 5; O’Brien offers a critical approach of the previous literature and tries to give the historical roots of Josephinian tolerance as well its ways to all the aspects of the tolerated policy.

9. Ingrid Creppell, *Toleration and Identity. Foundations in Early Modern Thought*, New York–London: Routledge, 2003, p. X.; on various aspects of the toleration see: Guðmundur Hálfðanarson (ed.), *Discrimination and Tolerance in Historical Perspective*, Pisa: University Press, edizioni plus, 2008, <http://www.cliohres.net/books3/books.php?book=7> (visited on 7.12.2014).

10. Creppell, *Toleration, op.cit.*, p. 3.

political discourse of early Modern Europe.¹¹ At that time, tensions between individual conscience and authority moved centre-stage, forcing a rethinking and restructuring of normative socio-political and socio-cultural constellations. The relationship between church and state, the reason of state, the relationship between subject and sovereign, the development of the concept of the self, the economy and commerce, all began to change in ways that must be understood to fully comprehend the meaning of the new concept of toleration.

As a word, toleration/tolerance derives from the Latin *tolerantia*, which is unconnected to religious dissidence.¹² However, in post-Reformation 16th and 17th century Europe, tolerance meant allowing another religion to exist rather than permission or concession; it meant to endure or bear rival confessions established in the same state or kingdom¹³ in order to avoid a “rapid collapse of the dynastic authority and a dangerous disruption of civil peace”.¹⁴ Toleration bolsters ‘living together, confronting the issues and the problems of collective life’,¹⁵ especially in multinational empires. After Jean Bodin’s aspects on toleration¹⁶ and Montaigne’s ideas on toleration as “the condition of living in the midst of diversity and multiplicity”,¹⁷ John Locke’s *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689) shifts toleration to the “boundaries of recognition” and cen-

11. Benjamin J. Kaplan, *Divided by Faith. Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge, Massachusetts–London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.

12. Creppell, *op.cit.*, pp. 5, 30-31.

13. Bernard Cottret, “1598-1688: De l’édit de Nantes à la glorieuse révolution. Concorde, liberté de conscience, tolerance”, in Jean-Paul Pichardie–Antoine Capet (eds.), *La Naissance de l’idée de tolérance 1660-1689*. Actes du colloque organisé à l’université de Rouen les 29 et 30 janvier 1999 avec le soutien du Conseil scientifique, numéro special, Université de Rouen 1999, pp. 3-4.

14. Jean-Paul Pittion, “Religion, Reason of State and Toleration”, in Pichardie and Capet, *La Naissance*, *op.cit.*, p. 50.

15. Creppell, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

16. *Op.cit.*, pp. 39-40.

17. *Op.cit.*, p. 92.

tres the discussion in a ‘negotiation’¹⁸ between the state and its people and in a recognition of rights and moral expression. Voltaire’s *Traité sur la tolérance* (1763), which aimed to exonerate the Protestant Jean Calas after his trial in 1762, initiated an intense discussion on the rehabilitation of the Protestants.¹⁹ We can also consider the debate presented by Evgenios Voulgaris’ in his *Σχεδιάσμα περί της ανεξιθρησκείας* (1768) in this context.²⁰ A long discussion on toleration or its absence, the liberty of commerce and the ‘naturalization’ of foreigners had also been underway since the 17th century in the context of economic state theory,²¹ and the philosophical discourse of the Enlightenment contributed to a deepening and a diversification of the tolerance concept. We must also include the toleration discourse in the identity debate –which is to say the differentiation of individuals and their membership and agency in one political/social/cultural collective or another (such as nation, race, religion, ethnicity, language, gender)²²– in the discourse on human rights, particularly after the French Revolution.

18. *Op.cit.*, pp. 93-94; further analyses on Locke’s Toleration see in the pp. 95-123.

19. Cottret, “1598-1688”, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

20. *Περί των διχονοιών των εν ταις εκκλησίαις της Πολωνίας δοκίμιον ιστορικών και κριτικών, εκ της Γαλλικής εις την κοινωτέραν των καθ’ ημάς Ελλήνων διάλεκτον μεταφρασθέν μετά και σημειωμάτων τινών ιστορικών και κριτικών ος εν τέλει προσετέθη και Σχεδιάσμα περί της Ανεξιθρησκείας*, 1768. On the subject see: Martin Knapp, *Evjenios Vulgaris im Einfluss der Aufklärung. Der Begriff der Toleranz bei Vulgaris und Voltaire*, Bochumer Studien zur neugriechischen und byzantinischen Philologie (Isidora Rosenthal-Kamarinea, ed.) vol. VI, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1984, and Konstantinos Kotsiopoulos, *Ανεξιθρησκεία: Κοινωνική θεώρηση των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων στον ευρωπαϊκό και νεοελληνικό διαφωτισμό, το παράδειγμα των John Locke και Ευγένιου Βούλγαρη*, Thessaloniki: Pournaras, 2008; see also: Paschalis Kitromilidis, *Νεοελληνικός Διαφωτισμός. Οι πολιτικές και κοινωνικές ιδέες*, Athens: Cultural Foundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1999², pp. 64-66.

21. Paulette Carrive, “Tolérance et prospérité chez les économistes anglais du XVIIe siècle”, in Pichardie and Capet, *La Naissance*, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-48.

22. Creppell, *op.cit.*, pp. 7-9; see also: Jean-Pierre Cléro, “Les fondements de la tolérance. De la liberté individuelle à l’utilité”, in Pichardie and Capet, *La Naissance*, *op.cit.*, pp. 79-102.

It was in this context that Joseph's Tolerance appeared. However, it is better to speak about the Edicts of Tolerance in the plural rather than the Edict of Tolerance (*Toleranzpatent-e*) of 1781, as various forms of resolutions in the spirit of Josephinian Tolerance were issued in and after 1781 all over the Empire. This Tolerance policy has to be seen as the hegemony of State over Church within the general framework of Josephinism, and as the reaction of the state's religious policy to the consequences of the Catholic Reformation because of the Protestant Reformation.²³ The denomination of these Tolerance edicts for the several parts of the Empire, especially for Hungary and Transylvania, such as *Benigna Resolutio* (25 Oct. 1781) or *Edictum tolerantiae*²⁴ besides the German one: *Toleranzpatent* exudes the various nuances of their political concept and amplitude; an amplitude that derived, in part, from the multilateral content of tolerance *per se* since the time of John Locke's *Letter of Tolerance* and from the differentiated theoretical approach of philosophers and politicians after it, and, on the other, from the great administrative, religious, jurisdictional and economic heterogeneity of the huge Habsburg imperial lands. According to the cameralist economic theory of Maria Theresa and Joseph's ministers, "the state's power varied directly in proportion to the size and quality of its population".²⁵ Specifically, the Josephinian approach to Tolerance has been constructed in accordance

23. Werner Ogris, "Joseph II.: Staats-und Rechtsreformen", in Norberto Bobbio (ed.), *Das Zeitalter der Menschenrechte. Ist Toleranz durchsetzbar?*, Transl. from the Italian by Ulrich Hausmann, Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1998, p. 124. An analytical essay on the coming into being of the Tolerance edict see: Gustav Frank, *Das Toleranz-Patent Kaiser Joseph II. Urkundliche Geschichte seiner Entstehung und seiner Folgen*, Säkular Festschrift des K.K. evangelischen Oberkirchenrathes A.C. und H.C. in Wien, Wien 1881.

24. Peter Barton, "Das Toleranzpatent von 1781", in Bobbio, *Das Zeitalter der Menschenrechte*, *op.cit.*, pp. 152, 157, 170-172; particularly on the Tolerance edict on Hungary see: Eva Kowalská, "Religious Intolerance after the Patent of Toleration (1781): the Case of the Hungarian Lutherans", in Hálfdanarson, *Discrimination and Tolerance*, *op.cit.*, pp. 147-156.

25. O'Brien, "Ideas", *op.cit.*, p. 15, "Cameralism indirectly improved the position of religious minorities by habituating the government to look more to the state's economic than to its ecclesiastical interests".

with Joseph's religiosity with the assistance of an enlightened elite of academicians and philosophers surrounding the Emperor, and in the light of new state-political theories and practices (*Kameralistik* etc.). Joseph II's instruction in natural law was influenced by the pedagogue Christian August Beck, according to whom the treatment of religious nonconformists should be governed by natural law and social utility.²⁶ As Beck notes, this *tolérance civile* was a necessity "Out of respect for the people who had delegated the authority to the sovereign".²⁷ The "*beneficium emigrandi*" was one of them.²⁸ Various explanations have been proffered surrounding the motivations behind Joseph's tolerance policy, including "attracting foreign skilled craftsmen to the new industries of Austria and settlers to the wastes of Hungary".²⁹

We can, however, assume the Edict/s of Tolerance expresses the religious tendencies of Joseph II., a loyal Catholic Christian, as well as utility. As he wrote to his Mother in a letter dated July 20, 1777: "Tolerance means to me that in purely temporal affairs, I would, without regard to religion, employ anyone in my service who is capable and industrious, and works for the welfare of the state; I would let him have land and exercise his profession, and I would give him citizenship".³⁰ In every form of Tolerance edict, the public *Religions-exercitium* remained the exclusive preserve of the Emperor's Catholic subjects, a decision that essentially restricted the amplitude of the sense of tolerance to a form of forbearance. A *Privat-exercitium* was reserved for the non-Catholics

26. *Op.cit.*, p. 16.

27. Jean Bérenger, "Tolérance: Joseph II", in Wolfgang Schmale–Renate Zedinger–Jean Mondot (eds.), *Josephinismus—eine Bilanz/Échecs et réussites du Joséphisme*, vol. of: *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Gesellschaft zur Erforschung des 18. Jahrhunderts* 22 (2007), p. 187; Berenger's article is a concise and critical discussion of the recent literature on the subject of Joseph's Tolerance.

28. Barton, "Das Toleranzpatent", *op.cit.*, pp. 152-153.

29. The aspect of Ernst Wangermann (*From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials*, London 1959, p. 14) cited by O'Brien, "Ideas", *op.cit.*, p. 1; see also Ernst Wangermann, "Joseph II. und seine Reformen in der Arena der politischen Öffentlichkeit", in Schmale et al., *Josephinismus*, *op.cit.*, pp. 161-174.

30. O'Brien, "Ideas", *op.cit.*, p. 21.

(*Akatholiken*): for the Christians of the *Confessio Augustana et Helvetica* as well as for the Greeks not united with the Catholic Church (*Griechen nicht unirte*).³¹ Special edicts were also issued for the Jews in the various imperial provinces, as well, stimulating a long debate and confrontation.³² According to this *Privat-exercitium*, all *Akatholiken* had the right to erect a temple and a school if more than 100 families lived in a place,³³ though bell-towers, other towers or street entrances were prohibited. However, privileges or other freedom letters [= *Freiheitsbriefe*] granted in the past to several groups and places within the Empire had to be recognized.³⁴ As we will demonstrate below, there was considerable heterogeneity in the vast area between the free city-port of Trieste to the capital city of Vienna, between the southern Hungarian provinces, where the Serbian Orthodox Church was also tolerated, and the Transylvanian cities of Braşov and Sibiu, where the antagonism of the Protestant Saxons,³⁵ who had lived there since the 12th century, proved conducive to another form of tolerance or intolerance. In these different cases, we very often have to distinguish between the ‘tolerance’ of the central authori-

31. Barton, “Das Toleranzpatent”, *op.cit.*, pp. 162, 165.

32. O’Brien, “Ideas”, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-31, where he discusses very briefly the cases referring to the Jews in the various Edicts of Tolerance in Galicia and Trieste, the two most opposite examples. The *Judenpatent* for Galicia tended to an assimilation of the Jewish people, which provoked many reactions. Different was the case in the free port of Trieste, Lois Dubin, *The Port Jews of Habsburg Trieste: Absolutist Politics and Enlightened Culture*, Stanford, CA, 1999; Tullia Catalan, *La Comunità ebraica di Trieste (1781-1914). Politica, società e cultura*, Trieste: LINT, 2000.

33. Barton, “Das Toleranzpatent”, *op.cit.*, pp. 166-168.

34. *Op.cit.*, p. 177.

35. In Transylvania, the Counter Reformation was not so effective: O’Brien, “Ideas”, *op.cit.*, p. 12, “The Protestant churches retained public worship and other rights granted by the Hapsburgs during the Turkish wars. Protestant continued to hold most public offices”. About Saxons in Transylvania, see László Makkai, “Herausbildung der städtischen Gesellschaft (1172-1526)”, Gábor Barta, “Die Anfänge des Fürstentums und erste Krisen (1526-1606)”, and Katalin Péter, “Die Blütezeit des Fürstentums (1606-1660)”, in Béla Köpeczi (ed.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1990, pp. 175-236, 241-298, 302-358.

ties and the ‘intolerance’ of established conditions and the local population or population groups, which led to contradictory behaviour, difficult circumstances and a differentiated meaning of tolerance *per se*.

The move toward religious tolerance had been prepared by the establishment during Maria Theresa’s reign of various Commissions such as the Court Censorship Commission, the Court Commission on Education and the Court for Religious Affairs.³⁶ Some of these Commissions, including the Commission for Education, were transformed during the 1770s, especially after the educational edict of 1774 and the catalytic appointment of the Prussian Johann Ignaz Felbiger to lead educational reform.³⁷ Schools had also to be founded, given the Enlightened policy’s focus on educating the Emperor’s people. Teaching methods, schoolbooks and school administration had all to be conducted according to special imperial laws and under imperial supervision.³⁸

Given the state policy of toleration, we will be discussing three specific points concentrating our attention on the diverse content of the term “tolerance” and its various versions. Our focus will be on the local level, both within the Habsburg Empire and the various religious and political equilibria brought into being both by the religious wars of the 16th century and by the different socio-economic composition of specific regions (Transylvania, Hungary) and their and annexation into the Monarchy after the Karlowitz Treaty (1699), but also on specific cities (the free port of Trieste and the capital, Vienna, and the cities and scattered rural population of Hungary). We will also be focusing on the cycles of Greek Ortho-

36. O’Brien, “Ideas”, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

37. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “Southeastern European Migrant Groups between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. Multilateral Social and Cultural Transfers from the Eighteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries”, in Harald Heppner–Eva Posch (eds.), *Encounters in Europe’s Southeast. The Habsburg Empire and the Orthodox World in the Eighteenth and the Nineteenth Centuries* [The Eighteenth Century and the Habsburg Monarchy. International Series, vol. 5] Bochum: Dieter Winkler, 2012, pp. 155-156.

38. Barton, “Das Toleranzpatent”, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

dox settlers (*paroikoi*), the Serbs, Greeks and Vlachs (Aromunians) who migrated from South-eastern Europe to the Habsburg lands in Central Europe during the long 18th century; our purpose here is to highlight some aspects of toleration or intolerance among various local populations adhering to different religious dogmas in the Habsburg Empire. Finally, we will delineate different dimensions of tolerance or intolerance (at the local and social level) within the cities of the Monarchy, from cosmopolitan Trieste to the imperial capital, Vienna, and both Hungarian and Transylvanian towns.

At this point, we will examine the role of the ‘tolerant’ policy the Habsburg authorities maintained towards Orthodox groups (Ottoman subjects in the main, but Venetian subjects, too, from the Ionian Islands, in particular), with a view to their establishing merchant communities in imperial lands. The initial aim of the Habsburg authorities was to encourage commercial exchanges with the South-Eastern regions after the Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718) and with their people, who specialized in trading products vital for the industrial development of the host Habsburg countries. This policy can also be understood within the framework of the theory and practice of ‘populationism’.

We are coming nearer to our argumentation on the basis of the practice of populationism and particularly the colonization of the Military Frontier across Croatian-Slavonia and Hungary during the long Ottoman-Habsburg wars,³⁹ the Banat of Temesvar,⁴⁰ as well

39. Karl Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft an der kroatisch-slawonischen Militärgrenze (1535-1881)*, Graz 1986; Dávid Géza (ed.), *Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, Leiden (et al.): Brill, 2002; Márta Fata, “Die Rolle des Militärs in der habsburgischen Impopulationspolitik außerhalb der Militärgrenze in der Übergangszeit zwischen Krieg und Frieden (1686-1740)”, in Matthias Asche–Michael Herrmann–Ulrike Ludwig–Anton Schindling (eds.), *Krieg, Militär und Migration in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin: LIT Verlag 2008, pp. 251-264; Sabine Jesner, *Habsburgische Grenzraumpolitik in der Siebenbürgischen Militärgrenze (1760-1830): Verteidigungs- und Präventionsstrategien*, PhD University of Graz 2013, <http://www.onb.ac.at> and <http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AC11104770> (visited on 18.11.2014).

40. Josef Kallbrunner, *Das kaiserliche Banat. Einrichtung und Entwicklung des Banats bis 1739*, München 1958; Benjamin Landais, “Habsburg’s State and

the impopulation policy pursued through the so-called ‘Deutsche Schwaben’ in the 18th century, especially in Hungary.⁴¹ The bright Banat area was colonized by Croats, Serbs and Vlachs (Aromuni-ans) from South-Eastern Europe in an effort both to defend the Habsburg Empire against the Ottomans and to cultivate the large areas destroyed and depopulated by the years of wars between the Habsburgs and Ottomans. The first permanent military institution in the Habsburg realm was not a standing army but a craggy line of frontier defences begun in 1522 to ward off the Ottomans; it was manned by mercenaries, local militia and –most significantly– armed peasants organized into military colonies. The structure of these colonies was based on the *zadruga*, a multi-extended family organizational schema.⁴² In November 1630, the Emperor proclaimed the *Statuta Wallachorum* or Vlach Statute, which regulated the status of the ‘Vlach’ settlers (including Croats, Serbs and Vlachs) from the Ottoman Empire with regard to the military command, their obligations, and their right to internal self-administration.⁴³

the Local Orthodox Elite. The Case of Temesvár (1750-1780)”, in Harald Hepner–Eva Posch (eds.), *Encounters in Europe’s Southeast. The Habsburg Empire and the Orthodox World in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, The Eighteenth Century and the Habsburg Monarchy, International Series, Vol. 5, Bochum: Dr Dieter Winkler Verlag, 2012, pp. 109-120.

41. Felix Milleker, *Die Besiedlung der Banater Militärgrenze*. Belacrkva, Weißkirchen, 1926; Immo Eberl et al. (eds.), *Die Donauschwaben. Deutsche Siedlung in Südosteuropa. Ausstellungskatalog*, Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1989; Ingomar Senz, *Die Donau-Schwaben*. Studienbuchreihe der Stiftung Ostdeutscher Kulturrat, vol. 5, München: Langen Müller, 1994.

42. Maria Todorova, *Balkan Family Structure and the European Pattern*, Budapest, Central European University, 2006, pp. 155-156; on *zadruga* see Karl Kaser, *Familie und Verwandtschaft auf dem Balkan. Analyse einer untergehenden Kultur*, Wien–Köln–Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1995; Idem, *Freier Bauer*; more literature on Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “Historische Familienforschung in Südosteuropa. Pluralität der Forschungstendenzen im internationalen Kontext”, *Historische Anthropologie* 5 (1997), pp. 140-142, 148-151.

43. Kaser, *Freier Bauer*, *op.cit.*, pp. 108-130. See also Géza Pálffy, “The Origins and the Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)”, in Géza Dávid–Pál

To encourage settlers, the Habsburg rulers promised special privileges such as free land or exemption from feudal obligations. The guarantees of religious freedom and exemption from feudal obligations made the Orthodox Serbs valuable allies for the monarchy in its seventeenth-century struggle against the Catholic Croatian nobility, especially after the so-called Serbian ‘*velika seoba*’ of 1690-1691.⁴⁴ When the Military Frontier was extended eastward after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, Serb (and some Croat) border guards played a similar role for the Monarchy against the Hungarian nobility. The newly-founded Serbian Orthodox Metropolis of Karlowitz⁴⁵ and the ‘Illyrische Hofdeputation’ would serve as authorities for the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy for many years.⁴⁶

Mercantilism led the Habsburg authorities to take a series of special measures in order to expand the Empire’s commercial and maritime activities. Around the time of the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718),⁴⁷ Charles VI issued a number of edicts including the ‘Patent on Freedom of Navigation in the Adriatic’ (1717), the Patent designating Trieste and Fiume (Rijeka) as Free-ports (1719), and

Fodor (eds.), *Ottomans, Hungarians, and the Habsburgs in Central Europe: the Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, Leiden: Brill, 2000, p. 60.

44. Walter Lukan, “‘*Velika seoba Srba*’. Der große Serbenzug des Jahres 1690 ins Habsburgerreich”, *Österreichische Osthefte* 33 (1991), pp. 35-54; R. Samardžić, “Velika seoba Srba 1690. Godine”, *Sentandrejski zbornik* 2 (Belgrade 1992), pp. 7-24; Noel Malcolm, “The ‘Great Migration’ of the Serbs from Kosovo (1690): History, Myth and Ideology”, in Oliver Jens Schmitt–Eva Anne Frantz (eds.), *Albanische Geschichte. Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung*, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009, pp. 225-251, gives a very interesting historiographic critical account on the subject.

45. Ioannis Tarnanidis, *Τα προβλήματα της Μητροπόλεως Καρλοβικίων κατά τον ΙΗ΄ αιώνα και ο Jovan Rajić (1726-1801)*, Thessaloniki 1972.

46. During the period 1741-1749, the Theiss-Marosh military frontier was gradually abolished in the face of bitter Serbian resistance; the lands passed under Hungarian administration. Thereafter, about 3,000 Serbs decided to emigrate to Russia (Alfred Rieber, *The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: from the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 48).

47. From the rich literature on the Treaty, see the recent book: Gharles Ingrao–Nikola Samardžić–Jovan Pešalj (eds.), *The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718*, Purdue University Press 2011.

the foundation of the so-called *Orientalische Kompagnie* (1719) aiming to consolidate Habsburg influence in South-Eastern Europe.⁴⁸ Free land and sea trade between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires by Ottoman and Habsburg subjects was established on a pre-emptive duty of 3%-5% on imports and exports, while the Treaty also provided for free navigation of the Danube. Maria Theresia followed a more intensive policy, which sought to invite people to establish their commercial networks in Habsburg lands and to contribute to the industrial expansion on the other.⁴⁹ Ottoman and Venetian subjects took advantage of the treaty and the Habsburg Monarchy's need for Ottoman agricultural and handicraft products, and activated the trade. This encouraging of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire to migrate can also be seen in the light of the Eastern Question, whereby a Great Power typically extended protection to a selected minority in the Ottoman Empire in the hopes of extending its influence there. Moreover, the reconquest of the Ottoman Lands by the Habsburg Empire was followed by policies that ultimately favoured Greek Orthodox traders. The Habsburgs needed to expand their commercial and maritime activities and consolidate their influence in the Ottoman lands.

The core of our argument, however, will be an examination of the evolution of 'permission' or 'recognition' into 'tolerance'. It has to be mentioned that before the era of the 'Toleration-edict' (1781), the Habsburgs had also faced difficulties relating to the co-existence of various ethnic and religious groups (Catholics, Unitar-

48. Wilhelm Kaltenstadler, "Der österreichische Seehandel über Triest im 18. Jahrhundert", *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 55 (1968), pp. 484-485; Ivan Erceg, "Außenhandel der Nordadriatischen Seestädte als Faktor im Entstehen der kapitalistischen Beziehungen in Österreich im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert", *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 55 (1968), pp. 464-480; Olga Katsiardi-Hering, *Η Ελληνική παροικία της Τεργέστης, (1751-1830)*, Athens: Saripolou Library, University of Athens, vol. 52, 1986, pp. 1-10.

49. On the rich literature on the subject, see: Olga Katsiardi-Hering, *Τεχνίτες και τεχνικές βαφής νημάτων. Από τη Θεσσαλία στην Κεντρική Ευρώπη (18^{ος}-αρχές 19^{ου} αι.)*. *Επίμετρο: Η Αμπελακιώτικη Συντροφιά (1805)*, Athens-Ambelakia 2003, pp. 53-66.

ians, Orthodox, Protestants, Jews, Armenians).⁵⁰ The wars of the Habsburgs against the Ottomans⁵¹ and their need to make alliances with other Christians (among them Protestants) also led them to adopt a practice of ‘tolerance’. Moreover, in some cases the authorities permitted the newcomers to organize their social and economic life, granting them privileges allowing the formation of confraternities, ‘companies’ and communities.

It is clear that the integration of Greek Orthodox people into a mutually shared Western European value system began in early Modern times, and particularly during the Age of Enlightenment and the era of the French Revolution. Orthodox people from the regions of Epirus, Macedonia, Thessaly, the Peloponnese, Asia Minor and Serbia became integrated in the networks of the Mediterranean (along the axis of the Adriatic) and South-Eastern Europe⁵²

50. See Joachim Bahlecke–Arno Strohmeier (eds.), *Konfessionalisierung in Ostmitteleuropa: Wirkungen des religiösen Wandels im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert in Staat, Gesellschaft und Kultur*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1999 [Forschungen zur Geschichte und Struktur des östlichen Mitteleuropa vol. 3].

51. Ekkehard Eickhoff, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen (1645-1700)*, München 1970; Jan Paul Niederkorn, *Die europäischen Mächte und der ‘Lange Türkenkrieg’ Kaiser Rudolphs II (1593-1606)*, Wien 1993; Bertrand Michael Buchmann, *Österreich und das Osmanische Reich. Eine bilaterale Geschichte*, Wien 1999; Ivan Pärvev, *Habsburgs and the Ottomans between Vienna and Belgrade, 1683-1739*, New York 1995; Plamen Dimitrov Mitev (ed.), *Empires and Peninsulas: Southeastern Europe between Karlowitz and the Peace of Adrianople, 1699-1829*, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2010.

52 . http://xeee.web.auth.gr/HCS/HCS_Conf_el/12_diaspora_hungary.pps (visited on 18.11.2014). We would like to thank Prof. Evangelos Livieratos and especially the cartographer Dr. Aggeliki Tsorlini/Aristoteleian University of Thessaloniki, who drew these maps for the Cartographic conference held in Kozani, 19.10.2013, on the occasion of the exposition “On the map: Westmacedonians and Kozaniots to central Europe – Hungary”: http://xeee.web.auth.gr/HCS/HCS_Conf_el/12_Kozani_2012_el.htm (visited on 30.1.2013). Dr. Tsorlini used the map elaborated by Ödön Füves, *Οι Έλληνες της Ουγγαρίας*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1965, and the article by Ikaros Mantouvalos, “Μεταναστευτικές διαδρομές από τον χώρο της Μακεδονίας στην ουγγρική ενδοχώρα (17^{ος} αιώνας-αρχές 19^{ου} αιώνα)”, in Ioannis Koliopoulos–Iakovos Mihailidis (eds.), *Οι Μακεδόνες στη Διασπορά, 17^{ος}, 18^{ος} και 19^{ος} αιώνας*, Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 2011, pp. 178-235; Μαρία Στασινοπούλου–Μαρία Χριστίνα Χατζηγιάννου (eds.), *Διασπορά–Δίκτυα–Διαφωτισμός*,

(tending to extend from south to north and into central Europe), through either collaboration or collision in the communitarian and commercial sector, paving the way for social, cultural and national identity consciousness.

Now, it is convenient to sketch the immigration of Greek Orthodox populations from the Balkans into the Habsburg Empire, on the one hand, and their establishment in the host societies, on the other. It is known that from the 18th century, particularly after the commercial treaty of Passarowitz (1718), the Habsburg Monarchy became a locus for a maritime and overland trade, which led to the emergence of Greek Orthodox urban merchant colonies (commercial ‘paroikies’). Following the proclamation of Trieste as a free port, the city became one of the major destinations for *Greci* immigrants from the Ionian Islands, Western Continental Greece, the Peloponnese, and –principally– the Aegean Islands and the coast of Asia Minor.⁵³

In the mid-18th century, the Greeks who settled in Trieste very quickly acquired religious and political privileges. It is true that Austria was interested in luring experienced merchants including Greeks to their realm in order to make Austrian trade competitive with other mercantile powers, for instance Venice. Thus, in 1751, Maria-Theresa issued a Decree of Privileges for the ‘Greci’ (Greeks and ‘Illyrici’)⁵⁴ of Trieste. In the following years, and on the basis of the decree in question, the ‘Greci’ managed to erect the

Athens: Center for Neohellenic Studies, National Research Foundation, 2005; Olga Katsiardi-Hering, «Δούναβης: Ποτάμι πολέμων και ειρήνης–Γέφυρα ψυχών και ειδών», in *Σκέδος εις Τιμήν*, Αφιερωματικός τόμος επί τη συμπλήρωσει 25ετίας από της εις Επίσκοπον χειροτονίας και 20ετίας από της ενθρονίσεως του Μητροπολίτου Αυστρίας και Εξάρχου Ουγγαρίας και Μεσευρώπης, κ. Μιχαήλ, Athens 2011, pp. 405-419.

⁵³ Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “Greek Merchant Colonies in Central and South-Eastern Europe in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century”, in Victor N. Zakharov–Gelina Harlaftis–Olga Katsiardi-Hering (eds.), *Merchant Colonies in the Early Modern Period*, London, Vermont: Pickering & Chatto, 2012, pp. 127-140.

⁵⁴. At this time, *Greci* was used to designate not only the Greeks but Orthodox people in general, and therefore the “Illyrici” (Serbians) of Trieste. Katsiardi-Hering, *Η Ελληνική παροικία*, *op.cit.*, pp. 85-102.

Orthodox Church of the Annunciation and St. Spyridon, despite major financial difficulties; they also sought to organize a *Confraternità* of the Orthodox Greek-Serbian (Illyrian) community in 1772.⁵⁵ It was thus because of the policy of tolerance pursued by the state, and the tolerant behaviour of the residents of Trieste, that a cosmopolitan society emerged so very quickly in the city. The contribution of Greek and Serbian immigrants to Trieste's economy and society may be reflected in the common topographical and architectural language of Trieste and in the tolerant coexistence of its inhabitants. Specifically, unlike in Venice (Campo dei Greci) or Vienna (Griechengasse), there was no Greek neighbourhood in the city. The Greeks, like other newcomers in the free port, were not considered "foreigners" by their host society, but belonged to the circle of people who together "made" Trieste.⁵⁶

Regarding the movements of groups or individuals from the Balkans to territories in Central and Northern Europe, we should stress that they did not take place exclusively in the 18th century, even though the opening up of continental trade and the impetus of entrepreneurial activity by the "Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant"⁵⁷ in this period reinforced the migration phenomenon. Until the end of the 17th century, the majority of historical Hungary (including Transylvania) remained under Ottoman domination. Thus, as early as the second half of the 16th century, Aromunians, Greeks, Armenians and Serbs, all of whom were Ottoman subjects, relying on a network of local and regional markets,⁵⁸ took an active part in trading local raw materials, agricultural products, fabrics, spices, salted products, nuts and other commodities from the Levant to

55. Katsiardi-Hering, *op.cit.*, pp. 98-102.

56. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, "Griechen, Serben und Juden in Triest. Koexistenz oder Symbiose?", *Zibaldone* 15 (May 1993), pp. 20-31.

57. Traian Stojanovich, "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant", *Journal of Economic History* 20 (1960), pp. 234-313.

58. On the long-distance migration networks of these people from the 14th-17th century see Lidia Cotovanu, *Migrations et mutations identitaires dans l'Europe du Sud-est (vues de Valachie et de Moldavie, XIV^e-XVII^e siècles)*, Thèse de Doctorat nouveau régime, EHESS, Paris 2014.

Transylvania through Wallachia and Moldavia.⁵⁹ However, given the various commercial privileges granted by the authorities, the 18th century, as we will see in detail later, witnessed the most intense economic migration of all, displaying the features of a self-supplying chain phenomenon.

The case of Transylvania is of particular research interest, because its political situation was entirely different from that of Trieste. Transylvania had initially been obliged to pay tribute to the Sultan (1526-1699) before being transformed into the Principality of Transylvania (1571-1711), which was ruled primarily by Calvinist Hungarian princes; after the Treaty of Karlowitz, it became subject to the rule of the Habsburgs. When Transylvania became an independent principality in 1540, four major ethnic groups (whose exact ratio cannot be established) clearly lived within its borders: Hungarians, Székelys, “Romanians” and Saxons. The latter were a people of German ethnicity who settled in Transylvania after the mid-12th century. The first Saxons, who had settled in and around Nagyszeben/Sibiu/Hermannstadt, and later arrivals who established themselves around Beszterce/Bistrita/Bistritz, became active in mining and farming, and the crucial eastern trade was mainly in their hands. In 1224, King Andrew II of Hungary codified their rights (*Diploma Andreanum of 1224*), giving them a fixed territory, determining their taxes and military obligations, and conferring upon them religious and administrative autonomy. Thus, the Germans managed very quickly to control trade in and around the cities where they settled.⁶⁰ Therefore, when Greek merchants arrived in the markets of Transylvania towards the end of the 16th century, the Saxon entrepreneurs considered them a threat to their interests and repeatedly attempted to create barriers to their commercial activities, often with the support of the local authorities.

59. Z.P. Pach, “The role of East-Central Europe in international trade (16th and 17th centuries)”, in Z.P. Pach (ed.), *Hungary and the European Economy in Early Modern Times*, London 1994, p. 243.

60. László Makkai, “Herausbildung der städtischen Gesellschaft (1172-1526)”, in Béla Köpeczi (ed.) *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1990, p. 278.

Throughout the 16th century, their control and supervision over the Greeks was relentless. However, within a few generations, the Greeks obtained the privilege allowing them to found their own trading companies both in Sibiu (1636) and Braşov (1678),⁶¹ rendering the staple right privileges null and void, bolstering the presence of Greek merchants in Braşov and allowing them to dominate the region's internal and external trade.⁶² In 1636, the Prince of Transylvania, George Rakoczy, granted a Privilege to the *Universitas Quaestorum Graecorum*, allowing Greek merchants to carry on a wholesale trade in Transylvanian fairs and to form self-governing "companies", a kind of corporation, in Sibiu (1639) and Braşov (1678). In 1701, Emperor Leopold I renewed the Privilege of the *Societates Graecorum* of Transylvania; seventy-six years later, Maria Theresa would also renew it, though she reduced their jurisdiction and the number of tax exceptions.⁶³

61. Mária Pakucs-Willcocks, *Sibiu–Hermannstadt. Oriental Trade in Sixteenth Century Transylvania*, Köln–Weimar–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2007, p. 120.

62. See also Gheorghe Laţar, *Les marchands en Valachie, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles*, Institutul Cultural Român, Bucarest, 2006, pp. 10-15. Regarding the internal organisation of the companies in Transylvania, see Cornelia Papacostea-Danielopolu, "L'organisation de la Compagnie grecque de Braşov (1777-1850)", *Balkan Studies* 14 (1973), pp. 312-323; Idem, "La Compagnie grecque de Braşov. La lute pour la conservation des privilèges (1777-1850)", *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* 12 (1974), pp. 59-78; Olga Cicanci, "Les statuts et les règlements de fonctionnement des Compagnies grecques de Transylvanie (1636-1736)–la Compagnie de Sibiu", *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* 14 (1976), pp. 477-496; Athanassios E. Karathanassis, *L'Hellénisme en Transylvanie. L'activité culturelle, nationale, et religieuse des compagnies commerciales helléniques de Sibiu et de Braşov aux XVIII-XIX siècles*, Thessaloniki 1989; Despina-Eirene Tsourka-Papastathis, *Η ελληνική εμπορική κομπανία του Σιμπίου Τρανσυλβανίας 1636-1848, Οργάνωση και Δίκαιο*, Thessaloniki 1994; Idem, *Η νομολογία του Κριτηρίου της ελληνικής 'Κομπανίας' του Σιμπίου Τρανσυλβανίας 17^{ος}-18^{ος} αι.: πηγές του δικαίου και των θεσμών του απόδημου ελληνισμού*, Athens: Academy of Athens, 2011.

63. Despoina Tsourka-Papastathis, "The Decline of the Greek 'Companies' in Transylvania: An Aspect of Habsburg Economic Policies in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean", in Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos–Constantinos D. Svolopoulos–Béla K. Király (eds.), *Southeast European maritime commerce and naval policies from the mid-eighteenth century to 1914*, Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 213-218.

In contrast to the tolerant state policy towards the Greek Orthodox was the intolerant behaviour of the dynamic commercial group of Lutheran Saxons.⁶⁴ This tension was reflected in their inter-merchant relations and may also be verified by the topography of the town. For instance, the members of the *compagnia grecești* in Sibiu who tried and finally managed to erect a church were not permitted to do so within the city walls, unlike the members of the Braşov merchant company who managed to get their church build in the heart of the city, albeit –given the strong Saxon presence there– in an out of sight spot.⁶⁵

Let us now take a look at the Greek diaspora in Central Europe in the 18th century. Taking advantage of the favourable terms of the commercial treaty of 1718, Greek merchants were able to insist on their right to establish themselves and to trade, demanding property rights and the right to maintain retail stores from the local authorities.⁶⁶ Most of them originated from Macedonia, Thessaly and Epirus and settled in Central Europe, particularly in Vienna and Hungarian cities (Pest, Gyöngyös, Eger, Miskolc, Tokaj, Nagyvárad, Kecskemét, Novisad etc.).⁶⁷ Note that the *Görögök* (Greeks in Hungarian) settled in towns that had an elementary market structure and some local production, which lent itself to commercial exploitation. Some of them operated as peddlers around the villages

64. Peter Sugar, “The Principality of Transylvania”, in Peter Sugar–Péter Hanák–Tibor Frank (eds.), *A History of Hungary*, Bloomington 1994, p. 127.

65. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “Η ελληνική διασπορά στην Κεντρική Ευρώπη: ο χώρος, η κοινωνία και οι άνθρωποι”, in Nikos Fokas (ed.), *Ελληνική Διασπορά στην Κεντρική Ευρώπη*, Budapest: Ú.M.K, 2012, pp. 21-26.

66. Bur, “Handelsgesellschaften”, pp. 267-290.

67. Ödön Füves, *Οι Έλληνες της Ουγγαρίας*, Thessaloniki 1965; Marta Bur, “Handelsgesellschaften–Organisationen der Kaufleute der Balkanländer in Ungarn im 17.-18. Jh.”, *Balkan Studies* 25 (1984), pp. 267-307; Vera Bácskai, “Gesellschaftliche Veränderungen in den Städten Mittel–und Osteuropas zur Zeit der Entfaltung der kapitalistischen Verhältnisse”, in Vera Bácskai (ed.), *Bürgertum und bürgerliche Entwicklung in Mittel–und Osteuropa*, Budapest 1986, v.1, pp. 143-227; Marta Bur, “The Greek Company in Hungary in the 17th-18th centuries”, in M. Fossey (ed.), *Proceedings of the first International Congress on the Hellenic Diaspora from Antiquity to Modern Times*, Amsterdam 1991, vol. 1, pp. 155-166.

and trade fairs of Hungary, profiting from agricultural products such as wine and livestock; others worked as wholesale merchants, transporting wool, cotton, red yarns, leather, tobacco, salted goods, saffron and other commodities (e.g. spices)⁶⁸ from Ottoman provinces to the production centres of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The tolerance policy implemented by the Habsburgs in the first half of the 18th century played a key role in creating conditions in which the Greeks could organize and represent themselves before the authorities. Therefore, they organized themselves under the administratively comprehensive term ‘Greek’ by establishing communities (in Pest, Miskolc et al.)⁶⁹ and commercial companies (in Zemun/Semlin, Neusatz, Temesvár, Gyöngyös, Tokaj, Szegedin, Szentes, Kecskemét, Debrecen, Várad, Vaz, Gyarmat, Karcag, Kecskit, Leva, Békés, Seben, Sopron, et al.) which were the main forms of their incorporation in Central Europe.⁷⁰

However, despite the occasional tolerance policy of local authorities, from the first half of the 18th century, the Habsburg authorities expressed concerns about foreign merchants in the internal retail and wholesale trade of the empire. In 1741, they decreed that Ottoman subjects had an unrestricted right to conduct wholesale and retail trade, provided they transferred their families to Hungary. By dint of a decree issued by Maria Theresa in 1769, full freedom of trade for Ottoman subjects was directly linked to their permanent residency, to their transferring their families to Hungary

68. Bur, “Handelsgesellschaften”, p. 52; S. Papadopoulos, «Οι ελληνικές κοινότητες της Ουγγαρίας και η συμβολή τους στην οικονομική και πολιτιστική ανάπτυξη της Β. Ελλάδας κατά την περίοδο της τουρκοκρατίας», *Δωδώνη* 18 (1989), p. 97.

69. Ödön Füves, *Görögök Pesten (1686-1931)* [Die Griechen in Pest] unpublished Habilitation, University of Budapest 1972 (trans. Andrea Seidler into German); Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “Αδελφότητα, Κομπανία, Κοινότητα. Για μια τυπολογία των ελληνικών κοινοτήτων της Κεντρικής Ευρώπης, με αφορμή το άγνωστο καταστατικό του Miskolc (1801)”, *Eoa kai Esperia* 7 (2007), pp. 247-310; Ikaros Mantouvalos, “Μεταναστευτικές διαδρομές από τον χώρο της Μακεδονίας στην ουγγρική ενδοχώρα (17^{ος} αιώνας-αρχές 19^{ου} αιώνα)”, in Koliopoulos–Mihailidis (eds.), *Οι Μακεδόνες στη διασπορά*, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-235.

70. Bácskai, “Gesellschaftliche Veränderungen”; Bur, “The Greek Company in Hungary”.

and taking the oath of allegiance, which meant they would receive Hungarian citizenship.⁷¹ However, in doing so they lost the Ottoman subjects' privilege of customs exemption secured for them by the treaty of Passarowitz. Only under these conditions were they given the right to develop commercial activity and permanent residency.⁷²

The Enlightened Habsburgs adopted *inter alia* Josiah Child's (1688) argument that naturalization had a significant role to play in foreign trade. The Act of Naturalization issued in 1774 led successful Greek entrepreneurs to lose their Ottoman *Untertanenschaft* ("subject status"). This procedure, on the part of the Greeks, was intensified mainly after the *Edicts of Tolerance*. So this policy made it easier for Balkan Orthodox people to settle permanently in Hungary, while simultaneously accelerating their "Hungarization" and integration into local society. In fact, the Act of 1774 was a determining factor in the Greeks' accession to a multi-ethnic Habsburgs Empire, which became their '*zweites Vaterland*' or second '*patria*'. Moreover, it gave Greek capitalists the opportunity to acquire civil rights (*Bürgerrechte*) and to become members of an economic elite known as *Wirtschaftsbürgertum*.⁷³

Within the context of their institutional organization, and from their arrival in the urban settlements of Hungary, the migrants declared their interest in serving their religious needs. Building an Orthodox church and creating a cemetery were the most basic concerns of the Greeks established in non-Ottoman environments. In central Europe, they initially attended Serb churches and Catholic chapels as well as worshipping in private homes.⁷⁴ In Pest, which was the most significant centre of the Greek Diaspora after Vienna, the Greeks and Macedonian-Vlachs (Aromunians), who moved there as early as the second decade of the eighteenth century, at-

71. Füves, *Οι Έλληνες της Ουγγαρίας*, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

72. *Op.cit.*

73. Vaso Seirinidou, *Οι Έλληνες στη Βιέννη (18^{ος}-μέσα 19^ο αιώνα)*, Athens: Herodotos, 2011, pp. 88, 91.

74. István Dobrossy, "Greek (Orthodox) Church", in Tamás Faragó (ed.), *Miskolc története* III/2 (2000), p. 929.

tended the Serbian church of Saint Georgios with their Serbian co-religionists until 1783, when they decided to secede from the Serbian community and found their own community association: the “Greek and Macedonian Vlach Community of Pest”. The *Görögök* exercised their religious duties, sometimes unhindered with the tolerance of the authorities, sometimes in a climate of opposition, restricted by local ecclesiastical and secular officials. In short, the process of consolidating their collective religious identity was frequently subject to strong social and political pressure, as was the case for the Orthodox population of Pec (German Fünfkirchen) in 1720 and 1729. This process prohibited them from exercising their religious rights freely.⁷⁵

Until 1745, the Greeks of Miskolc attended religious rites in a place assigned to them in the church rectory of the neighbouring town of Tapolca. Later, members of the community decided to rent a place owned by a member of the noble Vay family (because they had been forbidden to own landed property until then) and use it as a chapel consecrated to St Naum.⁷⁶ The community was free to choose its own priest, whose name was then ratified by the Metropolitan of Karlowitz.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, a basic request by Orthodox Balkan subjects was that the migrants’ ecclesiastical life be transferred from the small chapel to a large church.

75. Charalampos Chotzakoglou–Christian Gastgeber, “Griechische Mönche in Ungarn. Zwei Dokumente aus dem 17. Jahrhundert über das Sammeln von Almosen und den Einfluss der Unierten am Athos”, *Ελληνικά* 48/1 (1998), p. 98.

76. Mariann Olbert, «Οι τρεις πιο αξιόλογοι ναοί και εικονοστάσια της ελληνικής διασποράς της Ουγγαρίας: του Eger, του Miskolc και της Βουδαπέστης», in Eszter Kovács–Vasilios Stamatopoulos (eds.), *Görög Örökség. A Görög Orthodox Diaszpóra Magyarországon a XVII-XIX. században/Greek Heritage (The Greek Orthodox Diaspora in Hungary 17th-19th century)*, Budapest 2009, p. 117.

77. In 1766, a new Serb diocese was established on the territory of the Habsburg Empire after which the Orthodox population belonged to the Serb diocese in Hungary, whose seat was in Karlowitz. The Greeks initially attended religious worship in the existing Serb churches; later, they either took some of them into their own hands or built their own churches, but, very often, under the jurisdiction of the Serb bishop. See Willibald M. Plöchl, “Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Habsburgischen Donaumonarchie (1526-1918)”, *Balkan Studies* 13 (1972), pp. 17-30.

Regarding the Greeks in Vienna, in 1717 Charles VI issued a patent addressed to Orthodox Ottoman subjects who traded in Vienna, enshrining their right to trade and defining the terms of their trade. In 1723, the Emperor allowed them to settle in the little Steyrerhof between the Fleischmarkt and the Rotenturmstraße. They also had the little Chapel Saint George at their disposal, where they could pray in privacy with the Serbs. In 1776, the chapel became a church and official toleration was admitted; there is no doubt that the group had arrived at their religious self-determination.⁷⁸

The crucial change in the organization of the life of Greek communities in the Habsburg Empire came after the promulgation of the *Edict of Toleration* (1781) and Joseph II's desire to solve the problems not only between Catholics and Protestants but also among members of the same religious dogma. As a consequence of this policy, after 1781 a series of imperial degrees issued in various parts of Austria, Hungary and Transylvania permitted Greeks and Serbs to establish not only their own churches (without *campanille*)⁷⁹ but also their own schools. In some cases, local reactions forced the Greek merchants to erect their small churches outside the city walls (Sibiu) or, as mentioned above, in the centre but without direct street access (Braşov).⁸⁰

It is not a coincidence that during the last decades of the 18th century, Greeks attempted and finally managed to build their own churches, assuring independence from their Serbian brethren. At the turn of the 18th century, permission to establish the Serbian Me-

78. Seirinidou, *Oi Έλληνες στη Βιέννη*, *op.cit.*, pp. 276-277, 285; Willibald M. Plöchl, *Die Wiener orthodoxen Griechen. Eine Studie zur Rechts- und Kulturgeschichte der Kirchengemeinden zum Hl. Georg und zur Hl. Dreifaltigkeit und zur Errichtung der Metropolis von Austria*, Wien 1983.

79. In 1787 the members of the Greek community of Miskolc submitted a request to the bishop of Karlowitz, asking him to allow them to build their own church tower, "because we, scattered around the city, cannot be deprived of using bells, which is held absolutely necessary for the service of the Church" (Mantouvalos, "Μεταναστευτικές διαδρομές", *op.cit.*, pp. 234-235).

80. Katsiardi-Hering, "Η ελληνική διασπορά στην Κεντρική Ευρώπη", *op.cit.*, pp. 21-23.

tropolis of Karlowitz was granted by the Habsburgs to provide for the religious needs of all Greek-Orthodox Balkan peoples. This, given that the smaller number of Greeks, allowed the Serbs to dominate the church and the affairs of the mixed communities. During the 18th century, economic and social differences between the Greek and Serb trade diasporas of the Habsburg Empire “were acted out in the form of disputes concerning ecclesiastical and cultural life”. At issue was the language of the church liturgy and of school education in the multi-ethnic Orthodox trade communities of the Habsburg Monarchy. Disputes broke out in many Greco-Illyrian communities, many of which resulted in the separation of the two groups after the Edict of Toleration. With the exception of the Vienna Community, where the church of St. George was officially ceded to the Greeks (1776), in other communities (including Trieste in 1782 and Pest in 1790), the Greeks decided to pursue their separate communal development and leave the church they shared with the Illyrians to build their own.⁸¹

In addition to the issues that were interwoven into the migrants’ religious life, the community also took care to build an educational system that would safeguard the linguistic and cultural identity of its members. This was also a necessary condition for assimilating migrant children into the host society. The interest in educational themes on the part of migrants throughout the Monarchy grew stronger after the second half of the 18th century, when legislative decrees were issued that regulated significant aspects of the basic education received by Habsburg subjects and which concerned not only the empire’s German Catholic population, but also inhabitants of other nationalities, whatever their faith. The educational reforms of 1774 made a crucial contribution to the real popular Enlightenment (*Volskaufklärung*) while simultaneously producing the “catalytic power”⁸² required to educate the people of South-Eastern Eu-

81. Füves, *Görögök Pesten*, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-118; Katsiardi-Hering, *Η Ελληνική παροικία*, *op.cit.*, pp. 67-117; Seirinidou, *Οι Έλληνες στη Βιέννη*, *op.cit.*, pp. 282-286.

82. Alexandru Duțu, “Die ‘katalytische Kraft’ der deutschen Kultur: Das Beispiel Südost-Europas zur Zeit der Aufklärung”, in Anton Schwob (ed.), *Metho-*

rope (Serb colonists and migrants as well as Greek merchants), who established schools with programmes of study that reflected the new educational system.⁸³ In Hungary, after the official state recognition and institution of the Orthodox Church,⁸⁴ schools began to be established in Orthodox communities. The newcomers founded schools whose curricula reflected the new educational system. In the late 1770s, Court School-Commissions were established and their status was renewed by Joseph II within the framework of the Edict of Toleration. As O'Brien points out: "If the non-Catholics, Jews or Christians, were to enjoy their new rights, the intolerant mentality of the people had to undergo a fundamental change. For this purpose the government used the schools and the censorship to train the people and especially their spiritual leaders, the government officials, schoolteachers, and clergy, to regard the dissenters as fellow subjects".⁸⁵ Nevertheless, this project was not particularly easy, as is evident from the difficulties faced by the Greeks with regard to their effort to organize their own education system. However, despite the problems, by the end of the 18th century, the educational situation had improved considerably with the increase in the number of schools and their operation in 17 Hungarian cities.⁸⁶

In 1770-1771, a list was drawn up of the schools in Hungary, which showed that there were 89 functioning Orthodox churches,

dologische Studien zur deutschen Literatur Ostmittel- und Südost-Europas, München 1994, 39-53.

83. The Court School Committees were established in the late 1770s; their status was renewed by Joseph II as part of the Edict of Tolerance. Another Committee was also established to monitor the religious and educational activities of the non-Catholics, including school books, with the help of the revitalized Committee for Judicial Censorship. On school reform among the Orthodox minorities in the Habsburg empire, see Philip J. Adler, "Habsburg School Reform Among the Orthodox Minorities, 1770-1780", *Slavic Review* 33/1 (1974), pp. 23-45.

84. Regarding the history of the Orthodox Church in Hungary, see Feriz Berki, *Η εν Ουγγαρία Ορθόδοξος Εκκλησία*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964.

85. O'Brien, "Ideas", *op.cit.*, p. 43.

86. Andreas Horváth, *Η ζωή και τα έργα του Γεωργίου Ζαβίρα/Zavirasz György élete és munkái*, Budapest 1937, pp. 5-6.

63 of which were Serbian and 21 Romanian. Of these churches, only in Győr, Miskolc and Tokaj was there an exclusively Greek-speaking school, whereas in the cities of Eger and Komárom, the school was bilingual, and the children who attended it were taught their lessons in both Serbian and Greek. It should be noted that community education was not systematically organized at all, and that many of the communities did not have even their own buildings for teaching young students. Education in the Greek community of Miskolc⁸⁷ was organized long before the school was built in 1805. As early as the 1770s, its members had arranged to rent space to cover the community's educational needs. However, the problem of housing the school appears to have taken on a different form by the end of the century, owing to the increase in the number of pupils, a fact that obliged the administration to seek a permanent solution.⁸⁸ Among the Greek schools, the one at Zemun was particularly well-known. The conflicts between Greeks and Serbs which had broken out in 1793 resulted in the mediation of the bishop of Karlowitz. One year later, the school was built, and its financial self-sufficiency was ensured by a school fund.⁸⁹ In 1796, after their secession from the Community of *Illyrici* (1791), the Greeks and Aromunians in Pest set up their own school.⁹⁰ The first Greek school in Vienna, financed and overseen by the Greek Community of the Holy Trinity, was founded in 1804.⁹¹ In Trieste, the Greek school founded in 1801 was designed to function much like public

87. Regarding the education of Greek children in the Miskolc community, see Ikaros Mantouvalos, "Τὸ ἐλληνικὸν σχολεῖον εἶναι τὸ μόνον μέσον τῆς προκοπῆς καὶ μαθήσεως τῶν Νέων, εἰς τὰ ἐλληνικὰ γράμματα": πτυχές της εκπαιδευτικῆς ζωῆς της ελληνοβλαχικῆς κοινότητας του Miskolc (τέλη 18^{ου}-αρχές 19^{ου} αἰ.)", *Μεσαιωνικά και Νέα Ελληνικά* 10 (2012), pp. 103-128.

88. Mantouvalos, *op.cit.*, pp. 108-109.

89. Ioannis Papadrianos, *Οἱ Ἕλληνες πάροικοι του Σεμλίνου (18^{ος}-19^{ος} αἰ.)*. Διαμόρφωση της παροικίας, δημογραφικά στοιχεία, διοικητικό σύστημα, πνευματική και πολιτιστική δραστηριότητα, Thessaloniki 1988, pp. 129-131.

90. Füves, *Görögök Pesten*, *op.cit.*, pp. 364-365.

91. Seirinidou, *Ἕλληνες στη Βιέννη*, *op.cit.*, pp. 315-335.

schools throughout the Habsburg Monarchy, and was placed under the supervision of the Austrian educational authorities of the city.⁹²

As mentioned previously, the Commission for the ‘A Catholics’ was also established to supervise the religious and the educational activities of the non-Catholics and to control the textbooks used with the aid of the renewed Court Censorship Commission. There is no doubt that the invention of the term ‘A Catholics’ is more indicative of a policy of forbearance than of genuine tolerance. Nevertheless, these reforms made it easier to set up Greek printing presses in Vienna.⁹³ Greek and Illyrian (Serbian) newspapers and journals had been edited in the Habsburg capital city. In the printing houses of the cities of Vienna, Pest, Trieste, Leipzig –and, after 1801, in Venice– reading primers (*ABC-Lehrbücher*) were printed in the Cyrillic and Greek alphabets and included passages dealing with everyday life in their host cities rather than the pastoral space in which their parents had grown up. The reading passages in the schoolbooks praised the emperor, good manners and morality, but also the *Volk*, their *Γένος*=*Εθνος*=*Nation* in its new connotation.⁹⁴

Enlightened Despotism wanted its urban subjects to be devout as well as upstanding members of the bourgeoisie, ready to engage in trade or with literature. In their new environment, the ‘*paroikoi*’ [colonists] had the opportunity to manage the education of their children, to be integrated into local society and simultaneously to engage with the ideological waves of Nationalism. In the above mentioned printing houses, a large number of academic works on Geography, Physics, Mathematics, Grammar, Philosophy, History etc, were also published. It is well known that Vienna became both the ‘laboratory’ and the literary centre for Neohellenic and the Serbian national identity.

92. Katsiardi-Hering, *Η Ελληνική παροικία*, *op.cit.*, pp. 256-296.

93. K. Staikos, *Die in Wien Gedruckten Griechischen Bücher 1749-1800*, Athens: Stiftung der Griechischen Kultur, 1995; Aikaterini Koumarianou, *Die griechische Vorrevolutionäre Presse, Wien-Paris (1784-1821)*, Athens: Stiftung der Griechischen Kultur, 1995.

94. Katsiardi-Hering, “Southeastern European Migrant Groups”, *op.cit.*, pp. 154-162.

The communication of the various South-Eastern European People with each other in the host lands led to a new conjunction and cooperation on an ideological level, as well. The migrants were able to join the *unitas multiplex* that was Europe at the end of the 18th century. For all of them, Central Europe became a new *patria* and a new way of participating both in the dialogue on constructing the Idea of Europe and on founding their own modern nation-states. Through their texts and correspondence, they developed a real and ‘imagined’ dialogue with the enlightened, Christian, wise Europe in whose universities they studied; they tried and wished to be part of that ‘*ευνομομένη*’ (well-governed) Europe.⁹⁵

To paraphrase Rabaut Saint Étienne, who addressed the French Assembly in August 1789 on tolerance and the freedom: “Mais Messieurs, ce n’est même pas la tolérance que je réclame; c’est la liberté! La tolérance! Le support! Le pardon! La clémence!”⁹⁶ we can understand the desire for liberty, for political freedom, manifest in the Greek political texts published illegally in Vienna, Bologna or Livorno in the last decade of the 18th and the first of the 19th century. One needs only mention Rhigas Velestinlis, an extreme example of a scholar and Ottoman subject taking advantage of the brief window of opportunity provided by Josephinism and the French Revolution to publish liberal material and pursue political activities. Is it a coincidence that enlightenment political thought in South-Eastern Europe, as represented by the radical republicanism of Rhigas Velestinlis, incorporated the idea of cultural pluralism in a project for a unitary democratic state, modelled on the ‘Republic

95. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, “Die Europaidee in den Texten des griechischen Unabhängigkeitskrieges (1821-1829)”, in Konrad Clewing und Oliver Jens Schmitt (eds.), *Südosteuropa. Von vormoderner Vielfalt und nationalstaatlicher Vereinheitlichung. Festschrift für Edgar Hösch*, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005, pp. 245-252.

96. *De la tolérance aux droits de l’homme. Écrits sur la liberté de conscience, des guerres de Religion à la Révolution française, suivis de la laïcité entre la tolérance et la liberté par Jean Baubérot*. Textes réunis et présentés par Michel Kneubühler, Grigny: Editions paroles d’Aube, 1998, p. 25; See also Wolfgang Schmale, *Archäologie der Grund- und Menschenrechte in der Frühen Neuzeit: ein deutsch-französisches Paradigma*, München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997.

of Virtue', that was expected to replace despotism and to transform its subjects into free citizens?⁹⁷

Consequently, the multi-dimensional character of the diasporic identity of the Greeks took shape in the context of the policies of tolerance or intolerance pursued by the Habsburgs during the long 18th century; this identity was interwoven not with cultural entrenchment or cultural assimilation in the host country, but with practices and choices that prevailed throughout the immigration experience and through osmosis with other groups in the host society or other ethnic communities in Europe.

97. Paschalis Kitromilides, "An Enlightenment Perspective on Balkan Cultural Pluralism. The Republican Vision of Rhigas Velestinlis", *History of Political Thought* 24/ 3 (2003), pp. 445-479.

Konstantina Tortomani

**A Balkan Gothic: Bram Stoker's 'Drakula'
and the Balkan Identity**

A. The historical background of the 19th century

From the late Middle Ages, the 15th century that is, until the late 18th to early 19th century, what today is called the Balkans, was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. As a result Europeans were not really concerned about the Balkans, other than their being the outer limit of the Ottoman Empire in European terrain. Any thoughts that they might have had about the Balkan populations was limited to the notion of Christian Turks. However, during the late 18th and throughout the 19th century, all that changed.¹

First of all, during the 19th century the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula experienced 'national awakenings' and, thus, formed different nationalisms which resulted in revolutions against the Ottoman Empire. This placed the Balkans, especially the southern and eastern Balkans,² in the European Powers'³ center of attention, since all of them, more or less had interests lying with the Ottoman Empire's fate. About the northern parts of the Balkans, which belonged to the Austrian–Hungarian Empire, nationalism started to take roots there too, especially after the revolution of 1848 in Hungary. What is more, the national awakening of the Slavs in some provinces of the Empire was partly caused by the Mayarisation

1. M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford University Press, New York 1997, p. 62.

2. In today's Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania.

3. Mostly the British Empire, the Russian Empire, France, Prussia and the Habsburgs (Austrian Empire).

process, as also attested in Transylvania, were the Romanian nationalism appeared.⁴

So, the above mentioned issues were known to the Europeans and, as a result, the public opinions were divided in two, either for or against these revolutionary efforts. However, given that romanticism was a very strong influence in the 19th century, the sympathy for the revolting populations took substantial dimensions. An example for this is philhellenism, which peaked as a phenomenon in the 1820's.⁵

In addition, various facts, such as the slaughter and persecution of the Bulgarians by the Ottomans in the 1870's, were presented in the 'western' newspapers of the time and drawing a great deal of attention .

All the above, combined with romantic notions and stereotypes of the time, such as the image of the exotic, oriental, but at the same time barbaric and uncivilized Turk, resulted in exciting the imagination of the Europeans for the East and the Balkans in extension. An outcome of this was travelling towards eastern destinations. Until the 19th century such journeys would have been lengthy and difficult, however the invention of the railways provided a, relatively, comfortable and faster means of travel.⁶

Travelers, writers, even early anthropologists, visited the Balkans and then put their experiences into paper, to be shared with the rest of the European public. These early accounts of the Balkans have contributed in shaping the public's opinion as to the perception of the unity of the Balkans as a whole and as to what is the Balkan Identity. Some of the stereotypes that surround the term Balkan are evident in these early works and, of course, are, even subconsciously so, compared with the western European perceptions of what is civilized. As a result the Balkan is presented as an

4. V. Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination*, St Edmund University Press, Great Britain 1998, pp. 42-43.

5. Todorova, *Imagining, op.cit.*

6. C. King, *The Black Sea: A History*, Oxford University Press, New York 2004, p. 200.

‘other’, but this time, in contrast to the case of the Turks, an ‘other’ who at the same time is a Christian, and, in a way, another kind of a ‘European’ at close proximity. The latter is quite evident in the writings of early anthropologists, who tried to interpret the ‘Balkan situation’ using the theory of the stages of civilization, thus considering the Balkan populations as live figures of their western, uncivilized past.⁷

This opportunity to visit the south-east, and especially the Balkans, was seized by writers of popular fiction. The most influential and widespread type of literature at the time was the Gothic romance novel. After the Industrial Revolution, Western Europe had ‘discovered’ science and rationalism, thus becoming somewhat unattractive and unfit for the supernatural and romances. This turned novelists’ attention to a vast area, which was not only widely unknown to the European public, but also exciting and untouched by modern civilization.⁸

B. Balkan Gothic: Bram Stoker’s Dracula

The influx of popular fiction writers in the Balkans resulted in a massive number of published novels, whose plots were placed in the general Balkan area. Some famous examples include Lord Byron’s romantic poems about Greece, ‘The Prisoner of Zenda’ by Anthony Hope, Agatha Christie’s ‘The Secret of Chimneys’, Horace Walpole’s ‘The Castle of Otrando’ and the romantic gothic novel ‘Carmilla’ by Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, one of the first novels to launch the ‘vampire’ in literature.

The common element in these novels is that, even though, they are placed specifically in the general Balkan area, the names of the countries used are fictional. Ruritania, Herzoslovakia, Styria⁹ are a few names of such fictitious countries, which, however, sound ra-

7. Todorova, *Imagining*, *op.cit.*

8. Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania*, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

9. Styria is an actual province in Austria, but in the novel it is used with a supernatural setting.

ther genuinely 'Balkan'. This latter fact, the placement of the plots' settings in a familiar, but simultaneously imaginative place, is possibly a literary technique to excite and horrify effectively and from a certain distance.

Undoubtedly, the most notorious and beloved piece of the Gothic Romance novel is Bram Stoker's *Dracula*, which was published in 1897. The apparent protagonist of the novel is Count Dracula. The background for this character was semi-historic, the Prince of Wallachia, Vlad (Tepes) III, also known as Vlad the Impaler or Dracula, which means son of the Dragon.

Vlad the Impaler (1431-1476) became notorious even during his lifetime, firstly for his success in the battlefield against the Turkish soldiers, thus getting his nickname, Impaler. However, he was also known in Europe because of printed stories about him that circulated through Europe and Russia in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. An oral tradition favorable to Vlad the III started in the 15th century in the area of modern Romania, a tradition that partly influenced both the German and the Russian stories. Stories about Vlad can also be found in some Byzantine and Turkish sources as well as in the memoirs of pope Pius II. Yet the former stories were the most widespread and contain the most well-known elements of the Dracula tradition. The German, Russian and Romanian stories about Vlad all differ in the way they portray him. The German stories presented him as a bloodthirsty tyrant and a madman. Furthermore, they were used for propagandistic purposes against Vlad the III by Saxon merchants, with whom he had many disputes. Hungarian king Mathias Corvinus was also instrumental in the creation and circulation of these stories. In these stories, Vlad was responsible for many kinds of unneeded torture and violence against different peoples. In contrast to this view of Vlad, the Russian stories portrayed him as a just and righteous, albeit cruel, but mostly his cruelty was justified because it was a means to protect his kingdom. However, the role of these stories as propaganda seemed to fade

quite quickly, and they were absorbed into the normal literature of the time.¹⁰

Bram Stoker had studied extensively, both historical and contemporary travel sources about the Balkans before writing 'Dracula'. Some examples for this are Emily Gerard's book about Transylvania, called 'The Land beyond the Forest' (1888) and an article called 'Transylvanian Superstitions' (1885), also written by her. Additionally, he used William Wilkinson's 'Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia' (1820) and 'Magyarland', by 'A Fellow of the Carpathian Society' (1881), among others. All the above research was mentioned in Bram Stoker's notes, where one encounters, also listed books about folk beliefs in the Balkans.¹¹ Additionally, it should be noted here that Bram Stoker's own brother, George Stoker had travelled to the Balkans, and more specifically in Rumelia, and stayed there for a couple of years.¹²

A common characteristic of these books, however, is that they were written, mainly, by British officers, such as army or administrative officers, or even, by their wives. As a result, all of those accounts of the Balkans are, rather, biased since they contain notions of British superiority, annoyance by the different customs and circumstances, such as non-punctual train timetables. In Bram Stoker's *Dracula*, Jonathan Harker, a British solicitor, does complain about the punctuality of trains or more precisely the lack thereof: 'It seems to me that the further east you go the more unpunctual the trains. What ought they to be in China?' and 'Left Munich at 8.35 p.m. on 1st May, arriving at Vienna early next morning; should have arrived at 6.46, but train was an hour late'. Here, it would seem that Harker has a somewhat patronizing and disapproving

10. C. Leatherdale (ed.), *The Origins of Dracula: The Origins of Bram Stoker's Gothic Masterpiece*, The Ipswich Book Co Ltd, United Kingdom 1995, pp. 86, 87; R.T. McNally-R. Florescu, *In Search of Dracula*, Houghton Mifflin Geary, New York 1994, p. 78.

11. Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania*, *op.cit.*, pp.77, 78.

12. M. Gibson, *Dracula and the Eastern Question: British and French Vampire Narratives of the 19th century Near East*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2006, p. 79.

tone, perhaps, befitting of the stereotype of the Victorian-era British citizen.¹³

So, it seems, Bram Stoker used some actual facts about Transylvania, and he even based his central character on an actual, historical person, although he never mentioned anything about impalements or torture in the novel that would indicate how much he knew about Vlad the III's infamy. However, he manipulated his research findings in order to serve his purposes more adequately. For example he changed both the origin and the ruling place of Count Dracula. The historical 'Dracula', Vlad the III lived and ruled in Wallachia, but Bram Stoker placed him in the most remote parts of the neighboring Transylvania, the Borgo Pass.¹⁴ One of the most famous parts of the novel is the one where the English solicitor, Jonathan Harker, travels through Transylvania. What he described was a country of extensive forests, mist-shrouded mountains, howling wolves and gloomy castles. Transylvania, placed in the remote and borderline periphery of Europe, is also placed by Bram Stoker in the mental periphery of Europe as well, in a kingdom where superstitions and demonic creatures, such as werewolves and vampires, are still both widespread and, very much indeed, real.¹⁵

However, the most interesting alteration is Count Dracula's origins. In Bram Stoker's book Count Dracula explains his origins to Jonathan Harker thus: 'I am a Boyar'... 'We Szekelys have a right to be proud for in our veins runs the blood of many brave races, which fight as the lions fight... the Ugric tribe bore down from Iceland... What devil or what witch was ever so great as Attila, whose blood runs through these veins?' So, first and foremost Dracula describes himself as a Szeckler. Szecklers were frontiersmen, who defended the Austro-Hungarian borders against the Ottomans and

13. Leatherdale, *The Origins, op.cit.*, p. 97; B. Stoker, *Dracula*, Archibald Constable and Co., United Kingdom 1897, pp. 1, 3.

14. The Borgo Pass lies in the borders of Transylvania with Moldavia. Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania, op.cit.*, pp. 73-85.

15. Leatherdale, *The Origins, op.cit.*, pp. 86, 87, 108.

as a reward they were autonomous and owned land in the region of these borders. They were related to the Hungarians, spoke the Hungarian language and were Christians as well. However, they also claimed ascendancy from the Huns, and so it not surprising that Dracula claims to have the ‘blood of Attila running in his veins’. So Count Dracula has, supposedly, mixed blood in his veins, he is European, but also Hun. This Szeckler identity, double in its nature, both familiar and alien, is given to him so that he sounds exotic, but, nonetheless, European.¹⁶

Additionally, in the same speech to Jonathan Harker, Dracula talks about attempted invasions of ‘the Magyar, the Lombard, the Avar, the Bulgar and the Turk’ in his land. Also, Dracula himself calls his land ‘a whirlpool of nations’, and when Harker reaches Transylvania, he encounters Slovaks and Czechs, in other words Slavs: ‘Here and there we passed Czechs and Slovaks, all in picturesque attire, but I noticed that goiter was painfully prevalent.’¹⁷

Bram Stoker, explains, through Harker, at the very beginning of his novel the different components that comprise Transylvania’s population. ‘In the population of Transylvania there are four distinct nationalities: Saxons in the South, and mixed with them the Wallachs, who are the descendants of the Dacians; Magyars in the West, and Szekelys in the East and North. I am going among the latter, who claim to be descended from Attila and the Huns. This may be so, for when the Magyars conquered the country in the eleventh century they found the Huns settled in it’.¹⁸

Of course, at the time Transylvania was, really, inhabited by Romanians, Hungarians, Saxons, Gypsies, even Jews and Armenians, although, limited numbers of Serbs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Greeks and Ruthenians, Ukrainians that is, were living in the area as well. This information is given by Harker in the form of a travel account with ethnographic references, something quite common for

16. Stoker, *Dracula*, *op.cit.*, pp. 26, 27; Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania*, *op.cit.*, pp. 81, 82.

17. Leatherdale, *The Origins*, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

18. Stoker, *Dracula*, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

the Victorian era traveler, and as is the case with the comment about the thyroid problems in Transylvania's population, Bram Stoker wanted his narrative to sound as realistic as possible.¹⁹

However, what one could not fail to notice, is that Bram Stoker points out through Harker the 'Balkan Condition'. To be more specific, with all the above details about both Dracula's bizarre origin and the multi-ethnic population in Transylvania, Bram Stoker refers to the problem of the origin of the Balkan population and the Balkan identity in general. Conquered by the Ottomans and having experienced many invasions from many different tribes, such as the Huns, the Slavs and many others, the Balkans were certainly European, but then spoiled in a way, maybe even 'impure' in the eyes of the 'purely' Western-European British gentleman. Basically, the Balkans are presented as an 'Other' in European land, constantly in contrast to the 'normal', western European.²⁰

What is more, if one read George Stoker's account about his stay in the Near East he would discover his personal fondness for the 'honesty and charity' of the Turks and loathing of the 'selfishness and arrogance' of Greeks and Bulgarians. He reports, for example, how a Bulgarian sneers at financial donations from British charities, since 'the English know very well that the money they are subscribing now they will soon recover by means of their commerce with us' (p. 7). While describing his experiences George provides many examples of the generosity of Turks as opposed to the laziness and cunning of Bulgarians and Greeks (pp. 4 and 6-7), one such example being that when a certain Captain Layard lay dying a Greek boy refused to give up his blanket to ease his suffering while a Turk did (p. 76). So, it would be quite possible that George's abhorrence for the Balkan peoples might have reached

19. Leatherdale, *The Origins*, *op.cit.*

20. Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania*, *op.cit.*, pp. 74-84.

the ears of his brother. Such an image would definitely seem a far cry from the 'civilized' Victorian citizen.²¹

According to Eleni Coundouriotis, who argues that Stoker was following a Gladstonian²² position in fearing a Turkified Balkans which could not be absorbed into his idea of European states, Bram Stoker's novel is an attempt at a 'deligitimation of history' or an attempt to repress it. The Ottoman Empire having failed to 'Europeanize' itself through reforms leaves the peoples it once oppressed in a position that cannot be absorbed into Europe and thus, in an obvious symbiosis, its European residue is a threat to Britain's own understanding of itself as a European state: 'Dracula represents the irreconcilable aspects of history that do not fall neatly into a European narrative of progress and cannot be accommodated without forcing a significant change in that Western identity. British policy indicated a preference for a Europeanized Ottoman state over the resurrection of a pre-Ottoman, Christian Eastern Europe that would ally itself to Russia. Yet the Europeanized Ottoman state had proven to be impossible to realize; hence, Britain's burden as the hegemonic force behind the Concert of Europe was to create a new Europe by destroying what remained of the sick man of Europe and his antithesis, the powerful belief in the existence of a 'pure' Christian Europe. The destruction of Dracula fantastically enacts the destruction of these historical resonances'. Thus 'Dracula' becomes a symbol of the culturally tainted Balkans due to their oppression under the Ottomans.²³

Later on in the novel, Dracula travels to England and attacks the British in their own land. The unholy, impure vampire corrupts and pollutes, in a way the puritan, Victorian-English population. Bram

21. Gibson, *Dracula, op.cit.*, p. 79; G. Stoker, *With 'the Unspeakables'; or, Two Years Campaigning in European and Asiatic Turkey*, Chapman and Hall, London 1878, pp. 4, 6, 7, 76.

22. William Gladstone was a British Liberal politician, who served as Prime Minister for four times in the second half of the 19th century. Additionally, he was a personal friend of Bram Stoker's.

23. E. Coundouriotis, "Dracula and the Idea of Europe", *Connotations* 9.2 (1999-2000), 154.

Stocker might have chosen a Balkan origin for his blood sucking vampire in order to articulate the Western Europeans' fear, among others, of the Balkans and the threat that they possess in terms of not only cultural, but also political instability in Europe. According to a contemporary writer's, Charles Woods,²⁴ view it was proven by history that the 'Near East', the general area of the Balkans that is, has been both the apple of discord and the center stage of wars and it constitutes a constant danger for peace. Moreover, Dracula, as a symbol for the Balkan Identity, is considered a threat because he, too, is European. As Harker noticed when he first encountered Dracula, the Count could speak excellent English and later on in the novel, when he arrives in England he boasts that he does not seem foreign to the English. What is the most dangerous element of this kind of 'other' is that he can pass completely unnoticed because he can disappear into the background, exactly because of his European origin.²⁵

Furthermore, recent studies suggest another dimension of Dracula's demonization, which is seen as a reverse colonization. To be more specific, during the late 19th century a great deal of invasion novels had been published in England and one plausible interpretation suggests that the British see in Dracula and other monsters the monstrosity of their own colonialist behavior, reflected back at them.

More specifically, according to S. D. Arata the gothic genre in general is highly relevant to the socio-political context of its creation: 'The decay of British global influence, the loss of overseas markets for British goods, the economic and political rise of Germany and the United States, the increasing unrest in British colonies and possessions, the growing domestic uneasiness over the morality of imperialism -all combined to erode Victorian confi-

24. Henry Charles Wood was a British writer and a member of the Royal Geographical Society. He travelled extensively to the Balkans and Asia Minor and was used a special correspondent by several British papers. The above mentioned quote is taken from his article 'The Danger Zone of Europe' (1911).

25. Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania*, *op.cit.*, pp. 74-84.

dence in the inevitability of British progress and hegemony. Late Victorian fiction in particular is saturated with the sense that the entire nation... was in irretrievable decline'. In this light the vampire Count Dracula who is plotting to take over Britain in his eastern Carpathian castle, could be seen as the incarnation of the British fear of a reverse colonization, where the British are not the conquerors but the conquests.²⁶

Finally, in the end of the novel, it so happens that an Englishman (Harker), a Dutchman (Van Helsing) and an American (Quincey) slaughter Dracula with symbolically charged weapons: a kukri (symbol of the British imperialism) and a bowie knife (traditional American hunting knife). Basically, as it is the case with real-life political situations, in the novel as well, it takes more than one Great Power to 'extinguish' the Balkan threat. Let us not forget that during the late 19th and early 20th century the Western Powers interfered a lot in the Balkans in order to 'restore order' in the area. In reality, order in these cases meant western control. The independent Albanian state was to be governed by Dutch, and the problems in the area of Macedonia were to be solved by the means of an Italian governor with five more officers, each one a representative of the five Great Powers (Murszteg agreement,²⁷ 1903-1908).

In conclusion, Bram Stoker's 'Dracula', seems to be a highly representative of its time work of literature. The eerie gothic atmosphere is intertwined with ethnological and political notions of the 19th century Victorian-British society, thus embroidering reality and fantasy in a unique and inexplicable setting. Furthermore, various Western European prejudices against the Balkan peoples are reduced to supernatural causes: their, alleged, semi-wild, uncivilized nature is demonstrated as beastly and demonic, not only in the intellectual, but also in the physical sphere. However, Dracula

26. S.D. Arata, "The Occidental Tourist: 'Dracula' and the Anxiety of Reverse Colonization", *Victorian Studies* 33.4 (1990), 622, 623.

27. The Murszteg agreement was signed between the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire as an intervention in Macedonia, because it was claimed by all the surrounding Balkan states. Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania, op.cit.*, pp. 84-85.

still has another side, which resembles that of the Europeans', as he, and his people, is partly European, and fellow Christians. This association constitutes a great danger in the Westerners' eyes, for what would happen if the Balkan threat out-influenced Western-European civilization. So, Dracula has to be vanquished for the order of things to remain intact.

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Vemund Aarbakke

**The Report of Petâr Chaulev to Prime Minister
Vasil Radoslavov about the Situation in Western Thrace
in February 1914**

Introduction

Bulgaria was faced with a lot of internal and external challenges in the volatile political situation after the Balkan Wars. In connection with the parliamentary elections 23 February 1914, Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov sent his entrusted man, Petar Chaulev, to report about the situation in the “new lands” of Western Thrace. This report provides us with a snapshot of the situation on the ground at this critical juncture on the eve of World War I. The report is very informative and I have translated it in its entirety with a few footnotes to clarify some points. The full text follows at the end of this article. Although the text is very interesting in itself, it is not so easily accessible for people without an intimate knowledge of the issues discussed. It is consequently necessary to contextualise and comment on the text in order to realise its full potential in throwing light on these little known events.

The overall context

Today, Western Thrace usually refers to the part of the larger Thrace region that is in Greece. There are, however, various concepts in use and for the present article we are referring to the Ottoman lands between the Evros and Nestos rivers that were awarded to Bulgaria by the Bucharest treaty (10 August 1913).¹ This area had a turbulent past before this date and would continue to be in the forefront of Balkan rivalries. In short, it has the following history:

1. The two rivers are known in Bulgarian and Turkish as respectively: Mari-tsa-Meriç and Mesta-Karasu.

After the Ottoman conquest in 14th century the area remained under Ottoman rule until the Balkan Wars. In the First Balkan War Bulgarian troops and irregulars took control after defeating the troops of Yaver Pasha at Merhamli (today: Peplos) on 14/27 November 1913. They commenced immediately with the task of putting a Bulgarian national stamp on the area. Some villages were burnt during the hostilities, and several mosques were converted to churches.² One specific problem was the weak demographic basis for the Bulgarian territorial claims and one device for “remediating” this was a conversion campaign of the so-called Pomaks to Christianity. In Bulgarian national parlance they are referred to as Bulgarian Muslims because they share the same language. The forced conversion campaign carried out by the Bulgarian Holy Synod with the assistance of paramilitary forces took place in winter 1912-1913, and caused strong reactions not only in Ottoman circles, but also by western observers.³ The Bulgarian attempts to incorporate the area into Bulgaria proper were interrupted by the Second Balkan War, when Bulgaria lost on all fronts after attacking her erstwhile allies. Small Greek naval forces took control of the coastal cities in Western Thrace,⁴ but the main thrust came from the Ottomans who had been badly defeated in the the first war. Ottoman forces under Enver Pasha exploited Bulgaria’s weak military position to progress beyond the Midye-Enos line stipulated by the Treaty of London (30

2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*, Washington D.C. 1914, pp. 124-126.

3. Carnegie, *Report, op.cit.*, p. 77. The campaign became widely known and outraged the Ottoman authorities. A large body of Bulgarian documents related to the conversion campaign has been published in: Величко Георгиев–Стайко Трифонов, *Покръстването на българите мохамедани 1912-1913, документи* [Conversion of Bulgarian Muslims 1912-1913, documents], Sofia 1995. For a critical assesment of the conversion campaign, see: Пламена Стоянова, “Покръстването на българите мюсюлмани” [The conversion of Bulgarian Muslims], *Анамнеза*, Год. I, кн. 3 (2006), pp. 128-144. (<http://www.anamnesis.info/node/33>)

4. Καλλιόπη Παπαθανάση–Μουσιποπούλου, *Ελληνικά προξενεία στη Θράκη. Τόμος Β. Δυτική Θράκη* [Greek Consulates in Thrace, Vol. 2. Western Thrace], Athens 1977, p. 75.

May 1913). After reconquering Edirne a detachment of irregular forces led by Eşref Kuşçubaşı pushed on into Western Thrace and reached the main administrative centre Gümüldjina (today: Komotini) 16/29 August 1913.⁵ The Bulgarian administration had left the area in panick, and a period of retribution against the Bulgarian local population followed. The forced conversion of the Pomaks was reversed, and the Ottoman irregular forces reinforced by local *bashibozuks* sacked and looted several of the Bulgarian villages in the area.⁶ In the meantime Bulgaria was awarded Western Thrace south of Dydimoteichos by the Bucharest Treaty (10 August 1913), but had no effective control on the ground. The irregular Ottoman forces set up a local government that became know as the autonomous Gümüldjina republic and lasted for some 60 days.⁷

Nominally local Muslims notables headed the government, but real power was in the hands of the Ottoman irregular forces. These forced were headed by Süleyman Askerî Bey, an Ottoman officer close to Enver Pasha who would later be the first leader of what can be loosely termed as the forerunner to the Turkish secret services, the *Teşkilât-i Mahsusa* (The Special Organisation). These initiatives have to be seen in their historical context. The irregular forces were sent clandestinely into Western Thrace, because the Ottoman Empire did not dare to openly defy the Great Powers. The idea of an autonomous Western Thrace was also a devise that can be seen as a second best alternative in lieu of outright annexation. At this time the question of an autonomous Macedonia and Epirus was also on

5. For a selection of Turkish accounts, see Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya'da Millî Mücadele* [The National struggle in Thrace], Cilt I & II, Ankara, 1987 (first edition 1955); Cemal Kutay, *1913 de Garbî Trakya'da İlk Türk Cumhuriyeti* [The First Turkish Republic in Western Thrace 1913], İstanbul 1962; Ahmet Aydın, *Batı Trakya Faciasının İç Yüzü* [Inside the Western Thrace Tragedy], İstanbul 1971; Abdürrahim Dede, *Balkanlar'da Türk İstiklâl Hareketleri* [Turkish Independent Movements in the Balkans], İstanbul 1978; Nevzat Gündoğ, *Garbi Trakya Hükûmet-i Müstakilesi* [The Western Thrace Independent Government], Ankara 1987.

6. The best known Bulgarian account of these events is: Любомир Милетиз, *Разорението на тракийските българи през 1913 година* [The Destruction of the Thracian Bulgarians in 1913], Sofia 1918.

7. Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya*, *op.cit.*

the agenda and supported by various factions depending on the current political situation. The strong presence on the ground was used by the Ottoman Empire as a bargaining chip in the separate peace negotiations with Bulgaria that led to the Constantinople Treaty (16/29 September 1913). The Ottoman leadership in Istanbul that negotiated this treaty had the overall interests of the empire in mind and did not find it prudent to insist on Ottoman possession. The result was not well received in Western Thrace and the forces present in the area attempted at first to defy the order to hand over the area to Bulgaria, but would eventually have to give in to pressure from Istanbul.⁸

In the autumn of 1913 Bulgaria was faced with several dilemmas. She could no longer rely on her ability to take over Western Thrace by force because of her weakened military position. She was also actively seeking an alliance with the Ottoman Empire in order to jockey into position for pursuing a policy of revenge in Macedonia against Greece and Serbia. Eventually this would lead to the Secret Bulgarian-Ottoman treaty 6/19 August 1914 and the two countries later became allies during the Great War.⁹ Last but not least, the Bulgarian Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov had not been able to gain the necessary majority in the 24 November 1913 general election and was looking for a way to secure his grip on power. For the upcoming election on 23 February 1914 Radoslavov hatched a scheme of electoral engineering where the “new lands” of Western Thrace played a central role. The electoral constituency of Western Thrace would yield 24 mandates, half of them Muslims. Radoslavov exploited his control of the new Bulgarian administration to secure that the Christian votes were channeled to his party. For the Muslim vote, on the other hand, he struck a deal with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that was able to control the Muslim voters. All the 12 Muslim mandates from the “new lands” ran for his party and

8. Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs of a Turkish statesman 1913-1919*, London 1922, pp. 45-56.

9. Туше Влахов, “Турско-българските отношения през 1913–1915 г.” [Turkish-Bulgarian relations during 1913-1915], *Исторически преглед*, год. 11, кн. 1 (1955), pp. 28-30.

became elected. This tipped the scales and provided him with the necessary majority in parliament.¹⁰ The control of the Muslim vote and the Ottoman paramilitary presence in the area form the backdrop of Chaulev's report.

It can be useful to provide a brief summary of subsequent events. Bulgaria would try to integrate the "new lands" by putting pressure on the indigenous population and settling new colonists. This process was, however, hampered by the exigencies of the Great War. The eventual Bulgarian defeat led to the loss of Western Thrace by the Neuilly treaty (27 November 1919). The area was first put under allied administration led by the French General Charpy. Later it was ceded to Greece in the San Remo conference 19-26 April 1920, and Greek forces took control of Western Thrace towards the end of May. The Greek-Turkish war precluded a final settlement until the Greek defeat in Asia Minor led to the Lausanne treaty in 1923. After this date the territory became unequivocally Greek and has remained so, with the exception of a brief Bulgarian occupation during World War II.

The Protagonists

Faced with the volatile situation in Western Thrace, it is natural that Prime Minister Vasil Radoslavov felt the need for first hand information about the situation on the ground. He did this in the usual fashion. Instead of relying on the bureaucracy, he simply sent one of his trusted men to inquire about the situation and report directly to him. His choice for carrying out the task is interesting for several reasons. Petar Chaulev (1882 Ohrid-1924 Milan), was a leading figure in the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) belonging to its left wing.¹¹ In spite of this he supported the

10. Стайко Трифонов, *Тракия. Административна уредба, политически и стопански живот, 1912-1915* [Thrace. Administrative organisation, politics and economy 1912-1915], Sofia 1992, pp. 91-93.

11. For brief biographical notes see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petar_Chaulev. Wikipedia should be used with proper caution. The inclusion of persons in Wikipedia is also an indication of their reputation. All internet sources were accessed 31 October 2014.

Bulgarian army during the Balkans Wars, and as we can see he was not averse to carrying out tasks for the Bulgarian political establishment. He had a long track record as revolutionary, but succumbed to the IMRO infighting in the aftermath of the negotiations with Comintern in 1924. The author of the report that follows was consequently a person with rich political and paramilitary experience. Chaulev arrived in Komotini 21 February (old style) on the eve of the 23 February elections

His interlocutor in Western Thrace was Süleyman Askerî bey (1884 Prizren-1915 Basra), a high-ranking Ottoman military officer, member of CUP and close to Enver pasha.¹² He was among the officers who participated in the guerilla activities against the Italian invasion of Tripoli in 1911. Later he became head of the paramilitary operations in Western Thrace in the wake of the Second Balkan War. Around this time he also became the first chief of the Ottoman Special Organisation (*Teşkilât-i Mahsusa*). This organisation was involved in various clandestine operations and is particularly notorious for its role in the deportation of Greek men of military age to labour battalions (*amele taburları*) from the Asia Minor coast beginning in 1914 and the subsequent death marches of Armenian civilians in the interior of Anatolia. Süleyman Askerî bey committed suicide in connection with complications related to paramilitary operations in the Basra Vilayet (Iraq) 14 April 1915.

An analytic presentation of some of the main points in the report

Chaulev stresses the strong organisation of the Muslims. In this connection we have to keep in mind that the Ottoman paramilitary forces had been in control of the area since they took Komotini 16/29 August 1913. They drafted local Muslims into their army. The bid for autonomy resulted in the organisation of basic state structures and national symbols, including postal stamps, passports, flag and

12. For brief biographical notes see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%Bcley-man_Asker%C3%AE_Bey.

national anthem.¹³ The paramilitary forces had apparently remained *in situ* after the nominal Bulgarian takeover, and the Bulgarians were far from masters of the situation. As we can see from the report, the paramilitary forces had a strong grip on the Muslim vote. Chaulev supplies a partial list of names and positions for the key figures. A quick glance on this list displays various points of interest. The bulk of the list consists of Ottoman military officers, but there are also various persons originating from the Caucasus, who usually joined in these kinds of operations as a cross between mercenaries and freebooters. Many of them were of Circassian origin. The officers Tayar bey and Mahsar effendi were scheduled to lead detachments that were going to Pravishta (today: Eleftheroupoli) and Drama respectively. This should be seen within the framework of Bulgarian-Ottoman cooperation in organising guerrilla activities in areas they aspired to under Greek and Serbian rule. This kind of cooperation lasted right up until the signing of the Lausanne treaty in 1923, and Bulgarian guerrilla bands were active until 1934. In spite of this cooperation we can see that Chaulev is not comfortable with the shipment of arms through Bulgarian territory and seeks to minimise the risk for potential abuse against Bulgarian interests. A person of particular interest is Djafer bey from the Kastoria region who tours the villages as agitator. Since he is originating from a Slav speaking region, he is evidently used for disseminating propaganda in the many Pomak villages of the area.

Chaulev mentions that he knows a thing or two about secret organisations. He is of course referring to his tenure in IMRO. The interesting thing is that the Ottomans in general, and Enver Pasha in particular, seem to have picked up a lesson or two from chasing revolutionaries in Macedonia. Some of the clandestine Ottoman operations bear witness to this. Just as we saw the links between Chaulev and the official Bulgarian administration, the links between the official Ottoman administration and the paramilitary forces in Western Thrace is even more obvious. We can observe the regular

13. See the brief presentation in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_Government_of_Western_Thrace. It should be noticed that the Wikipedia accounts in other languages differ markedly.

contact with the CUP leaders in Istanbul who are in control of general policies towards Bulgaria. On the other hand, the speech of Süleyman Askerî Bey to the local Muslim population in Western Thrace about the newfound Bulgarian-Ottoman friendship, testifies to the need of the central administration to impose its views on the local population. It is clear that the nominal Bulgarian rule after the Constantinople treaty was in fact a Bulgarian-Ottoman condominium. The Muslims are in a strong position and quite demanding. Chaulev, on the other hand, is very uneasy about the Bulgarian administration's lack of authority.

Chaulev goes into some detail about reasons for the Bulgarian administration's weak position. His allusions to the regional governor Nedyalko Svinarov's incompetence is clear but carefully worded. The main problems with his appointment can be summarised as follows: Nedyalko Svinarov was from the village Zlatitsa in the Sofia region, and a well-known partisan of Radoslavov's Liberal Party. The Bulgarian government had promised in the Constantinople treaty to appoint Murat bey, who was a deputy in the Bulgarian parliament from Aytos, to the position. Radoslavov not only went back on this promise, but he appointed Svinarov more because of his party affiliation, than for his competence to carry out the difficult task. The highest-ranking general, Mihail Savov, was critical to Radoslavov's abandonment of this promise, and stressed furthermore the necessity to have a regional governor with a good command of Turkish. The situation was made even worse by Svinarov's nepotism. Svinarov took with him a host of adherents from his native village Zlatista. His brother became mayor of Makri, and several other relatives were also appointed to various positions in the Bulgarian administration.¹⁴ It is natural that the local population would react to the favouritism of Svinarov.

Tano Nikolov (1873 Haskovo-1947 Asenovgrad) and Michael Chakov (1873 Goumenitsa-1938 Sofia) are both well-known revolutionaries associated with IMRO and various other factions of

14. Трифонов, *Тракия, op.cit.*, pp. 83, 86, 105-106.

the Bulgarian-Macedonian revolutionary movement.¹⁵ There are occasional references to Nikolov in the Greek bibliography since he for many years was the leader of the Thracian Revolutionary Organisation. Besides their revolutionary activities they were obviously not averse to taking advantage of the situation to enrich themselves. Tano Nikolov had also played a prominent role in the Pomak conversion campaign, which is a further indication of his opportunism. Other people, such as Orhaniev, used their position in the Bulgarian administration to exploit the newly arrived refugees from areas now under Greek, Serbian and Ottoman rule. The politician Paskalev is criticised for lack of principle and his appointment as mayor of Komotini may be an indication of the lack of suitable persons to take up positions in the Bulgarian administration. A recurring theme in the report is the criticism against the disdain displayed towards the local population and the need to approach them in order to solidify Bulgarian rule.

Chaulev devotes ample space to describe internal strategies and divisions in the Muslims population and Ottoman leadership. Special mention is made of the important publicist and politician Ethem Rûhi (1873 Istanbul-1949 Istanbul).¹⁶ He became a member of the Committee of Union and Progress already in 1895. After arrests and exile in Europe he settled in Plovdiv in late 1904 and published several newspapers. He was well connected to CUP and served as a link between the Bulgarian Muslims and the CUP government in Istanbul. Chaulev is clearly wary of Ethem Rûhi's role and his ability to organise the Muslims. He fears their political power as well as their clandestine activities. He mentions threats and intimidations against Muslims who are ready to sell their estates to Bulgarians, as

15. See http://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/Михаил_Чаков; http://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/Тане_Николов for biographical notes. The spelling in standard literary Bulgarian is Tanju Nikolov, but Chaulev is from Ohrid and uses the form Tano. He is also referred to as Tane Nikolov.

16. For brief biographical notes see: <http://www.bicumle.net/yazar/ethem-ruhi-balkan/510>. For a detailed account of Ethem Rûhi's activities in Bulgaria prior to the Balkan Wars, see: Ayçe Feride Yılmaz, *The Ottoman Balkan gazette as an agent of empire within the Bulgarian nation state, 1910-1911*, Master thesis, Central European University 2013 (www.etd.ceu.hu/2013/yilmaz_ayce.pdf).

well as political assassination of political opponents of CUP inside Bulgaria. Chaulev thinks that they should also counter the CUP proagenda by supporting political forces among the Muslims that are in opposition to it.

The Bulgarian attempts to fasten the grip on the “new lands” was first of all threatened by the Muslim presence, but Chaulev also considers the Greek factor. At first he mentions the tricky question of ownership to property and goes on with proposing the expulsion of the Greek population from the strategically important areas of Suflu and Ortaköy. The Dedeagach area, on the other hand, had quite a number of Bulgarian villages before the war and they remained largely intact. Another consideration is the administrative division of the “new lands.” After stating that the Ottoman administrative division was based on the principle of “divide and rule,” he goes on to state that Bulgaria should now adopt the same policy but based on Bulgarian national interests.

All in all, as mentioned in the introduction, the report provides us with a valuable insight into the political thinking of the Bulgarian leadership during this period and a valuable snapshot of the situation on the ground during this critical juncture.

THE REPORT¹⁷

To Mr. Vas. Radoslavov
Prime Minister and Minister
of Internal and Foreign Affairs

Mr. Minister,

As you are aware of, in accordance with your wish I toured the new lands together with Siuleyman Askeri Bey [Süleyman Askerî Bey]. After I toured the main towns and villages in the new lands with the previously mentioned bey, it is my duty to report to Your Excellency what I was able to see and learn about the behaviour and thoughts of the Turkish population.¹⁸

On the 21th of last month the Turkish population of Giumiurdjina [Komotini] gave us a splendid reception.¹⁹ In the morning Siuleyman Bey summoned his people (you can see below who they were) and gave them instructions for the elections. On the 23rd of last month I visited several times the polling stations together with Siuleyman Bey, where one of his men was giving separate instructions to the individual voters and guiding them to the voting booth. Orders were given for all the Turks to go and vote, even those who were very sick, and those who could not go on foot were brought by special carriages. The results are known to you.

On the 24th last month Siuleyman Bey summoned an assembly of the most prominent Turks, some 15-20 persons, and spoke to them for more than three hours. His subject was Turkish history. After he accused the Turkish Sultans who had gone all the way to Vienna, he told them that Edirne was indispensable as the doorway to Istanbul.

17. The report can be found in the Bulgarian Central State Archives: Fond 313, Opis 1, Archivna edinitsa 2144. I would like to thank Alexei Kalionski for paleographic assistance with original handwritten document and discussion of the various events.

18. Chaulev apparently uses the word "Turkish" in a traditional sense as synonymous with Muslim.

19. i.e. February 1914. Dates are old style. According to the Gregorian calendar it would be March 6, 1914.

He accused the Turkish governments, that never had good relations with any of its their neighbours' governments, something that up until now had only had adverse results, and at the end he concluded that from now on they had no outstanding issues with Bulgaria and they would enjoy a sincere friendship.

He introduced me to everybody and explained to me the role each of them had played and were playing.

On the 26th the two of us went to Skecha [Xanthi].

Concerning his visit to Skecha I will only mention to you the words of the mufti:

“Even the reception of Sultan Reshad was not as enthusiastic as this.”²⁰

We stayed for four days in Skecha and were well received and invited home to all the prominent Turks.

There was a meeting of a small circle of people and he [Siuleyman Bey] said the same as he had said in Giumiurdjina.

From there we went on a trip to some of the Turkish villages near the Greek border. We visited the village Okchilar [Toxotes] and returned.²¹

We then went back to Giumiurdjina, where we spent three more days, after that two days in Dedeagach [Alexandroupoli], from there we went to Edirne for three days and then we parted: I went to Sofia and he to Istanbul.

Mr. Minister, I consider myself sufficiently competent to know something about secret organisations, and I tell you: the Turkish population in the Giumiurdjina region are so well organized that in my eyes they appear as one man.²²

The reception by the whole Turkish town and village population together with their women and children took place without any official announcement, without beating on drums. In Skecha they

20. Sultan Mehmed V Reshad (1844-1918), was sultan from 27 April 1909 until his death. He made a few vistic to the Balkans, but I am not certain about the dates in this case.

21. The village Toxotes was at the railway station on the border with Greece.

22. Giumiurdjina region is here used in the Bulgarian administrative sense.

left their workshops without the knowledge of the official [Bulgarian] authorities and secondly, I think that only the voting of 80,000 – absolutely all of the civil Turkish population, and the beating of some Turks who had been deluded by the opposition, are sufficient facts to confirm what I said above.

Not only that, there is something even more terrifying: They are organised in battalions, even platoons, something they told me themselves, and even more striking, when they greeted us upon arrival and departure they were in parade order headed by their officers in civil clothes.

In Skecha the vice regional commander [Bulgarian] also came to the reception together with the police officers [*pristav*] and some mounted police [*strazhar*]. I do not know whether he had been summoned or not. If he had been summoned, in my eyes it did not give a good impression of the representatives of the government, who instead of having the place of honour, cleared the path so the carts could pass – the work of any policeman.

The Turkish population is armed from head to toe. They told me that they have some machine guns and in the villages I suppose they have some canons too. Every town has well-furnished official premises, called “komit hane” (committee house), where they can meet and read newspapers.

In every town there is a commander, all without exception military officers.

I was not able to learn the exact number of officers, since some of them were out in the villages. I only managed to become acquainted with those who are presented below. Some of them were commanders of the towns.

Here are their names and their positions:

1. Siuleyman Askeri bey – Commander in chief
2. Reshad Said bey – Senior military officer
3. Arif bey – Adjutant to Siuleyman Askeri bey
4. Djamil Said bey – Commander of Skecha
5. Sadik Emin bey – Commander of Giumiurdjina
6. Riza bey – Commander of Dedeagach
7. Djelal bey – Commander of Suflu [Soufli]

8. Hadji Komuz-Oğlu-Selim – Commander of Kirdjali
9. Riza bey – Military doctor
10. Senior military officer born in Caucasus – Has good command of Russian
11. Senior military officer born in Caucasus – Has good command of Russian
12. İbrahim efendi – Georgian
13. Raif efendi – Intendant and escort officer in Giumiurdjina
14. Haki bey – Intendant and escort officer in Giumiurdjina
15. Hadji Mustafa – Intendant and escort officer in Giumiurdjina
16. Tayar bey – Head of the detachment that will go to Pravishta [Eleftheroupoli]
17. Mahsar efendi – Head of the detachment that will go to Drama
18. Djafer bey from the Kostur [Kastoria] region – Agitator who tours the villages
19. A Circassian – Commander of Daridere [Zlatograd]

These officers seem to follow a programme where every other day one goes to Istanbul while another returns. The chief of police [*gradonachalnik*] in Giumiurdjina, Murat Bey is a man who is unusually close to the Clubs. The Turkish population considers him the representative of the government and address themselves to him. The administrative correspondence of the Turkish municipalities first arrives at the club; applications first arrive at the club where they are corrected; and every juridical issue between the Turks is also seen to at the club.

The goal of Murat Bey is to play some kind of central role, to become popular among the Turkish clubs and go to Istanbul to take up some prominent position. He was very close to Talat Bey and Djemal Pasha.²³ The dismissal of Murat Bey and disarmament of the Turkish population are very delicate issues that require careful deliberations. Our military is quite self-confident and they think this

23. Together with Enver Pasha they made up the triumvirate of the three pashas who effectively ran the affairs of the Ottoman Empire from the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 until the end of World War I.

will be an easy task, but the uprising in Macedonia during the autumn, the destruction of two Serbian regiments at Debar, the capture of 16 cannons by the rebels, are sufficient examples to the contrary.²⁴

The reason why the Turks can be so well organised, and to continue to act in this fashion – to reinforce the ranks of the organisation, is that the government give them more than complete freedom and because the Bulgarian administration is utterly compromised.

It is not my intention to lash out at people, but I consider it to be the patriotic duty of every Bulgarian, in particular in the new lands, to reveal everything that is dirty and criminal, that leads the state towards the abyss, so that tomorrow it will not be too late.

The regional governor Mr. Svinarov, whose businesses I have no interest to investigate, may rank among the best and most honest persons, but rely on my patriotism and believe me that in these lands this man has no longer any more authority than a [simple] policeman. The elections are sufficient evidence to make you believe me. You know how many Bulgarian votes there are in the Giumiurdjina region, these Bulgarians are not Democrats, their vote was a protest by the Bulgarian people against the government that continue to keep people in charge who are compromised to their bones such as: Mihail Chakov,²⁵ Orhaniev, Tano Nikolov,²⁶ Paskalev as mayor of Giumiurdjina, etc.

It is sufficient for the government to ask Mih. Chakov how he has enriched himself.

Until yesterday Orhaniev made the refugees pick olives for him in return for flour from the state; and after promising them 10 *stotinki* a kilo, in the end he gave them 5 etc. Tano Nikolov who until yesterday baptized the Pomaks is now standing by the Pomaks. Paskalev

24. i.e. the Ohrid-Debar uprising in Northwestern Vardar Macedonia, September 7-19, 1913. Petâr Chaulev was the leading Bulgarian figure and units of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation acted in collaboration with the local Albanians against the Serbian authorities.

25. For brief biographical notes see: http://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/Михаил_Чакoв

26. The spelling in standard literary Bulgarian is Tanju Nikolov, but Chaulev is from Ohrid and uses the form Tano. He is also sometimes referred to as Tane Nikolov.

was a Turkish deputy until 2 years ago and spitted on everything Bulgarian, last year he was a Tsankovist,²⁷ commissioned during the whole war, so when did he become a liberal²⁸ and mayor of Giumiurdjina? The wife of Svinarov and the wife of some judge –both teachers, but former teachers and unemployed already under Turkish rule– were indignant agitators against the government and deprived if of Bulgarian votes.²⁹

In addition the government lost the elections in the new lands as they pushed the Bulgarian population towards the opposition, by having 12 Turkish candidates, some of them from outside the area and not one local Bulgarian, nor were any local Bulgarian appointed for government service.

It is not necessary to continue with these petty matters, that are many, but it is good for you to know what the Turks are thinking.

As I mentioned previously, the Turkish population is extraordinarily well organised and they live in the belief that tomorrow these lands will become Turkish again etc. How things end up will depend on the measures by the Bulgarian government; but besides this I want to inform you about what Turkish deputies will propose to you so that you can take your measures and not be taken by surprise.

1. They will propose that you clean out the administration and dismiss those who have harassed the Turkish population.
2. They have made a list of all the wrongdoings of the administrative and military authorities and if they are not corrected they will list them up in the national assembly.
3. When they arrive from there [Giumiurdjina] they will assemble everybody from Plovdiv and discuss matters with Etem-Ruhi [Ethem Rûhi].

27. i.e. a member of the Progressive-Liberal party, founded by Dragan Tsankov in 1884 – a “Russophile” and later, pro-Entente party. Its leader, Stoyan Danev, was Prime-minister during the Second Balkan War.

28. i.e. he switched to Radoslavov’s party.

29. i.e. they agitated against Radoslavov’s party and in favour of the opposition.

4. There is a danger that Etem-Ruhi will lead the Turkish group in Parliament and there will be a split, something I have heard the Turks say themselves many times.
5. They are offended by the fact that secret police has been sent to Giumiurdjina, without being presented to the chief of police [*gradonachalnik*] Murat Bey, and who by their incompetence have been spotted even by children.
6. The Turks are looking forward to the municipality elections, in order to elect Turkish governors [*obshtinski upraviteli*]; something they will have not only in village municipalities but also in the towns such as Giumiurdjina and Skecha.
7. The visit of general Dikov and his companions to buy Turkish estates [*chiftliks*] has made the Turkish clubs issue orders to the Turks and threaten them if they sell their estates.
8. The murder of Zeki Bey in Plovdiv and the fact that the murderers have not been arrested, an act that was organized from Istanbul and executed by the Giumiurdjina committee, encouraged the Turkish population immensely, as it gives them the idea that they are masters of the situation in Bulgaria too and can even carry out assassinations. The Bulgarian authorities must use all means to discover the assassins: a) the most important matter is to neutralise their future actions, b) to demonstrate that in Bulgaria the judicial works indiscriminately, c) Zeki Bey as a prominent member of the party Itilaf [*İtilâf*] which from what I know will not come to power tomorrow; and this party is also more friendly disposed towards Bulgaria.³⁰

Mr. Minister, considering what I have written above, I think that the first concern of the government must be to attract the Bulgarian population to its side, which is not too late, and namely:

30. The Freedom and Accord Party (Turkish: Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası, was a liberal Ottoman political party active between 1911 and 1913, during the Second Constitutional Era. It acted as the main opposition party to the Committee of Union and Progress. The party was suppressed after the Raid on the Sublime Porte of January 1913, in which the Committee of Union and Progress's leadership grabbed de facto control of the Empire.

a) To appoint honest and experienced local persons as governors of the municipal administrations.

b) To appoint honest, experienced local people as secretaries, tax collectors, even with a high salary.

c) Instead of the present gendarmery, without local knowledge and loafing about the streets from drunkenness, appoint local boys who have served as volunteers in the wars.

d) It should be appealed to high-ranking persons here in Sofia, honest and sincere patriots, to take up the positions of mayors in the towns, district police chiefs [*Okoliyski nachalnitsi*] and regional governors [*okrâzhni upraviteli*].

Only with such people – true patriots – who place the interests of society far above their personal interests, will they save the land, although in my eyes everything takes on a dark colour, and although this is a strong expression I hope that the situation is not hopeless.

Demonstrate to the Bulgarians in these lands, that these places are now ours, and that the refugee is in possession of what he has, because he – the refugee is not yet able to believe this when the Turks on one side say that it will become theirs and on the other Greek families are returning and given back their property, etc. The regional governor summoned a Greek landlord from Thessaloniki, gave him the documents that verify he [the regional governor] is renting the house and sent him [the landlord] away, people know this and say that tomorrow they will be expelled once more; they live under this impression as if they are awaiting their death, and some of the military would even sell Bulgaria for a Greek woman. The commissions for settling the refugees stand by with their hands tied, they are the target of slander, but I reckon it is because people are very upset and search for culprits everywhere and for everything. What they see, and what I condemn is that there is absolutely no colonization policy, and that is why I decided that I too should voice my opinion:

Deportation by all means of the Greek population in Suflu [Soufli] and Ortaköy [Ivaylovgrad]

Suflu and Ortaköy are our weakest positions within the new borders. During the first war the Greeks of Suflu first revolted

against the Turks; and during the second war they attacked our sentry army in the back with weapons in hand.

Later the same Greeks together with Turkish irregulars [*bashi-bozuks*] participated in the wholesale massacre of the Bulgarian population and burning of Bulgarian villages.

Again in Ortaköy Turkish soldiers and irregulars attacked Kushukavak [Krumovgrad] and thus threatened the Giumiurdjina-Kirdjali road, which forced the Bulgarian army to leave hastily the Aegean region.³¹

In place of the Greek towns of Ortaköy and Suflu we have to create Bulgarian towns by all means. The Dedeagach area is Bulgarian, but that has been the situation from Turkish times. If we succeed to bulgarify Suflu and Ortaköy too, we will by this act erect a strong Bulgarian wall between Istanbul-Edirne on one side and the Turkish masses in Giumiurdjina-Kirdjali on the other.

As long as Edirne is not in our hands, we must have a strong grip on Ortaköy and Suflu if we want to keep the Aegean coast. This is a question that has to be particularly and carefully examined. Instead of spending money on the development of Mustafa Pasha [Svilengrad], which with its hinterland can be nothing more than a big village, this money should be spent on the development of Ortaköy, where people from Mustafa Pasha will cultivate silkworm breeding under better condition from every point of view.

New administrative division

This is imperative, and should be done by Parliament, as soon as possible. The established Turkish administrative division is based on divide and rule. This principle should now be used to serve our interests.

I would propose the following administrative division:

Giumiurdjina town is the intellectual centre of the Western Thrace Turks. All initiatives come from here. Giumiurdjina, Skecha, Daridere and Dedeagach and Suflu should be made a separate region

31. i.e. the special detachment sent by Enver Pasha and led by Eşref Kuşçubaşı that set up the Giumiurdjina republic.

with Giumiurdjina as centre. The rest should be joined to the Stara Zagora and Plovdiv regions.

Under such an administrative division the Giumiurdjina region with a bulgarified Suflu, with a Bulgarian Dedeagach, with refugees, etc., will take on a Bulgarian colour and immediately neutralise the great influence Giumiurdjina town exercises over the Turkish population in all of Western Thrace.

The compact Turkish mass must be divided into different regions in order not to constitute a danger. Then the Giumiurdjina region, the shore region and the border region cut through by the railway, will take on a mainly Bulgarian colour from a national point of view with a systematic settlement of refugees (unfortunately there is no such policy).

Mr. Minister, the Turkish population in the new lands are very influenced by the Istanbul press. It is necessary with censorship that prevents the dissemination of every kind of Turkish newspapers containing various articles, but to let them have mostly access to their opposition newspapers, and in order for them to have reading material the government should take care of issuing a Turkish newspaper in Giumiurdjina where soon the printing office of Samardjiev will arrive from Thessaloniki.

On the basis of our agreements, the Turks have the right to stockpile weapons at the Greek border for arming the Turkish population on Greek territory. They want the weapons to follow the route Edirne-Dimotika [Didymoteihos]-Kirdjali-Skecha area and then to the border.

I am apprehensive against letting the weapons move along this route:

a) So that the weapons are not left in Turkish villages on our territory; b) so that they [the Turks] do not create a network; c) and our government will not be able to be fully informed. I opposed this plan and we decided that the weapon should go from Istanbul on a Bulgarian boat, unload at Porto Lagos and then be stored at Kirechköy [Hrysa].³² Since there are no machines for unloading at Porto Lagos Siuleyman Bey promised to send such equipment.

32. The village Hrysa has today grown into a suburb of Xanthi.

In these places we must have some of our more experienced people, who can follow up closely, and if there are actually stored weapons at Kirechköy we must already from now on station our army there.

The town of Skecha is their best organized centre with the greatest activity so here we must have our most experienced people, as temporary representative of our organisation, without whom nothing will take place, I appointed Angel Popov.

I spent three days in Edirne together with Siuleyman bey, among the Turkish high society. Besides the club *İttihat ve Terraki* [CUP], in Edirne there is also another club called the Committee Club that directs the clubs in our lands.

The largest part of the Edirne army went to Erzerum. In Edirne there is a total of (18) eighteen *taburs*, with maximum 10,000 soldiers.

Typhus and cholera is mowing the army. In a hospital with four doctors, three of them died within two days, and the one who remained cried as a child out of fear.

Having in mind the death of the doctors you can only imagine the situation in the army.

It would be good to take measures at our borders.

With my best compliments:

Pet. Chaulev

12 March 1914

Sofia

The Pomak Question

I was informed by His Eminence Boris that there are Pomaks who want to remain Christians and other who want to be baptised.³³ So

33. For the sake of clarity. He is referring to the Metropolitan Boris, and not the crown prince. "His Eminence Boris" was the Exarchist metropolitan in Ohrid (Boris Ohridski, 1910-1913, 1915-1918). On October 22, 1913, the Holy Synod decided to establish a new eparchy in Maronia (*Maroniyska eparchiya*), encompassing the Giumiurdjina, Skecha and Dedeagach areas with Boris Ohridski as temporary metropolitan. His vicars were Yosif Dragovitiyski (also in exile from Vardar Macedonia) and Ilarion Nishavski, in Dedeagach and Skecha respectively.

that we will not have any misunderstandings with the Turkish government the Pomaks should be sent to old Bulgaria, be baptised and appointed temporarily to a job; and it should be sent a couple of hodjas to their villages, even if they do not know Bulgarian and it should be opened Bulgarian primary schools with experienced teachers.

Maria Rizou

**The Loans to the Greek Refugees from
Bulgaria and Romania:
Conditions, Terms and Collateral**

No previous scholarship has focused on these two refugee groups: in some ways the refugees from Bulgaria and Romania could be described as the unsung heroes of this period of economic and social history. Their plight and their means of confronting it offers a unique insight into the Greek economy and society. These refugees were forced to move during the period 1914-1918, because of the particularly unstable political situation in the Balkans. The two Balkan Wars were quickly followed by the First World War. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze information through previously unseen documents referring to Greek refugees from Bulgaria and Romania from the Historical Archive of the National Bank of Greece. Although, the number of refugees from the Balkan area was smaller by one third (approximately 450,000 out of 1,250,000) of the total number that came to Greece during the period 1904-1924, this group is significant. They were the first organized refugees who came to Greece and took financial assistance from the Greek state and the National Bank of Greece. Although the majority of historians focus on the refugees from Asia Minor after 1922, this paper aims to describe an earlier picture of the Balkan refugee problem and its economic and social aspects. An examination of the bank's contracts and agreements sheds light on important issues in this period. Likewise, this research will examine whether the established criteria for the loan agreements were uniformly strict for all refugees, or if there were any exceptions.

I

The National Bank of Greece, having taken responsibility from 1914 onwards, of many financial agreements for the sake of the Greek state¹, it could not miss the chance to participate in this very special and extremely critical need for financial help to refugees. It was another way of gaining privileges from the Greek state. After the arrival of refugees in Greece, and until the completion of the time-consuming task of assessing the properties of the exchangeable refugees,² due to the intense distress of refugees, the solution adopted was to provide an advance final payment of the value of the property abandoned in Bulgarian and Romanian lands. The government would estimate first the value of the refugees' property³ and the National Bank took over the responsibility to pay the deposits to refugees.

The support of NBG⁴ was the only direct financial support to refugees. The debt servicing was considered satisfactory. Thus, by the Law ΦΕΚ 1170, published with the number 59 on March 21, 1918 and after royal decree on April 9, 1918, NBG undertook the obligation (with the guarantee of the Greek state), to grant loans to creditworthy refugees from Bulgaria and Romania. All loans should be repaid within two years from the date of agreement.

According to Law 1170, three committees were established, which would consider whether each refugee was creditworthy for

1. Even for the basic needs of the army (during the Balkan Wars and World War One), for example for the nutrition of the military, the government had to resort to the National Bank for deposits. The dependence on the National Bank, distinguished even in the field of culture. A progressive magazine as *Noumas*, was in 1907 by the author's ability to cover the costs of paper, while the magazine benefited from paid listings of the National Bank of Greece. C. Chatziiosif, "Introduction", in *History of Greece of 20th century*, Vivliorama, Athens 2009 (in Greek), p. 15.

2. Because of the unstable political situations there was an agreement among the Balkan states through which refugees could move to their preferable country voluntarily. This agreement officially signed in 1919 and it is known as Treaty of Neigh.

3. With the help of Refugees' Commissions.

4. When NGB is National Bank of Greece.

borrowing money or not. They checked if the refugees had submitted true data, if they had reported in detail every property item of them and finally, according to movable or immovable property, the committees would judge the amount of the loan that should be agreed. The final target was of course, the repayment. People consisted the committees had been elected under the responsibility of the Minister of Finance and Welfare, and they should be composed of eminent citizens, originating from the areas of the borrowers. This happened in order to have easy access to the settled living area of the refugees, in order to check their financial and social condition.

The committees were divided as follows: first, the Committee for the Eastern Macedonia refugees, secondly, the Commission of Thrace, Bulgaria and Asia Minor refugees, and third, the Commission of the Romanian refugees.⁵ The third article of the law 1170, clarified that the maximum family agreed loan, could not exceed the amount of 5,000 drachmas. Furthermore, it also mentioned, that the committees should state fully the details of the guarantors, their place of origin and their private property. Finally, they had to clarify the final amounts of loans that would be offered by area: 500,000 drachmas for Greek refugees from Eastern Thrace, 500,000 drachmas for Greek refugees from Bulgaria, 500,000 drachmas for Greek refugees from Asia Minor, 300,000 drachmas for Greek refugees from Romania.

The security of the state was provided legally, through a letter from the Minister of Finance to the Bank, which mentioned the name of the borrower person, the amount for which the guarantee was given, the names of the guarantors and the place of origin of each of these. The granting of the loan secured through action between the National Bank and the borrower. On the deed was placed a five cents stamp, bearing the number of the document in the Treasury.⁶

In the occasion that a refugee had exceeded the estimated time of the repayment of the loan, the State was required at the request

5. See ΦΕΚ law 1170/21-3-1918, no. 59, article 2°.

6. *Ibid.*

of the National Bank to pay the arrears, including interest and expenses of the Bank. The collection of the arrears was a state's responsibility.

This law had passed in the Greek parliament, in March 17, 1918, by the Minister of Finance, M. Negropontis and Minister of Welfare, P. Simos. The next day, it considered by the Minister of Justice I.D. Tsirimokos. The law was designed to help a part of the refugee population recover, within the context of social policy being practiced at that time.

To conclude, with the law 1170 in 1918, the Greek State authorized the NBG to lend money to the Greek refugees from Bulgaria and Romania, in order to indemnify them for the collateral left in their countries. The Greek state would become the guarantor. At that time, NBG became more careful and strict in the way that it was lending money. For this reason it established harsh criteria referring to the refugees' collateral. Except from the social profile that the NBG wanted to show in public, the main reason for agreeing to help the Greek state was the benefits and the increased power that it got. It was another opportunity for the bank to expand its strength and make the Greek state more depended on it. As already described, NBG was trying to save its profits by any way, in order to reduce at least the percentage of financial loss. By instituting specific criteria both for the refugees and guarantors' property (more details later in the chapter), the bank managed to grant "safe" loans, repaid in two years time after the day of agreement.

To sum up, the unstable relations between NBG and the Greek State represented the economic and political life of Greece in the second decade of 20th century. It is clear that NBG took the obligation to give financial support to refugees within other obligations that it had towards Greek state. As the Greek State did not have the funds to support them, its collaboration with NBG gave to the bank the opportunity to increase its profits as well as its fame in the Greek land.

II

Folder 21 from the Historical Archive of the National Bank of Greece is entitled “The loans of the National Bank of Greece, with the security of the Greek State to the Greek refugees from Bulgaria, 1918-1925”. It contains 55 saved contracts, which will be examined in this part of the chapter. Although the folder's title includes the years 1918-1925, it contains no contracts from after 1920 (referring to the refugees from Bulgaria). The contracts of this folder offer important information that has not examined before. What were the occupations of these refugees and what was their financial situation? What type of collateral and other property did they have? From which place in Bulgaria did they come and in which part of Greece did they settle? Was their settlement organized or not? Who were their guarantors? What were the profits for the National Bank of Greece? All these questions can be addressed by an examination of folder 21 and the related archival material.

The majority of the Greek refugees from Bulgaria originated in the areas of Plovdiv (Philippoupoli then), Varna, Andrianople, Anchialos and Petritsio. They arrived in Greece, having left behind every kind of property that they had owned, so they needed financial help in order to start their new life. Most settled in Athens, only about 5% moved to smaller cities such as Lamia, Piraeus and the island of Hydra. As a result, it can be said that refugees coming from Bulgaria, had an urban settlement.⁷ Given that most refugees coming Bulgaria had settled in the area of Thessaly and Macedonia (non-urban settlement), obviously these contracts are referring to the small percentage of them who settled in cities.

Through the study of the contracts,⁸ it emerges that the refugees had various reasons for asking a loan. First, they faced difficulties when they moved to Greece. Secondly, they were isolated from movable and immovable property they held in Bulgaria, because they could not communicate with their relatives who had stayed

7. Conclusion coming from the study of the Historical Archive of National Bank of Greece, folder 21.

8. Historical Archive of National Bank of Greece, folder 21.

there. Holding only property titles or other kinds of property certificates, they managed to borrow money from the NBG, in order to settle in their new country.

Furthermore, apart from the mentioned difficulties, in their contracts some refugees expressed other personal reasons, more important to them. Their bad financial condition created serious obstacles in the maintenance of their families and the management of their expenses. This is exemplified in the case of Aristotelis Papadopoulos, from Xanthi, who was asking money from the Loans Committee because he had five children, one of whom fought in the First World War, in the Bulgarian military.⁹ Another example is Konstandinos Xanthos, from Varna. He was a lawyer but his serious health problems meant he could not work and he was asking for a 5,000 drachmas loan.¹⁰ Another case was the refugee Kleoniki Trakoglou. She came to Athens in 1915 requested a 5,000 drachmas loan to finish her studies. Finally she managed to secure the amount of 1,500.¹¹ In order to continue his studies in the Department of Dentistry, Ioannis Thomas, applied to the Loans Commission. He was from the area of Philippoupoli and his private property was of low value. His guarantor could not offer much security. So, although he was asking for 3,000 drachmas, he managed to secure a loan of 1,000.¹²

In the application of the refugee Smaragda Terepandrou, it is mentioned that she was forced to leave Bulgaria in 1906, because her area (Anchialos) had been set on fire by the national army in an action aimed at killing people who did not want to join the Exarchate.¹³ Her guarantor, Sophia Tsami, pointed out the complete devastation of her area and also its poor financial situation since the beginning of the World War One. Her main reason for requesting a loan was the illness of her son (which had cost her a large amount of money) and the absence of her husband, who was working in

9. *Ibid*, contract no. 51514.

10. *Ibid*, contract no. 51533.

11. *Ibid*, contract no. 51608.

12. *Ibid*, contract no. 51609.

13. *Ibid*, contract no. 51576.

another place. A serious health problem forced Dimitris Vitkatsis (from Adrianople) to ask for a loan. In order to persuade the Loans Committee of his urgent situation, he submitted a doctor's certificate describing his serious health problems.¹⁴ Furthermore, in order to persuade the Loans Commission that his private property worth more than 136,000 drachmas, he submitted his collateral in detail. Such a move was observed only once in the entire archival folder. Finally, he managed to secure a loan of 1.500 drachmas. Moreover, it is interesting to note the name of his guarantor: Ioannis Tibanidis, who was a member of the Greek parliament. Tibanidis had a position of power in this period of time. His name alone could secure a positive answer from the Loans Committee. Deploying a member of the Greek parliament as guarantor for a loan with "social" character, means that political and social influences were playing an important role in the process of the loan agreement. Dimitrios Vitkatsis would not have been able to agree a loan otherwise as the value of his private property was low. As a result, the social character of these loans (as it is mentioned in the law 1170 part 2) did not operate in the way intended.

The previous example demonstrates the great influence exerted by the guarantors in the loan's acceptance and processing. In some cases, the social status and the importance of the guarantor influenced the decisions of the Loans Committee. His social power, his job and mainly his large private property, contained elements of creditworthiness that the Committee was taking into serious consideration. A general assumption that can be made for the refugees coming from Bulgaria was that they helped one another in the situations when both of them wanted to agree a bank loan. Characteristic examples are the contracts 51520 and 51521 signed in 1918.¹⁵ The trader Theofillos Papatheofillou, from Stenimacho, managed to agree with NBG a loan of 5,000 drachmas (the highest lending amount) with private property of 150,000 drachmas in his town of origin. His guarantor Anastasios Bardas had also high collateral with a personal worth of more than 200,000 drachmas. On the same

14. *Ibid*, contract no. 51647.

15. *Ibid*, contract no. 51520 and 51521.

day, Anastasios Bardas, a landowner, agreed a loan of 5,000 drachmas with guarantor Theofillos Papatheofilou. A few months later, both of them are cited as guarantors to another compatriot, Konstandinos Papatheofilou. He was a bank employee, and his collateral had value of 30,000 drachmas. His collateral was small for the lending amount he was asking (5,000 drachmas), but he managed to secure a loan of 2,000 drachmas mainly because of the large collateral of his guarantors.¹⁶ This is a characteristic example of refugees supporting each other. By participating in a “borrowing link” they could increase their possibilities of securing a loan because their collateral could be counted together with that of their guarantors. As the value of the collateral was increasing, the lending amount was growing too.

Faidra Papadopoulou managed to secure a loan from NBG only because of her guarantor. Without any employment and with collateral of only 25,000 drachmas, she agreed a loan of 4,000 drachmas. The agreed amount was about two or three times what she could have taken without the financial power of her guarantor, Chressoula Nikolaidou. Although she was widowed and unemployed, she had private property worth 500,000 drachmas, as much as the whole lending amount that refugees from Bulgaria had to share.¹⁷

After studying of the mentioned contracts, it can be observed that when the borrower and the guarantor had collateral of high value, the first could easily secure the highest lending amount of 5,000 drachmas. Another similar example are the contracts 51533 and 51534, in which Konstandinos Xanthos, lawyer, with private collateral of 150,000 drachmas, guaranteed to Ioannis Varveris, trader, with collateral 240,000 drachmas and conversely.¹⁸


Collaboration systems have been observed not only between the rich refugees but also to those from the lowest social groups. They collaborated with each other in order to sign a loan, because their private property was of small value. Through this collaboration

16. *Ibid*, contract no. 51603.

17. *Ibid*, contract no. 51546 and 51544.

18. *Ibid*, contract no. 51533 and 51534.

they managed to agree small but vital significance loans for them. On 1919, Kalliarchos Chatzimitriadis and Sotirios Botzolis, occupied as hairdresser and employee respectively, guaranteed for another refugee Apostolis Iordannou in order to agree a small loan of 1,000 drachmas. The value of the guarantor's property was 10,000 and 14,200 drachmas accordingly. With the sum of it (24,200) Apostolis Iordanou managed to secure this small loan. Accordingly, the guarantors of this case became the borrowers by agreeing smaller amounts of 600 and 500 respectively.¹⁹




Regarding the occupations that the refugees from Bulgaria were holding, we can observe a differentiation on urban and non-urban occupations. The majority of the refugees who requested a loan from the Loans Committee were unemployed women, occupied as housekeepers. A big percentage of this refugees' group were declared unemployed. In the signed contracts, 20% of the occupations were urban. In this category there were civil employees, workers, chemists and barbers. Then there were the landowners and the traders, with 17 and 15% respectively. An equal number consisted from bank employees and law students. According to this data, a general observation could show that borrowers came from all the social and

19. Ibid, contract no. 52103, 52103, 52104.

working classes, without though being treated in the same way from the bank. According to their solvency provided, they secured their lending amount. It is interesting that although this group of refugees had settled in big Greek cities, a significant percentage of them used to practice urban occupations. Probably these people belonged to the category of those who did not manage to secure land for cultivation in an urban area, and had to settle in a city.

However, it appears that the occupation of the borrower had a direct influence in the lending amount. It has been observed that in occupations such as traders, landowners and lawyers, because of their high liquidity in their monthly salary, the NBG granted highest loans. In contrast, occupations such as workers and civil employees were granted almost four times lower amounts. This happened because in the first case the bank could secure its profits easily. Workers and civil employees did not earn enough money to have savings or liquidity. The nature of their occupation was in the lower/middle class, which was struggling to cover even daily needs.




Analyzing the information from this pie chart, it appears that the unemployed (33%) were granted amounts up to 2,000 drachmas while the traders (13%) and the landowners (6%) granted from

4,000 to 5,000 drachmas. Workers (21%) and widows (15%) borrowed amounts up to 1,000 drachmas. The amounts agreed in the unemployed can be justified from their real estate (land and houses) or guarantors with large collateral. In this way they managed to agree loans in better conditions from what predicted.

Generally, it has been observed that Greek refugees from Bulgaria were holding real estate of high value, such as cultivated land or houses and shops. The estimation and the cost of this collateral proved that they were trustworthy to the bank and according to the worth of the collateral they could secure a certain amount of loan. The bank was thus secured its profits and the borrower the lending amount.

The grant of loans to employees and small traders was mainly to cover temporary and daily needs. The collateral of them did not exceed the amount of 10,000 to 12,000 drachmas and with this amount could not secure them a loan higher than 1,000 drachmas. In most of cases, they agreed small loans of 500 to 600 drachmas.

Another piece of information that can be analyzed from the study of the contracts is the time period of the loan agreements. In this folder, the majority of the loans were signed in 1918, just after the vote of the Law 1170. A smaller number were signed in 1919 and just a few of them in 1920. The following bar chart shows the differences. It is logical to have more signed contracts during the first two years of the loan agreement between the National Bank of Greece and the Greek state. In this period of time refugees were flocking to the Loans Committee as soon as they could, in order to be benefited from this financial help. In about 1920 the reserved lending amount had reduced and fewer and fewer refugees managed to secure a loan.



Section 2: The Greek refugees from Romania.

Immigrants and refugees, (in smaller numbers than from Bulgaria)²⁰ came to Greece from Romania.²¹ Because of their small number (about 50,000), the National Bank of Greece, in collaboration with the “Committee on loans to the refugees from Romania”, offered the smallest capital- fund loan (300,000 drachmas, almost half times lower than the sum which they offered to the Greek refugees from Bulgaria).²² Forty-one saved contracts for the refugees from Romania in the National Bank of Greece Archive are and they have all been examined.

The administration period of these loans was 1918 to 1919. The data under examination relates to refugees from Romania after World War I started. The small number of these refugees made

20. Romanian refugees were 50,000, Bulgarian refugees 300,000, Asia Minor refugees 1,100,000.

21. Veremis Ath.-Koliopoulos J., *Greece: The Modern Sequel*, Kastaniotis, Athens 2006 (in Greek), pp. 178-179.


22. The NBG gave the loans according to the moved population. As a result, because of their small number, refugees from Romania had to share the smallest amount of money, compared with those coming from Bulgaria and Asia Minor. The amounts were distributed as followed: Refugees from East Thrace, 500,000 drachmas, Refugees from Bulgaria, 500,000 drachmas, Refugees from Asia Minor, 500,000 drachmas, Refugees from Romania 300,000 drachmas. NBG Archive.

their settlement easier and less painful for the Greek state as it could cover by itself and with NBG help, all their urgent needs. Also this group of refugees benefited more from the NBG because at the time when they signed their loans, the NBG had a surplus of funds. The bank could thus lend them money easily, compared with after 1920 when its funds were much more restricted.

The analysis of the refugees' contracts throws up some interesting conclusions. Through their occupations, it is clear that they belonged to different social groups. Some of them were very wealthy and they had managed to secure deposits in their local banks. Others were from the middle class, with occupations such as landowners, workers in public services, students at university etc. Regarding this refugees' group from Romania, people coming from the lower class do not appear in the contracts. Their number is very small and only three workers come from this group. They did not have private property, even less a creditworthy guarantor to sign for them.

The following piece of evidence comes from folder 20 of the National Bank of Greece Historical Archives entitled "The loans of the NBG to the refugees from Romania, guaranteed by the Hellenic state: Contracts 1918-1925".²³ The refugees who had contracted these banking loans were mostly from the areas of Bucharest, Galatsio, Konstantza, Soulina and Braila.

23. Historical Archive of the National Bank of Greece, EAII Archive, A1, L10, S59, F20.



The bar chart above shows the professional occupation of the Greek refugees from Romania before their arrival in Greece. The majority of them were merchants and landowners. This explains the location that they chose after their arrival in Greece, which was Athens and Epirus, because of the good trade links of the former and the land for cultivation that the second one offered. Unemployed and renters show a smaller part and finally different kinds of mainly non-urban occupations represents the lowest percentage.

Two main features differentiate the Greek refugees from Romania from all the other refugees. First, they named as guarantors illustrious persons within the society to which they belonged. Second, they had bank deposits in their accounts, which naturally enabled them to obtain loans more easily. The high percentage of unemployed is worthy of mention. In this category were mainly widows who had to take care of their children and other women who were housekeepers. Mainly it is a group of females as only two men are including in this category.

Another piece of information that is included in the contracts were the reasons that forced these refugees to move to Greece. Firstly, they were historical reasons, and then the personal ones created by the political and social conditions of the period. The case of I. Efstathiades shows the reasons that forced him to move to

Greece²⁴ I. Efstathiades, was a trader from Bucharest, who settled with his family in Athens in 1915. He explains that the reasons that pressed him to move were the persecution of the Greeks by the Bulgarians and the interruption of transport between Thessaloniki and Romania, where he had developed trade relations. These actions resulted from the fact that Bulgaria had decided to abandon neutrality and to participate in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. Because of his great economic distress and his inability to take money from his place of origin, Efstathiades was forced to ask for a loan from the NBG in order to make ends meet for his family. In order to achieve this goal, he listed as guarantor, Luke Flamin (who was mentioned in the official documents), a member of congress from Patras. Additionally, for solvency purposes, he listed in every detail not only his financial situation, but also that of his wife.

Some refugees, although they did not have a specific occupation which could bring them a monthly income, managed to gain loans on good conditions. Such an example is the contract of a refugee woman, Evelyn Paxinou, who came from Ithaca. Although she was just a housekeeper, she secured a loan of 5000 drachmas (the highest amount that the bank could lend to a refugee), because she had some 100,000 francs in a Romanian bank account. Furthermore, in her application to the bank, she mentioned her little daughter Magdalena, who also had in her name 150.000 francs of collateral, but because she was a minor and could not apply, the mother asked the Committee to add in the total borrowing amount a sum for her.²⁵

Bank deposits (90.000 francs) were held by another Greek refugee from Romania, named Ioannis Sismanis. He was a renter, who, in order to ensure the largest possible amount from the bank,²⁶ added as a guarantor a very rich person, with the biggest collateral discovered in the whole archival material.²⁷ Through these examples,

24. *Ibid.*, A1, L10, S59, F20, contract 50899.

25. *Ibid.*, A1, L10, S59, F20, contract 50901.

26. The amounts were varied from 500 drachmas to 5,000 drachmas according to the renters collateral.

27. *Ibid.*, A1, L10, S59, F20, contract 50904.

it become obvious that, refugees who had bank deposits could easily secure a loan with better conditions, than someone who did not. Here is a small extract of a contract referring to deposits in Romanian banks that Greek refugees were holding:²⁸

οικονομική δυσχέρεια καὶ πρὸς ὑνακούρισιν ταύτης
 ζητῶν τὴν χορήγησιν προσωρινῆς δανείου κατὰ τὴν ἐγγύ-
 ρησιν τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ συμφώνου τῆς ἐσχάτης ψηφισθέντι νό-
 μῳ. - Ἡ περιουσία μου συγκροτεῖται ἐκ μετρητῶν περὶ
 τὰς 60 χιλιάδας δραχμῶν κατατεθειμένων εἰς τὴν ἐρ-
 γασίαν τοῦ θείου μου Γ. Γ. Σφέλου.

I'm asking for a temporary banking loan due to my bad financial situation with the guarantee of the Greek state according to the latest voted law. My property has value of 60,000 drachmas which has been deposited to the job of my uncle G. G. Sfalos.

Contracts of great interest are those referring to the Greek refugees from Romania originating from the Greek part of Epirus and mainly from the areas of Zagori, Pogonio, Konitsa and Labovo.²⁹ The majority were landowners and merchants and they represent a large proportion of the total signed contracts. They secured loans from 2000 drachmas up to 5000. Collaborating traders used each other as guarantors for their loans. Most of them settled in the villages of Epirus, from where they had originated. They often appeared at the Banking Loans Commission with certificates of their local municipality and the archdiocese of Ioannina, in order to prove their place of origin. As the first director of the National Bank of Greece, George Stavrou came from Epirus, and refugees from the same place of origin, and especially Ioannina, thought that


28. Abstract from the contract of Nick Dimitratos. Ibid, A1, L10, S59, F20, contract 50933.

29. These refugees had Epirus as place of origin before they moved to Romania. All their relatives remained in these villages.

they should benefit from this fact. These types of benefits can be partly seen in the contract number 8725 of Ioannis Matsopoulos.³⁰ In his contract, there is evidence that he knew one employee of the NBG branch in Ioannina, from whom he received a creditworthiness certificate to ensure a successful application.

In terms of the amounts that the Greek refugees from Romania were borrowing from the NBG, a careful observation can show that small amounts do not exist at all, something that does not happen regarding the Greek refugees from Bulgaria. The smallest amount that they were receiving was 1000 drachmas, an appreciable amount for this time. The explanation is that most of them had collateral of high value, and as already mentioned, deposits in Romanian banks.

The following chart presents a more complete picture.³¹



30. Ibid, A1, L10, S59, F20, contract 8725.

31. Data from Historical Archive of the National Bank of Greece, EAII Archive, A1, L10, S59, F20.

On the other hand, moderate amounts cover the biggest percentage of this chart. This fact can prove that Greek refugees from Romania mostly had an appreciable number of properties which enabled them agree a loan with the bank. Furthermore, as a studied group of people, it appears that their financial situation was more or less the same.

Also, in order for them to agree the preferable amount, a significant role played the certificates that some of them managed to receive from popular and respected people in their local community. For example, Vasiliki Kotsi, a housekeeper, managed to agree a loan of 5,000 drachmas because she had as guarantor the director of the Greek Ministry of Health, Christos Stefanopoulos.³² Although Miss Kotsi had a significant collateral, she used Mr Stefanopoulos and his power in order to ensure the highest lending amount. But during the study, it has been observed another kind of certificate too. A few refugees were taking certificates from the Greek state in order to prove that they belonged to a certain municipality or even to prove their age.³³ Generally, refugees from Romania tried to take advantage of every kind of contact they had in order to submit certificates in the Committee of Loans.

Comparing the information coming after the study of the folder 20 and 21 of the National Bank of Greece, it is observed a main difference between the refugees coming from Bulgaria and these coming from Romania. Refugees from Bulgaria were more numerous from these coming from Romania, but the majority of them were borrowing amounts less than 2,000 drachmas. They had as private property mainly cultivated land. In 80% of contract cases, they were using their fellow villagers as guarantors in order to agree the loan. These guarantors had high collateral and they possibly helped more than one person. The person who at first was the borrower became the guarantor of his guarantor when the second wanted also to agree a bank loan. By this way it created a lending network between the refugees coming from Bulgaria. On the other

32. Historical Archive of the National Bank of Greece, F20, contract no. 50928.

33. *Ibid*, F20, e.g. contracts no. 50933, 50984.

hand, refugees coming from Romania were richest as the majority of them hold deposits in Romanian bank accounts and for this reason they borrowed bigger amounts from the NBG.

Anna Efstathiadou

Australian Official War Photography from the Campaign in Greece, 1941

War images report topics that vary from extreme conflict and issues of life and death to everyday experiences that shape the lives of those involved in the conflict. Capitalist and industrial societies need large amounts of images as a “spectacle (for masses) and as an object of surveillance (for rulers)”, explains Susan Sontag, allowing the governments to distribute information that channels official views.¹ Media representations of war, Michael Griffin adds, “inevitably reflect cultural perspectives and reproduce traditions of cultural representations... invok[ing] notions of ethnic identity and nationalist mythology”.² They construct images of war by perpetuating or by adding new layers on specific themes of nationhood that inspire enlistment, boost morale and justify the involvement in the war. They also inform us about the extent of official censorship on wartime photography, which, as Prue Torney–Parlicki notes in the case of Australia, restricted and warned professional and amateur photographers about taking images that “could prejudice the effective prosecution of the war”.³

By the time of the Second World War, photography was an established medium synonymous with modernity and technological advances, and an integral part of the propaganda machine. It was assisted by the popularity of the cinemas where Movietone and Cinesound newsreels were projecting world news, the rise of ‘pic-

1. Susan Sontag, *On Photography*, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1978, p. 178.

2. Michael Griffin, “Media Images of War”, *Media, War & Conflict* 3.1 (2010), 7-8.

3. Prue Torney–Parlicki, “‘Grave Security Obligations’: The Australian Government’s refusal to Accredite Newspaper Photographers to Combat Areas During the Second World War”, *War & Society* 16.1 (May 1998), 109.

ture magazines' describing the events of the war, and other contemporary visual media, such as propaganda posters, advertising and commercial posters. In Australia, war photography was commissioned by a number of state institutions that had their own agenda and purpose, aiming to create images that perpetuated a sense of national belonging and nation-building. Photography "immediately became the subject of debates concerning its aesthetic status and social uses",⁴ and a main concern was how photography was used by military institutions and the government to record and promote the war back home. Official Second World War Australian war photographers constructed culturally specific representations, aiming to balance elements of photo-realism and documentary recording with the guidelines given to them by the institutions (government, army, press) that had commissioned them to do the job. Equally, since this visual material drew public attention, its controlled selection and circulation was required in order to communicate official views, to influence public opinion and to promote public support for war policies.

This paper discusses selected commissioned photographs, currently housed in the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, from the ill-fated 1941 campaign in Greece, which resulted in heavy losses for the 6th Australian and the 2nd New Zealand Divisions and whose success was seriously questioned at the time.⁵ Numerous scholars have examined Australian Second World War photography, either in a secondary role, visually supporting their historical accounts on specific battles and events of the war,⁶ or as part of

4. Liz Wells, *Photography: A Critical Introduction*, Routledge, London & New York 1996, p. 12.

5. Historians strongly believe that there was no certainty of success in the campaigns in Greece and Crete, questioning the decision of Australian and New Zealand leaders to follow Churchill's order and send their troops. See Maria Hill, *Diggers and Greeks: The Australian Campaigns in Greece and Crete*, UNSW Press, Sydney 2010; Peter Thompson–Anzac Fury, *The Bloody Battle of Crete 1941*, William Heinemann, North Sydney, NSW 2010); Peter Ewer, *Forgotten Anzacs: The Campaign in Greece 1941*, Scribe, Melbourne 2008.

6. Hill, *Diggers and Greeks*, *op.cit.*

their analysis of war imagery produced in Australia from 1939-1945.⁷ However, none of those works has specifically focused on the rich photographic material taken by the two official war photographers who covered the particular campaign, the Australian Damien Parer and the New Zealander George Silk, both working for the Australian Department of Information (DOI). The historical analysis of the Greek campaign, as part of the history of the Australian photography at war, is particularly lacking and this study fills the void.

It examines the photographic representation of the image of the Australian soldier during the short-lived campaign in Greek mainland, analysing photographs of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force soldiers merging into Greek culture, interacting with the locals in cities and villages, both at leisure and whilst marching to the front. It argues that there was a gradual change in their imagery as the photographers followed the members of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) from the cities to the frontline, moving from the strictly official constructions and ideological imaginings of the military requested by the DOI to personal and touching images of civilians badly affected by the horrors of war. The paper concludes that the conflicting agendas between the Army (Directory of Public Relations or DPR), the Department of Information and the press, in regard to producing images that could be used both as records and as publicity material,⁸ and the censorship exercised by the state to block the circulation of visual material that could impact on re-

7. Fay Anderson–Richard Trembath, *Witness to War: The History of Australian Conflict Reporting*, Melbourne University Press, Carlton Melbourne 2011; Shaune Lakin, *Contact: Photographs from the Australian War Memorial Collection*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra 2006; Neil McDonald, *War Camera-man: The Story of Damien Parer*, A Lothian Book, Melbourne 1994; Charles Meeking, *Pictorial History of Australians at War 1939-45*, Vol. II Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1957.

8. Ian Jackson, “‘Duplication, Rivalry and Friction’: The Australian Army, the Government and the Press during the Second World War”, paper given in the Conference Information Warfare: Shaping the Stories of Australians at War, 25-26 November 2010, University of New South Wales, ADFA Canberra.

cruitment rates or British-Australian relations led to a limited exposure and analysis of photographs taken during the Greek campaign. The purpose of Australian Second World War official photography was to construct images of the adventurous, easy-going and courageous soldiers of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force that should boost recruitment and justify the involvement of Australia in the war, sealing the fact that the specific campaign was a gamble and a costly operation for the Anzacs.⁹

Australian photography in the Second World War: institutions and purposes

The Second World War brought the broadening of Australian state institutions in charge of the photographic record of war, whose evidence, as Caroline Brothers explains, “has little to do with its particular content, or with any notion of photographic truth”, but instead with “the ideological currents which produced it and the collective imagination it inflected and to which it contributed”.¹⁰

Official war photographers were commissioned to create images to boost mobilisation and recruitment, also dealing with a contradictory brief from the official institutions in relation to war coverage. As during the Second World War there was compulsory military service for duty within the country but no conscription for service overseas, major functions of the images produced as part of the DOI campaigns were to encourage recruitment for service abroad and to boost the morale of the Australian public. Even though in February 1943 the government passed a bill that defined ‘Australia’ “in such a way as to include New Guinea and the adjacent islands”, therefore “obliging soldiers in the Citizen Military

9. “The term ‘Anzac’ ... refers to a particular kind of military formation –an army corps of two or more divisions, and under this way, an Anzac corps has been established only twice– at Gallipoli and, less famously, in Greece”. In Ewer, *Forgotten Anzacs*, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

10. Caroline Brothers, *War and Photograph: A Cultural History*, Routledge, New York 1997, pp. 185, 190.

Force (CMF) to serve in this region known as the South-West Pacific Area",¹¹ it was only towards the end of the war that obligatory conscription for the men of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) for service abroad was introduced. Men who joined the AIF during the war for service in Europe and the Middle East were volunteers.

In the photographic frenzy of the early 1940s, around 121 official photographers and cinematographers were charged with the task of collating a historical record on behalf of the Australian War Memorial. Twenty-seven were employed by the Australian Department of Information (DOI) and the remaining 94 were appointed to various military historical sections.¹² By the end of 1941, there were already two separate official organisations with opposing functions taking, collecting and releasing photographs in Australia. The first was the DOI, established in September 1939 by Robert Menzies, and charged with controlling the censorship of all media. The DOI was also responsible for "the distribution of films, posters and photos, editorial material to local and overseas media, and the maintenance of public morale".¹³ The DOI used photographs for propaganda purposes, showing the bravery, determination and readiness of Australian soldiers, introducing the foreign terrain, the enemies and the allies to Australians at home, and, ultimately, aiming to stimulate support for the war, attract volunteers and encourage recruitment. The second institution was the ex-War Records Section, becoming in 1941 the Military History and Information Section (MHIS) of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) in the Middle East, and from 1942 onwards, the Military History Section of the Australian Military Force (AMF).¹⁴ Its main function was to collect material for the Australian War Memorial, treating photographs as army historical records. Apart from the two differ-

11. <http://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopaedia/conscription> (accessed November 2012).

12. Norman Bartlett, *Pictorial History of Australia at War 1939-45*, Vol. I, Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1958, pp. 7-8.

13. John Hilvert, *Blue Pencil Warriors: Censorship and Propaganda in WWII*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland 1984, p. 3.

14. Bartlett, *Pictorial History of Australia, op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 5-6.

ent objectives, which required different skills, techniques and standards, the absence of collaboration between the two sections led to an eventful relationship throughout the war. Finally, in early 1942 the army established the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR), whose photographers treated photographs both “as historical records and as propaganda”.¹⁵

Within this framework of conflicting agendas, Damien Parer and George Silk were sent to cover the Middle East-Mediterranean theatre of war. Parer was an experienced photographer and documentary filmmaker whose work reflected commercial and avant-gard influences inspired by Charles Chauvel, Max Dupain and John Grierson, whereas Silk was a young sports photographer from New Zealand whose appointment to the DOI was criticised by the Australian Journalists Association.¹⁶ The two men were commissioned to collect material that “would be used where practicable, and subject to censorship, for publicity purposes and then passed to the Australian War Memorial for preservation as historical records”.¹⁷ The complex nature of their assignment and the involvement of the state agencies led to the poor distribution of their war photography.¹⁸ Although Parer was primarily a cameraman while Silk mainly shot stills, there was not a clear distinction between images taken for the newsreels and stills, as frame enlargements from Parer’s films regularly appeared in newspapers and magazines. As a result, Parer’s newsreel footage was widely used in cinemas, but only a small number of Silk’s still photographs were selected by newspaper editors for publication in newspapers and magazines within Australia, such as the photo-magazine *Pix*. The fact that

15. <http://www.awm.gov.au/publications/contact/photographers> (assessed November 2013).

16. Lakin, *Contact: Photographs, op.cit.*, pp. 106-7.

17. Lakin, *Contact: Photographs, op.cit.*, p. 106.

18. Edward Louis Vickery, *Telling Australia’s Story to the World: The Department of Information 1939-1950*, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2003. Vickery explains that there were disputes between the Army, the Government and the Press which contributed to the poor distribution and dissemination of propaganda material.

“over 100,000 official photographs, and many hours of film” were produced by different government agencies, but only a tiny proportion of this material was ever made available to the press during the war,¹⁹ suggests a fault in the organisation of the propaganda machine in Australia which involved a large number of institutions with competing demands. This inefficiency was manifested in the limited exposure and circulation of propaganda material, and especially photography, in the Australian press.

The campaign in Greece and propaganda photography

During the Second World War, Britain had committed to send assistance to Greece which was at war with Italy from October 1940. Despite Australia voicing its concerns about the uncertain success of this mission, focusing on the disproportionately small numbers of the allied forces in comparison to the enemy and weaknesses in communications, anti-air craft defences and air support, by 27th March 1941 the 16th Brigade of the 6th Division of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2/AIF), the New Zealand Division and the United Kingdom troops arrived in Greece.²⁰ Although Australian and New Zealand military units went to Greece “under their own banners”, they reunited for second and last time, forming the Anzac Corps.²¹

The government had to instil patriotism in order to get high recruitment figures and an obvious choice was to draw on a previous tested pattern, the recruitment efforts of the First World War and the similarities between the 1st and the 2nd AIF. The 6th Division, the first division to be raised, was manned from the early AIF recruits, “the so-called ‘thirty-niners’”, aware of the legacy of their predecessors and determined to “live up to the standards” they had

19. Jackson, “Duplication, Rivalry and Friction”, *op.cit.*

20. Meeking, *Pictorial History of Australians*, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 8-10.

21. Ewer, *Forgotten Anzacs*, *op.cit.*

set.²² Peter Secules states that as “the sons of Anzacs were off to the Middle East again”, the government, the military and the media relied on similar themes to those used in the First World War coverage.²³ However, even though official photographers and the press used photographs from the First World War alongside those of the Second in order to underline the similarity of the first contingent, developments in contemporary documentary practice and the emergence of newsreels and photo-magazines influenced the style and technique of Second World War media coverage, also allowing Parer and Silk to express their personal and not only the official line. Damien Parer was apprenticed as a photographer and worked in Sydney with the director Charles Chauvel and with the still photographer Max Dupain. As a result, his work was influenced by the style of his contemporary Australians in motion pictures and stills, who favoured landscapes and sunlight, and his own personal preference for documentary realism and “the notion of the photograph or film as a true picture of its subject”.²⁴ George Silk understood his role as an official war photographer as ‘a crusade’ with the purpose “to reveal truths about the world and mobilise action”, and consequently his competency in the use of small and medium format cameras and his reputation as a sports photographer allowed him to produce some of the best photographs taken during the war.²⁵

As soon as the news of the Greek expedition came up, Silk and Parer secured permission to sail for Greece. The light and clarity of the atmosphere and the beauty of the Greek landscape captured the

22. Jeffrey Grey, *The Australian Army*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, pp. 114-15.

23. Peter Secules, “‘Everything, in fact, except respect’: The Military and Media Department of Information during the Second World War”, in *The Military, the Media & Information Warfare*, eds. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Australian Military History Publications Canberra 2009, p. 65.

24. Lakin, *Contact: Photographs, op.cit.*, p. 107; Williams Maslyn, “My friend [Damien] Parer”, *Eureka Street* 4.9 (November 1994), 10-15.

25. <https://www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/focus/george-silk.asp> (accessed 26 October 2014).

two artists, along with other members of the Australian team, especially when compared with the hot, dull and dry desert. Chester Wilmot, the official war correspondent of the Australian Broadcasting Commission for the campaign, who was travelling for the most part with Silk and Parer, favourably referred to their arrival in Greece as ‘a relief’: to be “in a country with trees and grass; mountains and streams. ... a new world where people wave to you as you go by ... a country where the people round you are also ... fighting for the same cause”.²⁶ The Australian government organised the coverage of the Greek campaign with the propaganda purpose of persuading the Australian public that “here was a people worth fighting for, regardless of the odds Australian soldiers had against them”.²⁷ Although the Australian troops’ contact with the Greeks was mainly at the battlefield whilst fighting the Italians in northern Greece and later on in Crete, the main preoccupation of the Australian government was to convey through the propaganda photographs “a positive impression of the Allied presence in Greece to the people back home”.²⁸

This was evidenced in a number of images taken by Silk and Parer while Anzacs were stationed in Athens, and which complied with the conventions of tourist photography, focusing on history, geography, culture and the culinary specialities of the chosen destination. The theme of the Australian soldier as tourist in foreign lands had been inherited from the War Memorial’s First World War official photography scheme, and it was still popular in recruitment campaigns organised by DOI. It highlighted the perspective of travelling and adventure, an appealing incentive for those young Australians who were contemplating joining the services, but it also reflected the way the Australian administrative machine was operating. In particular, it manifested the fact that the DOI had its roots in the pre-WWI Department of External Affairs, which “regularly

26. Neil McDonald, *Chester Wilmot Reports: Broadcasts that Shaped World War II*, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Sydney 2004, p. 112.

27. Hill, *Diggers and Greeks*, *op.cit.*, p. 132.

28. Hill, *Diggers and Greeks*, *op.cit.*, pp. 134-5.

produced photographs to publicise Australia as a tourist destination”.²⁹ Moreover, technological advances that allowed the incorporation of photographs within posters, clearly marked similarities between tourist posters advertising holiday destinations and military recruitment posters showing Australian soldiers enjoying themselves in foreign lands.³⁰

During the first few days of recovery from the Middle East theatre of war, the troops spent their time in leisure walks and sightseeing around historical sites in Athens. Parer and Silk stood by their side, recording the moves of the Australian soldiers in a number of locations in the Greek capital, posing with and interacting with Greek soldiers and civilians. Soldiers were photographed next to monuments such as the Acropolis, on city streets, within landscapes such as the mountainous front line, next to the local people, revealing that they were part of this far away setting that made them feel welcome. Showing soldiers sightseeing abroad enabled Australians at home to visually share and access the lives and adventures of their compatriots in Greece, at the same time generating effective propaganda images for publicity that aimed to boost recruitment and embrace virtues of the 1st AIF, such as mateship, courage and love for adventure.



Figure 1. George Silk, Athens. *Australian troops at the Acropolis*, black and white photograph, March 1941. Australian War Memorial, AWM006840.

29. Vickery, *Telling Australia's Story*, *op.cit.*, p. 47.

30. One such example is the recruitment poster “*Make dad proud to say ... My boy ...in the East' – JOIN THE AIF*” (ARTV04332). The photograph (007786) was taken in 1941 in Alexandria where Australians, New Zealanders, British and Greek troops arrived after their evacuation from Crete.

George Silk's *Athens. Australian troops at the Acropolis* (figure 1) visually communicates this fusion of the diggers into European culture and civilisation, surrounded by ancient Greek ruins, and invokes a legacy that dates back to Charles Bean, the official war historian of the Australian War Memorial. Bean had been inspired in his configuration of Australian national history and the military commemoration of the AIF by the Athenian democratic model, which openly commemorated the war dead in public events.³¹ As Fiona Nicoll points out, antiquities, as national 'relics' excavated by men of the AIF in Syria and Palestine during the First World War, boosted associations of the image of the digger as builder of this modern nation which was trying to define itself in relation to the already established European civilisation.³² To this end, the places in which Silk chose to photograph the Australian soldiers were easily recognisable landmarks of well known civilisations, manifesting the Memorial's intention to instil through these photographs the rich history of other cultures within the newly fabricated image of the Australian nation which lacked this kind of cultural heritage. Richard White, writing about diggers abroad during the First World War, also comments on that element of 'cultural dependence' in a "journey from the provincial" and newly formed Australia to civilised, older, deeply-historical Europe.³³ Photographs shot in ancient sites not only validate White's point, but they also confirm Australia's justified involvement in this war, as a loyal and reliable ally who showed respect for Greece's cultural heritage. A number of shots have been taken by Silk showing Australian soldiers around the Acropolis, with titles that vary from "At the Acropolis, Australian troops look around (AWM006831)" to "Australian troops inside the Parthenon (AWM006835)" and "Con-

31. Peter Londey, "A Possession for Ever: Charles Bean, the Ancient Greeks and Military Commemoration in Australia", *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 53.3 (2007), 345.

32. Fiona Nicoll, *From Diggers to Drag Queens: Configurations of Australian National Identity*, Pluto Press, Annandale, NSW 2001, p. 24.

33. Richard White, "The Soldier as a Tourist: The Australian Experience of the Great War", *War & Society* 5.1 (May 1987), 65.

trast between the modern Australian and the ancient Greece (AWM 006838)”, to name only a few. All the images metaphorically underline their presence in the land of ancient heroes, suggesting an instant association of the qualities of gallantry, and the epic even superhuman prowess of the Homeric Greek characters with the modern Australian. These photographs, products of organised state propaganda, perpetuate representations of Greece founded on the classical ideals of the Athenian democracy inspired by re-constructed traditions and symbols used to support western political ideas and interests since the philhellenic representations of the Greek War of Independence in 1821.³⁴

Another characteristic of the men of the 2nd AIF photographed by Silk and Parer is that they not only inhabited the new destination as visitors, but also interacted within it with the local population. In a number of shots, Australian soldiers are shown looking at something, assuming the strangeness and otherness of the Greeks and their culture, while in others they become active participants, sharing everyday habits and routines with the locals. In this particular context, Silk’s photographs represent the Greek ally as ‘the other’, creating new configurations in the relationship between Australians and Greeks, of visitor and host, observer and participant. The lines in these polarities, however, were often crossed as the Australians not only interacted but even become part of the host community, recorded by Silk’s camera in a documentary way that blends the Australian soldiers with both the Greek army and the civilians.

34. Anna Efstathiadou, “Representing Greekness: French and Greek Lithographs from the Greek War of Independence (1821-27) and the Greek-Italian War (1940-41)”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 29.2 (2011), 191-218.



Figure 2: George Silk, Athens.
All good friends together. Greek soldiers on leave from Albania do their best to make the Australians welcome. There is a new optimism evident in Athens since the arrival of our troops who are being welcomed like honoured guests. As far as our men are concerned their general opinion is that Greece is the finest country in the world – bar one. March 1941. Australian War Memorial, AWM 006809.

In figure 2, the Australian troops relax and share a drink with their allies before they all make their way to the mountains of northern Greece. The propaganda purpose of the image is evident as the caption stresses the important role undertaken by of the 2/AIF to stand by the side of their allies at this decisive moment of the war:

All good friends together. Greek soldiers on leave from Albania do their best to make the Australians welcome. There is a new optimism evident in Athens since the arrival of our troops who are being welcomed like honoured guests. As far as our men are concerned their general opinion is that Greece is the finest country in the world – bar one.

As Neil McDonald and Peter Brune explain in relation to captions, the photographers had to fill in a dope sheet along with the image upon dispatch to the DOI.³⁵ They had to describe the photo, giving it a title or a caption, and mention when and where the se-

35. Neil McDonald–Peter Brune, *200 Shots: Damien Parer, George Silk and the Australians at War in New Guinea*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW 1998, p. vi.

quences were taken. Shaune Lakin adds that quite often there were two captions per image, especially by the Military History photographers, one comprehensive and accurate for the record, with the “phraseology of the official document”, and another one shorter and catchier for photographs aimed for the press.³⁶ The message in this particular photograph is strengthened by the Australian soldier on the left hand side who looks directly to the viewers, raising his glass and inviting them to join in this merry atmosphere. The photographer has positioned himself higher than his subjects to capture this dynamic image that focuses on a joyous moment of social interaction between Australians and Greeks. In an almost circular seating arrangement, the ‘circle of friends’ becomes a visual symbol that denotes feelings of warmth and protection, promoting a union based on the common goal of combating the Italian and German enemies.

Beyond encounters with the local people in the streets of Athens and other residential centres, Silk and Parer documented the journey of the Australian troops to the front line. On April 1941 Silk’s photographs depicted as realistically as possibly the difficult circumstances faced by the Australian soldiers on the Greek mountains. The pictorial account of landscape was a popular theme of official war photography, especially as the photographer aimed to provide a memorial record of the places where the Anzacs fought and lost their lives. For the government and the press, there was a fine line in getting the balance right between the naivety of pictorialism and the factualness of a snapshot able “to fix an epic”, to represent the war as “a subject matter of an advertising campaign”.³⁷ Greece was not an exception, and the photographers had to produce

36. Lakin, *Contact: Photographs, op.cit.*, p. 113. As most of the original captions have been destroyed after being transcribed into the caption books by the DOI in the 1940s, it is sometimes the dates that indicate when the negatives actually arrived at DOI’s offices.

37. John Taylor, *War Photography. Realism in the British Press*, Routledge, London and New York 1991, pp. 52-3.

propaganda images highlighting the strength and courage of the soldiers. The conditions were trying with the snow and the narrow winding roads through the mountains, and donkeys were the most reliable means of transport.



Figure 3: George Silk, Greece *Three diggers use donkeys as their means of transport along the mountainous roads*. Negative, April 1941. Australian War Memorial, AWM 006714.

The caption to the photograph (figure 3–006714) reads *Three diggers use donkeys as their means of transport along the mountainous roads*, and aims to record the actual conditions of the march to the front. The photograph is divided into two sections. The top half is dominated by the imposing snow-tipped Greek mountains as a commanding background, the bottom half by the Anzacs riding donkeys. The depiction of the smiling soldiers indicated their persistence, endurance and adaptability to the new landscape and its conditions, making a perfect publicity shot. Silk's Second World War photographs, like official photographer Frank Hurley's First World War battlefield scenes,³⁸ transformed the European landscape in ways to suit specific Australian nationalist purposes. The Greek landscape exuded neither a sense of destruction nor of heroism. It was a picturesque, mostly pleasing landscape that drew associations between past and present. Mount Olympus, in particular, the ancient land of the Olympian gods, became a tem-

38. Rod Giblett, "Shooting the Sunburnt Country, the Land of Sweeping Plains, the Rugged Mountain Ranges: Australian Landscape and Wilderness Photography", *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 21.3 (September 2007), 339.

porary ‘home’ of the modern Anzacs. As a meaningful landmark, Mt Olympus also featured in Nazi visual propaganda. Official war photographer Heinz Franke recorded the ascent of a team of Nazi climbers and the raising of the swastika at the top of the mountain on 20 April 1941, the day of Hitler’s 52nd birthday.³⁹ The symbolic power of the specific topos proves that, like the Philhellenes, Australian and German propagandist images continue to revisit myths of Greek antiquity in their attempts to reconstruct their own culture and history.

Figure 3 also elicits strong associations with the First World War “Man with the Donkey”, Simpson Kirkpatrick, who was carrying the wounded soldiers from the trenches in Gallipoli. For Peter Cochrane “the Simpson legend”, which was manufactured by newspapers with the purpose of increasing recruitment rates, highlighted certain characteristics of the Australian soldier, such as “the individual initiative and resourcefulness of the digger”.⁴⁰ Although the role of the donkey in the photographs of the Greek campaign was mainly to underline the different terrain and the difficult conditions the troops had to endure, it continued to emphasise determination, stamina and mateship. What it is worth noting in propaganda war photography is the reconfiguration of themes and motifs used since the First World War and which successfully managed to promote specific characteristics of the Australian male, like his ingenuity, originality and adaptability in new situations.



Figure 4: Damien Parer, Greece *Australian Bren gun carrier going through the village of Daphni near Athens en route for the battle front.* Negative, April 1941. Australian War Memorial, AWM 006841.

39. Alkis Ksanthakis, *Photography and Propaganda: Propaganda Units of the German Army in Greece, 1941-1944*, Militos, Athens 2012, p. 67.

40. Peter Cochrane, *Simpson and the Donkey: The Making of a Legend*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1992, pp. 63, 70-71.

Apart from the interaction with the Greek troops, there is an extensive coverage of images documenting the contact of Australian soldiers with civilians in the streets of Athens and other residential centres. The photograph (figure 4–006841) by Damien Parer, taken in March 1941, depicts the Australians departing Athens and moving towards the front line. Australian soldiers are ‘riding’ the armoured fighting vehicle, portrayed in the roles of rescuers and envoys of a technologically advanced country that contributes to this war with the much needed manpower and ammunition. The sight of the tank does not generate feelings of fear and uneasiness to the civilians. On the contrary, Greek children look with curiosity at the men on the Bren Gun Carrier and even wave at them. The Second World War blurred the boundaries between combatants and civilians, allowing a much closer interaction than that of the First World War. The Australian army on its way to their positions in Northern Greece, and later as it withdrew, was in constant dealings with the civilians who were living in the small towns and villages along the route. This proximity with civilians changed, varied and enriched the objectives, styles and techniques of war photography, leading war photographers to pay attention both to the civilians and to the soldiers themselves in a number of engaging encounters. From that moment onwards, Silk and Parer follow documentary practices based on their personal taste in the depiction of this war. Although they are the official war photographers of the Greek campaign, they show an interest in life of the hospitable Greek people they meet on their way to the front. Wonderful shots between the soldiers and the civilians are artfully depicted in Silk’s images where the Australians show an interest in the way of life of the local people. The rural scenes with peasants dressed in traditional attire give information about the social and economic conditions outside the Greek capital. In figure 5, a shepherd wearing his winter gown appears to discuss with two Australian officers the intricate design of his traditional shepherd’s crook. The caption that accompanies that photograph underlines that relationship between the Australian army and the local people: *The lonely shepherds found the diggers good compa-*

ny. The diggers did not mind either as the shepherds were always able to produce fresh eggs from seemingly nowhere.



Figure 5: George Silk, Greece. *The lonely shepherds found the diggers good company. The diggers did not mind either as the shepherds were always able to produce fresh eggs from seemingly nowhere.* Australian War Memorial, AWM 007808.

Chester Wilmot, in a letter sent from the front on 16 April 1941, notes that the encounters with the villagers improved the Australian diet which was otherwise based on tinned bully-beef: “Nearly every little urchin who sidles up to you in the mountains produces an egg or two from the inner recesses of his baggy clothes. You can often swap half a dozen Army biscuits for a couple of eggs and for a tin of M&V you will get anything from six to ten eggs”.⁴¹ The photograph implies nostalgia for a world uncorrupted by industry and urbanisation, appealing to the viewers’ emotions and making the role of the Australian saviour/ally even stronger.

As the Anzacs move to the front, the pictorial account of the landscape and the content of photographs start losing their mellow and relaxing tone. The content changed radically by the time the Anzac troops made first contact with the Germans on 10 April 1941. The Greeks in Eastern Macedonia had surrendered on 9 April, after gallant resistance. The Greek resistance had collapsed by 10 April, after the Germans took the town of Florina, and the 12 and 20 Greek divisions started withdrawing from their current positions at Veria Pass. The photographer and the cinematographer found themselves in the middle of this mad rush of the allied forces to withdraw rapidly as the Germans were approaching. There was

41. McDonald, *Chester Wilmot Reports*, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

virtually no allied air cover and the Luftwaffe was harrying the troops, spreading fear and causing unruly behaviour during the withdrawal.⁴² The conditions were appalling, with main arterial roads full of traffic not only from trucks and military vehicles but also from refugees.



Figure 6: George Silk, Greece. Villagers congregated in Serbia, hoping to obtain transport to the South, and for protection from the German bombs and machine gunning. April 1941 Australian War Memorial, AWM 007618.



As seen in figure 6, Silk and Parer were touched by the drama of the refugees or as Fay Anderson and Richard Trembath explain, “although Greece was depicted as ‘an Anzac epic’, the coverage was marked by ...the impact of war on the civilian population”.⁴³ Silk’s photographs, and Parer’s films, captured some poignant and graphic images of civilians fleeing their homes, which contemporary commentators of propaganda photography compare with the powerful images of Robert Capa from the Spanish Civil War.⁴⁴ With their portable and small format cameras and through their sequential shooting –the two men rarely worked in the same location, covering action in a range of different set ups and numerous shots– they produced a series of images that visually narrated a specific event. This can be clearly seen in the following photographs taken

42. For a detailed account of the withdrawal and evacuation of the Anzac troops from Greece see Hill, *Diggers and Greeks*, *op.cit.*, pp. 88-123; and also *Active Service: with Australia in the Middle East*, Australian War Memorial, the Military History and Information Section, AIF, Canberra 1941.

43. Anderson–Trembath, *Witness to War*, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

44. McDonald, *War Cameraman*, *op.cit.*, p. 88.

by Silk, which show a group of villagers trying to find a safe place on the mountains to settle with their children.



Figures 7 and 8: George Silk, Greece.

They live among the crags. People of Greece who fled to the mountains for protection against the 'Huns'. April 1941 Australian War Memorial, AWM 007766, 07765.



Figure 9: George Silk, Greece.

This little boy took his pet goat to the mountains, when he fled for protection against the 'Huns'. April 1941 Australian War Memorial, AWM 007752.

The faces of the children and the detail of a boy carrying a religious icon, a remnant of his previous normal life, communicate powerful feelings. For Ally Roche, the recording of the human side of the war, of the displaced civilians, was not part of the brief supplied by DOI.⁴⁵ The attention paid by both Silk and Parer to the refugees show how the emotional side of the war affected them and

45. Ally Roche, "The Personal View," *Wartime* 54 (2011), 42.

encouraged them to give their own interpretations on the subject, even though they knew that their images would not be chosen for Australian publications, as they fuelled debates about the futility of the Greek campaign and the inability of the military and political leadership to stand up to British demands. Beyond the complex nature of their assignment and the involvement of two major state agencies that were controlling the distribution of official war photography, Silk himself suspected that the reason so few of his photographs were circulated in the Australian press was a combination of ‘institutional mismanagement’ and the DOI’s conservatism to repeat and promote specific themes and ways of depicting Australians at war.⁴⁶

Conclusion

Parer and Silk, the ANZAC corps, and British and Greek units evacuated from mainland Greece to the island of Crete, for the next phase of the war in Greece.⁴⁷ The campaign in Crete did not seem to be sufficiently sensual and appropriate for propaganda publicity photographs. Apart from Silk’s embarkation photographs of the troops arriving in and departing from Suda Bay in Crete, which followed the tradition of the embarkation theme from the First World War, there is not an official visual record of the efforts of the Australians on Crete during May 1941. This is a sign of the pressure put on official war photographers and the competing briefs they had been given. John Treloar argues that “the keen competition on the part of the press and newsreels to cater for the public’s growing appetite for sensation” made “the gulf between the two (historical record and publicity image) wider than it has ever been”.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the control exercised by state institutions to prevent the

46. Lakin, *Contact: Photographs, op.cit.*, p. 108.

47. Major-General B. Freyberg of New Zealand was in command of all troops on the island: “15,000 British, 7,000 New Zealanders, 6,500 Australians and 11,000 Greeks”. See Charles Meeking, *Pictorial History of Australia at War 1939-45*, Vol. II, Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1957, p. 61.

48. Lakin, *Contact: Photographs, op.cit.*, p. 111.

leakage of unfavourable visual material that could impact on recruitment or British-Australian relations indicates heavy censorship in wartime propaganda with the purpose of boosting recruitment and justifying the involvement of Australia in the current war. The newspapers did not find Parer's and Silk's photographs from the Greek campaign newsworthy, and consequently they were reluctant to publish them. Instead they favoured overseas photographs and news stories about criticism of the behaviour of diggers written by correspondents from Malaya and Darwin, stories that sold better distracting attention from important political and diplomatic decisions.⁴⁹

The selected examples of official war photography discussed above show coordination and synchronisation within propaganda representations that aimed to increase recruitment by associating space with the notion of travelling, sightseeing and gaining new experiences. Second World War official photographers initially relied on an earlier body of work with pre-existing images and themes such as embarkation and Australian soldiers as tourists. These themes were "already current in popular discourse, revived and deployed for propagandist ends in narratives that pre-existed the war, or showed revealing qualities geared to strike a particular cultural chord".⁵⁰ However, the terrain, the climate and the particular allies and enemies determined the kind of images taken at the different stages of the war in the Middle East, Europe and the Pacific theatres. Unlike combat photography and its focus on heroism, masculinity and weaponry, the theme of the heroics of the Australian soldier was rather underplayed during the campaign in Greece. The specific campaign projected a portrayal of the Australian soldier focusing on his easy-going attitude and adaptability, also highlighting a much softer, friendlier and more caring side, smoothing the Australian soldier's hard-drinking and larrikin stereotype. War was seen as uniting and not dividing, bringing the allies closer and allowing for comradeship to flourish.

49. Email correspondence with Ian Jackson (AWM), 31st January 2011.

50. Brothers, *War and Photography*, *op.cit.*, pp. 35-36.

For Silk and Parer, the experience they got from the first years of the war, in the Middle East and Greece, paved the way for a more professional and well organised pictorial coverage of the Pacific theatre of war, which also brought huge success and an Oscar to Parer for his documentary on Kokoda. The war in the Pacific allowed the experienced photographers to establish their reputations inspired by the landscape and the jungle warfare, adapting to the new environment and its needs, but also revealing changes in the public's account of the war and the face of the enemy.

Vladislav B. Sotirović

**Anti-Serbian Collaboration
Between Tito's Partisans and
Pavelić's Ustashi in World War II**

Titographic 'history' against the scientific historiography

As more time passes after the death of “the greatest son of our nations and nationalities” –Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) –, and as more and more are fading the tapes of the feature films about “heroic and patriotic combats” of Tito's Partisans made by his regime propaganda (such as “Battle of Neretva”, “Battle of Sutjeska”, “Republic of Užice”, “Battle for the Southern Railway”, “Red Land”, “Walter Defends Sarajevo”, “Raid on Drvar”...) ¹ against

1. The feature film “Battle of Neretva” was the most expensive film ever made in Socialist Yugoslavia. It was extremely important for the Yugoslav regime that in those films were starring well-known Hollywood and other foreign actors in order to give to the regime more moral and political credibility from historical perspective. This credibility was important concerning both the people of Yugoslavia and the international community, especially regarding the Western countries of the liberal democracy. For instance, in the movie “Battle of Neretva” together with the Yugoslav actors, the most important roles were given to Orson Welles, Franco Nero, Yul Brynner and Sergei Bondarchuk. In the film “Battle of Sutjeska”, the role of J. B. Tito, as a Partisan military leader, plays Richard Burton. However, all these films are based on invented stories rather than on historical facts. Some of them are based on a pure falsification of historical truth like the film “Battle for the Southern Railway”, directed by Zdravko Velimirović, in which the destructions of the railways in Serbia and other sabotage actions committed by the forces of General Dragoljub Mihailović (the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (named by Germans, Tito's Partisans and the Croats as the Chetniks) simply are attributed to Tito's Partisans. According to some experts, the Yugoslav state invested more money for making such kind of ‘war-Partisan’ films than to all other films together for the very simple reason: the ‘war-Partisan’ films were the most effective public lessons of history of the Yugoslav peoples in World War II. They were shown in primary and secondary schools and the students were taken to the cinemas to watch them as part of

the “occupiers and domestic quislings”, the truth about the true character of this struggle and World War II in the areas of the Independent State of Croatia from 1941 to 1945 is becoming re-researched by a critical Serbian historiography.

During Tito’s Yugoslavia and, unfortunately, long time after 1991 the Yugoslav history of World War II was, and still in many cases is, treated only as a ‘history’. However, we believe it is time for the real science to deal with this period of the Yugoslav past, which means that finally a ‘historiography’ has to replace a quasi-science of politicized ‘Titography’. A phenomenon of the revolutionary taking power in Yugoslavia during World War II by Tito’s Communists and Partisans, provoking for that purpose a civil war, still remains incompletely explained in the Yugoslav historiography due to a number of circumstances. The most important are in our opinion the next two: 1) a lack of original and authentic archival material; and 2) unwillingness and fear of the home Yugoslav historians to reveal the truth. What concerns the lack of relevant (original and authentic) historical sources for the period of the civil war and violent communist revolution in Yugoslavia during World War II, the main reasons for such *de facto* state of affairs are:

- Revolutionary winners in the civil war, Tito’s Partisans (officially called by themselves as the People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, organized a deliberate and well-orchestrated policy of removal, and even physical destruction, of the archival material of both their own documents and the documents of their political enemies. The Titoists succeeded in short period of time after

history class curriculum. The contents of the films, of course, have been properly matched with the contents of the compulsory school history teaching program. Moreover, these films had even the function of the textbooks. However, not one of these ‘war-Partisan’ feature films is made according to the real historical events so that they all remain in the realm of political propaganda of a totalitarian one-party system and the regime (see more in M. Самарџић, *Фалсификати комунистичке историје*, UNA PRESS, Beograd 2010, pp. 79-121). Recording of these films was directly supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army as it is noticed at the beginning of the film “Republic of Užice”.

their military occupation of Belgrade and Serbia in October-November 1944 to eliminate almost all compromising authentic and original documents, which could challenge to a greater or lesser extent, politically coloured Titoist propaganda within the framework of the official (quasi)-historiography about the war years of 1941-1945. Thus, for example, in the Yugoslav archives the researcher cannot find the key documents of Tito's Partisans open cooperation and collaboration with the Croat-Bosniak Ustashi, Albanian (Shqipetar) fascist detachments and the German Nazi occupation forces, as well as an open anti-Serbian policy and military actions by Tito's Supreme Command of his revolutionary People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and its subordinated operational command headquarters. Therefore, preserved German and Italian documents (archival material) and the memoirs (including the diaries) of German and Italian commanders (for instance, by the General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau from Austria in service of the Wehrmacht)² are essential for uncovering the truth about the policies and real political objectives of Tito's forces, fighting for overtaking the political power in Yugoslavia in 1941-1945.

- The same winner in the civil war was after 1945 inserting for his enemies compromising archival documents and photos either to its own or enemy's files, which even today could be found in the archives on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Many of such inserted documents have been written after the war to be as a *corpus delicti* of the 'anti-people's policy of the anti-communist and anti-fascist forces, but such policy of inserting the forgery and falsificated historical documents and photos was systematically applied mostly to compromise the Supreme Staff and other subordinated commanders of the

2. See, for instance: Kriegsarchiv Wien (KAW), Glaise von Horstenau's Inheritance (B/67) including and his diary notes from Zagreb from April 1941 to September 1944 (KAW, B/67-diary); V. Kazimirović, *Nemački general u Zagrebu*, Prizma/Centar film, Kragujevac-Beograd 1996.

Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland under the leadership of General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović.³

3. There are documents (i.e., the letters) with forged signatures of the commander of the Royal Mountain Guard – Nikola Kalabić, who was under direct command by General Mihailović (as for example, the letter from December 19-20th, 1945), and retouched photos of the “Chetnik” commanders, but mostly of Kalabić, who was attributed by the Communists to false betrayal of the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland. According to the Communist version, only due to this betrayal General Mihailović became located and arrested by the Titoist security service (led by Aleksandar Ranković–Leka) in March 1946. The most insidious Titoists’ arson against General Mihailović is allegedly his, but in fact forged letter, (however in two versions and typed in the Latin alphabet), which is supposedly Draža Mihailović sent to “Dr. ALOIS STEPINAC, the Archbishop of Zagreb and the Croatian Metropolitan” („d-ru ALOJZIJU STEPINCU, nadbiskupu zagrebačkom i metropoliti hrvatskom“) on April 15th, 1945. In the letter General Mihailović was asking Archbishop Stepinac for close cooperation with the “Croatian people” (i.e., with the Ustashi and Home Guard soldiers) with Stepinac's blessing in order to halt “the victory of the Communist high tide”. If nothing else, to avoid the discussion of originality and authenticity of the letter from the technical point of view, it would be absolutely illogical that before the very end of the war, General Mihailović required close cooperation with the Croat Nazi Ustashi and Croatia’s Home Guard soldiers (“domobrani”) against whom he was fighting during the whole war and who (especially Ustashi, composed by the Croats and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim Bosniaks) committed terrible crimes of genocide against the Serb Orthodox inhabitants in Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Herzegovina, Srem and Bosnia (i.e., on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia). Moreover, it was a time when the Ustashi and Home Guard detachments were preparing to leave Yugoslavia in order to surrender to the American and British military authorities in Austria or Italy. Finally, General Mihailović was from the very beginning of the war absolutely aware that Pavelić’s Ustashi and the Partisans of Josip Broz Tito are of the same anti-Serb army fighting for the Croat national interest. However, in this case it is of extreme surprising the sloppiness of the Titoist forgers who made the letter of the same matter in two different variants, but forgot to destroy the first (older) one, or at least to move it to safety. Specifically, in the shorthand notes to the Communist called the “process of the century”, i.e. the process to General Mihailović in 1946 in Topčider in Belgrade, Mihailović’s facsimile letter to Archbishop Stepinac was released on a single page (97-th), but 39 years later the same letter was published in the Titoist collection of the “Chetnik” documents in the 14th book in the 4th volume on two pages (not on one page as the first version was written). In this second version of the letter, in comparison to the first one, it was changed the place of the address and the date of writing

The reason for this policy of inserting the forgery documents and other material to the 'Chetnik' files can be easily explained and understood if it is known that from the very beginning of the civil war between Tito's Partisans and Serbia's patriots in July 1941 and especially between Tito's detachments and Mihailović's Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland from November 1941 until March 1946,

(typing) next to the last letter's paragraph, which appears in the later version on the second page of the letter. In the first version of this alleged letter by General Mihailović to Archbishop Stepinac the caption "Supreme Command, April 15th, 1945, Army General" with Mihailović's signature is below the text of the whole letter, but in the second version of the letter the caption "Supreme Command, April 15th, 1945" is put at the upper right corner of the letter over the beginning of the text of it. Both of these letters, nevertheless, do not have the appropriate Command memorandum, seal and a number under which they were registered in contrast to the original and authentic documents issued by the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland. It is known that General Mihailović was signing himself as a *ђенерал* (đeneral), but not as *генерал* (general) as it is in this case (М.Д. Михаиловић, *Рат и мир ђенерала (изабрани ратни списи)*, I-II, Српска реч, Београд 1998, p. 365; *Collection of the documents and information*, XIV/4, 989-990. See also: M. Zečević, *Dokumenta sa suđenja Ravnogorskom pokretu 10. juni 15 juli 1946*, SUBNOR Jugoslavije, Београд 2001; *Izdajnik i ratni zločinac Draža Mihailović pred sudom*, Savez udruženja novinara FNRJ, Београд, 1946). This alleged letter to Archbishop Stepinac dated on April 15th, 1945 has and falsified signature of General Mihailović like in some other forged letters (for instance, to Brašić or to Mate Matićević). Original and authentic Mihailović's Latin script signature can be found in his letter to the Greek General Zervas, which is written in French language. This letter to General Zervas is dated on February 5th, 1944 and verified with clearly legible stamp "Command of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland," that is, however, not the case, for example, with the stamp on the letter dated on November 29th, 1944 (29. studenog) to Mate Matićević (Самарџић, *Фалсификати*, *op.cit.*, p. 36). The U.S. findings on how Titoist propaganda experts after World War II created the photographs of alleged Mihailović's army collaboration with the Germans and the Ustashi are published in the recent book: П. Симић, *Дража. Смрт дужа од живота*, Службени гласник, Београд 2012. In the same book it can be found a new evidence of how it is mounted the judicial process against General Mihailović in Topčider in 1946, or in other words, how the Titoists removed the original documents from the files issued by the authorities of Mihailović's "Chetniks" during the war and instead of them were putting the fake documents as the originals. The book is also offering the proof on the Communist torture of the arrested General.

when Mihailović was arrested by the communist security forces, the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland was the only military and political enemy who seriously stood on the way to the communist taking over the power in the whole country. Knowing the pre-war political aims of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that its armed forces began the civil war on July 7th, 1941 in Western Serbia, and tried to finish it with capturing Mihailović alive what they finally succeeded on “March 13th, 1946 in a house on the road Vardište–Priboj in Eastern Bosnia under still unknown circumstances”.⁴ The Titoists needed the general much more alive than dead in order to publically, in the name of the ‘people’, discriminate him, his movement and the Yugoslav Government in Exile (in London) in a rigged process of the stalinist type for ‘collaboration’ with the occupying forces, and finally to formally legalize their revolutionary way of taking power in the country. However, there were exactly Tito’s Partisans who on their way to power collaborated during the war with the foreign invaders and primarily with their domestic satellites, and most of all with the Croat-Bosniak Ustashi.

With historical sources for the historiography against the Titographic ‘history’

As for clarifying the issue whom Tito’s Partisans kept as their main, if not perhaps the only, political–military opponent and enemy during the entire World War II in Yugoslavia, that is directly related to the topic of this article – the Partisan cooperation and collaboration with the Croat-Bosniak Ustashi, we will here present the transcript of one archival, original and authentic partisan document from the period of their “struggle for the national liberation”. From this document is clear against whom the Partisans were fighting and against whom they did not fight, but what is the most important is what for they fought for four years (this document is

4 „13. марта 1946. године, у једној кући на путу Вардиште-Прибој, под још увек нерасветљеним околностима“ (К. Николић, *Историја Равногорског покрета*, III, Српска реч, Београд 1999, р. 314).

written in Latin letters and contains grammatical and linguistic errors):

“Dear Isa, you will wonder how I presented you this letter. But let it not make doubt to you. When we will once meet you, we will explain everything. Here is what it is about. You have with the Sixth Brigade, augmented with the parts of the Majevisa of Fruška Gora detachment, immediately to move between Goražde and Medjedje on Sandžak side and there to clean terrain from the Chetniks in the direction of Zlatibor and Čajniče. Here you will catch a connection with the left wing of our First Division and receive further directives.

On your way, i.e., during the move, do not fight with the Germans, do not undertake any action on the railway as it is in the interest of our current operations. Send even before your move your couriers towards Ustikolina, where they will catch a connection with our units.

Our most important task now is to destroy the Chetniks of Draža Mihajlović and break his administrative machine which is the greatest threat for the further national-liberation struggle.

Everything else you will find out when we meet.

In the Eastern Bosnia, leave smaller detachments whose task will now be to fight against the Chetniks and to mobilize the new men. Making stronger of the Sixth Brigade must not go at the expense of speed of moving to direction indicated above.

29-III-1943 g.

With comradesly greetings”

[signed by Josip Broz Tito, Aleksandar Ranković, and Sreten Žujović]⁵

From this archival *corpus delicti* we think that it is clear who was the only enemy of Tito’s revolutionaries, who was nothing

5. Archives of the Military-Historical Institute (AVI), Belgrade, Staff of the Supreme Command, Chetnik Archives, K-12, 30/12 (Letter to Isa, March 29th, 1943).

more than the client detachments of Stalin's Red Army in Yugoslavia.⁶ It is of extreme importance to emphasize that this document is signed by Josip Broz Tito himself. We would like to stress as well the fact that his political party's leadership several times at the Comintern's meetings in Moscow in the interwar period was issuing the directives to destroy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a "Greater Serbia created by the Versailles Order" after the Great War. Therefore, it is not surprising that in this document the Chetniks of Draža Mihailović (considered as the Serb nationalists) are the only real enemy who was standing on the communist way to build a new socialist Yugoslavia primarily at the expense of the Serb national interests.⁷

A similar letter, which was sent to the communist commander Isa Jovanović and signed by the top communist leadership –Tito, Ranković and Žujović–, is a letter in the form of a military order, which was written and signed by Tito on March 30th, 1943. This letter (also written in the Latin script) is addressed to the Headquarters of the Bosnian Corps of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia:

"All your fights direct against the Chetniks in Central Bosnia and Krajina, and fight only in defense against the Ustashi if you are attacked by them."⁸

Official Yugoslav state historiography of the 1980s and 1990s has 'quite appropriate' responses to these *corpus delicti* archival documents from World War II: that there was an apparently only

6. About the relations between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union see in: V.B. Sotirović, "Shaping the Borderlands of *Pax Sovietica Commonwealth* in Central and Southeastern Europe: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union during the Second World War", *Lietuvos Istorijos Studijos*, Mokslo darbai, 10 (Vilnius 2002), 65-82.

7. About the anti-Serbian character of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia see in: V.B. Sotirović, „Антирпски карактер Комунистичке партије Југославије”, *Serbian Studies Research*, 3.1 (Novi Sad 2012), 73-88.

8. *Archives of the Military-Historical Institute*, Belgrade, A copy of Tito's personal letter.

separate case, which can be explained by at that time military and political situation on the front in western parts of Yugoslavia as the Germans organized the military operation “Weiss 1” and “Weiss 2” (the “Battle of Neretva”) against Tito’s Partisans and, as it is known, a drowning man clutching at straws and catches. However, the central point of Tito’s offer to the Germans in March 1943 was not the only tactical maneuver due to the “new unfavorable situation” in order to save head, but rather it was a strategic policy and practical actions by Broz’s Supreme Command during the entire World War II in Yugoslavia. The truth was that the Germans organized offensive “Weiss 1” and “2 Weiss” not against Tito’s Partisans, but in fact against Mihailović’s Chetniks in order to destroy them in Krajina, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia prior to the Allied landings on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea.⁹ By making a direct agreement with Tito’s political representatives of the Supreme Command in March 1943 (“The March Agreement”) the Germans were actually sent the Partisans to the Chetniks on the Neretva River so that they do the job for them. Tito’s fighters met the German requirements singing the song “Partisans prepare your

9. On direct cooperation between Tito’s Partisans and Pavelić’s Ustashi in the area of the so-called “Republic of Bihać” indicates German general Fortner who commanded the German 718-th Division. In his report of December 26th, 1942 it was assessed that the Communists ruled the territory around Bihać in the length of 250 km. and the width of 100 km. On this territory according to him, there were about 63,000 Partisans. In a new report of January 6th, 1943 General Fortner reported to his superiors that Tito’s Partisans in this region “could get the booty in food and weapons without problems” from the garrisons held by Croatian Home Guard (*domobrani*) and the Ustashi (*Collection of the documents and information*, vol. XII, book 2, 952; *Collection of the documents and information*, vol. XII, book 3, 18). It has to be noticed that all the so-called „liberated territories“ by the Partisans westward from the River of Drina were in the „Independent State of Croatia“ and that in fact they were given to them by the Croat Nazi regime in Zagreb. The garrisons held by the Croatian Home Guard and the Ustashi which have been under the „attack“ by the Partisans in fact were not defended and they very quickly surrendered. That was a game played by both the Partisans and the Croatian armed forces as a very smart way how to provide the Partisans with the food, arms, ammunition and medicaments. Of course, the local German commanders knew very well what was going on.

machine guns to fire at the King and the Englishmen!”¹⁰ Thus, the common and only enemy of both the Germans and the Partisans were the Chetniks (the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland) led by General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović. The Chetniks were in the spring of 1943 prepared to wait and accept the Anglo-American allies in Dalmatia. For the Germans, the Anglo-American invasion of Dalmatian and/or Montenegrin sea coast meant the opening of a second front in Europe and retreat back to Germany, while the same Anglo-American action with the help of the Chetniks meant for Tito’s Partisans the end of a policy for the communist takeover of Yugoslavia.¹¹

It is necessary to draw attention to an episode from the Soviet “Republic of Bihać” in Bosnia-Herzegovina established by Tito’s Partisans in 1942, when the Partisans while leaving the territory of Bihać under the German offensive in spring 1943 by force took a large part of Serbian civilians with them, but not Croatian and Muslim, to the River of Neretva and possibly further towards Serbia. More than 40-50,000 Serbian civilians were moved by force and this partisan action had a three-fold function: 1) the civilians were the shield for the communist leadership and the partisan detachments who were going to fight the crucial battle against the Royal Chetniks on the left bank of the River of Neretva; 2) in this way the (anti-Serb) ethnic cleansing of the area was done; and 3) the Serbian civilians were prevented from escaping to the neighboring safe area around Gacko which was under Chetnik control. On this occasion the Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army in the Father-

10. The song was in original language: „Partizani spremte mitraljeze da pucamo na kralja i Engleze!“.

11. The Comintern adopted in 1935 the view that due to the impending threat of Nazi Germany and the war (as an exponent of the Western bourgeoisie) against the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Communists will not work anymore on destruction of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Contrary to the prior-1935 Comintern policy, Yugoslavia has to be as stronger as possible in order to as longer as resist the German attack before the German invasion of the Soviet Union. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22nd, 1941 and during the whole war, Moscow’s position was that Yugoslav Communists under the guise of “anti-fascist struggle” would take over the power in the country at the end of the war after which Yugoslavia will join the Soviet military, political and economic bloc.

land, General Draža Mihailović sent to the Yugoslav Government in London the following dispatch:

“Because of this communist terror the masses of the people are retreated from Bihać to Glamoč. As soon as the Germans approach, the unprotected peoples are left to the mercy of the Germans and the Ustashi who mercilessly massacred them. Who escaped by chance is freezing in the snow and ice. Between Drvar and Glamoč there are over 500 frozen corpses of women and children. This is more than a horror. It is a struggle of the Communists who are encouraged by the foreign propaganda to systematically destroy our [Serb] people.”¹²

However, after World War II, the Yugoslav state and party historiography has placed the thesis that in the above case (Serbian) people voluntarily went with Tito’s Partisans. In other words, it was a ‘humanitarian action’ in order to rescue the civilians what Josip Broz Tito confirmed in 1948 at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, literally saying the following:

“With our army huge crowds of 50,000 women, children and old men retreated towards Livno ... All units were left in their positions, while the Supreme Command with three Proletarian Divisions retreated to the River of Neretva.”¹³

In reality, however, these civilians protested and demanded to be transported and provided with food and clothing in order to survive the harsh winter. What happened after this protest we can find in the following text:

“Reluctance of the people, the elderly men, women and children – the Communists declared it as a type of rebellion, sab-

12. Л.Р. Кнежевић–Ж. Кнежевић, *Слобода или смрт*, приватно издање аутора, Сијетл, САД 1981, р. 186.

13. *Ibid.*

otage, fascism and all other. Then they were killed on the spot. They killed for every little thing. They killed mothers, who were fighting not for themselves, but for the salvation of their children, because they did not want to lead them to the death. Political commissars, ‘popular committees’, field workers and their servants were at work. They were going from house to house, taking by force women and children. They were dragging them on the road. They were putting this poor people in the convoy of death, which was going through the Golgotha, on which had to die.”¹⁴

It is clear that in this action (Serbian) civilians had to play the role of ‘human shield’ of Broz’s Partisans in the coming conflict in the valley of the River of Neretva against the main and sole military and political opponent – Mihailović’s Chetniks (supporters of the Royal Yugoslav Government in exile). The communist detachments went to Neretva in (“March”) agreement with the Germans. The latter had a plan to defeat the winners from the final battle between the Partisans and the Chetniks in the valley of the River of Neretva in Herzegovina and in this way to destroy both enemies – the Partisans and the Chetniks. For that purpose, after the communist victory on the left bank of the River of Neretva over the Chetniks, the Germans with the Ustashi immediately launched a new offensive (“Schwarz”, which is called in Yugoslav communist historiography as the “Sutjeska” or “the Fifth enemy offensive”).¹⁵ About the personal destiny of one part of (Serbian) civilians from this “Column of death” says, drawing on the evidence by Mane

14. М. Пешуг, *Революција у Лици 1941-1945*, ауторово приватно издање, Билефелд, Немачка 1966, р. 225.

15. The Partisan Supreme Command Staff with Josip Broz Tito succeeded to „break“ the enemy surrounding during the „Swartz“ offensive exactly on the part of the line hold by Croat Ustashi soldiers what can be another one direct proof of (Croat-led) Communist collaboration with the (Croat) Ustashi movement. After that, very weak Partisan detachments succeeded to establish another one „liberated territory“ in Bosnia lasted for several months around the city of Jajce that was also (as previous „Bihać Republic in 1942“) existing exactly on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia.

Pešut, another witness of the event – Vladimir Dedijer (the Jew, who was after the war official biographer of Josip Broz Tito), but this time from the communist side:

“The mother is going tonight barefoot on the ice, with some rags around the legs, which are so long to pull the frost to it. On the back in the bag baby hook. Another kid pulls the arm, while the third kid, the oldest one, is going and weeping. They did not eat anything for two days...

I approach one window boarded. Someone cries from the ground. I walked around the house, went down to the road and came to the door of the ground floor. I saw through the broken doors the people who were sitting around the fire, covered with the blankets, silent, motionless. A child cries out with a loud voice. Something struggled under a blanket. I walked up as closer as and cried as hard as I could. The wrestling stopped, but not and the child's voice. The blanket was lifted, revealing the face of the mother, whom I saw today with three children. Glassy eyes, she was all in a sweat. I realized what was happening. She was smothering her own baby. She was tired of. Gripping, griping, looking for the bread. She was tired, hungry, back of her was painful from wearing the youngest kid, the hands were painful of carrying the rest of two kids. She just wanted to release both the child and herself from the further horrors. If I came a minute later – at the morning we would find only a dead body of the child. It is no coincidence that this woman said at the evening when I met her on the road: “Holy Death, take me!”

For the twenty-one day she escapes from Banija region with the children before the “Prinz Eugen Division” and the “Devil’s Division”. She walked 350 kilometers on the frost.”¹⁶

About mass suffering of (Serbian) civilians from the “Column of Death” in February 1943, there is an eye-witness testimony by the

16. Пешут, *Революција у Лици*, *op.cit.*, p. 227.

commander of the “Dinara Chetnik Division,” Duke (vojvoda) Momčilo Đujić, whose testimony sheds a whole new light on official Yugoslav state titoist historiographic phrases about Partisan’s ‘humanity’ in the “Battle for the Wounded Men” (the “Battle of Neretva” or German “Weiss”) in the winter/spring of 1943:

“The Communists disseminate that the Germans, the Ustashi and the Chetniks go together in order to kill everyone. And they took with them many women and children from the Lika region [in present-day Croatia]. I was around Grahovo [in present-day Western Bosnia] waiting for Tito’s columns and was collecting these peoples [Serbian civilians], accommodating them in my villages and later on returning them to their homes. Many women, however, dragged the little children with them: mother did not want to leave a child! Tito cleverly came up with the idea – as the army moves slowly because of the women and children – that a special battalion would take the children and let the mothers go with their husbands. Nurses and special units reportedly will take care of the children. And now, he has taken these children ...about one hundred and fifty. Beneath a mountaintop of the Mt. Šator there is the Šator’s Lake with fresh water. There was here a state house for the forest guards. It was a luxury villa in mountain style. All those kids, I counted their skeletons, were put in this house and the house was put on fire.

I came a month later, it was the snow, and little bones of these children were sticking out from the snow. This picture also I cannot forget. We did not have a photographic camera, but one scene could be taken as an eternal monument: a mother from Lika region (Ličanka) who did not want to hand over her children, sat on a stone of the forest trail, approximately one km. from that house. The bodies were not disintegrated, they were still frozen. The mother was keeping one child on her breast, one child on his knees caught her under the armpit, and one was lying on the ground, the oldest, taking with his arms her legs. This image was never out of my

head. And who would not want to kill the Communists, who would not want to kill the Ustashi?"¹⁷

That this first-hand testimony about the behavior of Tito's Partisans with the wounded men in early spring of 1943 is not invented and/or occasional, and that in fact corresponds to the actual situation on the ground during World War II (as opposed to Yugoslav Communist movie the "Battle of Neretva", also called as the "Battle for the Wounded Men") gives us another relevant source from the same 1943, from December. This document is also historically very important for resolving the enigma of war life and work of Josip Broz Tito, for whom it is written so far an impressive number of biographic studies, but usually without reference to all relevant and reliable archival documents and testimonies. In all of these biographical writings still it remained unresolved the question of his true origin and his distinctive character up to his seizure of power in Yugoslavia by armed forces of the Partisan detachments which originated from the territory of the Independent State of Croatia and were mainly composed by Serbs.¹⁸ In order to contribute to the writings of both Tito's true (war time) biography and his partisan movement we present in the following paragraph one extremely

17. М. Глигоријевић, "Србија на западу", *Политика*, Београд 1991, pp. 132-133.

18. It was published in Belgrade in 2010 so far the first collection of more than 250 top-secret documents from Yugoslav and Soviet (today Russian) archives about Josip Broz Tito: П. Симић, Деспот З., *Тито, строго поверљиво. Архивски документи*, Службени гласник, Београд 2010. About the results of psycho-political analysis of Tito's personality see: В. Адамовић, *Три диктатора: Стаљин, Хитлер, Тито. Психополитичка паралела*, Informatika, Београд 2008. This is so far the best and most completed Tito's psycho-biography. One of the most glorifying Tito's biography by the western authors is: V.A.Dž. Fajn, "Diktatori mogu imati blagotvoran uticaj: izuzetan slučaj Josipa Broza Tita", Fišer J. B. (ed.), *Balkanski diktatori: Diktatori i autoritarni vladari Jugoistočne Evrope*, Beograd: IPS Medija-Prosveta, 2009, pp. 305-360. One of the most balanced and objective Tito's biographies so far is: П. Симић, *Дража. Смрт дужа од живота*, Службени гласник, Београд 2012.

important archival document which sheds light on the nature of the communist movement in Yugoslavia during World War II.

This is a top-secret document issued by the Special Police Department of the Command of the City of Belgrade about “Tito” on December 13th, 1943, archived in the *Archives of Yugoslavia* in Belgrade. It was sent to the Presidency of Government of Serbia:

“This Department has the honor to report to the Presidency that a notice was received containing certain details of the partisan army, the personality of their “commander” Tito, his way of life, as well as about the relationship between him, his closest associates and his army. These notices are received from persons who some time ago came from Montenegro.

According to that notice Tito with his [war] Staff spent last summer in the mountains near Nikšić and at a place called “Goransko”. Here at “Goransko” partisan staff organized a medical service using the local hospital, where wounded Partisans were getting medical help. In the hospital local people were also getting medical help, from whom partly this notice is received. What concerns the personality of Tito, the data we had are absolutely identical with the data received from these persons. In addition to already known data and those we received, Tito is mid-height, his exterior is smooth, he carries civil suits which are mostly new. He speaks a corrupted Serbian language, which resembles to Kajkavian [speech].

The relationship between Tito, his staff and members is authoritative in both official dealings and private life. This is reflected in particular in Tito’s dealing with his co-workers, even with the closest. And his way of life is very different from the life of the others, as Tito has plenty of food, a variety of sweets, leads immoral life and has beside him a young Jewish girl with whom he previously lived, while his ‘army’ gets very little food. Such poor food gets even sick – wounded Partisans.

His most intimate environment along with the others makeup and a Jew Moša Pijade and former Yugoslav officers

general Orović Savo and captain Jovanović [Arso], although about these two it is claimed that they accidentally joined them [Partisans]. Among other things, it is reported that Tito's staff is composed by younger people, except their important officials.

Tito's Staff is very mobile and it is a rare case to be at one place for a longer time. Movement occurs always when it is received notice from the intelligence about coming danger. Such a case occurred with the last place, where these data originated from. During moving from the mountain and a place called "Goranjsko" the Partisans burned all the archives, as well as the buildings where they stayed, and even 40 of their most seriously wounded [soldiers], as they frequently do it.

Their intelligence service is developed very much and mainly for this service they use local women, rarely local men, whose external looking did not draw attention of the local authorities. From the same source we know today that Tito and his staff are in the mountains between Plevlja, Pavino Polje and Nikšić.

Front notification is given to the title, with a request for knowledge and using it.

According to the order, the Administrator of the City of Belgrade, Head of the Department of Special Police. Inspector."¹⁹

We think that the most important value of this document lays in exactly what happened at the end of this story according to the report: The claim that Tito's Partisans killed during their withdrawal all of their 40 seriously wounded comrades, i.e. all those who could not move, which means at the same time all those whom the others had to carry. And this is not for the first time, but it is already common practice by Tito's soldiers as claimed by the source. That is what local informants testify, whose testimonies are the source of writing of this police report. So, in reality probably nothing is left

19. *Archives of Yugoslavia* (AJ), top secret report of Belgrade special police about „Tito“ (originally written in Cyrillic and stamped).

from post-war partisan propaganda about partisan humanity for their wounded comrades as presented, for instance, in well known Tito's regime's sponsored partisan action movie "Battle on the River of Neretva" (about the event from 1943).

In the context of our particular contribution to the revision of official Titographic 'history' of "our [Yugoslav] nations and nationalities" during World War II, we would like to deal in the next pages with the crucial research problem of this paper: the real nature of the relationships between Tito's Partisans and Pavelić's Ustashi. In fact, after the breakup and dispersal of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, in the hands of the researchers are coming more and more of the relevant archival material, which confirms (so far only the "Chetnik propaganda from abroad" according to the Yugoslav titographic 'historians') the open, systematic and strategic cooperation of the Croatian Ustashi with Tito's Partisans (two armies from the same state territory – Independent State of Croatia, and both led by the Croats). In this particular case, which we would like briefly to elaborate, we will deal with documented collaboration between the Nazi Ustashi and the Communist Partisans in the area already mentioned above – the territory around Gacko. More precisely, the territory of the Valley of Gacko in the Independent State of Croatia (today in the Republic of Croatia).

This valley as a whole, Gacko area is named after the River of Gacka which spreads from Medak over Gospić and Gorski Kotar until Serbian Moravica in the north nearby the border with Slovenia (Kranjska). In this area there were Italian, Ustashi, Partisan and Chetnik ("Dinara Chetnik Division" under the command of a former priest and war duke Momčilo Đujić) military formations. Tito's Partisans with Soviet military insignia during the entire war period tried by military strikes of guerrilla type to take over this area from the hands of the "Dinara Chetnik Division", but they did not succeed. One of the crucial reasons for their failure was the fact that local Serbs (who were the majority in the area) mainly sided with the royalist Chetniks (the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland), but not with the Croat-led Partisans. However, the crucial reason for such policy of the local Serb population was double-natured: 1)

the apparent cooperation with Pavelić's Ustashi by Tito's Partisans, and 2) participation in the genocidal anti-Serb policy of the Ustashi regime in Zagreb by the communist-partisan "Supreme Staff of Croatia". It was exactly in this area during World War II that an open and unequivocal collaboration between the Ustashi and the Partisan units happened. One of the classic examples of such collaboration was the case of two Croat brothers –Ivo Rukavina, commander of the Communist-Partisan "Supreme Staff of Croatia", and Juca Rukavina, commander of the most notorious Nazi Ustashi military (SS) formation– the "Black Legion".²⁰

Concerning the kind of concrete Partisan–Ustashi collaboration on the military field, a historical first-hand source says that the communist formations were drawn on a "people's assembly" in the village of Kunić at a time when 1,500 Ustashi soldiers were passing through the territory of Kordun and Lika with the aim to slaughter the local Serb villagers. So, at the moment when one Croat brother penetrates with his combatants to destroy as much as he could of what is Serb, at that same moment the other Croat brother instead of defending the people from slaughtering, he withdraws his military forces from the direction of the first brother's formations' passing. In other words, those who had to protect the people from slaughtering were going to rural political gatherings.

This is what Mane Pešut, as witness, wrote about this event:

"While the Partisan heroes played a wheel²¹ and having rejoicing, the Ustashi freely exercise their bloody feast. What was the prey, hunting Serbs, was visible at the best according to the kind of killing. Booty was so great, that the Ustashi did not have time in their innate principle, firstly to do a sadistic torture against the victims and then to kill them, but only to cut their necks. The biggest crime was committed in Tržić

20. Пешут, *Револуција у Лици*, *op.cit.*, pp. 181-217. Mane Pešut was a commander of the battalion of Dinara Chetnik Division. After the war he immigrated to West Germany where he wrote mentioned book that is a firsthand historical source written in a form of memoirs. Pešut was editing in West Germany the journal *White Eagles*.

21. The wheel (*kolo*) is a typical popular playing of the Serbs.

and Primišlje and then in Veljun and Perjasica. Many of the victims, who did not die immediately, were transported by bullock carts to the Chetnik territory in Plaški, where they were given the first aid. Throughout the whole period of the massacre it was not fired a single Partisan rifle to the Usta-shi.”

This evidence largely resembles the case of the “bloody Kragujevac October” from 1941, when Tito’s Partisan units literally had a great rejoice in the nearby village of Divostin during the shooting of Kragujevac civilians (2,300 including 300 pupils from the city Gymnasium) in front of the city (Šumarice) by the Germans. The communist leaders explained their behavior to Divostin peasants that, according to their strategy, whoever was not with them (the Partisans) was against them.²²

However, this is not the end of the collaboration story of the two Croat brothers from a family of Rukavina. In fact, there is evidence by Captain Ilija Popović, who was an officer of the American intelligence service known as the OSS (later the CIA) who was sent as an intelligence connection to Tito’s Partisan units during the conference in Tehran in November 1943.²³ The American officer saw

22. When the (trans-Drina) Partisans occupied the city of Kragujevac in Central Serbia in October 1944 they executed several thousands of civilians under the accusation to be the „collaborators“ and „national betrayers“ of whom 4,700 were buried at the same graves as those from October 1941 execution case. However, in 1945 the Communist authorities of Yugoslavia officially reported to the International Red Cross organization in Geneva that the Germans executed 7,000 Kragujevac civilians in October 1941. In the other words, all corps from the Kragujevac „Šumarice Memorial Park“ (2,300+4,700) are officially treated after World War II by both the Yugoslav (titographic) historiography and state authorities as those executed in October 1941 by the Germans.

23. The Allies (USA, UK and USSR) of the anti-Fascist coalition at this conference, which lasted from November 28th to December 1st, 1943 recognized the Partisans of Josip Broz Tito as the allied and anti-Fascist force, but only under the pressure by Stalin and, more importantly, the Partisan movement became recognized by the “big three” as the only legitimate political representative of the whole Yugoslavia. On the conflict between on one hand the Soviet Government and on the other the Yugoslav Royal Government in London and

with his own eyes the Ustashi commander Juca Rukavina as a guest at a banquet organized by the partisan staff, just during the time of the session of the 'big three' in Tehran, when among other things the fate of the post-war Yugoslavia was discussed. On this occasion, the Political Commissar of the host partisan detachments invited Captain Ilija Popović to the dinner and the banquet event. From this dinner and banquet we have a first-hand source testimony from the U.S. intelligence officer, who wrote:

“I came to a house and saw two Lieutenants (Ustashi) and Major Rukavina (also Ustashi) as they were sitting around table. Major Rukavina was wearing a German suit with the German Iron Cross. I then said to Commissioner: ‘I did not come to Yugoslavia to sit and eat with the bloodsuckers who murdered Serbian people. I have come to fight against them.’ Four times I came to Yugoslavia and never saw the Partisans fighting the Germans. From Yugoslavia I brought out many wounded men to Italy and every man told me that his wounds are not from the enemies, but: ‘My wounds are from my brother.’”²⁴

On direct cooperation and collaboration between the communist Partisans and the Nazi Ustashi on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia indicates the map of the Ustashi crimes against the Serbian population made by Bogdan L. Bolta (a participant in the

the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, see: B.N. Popović, *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941-1945)*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd 1988, pp. 90-108. One of the best mini anthologies of the documents of the Government in exile of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during World War II was published in 2008: К. Николић, *Владе Краљевине Југославије у Другом светском рату 1941-1945*, Институт за савремену историју, Београд 2008 (документа).

24. This testimony by the American Captain Ilija Popović is taken from the journal *Погледи* 74 (January 11th, 1991). As direct evidence of collaboration between Tito's Partisans and Pavelić's Ustashi during World War II serves and authentic photo showing the Ustashi soldier (standing) and one Partisan (on horseback) to be handled in their uniforms and with guns surrounded by several of their fellow soldiers. The photo is published in: Самарцић, *Фалсификати, оп.цит.*, p. 163. See Appendix No. 1.

war events), who in his book on Gračačka Chetnik Brigade concludes on the basis of the facts:

“We know that where there were the Chetnik units in Southern Lika, or anywhere, the Ustashi were not able to kill a single Serb through mass slaughter. But there, where there were the Partisans, and even with their strong forces, such as they had in the Central Lika and Krbava, in the counties of Uduba and Korenica, the Ustashi in those local Serbian villages were undisturbedly massacring [the Serbs] during the war, just they did it and in 1941. It has been proven that the party Partisan Command of Croatia in the summer and fall of 1942 intentionally was removing the Partisan units from the Serbian villages in this part of Lika, in order to open the way for the Ustashi to commit massacres in them.”²⁵

To the same conclusion about the Partisan-Ustashi political and military collaboration on the territory of the entire Independent State of Croatia tells another map named “Massacres of the Serbs in Yugoslavia (April 1941-August 1942)” from the book Кнежевић, *Слобода или смрт*, p. 44.

New German documents from the German archives on collaboration between the Partisans and the Ustashi in their joint fight against the Chetniks (the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland) of Jezdimir Dangić²⁶ are published in 2005 in Belgrade scientific journal *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* (Military Historical Review) edited by the Military Historical Institute, dealing with the review of the book by the German historian Klaus Schmider, *The Partisan War in Yugoslavia 1941-1944*. According to the book review, the author

25. L.B. Bolta, *Gračačka četnička brigada 1941-1945: prilog istoriji narodnog ravnogorskog pokreta*, Sidnej 1987, pp. 205-206.

26. Major Jezdimir Dangić was a commander of the Chetnik units of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland in the Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina till April 1942. On this territory he was protecting Serbian civilians from the Croat Ustashi massacres. He became arrested in April 1942 by the Germans and sent to the lager of Styj (Stryi) in at that time the Southeastern Poland (Galicia, present-day Ukraine).

of the book claims that the collapse of the Chetnik units of Jezdimir Dangić in Bosnia and Herzegovina was “influenced by tactical co-operation between the Ustashi and the Partisans at the beginning of April 1942, which lasted about two weeks. During this period, the Ustashi twice delivered ammunition to the Partisans.”²⁷

We would like to point out to a document from the Yugoslav archives, which also clearly indicates the direct collaboration of the Partisans with the Ustashi. It is, in fact, the order by the Supreme Headquarters of Josip Broz Tito’s “People’s Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia” (NOV i POJ)²⁸ which as strictly confidential dispatches what is registered under No. 785, dated July 25th, 1943. Part of the order is of major importance for us at the moment:

“To establish the connection with the Ustashi of the comrade Drekalom, who is sent by the General Staff of the Ustashi in Zagreb. He is visiting the places where there are Ustashi units and propagates, i.e. orders, a fusion of Ustashi with the Partisans ...according to obtained instructions from Zagreb. So far, he visited all of the Ustashi units located in the Coastal area, and as rearmost he visited Imotski. After the meeting in Imotski he went publicly to the Western part of the Imotski country’s villages of Studenica, Aržano, Lovreno and Čista, in order to determine the details with them. With him cooperates Boglić, an Ustashi Headquarters’ member from Omis, like most of the Franciscan friars, who on their account are

27. Citation according to the book *Равногорска омладина у рату 1941-1945. Сећања и казивања*, група аутора, књига друга, Удружење припадника Југословенске Војске у Отаџбини, Београд 2008, p. 332.

28. That was official name for the Partisan units of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from December 1942 till March 1945. From March 1945 till 1951 Tito’s armed forces were named as „Yugoslav Army“ (JA), but from 1951 their name was „Yugoslav People’s Army“ (JNA). However, their original name from July 1941 till January 1942 was „People’s Liberation Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia“ (NOPOJ), but from January till December 1942 they changed the name into „People’s Liberation Partisan and Volunteer Army of Yugoslavia“ (NOP i DVJ).

doing the fiercest propaganda in this direction. These data were received from comrade Colonel A. Jovanović and they are submitted to you as completely accurate for the orientation. In regard with this, immediately get in touch with comrade Drekaló and if you have not done it in relation to previously issued instructions start with the organization of the “U-2” territory on this basis.”²⁹

Agreements on collaboration

From all the above we believe that it is clear that the coordination of military operations, political and tactical cooperation between Tito’s Partisans and Pavelić’s Ustashi during World War II on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia was planned and systematically carried out during the whole war. From the military and tactical sense, this cooperation was based on an agreement between Corporal/Marshal Josip Broz Tito and Führer Ante Pavelić at the end of December 1941 when at the meeting between Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito and representatives of the Croatian Ustashi in Rogatica (Bosnia) was obtained the consent by the Ustashi leader Ante Pavelić to deliver weapons and ammunition to Broz’s Partisans and to permit for them both an uninterrupted residence and free passing through the territory of the Independent State of Croatia. Based on this agreement between the Croat armies, the Partisan supreme military and political leadership resided on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia from January 25th until May 25th 1942 without any interruption in the Bosnian town of Foča although in this region there were both Ustashi and Italian garrisons and even to the range of their guns, mortars and machine guns. This smooth residence of the Partisan military and political leadership for almost half a year on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia was a result of the signing of the Ustashi-Partisan agreement on collaboration after January 12th, 1942 when Tito’s special commissioner Edvard Kardelj (a Slovene), as a member of the Central Committee of the

29. Citation according to the book *Равногорска омладина у рату*, *op.cit.*, p. 336.

Communist Party of Yugoslavia, went from Čevljanovići (nearby Rogatica) to Zagreb in order to sign this agreement and then travelled to Ljubljana. The Ustashi deputy from Sarajevo came to Tito's headquarters in Foča already on February 16th, 1942 with Pavelić's personal letter for the formation and arming of the Communist "Second Proletarian Brigade". The ammunition and weapons from the Ustashi were soon delivered to this newly formed Partisan brigade on the territory of Mataruga, near Čajniče. On this occasion, the Ustashi delivering of the ammunition and weapons by one Ustashi major from notorious "Black Legion" of Jure Francetić was accepted by the Partisan commander Sava Kovačević (later on in 1943 he was shot in the back from a Partisan rifle during the "Sutjeska Battle") and Sava Brković, a senior Communist political commissar. This well-armed just formed Partisan "Second Proletarian Brigade" was immediately sent to a nearby battlefield around Srebrenica and Vlasenica in Eastern Bosnia, where in collaboration with the local Ustashi formations was fighting against the detachments of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland under the command of Majors Dangić and Todorović.

J. B. Tito at the end of March 1942 sent his two officials, Ivo Lola Ribar and Petar Velebit, to negotiate an agreement with the Ustashi authorities on getting certain territory for the Partisans in the Independent State of Croatia in the case that they will be expelled from Montenegro (Italian protectorate) due to a popular revolt against both the Communists and the Italians. I. L. Ribar and P. Velebit (both Croats) went together with the Ustashi Colonel Bećir Kulenović (a Muslim Bosniak) from Zagreb. While Bećirović stayed in Sarajevo until the day when a meeting with Tito should be agreed upon, Ribar and Velebit continued travelling together with the assigned Ustashi escort soldiers and arrived in Foča via Goražde to J. Broz Tito on April 1st, 1942. Then it was agreed about the exact date of the meeting between Tito and the official representatives of the Independent State of Croatia in the town of Rogatica, April 5th, 1942. From the Partisan side this meeting with the Ustashi representatives was attended by Tito himself, Peter Velebit and a member of the British military mission to Tito's Su-

preme Headquarters, Major Terence Atherton.³⁰ As negotiators from the side of the Independent State of Croatia appeared Sulejman Filipović and Bećir Kulenović together with other Muslims from Sarajevo. On this occasion in Rogatica it was agreed between the Ustashi and the Partisans on the precise conditions under which Tito's forces could cross over (from the east to the west) the territory of the Independent State of Croatia to their assigned areas in Western Bosnia. On this 'liberated' (according Titoist historiography) territory the Communists proclaimed the "Republic of Bihać" in the second half of 1942, which was the second –after the "Republic of Užice" (proclaimed in autumn 1941 in Western Serbia)– Soviet-style republic founded by Tito's Communists and Partisans on the territory of Yugoslavia.

At the beginning of June 1942, due to the anger of the people of Montenegro towards the politics of the 'left turn' by the Partisans and the red terror by the Communists ("Tito's dogs' cemeteries" in Montenegro and Eastern Herzegovina) Tito was in Plužine eventually forced to make a decision on the implementation of the agreement with the Ustashi in Rogatica. Following this decision, the remains of the First and Second Communist Proletarian Brigades, along with a Third Sandžak Brigade and two Montenegrin proletarian brigades started in early June 1942 to leave the territory of Durmitor Mt. in Northern Montenegro by crossing over Volujak. Broz's detachments on their way from Kalinovik to Trnovo were supplied by Sarajevo Ustashi with trucks full of food and ammunition. However, the official Ustashi report says that those tracks were captured by the Partisans from the Ustashi who have been allegedly ambushed and attacked by the Partisans on the road. This farce with alleged capture of large quantities of weapons and ammunition from the Ustashi by the Partisans will be very often re-

30. Major Terence Atherton (1903–1942), who was married to a Muslim from Sarajevo, was together with his technician liquidated by Tito's Partisans around April 16th, 1942 at the moment when he wanted to send a radiogram to his British command about the result of an agreement between Tito's and Pavelić's representatives. However, Broz after the liquidation officially announced that the British major, together with General Novaković, left his headquarters and defected to the side of the Chetniks who had allegedly killed him.

peated until the end of the war when even very well equipped and supplied Ustashi garrisons were 'seized' by the Partisans, but in fact they were voluntarily and amicably handed over to the Communists according to the Ustashi-Partisan bilateral agreements. It is necessary to mention that the German command in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, headed by Glez von Horstenau, accepted both direct and indirect cooperation agreements between Pavelić's Ustashi and Broz's Partisans in order to maintain a balance, a control of the warring forces, and most importantly, the mutual destruction of the Partisans and Mihailović's Chetniks.³¹ However, Berlin, and especially Hitler, never approved this cooperation.

A ceded to the Partisans territory within the Independent State of Croatia encompassed the area between the towns of Karlovac, Livno and Petrinja with the center town of Bihać. In such a way, the Ustashi regime in Zagreb provided to Broz's soldiers 'liberated territory' of about 15 districts of Bosanska Krajina, Lika, Korduna and Banije, but this fact did not stop the Ustashi to continue with their genocidal policies against the local Serbian civilians for the very reason that the Partisans did not defend civilians at all.³² On

31. About German-Partisan cooperation at the local level can be shown by the fact that strong German forces in the fall 1941 simply handed over to Tito's Partisans entire city of Užice in the Western Serbia with the factory for the manufacturing and repairing the weapons and ammunition. It is very strange and unusual that the Germans did not destroy or dismantle this factory before they left the city regardless the fact that they had quite enough time to do that. Moreover, there was no real need for the Germans to leave the city at all taking into account the fact that the Partisan units have been at that time weak. Military-political interplay between the Partisans, the Germans and the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland on the area of occupied Serbia during World War II was analyzed in the book: P. Grujić, *Boromejski čvor. Ko je bio patriota u Srbiji 1941-1945?*, ATC Avangarda, Beograd 2006.

32. The Independent State of Croatia was declared on April 10th, 1941 as fascist state. However, in many ways it was different from its models and the sponsors: the Nazi Germany and the Fascist Italy. The Ustashi ideologues have always openly insisted that this state was based primarily on the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church especially from the time of the so-called "Social Catholicism". The state was mainly a Roman Catholic dictatorial ideological construction based on the idea of the medieval crusades against the infidels (in this case against the Orthodox Serbs). It was accepted Vatican's standpoint that

this ‘liberated territory’ (“Republic of Bihać”), according to the Communist post-war historiography, in Bihać, Tito convened a two days (November 26th-27th, 1942) session of the first revolutionary “people’s council” (i.e., a Bolshevik Soviet), the Anti-Fascist Council for the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ).³³ The

democracy, parliamentarism and liberalism are destructive teachings leading to atheism of the society. Croatian Roman Catholic masses in the Independent State of Croatia were swayed by the ideological propaganda that this Roman Catholic country creates a future community of God on earth, but of course, without infidels – the Orthodox Serbs. Therefore, the main route guidance became “Civitas Dei”. In contrast to the Orthodox Christianity, which was declared to be unbelief, the Islam was accepted as a nest of the Croatian nation. A basic Ustashi political goal was to create through a comprehensive genocide against the Serb Orthodox population a necessary majority of the Croatian Roman Catholic population within the borders of the Independent State of Croatia (including and Bosnia-Herzegovina). According to the original Ustashi concept, the first huge concentration and death camp for the Orthodox Serbs was to be built somewhere in the sector of the lower River of Neretva in Herzegovina. However, since the Italian occupation authorities did not allow the Ustashi regime in Zagreb to build such a camp on their (southern) occupation sector of the ex-Yugoslavia, the Ustashi government did it on the River of Sava in the village of Jasenovac that was in the German occupation (northern) zone (М. Екмечић, *Дуго кретање између клања и орања. Историја Срба у новом веку (1492-1992)*, Треће, допуњено издање, Евро Giunti, Београд 2010, pp. 445-446). On the direct complicity of the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church in the commission of the crime of genocide in the death camp of Jasenovac is best illustrated by the fact that three commanders of this death and sadistic camp were the Roman Catholic priests alongside with the another fact that a huge number of them (especially the members of the Franciscan order) participated in the Ustasha crimes against the Orthodox Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia. Most bloodthirsty among all Roman Catholic priests was the commander of Jasenovac death camp – a monk Miroslav Filipović-Majstorović (known as “friar Satan”), who was before the war, a Franciscan friar and a chaplain in the village of Petrićevac in Bosnia. Friar Filipović was even once held a Holly Mass in a Roman Catholic church in the bloody Ustashi uniform and with a gun on the belt through which pulled the priest’s cassock (Ј. Алмули, *Јевреји и Срби у Јасеновцу*, Службени гласник, Београд 2009, p. 263). About the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the baptism and the massacres of the Orthodox Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia, see: А.М. Ривели, *Надбискуп геноцида. Монсињор Степинац, Ватикан и усташка диктатура у Хрватској, 1941-1945*, Јасен, Никшић, 1999.

33. AVNOJ – „Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije“.

same AVNOJ a year later (November 29th-30th, 1943) had also a two days session (the "Second" one) on the Ustashi controlled territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the town of Jajce, when Broz's Communists decided to proclaim themselves as the only legitimate political power in the country, i.e. committed a *coup d'état*. However, both of these AVNOJ sessions were absolutely undisturbed by the local Ustashi detachments and the Croatian government in Zagreb. The Second session in 1943 was held on the newly 'liberated' by the Partisans territory where it was proclaimed a new Soviet (Bolshevik) republic ("Republic of Jajce") in Central Bosnia-Herzegovina. Broz's Partisans on the ceded territory around Bihać were successively aided by the Ustashi government in Zagreb in combat gear, weapons, ammunition, and food so that they were completely able to reorganize their detachments and to transform them into a powerful army ready for the conquering of Serbia. On this 'liberated' territory with Ustashi support Tito succeeded to form from Serb refugees the First and Second Proletarian Divisions, the Third Montenegrin Strike Division, two divisions of Krajina Serbs, one division of Lika Serbs, one division of Banija Serbs and one Dalmatia division (around 25,000 soldiers). Later, all of these Partisan divisions became a core of the communist army in its conquest of Belgrade and Serbia in autumn 1944.³⁴

It was during staying in this ceded territory within the Independent State of Croatia by the Ustashi regime in Zagreb in the middle and second half in 1942 when the Politbureau of the Central Com-

34. П.М. Минић, *Расуте кости (1941-1945)*, Детроит, САД 1965, pp. 140, 173. Here we will mention one documentary report by the German army general, obergruppenführer Arthur von Flebsa, from the territory of the Independent State of Croatia on Ustashi-Partisan open collaboration. A sector of Flebs' commands included the South Dalmatian and parts of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory. The General was in 1943 and 1944 sending the military reports directly to Himmler in Berlin and he took his private war diary. So, Flebs writes about five Ustashi officers who went to the Partisan side but before that they issued to their men a short command: "Run away to save your lives!" ... "Ustashi battalion at the confluence of the River of Neretva is unable to reject even the simplest attack by the bandits, they are running cowardly away after the first bullet... and they are informing the Partisans. One Ustashi detachment even sold the ammunition to the Partisans" (Tagesbuch Nr. Ia&545).

mittee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia revealed to us the essence of the Communist-Partisan way of combat for the sake of the revolutionary conquest of power. It was exactly a speech given by the top Communist Moshe Pijade at the First session of the AVNOJ in November 1942 in the town of Bihać in the Western Bosnia who, as a senior member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, shortly and clearly explained what was the best way of creating a Partisan army led by Josip Broz Tito:

It is necessary therefore to create so many homeless people in order to be the majority in the country.

Therefore, we need to burn. We will fire and withdraw. The Germans are not going to find us, but they will for revenge burn villages. Then the villagers, who will remain without a roof, will by themselves come to us and we will have the people with us, and we will thus become a master of the situation. Those who have no home or land or cattle, will quickly join us, because we promise them a big heist.

The harder it will be with those who have some property. We will attract them by lectures, theater performances and other propaganda... We will gradually go through all the provinces. The farmer who owns a house, land, cattle, a worker who receives a salary and bread for us is useless. We have to make them homeless, proletarians... Only unfortunates become the Communists, because we have to create the misfortune, to throw the masses to desperation, we are mortal enemies of any welfare, law and order...³⁵

The roots and reasons for the collaboration between the Ustashi and the Communists/Partisans

The roots and causes of the wartime collaboration between the Ustashi and the Communists/Partisans date back to the time of the

35. *Archives of the Military-Historical Institute (AVI)*, Belgrade, Speech by Moshe Pijade at the First session of AVNOJ, Staff of the Supreme Command, Chetnik Archives, K-12, 30/12.

prewar Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and, on the basis of documentary material, at least from the year of 1932. The reasons for this collaboration were of the ideological–political nature and their basis is a common goal of both sides to destroy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and on its ruins to form the new states including at the first a Greater Croatia. In order to achieve this goal, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was logically supporting all anti-Yugoslav movements and their actions and, of course, has sought to establish close cooperation with them. Given a fact that the Croats were the most numerous in Yugoslavia after the Serbs as well as that their financial and industrial bourgeoisie was strongest in the country it was logical that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia will support all kinds of Croatian nationalism, anti-Yugoslav policy and separatism for the sake of breaking the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Such policy the Communist Party of Yugoslavia even officially included into its party program as a long-term political goal of the Yugoslav Communists. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that in the interwar period, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia openly supported, even in its public media, (a Greater) Croatian Revolutionary Organization (*Hrvatska revolucionarna organizacija* – HRO), i.e. the Ustashi movement, formed in 1929. For instance, the official “Magazine of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Section of the Communist International)”, how exactly was the title of the magazine – *Proleter*, at No. 28 from December 1932 (i.e., less than two years before the assassination of the Yugoslav King Alexander in France by the Croatian Revolutionary Organization) published an article on the support of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Ustashi movement. The first and main paragraph of the article reads as follows:

The Communist Party welcomes the Ustashi movement of Lika and Dalmatian peasants and placed itself completely on their side. It is the duty of all Communist organizations and every Communist to facilitate the movement, to organize and to lead. At the same time the Communist Party indicates the current shortcomings and mistakes in this movement, which

*are explained by the fact that the Croatian Fascist elements are playing in the movement so far a significant impact. (Pavelić Perčec), who are against developing of one Serbian mass movement against Greater Serbian military-fascist dictatorship because they fear that such movement will turn not only against the dictatorship but also against themselves and their Italian masters. Therefore, they are limited to the actions of small units and methods of individual terror.*³⁶

Such a Communist perspective on the Communist-Ustashi collaboration is directly inspired by the attitudes of the Stalinist Comintern (under direct and hegemonic leadership of Georgian Josef Visarionovich Dzhugashvili Stalin) on the resolution of the ‘national’ questions across Europe. It means in practice that any real or fabricated nation have the right to self-determination to the final territorial secession. Therefore, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, influenced by the Comintern, accepted the standpoint that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was a “Versailles creation” in 1919 despite the fact that Croatia’s Zagreb proclaimed the unification with the “Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro” even during the war on November 23rd, 1918,³⁷ i.e., before the start of sessions of the postwar international conference in Paris and the castles around the city. In fact, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’s Central Committee’s Politbureau adopted an official position of the Comintern from its Fifth Congress in Moscow in 1924 following the suggestions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia itself, that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as a “Versailles creation of a Greater Serbia”, has to be destroyed what meant that every anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav alliance and action were legitimate and welcome. On this occasion, it was adopted and issued a special resolution in Moscow

36. *Proleter*.

37. “Proclamation by the National Council of the unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro”, Zagreb, November 23rd, 1918 u Snežana Trifunovska (ed.), *Yugoslavia through Documents. From its creation to its dissolution*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1994, pp. 151-153.

on the national question in Yugoslavia with a request for creation of independent states of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, i.e., for territorial destruction of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. At the same time, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (the HRSS) was by Stalin himself labeled as an advanced and revolutionary party with which the Yugoslav Communists should cooperate. Here it is necessary to point out that the resolution of the Comintern in 1924 did not schedule an independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro from Yugoslavia and also did not determine any borders of “Slovenia”, “Croatia” and “Macedonia”. Therefore, the question of the republican–national borders was practically left to be solved by the Yugoslav Communists by themselves after the war with a new Moscow policy that (Communist) Yugoslavia has to exist. It was finally done in 1946 without any public debate on the border issue and with official proclaiming of the three new nations: the “Montenegrins”, “Macedonians” and “Muslims”. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia accepted the 1924 Comintern policy on the rights of peoples to self-determination up to the final territorial secession from existing and internationally recognized states. This policy was in the case of Yugoslavia finally realized in the 1990s with dissolution of the country by the Communists themselves. In sum, in 1924 under the direct influence of the Comintern the Yugoslav Communists have adopted the official position of Soviet Moscow that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia was an artificial creation of the Versailles Order after World War I that became a formal justification for the Yugoslav Communists to adopt an official policy guidelines on the destruction of Yugoslavia until 1935 when the Comintern changed a policy towards Yugoslav state and its territorial integrity. Anyway, Communist-Ustashi collaboration was a crucial one in any combination of the destruction of Yugoslavia from inside (no matter before or after World War II).

The communist final policy about breaking up the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia was finally shaped at the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Dresden in November 1928 (held in the building of the Party School of the

Communist Party of Germany – “Rosa Luxemburg”) when the destruction of the Yugoslav state was included in the official program of the Party. At the same time, the Yugoslav proletariat was called to the fight to defeat the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and to contribute to the victory of the Soviet government in Moscow in the coming imperialistic war planned by the Western countries against the Soviet Union. On this occasion, it was adopted and the revolutionary task of the Yugoslav Communists to lead the peasants and other oppressed national masses in the upcoming civil war in order to destroy the “current imperialistic state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for full national independence of the oppressed nations, the overthrowing of the bourgeoisie, the workers’ and peasants’ government and for the establishment of a Balkan federation of the republics of the workers and peasants”.³⁸ Here should be given a special attention to the fact that the text of the 1928 “Dresdner Resolution” of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the linguistic sense is very much coloured with a standardized vocabulary of the Croatian language which says a lot about the character of the leadership of the Party, which phrased the Resolution. The Yugoslav Communists in their anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian policy were even ready to collaborate with Mussolini’s Italy or Horthi’s Hungary in order to destroy their main political enemy – the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thus, Milan Gorkić (i.e., Joseph Čižinski, who was from the second half of 1932 an interim Secretary General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, appointed directly by the Comintern in Moscow) declared in April 1929 that in the case of rebellion in Croatia the Party must make “temporary strategic agreement with foreign imperialism” (Italy and Hungary) and even to give to those countries some Yugoslav territories, for the sake of destroying Yugoslavia and her regime of the “Greater Serbian hegemony” with the help of Rome and Buda-

38. B. Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988*, I, NOLIT, Beograd 1988, p. 160. On the territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the first Soviet (Bolshevik) republics were created in Labin, Ptuj and Southeast Banat. In Banat it was established agrarian republic in November 1918 as the „Soviet Republic of Kusići“.

pest.³⁹ Subsequently, the Yugoslav Communists were during World War II loyal to this Gorkiĉ's declaration and guidelines, collaborating with both the German occupiers and Paveliĉ's Croat Ustashi.⁴⁰

The 1928 "Dresden Resolution" of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was a direct supporting response to the conclusions adopted at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 in Moscow that World is coming closer to a general crisis of the global capitalism which will be followed by the Western imperialistic war against the USSR. Therefore, the Comintern in Moscow issued a directive to all its branches (i.e., the Communist parties) abroad that the Communists have to be prepared for participation in direct class conflict in order to break bourgeoisie order in their countries by the socialist revolution and to replace it with a socialist order. For that reason, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia already in 1928 after its congress in Dresden issued a directive for organizing of the armed uprising in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for the sake of its dissolution.

The first concrete political cooperation between the Croatian Ustashi movement and the Yugoslav Communists occurred already in 1932 when the Communists called all Yugoslav peoples in open rebellion against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in order to assist the Croatian national revolutionaries (the Ustashi) in their fight against the royal dictatorship (introduced on January 6th, 1929). This Ustashi uprising broke out in September 1932 when, with the help of Mussolini's Italy, an Ustashi group attacked a Yugoslav gendarmerie station in the village of Brušani at Velebit Mt. in Dalmatia with the intent to launch a mass uprising against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for the establishment of an independent Greater Croatia on the basis of the "Croatian historical and state's rights". Thus, in this case, Mussolini's Italy, Paveliĉ's Ustashi and the Yugoslav Communists became politically united in their mutual collaboration.

39. B. Petranoviĉ–M. Zeĉeviĉ, *Agonija dve Jugoslavije*, Beograd 1991, p. 191.

40. Минић, *Расуте косту, op.cit.*; K. Šmider, *Partizanski rat u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945*, 2005.

One of the most important documents and details from the history of pre-war collaboration between Pavelić's Ustashi and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is a concrete and comprehensive "Agreement between the Communist Party and the Croatian Ustashi liberation movement" reached in June 1935 and signed by Moshe Pijade for the Communist side and Dr. Mile Budak for the Ustashi movement in a prison of Sremska Mitrovica. The aim of this agreement was a very clear and unambiguous: a total destruction of the Yugoslav state and everything that was Serbian and Christian Orthodox.⁴¹ The text of the agreement became publically known in World War II as Serbia's government of General Milan Nedić reprinted it several times and at such a way informing the Serbs who were the Communists and Broz's Partisans and for whom and what fore they have been fighting in the war. However, it is true that from a historiographic-scientific-methodological point of view there is a problem of authenticity of this crucial document on Ustashi-Communist collaboration as the text of the agreement is preserved only in the transcript, i.e. not in the original form. Therefore, the only argument against the Communist-Ustashi collaboration by the post-war titographic 'historiography' is that this document was misused as pure war propaganda by the government of General Milan Nedić ("Nedić's forgery") against the patriotic freedom fighters Partisans. However, by using the basic principles of analogical methods we come to the conclusion that such an agreement (written, signed or oral no matter) between the Communists and the Ustashi certainly existed since the crucial points of it on the destruction of the Orthodox Serbs were implemented by both sides during and after World War II. In this sense, we have to notice at least six facts:

1. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not issue any communiqué in regard to the proclamation of the Independent

41. The most important parts of this Communist-Ustashi collaboration agreement is published in M. Самарџић, *Сарадња партизана са Немцима, усташама и Албанцима*, Погледи, Крагујевац 2006, pp. 66-67 according to *Archives of the Military-Historical Institute (AVI)*, Belgrade, Agreement Pijade-Budak.

- State of Croatia in Zagreb on April 10th, 1941 but we know that the Yugoslav Communists were well known for their propensity for issuing the party's communiqués on every political occasion and new situation.
2. Broz's Partisans during the whole World War II even did not think to try to liberate the most notorious death camp in Europe – Jasenovac (the “Nineth Circle of Hell”, the “Balkan Auschwitz”) in which the Ustashi soldiers killed up to 700,000 men including and children of whom the ethnic Serbs were the overwhelming majority.⁴²
 3. After the war the new Communist authorities transformed the death camp of Jasenovac into very beautiful park by destroying and removing all camp buildings and other material proofs of the genocide (totally different policy in comparison with the post-war Auschwitz, for instance). It is even erected a monument (called “Cracked Rose”) in 1966 devoted to all camp's victims but which consists of four Latin letters “U” which Pavelić's Ustashi soldiers wore on their caps as an official insignia of the movement.
 4. Josip Broz Tito (of Croat-Slovene origin), as a President of the post-war Yugoslavia for 35 years, never visited the place of Jasenovac and never participated in any of annual commemoration meetings on the place of this wartime “slaughtering house” or any other mass-grave place of the Serbs on the territory of the Ustashi-run Independent State of Croatia.
 5. About direct wartime collaboration between the Croatian Ustashi and the Croat-led Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its People's Liberation Army (the Partisan movement) of Josip Broz Tito in order to be solved the Serbian question in the Independent State of Croatia indirectly tells the case from July 31st, 1966 just at the opening ceremony of the memorial museum to the victims of the Jasenovac death camp (a “factory of death”). In fact, as one of the guests and also the official representative of the governing structures of Croatia at this ceremony was present and the President of the Parlia-

42. www.jasenovac.org; www.jasenovac-info.com.

ment of the Socialist Republic of Croatia – Stevo Krajačić, who was one of the most trusted associates of Tito. However, when the opening ceremony ended but thinking that the microphones are muted, Krajačić turned to the Serbian Partisan soldiers (his wartime comrades) telling them literally: “Here, we kill you not enough”. Nevertheless, the microphones were not turned off and as a consequence after this scandal Krajačić was forced to resign from the post.⁴³

6. It was a very fact that many Ustashi soldiers and officers during the war, but mostly in 1944 and 1945 when it was already clear who is going to be a loser and who a winner, changed a side and finished the war as Tito’s Partisans and therefore participated in the communist mass terror against Serbia’s civilians in 1944/1945 when Serbia became occupied by the Partisans who came from the territory of the Independent State of Croatia. It is estimated that at that time up to 100,000 Serbia’s Serbs lost their lives under the Partisan-Ustashi terror under the name of a fight against the ‘collaborators’ with the Germans, i.e., the Chetniks. Nevertheless, two cases of a changing side by the top Ustashi officers are here of extreme relevance as the examples:⁴⁴
 - A Croat Franjo Pirc was a commander of the Royal Yugoslav air squadron on April 6th, 1941 when the German Luftwaffe started the war against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by heavily bombing its capital – Belgrade. However, on the military air-port in the city of Niš in Serbia Captain Franjo Pirc burned all his airplanes except one which he used to fly to the Germans who sent him to Croatia where he became a chief commander of all air forces of the Ustashi Independent State of Croatia. During the war, there is a testimony of the US officer Ilija Eli Popovich (of the Serb origin) who was at Tito’s General Staff how on

43. Ривели, *Надбискуп геноцида*, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

44. Р. Макдавел, *Стрељање историје*, Поета–Рад, Београд 2012 [original title: *The Key Strategic Role of the Serbs and Their Leader, General Mihailovich, in Southeast Europe During World War Two*], pp. 5-8.

one occasion the Ustashi chief commander of all Croatia's air forces – Franjo Pirc came in the official car of the Independent State of Croatia with all Ustashi insignias escorted by the Ustashi soldiers to Josip Broz Tito who organized to him a welcome ceremony with a Partisan guard of honor. Tito was very kind with and welcome to Pirc for whom Broz organized and reach banquet at evening. However, Franjo Pirc at the end of the war joined the Partisans and was appointed by Tito as a commander of the Yugoslav (Partisan) Military Air Forces. Officially, according to the post-war Communist titography, Pirc was even the establisher of the military air forces of the Communist Yugoslavia. After his retirement, Pirc was appointed for the Yugoslav ambassador in Argentina – the country that accepted a huge number of the Ustashi after May 1945.

- A Croat Ustashi General Marko Mesić was a commander of the Ustashi troops during the Battle of Stalingrad where he was arrested by the Soviet soldiers. However, under the personal intervention of Josip Broz Tito, all arrested Croat soldiers became transformed into the People's Army for Yugoslavia's Liberation under Mesić command fighting as a part of the Soviet Red Army. Therefore, redressed Croat Ustashi soldiers took a participation in the Red Army's "liberation" of Serbia in October 1944 committing the war crimes against her civilians. Nevertheless, a General Marko Mesić became after the war appointed as a commander of the Guard of Josip Broz Tito for many years.

Conclusions

1. Collaboration between the Croat Ustashi movement and the Croat-led Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its Partisan movement during World War II on the territory of the Ustashi-governed Independent State of Croatia was a systematic, direct and above all anti-Serb oriented with the main political task to

- solve the Serbian question on this territory on the most brutal and Croat-favour way.
2. The roots of this collaboration are from the inter-war period when both the Ustashi and the Communists reached an agreement on destruction of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Serbs for the sake of creation of a Croat dominated Greater Croatia.
 3. For the Yugoslav Communists and their Partisan movement during World War II the only military–political enemy was the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (the Ravna Gora Movement) commanded by the General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović.
 4. In order to defeat the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland, as the only legal representative of the only legal government of Yugoslavia, the Communists collaborated with both the Ustashi and the Germans.
 5. After World War II the Communist quasi-historiography (‘titography’) did everything to falsificate a role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its Partisan movement during the war in order to present itself as a patriots and freedom-fighters.⁴⁵
 6. Even today, 70 years after the end of World War II, the most hidden and untouchable topic of historiographic investigation on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia regarding World War II history of the Yugoslav peoples is collaboration of the Yugoslav Communists and their Partisan detachments with the Ustashi regime in Zagreb and the Germans.

45. With regard to the issue on the titographic forgeries about Josip Broz Tito, Broz’s Partisans and the Ravna Gora Movement in 1941-1945, see Б.В. Сотировић, *Кривотворине о Јосипу Брозџу Титу, Брозџовим партизанима и Равногорском покрету, 1941. г.-1945. г.*, Вильнус: Штампарија Литванског едуколошког универзитета, 2014 (www.partizani.blog.com); Самарџић, *Фалсификати*, *op.cit.*

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Appendices



Figure 1:
Croat Ustashi soldiers together with the Croat-led Partisans



Figure 2:
A member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia Milovan Đilas and Partisan commander Koča Popović together with the German officers and soldiers during the „March negotiations“ (Bosnia-Herzegovina) in 1943 when both sides agreed to collaborate against the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland



Figure 3:

A shameful monument to the victims of the Ustashi-lead genocide on the place of a death camp of Jasenovac on the River of Sava in Croatia erected by the Yugoslav Communist authorities in 1966. It is made in a shape of the Ustashi „U“ insignia.



Figure 4:

A German soldier August Heller together with the Yugoslav Partisans of the Ljubić's Partisan Detachment in the Western Serbia around the city of Čačak in 1941.