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The Pontic Kingdom Under Mithridates VI

Figure 1. The map of the Pontic Kingdom



Source: "A Brief History of Pontos BC," Tasmanian Numismatist, accessed 11 July 2015, <http://www.vision.net.au/~pwood/March2002.htm>.

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1. Historical overview of the origins of the Pontic Kingdom and the results of the rule of Mithridates VI

1.1. Brief characteristics of the Pontic Kingdom: geography, languages, religion

The Kingdom of Pontus was a Hellenistic state of Persian origin situated in the Eastern Asia Minor washed by the Black Sea which played an extraordinary role in the Antique history between 302-64 BC. Its favorable geographical position (Fig. 1) remained an imprint on its history: based on the crossroads of important trade routes between Asia, the Balkans and the Black Sea region, having relations with rich countries of the Northern Mesopotamia, Caucasus, Iran and Black Sea region the Pontic Kingdom represented a vivid social, economic, ethnic, and cultural mixture of local Asia Minor, Anatolian, Iranian, and Hellenistic traditions. The northern border of Pontus was going through the southern coast of the Black Sea from the River Galis (modern Kizil-Irmak) up to the River Ofis (modern Ishtala-Dere). The River Ofis was the eastern border of Pontus and Chochis up to the River Lik in the south and the River Iris in the east crossing the River Galis. On the south the border of Pontus was expanding from the Mount Ak-Daga up to Gurlevik-Daga, then on south-western part the Pontic Kingdom was bordering on the Greater Cappadocia. Then the borderline was crossing the River Cappadox (modern Deliche Irmak), flowing into Galis.¹

According to B. C. McGing, “the Hellenistic Kingdom of Pontus which Mithridates Eupator inherited from his ancestors spanned much of the south coast of the Black Sea from Amastris in the west at least as far as Pharnaceia in the east. It was bounded inland by Paphlagonia and Galatia in the west, by Cappadocia in the south and by Armenia Minor in the east. Strabo gives its name as “Pontus” or “Cappadocia of the Pontus” while its neighbor to the south was known as “Cappadocia,” “Cappadocia on the Taurus” or “Greater Cappadocia.” Both Cappadocias had been satrapies of the Persian

1. S. Ju. Saprykin, *Pontijskoe carstvo* (The Kingdom of Pontus), (Moskva, 1996).

Empire but became independent kingdoms in the Hellenistic age. Pontus was situated in a remote area on the edge of the Greek and Roman world and was divided into two distinct parts – a narrow coastal plain and a mountainous inland region. Communication between the two parts was made very difficult by the steeply rising range of the Pontic Alps which runs parallel to the coast and close to it, leaving the coastal plain only a few miles wide in many places. The capital and one of the main cities was Sinope which due to its harbour and central position on the south shore of the Black Sea was the most prosperous important trading center of that coast.”

Despite the fact that Pontic Kingdom was a multiethnic state, Greek was the official language of the Kingdom, with other languages spoken such as Persian, Paphlagonian, Phrygian, Galatian, Armenian, and Lycian. The religion of Pontos was syncretic, incorporating Greek polytheism with Anatolian and Persian gods.²

1.2. The origins of the dynasty of Mithridatides

Saprykin, states that the question of the origin of the dynasty of Mithridatides has a major meaning in the history of the Pontic Kingdom. Although the research of this topic is aggravated by contradictions of the ancient tradition and sometimes totally opposite conclusions of the researchers. The earliest literary evidence was offered by Polybius who says that the king Mithridates III (220-185 BC) states that he originates from one of the “seven Persians” and in another source he states that Mithridatides originated from one of the Persian kings. Appian performs very important statements, saying characterizing Mithridates VI Eupator as the representative of the 16th generation of the predecessors of Darius I and the 8th generation of Mithridates Ctistis. Plutarch states that Mithridates, the son of Ariobarzan, became the founder of the Pontic Kingdom and the dynasty of Pontic kings. Thus, all of the mentioned ancient authors agree to the idea that the dynasty of Mithridatides was of Persian origin. The

2. S. Ju. Saprykin, “The Religion and Cults of the Pontic Kingdom: Political Aspects,” in *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*, ed. Jakob Munk Højte (Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 2009).


difficulties in this research are represented by the fact that there are numerous legends about the origin of the dynasty which were often created in order to justify the rule of Mithridatides in Cappadocia and therefore were widely used by Mithridates VI Eupator in order to support his expansion in the Asia Minor.

Having analyzed the data offered by Saprykin,³ we can conclude that the first known member Mithridates I of Cius who was followed by his son Mithridates II of Cius. Mithridates II's son, also called Mithridates, would become Mithridates I Ktistes of Pontus (meaning "The Founder"). The Independent Pontic Kingdom was created by Mithridates I Ctistes (reigned 302-266 BC). His son Ariobarzanes, the second king of Pontus, was succeeded by Mithridates II, who in 220 BC declared war upon the powerful city of Sinope, but was unable to weaken it and the city did not fall into the power of the kings of Pontus until 183 BC when Pharnaces I of Pontus conquered the city and made it the capital of the kingdom.

Mithridates IV Philopator Philadelphus started the policy of friendship of the Kingdom of Pontus with the Roman Republic and her allies which would continue till Mithridates VI Eupator. Mithridates V Euergetes continues his predecessor's friendly policy towards the Roman Empire and remains in history as a great benefactor to the Hellenic culture. The kingdom reached its greatest height under Mithridates VI Eupator, commonly called the Great, who for many years carried on war with the Romans, himself claimed descent from both the kings of Persia and from Alexander the Great, whom he imitated in his coin portraits and is notable for bringing the Pontic Kingdom to its greatest height. During his long reign (120-63 BC) he extended the kingdom to encompass also the northern coast of the Black Sea.

3. Saprykin, *Pontijskoe carstvo*, 17.

Figure 2. Pharnakes I, Kings of Pontos, Circa 185-170 BC.
Tetradrachm



Source: Forum Ancient Coins, accessed: 13 July 2015,
<http://www.forumancientcoins.com/fakes/displayimage.php?album=20&pos=848>.

1.3. Early Life and Reign of Mithridates VI

Mithridates VI, a son of Laodice VI and Mithridates V of Pontus, was born in the Pontic city of Sinope and was raised in the Kingdom of Pontus. The story of Eupator's birth can be seen as an example of Iranian influence, and probably of Alexander the Great imitation. It is said that the greatness of Mithridates' reign was foretold by the

heavens: in the year of his birth and of his accession to the throne, a comet appeared filling a quarter of the whole sky and blocking out the sun for seventy days. It symbolized the length of the king's life, the extent of his conquests and his eclipse of the might of Rome. Another story told is also proving the greatness of the future king: when still a baby, Eupator was struck by lightning, this supposed to provide the explanation for his surname Dionysus, whose mother Semele had been struck by lightning when pregnant with him. As the star and thunderbolt are part of Iranian royal legend, the association of Eupator with lightning recalls the similar experience of Alexander the Great (his mother Olympias had a dream that her womb had been struck by lightning). These stories indicate the importance of the Iranian tradition in the Mithridatid dynasty, and at the same time reflect his belonging to the great predecessor Alexander.⁴

Almost being poisoned, Mithridates V left the Kingdom to the joint rule of Laodice VI, Mithridates and his younger brother, Mithridates Chrestus. Laodice VI's regency over Pontus favored Mithridates Chrestus over Mithridates, so he had escaped from the plotting of his mother and had gone into hiding. Mithridates is said to have lived for seven years in the wilderness, here he grew strong and accustomed to hardship, before taking on the throne and initiating his conquest of the Black Sea and Asia. Mithridates' withdrawal could be a mixture of two further Iranian elements: 1) it is a recognizable feature of Iranian royal legend for the king to spend part of his youth secreted away in the country; 2) the Persians clearly attached great importance to hunting, an exercise which provided an excellent training in riding and shooting (two educational elements listed in Herodotus and the Arabian inscription). These elements once again reflect a comparison of the future king with Alexander the Great.⁵

Between 116-113 BC Mithridates returned to Pontus and was hailed the King. He showed clemency towards his mother and brother by imprisoning them both and giving them a royal funeral

4. E. A. Molev, *Властитель Понта. Монография* (The King of Pontus. Monography) (Nizhniy Novgorod, 1995).

5. B. C. McGing, *The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator, King of Pontus* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986).

after death. Mithridates married his first young sister Laodice because of the following reasons: 1) the purity of their blood-line; 2) as a wife to rule with him as a sovereign over Pontus; 3) to be the mother of his legitimate children to ensure their succession and to claim his right as a ruling monarch.

Mithridates entertained ambitions of making his state the dominant power in the Black Sea and Anatolia. After he subjugated Colchis, the king of Pontus clashed for supremacy in the Pontic steppe with the Scythian king Palacus. The most important Crimean centers of Tauric Chersonesus and the Bosporan Kingdom readily surrendered their independence in return for Mithridates' promises to protect them against the Scythians, their ancient enemies. The young king turned his attention to Anatolia, where Roman power was on the rise. He contrived to partition Paphlagonia and Galatia with King Nicomedes III of Bithynia, but it soon became clear to him that Nicomedes steered his country into an anti-Pontic alliance with the expanding Roman Republic. Mithridates fell out with Nicomedes over control of Cappadocia and defeated him in a series of battles. The Romans twice interfered into the conflict on behalf of Nicomedes (95-92 BC), leaving Mithridates, with little choice other than to engage in a future Roman-Pontic war.⁶

1.4 Internal and external policy of the Pontic Kingdom and subsequent changes of its borders

1.4.1. Social and economic situation in the Black Sea region

Under Mithridates VI Eupator the Pontic Kingdom managed to expand essentially its territory, having incorporated the Colchis, Cappadocia, Bithynia, the Greek colonies of the Tauric Chersonesos (Bosporan Kingdom) and for a brief time the Roman province of Asia as a result of the Mithridatic wars which took place between 88

6. S. Ju. Saprykin, *Понтийское царство: Государство греков и варваров в Причерноморье* (The Kingdom of Pontus: The State of Greeks in the Black Sea Region), (Moscow: Наука, 1996).

and 63 BC, the most prominent and fruitful of which was the First Mithridatic war (Fig. 3).

Figure 3. The Kingdom of Pontus (291-62 BC) at its height: before the reign of Mithridates VI (dark purple), after his early conquests (purple), and his conquests in the first Mithridatic war (pink)



Source: “Kingdom of Pontus,” Wikipedia, accessed 13 July 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Pontus.

The last quarter of the 2nd century BC the political and socio-economic situation in the Black Sea and Danube region was characterized by the decline of the situation in the Greek poleis. In the second half of the 3rd century BC the Scythian and Sarmatian tribes practically stated supremacy in the steppes of the Northern Black Sea region. Eventually, after numerous battles and peace agreements

Mithridates VI managed to set friendly relations with all the enemies in the mentioned region, who were assisting him in the wars against the Roman Empire. By the end of the 4th century the Black Sea poleis had a tendency for unification in order to create a united inter-pontic market for trade (basically ceramics, jewellery, and wheat). Therefore, the trade circles of the poleis of the region started to consider Sinope and Amasia as two centers for the Black Sea trade – the idea that was supported by the Pontic powers. Due to his three wars on Rome and despite the fact that two of them ended up in defeat of the Pontic Kingdom, Mithridates VI was considered to be the biggest enemy of the Roman Empire.

1.4.2. Policy towards the Roman Empire

The relations with the Roman Empire played an important role in the politics of the kings of Pontus. In respect of Rome, Mithridates VI Eupator at the beginning was using the policy of the Pontic Kingdom as a friend of Roman Empire which helped him strengthen his state by not conducting an aggressive policy towards Rome which was a wise political step.⁷ In the second half of the 2nd century BC the Pontic Kingdom with the support of the Roman Empire managed to annex the biggest part of the lost territories of the Otanids. However later the Roman Empire, loyal to its traditional tactics to lessen the power of the empowered by him ally, was trying to restrict the power of the Pontic Kingdom. The acme of the development of these bilateral relations was an unarmed conflict between them which caused enormous influence on the internal politics in Rome as well as on the destiny of the Hellenistic civilization. During these conflicts the Pontic Kingdom managed to reach a short-time peak of its power, but also lived through the period of the total decline.

7. Saprykin, *Понтийское царство*, 127.

1.4.3. Policy towards the Northern and Southern Black Sea region area

The characteristic features of the Mithridates VI foreign policy as to the lands of the Black Sea region, according to Saprykin,⁸ was the continuation of the policy of philhellenism in the conquered lands which supposed that the Pontic Kingdom was a unifying power for all the Greek lands. By liberation of Greek lands from barbarian tribes (Scythians, Sarmatians, Bastrans), he managed to incorporate the Northern Black Sea Region – Olbia, Chersonesos, Bosporian Kingdom, Colchis and Lesser Armenia into the economic and political structure of the Pontic Kingdom. As for the territories of Thrace and western coast of the Black Sea region, they accepted the protectorate of the Pontic Kingdom but their relationships were based on military support in wars against Rome and didn't have a direct political or economic dependence upon the Pontic Kingdom.⁹

It is important to underline that except for the goal of expansion of the territories of the Pontic Kingdom and the policy of philhellenism, Mithridates VI viewed the Black Sea region as the military basis for active conquests in the Mediterranean region with strategic centers of Amasia, Colchis and Cappadocia. Mithridates VI at the beginning of his rule concentrated his views on the former capital of the Pontic Kingdom Amasia which guaranteed to him important support. Mithridates Eupator turned Amasia into an important trade and economic center of the Black Sea region. The second point of the King's policy was the provision to the most important cities of the Pontic Kingdom of the right to produce their own copper coins and the right to produce copper drachmas to Amasia. Later Amasia was the only Pontic city to be allowed to produce its own silver and golden coins for a short time – which was an exceptional case; that was a part of the philhellenic policy of the King as well as a sort of a praise for the merits of the city for Mithridates VI. Another important point was the endeavor of the King to unify the currency of the Kingdom in order to establish strong economic ties within the

8. *Ibid.*, 151-52.

9. *Ibid.*, 130-35.

whole Pontic Kingdom. Mithridates Eupator encouraged the church coin mintage and strengthened the role of the church units. Also, he was providing poleis with limited rights of autonomy which was very important in order to keep the incorporated lands within the borders of the Pontic Kingdom.¹⁰

1.5. Land division and administrative organization of the Pontic Kingdom under Mithridates VI

Saprykin¹¹ states that the characteristic feature of the Pontic Kingdom before the rule of Mithridates VI was the mixture of ancient traditions of a village community, tribal relations and poleis land ownership. In the political and administrative respect it supposed the presence of a huge bureaucratic administrative system, which was based on obedience to the King's power and provided by it rights for autonomy and self-regulation of the Greek poleis.

Jakob Munk Højte¹² states that literary sources give very scattered and fragmented information about the administrative organization of the Pontic Kingdom under the dynasty of the Mithridatides and thus the investigation of the administrative structure of the Kingdom of Pontus should be conducted basing on inscriptions, topographical information, numismatic evidence and survey data. Given of the size of the armies of Mithridates VI, we can conclude that the population in the interior Pontos primarily lived in cities. The only city that Mithridates VI founded during his rule was Eupatoria, named so basing on the tradition of the Hellenistic kings who tended to call the new-founded cities in their own or their family names and which was situated south of the confluence of the Rivers Lykos and Iris in a highly strategic point. The evidence does show that kings founded cities in the interior, yet there is no epigraphic or literary evidence which could clarify

10. *Ibid.*, 207.

11. *Ibid.*, 221.

12. "Administrative Organization of the Pontic Kingdom," Centre for Black Sea Studies, accessed August 15, 2015, www.pontos.dk/publications/books/bss-9-files/bss-9-05-hojte-1.

whether the cities were self-governed entities. The only evidence that prove some degree of the cities autonomy are the so-called “municipal” bronze coins in the names of different localities during the reign of Mithridates Eupator.¹³ It has previously been thought that the coinage was part of a deliberate policy of hellenization by Mithridates VI which included the attempt to promote Greek polis-like structures in Pontos and permission to allow cities the mintage of their own coins was supposed to foster local pride. But since there was a central authority with an organized political programme behind the coinage as the coin types are the same for all the different mints which means that autonomy wasn’t full. There is an assumption that the issuing place could be a royal administrative center of each unit, while the total of the issuing places in Pontos were ten: Amaseia, Amisos, Chabakta, Gazioura, Kabeira, Komana, Laodikeia, Pharnakeia, Pimolisa, Taulara, Sinope, Amastris, and probably Dia west of Herakleia with the largest output of coins minted in Amisos and Sinope.¹⁴

Saprykin states that there were two types of cities in the Pontic Kingdom the status of which differed depending on the will of the King: firstly, these were small towns (*polihnion*) which had no status of a polis, had no agricultural chora and were obeying to the power of the King’s governor (*dioikoitis*) and secondly, these were Greek poleis (Sinope, Amasia, Amastris, Komana) who received the royal “gift” of restricted autonomy and *politeia* for its citizens as well as a moderate agrarian territory, divided into small units where agrarians lived. Although, by providing them with restricted autonomy the King circled the land of the poleis by fortifications which limited the freedom of the population.¹⁵ The centers or “capitals” of the administrative units though were *frouria* while the population lived in *katoikiai*. *Frouria* and *katoikiai* on the royal lands of the Pontus were the main basis of support of the King’s power.¹⁶ Also there were the

13. “Administrative Organization of the Pontic Kingdom,” 98.

14. Saprykin, *Понтийское царство*, 221.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*, 234.

horia, which were royal military garrisons and just like *katoikia* were subordinated to the *frouarhoi*, *eparhoi* and *dikoikitoi*.

Under Mithridates VI there was the process of gradual change of former fortified settlements into poleis: it included a part of the territory which used to be the King's land and subordinated to the capitals of the administrative units. The local population either became a part of the whole population, either lived as people who were dependent on the poleis, either could turn into *paroikoi*, that is citizens with restricted rights who dwelled in the lands that were controlled by the poleis. This as well as the right of copper coin mintage of the cities and fortifications that had no status of polis was a part of the philhellenistic policy of Mithridates.

The most crucial innovation of Mithridates VI was the Eupator's Law on Inheritance the idea of which was that after the death of the landowner, the land was inherited by his children of male gender and if none – it became the polis's belonging. The land was controlled by *dioikites*, representatives of the King and this law answered the interests of small and average landowners. As a consequence, this law strengthened the land ownership of one family and let the landowners to strengthen their positions in the polis. The king of Pontus accepted the right of the citizens to have their own land within the Kingdom, providing them with restricted autonomy – actions that were supposed to soften a serious land crisis in Hellenistic poleis of the Black Sea region of that time. At the same time, the King was fortifying his royal land belongings by building around 75 fortifications in order to keep the poleis under constant control.¹⁷ Pontos had an extensive network of fortresses throughout the country and the key importance of a fortress for the royal administration is proved by the fact that after conquering Lesser Armenia Mithridates ordered the immediate construction of strongholds (*phrouriai*) which totaled approximately 75, according to Strabon. The *phrouriai* were alike in construction which constitutes “the core of the administrative system

17. *Ibid.*, 211-36.

of the Pontic Kingdom serving both military and economic functions.”¹⁸

According to Saprykin,¹⁹ the Temple states in Pontic Cappadocia (Komana, Zela, etc.) consisted of the church, city that situated close to it, and agricultural land that was cultivated by *ierodoulous*, who paid taxes. From administrative point of view, there are two opinions of researches: either the profit from the church land was transferred to the Kingdom treasury, either to the sacred church treasury. But one thing is for sure: the owner of the land was the King in all the cases. In the church cities mostly lived the church officers (*ierodouloi*) and the worshipers (*theoforitoi*). The main Hierophant in the political hierarchy played the second role after the King. Temple states were allowed to mint their own coins which was supported by Mithridates VI as a part of his philhellenic policy.

2. Cultural record of the Pontic Kingdom under royal influence of Mithridates VI

2.1. The religious propaganda and cults of the Pontic Kingdom

In the religious life of the Kingdom of Pontos, the cults of Hellenic and local deities together with the ideological propaganda closely connected with royal deities, and, on the other hand, the ideological propaganda closely connected with royal dynastic policy, was predominant. The political aspects of the royal propaganda of Mithridates Eupator are usually stressed by scholars, who are connecting it with his anti-Roman activity before and during the Mithridatic Wars.

The political aspects of mithridatic propaganda in the Black Sea territories were deeply connected with the Pontic Kingdom, where the cult of Dionysos was used in the policy of the king. This is reflected on discovered coins and terracottas. In particular, Dionysos and his attributes were stamped on royal and bronze coins: Mithridates Eupator's royal coins of 96 BC were decorated with an ivy

18. “Administrative Organization of the Pontic Kingdom,” 103.

19. Saprykin, *Понтийское царство*, 249-59.

wreath which asserts the existence of a royal cult of Dionysos and the identification of the king with him in Pontos. In 102/101 BC the cult of Dionysos officially became royal and the king began calling himself Mithridates Eupator Dionysos. The appearance of the god on coins of the Greek cities of Pontos was due to the philhellenic policy of Mithridates. He gave some political and autonomous rights to his Hellenic subjects just after beginning the expansion in Asia Minor and at exactly the same time the terracotta workshop at Amisos began to produce a great number of masks and terracotta figurines of Dionysos, Satyros and Silenos, which were widely spread throughout the whole territory of the Pontic state. This definitely political and ideological propaganda introduced the king as the New Dionysos, eager to free the Greeks from the barbarians and, to a certain extent, from the Romans. Thus, the Pontic royal elite and the followers of the king tried to use religion and cults in order to strengthen the Mithridates Eupator's power.²⁰

From early childhood Mithridates appears mostly surrounded by Greeks people. It is remarkable that the title "Second after the king" was given to a Greek man, who was not a member of the royal house. This approach to the Hellenic community by the kings of Pontos is shown also by the support to the cities: the interest of Mithridates to base his reign on an urban structure may have been another aspect in the strengthening of the royal house with Greek support, diminishing the influence of the ancestral nobility.²¹ Territorial expansion meant that the royal propaganda mechanism had to portray the king of Pontos as protector and liberator of the Greeks, so that the resident population identified him with the god and worshipped as Savior – Soter. Although this feature was applicable to the cults of numerous gods, popular in the Kingdom of Pontos, Dionysos was the chosen one for official use.

The chief official god was Zeus, who was already a royal deity in the reign of Mithridates III. His image was shown on royal coins as Zeus Etaphore, sitting on a throne and holding a scepter and an eagle as symbols of spiritual and universal power. On the tetradrachms of

20. Saprykin, "The Religion and Cults," 249-50.

21. "Administrative Organization of the Pontic Kingdom," 104.

Mithridates IV and his wife, standing figures of Zeus and Hera, leaning on scepters can be found. In the same pose with a scepter, a single figure of Hera appears on the coins of Laodike, who after being widowed, for some time ruled alone until Mithridates V came to power. This means that the supreme Olympic gods, Zeus and Hera, were the symbols of power in the Greek world. They were worshipped in the Pontic Kingdom already in the 3rd century BC, and became particularly popular in the 2nd century BC, what proves that the cult of Zeus became official in Pontos under the early Mithridatides and the god was viewed as a protector of the royal family (Fig. 4). On the base of the worshipping of Zeus and Hera, some degree of deification of the rulers was assumed.²²



Figure 4. Pontic royal issues with Zeus and Hera

Source: S. J. Saprykin, “The Religion and Cults of the Pontic Kingdom: Political Aspects”, in *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*, ed. J. M. Højte (Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 2009).

During the reign of Mithridates Eupator, Zeus’ cult continued to be official, what can be seen from numismatics (Fig. 5). The majority of the copper coins from the so-called “quasi-autonomous” mints of Pontic cities bear the image and attributes of Zeus, obviously inspired by the royal propaganda. Some scholars suggest an Iranian origin of Zeus in Pontos, asserting the akin to the Persian royal god Ahura-Mazda, while others suppose the Seleukid influence on the

22. Saprykin, “The Religion and Cults,” 251.

cult, as the first kings of Pontos had dynastic links with the



Seleukids.²³

Figure 5. Coin of Amisos with the type “Zeus/eagle on thunderbolt”
Source: Saprykin, “The Religion and Cults of the Pontic Kingdom.”

In Paphlagonia and Pontos, Zeus was considered to be a protector of regions and cities, as the local villagers, grouped into native or ethnic communities, were the primary form of social organization of peasants in Anatolia. As mostly peasants, villagers and temple-servants were the worshippers of Zeus, one of the chief functions of the god was his role as patron of crops and natural forces.²⁴ In different regions, the cults to Zeus were mostly private, while the official royal cult seems to have been the cult of Zeus Stratios. On the coins of the Imperial period one can see Zeus Nikephoros, Nike and Athena Polias closely linked with Zeus as patron of warriors and armies. These coins were struck in Amasia, where a temple of Zeus Stratios had been erected. The sacrifices to Zeus Stratios were usually offered on hilltops or on the tops of mountains where sanctuaries were constructed. It has long ago been suggested that in the Kingdom of Pontos Zeus Stratios was identified with Ahura-Mazda, a protector of the Achaemenids in ancient Iran. While the Mithridatides regularly tried to imitate with the Persian god, F. Cumont noted that the Greek settlers in Anatolia identified their greatest god Zeus with resident Anatolian deities. This resulted in the syncretistic Greek-Iranian cult of Zeus Stratios with both local Anatolian and Iranian features. The

23. *Ibid.*, 252.

24. *Ibid.*, 253.

Iranian element contained the participation of kings in the sacrificial ritual, as in Persia under the Achaemenids, and the great role of fire during animal sacrifices. Exactly the affinity of rituals in the Persian cult and those belonging to the cult of the Greek Zeus made the two rather alike. Though the rituals on the whole remained Iranian, it is worthy to mention that the kings of Pontos offered sacrifices not to Ahura-Mazda, but to Zeus Stratios in accordance with the Greek tradition. This suggests the Hellenic origin of the cult that became official and royal under the early Mithridatides.

The city coinage under Mithridates Eupator represents Zeus with his attributes (eagle on thunderbolt) as a Hellenic Olympian god (Fig. 5).²⁵ Zeus was a multi-functional god, who to some extent was associated with Iranian deities like Ahura-Mazda and Mithras, though the Greek and Anatolian population of Paphlagonia and Pontos worshipped him foremost as a Hellenic god, who could be syncretised with Perseus, Men-Pharnakou, and Dionysos. Although practically no traces of the cult of Mithras in Pontos were found, by all means this Iranian god should have been a patron of the Mithridatides judging from their preferred royal name (“given by Mithras”). The cult of Men-Pharnakou continued also in the time of Mithridates VI. The association with Zeus, visible in the use of the thunderbolt, is completed by the depiction of this moon-god as a horse-rider (like Mithras, who was worshipped as a rider in Trapezous) and with a double-axe like Perseus. His link with Zeus and Dionysos is reflected in the use of a bull as his animal attribute, while his closeness to Phrygian Attis – by a pine-cone, a sacred plant of Kybele’s son. The god’s responsibility for fertility and vegetation is evident from the cornucopia, held in the left hand of Men-Pharnakou on the coin of Pharnakes I. As a moon-god Men could defeat darkness and evil. Besides the bull and the horse, a cock was the sacred animal of Men that was also a sacrificial bird in the Persian cults of Mithras and Ahura-Mazda. This profound syncretism of Anatolian, Iranian, and Hellenic cults we can see on Bosporan coins, minted in Pantikapaion (Fig. 6).

25. *Ibid.*, 255-56.

Another deity, who had an official royal cult in Pontos, was Perseus. The cult of this mythical patron achieved its highest popularity in the time of Mithridates Eupator. The royal tetradrachms and bronze city coins reproduce the hero's portrait and statue, his sacred



Figure 6. Mithridates VI Eupator as Men-Pharnakou on coinage from Pantikapaion

Source: Saprykin, "The Religion and Cults of the Pontic Kingdom."

attributes (Pegasos, winged harpa, aegis with Gorgon) and his female companion Athena. Under Mithridates V when the Kingdom of Pontos attempted to portray the king as protector of Hellenism in northern Anatolia and on the Black Sea, Perseus was associated with Apollon, the most popular Greek god in the Greek poleis of the Black Sea. Pfeiler proved that the portrait wearing a *kyrbasia* on the anonymous Pontic coins was that of the young king Mithridates Eupator. Contemporary coins of Amisos and Sinope with the head of a young man with a quiver wearing a Persian leather cap most probably also show a portrait of Mithridates Eupator VI (Fig. 7 a-b).²⁶

The introduction of an official cult of Apollon coincided with the proclamation of Sinope as the capital of their kingdom and the change of policy towards philhellenism. The association of Perseus with Apollon and Men-Pharnakou together with Dionysos was due

26. *Ibid.*, 258-61.

to the syncretism of the popular cult of Zeus with Attis. All of these gods were worshipped by the population of the Pontic state as gods of recovery and revival, conquerors of evil and enemies, what was

Figure 7 a-b. a) Portrait of Mithridates VI Eupator on bronze coinage of Amisos b) Mithridates VI Eupator as Perseus on the civic bronze coinage of Amisos



Source: Saprykin, “The Religion and Cults of the Pontic Kingdom.”

the main point of the official Pontic ideology, which tried to portray the king as the one, called upon to liberate the Greeks and gather neighbouring territories under his rule. This aspect of the political ideology of the kingdom was part of the philhellenic policy of the Mithridatides, which was actively pursued by Mithridates VI, who did not have the option of proclaiming himself a living Zeus, as this god was the highest of all the Olympian gods and goddesses and a creator of life, so such a proclamation might have caused distrust among the population. Nevertheless, to be proclaimed as Mithras or Ahura-Mazda was even more dangerous, as this might have raised the suspicions of the kings’ Hellenic subjects, especially after the kings had started a philhellenic policy. So there was the solution to declare the king a living Dionysos, responsible for victory over evil, darkness and recovery, and easily associated with many Anatolian, Hellenic and even Iranian gods and heroes. This god was equally important to the Anatolian population. The main idea of this political tendency was to deify the ruler to be a god or at the very least simply associated with the god. This religious and ideological point was

substantiated in the royal Mithridatic symbols – the star and crescent, linked with the cults of Men, Mithras, Ahura-Mazda, and which reflected their victory over darkness, evil, what was the main religious aspect of Persian Zoroastrianism. The general tendency of the religious policy of the Pontic kings was to make official those cults of deities, who were connected with military matters together with rebirth and winning over death.

The official cults and propaganda brought to Bosphoros from Pontos, Armenia Minor, and Kolchis, influenced the private cults within the whole Kingdom of Pontos including the region around the Black Sea.²⁷ So we can conclude that there were three levels of Pontic religious ideology and royal propaganda. First the Hellenic, which played the most central role in the deification of the ruler, mostly in the eyes of the Greek subjects, for whom Mithridates Eupator was proclaimed Dionysos and was associated with Ares, Perseus, Apollon, Herakles, and Helios – all sons of Zeus. This was the main cult in Pontos since the early Mithridates. Second, the Phrygian-Anatolian, where Attis and Men seemed to be the chief deities, that even Mithridates Eupator tried to associate himself with him in order to rally the resident population around him. Third was the Iranian: as the kings of Pontos, though being half-Persian by origin, did not declare themselves to be descendants of Mithras and Ahura-Mazda, proclaimed themselves to be equal to the Hellenic and Phrygian gods and heroes, where Perseus was a compromise between Greek beliefs and the Iranian essence of the dynasty.²⁸

2.1.1. Temple states in Pontos

Temples to gods of Persian and Anatolian origin in the Pontic Kingdom were distinguished from other temples due to their self-governing powers. They have been called “temple states” and were basically economically independent religious entities. The temple territories probably included: lands, that belonged to the independent native population, territories from villages, unions of villages and

27. *Ibid.*, 262-64.

28. *Ibid.*, 268.

tribes. According to Strabon's description of Komana Pontike, the priest ruled over the temple and the temple servants, and he had control over the revenues gained from the temple territories. The role of sacred slaves was to work for the temple, providing it with the resources necessary for its development. The vast amounts of capital under divine protection caused the temples to play an important role in the economic life of the area.²⁹

Priests were in charge of the administration of the temples and even came second in rank after the king: the priest of Ma in Komana Pontike wore a diadem during the two annual exoduses of the goddess and came after the king in the hierarchy, while Dorylaos was given the title of high priest by Mithridates Eupator. The priest was responsible for the territory belonging to the temple and its collected revenue. The size and importance of temples were explained in terms of the number of sacred slaves inhabiting the territory, who were subject to the priest, however, the latter one had no right to sell them. Apart from it, according to Strabon, sacred prostitution was also important for the temples. Describing the city of Komana Pontike, that was a large and significant religious centre, located at an important crossroad on a dense trade network, he mentioned a multitude of women, who made gain from their persons. As one of the most important temples of the Kingdom was at Komana and was dedicated to the goddess Ma, it is most probably, that these women were dedicated to this Goddess and gave Komana the reputation of a minor Korinthos. The temple was possibly surrounded by the royal fortresses, and was a town in which the servants of the goddess and the priests lived. Six thousand sacred slaves, dedicated to the service of Ma by taking oaths, were working the fields of the temple's sacred territory. Festivals dedicated to Ma promoted trade and prosperity.

As for the religious aspect of the temple states, it is apparent that Anaitis, Ma and Men must have been very important for Pontos in general. The kings evolved Men Pharnakou in the royal oath, Anaitis was worshipped in Zela and the importance of Zela for the kingdom was great. Sacred rites performed here were characterized by greater

29. E. Sökmen, "Characteristics of the Temple States in Pontos," in *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*.

sanctity and it is here that all the people of Pontus made their oaths concerning matters of the greatest importance. Thus, it can be suggested that the Pontic Kingdom had a strong Persian influence.³⁰

2.2. The Pontic and Bosporan copper coins of the time of Mithridates VI

Before the end of the second and the first half of the 1st century BC, the only copper alloy used for striking coins was bronze. However, during the reign of Mithridates VI, new alloys had been introduced into coinage in the several mints of Pontus and Paphlagonia, where simultaneous issues of coins *Head of Perseus/Pegasus* were struck of “pure” copper, and coins *Head of Dionysos/cista* were struck of brass.

The Pontic and Bosporan copper coins of the time of Mithridates VI from the collection of the State Hermitage in St. Petersburg have been analyzed and during the investigation it was possible to reveal the coins struck of unusual alloys, and also other coins struck of “pure” copper. These were the so called Pontic anonymous obols (*Head in leather helmet/Eight-ray star*) and Bosporan anonymous obols (*Head of Dionysos/Bowcase*). The last issues of Bosporan silver coins (*Head of Artemis/Stag feeding*, *Head of Dionysus/Brunch of grapes* and *Head of Dionysus/Thyrsos*) were struck of very poor silver which contained more than 50% of copper and were probably displaced by anonymous obols (*Head of Dionysos/Bowcase*), struck of “pure” copper.

As the introduction of new copper-base alloys into coinage coincided with the epoch of the Mithridatic wars against Rome, it is apparent that it was dictated by the necessity of searching for additional financial sources needed for preparing wide-scale military operations, and for the organisation of provincial coinage in the expanded Pontic state. Despite the fact that the honour of introducing new alloys into coinage belongs to the Pontic King Mithridates VI and his

30. *Ibid.*, 282-85.

circle, the especially wide use of brass and copper was exploited by Rome after the money reform of Augustus in 23 BC (Fig. 8-12).³¹

Figure 8. Mithradates VI, 120-63 BC



Source: “Kings of Pontos,” Asia Minor Coins, accessed 25 July 2015, <http://www.asiaminorcoins.com/gallery/thumbnails.php?album=52>.

Figure 9. Mithradates VI, 120-63 BC



Source: “Kings of Pontos,” Asia Minor Coins, accessed 1 August 2015, <http://www.asiaminorcoins.com/gallery/thumbnails.php?album=52>.

31. T. N. Smekalova, “The Earliest Application of Brass and ‘Pure’ Copper in the Hellenistic Coinages of Asia Minor and the Northern Black Sea Coast,” in *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*.

Figure 10. Mithradates VI. AR Tetradrachm



Source: “Ancient Coinage of Pontos, Kings, Mithradates VI,” WildWinds, accessed 10 August 2015, http://www.wildwinds.com/coins/greece/pontos/kings/mithradates_VI/i.html.

Figure 11. Pontos, King of Mithradates VI



Source: “Ancient Coinage of Pontos, Kings, Mithradates VI,” WildWinds, accessed 1 August 2015, http://www.wildwinds.com/coins/greece/pontos/kings/mithradates_VI/i.html.

Figure 12. Mithradates VI. AV Stater



Source: “Ancient Coinage of Pontus, Kings, Mithradates VI,” WildWinds, accessed 17 July 2015, http://www.wildwinds.com/coins/greece/pontos/kings/mithradates_VI/i.html.

2.3. Mithridates VI of Pontus wrapped in mystery: legends about the king

Throughout the centuries, various legends about the extraordinary intellectual achievements of the last Pontic king have been told. Mithridates supposedly had a prodigious memory. Pliny the Elder and other Roman historians report that he could speak the languages of all the twenty two nations he ruled. Since the 16th century, the documentation and description of the multitude and diversity of languages have been connected with the name “Mithridates.” In 1555, the Swiss scholar Conrad Gesner published a linguistic encyclopedia with the title “Mithridates sive de differentiis linguarum” (about the differentiation of languages). Later on other linguists continued to associate increased knowledge of the languages of the world with the multilingualism of Mithridates.³²

Furthermore, Mithridates is said to have lived for seven years in the wilderness as a youth, following the assassination of his father

32. L. Summerer, “The Search for Mithridates. Reception of Mithridates VI between the 15th and the 20th Centuries,” in *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*.

Mithridates V, in 120 BC. Here he grew strong and accustomed to hardship, before taking on the throne and initiating his conquest of the Black Sea and Asia.

Mithridates Eupator VI is most famously said to have sought to harden himself against poison, both by taking increasing sub-lethal doses of the poisons to build tolerance, and by fashioning a “universal antidote” to protect him from all earthly poisons. Obsessed with making himself immune to all poisons, he devised a remarkable project, collecting deadly plant, mineral and animal substances and testing them on condemned criminals, his friends and himself. After hundreds of experiments, Mithridates concocted a daily cocktail of minute doses of poisons mixed with antidotes. Many believed that the mysterious “mithridatium” was the reason for his celebrated vigour and longevity. After his death, versions of Mithradates’ trademarked elixir were eagerly swallowed by Roman emperors, Chinese mandarins and European kings and queens, inspiring a flow of scientific treatises on the Poison King’s long-lost original recipe, said to contain more than fifty ingredients.³³

2.4. Monuments, portraits and statues for the king: royal presence in the Late Hellenistic world

A characteristic feature of sanctuaries and political centres in Hellenistic Greece are the numerous monuments erected on different occasions by kings and dynasts or in honour of them. These monuments, as a key strategy of political communication, not only contributed to the appearance of those places, they were the only form of visual royal presence beyond the king’s own realm, thereby influencing the perception of his reign. However, compared to the 3rd and early 2nd century BC, in the Late Hellenistic period a remarkable change can be observed. Considering the quantity and diversity of monuments, only few later monuments, even those connected with an ambitious ruler like Mithridates VI, are mentioned in epigraphical and literary sources or known from the archaeological record.

33. “Mithradates: Scourge of Rome,” Stanford University, accessed July 10, 2015, http://stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Mayor_HistoryToday_11-20-09_0.pdf.

Already in 116/15 BC Mithridates and his brother were honoured with statues on behalf of the *gymnasiarchos* Dionysios on Delos, a result of their donations in favour of the gymnasium already mentioned. Also in Delos, in 102/101 BC an architectural monument was dedicated by the priest Helianax, two dedications in honour of Mithridates by the priest Dikaios, again in Delos, and other fragments of inscriptions from Delos naming Mithridates, as well as the dedication of an elaborate bronze vessel by the eupatoristai from the gymnasium. Inscriptions from Chios and Rhodos demonstrate the successful participation of the king at equestrian games there, and another inscription testifies to the honour of an eponymous stephanophoria awarded in Miletos in 86/85 BC. Cicero mentions a statue erected in honour of Mithridates by the Rhodians. It is remarkable, that the Mithridatic monuments on Delos apparently were not erected at the long established places preferred for royal monuments, but the fact that for the first time a Pontic king was markedly present in the context of an international centre reflects the political importance of the king honoured in this way. It is especially the imagery of such monuments that can serve as a prime source for royal ideology.³⁴

The portraiture of Mithridates has to be considered, since at least some of the portraits regarded as portraying Mithridates might have belonged to statues erected in public. Though the identification of Mithridates remains arguable, generally accepted seems the well-known portrait in the Louvre showing the king with a lions' scalp. But controversy exists over several other portrait-heads often connected with Mithridates. Besides two portrait-heads in Ostia and Athens and three from Delos, portraits in Odessa, from Pantikapaion, and also one in Venice representing him as Helios. The depiction as a beardless young man, the dynamic movement of the head and the hair with emphasized strands and a diadem unites them all; their reference to the portrait of Alexander the Great is evident. But apart from these iconographic elements, the portraits differ considerably from each other and are only loosely related. Some of these heads


³⁴ P. A. Kreuz, "Monuments for the King: Royal Presence in the Late Hellenistic World of Mithridates VI," in *Mithridates VI and The Pontic Kingdom*.

are comparatively free versions of Mithridates' portrait and can refer to descendants of Mithridates, so resemblance can be expected in order to emphasize dynastic legitimization.³⁵

There is a well-known group of sculptures from Pergamon with Mithridates and his residence there from 88-85 BC. The group shows Herakles with the portrait features and the diadem of a king, about to rescue Prometheus in presence of the reclining Caucasus. The subject with its reference to Caucasus could be applied to Mithridates, and also the dynamic depiction of Herakles could be interpreted in this way. The sculptural group therefore could be assumed as a highly political honorary monument, symbolizing the liberation of the Caucasus-region by Mithridates as Herakles or his liberation of the Greek world from the Romans. The only monument offering some clear information on Mithridates kingship is the monument erected for Mithridates on Delos in 102/101 BC in the sanctuary of the Samothracian Kabeiroi, though it was not located at or in the vicinity of one of the traditional places preferred for royal monuments. The Heroon-like construction of the Ionic order opened with a distyle in antis-façade to the south must have invited the sanctuary's visitors to enter the building, appreciating the sculptural decoration adorning mainly its inner walls (Fig. 13-14).


35. *Ibid.*, 133.

Figure 13. The monument for Mithridates VI on Delos in its reconstructed setting



Source: P. A. Kreuz, “Monuments for the King: Royal Presence in the Late Hellenistic World of Mithridates VI,” in *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*.


Figure 14. The façade of the monument for Mithridates VI



Source: Kreuz, “Monuments for the King.”

It consisted of a display of thirteen portrait-busts inserted in round shields: one of them in the tympanon of the façade, and twelve along the inner walls of the building (Fig. 15).

Figure 15. The portrait-medallions of the inner walls



Source: Kreuz, “Monuments for the King.”

It is also usually considered as the location of an inscribed statue base mentioning Mithridates that is commonly connected with a fragmentary cuirassed statue found in the sanctuary, showing him as a victorious commander. The monument has usually been interpreted with direct reference to the literary tradition and numismatic evidence. Both emphasize the Greek-Persian character of his kingship as a central aspect of Mithridates’ identity and ideology. Correspondingly the Delos-monument with its portrait gallery is regarded to be of the Greek and Persian background of Mithridatic kingship.³⁶

The tetradrachms of Mithridates VI basically show two different portrait types conveniently called “realistic” and “idealised” (Fig. 16 a-b). The first portrait struck from about 106 BC shows the king in his thirties. Compared to his distinctly Iranian-looking predecessors, the profile of Mithridates is more in accordance with royal Greek iconography of the period. There are no such peculiarities, like en-

36. *Ibid.*, 134-38.

largement of the eyes or fluffiness of the face, that occasionally occur among other royal portraits, the hair is somewhat longer than usual and the coins often show heavy sideburns. The later portrait type shows Mithridates younger. Here the features of the new Alexander, that would liberate the Greeks from their oppressors, are softer and more idealized. As for the coins imitating the tetradrachms of Alexander, they were struck in Mesembria and Odessos under Mithridates and have been suggested to carry his portrait in the guise of Herakles.³⁷

Figure 16 a-b. Tetradrachms of Mithridates VI. a) Early portrait type before 85 BC. b) Later portrait type after 87 BC



Source: J. M. Højte, "Portraits and Statues of Mithridates VI," in *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*.

Among the sculptured portraits one stands out in particular: the marble portrait with lion exuviae in Paris (Fig. 17 a-b). The only objection one could raise is that it wasn't for the identification with Mithridates. The most discussed piece of the group of possible portraits of Mithridates is the Herakles from the so-called Prometheus group in the sanctuary of Athena in Pergamon (Fig. 18), which was immediately identified as Mithridates VI when found in 1925.

37. Jakob Munk Højte, "Portraits and Statues of Mithridates VI," in *Mithridates VI and The Pontic Kingdom*.

Figure 17 a-b. Mithridates VI in lion exuviae. Louvre



Source: Højte, “Portraits and Statues of Mithridates VI.”

Figure 18. Herakles with portrait features from the Prometheus group from Pergamon

Figure 19. Portrait from Pantikapaion



Fig. 8. Herakles with portrait features from the Prometheus group from Pergamon, now in Berlin (author's photo).



Fig. 9. Portrait from Pantikapaion, now in St. Peterburg (author's photo).

Source: Højte, “Portraits and Statues of Mithridates VI.”

Figure 20. Portrait in Odessa Museum

Figure 21. Portrait in the National Museum in Athens




Source: Højte, “Portraits and Statues of Mithridates VI.”

Portrait found in Pantikapaion (Fig. 19) definitely shows a royal figure with a sharply turned head. The other portrait in Odessa Museum may have belonged to an acrolithic statue (Fig. 20), as it has the same dramatic turn as the Pantikapaion head and a pronounced Alexander-like treatment of the hair. The same scheme is found in royal portraits found in Athens (Fig. 21) and in Ostia (Fig. 22). All four heads belong from the late 2nd to early 1st century BC and can be said to have a very general resemblance to the coin portraits of Mithridates.³⁸

38. *Ibid.*, 150-52.


Figure 22. Portrait from Ostia



Source: Højte, "Portraits and Statues of Mithridates VI."

To the most probable portrait identifications can now be added a miniature head found in Pantikapaion in 1992 during the excavations of a small temple on the acropolis (Fig. 23).³⁹

Figure 23. Portrait found on the acropolis in Patikapaion, Kerch



Source: Højte, "Portraits and Statues of Mithridates VI."

39. *Ibid.*, 154.

2.5. Reception of Mithridates VI through centuries

The legendary ruler of Pontus and creator of the Black Sea Empire, Mithridates Eupator VI, was, until recently, one of the most celebrated figures of the Classical world, a hero of opera, drama and poetry. Writers like Dante and Boccaccio transferred ancient history into their own worlds of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Giovanni Boccaccio wrote the moralistic biographical book *De casibus virorum illustrium* between 1357 and 1363, which tells of the fall of famous men in antiquity, including Mithridates side-by-side with Pompeius Magnus, Caesar, Marcus Antonius, and Cleopatra. The French translation of the book includes four illustrated pages portraying the death of Mithridates (Fig. 24 and 25). Gautier de Costes de La Calprenede was the first French author to write a tragedy about the Pontic king, which appeared under the title *La mort de Mithridate* in 1637.⁴⁰ Medieval artists illustrated scenes from his reign, portraying him as a noble “Dark Knight” battling cruel Roman tyrants, Machiavelli called him a valiant hero, while Louis XIV was fascinated by Mithridates’ reign. Immortalised in a tragedy by the great French playwright Racine, Mithridates also inspired the 14-year-old Mozart to write his first opera, “Mitridate, re di Ponto.” Poets celebrated him, from Wordsworth and Emerson to Cavafy and the most famous A. E. Housman.

By the late 20th century, however, Mithridates’ name and deeds began to fade from popular memory. Despite his extraordinary achievements and crucial role in the downfall of the Roman Republic, Mithridates has been inexplicably neglected by English-speaking historians for more than a century. Théodore Reinach’s study, published in 1890, is the great authority on Mithridates. A popular biography in English appeared in 1958 written by the historical novelist Alfred Duggan entitled *He Died Old*. The image of Mithridates as the “Asiatic” enemy of culture and civilization originated in the 1850s with the greatest Roman historian of the 19th century, Theodor Mommsen. As recently as 1975, the German historian Hermann Bengston embraced the stereotype, arguing that the massacre of 88 BC.

40. Summerer, “The Search for Mithridates,” 19.

Figure 24 a-b. a) “Mithridate VI assiégé et morte de Mithridate VI” by Boccaccio; b) “Mithridate VI assiégé et morte de Mithridate VI” by Boccaccio




Fig. 1. “Mithridate VI assiégé et mort de Mithridate VI” by Boccaccio. Book illustration from *De casibus illustrium virorum* (1355-1360), French translation Laurent de Premierfait. France, 15th century AD (France, Lyon).



Fig. 2. “Mithridate VI assiégé et mort de Mithridate VI” by Boccaccio. Book illustration from *De casibus illustrium virorum* (1355-1360), French translation Laurent de Premierfait. France, 15th century AD (France, Lyon).

Source: L. Summerer, “The Search for Mithridates. Reception of Mithridates VI between the 15th and the 20th Centuries,” in *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*.

This portrayal of Mithridates as ruthless and despotic persists in recent novels and histories about the late Roman Republic: Michael Curtis Ford's *Last King*, Colleen McCullough's *The Grass Crown*, and Tom Holland's *Rubicon*.

Yet there are signs that Mithridates' star is rising. European scholar, Brian McGing, (*Foreign Policy of Mithridates*, 1986) has examined specific aspects of Mithridates' reign, while Luis Ballesteros Pastor analysed Rome's conflicts with an autonomous Hellenistic king in *Mitridates Eupator, rey del Ponto* (1996), and Attilio Mastrocinque with *Studi sulle guerre Mitridatiche* (1998), in his turn, considers how ancient biases influenced modern historians. In 2009, the Danish Centre for Black Sea Studies published a superb collection of scholarly papers edited by Jakob Munk Højte, *Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom*, followed by Philip Matyszak's popular treatment of the Mithradatic Wars.

Nearly everything we know about Mithridates was written by his enemies. Rome's fascination with its most dangerous enemies and admiration for Mithridates' courage and ideals left a wealth of biographical material, scattered throughout many ancient texts. Among the chief sources are: Justin's summary of a lost history by Pompeius Trogus, Appian's *Mithradatic Wars*, Dio Cassius's *History of Rome*, Strabo's *Geography*, Plutarch's *Lives of Sulla*, etc.

As the last independent monarch of the Hellenistic era left standing, Mithridates remains an ambiguous figure for many today: hero and model to some, perpetrator of monstrous crimes against humanity according to others.⁴¹

General Conclusion

The Kingdom of Pontus was founded and ruled by the dynasty of Mithridatides from the 291 BC until its conquest by the Roman Republic in 63 BC and was characterized by vivid ethnic, religious and social features. After the final defeat of the Pontic Kingdom as the result of the 3rd Mithridatic War, part of it was incorporated into the Roman Republic as the province Bithynia et Pontus and the eastern

41. "Mithradates: Scourge of Rome."

half survived as a client kingdom. The successful strategic geographical position of the Pontic Kingdom as well as its main trading center the city of Sinope helped the economical and financial development of the Kingdom.

The rule of the brilliant legendary Mithridates VI Eupator Dionysus, king of Pontus, who was the dominant figure of the 1st century BC that refused to accept his inclusion in the Roman sphere of control and attempted to assert the political and territorial independence of his lands, is widely known by the clash of the Hellenistic world with the Roman which lead to the acme of the Pontic Kingdom and eventually to its total decline. Compared to other regions in the Black Sea area, Pontos is archaeologically sadly under-explored due to the fact modern Turkish cities are built upon the Pontic ones. Very few excavations have taken place and basic recording of many monuments still lacks.

Mithridates' policy of philhellenism helped him create a large Hellenistic Empire which left important historical and cultural heritage which is being researched and investigated until the present days. It can be traced in world's numerous works of art, such as fictional literature, music and applied arts.

Dorothea Valentinova*

**Theodosian Code: Fides Catholica Adversus
Paganos et Haereticos**

*“And in those days the Orthodox inhabitants of Alexandria were filled with zeal and they collected a large quantity of wood and burned the place of the heathen philosophers.”*¹

*John,*² *Bishop of Nikiu, Chronicle (LXXXIV.45)*

After the legalization of Christianity in 313 AD with the Edict of Milan, the ambitions of the imperial and ecclesiastical authorities, disguised comfortably in the Christian dogma, invaded the Roman law, and penetrated the political and cultural dimensions of *Romanitas*, following the strategy of propaganda infiltration. That strategy relied on implanting old, familiar and stable Roman archetypal patterns and notions of religiosity, faith, morals and social justice, lying at the heart of the ancient Roman value system.

The defining of heresy and paganism has occurred by postulating their ultimate, extreme existential antagonism to the official dogma, church and state in the context of the Christian religious propaganda, which was trying furiously to reconstruct *fides catholica* as the only authentic and true religious identity *a priori*.

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1. Robert H. Charles, trans., *The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu*, translated from Zotenberg's Ethiopic (London, Oxford: Williams & Norgate, 1913), LXXXIV.45, 98.

2. In his chronicle, covering the period from Adam to the Arab (Muslim) conquest of Egypt, the Egyptian Coptic bishop of the city of Nikiu John (7th century AD), who also served as a general governor of the monasteries in Upper Egypt, included many texts reflecting the persecution of pagans and Christians. In a separate text he described the murder of the famous Hypatia.

Roman public law, “*quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat*,”³ regulating the legal matter regarding “*sacris*,” “*sacerdotibus*,” “*magistratibus*,”⁴ according to the famous phrase of Ulpian, clearly shows in its primary definition the deep connection and interdependence between the sacred and eternally divine law that has been reaffirmed through the sacredness of *religio* and *pietas*, and transitional, ephemeral human laws. The balance between these two realities is achievable only through harmonious interdependence between gods and mortals, who communicate through *religio*, and delimit *res profanae*⁵ in the “fabric” of *res sacrae* and *ius divinum*. The maintenance of this balance was a binding, connecting element of *utilitas publica*, *utilitas communis* and *bonum commune*,⁶ that marked the boundary between what was thought and experienced as morally good (*bonum et honestum*), and what was thought or experienced as merely advantageous, useful and profitable for private and oligarchic interests.⁷ The maintenance of the balance was also a significant factor for the vitality of the Roman *iustitia*, worshiped in pre-Christian Rome as *dea Iustitia*, and was a part of the foundation of the ancient Roman value system in which *res sacrae et divinae* are guarded by *ius* and *lex*.

3. Literally: public law “that is concerned with the Roman state” – part of the well-known formulation of Ulpian in his “Institutions” (Dig. 1.1.1.2, Ulpianus 1 Inst.), which defines the boundaries lying between the Roman private and the Roman public law: “*Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem: Sunt enim quaedam publice utilia, quaedam privatim. Publicum ius in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit*” (Public law is concerned with the Roman state, while private law is concerned with the interests of individuals, for some matters are of public and others of private interest. Public law comprises religion, priesthoods, and magistracies).

4. “religion, priesthoods, and magistracies”, 1.1.1.2, Ulpianus 1 inst.

5. Digesta, 1.8.6.3. Dig. 1.8.6.3. Marcianus 3 inst.: “*Sacrae autem res sunt hae, quae publice consecratae sunt, non private: si quis ergo privatim sibi constituerit sacrum /sacrum constituerit/, sacrum non est, sed profanum.*”

6. Public benefit, common benefit, common good.

7. About that difference and not only, in the context of the history of expropriation, see also: Susan Reynolds, *Before Eminent Domain: Toward a History of Expropriation of Land for the Common Good* (University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 16, 92.

The consequences of extrapolating the public law into realms of the sacred ceremonies, religion, priesthoods and magistracy⁸ resounded far away in time and were extremely advantageous and profitable for the Church as an embodiment of the clerical authority, and its canon law. One of the earliest and most significant consequences was the legitimation (as an act of providing legitimacy) of the secular authority through the divine law, as a manifestation of the will of gods (in the context of the Roman pantheon). It has been achieved also through promoting and propagandizing of strictly private clerical interests and goals, dressed in the convenient form of scriptures, available and reserved for interpretation solely by the senior clergy, who only was allowed and authorized to translate and interpret the will of the Christian God (in the context of the Catholic dogma).

In the second case the legitimacy of the secular authority through the official religion, and the *a priori* personal faith through the clergy, the Church and its dogma, turned quickly into one of the most powerful forms of manipulation and control over the masses. In this game of power and influence over bodies and minds was followed the logic of differentiation, marginalization and exclusion of *the Others*, the infidels, or just people who profess different, non-Christian beliefs. Propaganda countering and confrontation of *domestic* and *foreign*, of *us* and *them*, of *believers* and *infidels* required strongly defined boundaries. Those borderlines marked and declared the distinction, and regulated clearly and mercilessly all the privileges and rights, and the future of those who have chosen the “right” path. On the other side, they marked and declared the marginalization, deprivation of rights, extermination, and –finally– the total destruction of those who have chosen anything but not the “right” way, trampled down and guarded strictly both by the religious and secular authorities and their ardent apologists.

In the late Roman legal texts, including Codex Theodosianus, could be found well defined moments, that demonstrate the desperate legislative attempts to establish clear points of contact between *fides catholica* and *utilitas publica* (old concept with a new meaning, inserted into the propaganda language of the empirewide

8. Dig. 1.1.1.2, Ulpianus 1 inst.

Orthodox policy), as well as formal attempts to specify all those entities in public domain that could endanger *fides catholica* and *utilitas publica* in one way or another. Active law enforcement of officials (who were charged with implementation of all valid legal rules and *leges*), and legal texts' authors in the times of the Christian emperors faced an insoluble dilemma to what limits they could reach in their endeavours to ensure both the welfare and the future of the Christian faith and Church, on one hand, and of the Empire as a whole, on the other, and which of them should prevail.

Who else but the Emperor could answer these questions?

Thus in 383 AD, two priests who were accused of proclaiming and defending suspicious doctrinal positions, turned to the praetorian prefect Maternus Cynegius⁹ with a request for help. Cynegius decided to ask for assistance and clarification Theodosius I, who replied in a vague manner that the Emperor has no right to add even one iota to the divine law.¹⁰

In 404 AD the Western Roman Emperor Honorius reminded to his brother Arcadius, the emperor of the East that “the interpretation of matters of divine nature refers to the bishops, but the subordination of *religio* is our concern.”¹¹ In this early separation of powers, imperial officials, together with the obligation to ensure the supremacy of the only true faith, had to observe that the Church works for the public good, for *utilitas publica*. In 439 it was still possible for a quaestor who serves under the Western Emperor Valentinian III, firmly and boldly to state that: “when the number of [Christian] clerics grows excessively, public damages occur.”¹²

9. Maternus Cynegius (died on March 14, 388 AD) – a Christian, who served as praetorian prefect of the East from 384 until 388 AD; he was also consul in 388 AD– the year he died. Cynegius became famous with destroying some of the most sacred pagan temples.

10. Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin, ed., *Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity*, Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism, vol. 119 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 132.

11. Collectio Avellana, 38.4: “*ad illos (episcopos) enim divinarum rerum interpretatione, ad nos religionis spectat obsequium.*”

12. Novellae Valentiniani III, Tit. III (August 18, 439): “*...cum numerositas ex abundantia clericatus augetur, publica damna generentur.*” Gustavus Haenel,

Their numbers, however, increased extremely fast, together with their power. One of the main consequences was that the control on the balance among *fides catholica*, *utilitas publica* and *bonum commune* shifted to the Catholic Church. Historically the very fact that the bishops were entitled to set and define the religious doctrine and to act independently was not an insignificant setback for Constantine I¹³ and his successors.¹⁴ The delegation of power was a part of the division of authority, and its effects are yet to show up in time.

The separation between the Church and the State affected not only the jurisdiction of the bishops in matters of faith, but it allowed bishops and other clergy to be sued only by bishops,¹⁵ and all other litigants were entitled to choose whether to refer their disputes to ordinary courts or to rely on a bishop's decision. Conciliation procedure, through which they had to reach an agreement, subsequently called *episcopalis audientia*, was theorized and developed by the post-classical jurists as a form of civil jurisdiction (*compromissum*),¹⁶ available for both laity and clergy. Legitimized by the request of the Holy Apostle Paul to the early Christians not to bring their disputes before heathen judges (“*Audet aliquis vestrum, habens negotium adversus alterum, iudicari apud iniquos, et non apud sanctos?... Sed frater cum fratre iudicio contendit, et hoc apud*

ed., *Codicis Gregoriani et Codicis Hermogeniani Fragmenta*, (Lipsiensis: Prostat bonnae apud Adolphum Marcum, 1837), 137-38.

13. An important source on the Constantine's relations with the Church is the panegyric *De vita Constantini*, written shortly after the death of the Emperor by the Bishop of Caesarea Eusebius.

14. In this context, cf. Tony Honoré, *Law in the Crisis of Empire, 379-455 AD: The Theodosian Dynasty and Its Quaestors with a Palingenesia of Laws of the Dynasty*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2-3.

15. *Codex Theodosianus*, XVI.2.12 (September 22, 355); *Codex Iustinianus*, 16.2.41 (December 11, 412); 16.2.47.1 (October 8, 425).

16. Informal mutual agreement between the parties to comply with the decision of an arbitrator of their dispute; a mutual promise to abide by a judgement or arbitration. See: Reinhard Zimmermann, *The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition*, Clarendon Paperbacks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 526-530.

infideles?)¹⁷ *episcopalis audientia* emerged at the moment when the bishops assumed the role of arbitrators¹⁸ in private disputes between clerics, as well as between laymen.

With imperial blessing the Church, bishops and other clergy formed centers of control and influence through which they took independent decisions, affecting not only individuals, but also groups and larger communities of people, and thus the future of the Roman Empire:

*CTh.16.2.0. Concerning Bishops, Churches, and Clerics*¹⁹

CTh.16.2.33.

The same Augustuses [emperors Arcadius and Honorius] to Eutychianus, Praetorian Prefect.

In the churches, which, as usual, are arranged in the properties of different persons, as well as in the villages or in any other places, for the time being let be appointed clerics not from another property or village, but from the same in which the church will be built, so that the exact number of clergy in the church be determined with a *decision of the bishop*, according to the size or reputation of each village.

Given on the sixth day before the kalends of August at Mnizo in the fourth consulship of Honorius Augustus and the consulship of Eutychianus (July 27, 398).

*CTh.16.2.23.*²⁰

17. Epistula I ad Corinthios Sancti Pauli Apostoli, 6.1 и 6.6: “1. Does any one of you, when he has a case against another person, dare to go to law before the unrighteous and not before the saints?... 6. but brother goes to law with brother, and that before unbelievers?”

18. Zimmermann, *The Law of Obligations*, 527.

19. *CTh.16.2.0. De episcopis, ecclesiis et clericis. CTh.16.2.33: Idem aa. eutychiano praefecto praetorio. ecclesiis, quae in possessionibus, ut adsolet, diversorum, vicis etiam vel quibuslibet locis sunt constitutae, clerici non ex alia possessione vel vico, sed ex eo, ubi ecclesiam esse constiterit, eatenus ordinentur, ut propriae capitationis onus ac sarcinam recognoscant, ita ut pro magnitudine vel celebritate uniuscuiusque vici ecclesiis certus iudicio episcopi clericorum numerus ordinetur. dat. vi kal. aug. mnizo honorio a. iiii et eutychiano cons. (398 iul. 27).*

20. *CTh.16.2.23: Imppp. valens, grat. et valent. aaa. artemio, eurydico, appio, gerasimo et ceteris episcopis. qui mos est causarum civilium, idem in negotiis ecclesiasticis obtinendus est: ut, si qua sunt ex quibusdam dissensionibus levibusque*

Emperors Valens, Gratian, and Valentinian, Augustuses, to Artemius, Euridicus, Appius, Gerasimus and the other bishops.

Whatever is customary in the conduct of civil suits *shall likewise be observed in ecclesiastical litigation*, so that if there are any matters arising from certain dissensions and slight offenses pertaining to religious observance, they shall be heard in their own places and by the synods of their own diocese, with the exception of those matters which criminal action has established shall be heard by ordinary and extraordinary judges or by the illustrious authorities.

Given on the sixteenth day before the kalends of June at Treviri [Augusta Treverorum] in the fifth consulship of Valent Augustus and the first consulship of Valentinian Augustus (17 May, 376).

*CTh.16.2.45.*²¹

The same Augusti to Philippus, Praetorian Prefect of Illyricum.

We command that the ancient practices and the pristine ecclesiastical canons which have been in force up to the present shall be observed *throughout all the provinces of Illyricum* and that all innovation shall cease. Then, if any doubt should arise, such cases *must be reserved for the synod of priests and their holy court*, not without the knowledge of that most reverend man of the sacrosanct law, the Bishop of the City of Constantinople, which enjoys the prerogative of Ancient Rome.

delictis ad religionis observantiam pertinentia, locis suis et a suae dioeceseos synodis audiantur: exceptis, quae actio criminalis ab ordinariis extraordinariisque iudicibus aut illustribus potestatibus audienda constituit. dat. xvi. kal. iun. treviris, valente v. et valentin. aa. cons.

21. *CTh.16.2.45*: Idem aa. philippo praefecto praetorio illyrici. omni innovatione cessante vetustatem et canones pristinos ecclesiasticos, qui nunc usque tenerunt, per omnes illyrici provincias servari praecipimus. tum si quid dubietatis emerserit, id oporteat non absque scientia viri reverentissimi sacrosanctae legis antistitis urbis constantinopolitanae, quae romae veteris praerogativa laetatur, conventui sacerdotali sanctoque iudicio reservari. dat. prid. id. iul. eustathio et agricola cons. (421 iul. 14).

*Given on before the ides of July in the year of the consulship of Eustathius and Agricola (July 14, 421).*²²

Already in the early 4th century some of the Eastern Roman bishops had the ambition to create and develop Christian centers among the *gentes barbaricae*, strictly supervising their consolidation. On their turn, the Roman Emperors accepted as their personal duty and honor the Christianization not only of the Empire, but of the whole world.²³ As a result of this strict and orderly policy, even Kingdoms, such as Armenia and Persia, developed system of bishoprics, similar to the established one in the Roman Empire. In these regions the bishops, situated in the episcopal provinces, were subdued under the power of a *katholikos*.²⁴

By the beginning of the 4th century, for example, was established the Armenian Apostolic Church and its first *katholikos* Saint Greg-

22 Clyde Pharr, trans. and comm., *The Theodosian Code and Novels, and the Sirmundian Constitutions*, vol. I, Corpus iuris Romani (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1952), 449.

23. According to Eusebius (*Vita Constantini*, 4.24 “That he described himself to be a Bishop, in Charge of Affairs External to the Church”) Constantine perceived himself as a bishop with jurisdiction over all that remains outside the Christian churches, while the other bishops were empowered within these churches. “You are bishops whose jurisdiction is within the Church: I also am a bishop, ordained by God to overlook whatever is external to the Church.” And truly his measures corresponded with his words: for he watched over his subjects with an episcopal care, and exhorted them as far as in him lay to follow a godly life.” In that connection see: Garth Fowden, *Empire to Commonwealth. Consequences of Monotheism in Late Antiquity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 91; Philip Schaff, ed., NPNF2-01: Eusebius Pamphilius: Church History, *Life of Constantine*, Oration in Praise of Constantine, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Second Series, vol. I, T&T Clark (Edinburgh, WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1890), 1042.

24. Persia: Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin, eds., *Histoire de l’Eglise depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours* (Paris, 1934), vols. 3 and 4: 3: 492-95, 4: 321-30; Armenia: Fliche and Martin, *Histoire*, 3: 490-92, 4: 330-36. Concerning bishops in various areas around the Persian Gulf and the East, see: Fliche and, Martin, *Histoire*, 4: 529-31. See also: Ralph Mathisen, “Barbarian Bishops and the Churches ‘in Barbaricis Gentibus’ During Late Antiquity,” *Speculum* 72.3 (Jul. 1997): 664-97, 665.

ory the Illuminator was consecrated as Patriarch of Armenia by Leontius, the bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. There were established twelve provinces.²⁵ The bishop of Caesarea continued to enthroned and consecrate the Armenian *katholikoi*,²⁶ while Gregory played leading role in the conversion of the people and the rejection of Paganism and Zoroastrianism.²⁷

Ideal premises were created for the Church and the clergy to become a factor of repression, supported by the Imperial authority in ideological, political, institutional and juridical way. In the policy *contra paganos et haereticos* the whole administrative, ideological and legal potential of the Empire was involved. Among the numerous “bright” examples was also Maternus Cynegius, a Christian from Spain, who was appointed between 381 and 383 AD for *comes sacrarum largitionum* by Emperor Theodosius I,²⁸ and later also for *quaestor sacri palatii*. In 384 AD he became finally praetorian prefect of the East, with his prerogatives over *praefectura praetorio Orientis*.²⁹

Cynegius remains in history with his anti-Jewish laws, with his laws that prohibited any pagan sacrifices and with the mass destruction of non-Christian temples in Egypt and Syria. Theodosius I³⁰ himself forbade the veneration of Pagan gods in the East and ordered to Cynegius to close their temples in Egypt and Alexandria and to take all needed measures for the extermination of the pagan sacrifices and rituals, as a symbol of Paganism, keeping alive the flame of the unholy heresy,³¹ and appearing entirely in revolt against the

25. Fliche and Martin, *Histoire*, 3: 490.

26. *Ibid.* Fowden, *Empire to Commonwealth*, 79, 105; Mathisen, *Barbarian Bishops*, 666, n. 9.

27. In 301 AD King Tiridates III of Armenia (259-314), who had been converted by the Gregory the Illuminator (b. 257-d. 331), declared Christianity as the official state religion. Thus Armenia became the first state to adopt Christianity. Nina Garsoïan, *Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times*, R.G. Hovannisian, ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), vol. 1, 81.

28. *Codex Theodosianus*, XII.1.97.

29. *Codex Theodosianus*, XII.13.5.

30. Zosimus, *Historia nea*, IV.

31. *Codex Theodosianus*, 16.10.9: Idem aaa. cynegio praefecto praetorio. ne quis mortalium ita faciendi sacrificii sumat audaciam, ut inspectione iecoris ex-

official Christian doctrine. Furthermore the Emperor did not prevent the destruction of significant Hellenistic temples, including the Temple of Apollo in Delphi and the Serapeum in Alexandria.

In 388 AD during his second visit in the eastern part of the Empire, accompanied by the reverend bishop of Apamea Marcellus,³² Cynegius destroyed more pagan altars and sacred places:³³ the Temple in Edessa, the Kabeirion at the Island of Imbros, The Temple of Zeus in Apamea, the Temple of Apollo in Didymus, and all the temples in Palmyra.³⁴ In the same time hundreds of innocent pagans all over the Empire, were put under extermination, becoming real martyrs of their persecuted (proclaimed for illegal and forbidden) faith,

torumque praesagio vanae spem promissionis accipiat vel, quod est deterius, futura sub execrabili consultatione cognoscat. acerbioris etenim imminebit supplicii cruciatus eis, qui contra vetitum praesentium vel futurarum rerum explorare temptaverint veritatem. dat. viii kal. iun. constantinopoli arcadio a. i et bautone v. c. cons. (385 mai. 25).

32. Marcellus—Bishop of Apamea. Previously he served as a judge on the island of Cyprus. As a bishop he followed consistently the edicts of Emperor Theodosius I, in which he ordered all pagan temples in the Eastern Empire to be destroyed. The Church honors him on August 14. See: Matthew Bunson et al., *Our Sunday Visitor's Encyclopedia of Saints* (Our Sunday Visitor Publishing, 2003), 517; more about the temple: Ramsay MacMullen and Robin Lane, eds., *Paganism and Christianity, 100-425 C.E.: A Sourcebook* (Fortress Press, 1992), 44; Frank W. Walbank, *The Hellenistic World*, Fontana History of the Ancient World (Harvard University Press, 1993), 130; Ann I. Steinsapir, "Landscape and the Sacred—The Sanctuary dedicated to Holy, Heavenly Zeus Baetocaece" (An architectural interpretation of cult and cult practice in Roman Syria), *Near East Archaeology* 62.3 (1999): 182-194.

33. Theodoret of Cyrus, *Ecclesiastical History*, Book V, Ch. 21 "Of Marcellus, bishop of Apamea, and the idols' temples destroyed by him": Феодорит Кирский, *Церковная история*, V. 21: "О повсюдном разрушении идольских капищ". Феодорит епископ Кирский. *Церковная история* (М. РОССПЭН. Колокол, 1993), 198.

34. Concerning Cynegius' campaign against the pagan temples of the East, and in particular those in Palmyra, see: Frank Trombley, *Hellenic Religion and Christianization: C. 370-529*, Biblical Studies and Religious Studies, vol. 1 of Hellenic Religion and Christianization, C. 370-529, Religions in the Graeco-Roman World Series (Brill, 2001), 145-146 ff; Barbara Gassowska, "Maternus Cynegius, Praefectus Praetorio Orientis and the Destruction of the Allat Temple in Palmyra," *Archeologia* 33 (1982): 107-123.

in the famous camps of death in Scythopolis, Syria.³⁵ The camps were already built in 359 AD and their main function was torment and execution of the arrested and imprisoned. Hundreds anonymous victims died there without due process of law and sentence.

Cynegius was not satisfied with his anti-pagan policy and continued by issuing of anti-Jewish law. His fanaticism was fueled by the “spiritual” guidelines of the later proclaimed as a Saint of the Church Marcellus, Bishop of Apamea. Marcellus himself was killed around 389,³⁶ due to his decision to level with the ground the pagan temples within the diocese of Apamea. He supervised the destruction of a temple dedicated to Zeus Baetocaece, when pagans attacked him. This episode is one of the many illustrating the desperate but furious and persistent acts of resistance against the official Christian-centric church and against the state policy of violence, restrictions, persecution and extermination of the infidels, of their symbols and sacred centers. Merged in one collective image, pagans and heretics were the embodiment of *the Others*, such as they were and are defined in the archetypal construction and opposition of *us* and *them* (*nos adversus alienos, nos adversus barbaros*).

The policy of Theodosius II was also clearly aimed at the establishment and enforcement of *fides catholica* as the only legitimate state religion in the Empire. Its grounds, its legitimacy and the legal mechanisms for its protection were defined and regulated by imperative titles in *Codex Theodosianus*. The events surrounding the collection of all the laws from the reign of Constantine up to Theodosius II and Valentinian III in a Code, which was the first attempt “of the Roman authorities to collect and publish their laws after the Twelve Tables,”³⁷ are well known. On 26th of March 429 AD the Emperor Theodosius II, anxious about the low level of legal knowledge in his

35. David Hernandez, *The Greatest Story Ever Forged: Curse of the Christ Myth* (Dorrance Publishing, 2009), 123.

36. Fergus Millar, *The Roman Near East, 31 B.C.-A.D. 337* (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press, 1993), 241.

37. John F. Matthews, *Laying Down the Law: A Study of the Theodosian Code* (New York: Yale University Press, 2000), 17.

empire of the East,³⁸ founded or refounded a law school at Constantinople,³⁹ and declared his intentions to collect *omnes leges* in one single Code.

Twenty two scientists worked for nine years to compile it.⁴⁰ The result were 16 books, containing more than 2,500 imperial constitutions. It was published officially on 15th of February 438 AD.⁴¹ Except titles of legal, political, socio-economic, cultural and religious nature of the 4th and 5th century, the Code seeks to impose Christianity as the only official religion of the Empire, and regulates penalties, prohibitions and restrictions for pagans and heretics.

In Book 16 “On the Catholic faith” are established principles of supremacy and universality of *fides catholica*:

16.1.0. On the Catholic Faith^{42,43}

XVI.I.2. Emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius Augustus: an Edict to the People of the City of Constantinople.

It is Our will that all the peoples who are ruled by the administration of Our Clemency shall practice that religion which

38. William W. Buckland, *A Text-Book of Roman Law: From Augustus to Justinian*, Third edition revised by Peter Stein (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 38.

39. *Codex Theodosianus*, 14.9.3.

40. Noel Lenski, “Review: Laying Down the Law. A Study of the Theodosian Code by John Matthews,” *The Classical Journal* (The Classical Association of the Middle West and South, Inc.) 98.3 (Feb.-Mar. 2003): 337-40.

41. It was published in 438 in the Eastern Empire, and in 439 in the Western Empire by the Emperor Valentinian III.

42. *CTh.16.1.0. De fide catholica. CTh.16.1.2pr.* Imppp. gratianus, valentinianus et theodosius aaa. edictum ad populum urbis constantinopolitanae. cunctos populos, quos clementiae nostrae regit temperamentum, in *tali volumus religione* versari, *quam divinum petrum apostolum tradidisse romanis religio* usque ad nunc ab ipso insinuata declarat quamque pontificem damasum sequi claret et petrum alexandriae episcopum virum apostolicae sanctitatis, hoc est, ut secundum apostolicam disciplinam evangelicamque doctrinam patris et filii et spiritus sancti unam deitatem sub parili maiestate et sub pia trinitate credamus. (380 febr. 27).

43. See: Alberto Barzanò, *Il cristianesimo nelle leggi di Roma imperiale* (Milan: Figlie di San Paolo, 1996); Jean Gaudemet, *L'Édit de Thessalonique. Aspect of the Fourth Century* (Leide, 1997), 43-51.

the divine Peter the Apostle transmitted to the Romans, as the religion which he introduced makes clear even unto this day. It is evident that this is the religion that is followed by the Pontiff Damasus and by Peter, Bishop of Alexandria, a man of apostolic sanctity; that is, according to the apostolic discipline and the evangelic doctrine, we shall believe in the single Deity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, under the concept of equal majesty and of the Holy Trinity. We command that those persons who follow this rule shall embrace the name of Catholic Christians. The rest, however, whom We adjudge demented and insane, shall sustain the infamy of heretical dogmas, their meeting places shall not receive the name of churches, and they shall be smitten first by divine vengeance and secondly by the retribution of Our own initiative, which We shall assume in accordance with the divine judgment.

*Given on the third day before the Calends of March at Thessalonica in the year of the fifth consulship of Gratian Augustus and the first consulship of Theodosius Augustus (February 28, 380).*⁴⁴

Principles of “*fides Catholicae observantiae*” in an empire with only one official religion required the formulation of a privileged legal and social status of *the righteous*, and punishing and ultimately social marginalization of all the *heretics* and *pagans*. In Book 16, title 5 “Concerning Haeretics” Emperor Constantine ordered Dracilian,⁴⁵ vicar of the Eastern Diocese, to follow a clear policy of discrimination against violators of *lex catholica*:

CTh.16.5.0. Concerning Haeretics

44. Pharr, *The Theodosian Code*, 440.

45. Regarding the relations between Constantine and Dracilian, see also: *Vita Constantini*, 3.31: Eusebius’ Life of Constantine, Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Societies, vol. I (London: 1887-97), 3-13; Brett Whalen, ed., *Pilgrimage in the Middle Ages: A Reader*, vol. 16, Readings in Medieval Civilizations and Cultures (University of Toronto Press, 2011), 16; Charles Odahl, *Constantine and the Christian Empire*, Roman Imperial Biographies (Routledge, 2003), 188.

*CTh.16.5.1. Emperor Constantine Augustus to Dracilianus.*⁴⁶

The privileges that have been granted in consideration of religion **must benefit only the adherents of the Catholic faith.** It is Our will, moreover, that heretics and schismatics shall not only be alien from these privileges but shall also be bound and subjected to various compulsory public services.

*Given on the kalends of September at Gerastus in the year of the seventh consulship of Constantine Augustus and the consulship of the Constantius Caesar (September 1, 326).*⁴⁷

*CTh.16.5.5. Emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius Augustuses to Hesperius, Praetorian Prefect.*⁴⁸

All heresies are forbidden by both divine and imperial laws and shall forever cease. If any profane man by his punishable teachings should weaken the concept of God, he shall have the right to know such noxious doctrines only for himself but shall not reveal them to others to their hurt.

*Given on the third day before the nones of August at Milan (August 3). Received on the thirteenth day before the kalends of September in the year of the consulship of Auxonius and Olybrius (August 20, 379).*⁴⁹

Freedom of assembly and meetings was severely restricted, and the prohibitions were addressed, of course, to all the heretics and pagans in the Roman world. It was a part of a strategy to prevent in

46. *CTh.16.5.0. De haereticis. CTh.16.5.1:* Imp. constantinus a. ad dracilianum. privilegia, quae contemplatione religionis indulta sunt, catholicae tantum legis observatoribus prodesse oportet. haereticos autem atque schismaticos non solum ab his privilegiis alienos esse volumus, sed etiam diversis muneribus constringi et subici. proposita kal. sept. gerasto constantino a. vii et constantio c. cons. (326 sept. 1).

47. Pharr, *The Theodosian Code*, 450.

48. *CTh.16.5.5:* Imppp. gratianus, valentinianus et theodosius aaa. ad hesperium praefectum praetorio. omnes vetitae legibus et divinis et imperialibus haereses perpetuo conquiescant. quisquis opinionem plectibili ausu dei profanus inminuit, sibi tantummodo nocitura sentiat, aliis obfutura non pandat. dat. iii non. aug. mediolano, acc. xiii kal. sept. auxonio et olybrio cons. (379 aug. 3).

49. Pharr, *The Theodosian Code*, 450-51.

the very beginning any plan or a coup to overthrow the newly converted power, any movement or ideology against the authority, or any attempt for restoration of the old gods and faiths:

*CTh.16.5.11. The same Augustuses to Postumianus, Praetorian Prefect.*⁵⁰

All persons whatsoever who are tossed about by the false doctrine of diverse heresies, namely, the Eunomians, the Arians, the Macedonians, the Pneumatomachi, the Manichaeans, the Encratites, the Apotactites, the Saccophori, and the Hydroparastatae, shall not assemble in any groups, shall not collect any multitude, shall not attract any people to themselves, shall not show any walls of private houses after the likeness of churches, and shall practice nothing publicly or privately which may be detrimental to the Catholic sanctity. Furthermore, if there should exist any person who transgresses what has been so evidently forbidden, he shall be expelled by the common agreement of all good men, and the opportunity to expel him shall be granted to all who delight in the cult and the beauty of the correct observance of religion.

*Given on the eighth day before the kalends of August at Constantinople in the year of the second consulship of Merobaudes and the consulship of Saturninus (July 25, 383).*⁵¹

Privileged legal status of the adopted the only true faith was established and protected by the law:

50. *CTh.16.5.11: Idem aaa. postumiano praefecto praetorio. omnes omnino, quoscumque diversarum haeresum error exagitat, id est eunomiani, arriani, macedoniani, pneumatomachi manichaei, encratitae, apotactitae, saccofori, hydroparastatae nullis circulis coeant, nullam colligant multitudinem, nullum ad se populum trahant nec ad imaginem ecclesiarum parietes privatos ostendant, nihil vel publice vel privatim, quod catholicae sanctitati officere possit, exerceant. ac si qui extiterit, qui tam evidenter vetita transcendat, permissa omnibus facultate, quos rectae observantiae cultus et pulchritudo delectat, communi omnium bonorum conspiratione pellatur. dat. viii kal. aug. constantinopoli merobaude ii et saturnino cons. (383 iul. 25).*

51. Pharr, *The Theodosian Code*, 452.

CTh.16.2.16. The same Augustuses [Constantius and Julian] to the inhabitants of Antioch.

If in any city, town, village, hamlet, or municipality, any person by a vow of the Christian faith should show to all persons the merit of exceptional and extraordinary virtue, he shall enjoy *perpetual security*. For it is Our will that he shall rejoice and glory always in the faith, since We are aware that Our State is sustained more by religion than by official duties and physical toil and sweat.

*Given on the sixteenth day before the kalends of March at Antioch in the year of the consulship of Taurus and Florentius (February 14, 361).*⁵²

Any attempt to deviate from *fides catholica* has to be punished by different severe sanctions. Title 7, Book 16 of Codex Theodosianus, regulates the deprivation of all apostates the right to bequeath their property, and demands abrogation of any will, which was done in breach of this provision:

*CTh.16.7.0. Concerning Apostates*⁵³

*CTh.16.7.1. Emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius Augustuses to Eutropius, Praetorian Prefect.*⁵⁴

Those Christians who have become pagans shall be deprived of the power and right to make testaments, and every testament [in violation of this condition]⁵⁵ of such decedent, if there is a testament, shall be rescinded by the annulment of its foundation.

*Given on the sixth day before the nones of May at Constantinople in the year of the consulship of Syagrius and Eucherius (May 2, 381).*⁵⁶

52. Pharr, *The Theodosian Code*, 443.

53. Apostata, ae, m (Gr.: ἀποστάτης) – an apostate, heretic.

54. *CTh.16.7.0. De apostatis. CTh.16.7.1: Imppp. gratianus, valentinianus et theodosius aaa. ad eutropium praefectum praetorio. his, qui ex christianis pagani facti sunt, eripiatur facultas iusque testandi et omne defuncti, si quod est testamentum submota conditione rescindatur. dat. vi non. mai. constantinopoli, syagrio et eucherio cons. (381 mai. 2).*

55. As is stated in the Latin text, my note: D. Valentinova.

56. Pharr, *The Theodosian Code*, 465.

Part of the imperial strategy was the closure (and destruction) of all pagan temples, the absolute prohibition of all forms of non-Christian worship, all sacrifices in both East and West,⁵⁷ all pagan rituals, confiscation of all property of the heathen in favor of the Treasury, after his or her death penalty was carried out, and removal of every provincial governor who dared not to pursue and punish this type of religious crimes:

CTh.16.10.0. Concerning pagans, sacrifices, and temples

*CTh.16.10.4. The same Augustuses to Taurus, Praetorian Prefect.*⁵⁸

It is Our pleasure that ***the temples shall be immediately closed in all places and in all cities, and access to them forbidden***, so as to deny to all abandoned men the opportunity to commit sin. It is also Our will that all men shall abstain from sacrificies. But if perchance any man should perpetrate any such criminality, he shall be struck down with the avenging sword. We also decree that ***the property of a man thus executed shall be vindicated to the fisc***. The governors of the provinces⁵⁹ shall be similarly punished if they should neglect to avenge such crimes.

Given on the kalends of December in the year of the fourth consulship of Constantius⁶⁰ and the third of Constans,⁶¹ Augustuses (December 1, 346; 354?; 356).

57. Warren Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society* (Stanford University Press, 1997), 74.

58. *CTh.16.10.0. De paganis, sacrificiis et templis. CTh.16.10.4: Idem aa. ad taurum praefectum praetorio. placuit omnibus locis adque urbibus universis claudi protinus templa et accessu vetito omnibus licentiam delinquendi perditis abnegari. volumus etiam cunctos sacrificiis abstinere. quod si quis aliquid forte huiusmodi perpetraverit, gladio ultore sternatur. facultates etiam perempti fisco decernimus vindicari et similiter adfligi rectores provinciarum, si facinora vindicare neglexerint. dat. kal. dec. constantio iiii et constante iii aa. cons. (346 [354?] dec. 1).*

59. Rectores.

60. Flavius Iulius Constantius II (337-361).

61. Flavius Iulius Constans (337-350).

It is well known fact that in 325 AD the emperor Constantine summoned a general council of Christian bishops convened in Nicaea in Bithynia, south of Constantinople, actually the first ecumenical council of the Church, the famous First Council of Nicaea. One of its main purposes was to oppose officially Arianism, which was denied by the most bishops as heretical and dangerous to the salvation of souls⁶² and to the future of the Church.

Especially for the Donatists as heretics Codex Theodosianus provided separate financial penalties, depending on their social status:

*CTh.16.5.0. Concerning Heretics*⁶³

CTh.16.5.52pr. The same Augustuses to Seleucus, Praetorian Prefect.

62. Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (Penguin Adult, 1991), 28.

63. *CTh.16.5.0. De haereticis. CTh.16.5.52pr.:* Idem aa. seleuco praefecto praetorio. cassatis, quae pragmaticis vel adnotatione manus nostrae potuerint impetrari, et manentibus his, quae iam dudum super hoc definita sunt, et veterum principum sanctione servata, nisi ex die prolatae legis omnes donatistae, tam sacerdotes quam clerici laicique, catholicae se, a qua sacrilege descivere, reddiderint, tunc *illustres* singillatim poenae nomine fisco nostro auri pondo quinquaginta cogantur inferre, *spectabiles* auri pondo quadraginta, *senatores* auri pondo triginta, *clarissimi* auri pondo viginti, *sacerdotales* auri pondo triginta, principales auri pondo viginti, decuriones auri pondo quinque, negotiatores auri pondo quinque, plebei auri pondo quinque, circumcelliones argenti pondo decem. (412 ian. 30). *CTh.16.5.52.3:* Eos enim, quos nequaquam illata damna correxerint, facultatum omnium publicatio subsequetur. (412 ian. 30). Dat. iii kal. feb. ravennae honorio viiii et theodosio v aa. cons. (412 ian. 30).

Those provisions which were able to be impetrated by a pragmatic sanction⁶⁴ or by an annotation⁶⁵ of Our hand shall be annulled. Those limitations which were formerly defined on this subject shall remain in force, and the sanction of the former Emperors shall be observed. Moreover, unless from the date of the issuance of this law, all Donatist priests as well as clerics and laymen should return to the Catholic sect from which they have sacrilegiously withdrawn, then, as a punishment, all such persons of Illustrious rank (*illustres*)⁶⁶ shall be compelled to pay to Our fisc a fine of fifty pounds of gold each; persons of Respectable rank (*spectabiles*),⁶⁷ forty pounds of gold; Senators thirty pounds of gold; persons of Most Noble rank (*clarissimi*),⁶⁸ twenty pounds of gold; men of the rank of civil priests, thirty pounds of gold; chief decurions, twenty pounds of gold; decurions, five pounds of gold; tradesmen, five pounds of gold; plebeians, five pounds of gold; Circumcellions, ten pounds of silver each.

...3. If any person should not be corrected by the imposition of such penalties, he shall surely be pursued by the confiscation of all his property.

64. Pragmaticus, 3. In the late legal Latin: “pragmatica sanction,” “pragmatica iussio,” “pragmatica annotation,” “pragmatica constitution,” “pragmatica lex” – an imperial enactment of a particular importance, which relates to the affairs of the community, general administration, benefits given to large groups of people, orders to officials; the term “pragmatica sanctio” is also used for the letters by which the emperors of the Western and Eastern Empire mutually exchanged their official acts so they can be published in both parts of the empire (*Codex Iustinianus*, 1.2.10; pragmaticum, i, n: *Codex Theodosianus*, 6.23.3; 16.5.52). Adolph Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law*, vol. 43, issue 2 of Transactions of the American Philosophical Society (American Philosophical Society, 1968), 648.

65. Annotatio, onis, f (adn-) – a decision of the emperor, written in the margin of a petition addressed to him. In some texts it is distinguished from an imperial rescript (*rescriptum*), from which it differed in form, but not in content. The differences between *adnotatio* and *rescriptum* gradually vanished (*Codex Theodosianus*, *CTh.1.2.0. De diversis rescriptis: CTh.1.2.1*. See: Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary*, 350.

66. From *illustris*, - e.

67. From *spectabilis*, - e.

68. From *clarissimus*, 3.

...Given on the third day before the kalends of February at Ravenna in the year of the ninth consulship of Honorius Augustus and the fifth consulship of Theodosius Augustus (January 30, 412).

As an ultimate measure against still surviving from the persecutions pagans and heretics Donatists, the Theodosian Code stipulated common to both groups penalties – after being captured by the competent authorities and admit their guilt, they will be denied the right to participate in different forms of social life, to conclude contracts, and finally they will lose their right to participate in any associations and meetings:

*CTh.16.5.0. Concerning Heretics*⁶⁹

*CTh.16.5.54pr.*⁷⁰ *The same Augustuses* [Honorius and Theodosius] *to Julianus, the Proconsul of Africa.*

We decree that the Donatists and the heretics, who until now have been spared by the patience of Our Clemency, shall be severely punished by legal authority, so that by this Our manifest order, they shall recognize that they are intestable⁷¹ and have no power of entering into contracts of any kind, but they shall be branded with perpetual infamy and separated from honorable gatherings and from public assemblies.

Given on the fifteenth day before the kalends of July at Ravenna in the year of the consulship of Constantius and Constans (June 17, 414).

69. Pharr, *The Theodosian Code*, 460.

70. *CTh.16.5.0. De haereticis. CTh.16.5.54pr.*: Idem aa. iuliano proconsuli africae. donatistas adque haereticos, quos patientia clementiae nostrae nunc usque servavit, competenti constituimus auctoritate percelli, quatenus evidenti praeceptione se agnoscant et intestabiles et nullam potestatem alicuius ineundi habere contractus, sed perpetua inustus infamia a coetibus honestis et a conventu publico segregandos. (414 iun. 17).

71. Intestabiles – a class (similar to infames), whose status was regulated even in the Twelve Tables. *Intestabiles* could not be witnesses (*testes*), nor other persons may testify in their favor (Digesta, 28.1.26). Moreover, they were not allowed to witness a will and to bequeath (Digesta, 28.1.18.1). See: Paul du Plessis, *Borkowski's Textbook on Roman Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 106.

Confiscation of property and exile were the main penalties for clerics, who allowed worship of pagan gods and pagan rituals:

*CTh.16.5.54.1*⁷²

The same Augustuses [Honorius and Theodosius] to Julianus, the Proconsul of Africa.

Those places in which the dire superstition has been preserved until now shall surely be joined to the venerable Catholic Church, and thus their bishops and priests, that is, all their prelates and ministers shall likewise be despoiled of all their property and shall be sent into exile to separate islands and provinces.

Given on the fifteenth day before the kalends of July at Ravenna in the year of the consulship of Constantius and Constans (June 17, 414).

Severe penalties were imposed not only on criminals, defiling and denying the supremacy of the Christian faith and Church, but also over their accomplices who dared to harbour them or to assist them in their flight from the law: sanctions were imposed cumulatively – the confiscation of all property was accompanied by the same punishment which the law required for absconding offender:

*CTh.16.5.54.2*⁷³

Anyone who accepts these people, fleeing from the provided punishment, in order to harbour them, shall know that he will be subject to forfeiture of property for the benefit of our treasury, and to the punishment that will be imposed on them (June 17, 414).

72. *CTh.16.5.54.1*: Ea vero loca, in quibus dira superstitio nunc usque servata est, catholicae venerabili ecclesiae socientur, ita ut episcopi presbyteri omnesque antistites eorum et ministri spoliati omnibus facultatibus ad singulas quasque insulas adque provincias exulandi gratia dirigantur (414 iun. 17).

73. *CTh.16.5.54.2*: Quisque autem hos fugientes propositam ultionem occultandi causa susceperit, sciat et patrimonium suum fisci nostri compendiis adgregandum et se poenam, quae his proposita est, subiturum (414 iun. 17).

In 414 AD the fines for deviation from *fides catholica* were increased for those of high rank: a proconsul, vicar, or count were fined two hundred pounds of gold, and a senator – a hundred:

*CTh.16.5.54.3*⁷⁴

We also openly impose pecuniary penalties and fines on men and women, on individuals and [occupying] public offices, in amounts corresponding to their social status. Thus if anyone with the rank of *proconsul, vicar, or count of the first order* has not converted to the Catholic religion, he will be fined two hundred pounds of silver (June 17, 414).

Theodosian Code includes within the scope of the individual criminal responsibility all persons who demonstrate any associations with heretics, including senior magistrates and officials who have had the “imprudence” to attend gatherings of the Donatists:

*CTh.16.5.54.4*⁷⁵

With similar conditions we oblige as well the other privileged persons, so if a senator who has not been deprived of any honors and privileges, be found on a gathering of Donatists, he shall pay 100 lbs silver, and let the priests be forced to pay the same amount, the ten

74. *CTh.16.5.54.3*: Damna quoque patrimonii poenasque pecuniarias evidenter imponimus viris mulieribus, personis singulis et dignitatibus pro qualitate sui quae debeant irrogari. si igitur proconsulari aut vicariano vel comitivae primi ordinis quisque fuerit honore subcinctus, nisi ad observantiam catholicam mentem propositumque converterit, ducentas argenti libras cogetur exsolvere fisci nostri utilitatibus adgredandas. ac ne id solum putetur ad rescandam intentionem posse sufficere, quotienscumque ad communionem talem accessisse fuerit confutatus, totiens multam exigatur, et si quinquies eundem constiterit nec damnis ab errore revocari, tunc ad nostram clementiam referatur, ut de solida eius substantia ac de statu acerbius iudicemus (414 iun. 17).

75. *CTh.16.5.54.4*: Huiusmodi autem condicionibus etiam honoratos reliquos obligamus, scilicet ut senator, qui nullo munitus extrinsecus privilegio dignitatis, inventus in grege donatistarum centum libras solvat argenti, sacerdotales eandem summam cogantur exsolvere, decem primi curiales quinquaginta libras argenti addicantur, reliqui decuriones x solvant libras argenti, quicumque in haeresi maluerint permanere. (414 iun. 17).

first curials to be condemned to pay 50 lbs silver and the other decurions to pay ten lbs silver, all those who persevere to stay in the heresy (June 17, 414).

*CTh.16.5.54.9*⁷⁶

And all that could be gathered from this kind of people and places, let be sent immediately to the imperial treasury. *Given on the fifteenth day before the kalends of July at Ravenna in the year of the consulship of Constantius and Constans (June 17, 414).*

Trying to put in one clear historical picture all the known facts and processes, we see that the dramatic turnover in the relations between the traditional Mediterranean religions and the Christianity during the 4th and the 5th century was a dramatic prelude to a bigger change.

The 4th century started with systematic and cruel attempts for extermination of the new faith, being in its initial steps and endangering the old value systems, including that of the Romans. In 303 AD began the worst final stage in the Christian persecutions,⁷⁷ and it lasted until 311 AD, when the Edict of Toleration by the Roman Tetrarchy of Galerius, Constantine I and Licinius, officially ended Diocletian's anti-Christian policy. Christianity was legalized in 313 with the edict of Milan, issued by Constantine I and Licinius, proclaiming it for equal religion to the others, full religious tolerance within the territory of the Roman Empire, freedom of belief, legal rights for the Christians and return of their confiscated property.

With the edict of Milan the traditional Roman Pagainism lost its dominant role. The whole population of the Empire was granted the liberty to choose and observe its own faith, opening "the opportunity

76. *CTh.16.5.54.9*: Adque omnia, quae ex huiusmodi generibus hominum locisque colligi poterunt, ad largitiones sacras ilico dirigantur. dat. xv kal. iul. ravennae constantio et constante cons. (414 iun. 17).

77. Michael Gaddis, *There is no Crime for those who have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2005), 29.

for conversion not only to Christianity, but to other Pagan cults as well.”⁷⁸

By the end of that century, however, the balance of powers shifted from a temporal equilibrium to the favor of the Orthodox Church. Eager Christian apologists, zealous Christians and inspired Christian priests, supported by the highest circles of the Imperial authorities and applying the new imperatives of the active legislation *contra paganos et haereticos* ruined emblematic Pagan temples, persecuted or murdered with impunity those pagans and heretics, who refused to abandon their gods and beliefs.

The *new order* in this part of the world was marked by a series of tragic events, among which was the murder of Hypatia (415 AD), a Neoplatonist philosopher and mathematician, head of the Platonist School at Alexandria, where she taught philosophy, mathematics and astronomy. In his *Historia Ecclesiastica* the Byzantine historian Socrates Scholasticus testifies that Hipatia was kidnapped by a Christian crowd, stripped naked and dragged through the streets to the newly Christianised Caesareum Church, torn and flayed with tiles, still being alive. Finally her hands and legs were burnt.⁷⁹

Hypatia happened to be in the center of a conflict between Orestes, the Roman governor of Alexandria, who frequently asked her for advice, and the bishop of Alexandria, Cyril, a zealous keeper of the new Imperial faith. According to Socrates Scholasticus,⁸⁰ Orestes was afraid of the growing power of the bishops who did not recognize the jurisdiction of the State authorities appointed by the emperor and even encroached on their jurisdiction. During the growing conflict a group of 500 monks, armed and prepared to fight on the side

78. Наталия Воробьева, *Проблема отношений христианской церкви и государства в Римской империи I-IV вв. в освещении отечественной историографии второй половины XIX - начала XX в.* [Natalia Vorobieva, *The Christian problem of relations between church and state in the Roman Empire I-IV c. A domestic historiography of second half of XIX-early XX c.*] (Омск, 2005), 110.

79. 0380-0440. Socrates Scholasticus, *Historia ecclesiastica* XV, 125-40 [Documenta Catholica Omnia].

80. Socrates Scholasticus (c. 380-c. 439).

of the bishop, descended from the Mountains of Nitria. They confronted Orestes and attacked him with accusations, that he is a follower of paganism and idolatry. Orestes, himself, was a Christian, baptized by the bishop of Constantinople Atticus. One of the monks, Ammonius, attacked Orestes with stones and tried to kill him, but the governor was saved by the coming people of Alexandria. Ammonius was executed thereafter and the furious bishop Cyril proclaimed him for a Christian saint that had to be remembered as a martyr.

The intolerance of the Orthodox Church to any other different faiths and gods, was a phenomenon that extends far beyond the particularities of the Christian-pagan relations in the Antiquity,⁸¹ and far beyond the limits of the religious and theological argumentation. The use of the Imperial power, of the law, the administrative apparatus and the official policy as repressive state mechanisms that routinely act against *the Other*, defined as *the Enemy*, was a part of a strategy, deeply rooted into the history of the human civilization.

The aim has been always clear and constant – concentration of prerogatives and power, legitimacy of the supreme authority, coercion, oppression, subordination of the masses, control and conformism, that have to ensure material and ideological prosperity of those, who occupied the top positions in the state and the social hierarchy.

The key problem of such legitimation is also the central paradox of Christianity as a religion, whose sacred texts postulate love to all people, humble and pure altruism and sacrifice in the name of the love of Christ, or, as Matthew preaches:

*“But I say to you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who spitefully use you and persecute you.”*⁸²

81. Cf. Hal Drake, “Lambs into Lions: Explaining Early Christian Intolerance,” *Past & Present* 153 (Nov. 1996): 3-36, 5ff.

82. Matthew, 5:44.

On the historical scene love, compassion and faith pass always thousands of tests, experiencing extreme metamorphoses and transformations, having being saturated with foreign meanings or deprived of sense. In their light always perceivable is the Word of God – the supra-human, unthinkable, unnamable, the God without religions, the God beyond the earthly world, that God of the primary and purest essence, which is neither human nor material, but yet speaks through the voices of the prophets, spiritual saviors and spiritual teachers. Those who are most often killed, crucified or burned at stakes and crosses.

“And, in those days, there appeared in Alexandria a female philosopher, **a pagan** named Hypatia, and she was devoted at all times to magic, astrolabes,⁸³ and instruments of music, and she beguiled many people through Satanic wiles.... **A multitude of believers in God** arose under the guidance of Peter the Magistrate... and they proceeded to seek for the pagan woman who had beguiled the people of the city and the Prefect through her enchantments. And when they learnt the place where she was, they proceeded to her and found her... they dragged her along till they brought her to the great church, named Caesareum. Now this was in the days of the fast. And they tore off her clothing and dragged her... through the streets of the city till she died. And they carried her to a place named Cinaron, and they burned her body with fire.”⁸⁴

83. From ἀστρολάβον.

84. John Bihop of Nikiu, *Chronicle* (LXXXIV. 87-103): The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu: Translated from Zotenberg’s Ethiopic Text, vol. 4 of Christian Roman Empire series. Robert Henry Charles (Arx Publishing, LLC, 2007), 100.

*Elias Kolovos**

Mines and the Environment in Halkidiki: A Story from the Ottoman Past

Halkidiki, a beautiful peninsula in Northern Greece, has gained certain publicity in the crisis-struck Greece of the 2010s as the terrain of a confrontation, in some cases violent, between a Canadian mining company and the local people, who resist the mining activity with the help of leftist and environmental initiatives. The basic argument of the protesters against the search for gold in Halkidiki is the protection of the environment and the local communities. Along with similar struggles for the protection of the environment in the late capitalist era worldwide, a new historiographical field was born, “environmental history.”¹ In this context, the aim of this paper is to discuss the history of the little known today Ottoman investment in

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1. See, for example, two polemic papers by Alfred W. Crosby, “The Past and Present of Environmental History,” *The American Historical Review* 100 (1995): 1177-89 and Ted Steinberg, “Down to Earth: Nature, Agency, and Power in History,” *The American Historical Review* 107 (2002): 798-820. Also the historiographical review by J. R. McNeill, “Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History,” *History and Theory* 42 (2003): 5-43. For a review of the field of environmental history in Greek see Vasiliki Seirinidou, «Οι ιστορικοί στη φύση: Μια εισαγωγή στην περιβαλλοντική ιστορία» (Historians in Nature: An Introduction to Environmental History), *Ta Iστορικά* 51 (2009): 275-97. For a study of mining in Mexico in the *longue durée*, from the colonial times until the Canadian-based corporation mining of our days, see Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, “Exhausting the Sierra Madre: Mining Ecologies in Mexico over the Longue Durée”

mining in Halkidiki, between the 15th and the early 19th centuries, focusing on its social and environmental aspects.²

The Making of an Ottoman Mine

The Ottoman story of mining in Halkidiki originates from the very beginning of the construction of the Ottoman Empire during the 15th century. In the struggle for financing their emerging empire, the Ottomans had applied a policy of imperial fiscalism, aiming at controlling precious metals and coinage. In this context, the Ottoman Sultans Murad II and Mehmed II went to war with Hungary and the Italian states for control of the mining areas of the Balkans, principally in Serbia and Bosnia.³ At the same time, the Ottomans invested in opening new mines in the Balkans, like the mines of Siderokavsia/Sidrekapsi in Halkidiki.

The place name “Siderokavsia” means in Greek “smelting iron,” “ironworks,” or “siderurgy” (“sidero” means iron in Greek).⁴ We encounter it for the first time in the 9th century, when a monk by the

(forthcoming). I wish to express my gratitude to the author for sending me the draft of this stimulating paper before publication.

2. Two recent studies introduced Ottoman history into the field of the environmental history: Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011). A strong environmental problematique is also evident in the approach of Faruk Tabak, *The Waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). Cf. also the collective volume by Diana K. Davis and Edmund Burke III, eds., *Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2011).

3. See Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 58-9. For the Balkan mines see also Sima Circović, “The Production of Gold, Silver, and Copper in the Central Parts of the Balkans from the 13th to the 16th century,” in *Precious Metals in the Age of Expansion*, ed. H. Kellenbenz (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1981), 41-69.

4. Ioakeim Papagelos has located archaeological evidence of metallurgical activity in Skouries, dated from the Roman times, and in the plain southwest of

name of Ioannis Kolovos, left Mount Athos and settled in Siderokavsia together with his disciples. Later on, there are references to Siderokavsia as a “village” (Gk. *chorion*).⁵ The Byzantine tax registers (Gk. *praktika*) enumerate the villagers in the area as peasants, with fields, vineyards, and animals. There is only one reference, from the mid-14th century, to a “public ironworks” (Gk. *demosiakon siderokavseion*) in the nearby village of Kontogrikou,⁶ which might suggest that some kind of metallurgical activity was active in the area, during Byzantine times. However, there is no reference in mining at all before the arrival of the Ottomans.⁷

Sultan Murad II probably ordered the opening of the mines in Siderokavsia, a place-name that the Ottomans kept in the form of “Siderokapsı” (and, simplified in Turkish, “Sidrekapsı”), after his conquest of Salonica in 1430. According to the surviving pages of an Ottoman tax register dating from 1445, Siderokavsia was by then a silver mine (*maden-i nukra*). Its revenues had been recently transferred from the fief (*zeamet*) of the head of the Treasury (*defterdar*) Murad Bey to the imperial demesne (*hassa-i padişah*).⁸ Murad II had

Megali Panagia, dated maybe earlier. Ioakeim A. Papaggelos, «Το ‘κοινόν του Μαδεμίου’», in *Η διαχρονική πορεία του κοινοτισμού στη Μακεδονία* (Thessaloniki: Kentro Historias Thessalonikes, 1991), 257 fn. 1.

5. D. Papachryssanthou, *Ο αθωνικός μοναχισμός. Αρχές και οργάνωση* (Athonite Monasticism. Beginning and Organisation), (Athens: MIET, 1992), 123 and fn. 233, 124 and fn. 238. The names of two more villages in the area are connected with metallurgy: Metallin (“metallo”: metal in Greek) and Rudava (“ruda”: metal in the Slavic languages).

6. Jacques Bomboire, ed., *Actes de Xéropotamou* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1964), no. 25 (1346), l. 29-31 and no. 27 (1351).

7. Spyros Vryonis, “The Question of Byzantine Mines,” *Speculum* 37 (1962): 13-14, suggested that the Ottoman mines had Byzantine precedents in the area; his suggestion, however, is based in no other evidence than the place-name “Siderokavsia” itself.

8. N. Todorov and B. Nedkov, eds., *Fontes Turcici Historiae Bulgaricae, series XV-XVI* (Turski izvori za Balgarskata istorija, serija XV-XVI), vol. II (Sofia: National Academy of Sciences, 1966), 343. A Greek document of 1445, written in Siderokavsia, makes a clear reference to “trochous ergastikous,” i.e., smelting activity, and Muslim and Christian inhabitants, with names of both Greek and Slavic origin (Bomboire, *Actes de Xéropotamou*, no. 30).

also issued a regulation (*kanunname*) for the mines of Siderokavsia, which does not survive itself, but was renewed by his son, Sultan Mehmed II, and is partially reproduced in an order issued after a request by the infidel miners (*madenci gâvurları*) themselves.⁹ This important text was written according to the regulation for the mines of Kratova (Ott. Karatova), located to the east of Skopje. This might suggest that the Ottomans, in their effort to open the new mines in Siderokavsia, had transferred here by force (*sürgün*) skilled miners from the mines of Kratova.¹⁰ The connection between the two mines is established also by the fact that in 1471 the mines of Kratova and Siderokavsia were farmed out together as a *mukataa* worth of 2,250,000 *akçes* (51,136 ducats).¹¹ Moreover, we know that in the beginning of the 18th century, when the Ottomans attempted to reorganise mining activity in Siderokavsia, they transferred there some skilled miners from Kratova.¹²

The “village” (*karye*) of Siderokavsia, as it was registered in the Ottoman tax register of 1445, by 1478 had developed into a town (*nefs-i Siderokabsı*) that, together with the neighbour settlements of İzvor and Piyavica, constituted the “imperial demesne of the mine of

9. Robert Anhegger and Halil İnalçık, eds., *Kanunname-i Sultani Ber Muceb-i Örfi Osmani, II. Mehmed ve II. Bayezid Devirlerine Ait Yasakname ve Kanunnameler* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1956), 66-7; Nicoara Beldiceanu, *Les Actes des premiers Sultans conservés dans les manuscrits turcs de la Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris*, vol. I: *Actes de Mehmed II et de Bayezid II du ms. fonds Turc ancien 39* (Paris-Hague: Mouton, 1960), 138; Ahmet Akgündüz, ed., *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri*, vol. I (Istanbul: FEY Vakf Yayınları 1990), 524-26.

10. For the Ottoman policy of forced migration (*sürgün*), see Ömer L. Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda bir iskan ve kolonizasyon metodu olarak sürgünler,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 11 (1949-50): 524-70, 13 (1951-52): 56-78, and 15 (1953-54): 209-37.

11. Inalçık–Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 59, Table 1:12.

12. Mustafa Altunbay, “Osmanlı döneminde bir maden işletmesinin tarihi süreci: Sidrekapsı” (The History of the Function of a Mine during the Ottoman Period: Sidrekapsı), unpublished PhD dissertation, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2010, 225, 227-28, and below in this paper.

Siderokavsia” (*hasshâ-yı maden-i Siderokapsı*). The three settlements of the miners included then a total of almost 600 tax households (*hane*). Their numbers remained almost the same in the tax

Table: The population of Siderokavsia, Izvor, and Piyavica according to the Ottoman registers (15th-16th c.)

	1478			1519			1527			1568		
	H.	B.	W.	H.	B.	W.	H.	B.	W.	H.	B.	W.
Siderokavsia												
Muslim quarters:												
<i>Cami-i Şerife</i>										28	6	
<i>Üveys Çelebi</i>										31	19	
<i>Hüsam Halife Cedid</i>										32	24	
<i>Hüseyin Çelebi</i>										17	1	
<i>Kuruczade nam-ı diğeri Yeni Tarla</i>										14	12	
<i>İzzet Hacı</i>										14		
Muslims	20	1		62	12		50	32		136	73	
Christian quarters:												
<i>Protopapas</i>	55	2	5				100	18	8	109	46	
<i>Pop İvlad</i>	80	2	7				161	26	13	154	73	
<i>Pop Yan</i>	72	3	7				73	16	6	98	27	
<i>Yani Yerasna</i>	10											
<i>Papa Yani</i>	12		1									
<i>İstamad İslav</i>	14											
<i>Todor Vasil</i>	11		1									
<i>Yani Kirko</i>	70	2	5									
<i>Rosotova</i>	11		2									
<i>Yani Markovik</i>	14											
Christians, total:	349	9	28	305	31	37	334	60	27	361	146	
Jews										40	19	
Izvor												
<i>Pop Yovan</i>							79	22	4	142	47	5
<i>Pop Radoslav</i>							61	11	2	73	31	
<i>Pop Dimitri</i>							46	9	5	77	19	
Christians, total:	164		8	167	16	13	186	42	11	292	97	5
Piyavica												
Christians	75	8	1	91	5	10	89	18	8	129	69	
Total	608	18	37	625	64	60	659	152	46	958	404	5

H.: Households (*hane*). B: Bachelors (*mücerred*). W: Widows (*bive*).

Source: Elias Kolonos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί στην οθωμανική Χαλκιδική, 15^{ος}-16^{ος} αιώνας» (Peasants and monks in the Ottoman Halkidiki, 15th-16th c.), unpublished PhD dissertation, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2000, vol. 2, 27-29.

surveys of the first years of the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), but increased to reach almost 1,000 tax households by the reign of Selim II (1568). The miners were Christians in their majority, including, however, a Muslim community, which developed from 20 tax households in 1478 to 62 in 1519, 50 in 1527, and 136 in 1568.

The Table above shows that apart from the increase in the number of households, the number of unmarried men in the three settlements of the mines of Siderokavsia increased as well during the 16th century, comprising a considerable proportion of the population (from 10.2% in 1519, to 23% in 1527, and to 42.1% in 1568). These men should have been the unskilled labour force working in the mines, most possibly migrants. After 1527, a Jewish community from Salonica had also settled in Siderokavsia, which included 40 tax households and 19 unmarried men in 1568.

The mines of Siderokavsia were described extensively by the French traveller and botanist Pierre Belon du Mans (1517-1564), who had visited them in 1547, in the course of his *Voyage au Levant* (first published in Paris in 1553).¹³ According to Belon, “*le village [de Sicerocapsa] etait auparavant mal bâti, mais maintenant il semble à une ville.*” He compares it to the famous mining town of Joachimstal in Bohemia and maintains that it had developed in the last 12-15 years, reaching a population of more than 6,000 miners, who had been forced migrants (*gens ramassés*). They were Albanians, Greeks, Jews, Vlachs, Circassians, Serbians, and Turks, who spoke Slavic, Bulgarian, Greek, and Albanian. Further below in his narrative, Belon states that the metal workers were in their majority of Bulgarian origin (*de nation bulgare*), a possible reference to the origins of the miners from Kratova. On the other hand, the inhabitants of the two neighbouring villages were mostly Christians, speaking Serbian and Greek. Belon refers also to the Jews of Siderokavsia, who spoke Spanish (Ladino).¹⁴ Actually, according to Jewish sour-

13. Alexandra Merle, ed., *Voyage au Levant (1553). Les observations de Pierre Belon du Mans* (Paris: Chandeigne, 2001), 156-76.

14. *Ibid.*, 156-57 and 159.

ces, the first Jews of Siderokavsia were Ashkenazim, who were followed shortly after by Sephardim.¹⁵

The population increase in Siderokavsia, which peaked in the mid-16th century, corresponded to the increase of the production of the mines. According to Belon, “*c’est un village d’aussi grand revenu au Turc, pour la grande quantité de l’or et de l’argent qu’on y fait, que la plus grande ville de toute Turquie.*”¹⁶ He estimates the revenues for the Sultan between 9-10,000 and 30,000 gold ducats per month, 18,000 ducats on average (216,000 ducats per year). The practices of metallurgy had been transferred to the Balkans by Saxons in the mid-13th century. As a result, the technical terms describing mining and metallurgy used by the Ottomans in the regulations for the Balkan mines, and in actual practice, as Belon corroborates, were German.¹⁷

Belon is the first to describe in detail the operation of the Ottoman gold and silver mines of Siderokavsia: The ores, in some cases found out even in the open, was usually extracted in pits or galleries. When it was found in middle depth, it was extracted by four miners. Sometimes, however, it was so deep in the ground, that they had to extract it with the use of machinery based on horse-power. When the lead ore was extracted (Belon makes a special reference to the common

15. For the Jewish community of Siderokavsia see H. Jakobsohn, “The Story of A Lamb: The Jewish Community of Sidrokapsi in the late 16th and Early 17th Centuries,” in *The Jewish Communities of Southeastern Europe*, ed. I. K. Hassiotis (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1997), 214. In 1568, the Jews of Salonica were financing the operation of the mines in Siderokavsia with a sum of 50,000 *akçes*, paid as “*sarraflık*.” We can assume that they had earlier been assigned the duty of the exchange of coins in Siderokavsia, which can explain their migration to Siderokavsia. See M. Rozen, “The Corvée to Operate the Mines in Sidrekapsı and its Effects on the Jewish Community of Thessaloniki in the 16th century,” in Hassiotis, *The Jewish Communities*, 453-71.

16. Merle, *Voyage au Levant*, 156.

17. See Nicoara Beldiceanu, *Les Actes des premiers Sultans conservés dans les manuscrits turcs de la Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris*, vol. 2: *Règlements miniers* (Paris-Hague: Mouton, 1964), 59-66; Circović, “The Production of Gold,” 42-43; Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (N. York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 27; Merle, *Voyage au Levant*, 159.

galena lead ores extracted in Siderokavsia), silver was separated from the compound through smelting and cupellation, in furnaces of high temperature, where air flow made possible the oxidation of the lead and the removal of silver and gold. Belon describes in detail these furnaces, 500-600 in Siderokavsia, owned by private individuals (*particuliers maitres*),¹⁸ and states that for the separation of silver from the lead ore, they did not use charcoal (that they used for smelting the galena lead ore) but thick wood. Air flow for the furnaces was provided by bellows, operating with water power from nearby streams.¹⁹ On the other hand, the separation of gold from silver, an operation, says Belon, carried out an Armenian expert, was made through the process of salt cementation.²⁰

Belon's testimony is corroborated by the information from the Ottoman regulations of the mining activity in Siderokavsia, dating from the 15th century.²¹ According to these texts, the state claimed a share of 1/12 (8.3%) from the refined metal at the time of Murad II and the early years of Mehmed II. Before 1478, however, the taxation system had changed. A tithe of 10% was collected from the ore, and a second tithe was imposed later on the refined silver and gold after cupellation (*öşr-i cevher* and *öşr-i nukra*). After the collection of the tax, the miners took their share from the ore, which around

18. Cf. the relatively small individual mining operations in colonial Mexico, Studnicki-Gizbert, "Exhausting the Sierra Madre," 6.

19. Note that the Slavic place name Izvor for the village of miners near Siderokavsia means "source of water."

20. In 1546, Eliezer son of Abraham, a Sephardic Jew from the congregation of the Old Catalan synagogue (*Köhne Katalan cemaati*) of Salonica, farmed out (*iltizam*) for 11,000 *akçes* the right to search for gold in the water streams of Siderokavsia, and, further to the north, on the mountain of Beles. See Altunbay, "Sidrekapsı," 22, fn. 21.

21. See above, fn. 9 and especially the detailed report published by Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. II, 183-87, and Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 518-23. This report has to be dated around 1478, since it was ordered probably in connection with the survey of that date by Kasım Paşa, *sancakbey* of Salonica between 1472-1483.

1478 was divided in half between them and their contractors,²² the owners of the pits (Turkish *kuyu sahibleri* or *varak*, from the German *Gewerke*).²³ Actually, it was the skilled miners who were actually operating the mine through an assembly called *sabor*, arbitrating justice according to the Saxon mining code, and presided by a prelate (*knez*).²⁴ They should have also included the owners of the furnaces, who were called *vatrok*.²⁵ The workers in the mines worked in groups of eight men and were led by skilled miners, elected by the aforementioned assembly. They were named *hutman* (Germ. *Hutmann*) and *şafar* (Germ. *Schaffer*); *şafars* were Muslims in 1568.²⁶

The Ottoman state had the monopsony of the ore extracted in the mines. After the refinement of silver and gold with bellows (*çarh*), the ore was sold to the mint (*darbhane*), which operated in Siderokavsia, already from the times of Mehmed II.²⁷ However, silver and gold coins issued in Siderokavsia have been located only from the early 16th century.²⁸ The Ottomans farmed out both tax collection and the monopsony of the ore to farmers (*âmil*), who had also the right to collect agricultural revenues, like the tithe on vineyards, as well. The mint was also farmed out separately.²⁹ However, the state oversaw the whole operation of the mines through a superintendent

22. According to the report, in earlier years, the miners gave only 1/6 of the ore to the proprietors of the pits, and later, they sold the rest to them. It has to be noted also that the agreement between contractors and miners changed when the galleries had to take the water from the winter season out.

23. Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. II, 184-85. For the property status of these individuals in the Balkan mines, see in detail 89-94.

24. Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. II, 117-18. For the *knez* in Siderokavsia already in 1444 see Bombaire, *Actes de Xéropotamou*, no. 30.

25. According to a report of 1537, see Papangelos, «Το 'κοινόν του Μαδεμίου'», 269-70. For the *vatrok* in detail see Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. II, 95-97.

26. Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. II, 184, 109-11 (*hutman*), 111-12 (*şafar*).

27. See above, fn. 20.

28. Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 37.

29. Papangelos, «Το 'κοινόν του Μαδεμίου'», 269-70.

(*emin-i maden*), appointed by the Sultan, who was supervised by the judge (*kadı*) of Siderokavsia.³⁰

According to the Ottoman tax register of 1478, the estimated annual revenues of the mines of Siderokavsia, which were farmed out, included 25,000 *akçes* from the tithe on the ore (*öşr-i cevher*), and 80,000 *akçes* from the tithe on the refined metals (*öşr-i nukra*).³¹ Since the tithe was then calculated at the rate of 10%, the mines of Siderokavsia in 1478 had, according to the aforementioned number, a total production valued more than 1,000,000 *akçes* (22,727 ducats); we have already mentioned that in 1471 the mines of Siderokavsia and Kratova were farmed out together as a *mukataa* worth of 2,250,000 *akçes* (51,136 ducats). In the register of the first years of the reign of Süleyman, the annual revenues from the mines of Siderokavsia were 112,800 *akçes*, from the tithe on the refined silver and gold and the tax on refinement (*mahsul-i öşr-i nukra ve zeheb ve resm-i kal*).³² Since the tithe was then calculated at a rate of 12.5%,³³ we can estimate the total production at a value of 900,000 *akçes* (15,789 ducats). However, this amount did not include the revenues from the mint. According to a document dated 1537, the mines and the mint of Siderokavsia were farmed out previously for an annual sum 1,000,000 and 833,333 *akçes* respectively (a total of 32,263 ducats); the contracts were renewed to 1,066,666 and 1,216,666 *akçes* respectively.³⁴ According to the tax register of 1568, the same contracts had jumped to 2,000,000 and 2,600,000 *akçes* respectively (a total of 76,666 ducats).³⁵ These numbers show clearly that production in Siderokavsia had almost doubled during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent. However, they do not corroborate the number given by Pierre Belon for the annual revenues of from the

30. For the administration of the Balkan mines in general see Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. II, 127-40. For the role of the *kadı* see *ibid.*, 187, a case of a *kadı* asking for the replacement of the *emin*.

31. Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter: BOA), TT 7, 557.

32. BOA, TT 403, 1027.

33. Papaggelos, «Το 'κοινόν του Μαδεμίου'», 269-70.

34. *Ibid.*

35. BOA, TT 723, 164.

mines and the mint of Siderokavsia (see above, 216,000 ducats per year); Belon might have overestimated the revenues of the Sultan. In any case, according to Şevket Pamuk, “Sidrekapsi in Macedonia became by far the most productive of the Balkan mines during the first half of the 16th century.”³⁶ After the peak of the years around 1568, however, the value of the tax farms for the mines and the mint of Siderokavsia decreased: 3,162,857 for 1585 and 1588 (45,183 ducats) and 1593 (26,357 ducats), 3,200,000 for 1598 (25,600 ducats), 3,433,333 for 1607 (27,466 ducats), 3,820,979 for 1625 (31,841 ducats) and 1631 (20,110 ducats).³⁷ However, it is evident that Siderokavsia mined still large quantities of silver until even the third decade of the 16th century; Rhoads Murphey has shown that this was true for the Ottoman mines in the Balkans in general.³⁸

The remains of the mining town of 16th-century Siderokavsia are still visible today on the slope of Mount Stratoniko to the north of the village of Stageira and to the south of the road.³⁹ The village of Izvor (now Stratoniki) was situated one km to the southeast of Siderokavsia. Finally, Pyavica, according to Pierre Belon, was a small village over Siderokavsia, on the top of the mountain to the east of the town, with small houses.⁴⁰ According to the register of 1478, the three settlements of the miners were also taxed for their

36. Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 37 and 62, for the production of gold coins in Siderokavsia and Kratovo.

37. Rhoads Murphey, “Silver Production in Rumelia According to an Official Ottoman Report Circa 1600,” *Südost Forschungen* 39 (1980): 94. Cf. Altunbay, “Sidrekapsi,” 23-26.

38. Murphey, “Silver Production,” 75 and 85 for his estimation of the production of silver in Siderokavsia.

39. For the archaeological research in the area, see Ploutarchos L. Theodoridis, “The Consolidation Works on the South Tower at Siderokausia, Halkidiki,” in *Πύργοι και κάστρα*, ed. N. K. Moutsopoulos (Towers and Castles), (Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute of Patristic Studies, 1980), 77 and map of the site in p. 76. For the excavation, see also J.-M. Pesez, “Études de maçonnerie à Siderokavsia,” in *Structures de l’habitat et occupation du sol dans les pays méditerranéens, les méthodes et l’apport de l’archéologie extensive* (Rome-Madrid: École Française de Rome, 1988), 319-23.

40. Merle, *Voyage au Levant*, 173.

vineyards, cereals, sheep, and hives, being exempt from the poll-tax (*haraç*), the *ispençe*, the *salarlık*, the due from the wine barrels (*fıçı resmi*) and the service for the transportation of sheep (*celeb*).⁴¹ However, we can assume that what they produced did not suffice to meet their needs. These were met from the surrounding countryside. A tax regulation written around 1478 reports in detail the products that reached the market of Siderokavsia, including flour, wheat, barley, rice, lentils, greens and fruits, fat and cheese, honey, fish, sheep, swine, salt, wine, etc.⁴²

The Ottoman traveler Âşık Mehmed described in 1586/87 the town of Siderokavsia, where, he explains, he stayed for more than two years after an invitation from his local friends, as follows:

Sidrekabsi is the town of the district of the silver and gold mines. It's a small town. It has one mosque⁴³ and two public baths (hammams).⁴⁴ One of the hammams is a double one, with separate quarters for men and women respectively. The town does not have many streets. There is a mint there which strikes silver and gold coins from the mine of the district. The climate of Sidrekabsi is very pleasant during the summer and moderately cold during the winter. The water is coming from pipes and it is mild. Sidrekabsi has winter pastures near the seaside. During the winter of [99]4 and [99]5 (1586-87) the goats had kids and we enjoyed goat milk during all this season. This was a delicious drink which cannot be found in any other town of these parts. It is their special product and the people of Sidrekapsi use to send this goat milk as a gift to their friends in the towns of Serres and Salonica and the other neighboring towns.⁴⁵

41. BOA, TT 7, 557 and Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. I, 138.

42. Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. II, 186.

43. The mosque of Siderokavsia was registered for the first time in the register of 1568 (see above). The remains of the minaret can still be found today among the ruins of Siderokavsia.

44. One of the *hammams* is also in ruins today on the site of Siderokavsia.

45. Âşık Mehmed, *Menâzirü'l-Avâlim*, ed. Mahmut Ak (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), 995-96.

Âşık Mehmed described also the “mountain of Siderokavsia” (*cebel-i Sidrekabsi*):

The mountain is located to the south of the town of Siderokavsia, which is a silver mine. It is a high and wide mountain. Its length and width are of equal size and its total surface is over three parasangs (fersah) at a rough estimation. The mountain is at the border of the silver mine. Big and small trees on this mountain are innumerable. These trees are under the protection of the miners. They are protected from the villagers, so that they use them for the operation of the mine. On this mountain there are many places for hiking, full of sources and wells. The people of Siderokavsia have built in a tongue-shaped corner of the mountain a simple kiosk, named Çardak, with view to the Sea of Romania (Bahr-ı Rum).⁴⁶

The testimony of Âşık Mehmed includes the information that wood cutting on the mountains surrounding Siderokavsia was prohibited to the villagers, because it was used for the operation of the furnaces of the mines.⁴⁷ According to the regulation of Murad II and Mehmed II, the Christian miners of Siderokavsia had the right to make charcoal in the mountain (*dağdan kömür etmeğe mâni olmayalar, kim dilerse ede*).⁴⁸ The need for charcoal, which was used, as we have described above, for the furnaces which separated silver from lead, was much bigger of course. Around 1500, a group of villages in Western Halkidiki had become “villages of charcoal producers” (*kömürciyân-ı maden-i Sidrekapsı*) and they had been assigned

46. Mehmed, *Menâzirü'l-Avâlim*, 406.

47. The same information is repeated by Evliya Çelebi, who had visited shortly Siderokavsia in 1668: *Such big trees as the trees of the mountain of Siderokavsia cannot be found in any other country. Maybe only in the mountains of Ravna, in the vilayet of Bosnia. But in the case of the trees of Siderokavsia, nobody is allowed to cut them. This is because the mountain and the trees are the property of the state (mîrî kûhistân ve dirahistândır) and are being used for the smelting of the silver ore. If someone cuts a tree, he pays a fine.* S. A. Kahraman, Yücel Dağlı and Robert Dankoff, eds., *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, vol. VIII (Istanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası, 2003), 44.

48. Beldiceanu, *Les Actes*, vol. I, 138.

the task of supplying the mines with charcoal. In return, the charcoal producers were exempt from the extraordinary taxes (*avarız ve tekâlif-i divaniye or teklifât-ı örfiyye*). In the first years of the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent and during the reign of his son, Selim II, these were the old Byzantine villages of Revenikeia (Ravenik, today Megali Panagia) and Palaiochori (Palyohor), as well as the villages of Yeniköy (later Novoselo, today Neochori), Raligovi (Raliğova, later Liarigkovi, today Arnaia) and Varvara, which have been settled after the Ottoman conquest. By 1634, however, the Ottomans had established a much bigger group of villages in the *sancak* of Salonica (including villages in Serres, Drama, Zihne, Avrethisar, Demirhisar, and of course Sidrekabsi), which had been assigned the provision of 338 full loads and 25 quarter-loads of charcoal (*kömür beygiri*) for the mines of Siderokavsia; these services, however, could be exchanged with payments in cash.⁴⁹

Decline and Re-organisation of the Mining Activity

As a result of the arrival of large amounts of silver from the Americas, from the beginning of the 17th century, the Ottoman mints in the Balkans and Anatolia began to decrease their production, until, by the 1640s and 1650s, they virtually stopped the production of silver *akçes*, which were replaced in circulation with European silver coinage.⁵⁰ During the reign of Ibrahim I (1640-1648), the Ottoman mints all over the empire had closed, leaving only four still producing *akçes*, in Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Damascus, and Cairo.⁵¹ Evliya Çelebi, who visited Siderokavsia shortly after, in 1668, testifies to the closure of the mint:

In the years of the previous Sultans, pure silver akçes used to be struck in Siderokavsia. Actually, the mint is still standing in downtown Siderokavsia. In the reign of Sultan Murad IV, the mint stroke pure

49. Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 133-35 and Table 22 in pp. 143-44 (including only the villages of the *sancak* of Salonica).

50. Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 131, 139.

51. *Ibid.*, 145.

coins which circulated with the inscription “Sultân Murâd ibn Ahmed Hân ızze nasruhu duribe Sidirkapsi”. Afterwards, however, during the reign of Sultan Ibrahim, Kara Mustafâ Paşa banned their production [...] The mint of Sidrekapsi, together with other mints, they have been all closed since the reign of Ibrahim Han; the silver mine, however, is still in full operation.⁵²

The archival evidence shows that the Siderokavsia mines were still farmed out in the second half of the 17th century at an annual rate of 1,600,000 *akçes* (around 6,000 gold *sultani*) in 1670. This number expresses a sharp decrease in the revenues from Siderokavsia after the closure of the mint. Most probably, this was also the reason behind the transfer of the *mukataa* of Siderokavsia to the *mukataa* of the Customs of Salonica in 1673.⁵³ According to a local report reproduced in an order dated 1700, the silver mines of Siderokavsia were then almost abandoned.⁵⁴

During the difficult years of the long wars of the end of the 17th century, the Ottomans began once more to mint Ottoman silver coins, resulting, in the beginning of the 18th century, in the circulation of a new silver coin, the Ottoman *kuruş*.⁵⁵ In this context, it is of no coincidence that the Ottomans tried to revive silver production in the provincial mints, like Siderokavsia. According to the study of Mustafa Altunbay, in 1703, a Sultanic *ferman* ordered Çavuşzade Hüseyin Ağa of Salonica, the tax-farmer of the mines since 1698, to revive the production in Siderokavsia. Çavuşzade Hüseyin Ağa was appointed Superintendent (*emin*) of the mines and reported to the Porte on the abandoned mines, as well as on his efforts, with the assistance of the remaining skilled miners, to register and bring to-

52. Kahraman, Dağlı and Dankoff, *Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi*, 44.

53. Altunbay, “Sidrekapsi,” 26.

54. Ahmed Refik, *Osmanlı Devrinde Türkiye Madenleri (967-1200)* (Turkish Mines of the Ottoman Period), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1989), 47 (*hali ve harab*).

55. Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 159-60.

gether the *reaya* for work in the mine and in the production of charcoal. Some of the old pits and galleries of the mines were repaired and new ones were opened. The Ottoman government mobilized as day-workers in the mine the villagers of Sidrekapsi, İzvor, Arnavudköyü, Revenik (Megali Panagia), Varvara, Yeniköy (Neochori), Yerise (Hierissos) and Larigova (Arnaia), as well as villagers (*reaya*) from the neighbouring district (*nahiye*) of Pazargâh.⁵⁶ Some of the villagers, however, were not happy at all with their mobilization and tried to agitate an uprising among the workers, aiming at abandoning the mines.⁵⁷

Despite the efforts for the revival of the mines, the town of Siderokavsia seems to have never regained its lost population, after the abandonment of the production in the closing years of the 17th century. According to a sultanic order of 1707, Siderokavsia, the seat of the mining villages, was not anymore an important settlement. In fact, the neighbouring village of Izvor, where some Muslims also lived, was much bigger than Siderokavsia.⁵⁸ This is corroborated by the Ottoman surveys of the 18th century. According to one of 1743, Siderokavsia had 72 miners, and Izvor 184. The same figures, more or less, are reported for 1773 as well.⁵⁹ In 1806, when the English military expert William Martin Leake visited the mines of Siderokavsia, he mentions only the settlement of Nísvaro (i.e. Izvor), with

56. See, in detail, Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 34-46 and 69-71. The register of the survey of 1702 is the BOA, KK 5189.

57. Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 108 fn. 411. Some of the agitators were caught and imprisoned in Salonica.

58. I. Vasdravellis, ed., *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας. Α: Αρχείον Θεσσαλονίκης, 1695-1912* (Historical Archives of Macedonia. A: Archive of Thessaloniki), (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 1952), 67-68. According to a report of the *nazır* of the mine Süleyman, the Muslims of Izvor were then forced to move to Siderokavsia, where there was a mosque, together with the *reaya* who had come to Izvor from other districts.

59. Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 124. In 1773, Siderokavsia had 71 miners and Izvor 182.

300-400 houses, divided in two nearly equal *mahalles* of Greeks and Turks (i.e., Christians and Muslims), situated half a mile apart.⁶⁰

On the other hand, between 1704 and 1707 a fort was built in Siderokavsia for the protection of the mine and the precious metals from bandit and pirate raids. The fort had a guard of 40 *sekban* and 20 cannons, sent from Istanbul.⁶¹ Leake describes in 1806 the fort (*Kastro*) as the place where the silver was separated.⁶² We should maybe identify the tower which survives today in the centre of the village of Stageira with this fort.⁶³

After the reorganisation by Çavuşzade Hüseyin Ağa, the mines of Siderokavsia continued to be controlled by his family for the most part of the 18th century. Çavuşzade Ali Ağa, grandson of Hüseyin Ağa, was the Superintendent of the Mines (*emin-i maden*) between 1726 and his death in 1751; he was succeeded by his son, Çavuşzade Ahmed Ağa, until 1784.⁶⁴ This was a development consistent with the general evolution of 18th-century Ottoman society, the Ottoman

60. William M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. 3 (London: J. Bodwell, 1835), 160.

61. Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 107. According to a document of 1705, the villagers of Halkidiki were held accountable also for the protection of the mines. The same document testifies to an attempt for the farming out of the mines by the villagers themselves, just after the first three years of lease by Çavuşzade Hüseyin Ağa (Papaggelos, «Το 'κοινόν του Μαδεμίου'», 260-61, according to *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας*, no. 43 [1705]). However, the mines were farmed out in 1705 to Süleyman Ağa from Istanbul.

62. Leake, *Travels*, 164.

63. See Theocharidis, "The Consolidation Works."

64. Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 69-96. For a short interval, between 1772-1774, Ahmed Ağa was dismissed and the mines of Siderokavsia were directed by a Superintendent of the Imperial Mint (*darbhane-i amire*). Ahmed Ağa was able to regain his appointment, despite the protest of the miners. For the protest of the miners after Ahmed Ağa's reappointment in 1774 and an effort by the miners to farm out the mines themselves, see the document published by Refik, *Osmanlı Devrinde Türkiye Madenleri*, 42-43.

“age of the *ayans*”, when the Ottoman provincial elites asserted important power in the local level.⁶⁵ In 1784, however, Çavuşzade Ahmed Ağa resigned from the directorate of the mines of Siderokavsia, which were farmed out to the retired vizier Seyyid Mustafa Paşa. In 1807, Seyyid Mustafa Paşa was still farming out the mines⁶⁶ and his sons, Seyyid İsmail and Yusuf Beyzade took over after his death. Finally, in 1820, after an important rebellion which resulted in the dispersion of the miners and the abandonment of the mines, they were farmed out to the *reaya*, with a letter of the Greek Patriarch promising that the miners would not revolt again. The state retained, however, the control of the mines through the appointment of Mehmed Emin as director.⁶⁷

The annual revenues of the mines, as estimated in the tax farming contracts, reflect the volume of production in the mines of Siderokavsia during the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. When Çavuşzade Hüseyin Ağa started the reorganisation of the production, in the beginning of the 18th century, he had to pay annually 1,600,000 *akçes* (4,444 gold ducats); during his second term between 1710-1713, after the reorganisation of the mines, the annual payment had risen up to 2,710,245 *akçes* (7,528 gold ducats). In 1719, his grandson Çavuşzade Ali Ağa farmed out the mines for the first time against an annual payment of 3,203,600 *akçes* (8,898 gold ducats). His son, Çavuşzade Ahmed Ağa took over the mines in 1751 against a payment of 2,935,008 *akçes* (6,114 gold ducats). Finally, between 1772-1810, the mines were farmed out against an annual payment of 25,315 kuruş (3,164 gold ducats); a total of 200 okkas of silver were expected then to be delivered annually from Siderokavsia to the

65. According to the expression of Bruce McGowan, “The Age of the *Ayans*, 1699-1812,” in İnalçık–Quataert, *An Economic and Social History*, 637-738.

66. Leake, *Travels*, 160-61, however, mentions as the *maden ağası* a certain Rüstem Ağa, a client of İbrahim Bey of Serres. The previous years Rüstem Ağa had been expelled from his post after a complaint of the villagers, but he succeeded to overrule his dismissal, come back and take revenge upon the Greek notable of Izvor.

67. Cf. Altunbay, “Sidrekapsi,” 96-99 and Papaggelos, «Το ‘κοινόν του Μαδεμίου’», 262-65 (according to *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας*, no. 302).

Imperial Mint.⁶⁸ In 1820, the mines had been farmed to the miners themselves for an annual payment of 37,621 *kurus* (4,702 gold ducats), plus an interest of 85,000 *kurus*; the same amount of 200 okkas of silver were expected to be delivered annually from Siderokavsia to the Imperial Mint.⁶⁹ From the aforementioned data, it is clear that the production of the silver mines of Siderokavsia in the 18th century never reached the volume of production of the 16th century.

Mustafa Altunbay has studied in detail the surveys of the Siderokavsia mines and of the villages which had been attributed to them during the 18th century.⁷⁰ According to the survey of 1702 (BOA, KK 5189), 3,461 Christians and 775 Muslim *reaya* from more than 150 villages in the *sancak* of Salonica (which included the *kazas* of Selânik, Siroz, Drama, Zihne, Demirhisari, Avrethisari) were registered as miners (*madenci*): they actually had to provide the mines of Siderokavsia with 360 $\frac{3}{4}$ full loads of charcoal (*kömür beygiri*) or pay a cash equivalent. Another survey was made in 1722 by Kapucibaşı Ahmed Ağa, the *maden emini* of Siderokavsia (BOA, KK 5187). In this case, the 3,410 Christian and 872 Muslim mine workers (*madenci*) registered in the *sancak* of Salonica were forced to deliver annually 459 $\frac{1}{2}$ loads of charcoal or their equivalent in cash, an increase which created much resentment among the miners, especially in the villages of Serres.⁷¹ As a result in 1726, when Çavuşzade Ali Ağa farmed out the mines as an independent contractor, a new survey was ordered. In this register (BOA, MAD 22135), an increased total of 4,669 Christians and 851 Muslims were imposed a reduced annual rate of 397 $\frac{1}{2}$ loads of charcoal or their

68. See in detail the Table 17 in Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 101. Cf. also the testimony of Leake, *Travels*, 161, for 1806, who was told that the *mukataa* costed 120 purses and 200 okes of silver.

69. Papaggelos, «Το 'κοινόν του Μαδεμίου'», 262-65 (according to *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας*, no. 302).

70. For the surveys, see in detail Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 135-39, including also tables of the villages involved.

71. In 1722, 92 villages of Halkidiki were registered as miners and only four as charcoal producers. See BOA, KK 2869.

equivalent in cash. The new register, moreover, introduced a distinction between the 12 villages of the actual miners of Siderokavsia (*cevherkeşan*), which no longer had to deliver charcoal or pay a cash equivalent, like the other villages of the charcoal producers (*kömiürkeşan*) in the *sancak* of Salonica.⁷² This was the first formation of the later called “Koinon tou Mademiou” (Mademochoria) in Greek. The villagers of the miners and charcoal producers of Siderokavsia enjoyed a special status (*serbestiyet*) of tax exemptions from the extraordinary taxation, a status which was defended by the superintendants of the mines.⁷³ According to Leake’s testimony, in 1806 the *maden ağası* had to deliver to the state 200 okes of silver from the mines, but he never made more than 100 okes; thus he had to supply the difference in cash. However, the “Greeks of the Sidherokapsika” (the 12 villages of the miners of Siderokavsia, called “eleutherochoria” by Leake, i.e., *serbest* villages), were “well content to make good the deficiency for the sake of the advantages they derive from belonging to the government of the mines.”⁷⁴

Leake describes also the operation of the mines, in 1808, which seems to have been restricted by then to a single deposit, soon to be exhausted:

The mines now wrought are about half an hour from Nizvoro, between two hills, in a deep ravine, where a stream of water serves for the operations of washing, as well as to turn the wheel for working the bellows of the furnace. The whole is conducted in the rudest and most slovenly manner. The richest ore is pounded with stones upon

72. Altunbay, “Sidrekapsi,” 149. The register of 1752 (BOA, KK 5196), made by Çavuşzade Ahmed Reşid Ağa, counted a total of 3,426 Christians and 605 Muslim *reayas* in 88 villages in the *kaza* of Salonica, who had to deliver 194 $\frac{3}{4}$ loads of charcoal, or their cash equivalent, to the *maden emini*.

73. Altunbay, “Sidrekapsi,” 194. Cf., for the tax privileges of the miners: *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας*, no. 156 (1733) and no. 191 (1762). According to the latter document, the villages of the miners were the following: Sidrekapsi, Izvor, Arnavudkoy, Vrasta, Gomatou, Revenikia, Larigkova, Stanos, Neochori, Varvara, and Modi (11 villages).

74. Leake, *Travels*, 161.

*a board by hand, then washed and burnt with charcoal; the inferior ore is broken into larger pieces, and burnt twice without washing. The lead, when extracted from the furnace, is carried to Kastro, where the silver is separated, in the proportion of two and three drams to an oke of 400 drams. When the present shafts are exhausted, the mines will probably be abandoned.*⁷⁵

There is some evidence that the miners, who had compulsory to work in the mines, were in some cases organising collective actions very similar to modern “strikes.” In 1721, seven Christian *hutmans*, supervisors, named Michos, Alagözöğlü Manolis, Dimos, Alexis, Zacharyas, and Kostas, left the galleries and led an uprising of the workers which led also to plundering. In 1737, two other *hutmans*, Argyris and Papathanasis, led another “strike” of the workers, aiming at deserting from the mines (*madeni iptal kastıyla*) and returning to their villages; after the suppression of the “strike,” the two agitators were exiled to the Morea.⁷⁶ A similar “strike,” organized by the *hutmans*, was also registered in 1785.⁷⁷ Another act in the repertoire of contention of the miners was to hide and steal the precious ore: we know of one major case in 1710, when the *hutmans* Konstantinos, Dimos, and Michos had hidden a rich deposit “for the sake of them and their offspring” (*bize ve evladlarımıza kalsın sonradan mahfice intikam ederiz*).⁷⁸ In some cases, the villagers refused to go and work in the mines: this was the case in Hierissos in 1753 and Gomatou in 1785.⁷⁹ The villagers of the charcoal producers were also rebelling, when they could not catch up with the norms needed from them: one case we know of is that of Larigkova in 1720.⁸⁰ In another case, in Galatista in 1795, the elder (*kocabaşı*) Kosta denied the tax collectors of the mines to enter the village.⁸¹

75. Leake, *Travels*, 164.

76. Altunbay, “Sidrekapsi,” 109.

77. *Ibid.*, 112. The mines had experienced a crisis in 1775 as well. See in detail, *ibid.*, 94-95.

78. *Ibid.*, 110.

79. *Ibid.*, 126, fns. 39-40.

80. *Ibid.*, 110.

81. *Ibid.*, 113.

As the actual farmer of the mines in 1820, the “Community of the Mine” (Gk. *to koinon tou Mademiou*) participated in the Greek Revolution of 1821 as a legal entity, having initially one and by June 1821 five representatives signing documents on behalf of the revolutionaries. With the outburst of the rebellion, the Ottoman director of the mines (*maden ağası*), had to evacuate the fort, which was burnt down a bit later, having lost almost all of his men but two after an ambush near the village of Stanos. However, soon after, the Ottoman army marched into Halkidiki and crushed the rebels, who had to leave their villages for Mount Athos and the islands of the Aegean. In 1823, the *kocabaşıs* of the 12 villages of the mines had to accept their tax debts from the previous years.⁸² The events of 1821 seem to have sealed the mines in Siderokavsia. From an Ottoman document of 1830, we learn that the Ottomans have again tried to revive production, and that in 1832 they had appointed *vali* Vecihi Paşa as the director of the mines.⁸³ However, the mines were closed until the end of the 19th century.⁸⁴

In 1907, the *Société Ottomane des Mines de Cassandra*, the owner of the mines since 1893, established in Stratoni a modern hydromechanical unit. In 1920, the pyrite mines of the Ottoman French company were farmed, for 60 years, by the Anonymous Greek Company of Chemical Products and Fertilizers (A.E.E.X.Π.&Λ.); the two companies merged in 1927; after World War II, the company was acquired by the industrialist Bodosakis–Athanasiadis, who started exploiting the sulfure ores in Olymbiada. In 1992, the Greek company dissolved.⁸⁵ From 1996, the Canadian company TVX Gold started an effort to mine gold in the area, provoking the environmental resistance of the local society.

82. Papaggelos, «Το ‘κοινόν του Μαδεμίου’», 267-68. In 1829, 43 families of refugees on the island of Skopelos were from the Mademochoria.

83. *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας*, 474, 521, 523.

84. Papaggelos, «Το ‘κοινόν του Μαδεμίου’», 268, fn. 43.

85. See Leda Papastefanaki, «ΕΕΧΠΛ (1909-1993). Κεφάλαια, Τεχνολογία, Αγορές, Εργασία» (ΑΕΕΧΠΛ [1909-1993]: Capitals, Technology, Markets, Labour), in *Ανώνυμη Ελληνική Εταιρεία Χημικών Προϊόντων και Λιπασμάτων (1909-1993)* (Athens: Piraeus Bank Group Cultural Foundation, 2007), 15-55.

Mining and Deforestation

How did the operation of the Ottoman mines of Siderokavsia contribute to the deforestation of Halkidiki?⁸⁶ There is some scattered evidence that the need for timber, both for the galleries and for the production of charcoal, distributed among 150 villages in the area of Salonica, had serious implications for the forest. First of all, we have detailed information for the timber used for the galleries of the mine during the first years of the 18th century: almost 7,500 trees in 1703, over 35,000 in 1706 and almost 20,000 in 1707.⁸⁷ Moreover, in 1731, according to an Ottoman report, there were not enough trees around the village of Larigkova for the production of charcoal. As a result, its inhabitants were ordered to offer their services as miners.⁸⁸ In 1782, the villagers of Peristera, Galatista, Ravna, Megala Vrasta, Livaditsi, Ardameri, and Loukova, reported to the *emin* of the mines that the mountains in the vicinity of their villages had no more timber for the production of charcoal. After an inspection, which corroborated the report, the production of charcoal was imposed to villages which had enough forests, i.e., Larigkova, Nihori, Revenikia, Gomatou, Varvara, and Stanos.⁸⁹

In light of the above information, it is interesting to note the disappearance of the forest in the area of the village of Peristera, in the southern slopes of Mount Hortiatís. We have evidence from the 11th

86. For the deforestation in early modern Europe cf. Lajos Rácz, "The Price of Survival: Transformations in Environmental Conditions and Subsistence Systems in Hungary in the Age of Ottoman Occupation," *Hungarian Studies* 24 (2010): 26-27. For the deforestation in the Greek lands, see Vaso Seirinidou, «Δάση στον ελληνικό χώρο (15^{ος}-18^{ος} αι.): Αναμηλαφώντας μια ιστορία καταστροφής» (Forests in Early Modern Greece [15th-18th c.]: Reconsidering a History of Catastrophy), *Μεσαιωνικά και Νέα Ελληνικά* 11 (2014), 74-75. Cf. the catastrophic deforestation caused by the mining activity in Cerro de San Pedro in colonial Mexico, in Studnicki-Gizbert, "Exhausting the Sierra Madre," 7.

87. Altunbay, "Sidrekapsi," 56.

88. *Ibid.*, 123.

89. *Ibid.*, 129.

century, but none from the 19th century.⁹⁰ Likewise, we have evidence from the 14th century for the forest on Mount Kalavros, but none from the 19th century, at least for a part of it.⁹¹ The deforestation in these two areas might be attributed to the production of charcoal for the needs of the mines of Siderokavsia.

In conclusion, the function of the Ottoman mines seems to have transformed the environment of the western Halkidiki, through the exploitation of both the subsoil and the forest. This exploitation would intensify during the modern years, from the second half of the 19th century and until today, when very important hazards for the environment of Halkidiki, especially from the potential of the mining activity, are at stake.

90. Paul Bellier et al., *Paysages de Macédoine* (Paris: De Boccard, 1986), 114 and 91-92.

91. *Ibid.*, 114 and 90, 92: In 1901, Adolf Struck found a thick forest of beeches and oak-trees to the west of the village of Vavdos, which he crossed for two hours.

*Phokion P. Kotzageorgis**

Nomads (Yürüks) and Environment in Early Modern Halkidiki¹

The interaction between man and nature has changed dramatically in the 20th century, has disturbed the balance of two and the consequences of this development has evolved out of control for both nature and humankind. This situation led to an increasing involvement of scientists with the environment, in order to reappraise the role of human beings in it and thereby to become more feasible protection of the environment. This turn has led, among other things, to the emergence of the new field of the environmental history in the USA during the '70s. Since then there has been a bloom of the field, initially in the USA and then in Europe with different focuses on the environment in each of them. In USA the environmental history in principle focused on the impact of European colonization in the Americas and the issue of exhaustion of natural resources. In contrast, Europeans were particularly interested in the environmental impact of industrialization of the cities and in the fate of forests, namely the problem of deforestation.² The field experts have formulated in three levels the work that a historian can contribute to the study of the environment: a) the study of the environment *per se*. At this level the collaboration of historians with other specialists (environmentalists, biologists, geologists, etc.) is obvious and should be

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2. Cf. the very comprehensive review of the historiography on the environmental history in: Vaso Seirinidou, «Οι ιστορικοί στη φύση: Μια εισαγωγή στην περιβαλλοντική ιστορία», *Τα Ιστορικά* 26.51 (Dec. 2009): 275-97.

close. b) Relations and environmental interaction with socio-economic factors. At this level the changes or developments that occur in the environment in relation to changes in human society or economy and vice versa are studied. c) A third level is dealt with the intellectual history and it is concerned about perceptions of the past about nature and man's relations with it.³ The three levels of the study of environmental history do not necessarily coexist simultaneously within the same research project. A survey may analyze just one level, and its findings may be of supplementary and auxiliary value to another.

In the interaction of environment with human society topics such as the development of settlement network and demographic change, the proprietary rights of land and the rural economy play an important role. Essentially, in this level *par excellence* the interest lays both on human activity that determines and/or affects the environment, and on the influence of the environment in the local society and economy. Through this approach the historian uses various methodological tools of other sciences such as geography, demography, economics, social anthropology, in connection to those of biology, agricultural economics, botany–zoology, geology, climatology, etc., in order to achieve his/her scope.

The history of the Ottoman world in a purely environmental perspective has given just recently interesting examples of research. More specifically, two monographs have been published the same year by the same publishing house. The first one⁴ is about the impact of the “Little Ice Age” in Ottoman Anatolia at the turn of the 16th to the 17th century and its connection with the problem of rebellions

3. Donald Worster, “Doing Environmental History,” in *The Ends of the Earth*, ed. Donald Worster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), 293. Sometimes, to this trilateral level a fourth one is added, which concerns with the environmental policy implementing by the states. Timo Myllyntaus, “Environment in Explaining History,” in *Encountering the Past in Nature*, eds. T. Myllyntaus and M. Saikku (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2001), 152-55.

4. Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

occurred at the same time and in the same region. The second⁵ studies the decentralized role of the Egyptians in the management of the Nile's irrigation system and the positive response of the central Ottoman government to local initiatives. Both topics concern crucial research questions of the Ottoman history and it is very important that an environmental perspective has been given to them.⁶ In addition, the study on Egypt revealed that local history can adequately contribute to a wider synthesis for an environmental history of the Ottoman Empire.

The study of a particular region through the prism of environmental history is the subject of a project launched by the International University of Greece (IUG) within the framework of the program "Excellence II." The area under study is Halkidiki through centuries from antiquity until present day. This paper is part of the findings of the research on the early modern period (15th-18th c.), conducted by the present author together with the Assistant Professor at the University of Crete, Dr. Elias Kolovos.

One of the main changes that occurred in the area of Halkidiki in the early modern era was the arrival of new settlers and the occupation of space by them. This fact in itself raises a number of questions such as: who were the new settlers and what kind of changes did they provoke? Where did they settle in? What were their relations with the local people? To what extent was the settlement network reshaped due to the arrival of the newcomers? To what extent financial

5. Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt. An Environmental History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

6. For the reception of these two studies in the field of environmental history see the book review of Karl Appuhn, "The Nature of Ottoman History. Review Article," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 46.2 (2012): 302-06. On the influence of the book of Fernand Braudel for the Mediterranean (*La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris 1949), some historians has tried to incorporate a geographical perspective in their studies and thus to discuss issues regarding the influence of the environment, and especially of the climate, on Eastern Mediterranean. For some early studies see a bibliographical survey in: Gustaf Utterström, "Climatic Fluctuations and Population Problems in Early Modern History," in Worster, *The Ends of the Earth*, 69-77.

balance was overturned or the new tax regime affected both locals and newcomers? What was the impact of the new settlers on the environment, especially as regards the equilibrium between cultivated and grazing areas or in the shrinkage or disappearance of forestlands?

The Ottoman conquest of the Balkans was followed by a massive immigration of Muslim populations from Anatolia to the Balkans from the late 14th century onwards. There were two main groups of immigrants: *Türkmen* nomads and Muslim craftsmen. The formers scattered in the countryside, while the latter settled in towns. The nomadic populations in the Balkans and Western Anatolia were known in the Ottoman administrative language as *Yürüks*⁷ (obviously from the Turkish verb *yürüme* = to walk), a term that did not have a national, ethnic or tribal meaning, but was simply used by the Ottoman bureaucracy to differentiate these populations from other nomads of the Ottoman Empire.⁸ Therefore, both administratively as well as in their socio-economic organization these populations differed from the nomads (*Türkmens*) of the Central and Eastern Anatolia. While the *Türkmens* maintained their tribal way of organization, the *Yürüks* were organized by the state in a military base from the beginning of their history. According to this organization, the *Yürüks* were divided into “hearths” (*ocaks*) of 25 persons, of which 20 were auxiliary soldiers and 5 participated in campaigns. In peacetime they were obliged to offer services for the state such as in con-

7. Classical work for the study of *Yürüks* is Mehmed Tayyib Gökbilgin, *Rumeli’de Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlâd-ı Fatihân* (Istanbul: Osman Yalçın Matbaası, 1957). Basic is also the article: Halil İnalçık, “The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansion and Economic Role,” in idem, *The Middle East and the Balkans Under the Ottoman Empire. Essays on Economy and Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 97-136. Finally, see recently: Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire. Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle-London: University of Washington Press, 2009); Harun Yeni, “The Yürüks of Ottoman Western Thrace in the Sixteenth Century,” unpublished PhD, Bilkent University, Ankara 2013.

8. For the meaning of the term *Yürük*, see İnalçık, “The Yürüks,” 103.

struction of public works (e.g., building of bridges or repair of castles).⁹ Although manpower was necessary for military organization, not all Balkan *Yürüks* were enrolled in this system. In principle, the state itself decided, based on its needs, how many of these people were needed and had to be recorded in special registers (*yürük defterleri*).¹⁰ This last fact further complicates the attempt for a quantitative estimation of the *Yürük* population who settled in the Balkans, since all *Yürüks*, in theory and in practice, were not registered in these cadastres.

Their arrival in the Balkans was not a one-off thing, but they immigrated in waves. Current research cannot determine the phases of the migratory waves and of the sedentarization process of these populations. Particularly for the area under study it is suggested that *Yürüks* had arrived as early as the last decade of the 14th century in the region of Thessaloniki, after the first Ottoman conquest of the city in 1387, as a result of the state policy of forced migrations (*sürgüns*).¹¹ To these *Yürük* groups was given the special name “*Yürüks* of Thessaloniki” (*Selanik Yürükleri*) so as the Ottoman state distinguished them in terms of administrative and fiscal status from other

9. Gökbilgin, *Rumeli’de Yürükler*, 38; Harun Yeni, “The Utilization of Mobile Groups in the Ottoman Balkans: A Revision of General Perception,” *Arhiv Orientalni/Oriental Archive* 81 (2013): 186-90.

10. Yeni, “The Utilization,” 198-202. Yeni estimates that in Western Thrace, during the 16th c., only 10%-15% of the whole *Yürük* population of the region had been enrolled in the state military organization.

11. İnalçık, “The Yürüks,” 106; Vassilis Dimitriadis, “The Yürüks in Central and Western Macedonia,” in *Etnogeneza na Jurucite i nivnoto naceluvanje na Balkanot* (Skopje: Makedonska akademija na naukite i umetnostite, 1986), 9-10, where it is argued that after the first Ottoman occupation of Thessaloniki in 1387 the first wave of *Yürük* colonization in the region of Thessaloniki was observed and that in 1394 a second one was occurred. The colonization of *Yürüks* in Thessaloniki’s countryside in the reigns of Murat I and Bayezid I in 1390’s, mainly from Western Anatolia (Saruhan region) aimed at the strengthening of the city’s military defense (Nevra Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins: Politics and Society in the Late Empire* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009], 99-100; see the relevant primary source in Friedrich Giese, ed., *Aşıkpaşazade, Die altosmanische Chronik des ‘Aşıkpaşazade* [Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1929], 56, 66-67).

Balkan nomad groups.¹² Other migratory waves followed until the second half of the 16th century, when the arrival of new settlers stopped.

In Halkidiki, although the first *Yürüks* should have arrived at the end of the 14th century, the first clear and measurable information available to us dated from the early 16th century. The fact that they were not registered in the fiscal cadastres of the 15th century does not mean that they were absent from the area. This is probably due either to a generally incomplete registration of taxpayers by the Ottoman authorities in this early period, or to *Yürüks*' strong nomadic character which made it difficult to register them or to the fact that the state was not interested in their systematic registration. A fourth possibility is that there existed special *Yürük* registers (*yürük defterleri*) since the 15th century, which have not been preserved, so that all nomads may be registered there. However, in 1519, when they are first recorded in ordinary fiscal registers (*tahrir defterleri*),¹³ their numbers are already noteworthy, which it suggests that they had been in an advanced stage of sedentarization. In the tax survey of that year, there were registered two *Yürük* settlements, which from then onwards would appear in the subsequent surveys as well: Ğayna in Eğri Buçak (present-day Nea Apollonia) and Serçi & Nasuh Fakih with "other name" (*nam-ı diğer* [hereafter: nd]) Rahmancı.¹⁴ In following

12. Gökbilgin, *Yürükler*, 74-78. From the *Yürük* groups of the Balkans (Naldögen, Tanrıdağı/Karagöz, Kocacık, Ofçabolı, Vize) not all of them were named after a placename. Even in the groups which bore a placename in the title, their populations were not inhabited those areas. For instance, not all of the *Selanik Yürükleri* inhabited the region around Thessaloniki, but they were settled in Thessaly as well. Thus, this term had, for the state, administrative and fiscal meaning and not geographical.

13. Actually, in the survey of 1478, it is registered one single *Yürük* in the Muslim village Dağ Gölü, in the surroundings of Hortiatıs mountain (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Tapu Tahrir Defteri, no. 7 [hereafter: TT 7], p. 565).

14. TT 70, pp. 9 and 7. In the first village it is noted that it concerns of a "community" (*cemaat*) of *Yürüks*.

tax surveys, besides the above two villages, *Yürüks* are also registered in other places:¹⁵ *Yürüks* are registered in the old Byzantine and already Muslim village Agathi (present-day Plagiari), as well as in the mixed village of Yerakar (present-day Gerakarou). In the Christian village Akrotir (next to Lake Volvi) in the register it is noted that a tithe is collected from *Yürük* estates within the borders of the village; the *Yürüks*, however, are not registered together with the taxpayers of the village.¹⁶ The village Aya Yorgi (east of present-day Neohori in Nea Kalikratia) had, according to the note of the register, *Yürük* cultivators, who came “from outside” (*hariçden*). The village Ilıca (Thermi Baths) was cultivated by peasants (*reayas*) from outside, while a *Yürük* winter pasture tax was collected from *Yürüks* and was registered in village’s tax revenues. In the salt producing Christian village Krini it is noted that *Yürüks* grazed their flocks and paid the pasture tax (*resm-i otlak*). In the salt producing village Mesimer the *Yürüks* who wintered their sheep there paid hearth tax (*resm-i duhan*), and so they did in the uninhabited villages Paliroz and Apanomi, in the same area. Finally, winter pasture tax or hearth tax paid by *Yürüks* is also registered in the villages Peşter (Peristera), Siğil (between N. Triglia and N. Tenedos), Tri Piğad (near today Prinohori) and Vromosirta (Aghios Panteleimon).¹⁷ Finally, in the 1568 survey there are entries for *Yürüks* in the same villages as above –although the information are more detailed concerning the group names– but *Yürüks* also appear in the villages Zumbat (Trilofos), Sığıl-ı köhne and Sarandarya nd Sığırıcı (Tagharades).¹⁸ In conclusion, villages that were exclusively

15. It is a question whether the Muslim peasants of Halkidiki were not *Yürüks*. In the present analysis, we strictly separate the term *Yürük* in order to study its dispersion, considering that for the Ottoman state, which knew very well the characterization of the two groups, the specific tax-payers were *Yürüks*. Thus, for example, the Muslim village Agathi was registered as having *Yürük* inhabitants only in the survey of 1527 (see: TT 403, p. 942).

16. It is possible that they might come from the neighbor village Eğri Buçak.

17. See respectively: TT 403, pp. 942, 843, 894, 916, 724, 705 & 737-8, 704, 727, 735, 737, 739-40, 704, 827, 718, 986, 821, and 649.

18. See respectively: TT 723, pp. 849-852, 335, 367, 227-251, 99-100, 315-6, 846-7, 914-916, 96, 88, 302-03, 346, 184-5, 171, 182, 87.

inhabited by *Yürüks* were Ilica, Turhanlu (Lakkia), Tuzcılar (Souroti), Karaçulhalı (Kardia), which bore Turkish names and were placed in the valley of Vassilika, as well as Sarantarea and Agathi, who preserved their Byzantine names albeit inhabited by Turkish colonizers.

Based on the taxation we cannot establish a direct relation between the amount paid for the taxes on stock breeding in a settlement and the number of *Yürüks* lived in this settlement. Having as an example the more complete survey of 1568, we put forward the following data: out of the 34 settlements (villages and *mezraas*) taxed with a tax per flock (*resm-i ağıl*), none included *Yürüks* among the taxpayers, while in those that included Muslims, Christians were the majority. It is characteristic that the village Maruda nd Karvya (Nea Silata), who had a lot of Muslims, paid one of the lowest amounts for that tax (28 *akçes*). The picture was somewhat different for the winter pasture taxes (*resm-i kışlak*). There were *Yürük* villages (e.g. Tuzcılar) who paid a quite high amount of the tax, but it was the *mezraa* (uninhabited cultivated land) Aya Yorgi, where it was not only noted that the tax was paid by *Yürüks*, but it paid by far the highest amount (1,654 *akçes*). The sheep tax (*adet-i ağnam, resm-i ğanem*) is also an interesting case. By far the highest amount (8,577 *akçes*) was paid by the *Yürük* village Tuzcılar. The amounts of taxation, however, cannot be matched to a number of sheep and goats. Since there is not preserved any tax regulation (*kanunname*), which would indicate the rates of taxation in the region, only estimates can be made, taking into consideration the extant tax rates elsewhere in the Greek lands. Assuming that each sheep or goat was taxed with 0.5 or 1 *akçe*,¹⁹ only Tuzcılar should have had around 4,200 or 8,500 sheep and goats. Perhaps it is more interesting the fact that among

19. See the very useful table with the amounts of the sheep taxes in the Greek lands in: John C. Alexander, *Toward a History of Post-Byzantine Greece: The Ottoman Kanunnames for the Greek Lands, circa 1500-circa 1600* (Athens: s.l., 1985), 481 and also 475-80 for the taxes. The Ottoman fiscal terminology did not distinguish sheep from goats, so that it is impossible to know which kind of animals were grazed. Goat grazing aggravates much more the environment than sheep grazing.

the other eight villages taxed with 1,000 *akçe* or more –which therefore had as many or twice as many sheep and goats– only Marudan and Karvya had *Yürüks* among the village tax-payers.

In the survey of 1568 the number of *Yürük* communities (*cemaat*) was as follows: 12 in Eğri Buçak, 7 communities in the region of Zumbat, 7 in Andığonya, 5 in Aya Yorgi, 2 in Sarandarya, 1 in Ilıca, 1 in Hortaç. The “village” Serçi & Nasuh Fakih and Rahmancı, as noted in the register, was comprised of 81 *Yürük* communities, which administratively belonged (*tabı*) to other areas (e.g., Demirhisar, Siroz, Ustrumça).²⁰ It can be assumed that these *Yürüks* wintered in Halkidiki, without having a necessarily specific place of residence. Moreover it is stated in the register that *Yürüks* were not farmers and that they paid to the tax collector only secondary taxes.²¹ So the above hypothesis is confirmed. The fact that both in Serçi and in Eğri Buçak there was an increase in the number of their communities between 1527 and 1568 is evidence that new *Yürüks* arrived and/or just were registered in Halkidiki around the middle of the 16th century.²² The registration of *Yürüks* in the last cadastre of 1568 presents large numbers of them in other settlements too. The demographic dynamics of *Yürüks* in relation to a) other Muslims and b) the total population of Halkidiki region are reflected through their percentage in the respective categories, after taking into account all the settlements where *Yürüks* are clearly registered.

20. TT 723, p. 227: *cemaat-ı Hamzalu an kaza-ı Siroz der kurb-ı Laçko an hassa-ı muşarun ileyh* [mirmiran-ı liva-ı Selanik]; p. 230: *cemaat-ı Çoban Fakih tabı-ı Ustrumça der sınır-ı Drağolit an hassa-ı muşarun ileyh*. Some others came from other regions of Thessaloniki province. See TT 723, p. 249: *cemaat-ı Aydoğdu der kurb-ı Lahana tabı-ı Selanik*.

21. T 723, *ibid.*: *reaya-ı yürükler dir ziraat etmezler amma ekinde bennak ve mücerred resm-i niyabet ve resm-i arusane köyde virürler hassa-ı mirmir[an] liva-ı Selanik el-mezbur*.

22. The same picture of the big demographic increase was observed in other villages as well. For example, in the village Aya Yorgi 20 *Yürüks* were registered, while under the title “*Yürüks* of the *nahiye-i Sidrekapsı*” were registered 7 communities in sum (total 93 tax-payers), from which four it is noted that they were located near the village Zumbat (TT 723, pp. 367 and 182-3 respectively).

YEAR	1478	1519	1527	1568
<i>Yürüks</i> ²³	1	595	776	2,308
% of Muslims	0.3	37.1	44.5	69.5
% of the total	0.04	7.9	7.1	20.8

A few conclusions about the *Yürük* presence in Halkidiki may be drawn through the analysis of the registers of the 16th century. a) Although the first sultans settled nomads in the region of Thessaloniki, we cannot be sure of their numbers and of their settlements. Probably for reasons of government policy (i.e., they were only included in the special *Yürük* registers) they were not recorded in registers of the 15th century, while there is an ever growingly meticulous policy of recording them in the 16th century. Therefore, judging retrospectively, we assume what their original location would be and we draw a picture of their population dynamics. b) Their spatial dispersion was concrete. *Yürüks*' winter settlements in Western Halkidiki seem to be predominant in Kalavros and at the hilly area to the south and less on the south slopes of Hortiatis Mountain. That finding is also evident from the distribution of their settlements in the 19th century and in the early 20th.²⁴ Their settlements corresponded exactly to the current zone of maquis. That means that they settled in the immediate area southeastwards of Thessaloniki, in Kalamaria, extended to the area just north of Nea Moudania. Their second habitation zone was the area of Nea Apollonia (next to Lake Volvi), where Eđri Buçak was the unique village of Halkidiki founded by these populations. Except for this village, the *Yürüks* did not create any other villages. They either settled at the outskirts of former (by then abandoned) Christian (or inhabited by Christians) villages²⁵ or

23. The *Yürüks* of Eđri Buçak are added, who are registered as Muslims and in a note it is referred that they were sedentarized *Yürüks* (*yerli Yürükler*).

24. Paul Bellier et al., *Paysages de Macédoine* (Paris: Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation de Byzance, 1986), map out of text no. 2.

25. The cultivation of the lands of *mezraa* type is interpreted this way.

they created their own settlements (*mahalle, cemaat*), which are registered as such in the administrative and fiscal sources.²⁶ c) The gradual increase in numbers led them to reach the highest percentage among the Muslims in Halkidiki and the one fifth of the total population of Halkidiki.²⁷ However, more important for their demographic and economic dynamics is the very nature of these populations.²⁸

Based on the Ottoman tax registers we can discern two *Yürük* groups. On the one hand there are the “settled ones” (*yerli Yürükler*), namely those who either were identified as such (as in the case of *Yürüks* of Eğri Buçak)²⁹ or cultivated land (as in the cases of the Christian villages Akrotir and Aya Yorgi, or the uninhabited ones Paliroz and Apanomi). They were obviously living in the settlements that they had established and came within the borders of old villages just to cultivate the land.³⁰ These *Yürüks* constituted the smaller part of *Yürüks* in Halkidiki, at least in the 16th century. On the other hand there were those who remained in a nomadic or semi-nomadic stage. They had a dual origin: a) *Yürüks* coming from outside Halkidiki (e.g., Serres region) and whose flocks wintered in the lowlands and semi-mountainous parts of Halkidiki and b) *Yürüks* who lived in communities of Halkidiki and were mainly or exclusively engaged in agriculture, moving within a small geographical radius range of

26. Apart from Eğri Buçak, the only villages bore Turkish names were the transformations of the initially *Yürük* communities into villages during the 16th and 17th c., e.g., the villages Uzun Ali (Plagiari), Üç Ev (Neohoraki) etc.

27. It has not been studied yet any register (*yürük defteri*) for *Selanik Yürükleri*, which might register the *Yürüks* belonged to the state military organization, so that we could see their percentage. Such a study has been conducted for the *Tanrıdağı Yürükleri*. See above the bibliography in fn. 10.

28. Elias Kolonos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί στην οθωμανική Χαλκιδική, 15^{ος}-16^{ος} αιώνας», unpublished PhD, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2000, vol. I, 84-86 and 102-03; vol. II, 58-59 and 106-09.

29. See for example TT 403, p. 678, where they were registered to pay regularly all the agricultural taxes the ordinary peasants paid.

30. For the presence of *Yürüks* in Christian villages see Dimitriadis, “The *Yürüks*,” 11.

few kilometers from their location and paid the corresponding live-stock tax. The first constituted the great “village” Serçi & Nasuh Fakih nd Rahmancı, which was an inclusive and more administratively than geographically localized village. These were by far the most in terms of population numbers. Settled *Yürüks* who exclusively were occupied in agriculture also existed in significant numbers. Taxing them with the personal tax (*resm-i çift*) was seen as an attempt by the state to maintain their nomadic character and thus their military organization, which was necessary for the central government. Thus, through rural taxation, the state “punished” in a way those *Yürüks* who wanted to stop providing military services to the state and to become ordinary peasants (*reaya*).³¹ Nevertheless, the *Yürüks* of Halkidiki did not differ (with regard to the issue of settlement) from the other *Yürüks* of the Balkans, where the main feature, in contrast to the Anatolia, was the initially semi-nomadic and subsequently sedentarized nature of the former in contrast to the latter.³²

The decrease in their population³³ from the late 16th century until the end of the next century forced the State to proceed with a detailed registration of them in order both to stop the wave of abandonment of the military organization and their integration into the same fiscal units with common peasants, and to use them in that difficult period for the state, because of the long war with Austria (1684-1699).³⁴

31. Gökbilgin, *Yürükler*, 48-49. This policy was followed until 1576, according to M.T. Gökbilgin.

32. İnalçık, “The Yürüks,” 110. See the statement of the English traveler William M. Leake, (*Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. III [London: J. Bodwell, 1835], 175) as early as the beginning of the 19th c.: *The Yürüks, who in Asia live a wandering life, like the Kurds and Turkomans, as their name implies, have become more sedentary in Macedonia and Thrace, where they have villages, and have become cultivators.*

33. The decrease in numbers does not mean that people migrated to other regions; more probable is that they avoided enrolling in the military *Yürük* organization.

34. See the order (*ferman*) published in Ioannis K. Vasdravellis, ed., *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας, τ. Β΄: Αρχείον Βεροίας* (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 1954), 80-81 (of 1682). See also Reşat Kasaba, “From moveable empire

The survey, which covered all the Balkans, was conducted in 1691 and had for Halkidiki the following results:³⁵

<i>NAHIYE</i>	COMMUNITIES	SOLDIERS
Pazargâh	27	375
Boğdan	14	335
Kelemerye	32	696 ³⁶
TOTAL	73	1.406

If the survey of 1568 is taken as a yardstick, it results that while the number of *Yürük* communities did not particularly decrease,³⁷ in contrast, it significantly decreased the number of tax-payers, should have the *neferan* of 1691 corresponded with the *hanes* and *mücerreds* of 1568.

From the above analysis it results that in Halkidiki during the early modern era there existed *Yürüks* in the form both of completely sedentarized peasants and of purely nomads. However, the trend, as generally in the Balkans, was their permanent sedentarization. Thus, after the last survey of 1568 and by 1691 *Yürüks*' demographic and urban picture was crystallized and they fully incorporated into the rural society and economy of the region. The arrival of nomads in a society (and economy) of settled peasants caused problems of adaptation to the new life. The older historiography has stressed the conflicting nature of the relations between nomads and peasants. In Halkidiki, the arrival of *Yürüks* led to a long period of adaptation to the

to immovable state: Ottoman policies towards nomads and refugees in the modern era," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 45 (2011): 230-31.

35. Gökbilgin, *Yürükler*, 263-65; Vassilis Dimitriadis, «Φορολογικές κατηγορίες των χωριών της Θεσσαλονίκης κατά την Τουρκοκρατία», *Μακεδονικά* 20 (1980): 404-06.

36. Dimitriadis calculates "596" soldiers, whereas the correct sum is 696! (*Ibid.*, 406).

37. We cannot be able to identify the settlements in the two surveys. A few communities of the survey of 1568 there were succeeded in identifying with those of the survey of 1691. However, it should be bear in mind that in the second survey the *Yürük* communities had been settled, while in the former they belonged to regions, which are located more or less outside Halkidiki (e.g., Sidirokastro, Serres).

peasant life, which often resulted to conflicts.³⁸ The *Yürüks* did not settle in deserted land, but in an area, where there existed for a long time ago a well-structured settlement network. Thus, the occupation of space caused pressure to peasants. The elements and the phases of this relation can be better discerned in the area of Kalamaria, a region where there were a dense presence of *metochia* (monastic farms) and numerous *Yürük* communities. Therefore, the *Yürüks* settled in an area that was not at all deserted, but also had a large number of *metochia* together with the land belonged to Christian villages of the region.³⁹

The dispute over the delimitations of fields and estates was the most important issue that both monks and nomads were preoccupied with. In 1529 the monks of the Athonite monastery Hagios Pavlos complained for encroachment of their monastic lands by the neighboring *Yürük* community of Kūlahli.⁴⁰ In the documents the borders of the monastic lands which formed also the border with *Yürüks* were also delimited. Occasionally, the dispute concerned irrigation ditch (*savad yolu*), necessary for both animals' breeding and crop cultivation. Even this was also delimited and its ownership was claimed.⁴¹ In other cases the accusation was the illegal transgression of *Yürük* flocks in monastic lands, a common problem in cases of peasants and nomads, who were neighbors.⁴² Illegal incoming animals were

38. It is highly probable that this tension resulted in the abandonment of the village Siğil between 1527 and 1568 and the movement of the inhabitants to the village Rossaiou (which took the name Siğil) in corroboration with the simultaneous settlement of in the lands of the old Siğil (Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 3, 109).

39. The next section is based on the Ottoman archive of the Athonite monastery of Hagios Pavlos, which possessed a big *metochion* in Kalamaria and neighbored with a *Yürük* community.

40. The documents are: Archive of the Monastery of Hagios Pavlos [hereafter: AMHP], K/28 (1529) and K/15 (1567). For the topic see: Phokion Kotzageorgis, *Η αθωνική μονή Αγίου Παύλου κατά την οθωμανική περίοδο (14^{ος} αι. -1830)* (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2002), 92-96 and 85-86 and the bibliography.

41. AMHP, K/5 (1587), K/77 (1588).

42. AMHP, K/26 (1542), K/25 και K/42 (1586), K/10 (1588).

generally described in the documents as pack animals or sheep (*tavarlarını [ve koyunlarını] saltvirüb*).⁴³

Besides Kalamaria, disputes between monks and *Yürüks* were also observed in Sithonia peninsula. In this case the trespassers apparently came from the region of Pazargâh (Nea Apollonia), since *Yürük* communities were not located on the peninsula of Sithonia and therefore were not neighbors of any *metochion*.⁴⁴ It is mostly interesting that sometimes in Ottoman court the *Yürüks* cooperated with local Christians against the monks, thus showing the formation of a kind of alliances between settled peasants and nomads. In 1625 two *Yürük* shepherds transgressed with their flocks into the winter pasture of Kriaritsi, and they had received a title deed (*tapu*) from the previous tax collector (*zabıt*) of the region for the sheepfold, which was built inside the winter pasture lands. When the monks brought a document in favor of their claims and they demanded the defendants to withdraw the flocks within two months, the latter, having been supported by the Christians of the nearby village of Sykia, disappeared and did not present on trial.⁴⁵

The claims of ownership in Kalamaria concerned an attempt for searching for a *modus vivendi* between the monks and their new neighbors. When we look at the years the relevant documents were issued or the dispute had been revived (1529, 1542, and 1567), we find that they coincide with years of tax surveys with the exception of the period 1586-88. It can thus be suggested that monks claimed over the land ownership so as to secure their estate properties in view of the upcoming tax survey. In one case, indeed, in 1548, the dispute was not with *Yürüks* in general but with their *sipahı*, who asserted the Athonite *metochion* as part of his fief and hence claimed the owed taxes. The presentation of the relevant entry from the recent

43. AMHP, K/26 (1542), K/15 (1567), K/25, K/42 (1586), S/5 (1595).

44. AMHP, S/5, 9-1 και Kr/6 (1595). Cf. Kotzageorgis, *Η αθωνική μονή*, 112.

45. AMHP, Kr/1, Kr/2, 7 and 8 fol. 6 (all from December of 1625 with a few days interval).

tax register (1542) by the monks, which showed that the estate belonged to another fief-holder, vindicated the monks.⁴⁶ It is also interesting that all relevant documents were issued in the spring. Obviously, once *Yürüks* started using the monastic lands for wintering their flocks, the monks responded by demanding the issuance of official documents (*fermans, hüccets*).

Sometimes, the dispute took acute form. In 1562 three *Yürük* shepherds were accused by the monks, because not only they transgressed the land of their estates, but also wounded one of the monks when he tried to stop them.⁴⁷ In 1599 two *Yürük* shepherds were blamed for beating a monk of the monastery of Hilandar. With the intervention of shepherds' employers, who were set as guarantors of their employees, accusations were dropped.⁴⁸ Finally, the monks could also experience indirectly repercussions from the activity of *Yürüks*. When in 1605 the *Yürük* village *Külahlı* suffered a bandits' attack that killed few of the inhabitants, the latter asked the monks to seize their neighbor *metochion* as a compensation for the damage. When the monks refused and appealed on trial, the *Yürüks* reacted by refusing to appear in court; moreover, they got money from the monks using violence, they harassed nine people in the *metochion*, of which the four finally died.⁴⁹ The decree that describes the incident orders the judge (*kadı*) to punish the culprits.

Based on monastic archival material, the cases of disputes over land ownership between *Yürüks* and monks in Kalamaria stopped in the late 16th century. The first document which shows that the relations between the two groups entered into a new phase dated from at least as early as 1599, when the first attested attempt at settling an agreement between the two parties took place. The monks agreed that two *Yürüks* –with whom they had hitherto disputes– could graze their flocks in the pasture land of the *metochion*, while paying in the

46. AMHP, K/20 (1548).

47. AMHP, K/24. Cf. Kotzageorgis, *H αθωνική μονή*, 95.

48. AMHP, K/79 (1599). For similar cases from the 17th c., see Vančo Boškov, "Jurućite i svetogorskite manastiri," in *Etmogeneza*, 60 and 66.

49. AMHP, K/11 (1605). Cf. Kotzageorgis, *H αθωνική μονή*, 95.

form of a “loan” an annual rent of 7,000 *akçes* each.⁵⁰ As characteristically stated in the document, the *Yürüks* used to graze in the pastures and in the arable land sheep, buffaloes and other animals, but the monks gave them permission to graze only sheep (*koyunlarını ve sığırlarını ve sair hayvanlarını metohin mezraalarında ve meralarında otlamağa [...] ancak koyunlarını getirüb otladub sığırlarını ve sair hayvanlarını getirüb otlatmayacak oldılar*). In 1610 another dispute with a *Yürük* was likewise resolved. Elhac Halil b Pir Ali claimed that he had been herding flocks in a particular location of the Kalamaria *metochion* and that he had full proprietorship on it. The monks asked for *in situ* examination of the case; the examination was conducted by members of the local court in the presence of several representatives of the local *Yürüks*. The monks won the case. However, they agreed to graze their flocks together with the *Yürük* and that the latter would pay to the monastery 100 *ğuruş* per year as a “pawn” for the use of pasture land. The monks were interested in ratifying the delimitation of their *metochion* through the issuance of another document at the same day.⁵¹ This case was not at all a unique one. A few years later, in 1620, the monks agreed with a *Yürük* named Durali Dede b Veli to graze his sheep within the lands of their *metochion* without paying rent. The *Yürük* lent the monks 5,000 *akçes* to have their monastery repaired. This affair lasted until 1629, when the monks managed to repay the loan to Durali’s son, Yunüs.⁵² In one of the documents the monks declared that their fields were a wasteland and thus suitable for grazing (*hali olan tarlalarımızda rayi ettirmeğe taahhüt olunmuş idi*). In all these documents there is a constant reference to grazing sheep and not other animals, while the disputed area is indiscriminately referred to as meadow (*mera*), winter

50. See K/68 (1605): *koyun kışlaları*; K/73 (1610): *mezraa*; K/72 (1610), K/51 (1610): *mera koyunlarını koyub*; 61, F.2 (1620), K/64 (1624), K/71 (1627): *koyunları metohumuz sınırında rayi olunmağa icazet ettik*.

51. AMHP, K/74.

52. AMHP, K/73, K/72, K/51 and Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 3, 185 (no. 228). Cf. Kotzageorgis, *H αθωνική μονή*, 85.

pasture (*kışla*), or cultivated land (*mezraa*).⁵³ Similar relations of the same kind between monks and *Yürüks* are also discernible in a series of 44 loan documents (*hrestikes homologies*) from the mid-18th century in the Kalamaria *metochion*. Several of the Muslims creditors who signed in Greek documents *in situ* (i.e., in the *metochion*) could be considered descendants of the 17th century *Yürüks*.⁵⁴ It is therefore apparent that the relations between (former) nomads and peasants were not limited only to a conflict level, but that both parties tried to find ways for coexistence. It is worth mentioning that the concept of conflicting relations between peasants and nomads is considered by the historiography as a part of the “orientalist” paradigm and those who reject it tend to highlight the symbiotic relations between the two groups, despite their conflicts.⁵⁵ It is interesting that although nomadic populations from Anatolia began to settle since the early 16th century, it is, however, at the end of the next century that the Ottoman state would proceed with the compulsory settlement of nomadic populations of Anatolia. The registration, in fact, of the *Yürüks* of the Balkans in 1691 is part of this policy.⁵⁶

The late 16th century is a crucial point in time. At that period of great economic and financial crisis, the monasteries suffered significant tax burdens and faced difficulties to maintain their *metochia*.

53. AMHP, 61-2 (1620), K/64 (1626), K/71 (1627), K/54 (1629). Cf. Kotzageorgis, *H αθωνική μονή*, 86.

54. Phokion Kotzageorgis, *Αρχείο της Ι. Μ. Αγίου Παύλου. Επιτομές εγγράφων, 1010-1800* (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2008), nos. 47-50, 52-57 (1756), 58-71 (1757), 72, 74-77, 80-82 (1758), 83-87 (1759), 89-94 (1760), 95-98 (1761). A lot of the creditors came from the *Yürük* communities of the region, e.g. no. 47: *τηλκελίδες, ελκελη*. As late as 1799 the “powerful” (*κρατούντα*) man of Nikiti was a *Yürük* named Tilli Veli (Vassilis Anastassiadis, *Αρχείον Ι. Μ. Χιλανδαρίου. Επιτομές μεταβυζαντινών εγγράφων, 1433-1800* (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2002), nos. 337 and 368).

55. Suraiya Faroqhi, “Ottoman Peasants and Rural Life: The Historiography of the Twentieth Century,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 18 (2000): 160-61; Chris Gratien, “Ottoman Environmental History: A New Area of the Middle East Studies. Review Article,” *Arab Studies Journal* 20.1 (2012): 253-54.

56. Kasaba, *A moveable empire*, 53-83 (esp. 72-74 for the Balkans). See also above fn. 34.

This situation led them to neglect some of their estates, and therefore they gradually turned into fallow. This very interesting phenomenon of environmental history cannot unfortunately be generalized and documented –not yet at least– on other *metochia* or areas of Halkidiki's landscape. This development, however, is due more to economic reasons rather than to demographic ones, since there is no evidence that the population of the area –and thus the manpower– had dramatically decreased. In addition it is not at all certain that Halkidiki suffered from the 17th century climate change and that this had an impact on the environment or caused a population decrease.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the monasteries were in great need for cash in order to meet their functional expenses and to pay their growing taxes. In the Kalamaria *metochion*, vicinity to *Yürüks* led the monks to alter their relations with them: from competitors and litigants *Yürüks* become creditors. This development took place at a time when at least the Kalamaria *Yürüks* were already considered an established group and therefore the coexistence of peasants-monks with them should be taken for granted.

The arrival of immigrants in Halkidiki affected the management of landscape and natural resources by the locals. These people, by definition nomadic, came in droves in Halkidiki and chose specific areas to settle in. They settled in the maquis area, i.e., the hilly zone starting at the eastern outskirts of Thessaloniki and extending southeast to the area of present-day Nea Moudania. This area is suitable for grazing. A second area was the road passing south of the Lakes Langada and Volvi with the village Eğri Buçak (which had been founded by them) as a center of their settlements. The interim mountainous area to the west-northwest of the peninsula was also a wintering area of *Yürüks*' herds. The benign climate and the geomorphology of Halkidiki were ideal for wintering flocks. This is why the

57. For the view that climate does not change dramatically in the Ottoman lands, so that it could have an effect on the environment see Hans-Dietmar Hütteroth, "Ecology of the Ottoman Lands," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. III: 1603-1839*, ed. S. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 22-23. For the opposite view and the influence of the "Little Ice Age" in Anatolia in the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th c., see Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion*, 223-25.

area was used extensively by *Yürüks* as a winter pasture. It is documented for the 16th century that *Yürüks*' flocks from the region of Serres, Sidirokastro and even Stroumtsa, spent the winter time in Halkidiki following the route through Vertiskos Mountain and they entered Halkidiki via the lakes area. On the other hand, those *Yürüks* who chose to settle in Halkidiki, at least since the 16th century, had cultivation of land as a supplementary means of income.⁵⁸ The choice of the geographical location of *Yürüks*' settlements is corroborated to the existence of the large urban center of Thessaloniki. During the 16th century the military reasons (i.e., the defense of the city) which had been the initial impetus for the *Yürük* colonization in late 14th century⁵⁹ ceased to be significant. In the 16th century, however, there was another reason which kept *Yürüks* very close to the city. Thessaloniki was the center of the flourishing manufacture of woolen uniforms for the Janissaries corps. It was a state-owned enterprise under the management of the city's Jews.⁶⁰ Because of this manufacture, the city's needs for wool were high. The presence of stockbreeders in the immediate periphery of the city was vital for the sufficient supply of the wool manufacture. Therefore, *Yürüks* as stock breeders *par excellence* (by grazing mainly sheep even as established groups), benefited from this situation and became the basic wool suppliers to Thessaloniki.⁶¹ This is also another reason why *Yürüks* did not settle in Sithonia peninsula, which has always been a grazing zone.⁶² Consequently both ecological and economic reasons

58. A completely opposite example were the *Yürüks* of Eğri Buçak, the taxation of whom in 1568 did not consist of even one tax relevant to animal husbandry (TT 723, pp. 849-852). The village was taxed for cereals, beehives, and various fees (*niyabet ve resm-i arus*).

59. See above fn. 11.

60. From the rich bibliography on the manufacture of woolen uniforms of Thessaloniki see Benjamin Braude, "The Rise and Fall of Salonica Woollens, 1500-1650: Technology Transfer and Western Competition," in *Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the Mediterranean World after 1492*, ed. A. M. Ginio (London: Routledge, 1992), 216-36.

61. İnalcık, "The Yürüks," 116.

62. The other reason could be the very dense presence of the Athonite properties and that the latter saw Sithonia as a kind of a physically and economically ex-

are due to the choice for the sedentarization or just the wintering of *Yürüks'* flocks.

The *Yürük* populations, starting from zero point in the late 14th century, reached their highest demographic point in the second half of the 16th century, when on the one hand new migratory waves stopped and on the other hand they began to leave the administrative-military system of *Yürüks* and started their fully incorporation into common peasants. Interestingly, while generally in the Ottoman Empire these populations offered mining services they do not seem to have been used in the mines of Halkidiki. Neither has been any information on their involvement in transfer of raw materials or food over long distances. This is explained by the established nature of *Yürüks* and by the fact that they apparently did not possess any transport animals. Moreover, the available information refers to possession of sheep or goats, or even pack-animals (e.g., buffaloes) but not long-distance transport animals (e.g., camels).

The arrival of so many nomads, who were accompanied by their herds, changed the balance –ecological, social and economic– in the region. We can suggest that in those parts of Halkidiki where *Yürüks* settled, permanently or temporarily, it was observed the phenomenon of conversion of arable –or formerly cultivated– land into pastures.⁶³ It is quite characteristic, for example, that while in documents of the 16th century the delimited and clearly specified monastic lands were described as an area of fields (*tarla*), in the 17th century the same area is defined as meadow (*mera*).⁶⁴ This is obviously due to the pressure exercised by *Yürüks* to peasants, so as to provide pasture for their flocks. This change did not necessarily imply population decline neither did it dramatically affect taxation. The peasant (in this case the monastery) was required to pay an annual tax, usually a lump sum for the use of land. During the 17th century the

tension of the Athonite peninsula as it concerns the animal husbandry, similar to the region of Provlaka (in Ierissos), as it concerns the agriculture.

63. Cf. Kotzageorgis, *H αθωνική μωνή*, 86.

64. Cf. the delimitations provided in the documents K/26 (1542) or K/15 (1567) with K/72 (1610).

state (i.e., the tax collector) did not exert strict control regarding the type of land use and the expected tax from it, but it was contented to collect an annual tax. This development, however, is mainly related to the ongoing and –due to financial problems– partial abandonment of cultivation in numerous *metochia*.⁶⁵ The change of cultivated lands into fallow in the early modern era in Halkidiki is an interesting case which asks for more documentation. However, there is indeed more direct evidence that the activity of herds affected the environment. In 1830, the Scottish diplomat and writer, David Urquhart, traveling in Northern Greek peninsula, on his way from Zumbat to Karvya, an area with strong *Yürük* presence, gives the following description of the landscape:

*The country now became barren and dreary; former cultivation had displaced the forests; the recent buildings of the shepherds had destroyed the underwood, and the season of the year had defaced the verdure of the lowly grass.*⁶⁶

The image of a desolate and arid landscape is also given for the whole region until Sofular (today Nea Triglia).⁶⁷ Actually it is a zone both of intense *Yürük* presence and overgrazing.

65. Agriculture retreat in favor of husbandry is a phenomenon generally observed in the Ottoman and Mediterranean world from 17th c. onwards (Hütteroth, “Ecology,” 30-31, where the author connects the phenomenon of the extension of big farms [*çiftlik*s] and the more profitable activity of stock-breeding than the cultivation of fields).

66. David Urquhart, *The Spirit of the East*, vol. II (London: H. Colburn, 1839), 60. Other travelers attributed the desertification of the region to the damages happened during the Greek rebellion in Halkidiki during 1821 (Émile Isambert, *Itinéraire descriptif, historique et archéologique de l’Orient. Première Partie: Grèce et Turquie d’Europe* [Paris 1873], 730). For another observation on the deforestation in the area between the villages Mesimeri and Atmacalı see Denis Feissel et Michel Sève, “La Chalcidique vue par Charles Avezou (avril-mai 1914),” *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 103 (1979): 248.

67. Urquhart, *The Spirit*, vol. II, 64: [N]othing met the eye but yellow barrenness, where not a vestige, a tree, or a broken rock, interfered with the smoothness of the undulating surface...

Deforestation in Ottoman lands was not due to the action of nomads, but to that of established peasants, who had a higher density compared to the nomads and needed forests for firewood.⁶⁸ Within this framework it can also be understood the use of forest woods as fuel for the furnaces of the mines in Halkidiki.⁶⁹ Since the Ottoman state did not follow an official policy for the forests before the 19th century, as the latter were generally considered public property, their survival or not depended on the peasants lived nearby.⁷⁰ Consequently, any deforestation (e.g., the forest in Kalavros Mountain⁷¹) cannot be attributed only to *Yürük* activity. The quest for pastures brought *Yürüks* into conflict with the peasants. Thanks to the monastic archives we can follow such conflicts only in relation to the *metochia*, but conflicts should have been against other peasants too. The *Yürüks* of Halkidiki did not settle in deserted or sparsely populated areas. Hence the conflict was intense. The economic crisis of the late 16th century contributed to the change of the relations between nomads and peasants. The former, from would-be trespassers of arable lands, become creditors and ultimately users of the lands from which they had been previously prevented to enter and which had been converted to pastureland. The postulated retreat of cultivated lands in relation to livestock growing is an environmental effect of the presence of new residents in Halkidiki. However, the demand by the *Yürüks* for more pasturelands could not be met with their expansion into new territories, since there was not much availability of vacant lands. In contrast, the population growth in the second half of the 16th century exacerbated the problem of demand for pasturelands at the expense of agricultural land. This demand, however, was not caused by the pure nomadic nature of these populations –which did not exist then– but by the demand of the market of Thessaloniki for wool.

68. Hütteroth, “Ecology,” 26.

69. See the article of Elias Kolovos in the present volume: “Mines and environment in Halkidiki: A story from the Ottoman past”.

70. For the forests in Early Modern Greek peninsula see Vaso Seirinidou, «Δάση στον ελληνικό χώρο (15^{ος}-18^{ος} αιώνας). Αναψηλαφώντας μια ιστορία καταστροφής», *Μεσαιωνικά και Νέα Ελληνικά* 11 (2014): 69-88.

71. Bellier et al., *Paysages de Macédoine*, 114.

In an unsigned report on the Kalamaria *metochia* dated from 1924 the situation is described as follows (the emphasis is mine): The whole land of Kalamaria area is characterized by the lightness of the soil, the non-retention of water and the lack of running water, so that *the fertility of the soil, despite its good reputation, is relatively limited* (more in the southern part, less in the northern part). *Low fertility is due to the destruction of woodland, of which very little remains.* Swampy areas, except for some minor ones in the south, do not exist; therefore the climate may be considered rather healthy. The rainy season lasts until spring, the rains afterwards get rare and during the summer scarce. Generally the land is suitable, except for cereals, and for tree cultures that do not require irrigation, in particular vines, mulberry trees and olive trees.⁷² However, how have the *Yürüks* contributed to this situation of low fertility of soil? Is this situation only due to *Yürüks*' herds or due to the continuous and intensive exploitation of the region since at least the middle byzantine period on?

72. Athens, Gennadios Library (American School of Classical Studies), Archive of Konstantinos D. Karavidas, fol. 7.1: «Μελέτη μετοχίων τμήματος Καλαμαριάς», 15/6/1924 (unsigned).

*Antoni Mironowicz**

The Activities of the Patriarch Teofanes III in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The Union of Brest divided the Orthodox Church into two factions: a) the Orthodox faction including most of the clergy and faithful and the bishops of Lvov Gedeon Balaban (1569-1607) and of Peremysl Michael Kopystensky (1591-1610), b) the Uniat faction including the remaining Orthodox hierarchy and supported by the king and the Catholic church. During the first twenty five years after the synod in Brest the Orthodox community failed to re-establish the legal status of the Orthodox Church from before 1596. The Uniats managed to achieve a legal status which allowed them to take over all of the privileges of the Eastern Church in the Commonwealth. They took over most of the bishoprics, churches and monasteries. Nevertheless they failed to fully triumph over the Orthodox Church.¹ Neither did the Uniats gain an appropriate position in the Latin Church. Their bishops still had no seats in the senate and their clergy did not receive the same rights as Catholic clergy. Uniat metropolitans protested in a memorial addressed to the Pope that they meet with as much contempt as the Jews.² The Orthodox community never accepted outlawing their church. In local and national parliaments Or-

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1. K. Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska. Zarys historyczny 1370-1632* (Warszawa: 1934), 107-92; L. Bieńkowski, "Organizacja Kościoła wschodniego w Polsce XVI-XVIII w.," in *Kościół w Polsce*, ed. J. Kłoczowski, vol. II (Kraków: 1969), 779-837; M. Papierzyńska-Turek, "Kościół prawosławny na ziemiach ruskich Litwy i Korony," *Przemyskie Zapiski Historyczne* VI-VII (1990): 139-162; A. Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny w dziejach dawnej Rzeczypospolitej* (Białystok: 2001), 55-79; A. Mironowicz, *Prawosławie i unia zapanowania Jana Kazimierza* (Białystok: 1997), 17-33.

2. "Impedimenta ex parte Catholicorum Ritus Latini frigide defendentium Unionem," in M. Harasiewicz, *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae ad dioeceses ruthenae Leopoliensem, Premisliensem et Chelmensem* (Leopoli: 1862), 263-71.

thodox nobility, supported by the protestants, argued for the return of the rights of the “Greek faith” and bishoprics with their benefits. The parliament, fearing religious uprisings issued two constitutions in 1607 and 1609, which officially acknowledged the rights of the Orthodox Church in Poland. After the death of the bishop of Lvov, Gedeon Balaban (1607 r.) and the take over of the Peremyshl diocese by the Uniats, after the death of Michael Kopystensky (1610 r.), Lvov remained the only Orthodox bishopric. It was taken by Eustachy (Jeremiasz) Tysarovsky (1607-1641) but after he declared remaining Orthodox he was not accepted by the state. The bishop of Lvov was unable to oversee the religious life of the whole Kiev metropolia.³ It was natural for the Orthodox clergy and faithful to want to consecrate new bishops.

Endeavours towards ordaining bishops were made with the Constantinople Patriarchate by the Orthodox clergy and lay elites. These were supported by the Tzars and Russian clergy. As soon as 1612 the Kiev clergy asked the Greek monk Neofit, who was in the Dniepr region at the time, to ordain priests. Neofit had come to Kiev with the patriarch of Jerusalem Teofanes (1608-1645) in 1620 r., which could mean that he was an intermediary between the Kiev metropolia clergy and Constantinople.⁴ The Polish Orthodox negotiated not only with the patriarch, but with the Sultan as well. The Tzarogrod Patriarch could not visit Kiev personally to ordain the new bishops, because of the political situation and the Polish-Turkish conflict. In that situation other means were sought to reactivate the Orthodox hierarchy in the Commonwealth. One chance was the journey of the patriarch of Jerusalem to Moscow to ordain the new head of the Moscow Church – Filaret (1619-1633).

The patriarch’s stay had been prepared for a few years. The head of the Jerusalem Church received a letter from the Tzarogrod patriarch Timotheos (1612-1621) bearing the date of 1st April 1618. The patriarch Timotheos granted him the authority and blessing to ordain bishops on his way to Moscow. The patriarch’s letter does not men-

3. Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny*, 74-78; D. Blazejowskyj, *Hierarchy of the Kyivan Church (861-1990)* (Rome: 1990), 232.

4. Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny*, 419.

tion any particular countries, but it indirectly suggests that a part of it refers to Poland, which was the only country at the time, to have a problem with the Orthodox Church hierarchy. The patriarch's letter was later often invoked by the Ruthenian clergy and members of parliament attempting to gain legal confirmation of the ordained church hierarchy.

The aim of Teofanes' mission involved more than just religion. Contrary to his predecessors the patriarch of Jerusalem did not travel through Poland but through the lands of the Tartars. On his way the patriarch indirectly took part in the Polish-Moscow talks, when he was in Tule. He awaited there for the decisions of the Truce of Dyvilino, which allowed Filaret, who was the candidate for patriarch, to return to Moscow from captivity in Poland. On the 24th June 1619 the patriarch of Jerusalem consecrated Filaret as the patriarch of Moscow and granted his blessing to the monks opposing Poland.⁵

In February 1620, while the patriarch Teofanes was in Moscow, a Cossack envoy ship arrived there to negotiate with the Tzar's officials. During the talks the Cossacks mentioned questions of religion, especially the persecution of the Orthodox in Poland. The new patriarch of Moscow, Filaret, supported their attempts to establish the Orthodox hierarchy. The patriarch of Moscow, who still had fresh memories of his imprisonment in Malbork, was resentful towards Roman-Catholics. He also had a strong influence on the policy of his son – tzar Michael Fyodorovitch Romanov. Nevertheless, it cannot be said, as it is traditionally presented in literature, that it was only in Moscow that the concept of re-establishing the Ruthenian episcopate was born.⁶ What happened later confirms that it had been agreed before Teofanes arrived in Moscow. Such a decision could not have been made without the knowledge and support of the patriarch of Constantinople. Only certain details and perhaps

5. Makarii (M. P. Bulgacov), *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. XI (Sankt-Peterburg: 1882), 13; M. S. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi*, vol. VII (Kiev: 1909), 248.

6. Chodynicky, *Kościół prawosławny*, 422; V. O. Eingorn, "O snosheniakh malorossiiskogo dukhovenstva s Moskovskim pravitelstvom v tsarstvovanie Alexieia Mikhailovicha," *Chtieniia w imperatorskom obshchestvie istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom Universitietie*, CLXV (1893): 18.

the list of candidates for bishops could have been decided on in Moscow.

The crucial decisions concerning the reactivation of the Orthodox hierarchy were made in Constantinople. The Tzarogrod patriarchate was supported by the patriarch of Alexandria Cyril Lukarys (1602-1620), who was in Poland earlier and had a good knowledge of the situation of the Orthodox Church. On 29th May 1620 he issued an address to the Ruthenian people, in which he encouraged them to remain with their Orthodox faith and oppose the union. In 1621 he became the patriarch of Constantinople (1621-1630).⁷ Other eastern patriarchs were also interested in recreating the organisational structure of the Kiev metropolia.

The patriarch Teofanes left Moscow on 4th February 1620 and around 22nd March he arrived in Kiev. Sigismund III Vasa (1587-1632), who feared his visit, ordered the voivod of Kiev Tomasz Zamoyski to follow the hierarch. Hetman Stefan Żółkiewski even wanted to arrest him, when he learned that the patriarch intended to visit Lvov. He finally changed his attitude out of fear of Cossack and Orthodox uprisings. On 5th May 1620 he urged the Kiev citizens to welcome the patriarch suitably and the people of Volhynia and Podillia to see to his safety. The patriarch himself informed the king in a letter that he came to polish lands with no ill intent. In response, the king informed the patriarch on 17 March 1620, that he trusted the patriarch's stay would be peaceful and that his safety was guaranteed.⁸

Returning from Moscow through Ukrainian lands the patriarch of Jerusalem Teofanes issued an address on 15th May 1620 to the Orthodox inhabitants of the Kiev region, where he blessed the members of the Kiev brotherhood. Ten days later he informed the faithful of his visits in Orthodox churches and monasteries and of granting his blessing to the Slavic-Greek school and the newly built church of the Annunciation of Holy Mary. During his stay in Kiev the patriarch of Jerusalem granted stauropegial rights to the Kiev, Lutsk, Mohylev

7. Chodyncki, *Kościół prawosławny*, 346-48; 362-66, 422, 466-68; 512-28.

8. *Ibid.*, 424-25.

and Slutsk brotherhoods, as well as confirming the privileges of the Lvov and Vilnius brotherhoods.⁹ Teofanes started a close cooperation with the brotherhoods of Lvov, Vilnius, Lutsk, Mohylev and Minsk.¹⁰ Thus the patriarch Teofanes wanted to rally the brotherhoods, which opposed the union, to his cause. By making them independent of the local clergy and subjecting them to patriarchal rule, Teofanes made the brotherhoods into a tool for the realisation of his policy. Gaining the brotherhoods was the first step leading to the reactivation of the Orthodox hierarchy.

The next stage was an open letter to the Orthodox of Lithuania and Poland of 13rd August 1620, urging them to choose bishops from among themselves.¹¹ By the end of October a meeting of clergy and laymen took place, where candidates for the metropolitane and bishops were elected. At first the patriarch was reluctant about ordaining the hierarchs, as he feared the reaction of the Polish king.

In the meantime one important thing happened, which changed the patriarch's position concerning the ordination of bishops. At the start of October, Teofanes started preparing to leave for Kiev and Moldavia. During these preparations the departing patriarch received a message that the Polish expedition to Moldavia ended on 20th September 1620 with a defeat at Cecora and the ill-disposed towards the Orthodox hetman Stefan Żółkiewski died on 7th October. The patriarch understood that he was freed from the inconvenient control of the hetman's officials. Asked by the Orthodox clergy, the patriarch

9. *Arkhiv Jugo-Zapadnoi Rossii, izdavaemyi Kommissiieu pri Kiievskom, Podolskom i Volynskom General-Gubernatore*, part. I, vol. 7 (Kiev: 1887), 297-98; *Arkhograficheskii sbornik dokumentov otnosiashchsia k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, vol. II (Wilno: 1867), 58; Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. XI, 244-46, 333; Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny*, 425; V. Kartashev, *Ocherk po istorii Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. II (Paris: 1959), 274-75.

10. S. Golubiev, *Kievskii mitropolit Petr Mogila i jego spodvizhniki*, vol. I (Kiev: 1883), 235-256; I. Flerov, *O pravoslavnikh tserkovnikh bratstvakh, protivoborstvovavshokh unii v Iugo-zapadnoi Rossii w XVI, XVII i XVIII st.* (Sankt-Petersburg: 1857), 56-58; A. Mironowicz, *Bractwa cerkiewne w Rzeczypospolitej* (Białystok: 2003), 35-36.

11. Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. XI, 249, fn. 121; Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi*, vol. VII, 435-36; Chodynicki, *Kościół prawosławny*, 426.

returned to Kiev. There, after receiving guarantees of safety from the Cossacks, he decided to reactivate the hierarchy.¹² Under the protection of the Cossacks and the hetman of the Zaporozhe Army, Peter Sahajdachny (1613-1622), the patriarch ordained on 19 October in the Church of the Revelation in Kiev Yov Boretsky, an ighumen of the St. Michael monastery and the former rector of the brotherhood school in Lvov, as the metropolitan of Kiev and Halich. Earlier, on 16th October an ighumen of the Mezhyhorsk monastery Isaac Kopinsky, who spent 15 years at the Athos Mountain, became the bishop of Peremysl and Samborsk. A month later Teofanes ordained a well known author of polemics Meletij Smotryc'ky as the archbishop of Polotsk. After leaving Kiev, escorted by Cossacks, at the beginning of 1621, the patriarch ordained in Trekhymirov an ighumen of the local monastery Joseph Kurtsevich as the bishop of Volodymyr and Brest. In Biala Tserkiev he ordained an ighumen of the chernytsky monastery Isaac Boryskovich as the bishop of Lutsk and Ostroh. In Zhyvotovo he ordained the ighumen of the mieletsky monastery Paisij Hipolitovich as the bishop of Khelm and Bielsk. His companion, ordinary of Stachona, Grek Abraham became the bishop of Pinsk.¹³

12. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi*, vol. VII, 436.

13. P. I. Orlovsky, "Uchastiie Zaporozhskikh kozakov v vostonovlenii iierusalimskim patriarkhom Teofanom pravoslavnoj juzhno-russkoi tserkovnoi iierarkhii w 1620 g.," in *Trudy Kievskoi-Dukhovnoi Akademii 1905 g.* (Kiev: 1905), 648; J. Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, vol. II (Würzburg-Wien: 1881), 145-48; Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. XI, 242-64; Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi*, vol. VII, 426-37; D. Doroshenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy*, vol. I (Warszawa: 1932), 206-07; Chodyncki, *Kościół prawosławny*, 425-429; W. Tomkiewicz, "Cerkiew dyzunicka w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1596-1795," *Przegląd Powszechny* CIC (1921): 161-63; L. Bienkowski, *Organizacja Kościoła wschodniego. Zarys historyczny* (Lwów: 1936), 843-44; W. A. Serczyk, *Na dalekiej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozacczyzny do 1648 r.* (Kraków: 1984), 188-89; A. Mironowicz, "Organizacja Kościoła prawosławnego do końca XVIII wieku," in *Europa Orientalis. Polska i jej wschodni sąsiedzi od średniowiecza po współczesność*, Z. Karpusa, pod ed., (Toruń: 1996), 214-15; Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny*, 80-84.

Before leaving Poland Teofanes issued two documents of political importance. In the first one the Cossacks were forbidden to fight against Moscow. In the second he informed the Orthodox community of his re-establishing of the Kiev metropolia with seven bishoprics and putting an anathema on the Uniats. The document states that after the death of the metropolite the bishops should choose the new one from among themselves and ask the patriarch of Constantinople for confirmation. Stauropigial brotherhoods, in these times so difficult for the Orthodox Church, should submit themselves to their bishops. He also urged the hierarchs to eliminate customs inconsistent with the Orthodox tradition.¹⁴ The patriarchal document shows that the problem of Orthodox citizens of Poland and Lithuania extended beyond the sphere of internal policy and into the range of influence of Moscow and Constantinople.

Of his activities Teofanes informed patriarch Filaret from Moldavia on 12nd March 1621: "Let it be known to you, holy lord, that we have, thanks to your prayers, the tzar's grace and God's help, freed ourselves from the enemies of our faith; the army and people of Kiev have led us to the Vallahian border and there we are now, worshiping your rule."¹⁵ Bringing this letter up as proof of the involvement of Moscow in reactivating the hierarchy is not justified. The patriarch of Moscow supported the activities of Teofanes, but had no real possibility of taking part in the reactivation of the hierarchy. The real forces supporting the patriarch of Jerusalem were the Cossacks and brotherhoods. The consecration of bishops and metropolitan Yov Boretsky took place in brotherhood churches. The patriarch enjoyed the financial support of the brotherhoods and the protection of Cossacks. Nevertheless, he mainly consulted his decisions with the monastic community, as can be seen by his visits in the monasteries in Mezhyhorsk, Trekhtemirov, Chernchysk, and Kiev. The new bishops came mainly from monasteries visited by the patriarch.

14. *Arkhiv Jugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, part. I, vol. 5 (Kiev: 1872), 1; Chodyncki, *Kościół prawosławny*, 428.

15. Makarii, *Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi*, vol. XI, 264-65.

Reactivation of the Orthodox hierarchy was seen as an act of disloyalty towards the state. The Uniate exerted pressure on the king, urging him to take decisive actions against the newly ordained hierarchs. Similarly did nuncio Kosmas de Torres (1621-1622). The political situation in Poland forced Zygmunt III Vasa to take more moderate actions. While Teofanes was in Ukraine the king asked him to convince the Cossacks to take part in the war on Turkey. The patriarch of Jerusalem complied with the king's request, so the Orthodox could count on acknowledging the reactivated hierarchy.¹⁶ The king could not disregard that, especially the protection the bishops received from the hetman of the Cossack army – Peter Sahajdachny. Firm intervention from the king would provoke a religious war in Ukraine. Therefore the king only proclaimed that he condemned the consecration of hierarchs against the laws.

Ruthenian members of the parliament attempted to confirm the rights of the Orthodox Church at the 1620 session. They asked for the reactivation of the hierarchy, keeping it a secret, that the choice of metropolitan and two bishops had already been made. At this session the member from Volhynia Wawrzyniec Drzewiński presented the situation of the Orthodox faith in Poland. He invoked drastic examples of restricting the freedom of faith of the Orthodox and their access to town offices. "Churches closed, church goods robbed, there are no monks in monasteries, children die unchristened, dead are buried without rites like carrion, men and wives live without blessing, the people dies without confession. So it happens in Mohylov, Orsha, Minsk. In Lvov a non-Uniate cannot join a guild, cannot go with the Holy Gifts to a sick man. In Vilnius the bodies of the Orthodox are driven out of town only through a gate used for disposing of garbage. For twenty years we have asked for our freedoms to be preserved, but to no avail."¹⁷ The brotherhoods also petitioned the king. Members of the Vilnius brotherhoods demanded

16. Chodyncki, *Kościół prawosławny*, 432.

17. K. Znosko, *Istoricheski ocherk Tserkovnoi unii, ieia proiskhozhdenie i kharakter*, part. II (Warszawa: 1933), 127; N. Bantysh-Kamensky, *Istoricheskoie izviestie o voznikshei w Polshe unii* (Vilno: 1886), 64-69; Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi*, vol. VII, 444, fn. 1.

that the rights of the Orthodox Church be confirmed. The problem of calming the "Greek faith" was one of the Cossack demands in the 1621 parliamentary session. In spite of these pressures the parliament failed to pass a constitution on matters of religion, therefore not acknowledging the ordained Ruthenian bishops.¹⁸

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While evaluating the activity of the patriarch of Jerusalem Teofanes in Poland in view of the later religious events one has to note that the Orthodox hierarchy had been re-established thanks to his visit. The realisation of this project was not a matter of chance. The time of the reactivation of the Orthodox hierarchy was carefully planned. The determination of the patriarch in the realisation of this venture resulted from the tragic situation of the Orthodox Church in Poland devoid of all rights and episcopate. By consecrating new hierarchs the patriarch Teofanes preserved the continuity of the hierarchy. The local church could not function without bishops. Because of the war on Russia and Turkey the Orthodox Church lost contact with the Tzarogrod patriarchate. It was equally important to confirm or grant stauropegial rights to the brotherhoods, which were at the time the main force defending the rights of the Orthodox Church. Brotherhoods, which played a growing role in the anti-Uniat activity, became the main support of the Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cooperation between the patriarch and the brotherhoods strengthened their position in the church and made their members even more active.

The patriarch Teofanes was the first to cause the Cossacks as a whole to support the Orthodox Church. The Cossacks, who were at first religiously indifferent, became by the middle of the 17th century the main protectors of the Orthodox Church. Teofanes' stay in the Commonwealth opened the period of the Cossacks with the Church. He also caused the monasteries to become more active. Appreciating the role of monasteries he indicated them as the main sources of Orthodox spiritual life. His actions resulted in a significant increase in the religious awareness of the clergy and faithful of the Orthodox

18. Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny*, 82.

Church. In consequence the development of Uniatism had been stopped and the Orthodox Church started reclaiming lost churches and monasteries. The political circumstances of the patriarch's visit caused the problem of the Orthodox Church in Poland to become a matter of international politics. Finally, under the pressure from abroad and from the Orthodox people, the new king Vladyslav IV agreed to legalize the Orthodox hierarchy at the coronation parliament in 1633. A new metropolitan was appointed –Peter Mohyla (1633-1647)– and new bishops were ordained. The church structures could be restored and the hierarchy could preserve its continuity thanks to the mission of the patriarch of Jerusalem Teofanes in 1620-1621.

Vladimir Bošković*

Unveiling the Male Empires: Jelena Dimitrijević in Thessaloniki¹

When she decided, on that July day in 1908, to change her original destination and instead of Western Europe, to travel to Thessaloniki –after reading in a newspaper that Turkish women “unveiled themselves”– Jelena Dimitrijević did not know that she would bring an epistolary travel account from that journey, and that it would become a rare and curious testimony of times.²

The center of that strange Young Turk Revolution, progressive and anachronistic at the same time, Thessaloniki at the beginning of the last century comprised an apotheosis of the Ottoman state ideology, with its multiethnic population: Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Levantines, Vlachs, Sephardic Jews, a community of “converts” (Islamized Jews, *Dönme* or *Mu'min*, “the faithful ones”), various peoples, many of which had disappeared in the wastelands of history, gathered around the great harbor on the shores of the Thermaic Gulf. That vanished world, which was recently adequately described by Mark Mazower in his book *Salonica: City of Ghosts*,³ received one night Mrs. Jelena Dimitrijević, the spouse of a Serbian military officer, a renowned writer, an ardent patriot, a devoted feminist who spoke six languages, and whose poems dedicated to beautiful Mus-

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1. A version of this article first appeared in the bilingual edition Jelena Dimitrijević, *Pisma iz Soluna/Επιστολές από τη Θεσσαλονίκη*, trans. Vladimir Bošković (Loznica: Karpos, 2008).

2. Cf. also Natalija Tomić, “Dve vrste Pisama iz Soluna: Feminističko istraživačko novinarstvo Jelene J. Dimitrijević naspram nepouzdanog izveštavanja Branislava Nušića,” *Novi izraz* 55-56 (2012): 154-69.

3. Mark Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950* (London: HarperCollins, 2004).

lim women already in her youth had brought her the nickname “Serbian Sappho.” Through her acquaintances with some of the most notable members of the Young Turk Committee of Unity and Progress (including the family of Ismail Enver, one of the leaders of the Revolution), through her familiarity with Turkish women, many of whom she knew from her days in the city of Niš while it was still part of the Ottoman Empire, but also through her personal culture, she was soon received in the best houses of Thessaloniki –Turkish, Jewish, and Greek– and described her impressions from this six-week journey in ten letters, all addressed to her French friend Louise St. Jaksic, professor at the Higher School for Girls in Belgrade.

The liberation of the city in the First Balkan War in 1912, on the feast day of the Christian patron saint of the city, Saint Dimitrios, started a series of major changes the city would endure in the decades to follow. The great fire of 1917 destroyed most of the buildings in the central urban areas. After the Asia Minor disaster of 1922, following the Lausanne Treaty, a mandatory population exchange took place between Greece and the newly founded Turkish Republic. This had major consequences for Thessaloniki, whose Muslim (and Mu'min) population disappeared at that time. Soon thereafter the new government toppled dozens of minarets whose silhouettes Jelena observed from the Upper Town and which provided the city with “that unmistakably Eastern look which modern Athens lacks and modern Belgrade has lost.”⁴ The last hit to Thessaloniki as Jelena knew it came during the Second World War, when the large Jewish community, one of the largest in Europe, almost completely vanished in Auschwitz. The followers of Sabbatai Zevi (or Shabbetai Tzvi, 1626-1676), a Jewish mystic and self-proclaimed messiah who eventually called on his supporters to convert to Islam –those are the *Donme* which Jelena described with so much curiosity and compassion– would leave the city, but they would also, like most other refugees from Rumelia in the Republic of Turkey, offer an important support to the reforms of Kemal Atatürk, who himself was born in Thessaloniki.

4. Bozidar Jezernik, *Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze of Western Travellers* (London: Saqi Books, 2004), 216.

The Letters from Thessaloniki are interesting perhaps mostly because they carry one of the last, and female, voices of the vanishing Ottoman world, and also because they depict the brighter side of the Young Turk movement, which in the following years would degenerate into something very different from the ideals which galvanized its supporters on the streets of Thessaloniki in 1908.⁵ The letters also fill out one of the peculiar voids of the cultural geography of Serbia, for which this city virtually does not exist, apart from the memory of the military retreat in the First World War. All attempts to provide it with a place on the imaginary map of the Serbian literary world had limited range: the one that reached the furthest was by Ksenija Maricki Gadjanski, Ivan Gadjanski, and Elli Skopetea, who in 1998 published an anthology of the *Poetry of Thessaloniki* in which they represented the results of the city's unusual literary flourishing in the twentieth century. Still, the old Thessaloniki, one of the few places in Europe that never lost its urban character and remained a *city* ever since it was founded by the Macedonian king Cassander in 315 BC –whose early Christian communities were praised by the apostle Paul; where the Roman Emperor Galerius had built his palace; and the twelfth century episcopo Eustathius wrote his essays on the colors of the sea; the same streets treaded upon and described with endearing naïveté by the Belgrade monk Jerotej Račanin in 1704⁶ – still exists somewhere and waits to be discovered. Thanks to her unique sensibility, Jelena Dimitrijević was able to feel and record the ancient city, an entire forgotten world, in its last resplendent days.

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Jelena Dimitrijević, born in 1862 in the town of Kruševac, wrote poems, narrative fiction, and travel accounts; and all of her books,

5. See Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).

6. *A Journey to the City of Jerusalem by Jerotej, a Hieromonk from Rača, in the Year from Creation 7212, and from Christ's Birth 1704, on the 7th of the Month July* (in Serbian), reprint of the first edition by Osip Bodyansky from 1861 (published by the Moscow Academy of Sciences), in the article: Borivoje Marinković, "Odlomci traganja za Račanima i tradicijom o Jeroteju Račaninu," *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu* 12/1 (1969): 301-48.

apart from the novel *New Women* (inspired by her experiences in Thessaloniki: new, i.e., young, as in Young Turks, *Jön Türkler* from French *Jeunes*) were published in private editions. One portion of her poetry was collected under the title *Jelena's Poems* in 1894 (for a long time she would sign her poems with her first name only, which gave rise to fantastic theories about her identity in the press and the literary salons of the time) and *Une Vision* in 1936; the rest, which she wrote up until the end of her life, remained scattered in the magazines and almanacs of the time. There are still a number of unpublished poems and texts within her manuscript archive, currently held at the National Library in Belgrade.

Explaining her change of mind at the beginning of *The Letters from Thessaloniki*, Jelena wrote: "I have two loves, one for the east, and another one for the west." As she was affluent, those loves did not remain unfulfilled, she traveled extensively in both the east and the west, always with a pen in her hand. She interviewed New York bank magnates, an Indian maharaja, and the Egyptian feminist Huda Sha'arawi amongst others. She traveled all of her life, with passion – to Turkey, Austria, Spain, Greece, France, Italy, England, Egypt, India, Japan, and the United States. Apart from her poems, many of which obsess over her female acquaintances, testimonies to these journeys are *Letters from Niš Regarding harems* (1897), *Letters from Thessaloniki* (1908), *The American Girl* (1918), *Letters from India* (1928), *Letters from Egypt* (1929), *The New World or One Year in America* (1934). While her husband was alive, they traveled together; after his death, she traveled alone. She crossed the Atlantic on her own and she spent a year in America alone. In her sixties, she set off on a journey around the world. She published a book from that journey too – *Seven Seas and Three Oceans: Traveling around the World* (1940).

As travelogues are traditionally considered a "lesser" form of literature, it is understandable that Jelena's fiction fared better in literary history. Her stories: *The Vision of Djul-Marika* (1901), *Fati Sultan*, *Safi Hanum*, *Mejrem Hanum* (1901), and the novel *The New Women* (1912) were allowed into the mainstream of the male canon of Serbian literature, especially the first and the last among them; the

latter was awarded a prestigious literary prize by the influential literary society Matica Srpska. In the year 1928 a Russian translation was published in Moscow and her stories were translated into German, Bulgarian, and Polish. A good number of these texts, mostly published in literary magazines, are extremely hard to find and deserve a modern reprint.

In her time, Jelena stands as an “exceptionally interesting combination of sincere nationalism and sincere cosmopolitanism,”⁷ and later criticism often did not know what to make of her. During her life she was esteemed as a writer: she published in the most prestigious magazines, she was a member of various literary and charitable societies, and she was respected by literary critics such as Pavle Popović, who was a personal friend. After her death, however, and especially after her “second death” – a brief and strictly negative review by Jovan Skerlić in his influential *History of Modern Serbian Literature* – her texts, despite sporadic inclusion in anthologies and literary lexicons, sunk into oblivion. Some of her poems, nevertheless, acquired a life of their own; for instance, her poem “O Fiery Sun” (*Sunce jarko*) from the cycle *To Sevdija from Sevdija* (*Sevdiji of Sevdije*, chosen for the etymological connection to the Turkish word for “love”) was given an “urban melody” and was sung, with affection, by the Serbian soldiers of the First World War, and it has remained popular in the Niš area to this day.⁸

Jelena’s name reappeared in the Serbian literary scene only in the 1980s, perhaps partially thanks to a reprint of the work of another early Serbian feminist, Isidora Sekulić, who wrote an intriguing review of Jelena’s American travels. In 1986, *The Letters from Niš Regarding Harems* was published and followed by an essay by Slobodanka Peković, who is to receive the highest credit for this edition. This book is the best received of all Jelena’s texts, and it has been

7. Slobodanka Peković, “Romani i putopisi u stvaralačkom postupku Jelene Dimitrijević,” in *Jelena Dimitrijević – Život i delo. Zbornik referata s naučnog skupa*. Niš, 28. i 29. oktobar 2004 (Niš: Centar za naučna istraživanja SANU i Univerzitet u Nišu, 2006), 56.

8. More on that in Đorđe Perić, “Osvrt na popularnost pesama Jelene Dimitrijević ‘Sunce jarko’ i ‘Baba Krasa’,” in *Jelena Dimitrijević – Život i delo*, 155-82 (see below).

republished several times since. Because of this, her name is often linked to the city of Niš, although she spent most of her life in Belgrade, from 1897 until her death in 1945.

Her remaining texts remained inaccessible to wider audiences, despite the fact that her literary figure, with modern theoretical currents, became more and more interesting. So Svetlana Slapsak published several excerpts from her travels with commentary, in the magazine *ProFemina* (1998), as well as several excellent studies, the most important of which is *Harems, Nomads: Jelena Dimitrijević*.⁹ Jelena's texts make up an important part of recent studies of Serbian literature, both in Serbia and abroad: the eminent British scholar of Serbian literature, Celia Hawkesworth, published a study on Jelena in 1999.¹⁰ She also gave Jelena a prominent place in her book on Serbian and Bosnian female writers.¹¹ The University of Niš organized a symposium on Jelena in 2004.¹² That Jelena's figure is becoming more and more attractive to the general readership can be seen in the fact that Ivana Kosanović recently published a fictional biography of Jelena,¹³ and there is an increasing number of re-editions and studies of her work.¹⁴

The East, in the way that it was constructed and popularized through contemporary French and English literature, was the strongest thematic axis of Jelena's writing. Experienced as an ambivalent blend of sensuality, exoticism and debauchery, this world was both intoxicating and repulsive or, to quote the Greek historian Elli

9. *ProFemina* 15-16 (Fall 1998), reprint in *Žene, slike, izmišljaji*, ed. Branka Arsić (Beograd: Centar za ženske studije, 2000), 49-73.

10. Celia Hawkesworth, "A Serbian Woman in a Turkish Harem: The Work of Jelena Dimitrijević (1862-1945)," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 77/1 (1999): 56-73.

11. Celia Hawkesworth, *Voices in the Shadows: Women and Verbal Art in Serbia and Bosnia* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000).

12. See fn. 7.

13. Ivana Kosanović, *Moja draga Jelena* (Niš: Zograf 2007).

14. Ana Stjelja, "Elementi tradicionalnog i modernog u delu Jelene Dimitrijević", unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Belgrade, 2012.

Skopetea, it was “an admixture of parody and saccharinity.”¹⁵ Jelena described this world with the cognizance and familiarity of a person who felt that she herself, to some extent, also belonged to it. Although one can sense the strong influence of her French readings (Chateaubriand, Loti, or Gautier) in those texts, it is a feeling which is contrasted by her own personal experience from the harems of Niš, Constantinople, and Salonica. These influences are made even more interesting because they stem from a time when the national ideologies of the young Balkan states, in the process of modernization and Europeanization, were at the height of their efforts to exorcize every cultural link to the age usually described as “the Turkish yoke” and to decisively suppress it into the past.¹⁶

Nevena Ivanović is correct when she claims in her study that Jelena is a special example of the female resistance against the dominant national/nationalistic discourse.¹⁷ Jelena’s journey begins from paradigmatic stance of the “white woman, colonizer” who sets off to liberate the “oriental” women. According to Ivanović, Jelena eventually lost her ideological center and constructed an alternative national program, separating herself from her own national culture in the process. In opposition I argue that Jelena’s ideological centering was very much unlike the late twentieth century European nationalism. One should not forget that, in Jelena’s sociocultural context, the cultural topography had different semantics than it does today. I posit that Jelena’s patriotism was based on the social dimension of the national revolutions, where the emphasis was on *liberation* and where the centering was social and cultural instead of ethnic. The impetus of this ideology was the replacement of the feudal system with a state of law and civil liberties. Jelena often stressed that her

15. In a book of research about cultural stereotypes in the times of the Young Turk Revolution: Elli Skopetea, *Η Δύση της Ανατολής: Εικόνες από το τέλος της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας* (Athens: Gnosi, 1992). Late Thessaloniki professor Elli Skopetea dedicated a significant portion of her scholarly work to these questions.

16. See, among others, Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

17. Nevena Ivanović, “Zaposedanje drugog i manipulacija ‘ženskim pismom’,” *R.E.Č.* 59/5 (2000): 214-16.

mother was a “Turkish slave.” Her search through the narrow streets of the Upper Town of Thessaloniki under Young Turks had exactly the same goal as her pushing through the snow of Manhattan: she was looking for free women. As the semantic web of Serbian literature changed together with its social-historical contexts, so did Jelena’s program become obsolete and inapplicable in a new, *different* national(ist) culture. In other words, it was not Jelena who excluded herself from her national culture, but the national culture which changed its ideological orientation and from a liberating force became carrier of a new oppression. Jelena’s free, cosmopolitan spirit had no more place in it.

Jelena committed several mistakes for which the Serbian history of literature could never forgive her. First, she was a woman. Second, and even worse, she was a feminist. Finally (likely the worst offense of all) she portrayed the world of the Muslim harem with sympathy and familiarity, depriving it of its traditional fictional and exotic elements, and ruining the male fantasy.

The sexuality in Jelena’s writings also opens some interesting questions. Her contemporaries called her “our Sappho,”¹⁸ and said about her: “It is a woman who loves women, but she loves them like we do.”¹⁹ Not only are her first-person poems dedicated to the beauty and light complexion of Turkish and American women, but the sole center of her attentions are always and without exception women. In America she met women in the famous “Boston marriages,” and homoerotic motifs are explicitly present in the novel *The New Women*. She would ask openly about Muslim women in Thessaloniki: “Have they all known the Greek Sappho, these beautiful, sensitive women full of soul?” The obsessive description of the harem, her preoccupation with the concept of the “unveiling” of Muslim women, as well as her careful recording of every bare body part opens the possibility

18. Slobodanka Peković, “Pogovor,” in Jelena Dimitrijević, *Pisma iz Niša o haremima* (Beograd: Dečje novine, 1986), v-vi. Referring to Vlastoje Aleksijević, *Naša žena u književnom stvaranju* (Novi Sad: 1941), 20. Aleksijević’s text itself is republished in the *ProFemina* (1995).

19. Haru, “...,” *Videlo*, 13/47 (1892), reference in Peković, “Pogovor,” I.

for the interpretation of her writing as an exercise in male voyeuristic pleasure.²⁰ Some critics argue that the authors describing harems were “defined by their masculinity, their social class, and their European culture.”²¹ A look at some of the photos from Jelena’s youth indeed provoke thoughts about the role of gender masquerade in her writing, particularly as a way to resolve the conflict of desire. Characteristically, the novel *American Girl* was entirely written in the first person masculine. Other scholars, however, accuse the first for the projection of culture and sex. They claim that women writers and ethnographers “tamed the exotic” or, put slightly differently, “these women normalized and humanized the harem.”²² Eventually, Jelena was pushed into the margins of male literary history in the process aptly referred to by feminist critics as “the conspiracy of not reading.”²³ Fortunately, that conspiracy proved unsuccessful in Jelena’s case.

20. Suzanne Rodin Pucci, “The Discrete Charms of the Exotic,” in *Exoticism in the Enlightenment*, eds. George Rousseau and Roy Porter (Manchester-New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), 150.

21. Joanna de Groot, “Sex and Race,” in *Sexuality and Subordination*, eds. Susan Mendus and Jane Rendall (London: Routledge, 1989), 104.

22. Billie Melman, *Women’s Orients: English Women and the Middle East 1718-1918* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 62.

23. Neda Božinović, *Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u XIX i XX veku* (Beograd: Devedeset četvrta i Žene u crnom, 1996), 92.

*David Wills**

**The Salonica Campaign of the First World War
from an Archaeologist's Perspective:
Alan J.B. Wace's *Greece Untrodden* (1964)**

The Greek Front of the First World War was characterized by Stanley Casson, who was posted there after serving in Flanders in 1915, as a “forgotten expedition.”¹ One hundred years later, it can still be said that “historical research on the events of Eastern Europe, in the Balkans and in Turkey is much behind, considering the level of research on World War I in Western and Central Europe.”² But as one unnamed British officer wrote of Lake Doiran in 1918, Greece had offered brutality comparable to the more famous massacres of France and Belgium: “the very name of the battle is unknown to most. Yet, in singularity of horror and in the tragedy of defeated heroism, it is unique among the record of British arms.”³ Those present in Greece with the Allied forces experienced combat in terrible conditions, internal divisions, and a fire which devastated Thessaloniki in 1917.

Alan J. B. Wace (1879-1957) is renowned as an archaeologist, Director of the British School at Athens, and collector and curator of Greek folk textiles for the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. During the First World War he worked clandestinely in Athens for British intelligence, alongside the prolific author and memoirist Sir

* Treasurer of the UK's Society for Modern Greek Studies.

1. Stanley Casson, *Steady Drummer* (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2010), 97. Casson was Wace's Assistant Director at the British School at Athens from 1919-22.

2. Holger Afflerbach, “Greece and the Balkan Area in German Strategy, 1914-1918,” in *The Salonica Theatre of Operations and the Outcome of the Great War* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2005), 53.

3. Quoted in Paul Gough, *Stanley Spencer: Journey to Burghclere* (Bristol: Sansom, 2006), 77.

Compton Mackenzie. In 1964, Wace's *Greece Untrodden* was published posthumously and privately by his wife.⁴ The various chapters recount folk stories he had gathered during his extensive travels in rural Greece, together with episodes from the life of a fictional archaeologist, George Evesham. Though Wace himself was a scholar, he did not view contemporary Greece through a classical lens, as so many others have of his time and since. During his career he was a tireless collector of objects representing a Greek rural lifestyle which was fast disappearing in his own time. Through this book, Wace became in addition a chronicler of oral traditions and beliefs.

This paper argues that in *Greece Untrodden* Wace was satirizing those twentieth century British scholars and travellers who viewed modern Greece only through what they knew of antiquity. Evesham the archaeologist is described as foreseeing his own death during the modern industrial conflict that was World War I. Yet this is revealed to him through a meeting with a classical nymph: the reality of the present is mediated through the past. Within this collection of stories, Wace described British participation in the Salonica Front as "fruitless" because it was undertaken under a misapprehension about the country in which it took place. Wace was fully aware that so often during the twentieth century, and the period of the First World War was no exception, visitors knew more about ancient than modern Greece, and that they insisted upon finding relics of the past in the country's people and landscape. I begin here by reviewing British views of the Salonica Front, contemporaneous to the conflict; continue with a summary of Wace's career and scholarship, with particular focus upon his relationships with ancient and modern Greece and his role in the Great War; and finally discuss fully the message of Wace's *Greece Untrodden*.

4. Alan J. B. Wace, *Greece Untrodden* (Athens: Mrs Alan Wace, 1964). I would like to thank Dr Elizabeth (Lisa) French and Ann French, Wace's daughter and granddaughter respectively, for their kind advice and information during the research for this article. It cannot, of course, be assumed that they share my views.

British perceptions of the Salonica Front

The campaign in northern Greece saw the British army and government embroiled in a morass of disease, primitive living conditions, huge seasonal variations in combat conditions, and conflicting politics. G. Ward Price, described in his account of the war as “the official correspondent with the Allied forces in the Balkans,” lacked confidence in the political reliability of his Greek hosts: there was always the potential to be stabbed in the back. His allegations include deliberate delays and difficulties caused by local officials in producing transportation for Allied military supplies. He was, for example, told that one station-master was “pro-German, and probably won’t allow your train to pass.”⁵ A recent historian records that around two thousand deserters from the Greek army formed themselves into an armed band which attacked and raided British supply convoys.⁶ But Ward Price was certain that problems in Greek political loyalty began at the top: the German-linked King Constantine, until he abdicated in 1917, was “doing all he could to obstruct and restrict our action in Macedonia.”⁷ Stanley Casson, however, found it unsurprising that, with Greece officially neutral at first, the British should encounter resentment when they were effectively seizing supplies, infrastructure and transportation. In Thessaloniki, as he pointed out, the Greeks “had been dispossessed of their own city.”⁸ Alexander Thorburn was more complimentary than most about how the locals reacted to their benevolent invaders: “The rubbish published about riots and things in Salonica is very absurd. The town is about as riotous as Little Sutton or Raby Mere.”⁹

5. G. Ward Price, *The Story of the Salonica Army* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), 73, 83-4, 53.

6. Martin Marix Evans, *Forgotten Battlefronts of the First World War* (Stroud: Sutton, 2003), 204-5.

7. Ward Price, *The Story of the Salonica Army*, 211.

8. Casson, *Steady Drummer*, 98.

9. Ian Ronayne, ed., *Amateur Gunners: the Great War Adventures, Letters and Observations of Alexander Douglas Thorburn* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2014), 118.

In describing Thessaloniki and its inhabitants, Ward Price's criticisms plainly became an unpleasant Orientalizing characterization of attempted exploitation and duplicity. Both Greeks and Jews were alleged to have inflated prices in the city, so that "profits are very large." The standards of native services and products were placed firmly below those of the sophisticated British: "Rubbish has been sold at the price of first-class European goods because the difficulties of transport have prevented British firms from getting consignments out to Salonica." British officers seeking personal or professional accommodation had been exploited by "Oriental" pricing, because they were "unaccustomed to guile and hating a haggle." Finally, Ward Price slyly remarked that Floca's Café and the restaurant at the White Tower had "made fortunes for their very wide-awake proprietors."¹⁰ Here, as in other British accounts of the time, Thessaloniki was dismissed as possessing merely the window-dressing of civilization. Scratch beneath the surface, it was thought, and the city had barely emerged from the dust of the East. For R. Guy Turrall of the Royal Engineers, writing in a letter of 1916, "after the bright streets and wholesome hotel interiors of Alex[andria] there is a decided nth rate atmosphere." Consequently, Turrall was left "devoutly hoping that tomorrow will bring orders to proceed at once up country to our respective units."¹¹

Once away from the city, the British soldiers encountered equal but differing hardships during each season. In winter, they faced the task of moving men and materiel through villages where "a stream runs through the street, and of course there is deep mud everywhere," as British officer H. Collinson Owen later recalled.¹² By 1917, the fear and reality of malaria, which each summer caused more casualties than through wounding, demanded the wearing of facemasks and gauntlets in the oppressive heat of the day.¹³ The British government and commanders had been slow to realize what was required. In his memoirs, Stanley Casson invented a conversation between a pair of

10. Ward Price, *The Story of the Salonica Army*, 76-78.

11. Quoted in Evans, *Forgotten Battlefronts of the First World War*, 193.

12. *Ibid.*, 217.

13. *Ibid.*, 230.

military medical planners in London who possessed scant knowledge of the region's location or climate. As they pored over a map in 1915, he imagines their deluded relief: "Thank heavens, Henry, then I shan't have to get any of that damned tropical equipment for them or have to write any more memos. If it's in Europe, then of course it can't be tropical. Only India is in the tropics." Meanwhile, Casson had personal experience of troops previously deployed in Turkey arriving in the snow of the Greek mountains equipped with the "sun-helmets and thin shorts of tropical service which they had worn in the blistering heat of Gallipoli."¹⁴

Greek soldiers were also, at least at first, ill-equipped for the nature of the campaign. Though possessing greater experience of mountain warfare than their British counterparts, the supposed Greek characteristic of "recklessness" caused foreign observers not to regard them as natural fighters in the static trench conditions which often prevailed on the Salonica Front.¹⁵ Nonetheless, Angeliki Dimitriou has recently argued that Greek soldiers acquitted themselves well, following orders, mastering new trench warfare techniques, and eager to take part in major attacks when required.¹⁶ Ward Price eventually conceded, no doubt grudgingly, that "as fighting material they are not at all bad."¹⁷ When occupying Bulgarian villages, Greek soldiers refrained from looting and barbarity, perhaps because, as Dimitriou suggests, they recognized a lifestyle in common with the vanquished: "the Greek fighter –although the victor– after years of war had never forgotten his home village, his family, his land and his animals."¹⁸

British observers expressed dismay at the backwardness of the Greek countryside, but many found solace in their knowledge of the Classics. Alexander Thorburn employed derogatory language in describing "these hill people" as having "extremely primitive and pred-

14. Casson, *Steady Drummer*, 115, 100.

15. Angeliki Dimitriou, "The Greek Fighter on the Macedonian Front during World War I," in *The Salonica Theatre of Operations*, 178.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Ward Price, *The Story of the Salonica Army*, 238.

18. Dimitriou, "The Greek Fighter on the Macedonian Front," 181.

atory habits.” But he persisted in speaking “classical Greek” to locals,¹⁹ and he was by no means alone in interpreting what he saw through the ancient past. Compton Mackenzie, for example, experienced a magical lunch in the locality of Kithaeron, “the Muses’ countryside,” viewing from a bridge as “a Naiad floated down the stream, singing to herself a low sweet song.”²⁰ At sea, en route to Turkey in 1915, Mackenzie rescued a refugee, “a woman with a baby at her breast floating in a wash-tub far out on the moonlit water.” A Classical parallel sprang readily to his mind: “Here was Danaë with the baby Perseus in that chest, in which King Acrisius had sent them floating out to sea in the hope that neither of them would be heard of again.”²¹ Mackenzie stated much later that he “gave my heart to modern Greece” during the First World War.²² The past was unavoidable for many soldiers serving in Greece, however extensive or meagre their level of education. As Casson reported, those digging trenches in the Struma Valley encountered graves, inscriptions and vases: “there was history in every square yard of this ancient valley.”²³

The celebrated British artist Sir Stanley Spencer spent the vast majority of his life in the safe, comfortable village of his birth, Cookham. By the second year of war, however, he felt compelled to enlist, and found himself, after training as a lowly medical orderly, in northern Greece. It was unsurprising, given his character and background, that he found solace as well as horror in the countryside around Salonica. The artist was sufficiently traumatized to reflect that “it is not proper or sensible to expect to paint well after such experiences.”²⁴ Nevertheless, Spencer’s sketches and finished works featuring Greece from that time are positive in outlook. Choosing to shy away from representing horrific details, Spencer concentrated in

19. Ronayne, *Amateur Gunners*, 38, 36.

20. Compton Mackenzie, *First Athenian Memories* (London: Cassell, 1931), 371-73.

21. Compton Mackenzie, *Greece in my Life* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), 25.

22. *Ibid.*, 23.

23. Casson, *Steady Drummer*, 142.

24. Quoted in Gough, *Stanley Spencer*, 85.

particular on local mules at work transporting the many wounded soldiers to dressing stations for treatment.²⁵ Such scenes inspired him as “there was a grandeur... all those wounded men were calm and at peace with everything.”²⁶ Greece at war also provided the inspiration and purpose for his largest and most celebrated project, the Sandham Memorial Chapel at Burghclere in England. Here, the inclusion of Macedonian mules sets the central painted scene of salvation –*The Resurrection of the Soldiers*– firmly in the Greek town of Kalinova.²⁷ Spencer’s Salonica Front was thus populated by gentle animals over mechanized beasts, reflecting redemption rather than recrimination.

Spencer was merely a component part of an elaborate system which had developed to cope with the increasing numbers of Allied servicemen requiring treatment for injuries and illness, as Gerasimos Pentogalos has shown. Three hospitals in Thessaloniki were taken over soon after the arrival of the Allied military in 1915, which supplemented hospital ships moored off the city, with the most serious cases being evacuated to Marseilles. Early in 1916, a number of more permanent military hospitals were created in the city and elsewhere in Macedonia, supported by five casualty clearing stations and four motorized ambulance units. Further expansion of hospital facilities was occasioned in 1916 by the official participation of Greece’s own forces in the war, and in 1918 by the outbreak of Spanish flu and ongoing problems with malaria.²⁸

The impact on Thessaloniki of Allied occupiers and the takeover of hospitals was dwarfed by the fundamental changes wrought by the fire of August 1917. G. Ward Price predictably blamed the local authorities and exonerated their foreign hosts: “the Salonica firemen always proved themselves incapable of coping with the most trivial

25. Ann Danks and Carolyn Leder, *Paradise Regained: Stanley Spencer in the Aftermath of the First World War* (Cookham: Stanley Spencer Gallery, 2014), 8-9, 50, 52.

26. Quoted in Gough, *Stanley Spencer*, 86.

27. Danks and Leder, *Paradise Regained*, 52.

28. Gerasimos E. Pentogalos, “Medical Problems on the Salonica Front, 1915-1918,” in *The Salonica Theatre of Operations*, 211-3, 217-8.

house-burnings unless reinforced by fire-parties from our Fleet.”²⁹ An official report produced at the time praised the British for their efforts in assisting those in need, whilst noting stories of the French stealing and attacking women.³⁰ With a large swathe of the city destroyed, victims were offered emergency accommodation, food handouts for thirty thousand, and free rail transport for those who preferred to depart for other regions of Greece.³¹ As a result of this, and post-war rebuilding, the diversity in the city’s appearance and population was reduced.

1917 was also the year in which Alan Wace’s fictional protagonist was “mortally wounded in the fruitless Allied offensive in April of that year.”³² Ward Price, writing in 1918, regarded this as “the most considerable action they have yet fought in the Balkans.”³³ This so-called First Battle of Doiran alone produced British casualty figures of 3,163.³⁴ The “fruitlessness” of this military action, as expressed in *Greece Untrodden*, is also raised within several contemporaneous accounts. Alexander Thorburn was involved in a diversionary endeavor for this attack which he regards, strategically and in terms of casualties, as a “complete failure.”³⁵ Ward Price outlines how repeated attacks over successive days were unsuccessful: “the enemy line was entered, but made untenable for us by bombing and counter-attacks.”³⁶ As reasons for the failure at Doiran, recent scholars have identified inadequate artillery provision and outdated methods; the commanding height of the Bulgarian positions; fractured lines of communication; and an inability to keep the build-up for the attack unknown to the enemy.³⁷

29. Ward Price, *The Story of the Salonica Army*, 81.

30. Charalambos Papastathis, “The Fire of Salonica and the Allies,” in *The Salonica Theatre of Operations*, 265-66.

31. *Ibid.*, 268.

32. Wace, *Greece Untrodden*, 90.

33. Ward Price, *The Story of the Salonica Army*, 195.

34. Alan Wakefield and Simon Moody, *Under the Devil’s Eye: The British Military Experience in Macedonia 1915-1918* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2011), 81.

35. Ronayne, *Amateur Gunners*, 51.

36. Ward Price, *The Story of the Salonica Army*, 204.

37. Wakefield and Moody, *Under the Devil’s Eye*, 74.

Writing of the whole campaign, a historian has recently noted that “The German leaders considered Salonica as an allied waste of manpower; as the greatest, and voluntary, Prisoner of War camp of the war.”³⁸ But unsurprisingly, many at the time, and since, have defended the Allied presence in Greece during the First World War, and the resultant expenditure of lives and resources. In the view of art historian Paul Gough, Britain and France’s involvement in Greece provided much-needed relief for their Balkan allies, and opened a second front which proved vital to the eventual downfall of Germany: “the campaign brought about the defeat in the field of the Bulgarian army, liberation of Serbia and the protection of Greece, and the strategic exposure of both Austria and Turkey.”³⁹

There were supposedly other benefits for the Greeks. Vasiliki Galani-Moutafi has recently written of the nineteenth century that “Through a presumption of colonial supremacy and an ideology that boasted their self-esteem, British travellers presented England as a place that had replaced Greece as the center of knowledge and science.”⁴⁰ British observers of the First World War considered that they had been able to bring some civilization to the allegedly primitive region of the Balkans. This was manifest in such measures as the provision of clean water, the draining of malarial swamps, and the establishment of a farm school.⁴¹ Ward Price viewed Thessaloniki itself as a “swamp” which the British had improved, so that goat tracks had become roads usable for motor vehicles.⁴² Thus did the British congratulate themselves that they had been able to repay their debt to Ancient Greece.

38. Afflerbach, “Greece and the Balkan Area,” 59

39. Gough, *Stanley Spencer*, 89.

40. Vasiliki Galani-Moutafi, “Greece in Travel Writing and Tourist Discourse: Cross-cultural Encounters and the Construction of Classifications,” in *Travel, Tourism and Identity*, ed. Gabriel R. Ricci (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2015), 41.

41. Mark Mazower, *Salonica: City of Ghosts* (London: Harper Collins, 2004), 315-17.

42. Ward Price, *The Story of the Salonica Army*, 66.

Alan Wace in ancient and modern Greece

Alan John Bayard Wace was born in 1879. After receiving his Classics BA in 1901 from Pembroke College, Cambridge –the city of his birth– with a particular interest in Greek sculpture, he became a lecturer at St Andrews University in 1912. He was then, from 1914-23, Director of the British School at Athens (BSA). In a significant change of focus, he spent ten years (1923-34) as Deputy Keeper in charge of Textiles at the Victoria and Albert Museum, London. He returned to Cambridge, and the world of classical archaeology, as Lawrence Professor from 1934-44.⁴³

As an archaeologist, Wace was very *active* in more than one sense of the word. His longest and greatest association was with the site of Mycenae, beginning in 1920-23, resuming in 1939, and concluding in 1950-55, just two years before his death in Athens. His work at Mycenae led to an academic dispute with Sir Arthur Evans, the imperious excavator of the so-called Palace of King Minos at Knossos in Crete. In explaining the links between the Minoan and Mycenaean cultures, Evans sought to maintain the supremacy of “his” site by arguing that Mycenae had been a mere satellite of the Cretan civilization. In contrast, Wace emphasized Mycenae’s mainland Greek roots.⁴⁴ Wace’s view of the primacy of Mycenae has subsequently been vindicated: “the Mycenaean Greek takeover of Knossos has become an accepted historical fact.”⁴⁵ In *Greece Untrodden*, Wace refers to this controversy by having Oxford scholars erroneously declare an ancient ring from the mainland “not Mycenaean but Minoan, for all the civilization of Mycenae and everything found there came from Crete.”⁴⁶

43. Linda M. Medvid, *The Makers of Classical Archaeology: A Reference Work* (New York: Humanity Books, 2000), 301; Rachel Hood, *Faces of Archaeology in Greece: Caricatures by Piet de Jong* (Oxford: Leopard’s Head Press, 1998), 42.

44. Helen Waterhouse, *The British School at Athens: The First Hundred Years* (London: The British School at Athens, 1986), 26, 35, 108-09.

45. J. Alexander MacGillivray, *Minotaur: Sir Arthur Evans and the Archaeology of the Minoan Myth* (London: Pimlico, 2001), 310.

46. Wace, *Greece Untrodden*, 98.

At Cambridge, Wace had been a student alongside R. M. Dawkins, his predecessor as Director of the BSA.⁴⁷ Dawkins was a folklorist as well as excavator, late in life publishing volumes of myths and tales. In 1906 and 1907, Dawkins and Wace had travelled widely in search of stories, dialects, and folk textiles in Greek islands off the beaten track.⁴⁸ They used a “combination of steamer and hired caique to reach areas where they felt they could see embroideries *in situ* and buy them with a direct provenance.”⁴⁹ Public exhibitions of the items Wace and Dawkins collected were mounted in London and Cambridge in 1905-6, 1913, and during the First World War. The majority of Wace’s important textile collection was eventually donated or sold by him to museums in London, Liverpool and Washington.⁵⁰ His location photography has recently illustrated a catalogue accompanying a landmark exhibition of Greek textiles in London.⁵¹

Between 1910 and 1912, Wace also undertook expeditions to northern Greece with Maurice Thompson, accompanying and observing the Vlachs in their summer transhumant journey.⁵² These travels were conducted in a spirit of hardiness and simplicity. The historian Arnold Toynbee wrote in his memoirs of the pair being “indifferent to heat, hunger, cold or exposure to the elements... [travelling] like klephts.”⁵³ Thompson later reminisced that “he and Wace would simply put a toothbrush in the pockets of their waterproofs

47. Medvid, *The Makers of Classical Archaeology*, 76.

48. Peter Mackridge, 2009, “From Archaeology to Dialectology and Folklore: The Role of the British School at Athens in the Career of R.M. Dawkins,” in *Scholars, Travels, Archives: Greek History and Culture through the British School at Athens*, ed. Michael Llewellyn Smith, Paschalis M. Kitromilides and Eleni Calligas (London: The British School at Athens, 2009), 49-50, 57.

49. Ann French, “The Greek Embroidery Collecting of R. M. Dawkins and A. J. B. Wace,” in *Scholars, Travels, Archives*, 79.

50. *Ibid.*, 86-88.

51. Maria Passa-Kotsou, “The Women’s Costume of Astypalaia,” in *Patterns of Magnificence: Tradition and Reinvention in Greek Women’s Costume*, ed. Ioanna Papantoniou (London: The Hellenic Centre, 2014), 45.

52. Hood, *Faces of Archaeology*, 42.

53. Waterhouse, *The British School at Athens*, 22.

and so set off to Thessaly.”⁵⁴ The result was a 1914 co-authored study of *The Nomads of the Balkans*, which is still cited today.⁵⁵

During the First World War, Wace took advantage of the hiatus in student residency to catalogue some of the BSA’s papers.⁵⁶ He argued for the importance to British prestige within Greece of keeping the school open during wartime.⁵⁷ A 1917 letter reveals that he was also continuing to purchase textiles.⁵⁸ In 1915 and 1916 he was able to take up his archaeologist’s trowel again, in partnership with Carl Blegen of the American School, at Korakou and Corinth.⁵⁹ On Christmas Day 1914, Wace happened to meet and shake hands with Georg Karo, Director of the German Archaeological Institute. But, more generally, Wace concluded that friendship and scholarly links with the Germans must be put on hold during official hostilities.⁶⁰ Those associated with the BSA certainly played an honourable part in the war effort: ninety former students gave war service, of which seven died. Richard Clogg, in his study making detailed use of BSA archives, notes that many of these served in Greece, “making use of their linguistic skills and knowledge of the terrain and of Greek waters.”⁶¹ With Greece officially neutral until June 1917, putting the staff and premises of the BSA to direct use for the British war effort was controversial. R.M. Dawkins complained that Wace had been discouraging British soldiers from using the accommodation and recreational facilities.⁶²

However, Clogg has shown that the role of the BSA was murkier than Dawkins’ accusation of negligence would suggest. In 1916, Wace publicly denied claims made by the Greek press that the BSA

54. *Ibid.*, 135.

55. For example, by John L. Tomkinson, *Festive Greece: A Calendar of Tradition* (Athens: Anagnosis, 2003); Tim Salmon, *The Unwritten Places* (Athens: Lycabettus Press, 1995), 137-38, 202.

56. Waterhouse, *The British School at Athens*, 24.

57. Richard Clogg, “Academics at War: The British School at Athens during the First World War,” in *Scholars, Travels, Archives*, 165.

58. French, “The Greek Embroidery Collecting,” 80.

59. Hood, *Faces of Archaeology*, 44.

60. Clogg, “Academics at War,” 165.

61. *Ibid.*, 166.

62. *Ibid.*, 174.

was harbouring and encouraging spies, but admitted in private to taking in “King’s Messengers, Foreign Office people and similar men engaged in government service.” Wace later received thanks from the British government for his “invaluable services” to the British Legation. He was styled as Director of Relief for British Refugees from Turkey. In reality, as Wace himself acknowledged later, this role was “merely camouflage for Intelligence.”⁶³ The head of British intelligence, Compton Mackenzie, lodged at the BSA for a time in 1915 and daily took lunch with Wace privately. In working for the Legation, Wace was tasked with curtailing the movement of foreign spies from Greece to Egypt, and so developed a pioneering system of visas for travellers: “from it sprang the whole of that great system of passport control around the world.” Mackenzie recalled Wace working in the Legation “at a table in one of the corridors, from which a long trail of waiting applicants sometimes stretched right across the marble entrance hall and even out into the street.”⁶⁴

Described by Mackenzie as “a delightful combination of great scholarship and humour,” Wace also had, according to Rachel Hood, a reputation for sometimes being “difficult,” exhibiting “irritation with others slower than himself.”⁶⁵ But he was an excellent teacher and was often helpful to students in their endeavours to scale the academic career ladder.⁶⁶ For example, in a letter dated 4th January 1933, Wace offered the recipient, a Miss Wynn Thomas, an introduction to Dr Axel Boëthius, the Director of the Swedish Institute of Classical Studies in Rome, and wished her “the best of luck in your work and your travels.”⁶⁷ Wace would have often encountered earnest Philhellenes, who were later recalled by Maurice Thompson as hating the language of contemporary Greeks because it had been

63. *Ibid.*, 168-9.

64. Mackenzie, *First Athenian Memories*, 94, 208-10.

65. *Ibid.*, 194; Hood, *Faces of Archaeology*, 46.

66. Hood, *Faces of Archaeology*, 45-46.

67. Found in my copy of *Greece Untrodden*. Described in the letter in glowing terms as “an absolutely first class archaeologist,” Boëthius had worked under Wace at the excavation of Mycenae the previous decade (Medved, *The Makers of Classical Archaeology*, 42).

spoiled by picking up garbled American obscenities – “goddamson-ofabitch,” for example– when in fact “had he known it, Aristophanes would certainly have used the expression in a chorus.”⁶⁸ In contrast, Wace’s regard for making the most of living amongst the descendants of the Ancient Greeks led him to encourage students at the British School to learn the modern language. He maintained that certain modern beliefs, customs and practices had ancient antecedents. In an article on “North Greek Festivals,” Wace argued for connections between the mumming he had witnessed and the bawdy satyr plays of the classical period.⁶⁹ At around the same time, a former student of the BSA, J. C. Lawson, was espousing a theory entitled *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion: A Study in Survivals* (1910). Such explicit survivalism was dismissed by Wace’s contemporary and collaborator Dawkins, who “believed in the unity of medieval and modern Greek culture rather than in the continuity of Greek culture from antiquity to the present day.”⁷⁰

Greece Untrodden and the Salonica Front

Greece Untrodden (1964) comprises nine stories, all of which, Wace reveals in his foreword, were composed for telling around late-night campfires. The final two are folk tales from Northern Greece. The remainder concern the “mythical George Evesham,” a British archaeologist who, like Wace, travels extensively across remote parts of Greece, where the locals meet him with generosity and entrust him with “the heart of the land.”⁷¹

With an aspiration common to travellers across the ages, Evesham “liked to explore what he called untrodden Greece and any place that was off the beaten track had a special fascination for him.”⁷² In 1909 Evesham travels to Pelos, a fictional Cycladic island

68. Hood, *Faces of Archaeology*, 110.

69. *Ibid.*, 42, 46. John L. Tompkinson (*Festive Greece*, 20-24) illustrates the furry costumes, sheep bells and elaborate headdresses sported by today’s mummers in that region of Greece.

70. Mackridge, “From Archaeology to Dialectology and Folklore,” 56.

71. Wace, *Greece Untrodden*, 7.

72. *Ibid.*, 11.

within sight of its more well-trodden neighbours of Delos, Paros and Naxos. He is aware of the insignificance of its history and the paucity of its archaeological remains, but manages to find a continuity between past and present through its primary export of ceramics.⁷³ Although he is welcomed in Pelos with traditional hospitality, Evesham learns that foreigners who fail to understand the Greeks and mock local beliefs meet an unfortunate end, as had been the case with a German who had disappeared whilst traversing the mountain of Ozia.⁷⁴ Evesham discovers that no locals will accompany him to the mountain on account of it being sacred to Zeus in antiquity. Persevering alone, Evesham encounters Zeus himself in the guise of a shepherd, whose hostility to trespassers in his sanctuary explains the disappearance of earlier travellers.⁷⁵

Evesham's travels in Greece increasingly involve the collapse of boundaries between past and present, ancient and modern. His report to nearby villagers that he had emerged from thick cloud on a mountainous walk to be welcomed at an isolated hermitage by a monk is greeted as evidence that St Narcissus is still abroad.⁷⁶ Evesham protests his skepticism about such occurrences – “for there are no saints nowadays.” But he becomes more willing to believe when he learns that, rather than a beatified contemporary, Narcissus is a ghost from remote history, the lover of a Byzantine princess who took his monk's vows when their relationship was discovered.⁷⁷ Evesham goes on to honour the past through his refusal to disturb the saint's tomb and by lighting candles to his memory.

The narrator of the stories – named only as “Cassius” – emphasizes that Evesham was “passionately interested in everything Greek,” which extends to his “almost fanatical belief that there was some truth in such tales” of the supernatural.⁷⁸ Odd disturbances at a Mycenaean tomb where Evesham is excavating are attributed to the res-

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*, 15.

75. *Ibid.*, 17, 24.

76. *Ibid.*, 36, 39.

77. *Ibid.*, 39, 41.

78. *Ibid.*, 72.

ident skeleton's vampirism, and Evesham calls in the Church to perform a ceremony and leave an icon as protection.⁷⁹ In a separate incident, a long-deceased British scholar of the nineteenth century, buried on a local acropolis, shows Evesham, through disturbances wrought during an earthquake, the location of Mycenaean tablets.⁸⁰

The final revelation Evesham receives from the past is about his personal future – the location and circumstances of his own death. Enthusiastically joining his country's army upon the outbreak of war in 1914, he was killed fighting the Bulgarians three years later.⁸¹ More specifically, Wace describes "his death in the fruitless British offensive of that month on the Doiran sector" – April 1917.⁸² The tale of Evesham's demise begins with a girl he encounters who "walks like a goddess."⁸³ The narrator, Evesham's interlocutor Cassius, openly scoffs at him. The girl is "no different from hundreds of other Greek girls" and, in any case, she cannot resemble the ancients in that "Homer says that Hera and Athena walked like nervous pigeons."⁸⁴ However, Evesham and Cassius shortly discover that they are indeed in close proximity to divinity: local tradition has it that nearby Mount Exeva was the location of a shrine in honour of the Nymphs or Graces. Later, a further local girl, giving her name as Phaenna, appears in the clothes of a shepherdess to show Evesham

79. *Ibid.*, 62.

80. *Ibid.*, 73.

81. *Ibid.*, 49, 74.

82. *Ibid.*, 87.

83. *Ibid.*, 76.

84. *Ibid.* Jack L. Davis has said that Evesham is "Wace's fictional *alter ego*": Jack L. Davis, "Unbalanced Academics, Scribblers, and an 'Odd Christmas'," *From the Archivist's Notebook*, 1st September 2014, accessed 26th April 2014, <http://nataliavogeikoff.com/2014/09/01/unbalanced-academics-scribblers-and-an-odd-christmas>. I regard Wace's relationship with his fictional character as more complex than Davis' comment would suggest. As I have shown, Evesham exhibits some characteristics in common with his creator: a penchant for travelling widely in Greece on foot, for example. However, in other ways I believe that the narrator, "Cassius," more closely equates with Wace's own position. Cassius is the rational onlooker who does not share Evesham's sometimes outlandish faith in connections between classical Greece and the present day.

the correct place on the mountain to dig for the shrine.⁸⁵ The classicist Jenny March has noted that the Graces were minor deities who “played little individual part in myths,” and Phaenna is even more marginal in that she is named by only a few ancient writers.⁸⁶ During the course of the subsequent excavation, Evesham dreams one night of how he is to be killed, charging uphill amongst British troops against the Bulgars. Recognizing that he has arrived at this very location, near Lake Doiran, in April 1917, Evesham is greeted by the same Phaenna.⁸⁷

Identifying the apparition as Phaenna enables Wace to demonstrate, once again, the obsessive and obscure knowledge that Evesham has of the ancient world, and to leave his fireside audience/readers with a final pun. Evesham’s last words, as he lies mortally wounded, are to cry out the name of his classical soothsayer. But this is comically misinterpreted by his less educated superior officer, as “Fanny, Fanny!”⁸⁸ The classical past, then, had a significant role to play in Evesham’s experience of the Great War. It led to his initial interest in visiting the modern country of Greece, his return there as a soldier, and presaged his eventual slaughter. The Phaenna who appeared to Evesham was, naturally, “good looking”, since the Graces were beauty personified.⁸⁹ For him, the beautiful Classical past was as real an element in his death as the brutal present. Just as the artist Stanley Spencer found solace and redemption in his experience of primitive pastoral scenes, Evesham sought the bosom of his beloved classicism (in the person of Phaenna) at the last.

Evesham appears to believe that the past can exist alongside the present. The old magic of the Classical world is to be listened to, taken seriously, and at times obeyed. This is a sort of hyperreality, a world more real than the real. The semiotician Umberto Eco coined the term hyperreality in a famous 1975 essay. During his travels across America, Eco visited waxwork museums and other heritage

85. Wace, *Greece Untrodden*, 85.

86. Jenny March, *Dictionary of Classical Mythology* (London: Cassell, 1998), 173.

87. Wace, *Greece Untrodden*, 86-87.

88. *Ibid.*, 88.

89. *Ibid.*, 83; March, *Dictionary of Classical Mythology*, 173.

attractions in which the past had been (re-)constructed as more perfect than it could have been originally. For example, President Johnson's Oval Office had reappeared in Texas "using the same materials, the same colors, but with everything obviously more polished, shinier, protected against deterioration."⁹⁰ At the Museum of the City of New York, Eco encountered dioramas of historical events which appeared more real than the dusty documents and fragmentary archaeological objects which accompanied them. These were instances, Eco argued, where the "imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must fabricate the absolute fake."⁹¹ He was left with the "impression of entering and leaving time in a spatial-temporal haze where the centuries are confused."⁹² Similarly, George Evesham's imagination enables him to construct his own Greek hyperreality. In such instances as the prophetic nymph and the revelations of the dead nineteenth century scholar, the ancient past leaks through, mixing with and supplanting the present in realness and vividness.

Evesham had been excited to learn that Mount Exeva had been the haunt of centaurs. His thinking about "what a Centaur's skeleton would be like" is clearly Wace poking fun at scholars who worship the classical past so much that they believe in the literal truth of its myths.⁹³ Through his travels and his studies of modern folk art and traditions, Wace had gained a respect for Greece that was not merely rooted in its past, but also appreciated its present culture on separate and equal terms. In *Greece Untrodden*, the scoffing of Cassius reflects this rational world view, though this is subverted by the eventual truthful prophecy of the nymph.

For men such as Evesham, the true heirs of the classical Greeks were the British. The modern Greeks resembled the ancients only in their physical features and apparently timeless rural habits. Civilization, in the form of roads, cities and infrastructure, was being brought

90. Umberto Eco, *Faith in Fakes: Travels in Hyperreality*, trans. William Weaver (London: Vintage, 1998), 6-7.

91. *Ibid.*, 8-9.

92. *Ibid.*, 11.

93. Wace, *Greece Untrodden*, 81.

to northern Greece, and Thessaloniki in particular, in the midst and in the wake of the First World War. This process was hastened by the fire, which local backwardness in fire prevention and response had contributed to. During his visit north prior to the conflagration, Stanley Casson made clear what he regarded as the contrast between the already-Westernised capital, Athens, and the still-Balkanised second-city of Thessaloniki: “here was the mist and heat-haze of the Balkans, not the luminous colours and shapes of a more Mediterranean world.”⁹⁴ For such observers of the early twentieth century, it was the British, rather than the Greeks, who could most completely understand and connect with the higher civilization of the ancient world. Evesham’s belief that the ancients came alive and chose to speak to *him*, much to the astonishment of the local Greeks, therefore seemed perfectly natural.

In Wace’s fantasy tales, the “fruitless” nature of Evesham’s death of course evokes the pity of the First World War, an industrial conflict which claimed the lives of so many on the battlefields around Thessaloniki and elsewhere. But “fruitless” also, I believe, reflects Evesham’s wider relationship with Greece. Wace was issuing an admonition to those who encountered Greece that they should not be, as Evesham had been, unwilling or unable to see beyond its classical past.

94. Casson, *Steady Drummer*, 125.

Ioannis S. Papafloratos

The Italian Policy in Epirus (1861-1918)

The interest of Rome in the region of Epirus dates back to the establishment of the Italian state in 1861. The Italian kingdom was not able to compete with other major powers in distant markets and to undertake overseas campaigns. Therefore, it sought an outlet in the vicinities of the Balkans and of the Middle East. Unfortunately for Italy, even in these areas, any direct confrontation with Germany (which had invested heavily in its policy towards the East), Great Britain (the economic leadership of which was undoubted because it was based on Egypt and on the control of the canal of Suez) or France (which had concluded the first capitulations to the Sultan and had deep roots in the area) was unthinkable. The only way left to Rome was to attempt to take advantage of the competition between the Great Powers.

The eastern Adriatic coast was a favourite target for the Italians because of its geographical proximity, the dominant role of Genoa and Venice in the region in previous centuries and the apparent inability of the Ottoman Empire to meet the requirements of the time. The control of this area was to become one of the major objectives of the Italian foreign policy for a long time. Moreover, many Italo-Albanian intellectuals, who lived mainly in the former Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, made a propaganda campaign to influence the public opinion.

The first (incomplete) proof of Italian ambitions appeared in 1862. Then, King Otto of Greece sent a delegation in Rome implementing a more dynamic foreign policy towards the Ottomans. The Greek side proposed to the Italians to send troops to the area under Giuseppe Garibaldi immediately after the uprising of the people of Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia against the Turks. In this uprising, the Albanians would participate as well, while Greece and Serbia would declare war on the Sultan. This project had attracted

the interest of many Italian leaders. In July of that year, a bilateral agreement between the Greek Army Minister Dimitrios Botsaris and the representative of the Italian King Stefano Turr was signed. Unfortunately, the text of the contract contained several vague points and implied the support of France for the success of the ambitious project. Paris had never taken seriously into account the abovementioned agreement. At the same time, King Otto was dethroned and thus the plan was never implemented.

In March 1878, Constantine Lombardos (representative of the Greek Prime Minister Alexander Koumoundouros) travelled to Rome for talks with Italian political leaders on the Eastern Question. In February 1878, the Treaty of St. Stephen was signed, which provided, *inter alia*, the integration of the territories of Kosovo and Albania to Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia. This possibility caused the reaction of the Italo-Albanian intellectuals led by Francesco Crispi and the mobilization of Albanian nationalists. All these wished the formation of an autonomous Albanian state within the Ottoman Empire. Crispi stated to the Greek ambassador in Rome (named Paparrigopoulos) that Greece should be ready to occupy Epirus in collaboration with Italy. In addition, Rome would send its troops in Albania in order to prevent the occupation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary.¹ Crispi's proposals (who was then foreign minister) to the Greek government were repeated by several Italian leaders and led to strong reactions from the other Great Powers, especially Great Britain.

The Congress of Berlin (June-July 1878) was the turning point for the Italian foreign policy in the region. Rome realized that Vienna would never agree to carry out her plans for the northern coast of the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Therefore, she turned her interest to the

1. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck asked Crispi whether he would agree to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austrians. The Italian politician strongly opposed to such a possibility and Bismarck proposed the occupation of Albania or any other area of the Adriatic by the Italian troops in return. Since then, Crispi had included the occupation (or integration in the Italian sphere of influence) of the region among the immediate priorities of his policy. He wrote in his diary: "Albania has all rights to become an independent state and more (rights) than Serbia and Bulgaria."

area of today's Albania. Since then, Rome is in permanent confrontation with Athens for this region. The Italian diplomacy was against any annexation of Epirotic land to Greece, during the sessions of that Congress. Moreover, Rome sent in the area Colonel Giovanni Sironi, who was a famous writer of military geography. He came into contact with Muslim beys and many officials of the Ottoman administration. Later on, he expressed an opinion against the Greek proposal for the liberation of the Epirotic coastline. His effort was successful and so Corfu was isolated from the rest of the Hellenic kingdom. Moreover, the Italian consul in Preveza drew up a memorandum against the possible annexation of Epirotic lands to Greece.

Following the success of her policy in the Congress of Berlin, Rome had drawn up a program of spreading the Italian culture and increasing her commercial activities in the region through her diplomatic delegations in Durres, Ioannina, Monastiri, Preveza, Shkodra and Valona. The spreading of the Italian language would be achieved through the Italian schools, which opened in Skodra (1881) and Durres (1888). Also, Rome had succeeded in introducing the teaching of Italian language in the Romanian school of Ioannina and she reinforced in many ways the functioning of Albanian schools (e.g. Italian envoys distributed free books and clothes to students). Moreover, the Italian diplomacy sought (unsuccessfully) to guarantee certain rights in the region with the signing of the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, in May 1882. Although her effort failed, Rome did not stop trying. As a result, the Italian diplomacy achieved her goal after five years on the occasion of renewal of the treaty. In February 1887, the Italian government came to an agreement with the Austrian one, according to which the special Italian "interest" for Albania was accepted under the conditions of both Treaties of Reichstadt and Budapest. Rome made officially known her aspirations for the region by the speech of foreign minister before the Italian parliament, in December 1900. These statements had not caused any serious international reactions and three years later the Italian General Staff had considered the possibility of occupation of the territories of Albania. At the same time, the Italians stepped up the anti-Greek propaganda through the "Albanian National Society"

and its journalistic organ of *La Nazione Albanese*. Also, strong anti-Hellenic activities were developed by Jeronimo de Rada through the columns of the newspaper *L' Albanese d' Italia*. Finally, anti-Hellenic articles were published in many Albanian newspapers, based in Italy (such as *The Albanian Star* and *The Albanian Flag*).

In the early years of the 20th century, Rome had focused her policy in the economic field. Several Italian banks (such as “Banca Commerciale”) opened branches in the area, while several well-known commercial and manufacturing companies (like that of Giovanni Bombrini & Leopoldo Parodi-Delfino) became active in the region. Rome facilitated in every way any company wishing to operate in Epirus. As a result, a shipping company and a commercial company had been established in Preveza. These efforts caused strong reactions from the Greeks of Epirus, who managed to frustrate the establishment of an Italian school in Ioannina and to prevent the introduction of the Italian language in Zosimaia School. Finally, the reactions of Greek Epirotes led to the failure of the attempt to establish a branch of an Italian bank in Ioannina. At the same time, Athens was attempting to keep a low profile in order to avoid a direct confrontation with Rome.

The success of the Young Turks movement (July 1908) was a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Italian plans. The situation became really complicating for the Italian leaders, when a sudden event changed the course of events: the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, in October of that year. Rome resented and secured Vienna's consensus in an agreement, which provided that if Austria-Hungary integrated Novi-Pazar as well, Italy would be equally satisfied in another area in the Balkans. This agreement gave a major boost to the Italian plans. Note that throughout the period 1900-1911, several Italians bribed many Ottoman leaders in order to torpedo any attempt of Greek-Albanian approach.

The Italian-Turkish War of 1911 was a temporary obstacle to the Italian efforts. The Italian diplomacy watched with dismay the Albanians to remain neutral in the conflict, after what she had done in their favour. The Italian envoys had even secured promises of the Ottoman officials to provide amnesty to the instigators of the revolts

of previous years, not to mention the allocation of economic and educational privileges. Luckily enough (for Rome), the ottoman government had not kept her promises and Albanian nationalists organized a new uprising in the spring of 1912, which shortly prevailed in Kosovo and the region of Skodra. As a result, the Turks accepted to sign an agreement with the Albanian nationalists in Skopje, which conferred certain privileges to the Muslims living in the area (in August 1912).

In October of that year, four Balkan states declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Initially, the Albanians rebelled and proclaimed their intention to preserve the territorial integrity and freedom in their areas. Gradually, however, (and in fear of the rapid advancement of Greek and Serbian troops) they were the only people in the Balkans, who cooperated with the Ottoman forces. Conceiving the gravity of the situation, some leaders of the nationalist Albanian movement rushed abroad to secure diplomatic support. Rome and Vienna reacted favourably to the Albanian case. The Italian diplomacy (primarily) and the Austrian one (in the second rank) believed that the Balkan states were instruments of St. Petersburg and therefore they faced with a strong suspicion their victories over the Ottomans. Soon, Rome decided to ignore the ambiguous attitude of the Albanian nationalists in the recent past and to offer her support to Ismail Kemal, who proclaimed the independence of Albania in Vlorë, on November 28th, 1912.

Both Rome and Vienna coordinated their actions and managed to elicit a positive decision for the Albanians from the Conference of Ambassadors, which had met in London to resolve the outstanding issues of the First Balkan War. In particular, this Conference had adopted the establishment of an autonomous Albanian state, without, however, to define its borders, on December 20th, 1912. The Italian representatives had supported strongly the claims of Albanian nationalists. The latter spoke of an Albania, which would extend from Montenegro to the Gulf of Amvrakikos!

Indeed, the Austrians but mainly the Italians had frequently invoked the threat of entrance into a war for the sake of the region.

Therefore, Vienna and Rome achieved their goal. However, the Italian diplomacy was not pleased with this great success and only a few days later it signed a secret agreement with the Austrians in order to coordinate the actions of both governments for the establishment of an independent Albanian state (on December 31st, 1912). In the new state, the two countries would maintain equivalent spheres of influence. This agreement (ratified by the Treaty of Rome, on May 8th, 1913) was an open challenge to all the other Great Powers.

At the same time, the fighting continued and the Greek army, led by the Crown Prince Constantine, captured Ioannina and marched to the north, liberating Korça, Gjirokastra, Tepeleni and Saranda, in February 1913. The triumphant advancement of these Greek troops provoked the reaction of Rome, which required from Athens to forbid Constantine to continue to the liberation of Valona. Venizelos showed that he complied with the wishes of Rome and then the latter raised a new claim. The Greek army had to withdraw from Gjirokastira to ensure fully Valona for the Italians! The Greek sovereignty should not extend beyond the Gulf of Sagiada. In March, the Montenegrins occupied Skodra, in defiance to the contrary “advice” of Italy and Austria-Hungary. In April, the Italian foreign minister Marquis Di San Giuliano threatened Greece with war if her army gained control of the east side of the Strait of Otranto. He made it clear unequivocally to the envoy of the Greek government George Theotokis. Next month, the Italian Marquis told the Greek foreign minister that the Greek Government had to take into account that the “fair” aspirations of Italy for Epirus would be always included in the program of all Italian governments. The same day, strong rumours circulated in the Italian capital on the imminent seizure of Valona and Saranda by Italian troops. Then, the policy of Rome had become challenging for many in Europe, i.e., the French politician Georges Clemenceau who wrote that Italian leaders used to change the ethnological maps of Epirus against the Greek inhabitants of the region.

In the Conference of Ambassadors, the Italian representative Marquis Guglielmo Imperiali presented the draft of his country on the borders of the Albanian state. France, Great Britain and Russia did accept the Italian proposal. At the same time, Marquis Di San

Giuliano stated shamelessly to the Greek Chargé d’Affaires in Rome, Kaklamanis: “I admit that even today Gjirokastra and Korytsa are Greek, but the rights of a small country like that of Greece cannot supersede the interests of a Great Power like Italy.” But, the Italian plan was rejected by the states of Entente. However, the whole matter was the subject of discussions and debates among the representatives of Great Powers in the Conference of Ambassadors.

The close Italo-Austrian cooperation had caused the convocation of Russia with the French. St. Petersburg had drawn up a plan, under which Greece would take the valley of Delvino, Saranda and Konitsa. This project had caused panic in Rome, where it was understood that her excessive ambitions had begun to concern the European diplomacy. The Italians fled hastily to the Austrians. The two governments produced a new draft, which met about 80% of the Italian claims and caused euphoria in the Albanian nationalists. On May 9th, 1913, representatives of Italy and Austria-Hungary suggested the withdrawal of the Greek army from Delvino, Gjirokastra and Korca (which would be annexed to Albania) and in return, Greece would gain a few extra kilometres on the coastal zone, extending sovereignty to the Gulf of Ftelia. In Athens, this proposal caused turmoil and King Constantine refused to withdraw the victorious troops (which he had commanded) from the liberalized parts of Epirus. Venizelos was in a difficult position and expressed his strong complaints to London. The British foreign minister Lord Edward Grey assured the Greek ambassador in London (named Ioannis Yennadhios) that Italy would never be left alone to settle the fate of Epirus.

However, the British assurances proved worthless. The Italian diplomacy intelligently linked the issue of Epirus with that of the Aegean islands, which had not yet been finally awarded to Greece. In June, Marquis Imperiali submitted a new proposal, under which his country would accept the immediate return of the Aegean islands (which were liberated and occupied by Greek troops) to Greece, if the other Great Powers endorsed the plan of May 9th. Moreover, Rome suggested a pro-Hellenic settlement for the status of the Dodecanese, which she had under control from the previous year. Ultimately, the issue of the new state borders remained open and on May

30th, 1913 the Treaty of London was signed. This treaty terminated the First Balkan War. It also provided that Albania would be on the security of the Great Powers and a commonly accepted sovereign would rule her.² Also, it was decided to appoint an international commission audit, to send Dutch officers for maintaining order and to establish an international commission in order to delineate borders of the new state. Italy and Austria-Hungary had reacted strongly against the establishment of that committee and their representatives in the Conference of Ambassadors argued that this should set only minor details of the delimitation line. According to the Italian representative, Korça should be given to Albania in advance. The intransigence of the two governments on this issue and the fact that Greece had acquired large areas in Macedonia from the Bulgarians (in the Second Balkan War) led Lord Grey to forget his promises and to join with the Italo-Austrians. Unfortunately, he did not confine only to this but he influenced the French and the Russians to accept the assignment of Korça to Albania. The Italian government assisted his effort, by threatening with an immediate delivery of the Dodecanese to the Ottomans and blocking the return of the Aegean islands to Greece. It was a brutal blackmail.

The committee for the delineation of the borders of the newly created state began her work in October. At the end of the month, the representatives of Vienna and Rome warned Athens that they would not tolerate the lack of cooperation of local residents and they would consider Albanian all the villages whose inhabitants would follow such a policy. This international committee had worked in a climate of intense wrangling among her members mainly in northern Albania for a short period. The advent of winter and the continuing disagreements among the members of the committee led to the suspension of its work. Then, its members decided to move to Florence, where they would delineate the southern borders of Albania with the help of maps. On December 17th, the Protocol of Florence was signed, which awarded large areas to Albania, including Gjirokastra and Korça. In Athens, this Protocol caused serious tension between King Constantine and Prime Minister Venizelos.

2. In July 1913, the German Prince William of Wied was selected.

Finally, the North Epirotes did not pay any attention to the exhortations of the Greek government and rose without her assistance. In February 1914, the government of the self-proclaimed "Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus" was established. The Albanians were divided as Essad Pasha had formed a second government in Durres since December 12th, 1913. Soon, they were defeated militarily and chose the path of compromise with North Epirotes, following the Italian "advice." This compromise led to the signing of the Protocol of Corfu, in May 1914. According to this protocol, the North Epirotes would enjoy many privileges, which would secure their Greek identity. The Greek character of the area was expressly stated and a special administrative organization of the provinces of Gjirokastra and Korça was provided. Unfortunately, the protocol had never been effectively implemented by the Albanian state.

The diplomatic process had not prevented the Italians from intensification of their propaganda, notably through their consul in Ioannina Domenico Nuvolari. At the same time, the Italian diplomacy played the role of the unsolicited adviser of Albanian nationalists. Initially, she persuaded their leaders to compromise with the Greeks in Northern Epirus and then she tried (unsuccessfully) to mitigate the terms of the settlement, shortly before the signing of the Protocol of Corfu. Then, the Italians tried to conduct fully Albanians to secure the lead over their Austrian "allies."³ At the beginning, they organized the uprising of the Muslim fundamentalists against the new ruler of Albania in the central regions of the country, King Wilhelm (Prince of Wied). Rome considered him as Vienna's puppet and wanted his dethronement. The Italian policy had resulted in the acute reaction of Vienna and it caused a serious breakdown in bilateral relations. The leader of the rebels Essad Pasha was arrested and was deported to Italy. However, the insurgents were not put off and they

3. Marquis Di San Giuliano revealed quite clearly the goals of the Italian diplomacy in statements in front of the members of the Italian Parliament, on December 12th, 1913. "Albania itself has little importance, but the possession of her ports and coasts from Austria would made her automatically dominant in the Adriatic Sea."

extended their activities to the south, violating the terms of the Protocol of Corfu. The North Epirotes decided to liberate Korça with their own forces. Also, other armed groups of North Epirotes liberated several villages near Valona and they occupied Berat temporarily, on September 14th. But the situation in Europe had already changed dramatically.

On June 28th, 1914, the Crown Prince of Austria-Hungary Franz-Ferdinand and his wife Archduchess Sofia were assassinated in Sarajevo. Vienna had sent an ultimatum to Belgrade, because the interrogations of her authorities had demonstrated the involvement of several high-ranking Serbs in the crime. The Serbian government (led by St. Petersburg) did not meet all the conditions and Vienna had declared war on Belgrade.

In August 1914, the First World War began between two blocs, which had been set up many years ago. The first consisted of Austro-Hungary, Germany and Italy and it was called the “Triple Alliance” or the “Alliance of the Central Empires.” Its establishment was dated from the 19th century. The second was the “Triple Entente” or the “Entente Cordiale” and it consisted of France, Great Britain and Russia. That coalition was also formed since the 19th century. The only state that did not enter the war (as it ought to) was Italy. Prime Minister Antonio Salandra stated that his country would remain neutral. In fact, the Italian government believed that there was an opportunity to trade-off her entry in war. So, she started negotiations with the two blocs to ensure maximum benefits and to meet all her imperialist plans. Moreover, the government avoided a collision with a large group of Italian public opinion, which had peaceful tendencies. Devotees of such peaceful views were mostly the Socialists and their newspaper *Avanti*, whose director was Benito Mussolini.

Gradually, the Italian public opinion began to support the participation of the country in the war against her official allies (i.e., Austrians and Germans). Strangely enough, Mussolini played an important role in this movement, as well. After a while, the Italian government began negotiations with the two rival camps, “having put Italy to public auction.” Finally, the British and the French “tendered.” They offered the southern Tyrol-Trentino, Trieste and also

the peninsula of Istria, the neighbouring islands of Dalmatia, the ports of the Adriatic, the control over the Albanian case, the final sovereignty over the already occupied by the Italians (since 1912) Dodecanese Islands, the province of Antalya in Asia Minor, a part of the German colonies in Africa and post-war reparations. In April 1915, the Treaty of London was signed, according to which Italy got the above-mentioned areas in writing.

However, Rome was still negotiating with Vienna until one week before the signing of the Treaty of London. Meanwhile, various Italian politicians reassured Berlin that their country would never fight alongside the enemies of Germany! The Italian government sought to gain time in order to prepare her troops. It also aimed to ensure the people's consent through the well-orchestrated campaign of war-mongering Press. Finally, on May 3rd, 1915, Salandra denounced the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. Twenty days later, he declared war on Austria-Hungary. The entire Italian attitude at that time was characterized as either "a unique example of treason in international history" (Proclamation of the Emperor Franz-Joseph II of Austria-Hungary) or as turning Italy into "the whore of Europe", a country which refused to honour her signature.⁴

In Albania there was an intense internal turmoil and King Wilhelm was forced to leave the country in September 1914. The Greek troops (with the permission of the British) recaptured Northern Epirus to ensure the interests of her Orthodox residents. In return, Rome secured a license to ashore troops in Valona. In December 1914, the Italians took over this port, the island Sason and several villages in the Albanian hinterland. Afterwards, there was a short period, in which the battles had come to a standstill. This period ended with Italy's entry into the war.

The Greek Prime Minister Dimitrios Gounaris decided to hold elections in the region simultaneously with the parliamentary elections in the rest of Greece, on May 31st, 1915. The election of nine North Epirotes delegates caused the wrath of Rome. The Italians ac-

4. J. Nehru, *Glimpses of World History* (London: Lindsay, 1949), 615; St. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945* (in Greek) (Athens: Filistor, 1995), 536.

cused the Greek government for breaking the law, because the occupation of the region by the Greek army was temporary. Therefore, Venizelos (who had resumed duties of Prime Minister once again) expelled the delegates of North Epirotes from the Greek parliament, trying to avoid a further deterioration of the Greek-Italian relations.

Nevertheless, the proximity of the troops of both countries on Epirus had caused tensions and aggravated the bilateral relations. In June 1915, troops of Serbia and Montenegro invaded and occupied a number of cities, including Elbasan, Pogradec, Skodra and Tirana. The Albanian nationalists fled in panic to Italy, where they were reserved a warm welcome. Rome had to change her policy in order to achieve her goals. But she had not enough time. In October, the Serbs suffered a tumultuous attack by the Austrians. Their army was defeated and it began to decline towards the southwest. The states of Entente had already thought about establishing a new front in the region and the Italian government proposed the landing of Allied troops in Valona. Unfortunately for Rome, her proposal was rejected. British and French landed their forces in Thessaloniki but they failed to assist substantially the persecuted Serbs. Rome proposed to send more troops in the region on the pretext of protecting the retreating Serbs.

Finally, London and Paris accepted the Italian proposal and a special unit had been formed under the leadership of General Bernotti. The name of this unit was “Corpo Speciale Italiano d’ Albania.” The Italian diplomacy succeeded the withdrawal of Serbian troops from the area. It should be noted that the Italian soldiers did not want to fight the Austrians and they preferred to run away with their friends, the Albanian nationalists. In February 1916, Italian troops and the forces of Essad Pasha left from Durres to Italy. In the area rested only a few divisions, near Aaos River. As a result, the Austrians got Durazzo.

A month earlier, the government of Stefan Skouloudis had accepted the delegates of North Epirotes, who were elected in the parliamentary elections of November 1915.⁵ The official reception of

5. In the elections of November 23rd, 1915, the Liberals did not participate. The new government of Stefan Skouloudis assured the states of Entente that Greece

these delegates angered Rome and foreign minister Baron (Giorgio) Sidney Sonnino protested angrily to his colleagues of the states of Entente. Initially, the Greek Government had shown her capacity to resist the pressures but eventually she was forced to retreat. However, Athens had taken another important step, moving the issue of a royal decree, with which Greece officially annexed Northern Epirus, in April 1916. The Italians became really angry, indicating that this area would be permanently awarded to Greece after the end of the war. The Italian ambassador in Athens Count De Bosdari made a formal demarché to protest on the action of various Greek rebel forces against Albanians in Epirus.

Athens rejected the demarché as totally unfounded. The latter sent troops to occupy areas, which were under the Greek administration. This action caused the anger of Athens. The Italians claimed that they had no confidence in the army of neutral Greece. Moreover, they wanted to get full control of the telegraph and telephone network in the region to prevent the possibility of a surprise attack by the Austrians. It was clear even to the most malicious observers that the Italian claims were specious.

In August 1916, the Italians occupied the villages of Drymades and Paliassa and the city of Tepeleni. Next month, the Italian troops entered Delvino, Gjirokastra, Himara, Premeti and Saranda. The Greek government protested unsuccessfully. The behaviour of the Italians to the occupied areas was openly hostile to their Greek inhabitants. In particular, they expelled the Greek authorities, they drove away the Greeks from public services and they shut down the Greek schools. The tension was high in Epirus. In Athens, the climate was hostile to the Italians. However, Rome asked the Greek government of Alexander Zaimis to give permission to her troops to pass from the Greek territory in order to supply the Allied troops in the Macedonian front (October 1916). Of course, Athens denied because Greece was still neutral. Meanwhile, Venizelos had left Athens to Crete. Then, he moved to Thessaloniki. The movement of "National Defence" (Ethniki Amyna) had already broken, but its

would continue to remain neutral. At the same time, elections in Northern Epirus took place and 18 delegates were elected.

popularity was initially limited only to the Aegean islands, Crete and Thessaloniki. However, supporters of Venizelos were organizing in several parts of Greece. In Korça, they managed to prevail and they expelled the official Greek authorities.

Rome did not react because Korça was out of her immediate objectives and military capabilities during that time. Italians encouraged the Albanian bands, which were moving towards the city. A few days earlier, they had destroyed the city of Moschopolis. Rome sent her troops south of the Greek-Albanian border of 1913. The Italian army captured Delvinaki and Kalpaki (in January 1917), Konitsa (in February) and Sagiada (in March). Over the next few months, the interest of Rome was turned into the Austrian front. Paris took advantage and helped the Venizelists to expand their control in many parts of Epirus and in some Aegean and Ionian islands. It is significant that French troops were settling in every area then “joined” the movement of Venizelos.

In early June, General Ferrero proclaimed Albania an independent state under the protection of the King of Italy. Rome had failed to ensure the Allied approval for this initiative but it had calculated the momentum. Allies (mainly the French) said nothing in order to secure the Italian consent on the dethroning of King Constantine. Russians protested against this initiative but their position was considerably weakened after the dethronement of Tsar Nicholas. Italians were encouraged and invented new excuses to occupy Ioannina and the whole region to Metsovo, in the coming days. At the same time, several Italian circles promoted the organization of the Vlach-speaking separatist movement of Pindus and of Muslim Chams. The Italian vice-consul in Ioannina went to Grevena and Trikala, which were found in the buffer zone between the official Greek state and the “state” of Thessaloniki. There, he was seeking the support of the Vlach-speaking inhabitants in the form of a request for seizure of their lands by the Italian troops. Moreover, the Italians handed out wheat to residents of the buffer zone to ensure their favour.

On May 30th/June 12th, 1917, King Constantine was forced to leave his throne after intense backroom machinations of the French. The next day, Prince Alexander came to the throne and after a few

days Venizelos and his team arrived in Athens from Thessaloniki. The Cretan politician was sworn in as Prime Minister of Greece and he declared war on the Central Empires, on June 15th/28th.⁶ Italy was now an ally of Greece and Venizelos demanded the withdrawal of her troops in Epirus beyond the line fixed by the Protocol of Florence. At the beginning, Rome seemed willing to discuss this possibility provided that she would retain control of the triangle of Pogoni until the end of hostilities. Moreover, the Italian government demanded not to install the Greek authorities in the region! Athens refused because the triangle of Pogoni was contractually guaranteed to Greece. So, Venizelos proposed an international arbitration.

At the same period, an allied conference took place in Paris on the developments in the Balkans. It was decided the simultaneous departure of the French and the Italian troops from Epirus except for the area of Pogoni, which would remain under the Italian control until the end of the hostilities. The Italian consul in Ioannina organized several manifestations of Muslims and Vlach-speaking inhabitants. The Italian military commander in Parga published a proclamation, which emphasized the importance of the Italian occupation for the safety of Albanians. These Italian actions caused the reaction of the Greek government. After the withdrawal of the French troops from the Greek territory, Italian troops were obliged to evacuate those areas of Epirus that were under their occupation in mid-September, applying the decision of the Conference in Paris.

However, Italian troops remained in Pogoni. Their commander-in-chief stated to the Greek governor of Ioannina that the stay of his troops in the area would be temporary. Moreover, the Italians remained in Northern Epirus, as well, where they adopted further measures against the Greek residents. These measures consisted of the closure of all Greek schools, the displacement of many elders and educated North Epirotes to Italy and the installation of many Muslims in the region. In addition, a local court was established, in which the Albanians had the majority. Finally, Muslims were allowed to submit complaints against North Epirotes for crimes having

6. The "state" of Thessaloniki had declared war on the Central Empires as early as November 1916.

been committed before the start of the Italian occupation.

Until then, the Greek government had implemented a more moderate policy, while a division was installed in Ioannina immediately after the departure of the Italians. The latest developments had caused a general outcry of the Greek people and the government was obliged to harden her policy. On September 16th/29th Athens protested angrily to both the British and the French governments. The latter decided on the eve of the French troops in Korça to prevent further deterioration of the Greco-Italian relations. Rome adopted a softer stance, arguing that it sought to annex the area but only to preserve the independence of Albania and to prevent the interference by a third force in the region. Indeed, the new Italian ambassador in Athens Baron Romano Avezzana tried to dispel impressions and adopted a new, tempered profile. The Albanian question was referred for discussion to the Peace Conference.

In conclusion, the Italians had expansionist ambitions in the region of today's Albania from the early years of the establishment of their state. This policy, though it took various forms during the years 1861-1939, was followed by consistency in her objectives by every Italian government of the period. Unfortunately, the study of historical events shows that the fulfillment of the vision of Rome sacrificed the rights of the Greek inhabitants of Northern Epirus, who are still waiting for implementation of the agreements.

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Vaios Kalogrias

**Draža Mihailović – Napoleon Zervas: A comparative
analysis of Resistance and Collaboration in
Serbia and Greece (1941-1944)***

Introduction

One of the most problematic issues during the period of Axis occupation in Serbia and Greece (1941-1944/45) deals undoubtedly with the relation of two prominent exponents of non-Communist resistance to the German and Italian authorities. General Dragoljub (Draža) Mihailović and Colonel Napoleon Zervas, two officers of the old Yugoslav and Greek Army who had more or less parallel bias –not to forget to mention their attempt to establish a military cooperation–, represented as no one else the difficult symbiosis between non-Communist resistance against enemy occupation and anti-Communist cooperation with the Axis powers.¹

Although Mihailović and Zervas were the main protagonists of the non-Communist struggle against Axis, Tito and ELAS (*Greek People's Liberation Army*), there is no comparative study on their political and military activity. There are of course books and articles which deal with the one or the other person and give us useful

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1. The term “collaboration” means here the cooperation with the Axis powers and will be not used as a synonymous word for “treason.” On this matter, see Stathis Kalyvas, “Collaboration in comparative perspective,” *European Review of History* 15.2 (2008): 109-11.

information about their controversial motives.² But a comparative view can help us better understand their strategy toward the Axis authorities and the Communist-led resistance movements.

Until the mid-eighties Mihailović and the Chetniks were considered in the official Yugoslav historiography as “collaborators” and “war criminals.”³ In the nineties, he was celebrated in Serbia as a “national hero.” By contrast, Zervas was officially recognized after the occupation as one of the main leaders of the guerrilla resistance movement. After the fall of the Colonels’ dictatorship (1967-1974) and under the predominance of the left-wing historiography he was usually regarded as an “agent of the British” or –even worse– as an ally of Nazi Germany.⁴

2. To Mihailović: Walter Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945* (New Brunswick-New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973). Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945. The Chetniks* (Stanford: University Press, 1975). Lucien Karchmar, *Draza Mihailović and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement, 1941-1942*, 2 vols. (New York-London 1987). Simon Trew, *Britain, Mihailović and the Chetniks, 1941-1942* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998). Mihailović’s contacts with the Axis powers were already 1945 a subject of study. R. V. Elson, “The tryth about Mihailovic,” *World Review* (January 1945): 18-25. Zervas’ biography has not been written. To his organization see, for example, Vagelis Tzoukas, *Οι οπλαρχηγοί του ΕΛΕΣ στην Ήπειρο 1942-44. Τοπικότητα και πολιτική ένταξη* (Athens: Estia, 2013). Michail I. Myridaki, *Αγώνες της φυλής. Η Εθνική Αντίσταση ΕΛΕΣ-ΕΟΕΑ 1941-1944*, 2 vols. (Athens: Sideris, 1976).

3. Holm Sundhaussen, “Okkupation, Kollaboration und Widerstand in den Ländern Jugoslawiens 1941-1945,” in *Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938-1945). Beiträge zu Konzepten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen Okkupationspolitik*, ed. Werner Röhr (Berlin-Heidelberg: Hüthig Verlagsgemeinschaft, 1994), 349-65, 355.

4. About the new tendencies in the Greek historiography regarding the civil war, see Nikos Marantzidis and Giorgos Antoniou, “The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941-2002,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41/2 (2004): 223-31.

Military Careers

Both Mihailović and Zervas were officers of the pre-war army. The first was born 1893 in Ivanjica in the Kingdom of Serbia. In 1910 he entered the Serbian Military Academy. He participated in the Balkan Wars and in the First World War at the Salonika front. In 1918 he was promoted to Lieutenant. In 1922 –as a Major– he became a member of the General Staff. In 1934 he served as military attaché in Sofia and in 1936 in Prague. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel in 1935. Two years later he got into trouble, when he submitted a critical report on the structure of the Royal Yugoslav Army. His proposals concerned the idea of dividing the Yugoslav Army along national lines (into Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) and the use of mobile guerrilla units at the border districts. General Milan Nedić (1877-1946), Minister of the Army and Navy, sentenced Mihailović to ten days imprisonment. The Second World War found him holding the position of an assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Second Army in northern Bosnia.⁵ Mihailović was at that time known to circles of the British Embassy and he supported the pro-allied *coup d'état* of General Dušan Simović in Belgrade on May 27, 1941.⁶

Zervas on the other side was of revolutionary nature. He was born 1891 in the region of Arta in Epirus. In 1910 he volunteered for the Greek Army and participated in the Balkan Wars. Unlike Mihailović he was an adherent of Republic. In 1916 he joined the pro-Venizelist movement of National Defence in Salonika, and in 1922 he supported the anti-Royalist revolt of Nikolaos Plastiras (1883-1953) and

5. Holm Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens. 19.-21. Jahrhundert* (Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2007), 320. Matteo J. Milazzo, *The Chetni Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance* (Baltimore-London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 12-13. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg [BA-MA] RS 3-7/16: Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Kroatien, Abt. Ic, Nr. 1897/43 geh., “Die nationale Aufstandsbewegung der Cetniks im Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien, Slovenien und Montenegro,” H.Qu., 5.5.1943.

6. Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies, 1941-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987) [first published in 1973], 21. Klaus Olshausen, *Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Die deutsche Politik gegenüber Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973), 45-57.

Stylianos Gonatas (1876-1966). In the inter-war period he played an active role in military affairs. After the establishment of General Theodoros Pangalos' dictatorship in 1925 he was appointed commander of the Second Battalion of the Republican Guard in Athens. On August 22, 1926, he took part in the "palace revolution," led by General Georgios Kondylis (1879-1936), that overthrew Pangalos. When Kondylis made clear his intention to dissolve the Republican Guard, Zervas opposed him violently. He was defeated in the street fights of Athens and sentenced to prison. Two years later the government of Eleftherios Venizelos granted him amnesty, and he became Lieutenant Colonel in retirement.⁷

After that the military career of the ambitious Greek Colonel seemed to come to an end. In contrast to Mihailović, Zervas was not belonging to the high-ranking military leadership on the eve of the German invasion (6 April 1941). He neither enjoyed a good reputation among his colleagues. But he possessed undoubtedly military qualities. Soon the Axis occupation gave him the opportunity to prove his abilities.

Axis Occupation

In April 1941 Mihailović and Zervas were faced with the reality of enemy occupation. After the military collapse of Yugoslavia and Greece the Axis authorities began to establish their *New Order*. Germany annexed northern Slovenia; the ultranationalist organization "Ustasha" (*Croatian Revolutionary Movement*) proclaimed the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) under the leadership of the so-called *Poglavnik* (chief) Ante Pavelić, but without Dalmatia that was

7. Hermann Frank Meyer, *Blutiges Edelweiß. Die 1. Gebirgs-Division im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2008), 508-13. Hagen Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte. Griechenland 1941-1944* (Frankfurt am Main-Bern-New York: Peter Lang, 1986), 95. John Louis Hondros, *Occupation and Resistance. The Greek Agony 1941-44* (New York: Pella, 1983), 106-07. Heinz Richter, *Griechenland zwischen Revolution und Konterrevolution* (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1973), 169.

annexed by Italy. Montenegro was turned into an “independent province” under Italian administration. Kosovo (except Mitrovica) became part of an Italian-influenced “Great Albania.” Bulgaria was rewarded with Vardar-Macedonia (except the Albanian enclaves in the west) and Greek eastern Macedonia and Thrace.⁸ In Serbia and Greece German-controlled governments under the leadership of high-ranking army officers like Milan Nedić and Ioannis Tsolakoglou came to power.⁹

Belgrade suffered not only on the economical exploitation but also under the enormous territorial losses. Serbia (with Banat, in which dominated the local German minority) was reduced to its pre-1912 borders (about 51,000 km²).¹⁰ Athens on the other hand was confronted with hunger, black market, inflation and a serious national threat in northern Greece: The Bulgarization of eastern Macedonia and Thrace.¹¹ It was also confronted with the Italian ter-

8. Marie-Janine Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert* (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2010), 136-45. Edgar Hösch, *Geschichte der Balkanländer. Von der Frühzeit bis zur Gegenwart*, 5th ed. (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2008), 225-31. Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens*, 306-11. Misha Glenny, *The Balkans 1804-1999. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers* (London: Granta Books, 1999), 485. L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000) [first published in 1958], 771.

9. Milan Ristović, “General M. Nedić-Diktatur, Kollaboration und die patriarchalische Gesellschaft Serbiens 1941-1944,” in *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1919-1944*, ed. Erwin Oberländer (Paderborn-München-Wien-Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001), 633-87. Hagen Fleischer, “Kollaboration und deutsche Politik im besetzten Griechenland,” in *Europa unterm Hakenkreuz. Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938-1945). Beiträge zu Konzepten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen Okkupationspolitik*, ed. Werner Röhr (Berlin-Heidelberg: Hühig, 1994), 377-96.

10. Milan Ristović, “Rural ‘anti-Utopia’ in the ideology of Serbian collaborationists in the Second World War,” *European Review of History* 15/2 (2008): 179-92, 179.

11. Bulgaria also intended to extend its sphere of influence on the German-occupied Florina district in Greek western Macedonia for the protection of the “Bulgarian population.” Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 [DGF], Series D (1937-1945), vol. XIII, *The War Years (June 23-December 11, 1941)*, RAM 56 g. Rs., Record of the Reception of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov by the Foreign Minister in Berlin on November 26, 1941, Washington 1964, 840-

ritorial claims on Epirus and the Ionian Islands and with the separatist efforts of parts of the ethnic, religious and language minorities such as the Vlachs¹² in Thessaly, the Slavophones in western Macedonia and the Albanian-speaking Muslims (Chams) in Epirus, particularly in the area of Thesprotia.¹³

The collapse of the political and territorial pre-war order left a vacuum that enabled the rise of anti-Axis movements and radical revolutionary forces.

The “Ravna Gora Movement”

Axis *New Order* forced the creation of resistance movements. Two groups were able from the very first to organize the armed liberation struggle: Communists and army officers. In Serbia as well as in Greece army officers with pro-English sentiments and bourgeois

43. The Italians too wanted to incorporate the town of Florina in “Great Albania.” German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 [DGF], Series D (1937-1945), vol. XII, *The War Years (February 1-June 22, 1941)*, 230/153212-13, The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria, Telegram, Secret No 645, Berlin, May 4, 1941, Washington 1962,702-703. Also in Vardar-Macedonia (regions of Ohrid, Struga and Tetovo) existed a conflict of interests between Bulgaria and Italy. DGF, *The War Years (February 1-June 22, 1941)*, 274/177926-27, The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria, Telegram No 318 of April 25, 1941, 639-40.

12. The Rumanian government was interested on the fate of the Vlachs. In a memorandum to Berlin it proposed “a free Macedonia, with the inclusion of the Rumanian national group or [...] a Rumanian area for the Rumanian population in the Timok and Vardar Valleys [...]” It rejected the idea of “a supremacy of Bulgaria, and thus of the Slavs in the Balkans.” DGF, *The War Years (February 1-June 22, 1941)*, 222/149545-48, Memorandum by an Official on the Foreign Ministry, Berlin, April 23, 1941, 616-18. General Ion Antonescu also favored “the establishment of a route linking Germany with Salonika which is not dominated by Slavs.” After that Bulgaria would be separated from Serbia. DGF, *The War Years (February 1-June 22, 1941)*, 222/149577-79, The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry, Bucharest, Telegram No 1170 of April 28, 1941, 656-58.

13. Vaios Kalogrias, *Okkupation, Widerstand und Kollaboration in Makedonien 1941-1944* (Mainz-Ruhpolding: Franz Philipp Rutzen, 2008), 87-128. Evangelos Kofos, *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia. Civil Conflict, Politics of Mutation, National Identity* (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), 100-07.

views became leaders of guerrilla units. In the first case it was the royalist and pro-western Colonel of the General Staff Mihailović, a soldier with an intellectual appearance, who refused to accept the capitulation of the Royal Yugoslav Army and moved with 50-60 compatriots to the mountains of western Serbia. In May 1941 he organized the first groups of his Chetnik-movement around Ravna Gora. Later, they were called officially “Yugoslav Army in the Homeland.”¹⁴

The Chetnik organization (*Ceta*, armed band) had its origin in the Serbian battles against the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. It had played a crucial role during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. The organization was also in existence during the inter-war period as a special unit of the Royal Yugoslav Army, under the command of veterans of the irregular war.¹⁵ The German military authorities considered the Chetnik-movement as successor of the old Yugoslav Royal Army.¹⁶

Mihailović’s goal was the liberation and restoration of the former Yugoslav Kingdom under Serbian rule and the cooperation with the Allies, especially with the British Supreme Command in the Middle East. He also wanted to maintain the social pre-war order and to protect the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia against the genocide policies of “Ustasha.”¹⁷ But he also sympathized with the idea

14. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 20-21. The first German reports about the Chetnik groups are from May 10, 1941. Erich Schmidt-Richberg, *Der Endkampf auf dem Balkan. Die Operationen der Heeresgruppe E von Griechenland bis zu den Alpen* (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1955), 16.

15. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 20. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, 773. Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941-1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1964), 103. Also see BA-MA RS 3-7/16: Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Kroatien, Abt. Ic, Nr. 1897/43 geh., “Die nationale Aufstandsbewegung der Cetniks im Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien, Slovenien und Montenegro,” H.Qu., 5.5.1943.

16. BA-MA RW 40-13: Der Bevollm. Kommandierende General in Serbien, Ia/Ic, Nr. 3335/41 geh., “Aufstandsbewegung,” O.U., 1.11.1941.

17. On the motives of Ustasha’s mass terror see Jonathan E. Gumz, “Wehrmacht perceptions of mass violence in Croatia, 1941-1942,” *The Historical Journal* 44/4 (2001): 1015-38, 1025-28. The German authorities in Croatia were wor-

of a “Greater Serbia” within Yugoslavia. According to his memorandum “The homogenous Serbia” from June 1941, post-war Serbia would include northern Albania, Vardar-Macedonia, Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Dalmatia and parts of Croatia (with a strong Serb population). This plan was connected with mass expulsions of Croats, Albanians and Muslims (especially from Sandzak and Herzegovina).¹⁸ According to German sources the Serb Colonel also intended to incorporate Bulgaria into his post-war Yugoslavia.¹⁹ Obviously, he seemed to wish a Serb hegemony over the Balkan Peninsula.

The propaganda of the Croatian nationalists used a so-called map of Mihailović’s “Future Federal Yugoslavia” to emphasize the “Serb danger.” As Pavelić’s authorities noted, Mihailović considered only Greece as a friendly state.²⁰ He needed a common Yugoslav–Greek frontier and a good relationship to Greece, because the port of Salonika would guarantee Serbia’s access to the seas.²¹

ried about the Ustasha’s excesses against the Serb population because they would “create centers of unrest in the near future which will be difficult to control.” DGF, *The War Years (June 23-December 11, 1941)*, 245/162034-35, The Chargé d’Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry, Subject: “Persecution and resettlement of Serbs,” Zagreb, Telegram No 708 of July 10, 1941, 113-15.

18. Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens*, 160-61. According to Sundhaussen, “Great Serbia,” “Serbian Hegemony over the Balkans,” “Serbian Rebirth” and “Revenge” were the four key motives of the Chetnik ideology. Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens*, 322. But last, Mihailović’s strong nationalist bias and support for the crown and the pre-war order were no competition for Tito’s internationalist and revolutionary slogans. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, 779.

19. BA-MA RS 3-7/16: Befehlshaber der deutschen Truppen in Kroatien, Abt. Ic, Nr. 1897/43 geh., “Die nationale Aufstandsbewegung der Cetniks im Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien, Slovenien und Montenegro,” H.Qu., 5.5.1943.

20. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [PA AA] R 105164a: Iwo Bogdan, “Aufdeckung neuer Urkunden über politische Ziele und Bestrebungen der ‘Jugoslawischen Regierung’ in London.” The map was published in the Croatian newspaper *Spremnost* on January 24, 1943.

21. BA-MA RH 19XI/45: Nachrichten-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 16, Br. B. Nr. 128/45 gKdos., Nachr. Aufkl. Lage-Meldung, “Tito und D.M.-Banden im ehem. Jugoslawien,” 18.1.1945. In a report of the leading EDES-members in Athens after the war, it was estimated that Mihailović had territorial claims over Greek

In the face of the German decision to reduce the territory of Serbia in the boundaries of the old Kingdom²² and under the impression of “Ustasha’s” persecution measures, the increase of Serb nationalism was a logical consequence. In Ravna Gora Mihailović enjoyed the support of Serb notables who continued to believe in traditional values such as Church and Monarchy. In Belgrade he won the support of bourgeois politicians, the Orthodox clergy, anti-Communist intellectuals, university students and Serb refugees from Bosnia and Croatia. As early as August 1941 –and before the creation of a collaborationist government– he established a “Central National Committee,” that was composed of personalities from the pre-war Serb Agrarian and Republican party. On January 11, 1942 he was appointed Minister of War at the exiled Yugoslav cabinet – a fact that emphasized his leading role.²³

The German administration became aware of him: “Furthermore there exists in the person of Colonel Draza Mihailovic a rallying point für all insurgents with nationalist leanings. This person [...] should nevertheless not be underestimated, since many nationalistically minded Serbs sympathize with him. [...] True, at the present moment he does not present any acute danger, particularly as he has become an enemy of the communists [...]. In the long run, however

(western) Macedonia. Gennadius Library [GL], American School of Classical Studies at Athens [ASCSA], George Papaioannou Collection 2/11, “Εκθεσις μελών Δ/σης Επιτροπής ΕΔΕΣ Αθηνών-Πειραιώς-Περιχώρων,” Athens, February 10, 1971.

22. Many officials of the Third Reich were not even ready to accept a Serb national state.

23. Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens*, 145-46. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 22. Milazzo, *The Chetni Movement*, 18. In this way the Yugoslav military in exile was hoping to tie Mihailović to the government. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, “Out of Context–The Yugoslav Government in London 1941-1945,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 16 (1981): 89-118, 95.

he might become dangerous.”²⁴ The German authorities also characterized Mihailović’s organization as a popular movement with a clearly military structure and no prominent politicians.²⁵

The Yugoslav government in exile promoted him to the rank of General. Since October 1941 he enjoyed –as the only legitimate representative of the Yugoslav resistance– the material and logistical support of Britain. A British Liaison Officer (BLO), Colonel Bill Hudson, an agent of SOE,²⁶ was sent to his headquarters in Ravna Gora.²⁷ Also the Soviet Union recognized the Chetniks officially: Moscow radio praised Mihailović as the leader of the Yugoslav resistance forces.²⁸ This development helped him to consolidate his authority among the non-Communist officers in Serbia.

Until September 1941 the number of Mihailović’s Chetniks was not very high (about 3,000-4,000 men). Many of them were officers and other ranks of the Yugoslav Royal Army, police officers and gendarmes. According to German military records the guerrilla army grew to 30,000 in 1943. But the arithmetical dynamic of the movement didn’t represent its quality. The rivalries between the various local Chetnik leaders were not an unusual phenomenon, and Mihailović didn’t succeed to force discipline and to control the activities of his own men outside Serbia.²⁹ This was a disadvantage for the

24. DGF, *The War Years (June 23-December 11, 1941)*, 4927/E2583372-79, The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry, Confidential, Subject: “The situation in Serbia,” Pol. S No 2, Belgrade, December 3, 1941, 944-48.

25. BA-MA RH-20/12-217: Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung 4, Br.B.Nr. 806/42 gKdos., “Organisation der Draza Mihajlovic-Bewegung,” O.U., 11.9.1942.

26. The organization “Special Operations Executive” was supporting armed resistance in Axis-occupied Europe.

27. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 28-30. Wolfgang Bretholz, *Ich sah sie stürzen* (Wien-München-Basel: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1955), 182. In his reports Hudson confirms the rumors about Mihailović’s cooperation with the enemy. Elisabeth Barker, “Fresh Sidelights on British Policy in Yugoslavia, 1942-3,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 54/4 (1976): 572-85, 573.

28. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 44.

29. Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens*, 146.

whole Chetnik-movement, because it couldn't represent itself as a united guerrilla army and follow a common line toward the Axis authorities and "Ustasha." As L. S. Stavrianos remarks, "this loose organization and the lack of discipline were to be important factors in Mihailović's failure to build up an efficient army."³⁰

From this point of view it was not a surprise that in some Yugoslav lands (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro) the Chetniks collaborated with the Axis troops against Tito, and in Serbia they organized the guerrilla struggle against them. This is why the Germans spoke usually of "Mihailović-Movement" and "illegal Chetniks" with refer to the resistance branch, and not generally of Chetniks. Kosta Pećanac for example, a veteran of World War I and the nominal head of the Chetnik organization when the Second World War broke out, didn't share Mihailović's resistance views. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union he was engaged in a policy of collaboration. On August 27, 1941 he announced the recognition of the German authority and cooperated with the Nedić administration. Detachments of his Chetniks in southern Serbia were incorporated into the state gendarmerie. The German Army appreciated his willingness to fight against the communist-led Partisans and to keep distance from Mihailović.³¹

More chaotic was the situation outside Serbia. The Chetnik leaders in eastern Bosnia (Bogdan Dangić, Boris Damjanović, etc.) operated independent from Ravna Gora. They fought each other and also against "Ustasha." One of them, Major Dangić, was ready to sign an agreement with the German military authorities. In turn, he expected the recognition of his local authority. For the purpose of negotiations he came himself to Belgrade. But the reaction of the Croatian government prevented such an agreement. Dangić was later captured

30. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, 773.

31. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 21. Milazzo, *The Chetni Movement*, 18-19. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 104-05, 113-14. BA-MA RW 40-13: Der Bevollm. Kommandierende General in Serbien, Ia/Ic, Nr. 3335/41 geh., "Aufstandsbewegung," O.U., 1.11.1941.

by the Germans. Only in July 1942 Mihailović succeeded in persuading some of the so-called “separatist Chetniks” (thanks to money or even to terror) to accept his leadership. The final aim of all Chetniks in Bosnia was the unification of their homelands with Serbia.³²

Regarding his resistance concept Mihailović did not wish large-scale military operations against the Axis troops – a typical attitude of many regular officers in German-occupied Europe –, because he was afraid of reprisals against the civilian population, especially against the Serbs. The executions of 2,300 people in Kragujevac by the German troops on October 21, 1941 made a deep impression on him.³³ He also held back with attacks against members of Nedić’s administration.³⁴ In accordance to the declaration of the Yugoslav government in exile from July 22, 1941 he chose to safeguard his organization until an allied invasion would take place in the Balkans (like in the case of the First World War). Then his guerrilla army would rise against the Axis powers and preserve public order.³⁵ He was convinced that only the Allies could liberate the Yugoslav territories – and not a guerrilla organization. So he “planned to organize the entire country militarily before awaiting the opportune moment

32. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 119-20. BA-MA RH-20/12-217: Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung 4, Br.B.Nr. 806/42 gKdos., “Organisation der Draza Mihajlovic-Bewegung,” O.U., 11.9.1942. BA-MA 40/28: Kommandierender General und Befehlshaber in Serbien, Abt. Ia Nr. 3320/42 geh., H.Qu., 30.4.1942.

33. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 34. On this massacre see Walter Manoschek, “Kraljevo–Kragujevac–Kalavryta. Die Massaker der 717. Infanteriedivision bzw. 117. Jägerdivision am Balkan,” in *Von Lidice bis Kalavryta. Widerstand und Besatzungsterror. Studien zur Repressalienpraxis im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. Loukia Droulia and Hagen Fleischer (Berlin: Metropol-Verlag, 1999), 93-104.

34. Paul N. Hehn, “Serbia, Croatia and Germany 1941-1945: Civil War and Revolution in the Balkans,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 13/4 (1971): 344-73, 352.

35. Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens*, 320. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 26. BA-MA RW 40/39: Kommandierender General und Befehlshaber in Serbien, Abt. Ia Nr. 920/43 geh., “Lagebericht für die Zeit vom 1.-15.3.1942,” H.Qu., 19.3.1943.

for a general uprising.” Until then resistance had to be coordinate with the British orders.³⁶

What is usually forgotten is that Mihailović also intended to establish cooperation with the non-communist resistance forces in other states. He was the only army officer who seriously thought about a common guerrilla action and could play a leading role in the Axis-occupied Balkans. The strategic position of Serbia in the centre of the Balkans was a major advantage and enabled him to reach contact with like-minded personalities in the neighbouring countries. He authorized the set up of an illegal radio station with broadcasts in Bulgarian, Turkish, Rumanian, Greek and Serb language. His commander in southern Serbia, Colonel Radoslav Djuric, received the order to negotiate with the Bulgarian *Agrarian Party* and Albanian groups, and to organize the “Mihailović-Movement” in Macedonia and Salonika. Mihailović also created an effective courier service with branches in Salonika, Bucarest, Ankara, Cairo and London.³⁷

Obviously, through the last channel he attempted to establish contact with the Greek non-communist resistance groups. In late summer 1942 a Chetnik representative was sent for this purpose to Salonika, but without success. It is estimated that in June 1944 another Chetnik representative made his way to the Greek city. Resistance-friendly army officers in the state administration advised him to come in touch with the head of a guerrilla force in the mountains of Epirus. His name was Napoleon Zervas.³⁸

36. Milazzo, *The Chetni Movement*, 16-17.

37. BA-MA RH-20/12-217: Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung 4, Br.B.Nr. 806/42 gKdos., “Organisation der Draza Mihajlovic-Bewegung,” O.U., 11.9.1942.

38. Athanasios I. Chrysohoou, *Η Κατοχή εν Μακεδονία. Οι Γερμανοί εν Μακεδονία*, vol. 5 (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 1962), 217-22, 397-401. Also German sources confirm the mission of the Serb officer in Salonika. PA AA, R 27301, Sonderbevollmächtigter SO, Akten betreffend Telegramme Athen-Belgrad vom 2.1944 bis 9.1944, 183 vom 14. Juni, für Gesandten Neubacher, Graevenitz.

The “National Republican Greek League”

In the case of Greece neither high-ranking army officer remained in the mountains after the military defeat in April 1941 to organize armed resistance, nor the Greek government established a guerrilla command as the Yugoslav government did in April 1940.³⁹ However, some kind of conspirative preparation was made among army officers in mid-June 1941 in Athens – before the German attack against the Soviet Union. One of these officers was Zervas.⁴⁰ On September 9, 1941 he founded an illegal anti-Royalist organization under the name of EDES (*National Republican Greek League*) with General Nikolaos Plastiras, who was exiled in France, as its nominal head. In the next two years Zervas became the dominant figure of the second important guerrilla mass movement in Greece. He was the first well-known (ex-regular) army officer who created armed units in the mountains.⁴¹

Unlike his Serb colleague Zervas did not recognize the authority of the Greek government in exile and rejected the royalist pre-war order. His aims were primarily of political-revolutionary nature: The establishment of a “Social Democratic Republic” after the occupation and the punishment of all persons who had participated in the authoritarian Metaxas regime (1936-1941).⁴² The “old political world” in Athens, powerless and discredited, did not support him.⁴³ His political home, the *Liberal Party*, as Zervas wrote to his old

39. Hondros, *Occupation*, 100.

40. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection, Napoleon Zervas, “Συνοπτική έκθεσις μετά τινών στοιχείων της οργάνωσης Εθνικής Αντιστάσεως ΕΔΕΣ,” Athens, February 19, 1949.

41. C. M. Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949* (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), 29.

42. Hondros, *Occupation*, 105. Richter, *Griechenland zwischen Revolution und Konterrevolution*, 169.

43. André Gerolymatos, *Red Acropolis, Black Terror. The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry, 1943-1949* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 73.

friend General Gonatas (1876-1966), reacted in a negative way.⁴⁴ And KKE (*Communist Party of Greece*) mistrusted his post-war intentions.

Zervas established an organization that was identified with his own person. Mark Mazower is right when he writes that EDES was based “on the charismatic personality of the *archigos* [leader] rather than on ideology.”⁴⁵ But the reason for that was the fact that he had neither a broad basis of support in the pre-war area as in the case of KKE, nor had he a military structure like the Chetniks. The centralization of power was a necessity and not a matter of option.

EDES was an attempt to fill the political and ideological gap between the pre-war bourgeois parties and KKE.⁴⁶ Zervas understood well that it was impossible to organize the guerrilla struggle from Athens. In July 1942 he took to the hills in the region of Valtos north-east of Arta with some close comrades such as the intellectual professor Komninos Pyromaglou and Michalis Myridakis.⁴⁷ Before that he established an EDES-Committee in Athens.⁴⁸ Unlike Mihailović Zervas had not many armed followers, but he managed to

44. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 1/4, “Ναπολέον Ζέρβας προς Στυλιανό Γονατά. Ελευθέρα Ορεινή Ελλάδα”, January 9, 1944.

45. Mark Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece. The Experience of Occupation 1941-1944* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1993), 140.

46. Komninou Pyromaglou, *Η Εθνική Αντίσταση. ΕΑΜ-ΕΛΑΣ-ΕΛΕΣ-ΕΚΚΑ* (Athens-Janina: Dodoni, 1988), 305-07.

47. Zervas claims that he aimed first to set up a political organization for the support of the guerrilla struggle and then to take to the mountains. This is the reason why he delayed to leave Athens. Direction of Military History/General Staff of the Greek Army [DIS/GES]: Napoleon Zervas, “Συνοπτική έκθεση τις οργανώσεως ΕΔΕΣ,” February 19, 1949 (ΑΕΑ, vol. 2, doc. 1). He regarded as too early the British wish to take guerrilla action in April 1942. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection, Napoleon Zervas, “Συνοπτική έκθεση μετά τινών στοιχείων της οργανώσεως Εθνικής Αντιστάσεως ΕΔΕΣ,” Athens, February 19, 1949.

48. Among the leading members of EDES in Athens were Ioannis Matsoukas, Iraklis Petimezas, Ilias Stamatopoulos, Dimitrios Giannakopoulos, Apostolos Papageorgiou, Ploutarhos Metaxas, and Haralabos Papathanasopoulos. Its main organ was the illegal paper (*Δημοκρατική Σημαία* (from August 16, 1942 until October 12, 1944). GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 2/11, “Έκθεση

incorporate into EDES some local organizations as the “National Group of Valtos” and “Ellas–Eleftheria” (*Greece–Freedom*) in March 1943. The latter was founded in December 1941 by reservist army officers in the town of Arta.⁴⁹ By the end of 1942 Zervas had already a well-armed band of 100 *andartes* (irregulars) under his command, which played an important role in the famous Gorgopotamos’ operation in November of the same year.⁵⁰ Whenever he could, Zervas employed regular and reservist officers, in the main adherents and friends of Plastiras and Gonatas, with strong republican sympathies.⁵¹

It is quite true that Zervas’ guerrilla army was based most on personal ties and on the competent clientele structure of his local warlords (*capetani*) rather than on political or ideological motives.⁵² The *capetani* were politically or economically influential persons who had filled the power vacuum in their region after the beginning of occupation and had established armed formations.⁵³ Mihailović’s *vojvodas* were organized in a similar way. They were stronger and perhaps more efficient, but Zervas’ warlords achieved a better control of their subordinates. Stylianos Choutas for example –the founder of a national group in the mainly pro-royalist region of Valtos who cooperated closely with Zervas–⁵⁴ stopped the initiative

μελών Δ/σης Επιτροπής ΕΔΕΣ Αθηνών–Πειραιώς–Περιχώρων,” Athens, February 10, 1971.

49. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 4/3, “Εκθεσις επί του τρόπου οργανώσεως, της οργανώσεως Εθνικής Αντιστάσεως Ελλάς–Ελευθερία (Ε–Ε),” after 1944.

50. Hondros, *Occupation*, 106.

51. Edgar O’Ballance, *The Greek Civil War 1944–1949* (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), 53.

52. Polymeris Voglis, *Η ελληνική κοινωνία στην Κατοχή 1941–1944* (Athens: Alexandria, 2010), 89.

53. To the structure of the local warlords in Epirus, see Vagelis Tzoukas, “Οπλαρχηγοί και καπετάνιοι στη δεκαετία 1940–1950. Η περίπτωση της Ηπείρου,” in *Οι άλλοι καπετάνιοι. Αντικομμουνιστές ένοπλοι στα χρόνια της Κατοχής και του Εμφυλίου*, ed. Nikos Marantzidis (Athens: Estia, 2005), 375–430.

54. It was a difficult task for the republican leader of EDES to find loyal adherents in the pro-royalist region of Valtos. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou

of some native army officers to create their own band.⁵⁵ Another competent local EDES' leader, George Papaioannou, also was succeeded in keeping the unity of his *andartes* group in his birth region Trichonis.⁵⁶

Papaioannou was the head of a local band from March 22 until October 10, 1943. In March he joined EDES and one month later he received British military support. In May he and some of his men were captured in Thermos by ELAS. Papaioannou was tortured and a few members of his band were executed. Thanks to the intervention of British officers he was released. After this bloody episode, Papaioannou took action again. But his band was dissolved once again by ELAS in October. Some of his subordinates were arrested and brought to the monastery of Proussou which was turned to an ELAS' concentration camp.⁵⁷ Papaioannou was forced to leave that area. In Athens he joined EDES' committee and took over a leading role.⁵⁸

Generally, the *capetani* respected Zervas who tolerated their self-administration and legitimated their armed presence as a resistance force. But in many cases they were unwilling to take orders from EDES' officers and operated mostly in consultation with Zervas. On the other hand, they knew that without the cooperation with the army officers they did not have a chance to be recognized by the British and the exiled Greek government. The alliance between them and the army officers, that laid the foundation for the growing of EDES' guerrilla movement, was necessary for the *capetani* if they wanted

Collection, 2/15, "Περί της Εθνικής Αντιστάσεως εν Βάλτω, υπό Λουδ. Γερομήτσου δια Νικ. Γ. Παπαιωάννου," after 1961.

55. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 1/8, "Στυλιανός Χούτας προς Ευγένιο Στράτο," Triklinos, June 10, 1943.

56. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 2/3, "Γ. Ν. Παπαιωάννου προς το Γενικόν Αρχηγείον (Γραφείον Αρχηγού)," S.D.A.T., October 10, 1943.

57. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 2/6, "Εκθεση του Α. Χολέβα για την Εθνική Αντίσταση και τα γεγονότα μεταξύ ΕΔΕΣ και ΕΑΜ στη Δυτική Στερεά," June 15, 1945. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 8/3, "Εκθεση Γεωργίου Ν. Παπαιωάννου," Agrinio, January 6, 1953.

58. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 8/2, Ilias Diamesis, "Εκθεση στρατιωτικής δράσεως του ιατρού Γεωργίου Ν. Παπαιωάννου," Athens, March 15, 1947.

to be accepted as “freedom fighters.” This alliance was also necessary for the army officers because, otherwise, their resistance and political slogans could hardly reach the local village population. Thanks to Zervas’ successful “management” a *modus vivendi* was found. Of course the loose military structure and the lack of discipline were not the ideal basis for the creation of a revolutionary army on national grounds – as it was created by the Communists. In the words of Christopher Montague Woodhouse, “Zervas’ force was virtually a private army, dominated by a single personality and limited to his native territory in north-west Greece.”⁵⁹

Zervas’ units in the Italian-occupied area of Epirus fought against the Axis troops and also operated against the collaborationist militia of the Albanian-speaking Chams in Paramythia and Philiates, who favored the annexation of Epirus to a “Great Albania.”⁶⁰ But he refrained from attacking the Greek state administration in his operation area. Like Mihailović Zervas was a typical exponent of traditional irredentist bias (northern Epirus, Dodecanese, Cyprus) and a zealous advocate of a “Greater Greece.” Especially he supported a national-minded Greek resistance organization in southern Albania (northern Epirus) called MAVI (*Liberation Front Northern Epirus*) with men, arms and supplies. He was anxious to expand EDES’ activity outside the Greek territory.⁶¹

His resistance concept was very similar with that of his Serb colleague: He focused on limited military action in accordance with the directives of the Allied Headquarters in Middle East.⁶² He was convinced that only an allied victory could liberate Greece from Axis yoke. For this reason he cooperated closely with members of the BMM (*British Military Mission*) such as Christopher M. Woodhouse. The latter described him as “a loyal ally, but not, like the

59. Woodhouse, *The Struggle*, 38.

60. Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte*, 463.

61. DIS/GES: Ethnikes Omades Ellinon Andarton EDES, “Εκθεσις επί του ες Αλβανία ελληνικού στοιχείου,” August 18, 1943 (AEA, vol. 1, doc. 6).

62. Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschatten der Mächte*, 137.

Communists, as a born organizer.”⁶³ Thanks to the British help Zervas was able to establish a guerrilla administration called EOE (*Free Mountain Greece*).⁶⁴ His “rural kingdom” survived until the end of Axis occupation. He was the only Greek army officer who succeeded in constituting a parallel state-like structure.

Civil War and Collaboration

Mihailović’s anti-Communist war

Both Mihailović and Zervas shared a common fear for a “communist insurgency.” In Mihailović’s case the quarrel with the Communists begun from the very first moment. The consultations between him and Tito on September 19, and October 27, 1941 did not flow into an agreement for common guerrilla action. Too different were the resistance concepts and the post-war goals of the nationalist and communist struggle: Mihailović, the pro-royalist army officer, rejected the idea of “total war” against the occupation forces; he preferred a defensive strategy without mass losses for the civil population and opposed the concept of a “Federal People’s Republic” that would lead to the abolishment of the Monarchy. He had not revolutionary ambitions, his guerrilla army was composed of peasants and he appealed mainly to the Serbs, while Tito proceeded to gain support of all ethnic groups, to build up mobile “Proletarian Brigades” and to overthrow the bourgeois pre-war order.⁶⁵ For Mihailović the fight against the “internal enemy,” i.e., the Partisans, became a high priority; the liberation struggle could wait at the moment.

Although some kind of cooperation took place, the Communist-led side was seeking “to influence the Chetnik rank and file with

63. C. M. Woodhouse, “Situation in Greece—Jan to May, 1944,” in *British Reports on Greece 1943-1944*, ed. Lars Baerentzen (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 1982), 47-115, 80.

64. For more information see Kosta E. Ioannou, *Η Ελευθέρα Ορεινή Ελλάδα* (Athens: Dromevs, s.a.). Also see Vagelis Tzoukas, “1944-Η Ελεύθερη Ορεινή Ελλάδα του ΕΔΕΣ,” in *Η Εφημερίδα των Συντακτών* 12.03.2014.

65. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 114-15.

false slogans and in some instances by coercive means.”⁶⁶ The proclamation of the soviet-inspired “Republic of Uzicé” (south of Belgrade) in September 1941 alarmed national-minded peasants. In November armed clashes took place between the Chetniks and the Partisans. After the military operations of the Wehrmacht against all irregulars Mihailović was on the run; his Staff was dissolved, and some of his comrades were arrested and later shot by the Germans.⁶⁷ The Partisans also were forced to evacuate the “Republic of Uzice” and to retreat south into Italian-occupied territory. The action of Wehrmacht saved probably the Chetniks from a defeat against the Partisans. At the same time Mihailović had a meeting with representatives of the German military administration. The German Intelligence Service was informed about the split between the Chetniks and the Partisans and intended to achieve a *modus vivendi* between the Axis authorities and Mihailović’s units. But the negotiations on November 11 have not been successful; the Germans were not interested on a accomodation. They accused Mihailović of having collaborated with the Partisans and demanded –in a remarkable arrogant way– the complete surrender of his “illegal Chetniks.” But Mihailović refused. His cooperation offer was a truce in exchange for arms, which he would probably use against the Partisans.⁶⁸

The German authorities had no doubt about Mihailović’s anti-Axis motives. In a telegram of December 3, 1941 the Plenipotentiary of the German Foreign Ministry with the military commander in Serbia, Felix Benzler, reported about him: “Furthermore there exists in the person of Col. Draza Mihailović a rallying point for all insurgents with nationalist leanings. This person who is said to have his headquarters in the mountain between Cacak and Valjevo in the village of Ravna Gora has not many followers any longer but should

66. DGF, *The War Years (June 23-December 11, 1941)*, 230/153316, The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, Telegram No 493 of August 12, 1941, 308.

67. BA-MA RW 40/14: Der Bevollm. Kdr. General in Serbien, Abt. Ia Nr. 339/41 gKdos., Belgrad, 10.12.1941.

68. Glenny, *The Balkans*, 493. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 31-37. Milazzo, *The Chetni Movement*, 37-38.

nevertheless not be underestimated [...]. At the present moment he does not present any acute danger, particularly as he has become an enemy of the Communists, with whom he had first cooperated, and is indeed fighting them.”⁶⁹ Until liberation Mihailović would always be considered in Berlin –especially by Hitler and his entourage– as an enemy of the Nazi *New Order*.⁷⁰

Collaboration with Axis was not Mihailović’s original plan. But the strengthening of Tito’s Partisans and the developments in Montenegro brought him in a very difficult situation. The Italian-Chetnik cooperation started at a time when Mihailović was still in Serbia and had no control over the events in Montenegro.⁷¹ He probably decided to tolerate the local Italian-Chetnik agreements in order to keep the Partisans out of Montenegro and to turn that territory into a bastion of the Chetnik forces. Of course he didn’t confirm openly the agreements of the Montenegrin Chetniks, because he was too careful not to break with the British and to lose eventually popular support. The “legal Chetniks” in the Italian-occupied area were free to establish a local village administration and to take up an official position.⁷² In turn they left the Italian garrisons and communications in peace and accepted –at least for the moment– the Axis regime. The Italian authorities, whose territorial claims were directed against the Independent State of Croatia, appreciated the Chetniks’ participation in anti-Partisan military operations. They also looked to build up a domestic counterweight to the “Ustasha.” But the policy of collaboration undermined lastly Mihailović’s prestige by the Allies.⁷³

69. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 39.

70. Sundhaussen, “Okkupation,” 361.

71. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 40-41.

72. Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens*, 146. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 139.

73. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 62. Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen & Co., 1952), 80-81. Hehn, “Serbia, Croatia and Germany,” 356.

The Germans, who continuously criticised the Chetnik-friendly policy of the Italian administration,⁷⁴ refused to follow the Italian example and organized military operations against the “illegal Chetniks” in Serbia. Hitler was determined to destroy the Chetniks as well as the Partisans. He made no distinction between them.⁷⁵ But some representatives of the German Foreign Ministry in Belgrade like Felix Benzler realized soon that military action against both the Partisans and the Chetniks would lead probably to their unification. Therefore, Wehrmacht should act only against Tito. Also German military commanders in Serbia favoured a local cooperation with the “illegal Chetnik” groups.⁷⁶ But such thoughts did not win the upper hand. On September 9, 1942 Mihailović called through leaflets and clandestine radio transmitters for civil disobedience to Nedić’s regime. In November and December the Germans arrested and executed many functionaries of the “Mihailović-Movement” in order to restore Nedić’s authority. The German-Chetnik quarrel came to an end only after the Italian capitulation in September 1943 and the British decision in November –on the basis of reports of the BMM in Tito’s Headquarters– to abandon Mihailović and support the Partisans.⁷⁷ In May 1944 Mihailović, a devoted adherent of the crown,

74. For example, the Foreign Minister of Nazi Germany von Ribbentrop regarded the Chetniks and Mihailović as more dangerous than the Communists. For this reason he demanded from Italian Foreign Minister to put an end to the Italian-Chetnik cooperation. But the Italian military authorities were dependent on Chetniks’ support. Srdjan Trifkovic, “Rivalry between Germany and Italy in Croatia, 1942-1943,” *The Historical Journal* 36/4 (1993): 879-904, 895-96. In the same way argued Mussolini in his meeting with Ribbentrop in Rome in February 1943. *Ibid.*, 900.

75. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 104.

76. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 112. Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, 81.

77. Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens*, 330-31. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 67. Milazzo, *The Chetni Movement*, 105. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 139. This change in British policy was initiated in February 1943 after Churchill’s consultations with SOE-officials in Cairo. The British Prime Minister had serious doubts about the military ability of the Chetniks. Hugh de Santis, “In Search of Yugoslavia: Anglo-American policy and Policy-Making 1943-45,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 16/3 (1981): 541-63,

was no longer a member of the government in exile.⁷⁸ In turn, this strengthened the collaborationist tendencies among the Chetnik leaders. At about the same time (November 1943) the Partisans declared their “Federal Yugoslavia” and prepared to enter into Serbia. From his side Mihailović called in January 1944 a “Chetnik Congress,” which announced the reorganization of post-war Yugoslavia as a federation of three units: Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. But it was too late for a radical change of ethnic policies.⁷⁹

Under these circumstances and without allies in and outside Yugoslavia Mihailović made his “peace” with the Germans. If he wanted to continue the anti-Communist struggle, he had to give up his hostile position toward the Axis authorities and the Nedić administration. Civilian officials of the Third Reich like the “Special Emissary of the German Foreign Office for Southeastern Europe,” Dr. Hermann Neubacher, a former mayor of Vienna, tried to establish a common anti-Communist front between Nedić’s “Serbian State Guard,” the “Serbian Volunteer Corps” of the extreme Serb nationalist and pro-Nazi ‘Zbor’-movement of Dimitrije Ljotić⁸⁰ and Mihailović’s “illegal Chetniks.” In autumn 1943 Neubacher was instructed from Berlin to organize the anti-Communist struggle of the national-minded people in the German-occupied Yugoslav territories, Albania and Greece.⁸¹ He had the permission to initiate local and temporary agreements between Befehlshaber Serbien and “illegal Chetnik”-leaders who fought against Tito. The object of these agreements was the military cooperation –from case to case– against the Partisans. Hitler, who was well-known for his anti-Serb feelings, and high-ranking Wehrmacht officers declined to make an

544-45. Of course the allegations of collaboration also played an important role in the British decision.

78. Bretholz, *Ich sah sie stürzen*, 184.

79. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies*, 199.

80. Ristović, “General M. Nedić,” 647. “Zbor” was a stronghold of Nedić’s regime. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 113. Hermann Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-1945. Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten* (Berlin-Frankfurt: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1956), 154.

81. Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost*, 167-68.

official agreement with Mihailović, because he was still pro-British and an enemy of the Reich. They also wanted to secure Nedić's authority.⁸²

At the beginning of 1944 the SS-“Prinz Eugen Division” announced that it would support the Chetniks in eastern Herzegovina with arms and supplies only if they would break with Mihailović and the Allies.⁸³ In Montenegro Neubacher supported Lieutenant Pavle Durisić to set up a new armed Chetnik formation, the “Montenegrin Volunteer Corps.”⁸⁴ Also in Croatia Chetnik leaders like Radivoj Kosoric signed official agreements with German military commanders. They were obligated to recognize the Independent State of Croatia and to cooperate with the hated “Ustasha.” Furthermore, they put themselves under the orders of the Wehrmacht and abandoned national and royalist Serb symbols.⁸⁵ But other Chetnik groups began to attack German targets in the last chaotic months of Axis occupation.⁸⁶

In Serbia Mihailović, who tolerated the local authority and also the atrocities of other Chetnik *vojvodas*, tried to achieve an understanding with Nedić in order to win time until an allied landing. But he refused to cooperate with Ljotić.⁸⁷ The Chetnik leader was not ready to identify himself with the pro-Nazi camp. After the entry

82. Klaus Schmider, *Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941-1944* (Hamburg: E. S. Mittler und Sohn Verlag, 2002), 481-88. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 164. Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost*, 147-48, 165-66.

83. BA-MA RS 3-7/16: 7. SS-Frw.-Geb.-Division “Prinz Eugen,” Abt. Ic Nr. 107/44 geh., “Zusammenarbeit mit den Cetniks,” O.U., 15.2.1944.

84. Hory and Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat*, 165. Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost*, 183-84.

85. BA-MA RS 3-7/16: SS-Division “Prinz Eugen,” Ic 811/44, “Verhandlungsprotokoll in den am 7.7.1944 zwischen Herrn Radijov Kosoric als Vertreter der Romanija-Abteilung und SS-Obersturmführer Kirchner als Vertreter der SS-Division ‘Prinz Eugen’ geführten Verhandlungen.”

86. BA-MA RS 3-7/14: Gen.Kdo.V.SS.Geb.Korps, Abt. Ic Tgb. Nr. 4057/44 gKdos., Betr.: “Verhalten gegenüber Kroat. Kampfgemeinschaft und bisher loyalen Cetniks,” H.Qu., 03.09.1944.

87. PA AAR 105164a: Telegramm (geh. Ch. V.), Nr. 38, Sonderbevollmächtigter Südost, “Lage des D.M.,” Tirana, 20.1.1944.

of the Red Army in Serbia in autumn 1944 he was hiding with a few hundred Chetniks in the mountains of eastern Bosnia. In the Titoist *New Order* he was the most prominent outlaw.

Zervas' "gentlemen agreement"

In Greece Zervas' secret contacts with the German military authorities were also of anti-Communist nature. At first he had refused the proposal of his Communist opponent in the field, Aris Velouchiotis, to be the military commander of a united guerrilla army. On December 31, 1942 he wrote in his diary that Communism was planning to destroy him.⁸⁸ Zervas resisted the Communist's tactics to incorporate him into ELAS, and the British helped him to defend his sovereignty. Under the impression of the powerful EAM-movement and the disbanding of the non-communist units in Thessaly and Macedonia through ELAS he made his peace with King Georg II in March 1943 and recognized the authority of the Greek government in exile without holding an office. He became reconciled with the "old political world" in Athens and denounced EAM/ELAS as a Communist organization that wanted to seize power by force. From now on he accepted pro-royalist officers by EDES. His organization grew up in April to 3,000 men and in July to 6,000.⁸⁹

EDES became more and more conservative, but it can be assumed that "Free Mountain Greece" was something like an "oasis of freedom" for non-Communists from the EAM-controlled territory.⁹⁰ Zervas regarded Communism as a greater danger than Monarchy and was aware of the British government's attachment to the exiled

88. He also expressed his fear that the British had not understood the true Communist aims. Dimitris Thanas, ed., *Ημερολόγιο Στρατηγού Ναπολέοντα Ζέρβα 1942-1945* (Athens: Okeanida, 2013), 163-64.

89. Ole L. Smith, "«Ο πρώτος γύρος»—Εμφύλιος πόλεμος κατά την Κατοχή," in *Ο ελληνικός εμφύλιος πόλεμος, 1943-1950. Μελέτες για την πόλωση*, ed. David H. Close, 3rd ed. (Athens: Filistor, 2000), 84-100, 90. Meyer, *Blutiges Edelweiß*, 514. Hondros, *Occupation*, 135.

90. Myridaki, *Αγώνες της Φυλής*, 258-59.

King.⁹¹ But he never made propaganda for George II.⁹² The fact that he was cooperating with BMM helped him of course to achieve a great score of reputation among the bourgeois and conservative camp. The British authorities supported him as the only reasonable alternative to EAM/ELAS' expansion in rural Greece.⁹³

Despite of that, the British opposed the establishment of a common anti-Communist front between him and Mihailović. From February 1943 Zervas was anxious to establish a link with the Serb Colonel. For this reason he asked the British authorities in the Middle East to initiate the contacts. In the next month he was informed that Mihailović's representatives would visit him in Epirus.⁹⁴ But only in May 1944 two delegates of Mihailović, the Captains Divic and Pavlovic, reached Zervas' Headquarters. The Chetnik leader proposed a cooperation based on anti-Communist grounds. His delegates claimed that he ordered an army of about 40,000-50,000 men who fought against Tito and the Germans. Zervas told them that he had to consult first Cairo. But the BLOs of his staff were not very optimistic.⁹⁵ Indeed, the answer from Cairo was negative. The Headquarter Middle East as well as the Greek exiled government "suggested" Zervas to avoid any further contact with the Chetnik delegates. After that Zervas assured Cairo that he did not approve a cooperation with the Chetniks. But in his diary he expressed his anger about the decision of the British to help Tito and to abandon "national Serbia." This order was not "understandable" to him, but

91. Woodhouse, *The Struggle*, 35-36.

92. Makris-Staikos, *Βρετανική πολιτική*, 107. EDES' press still called for a "Socialist Republic." GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 1/1, "Ο ενδελεγγόμενος δρόμος," in *Ελευθέρα Ορεινή Ελλάδα* 28.04.1944.

93. Prokopis Papastratis, "The British and the Greek Resistance Movements EAM and EDES," in *Greece. From Resistance to Civil War*, ed. Marion Sarafis (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1980), 32-42, 33.

94. Thanas, *Ημερολόγιο*, 209, 227. Public Records Office/Foreign Office [PRO/FO] 371/37201 R 2332: Pearson to P. J. Dixon, JSAP/GR/2015, March 11, 1943.

95. Thanas, *Ημερολόγιο*, 515. PRO/FO 371/43687 R 8676: Talbot-Rice to Howard, DTR/GR/7374, May 26, 1944 and R 8896: Talbot/Rice to Dew, DTR/GR/7385, May 30, 1944.

he was “obligated” to obey.⁹⁶ The exiled Prime Minister George Papandreou was afraid that EDES and the Greek forces in exile would be involved in the civil war in Yugoslavia.⁹⁷ Mihailović’s representatives returned to Serbia and their visit was kept secret.⁹⁸

Obviously, the British were determined to avoid any kind of provocation against the Communist-led resistance movements, which could lead to a general civil war and paralyse the struggle against the Axis powers. A Balkan cooperation between EDES, the Chetniks and the Albanian nationalist organization “Balli Kombetar” (*National Front*) did not take place.⁹⁹ The predominance of the left-wing Partisans in Southern Albania, Vardar-Macedonia and Greek western Macedonia and probably the unbridgeable national differences between the Chetniks and “Balli Kombetar” left no hope for an antagonistic nationalist resistance pan-Balkan movement.

Zervas was also interested in forming an anti-Communist block in Greece, but at the same time he was careful enough to avoid cooperation with the German-controlled government of Ioannis Rallis and its armed force, the “Security Battalions” (*Τάγματα Ασφαλείας*). A crisis came up in May 1943 when a part of EDES’ Committee in Athens under the Colonels Apostolos Papageorgiou and Charalambos Papathanasopoulos and the lawyer Ilias Stamatopoulos denounced the resistance struggle and begun to collaborate with the “Security Battalions” and Rallis’ administration.¹⁰⁰ They considered guerrilla action useless and advised Zervas to dissolve his units and to come back to Athens. Zervas, who denied a cooperation with the

96. Thanas, *Ημερολόγιο*, 521.

97. PRO/FO 371/43688 R 9074: Papandreou to Zervas, May 29, 1944.

98. PRO/FO 371/43688 R 9331: Talbot-Rice to Dew, DTR/GR/7421, June 8, 1944.

99. Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost*, 108.

100. Fleischer, *Im Kreuzschatten*, 245-47. Hondros, *Occupation*, 105. Pyromaglou, *Η Εθνική Αντίσταση*, 308-09. Roland Hampe, *Die Rettung Athens im Oktober 1944* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1955), 47. It was also existing a resistance branch under the leadership of Ioannis Matsoukas, Iraklis Petimezas and Dimitris Giannakopoulos. DIS/GES: Napoleon Zervas, “Περί αναγνώρισεως της Οργανώσεως Εθνικής Αντιστάσεως του ΕΛΕΣ Αθηνών-Πειραιώς και Περιχώρων,” November 20, 1952 (AEA, vol. 2, doc. 7).

“Security Battalions,” refused and tried –unsuccessfully– to persuade them to abandon their pro-Axis course. In the illegal paper *Democratic Flag* (*Δημοκρατική Σημαία*) from October 15, 1943, the three members of the Athenian Committee were officially denounced as collaborators and were expelled from the organization.¹⁰¹ Zervas also denounced collaborationist officers and citizens who abused the name of EDES for “anti-National” aims.¹⁰²

Another challenge came also from Athens. In a personal letter the chief of the “Security Battalions,” General Constantin Dertilis, warned Zervas to avoid any kind of military agreement with ELAS. He made the proposal that EDES and the “Security Battalions” should attack ELAS in a common action from both sides of Greece, Epirus and Athens.¹⁰³ Zervas was not interesting in such an arrangement. But at the end of 1943 he sent army officers to German-occupied Macedonia in order “to form bands and [to give] details of beaches on Halkidiki for landing supplies.”¹⁰⁴ In October Zervas’ delegates recruited fighters in the areas of Kastoria and Grevena.¹⁰⁵ In November non-Communist officers and *capetani* in Central Macedonia who were represented by Lieutenant Asterios Mihalakis and Theofilos Vais, in a time when EDES was involved in the civil war against ELAS, proposed the integration of their armed formations into EDES. Zervas accepted that.¹⁰⁶

101. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 2/11, “Εκθεσις μελών Δ/σης Επιτροπής ΕΔΕΣ Αθηνών–Πειραιώς–Περιχώρων,” Athens, February 10, 1971. After liberation, Zervas was willing to forgive Papageorgiou. Thanas, *Ημερολόγιο*, 700.

102. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 1/2, “Ναπολέων Ζέρβας προς Στρατηγείον Μέσης Ανατολής,” 01.12.1943.

103. BA-MA RH 19VII/31: 104.Jäg.Div. Ic, Br. B. Nr. 199/44 geh., O.U., 24.2.1944.

104. PRO/FO 371/37210 R 13768: Greece. Situation Report for week ending December 18, 1943.

105. PRO/FO 371/37206 R 10938: Periodical Intelligence Summary Nr. 12, October 20, 1943.

106. GL, ASCSA, George Papaioannou Collection 1/4, Ελευθέρα Ορεινή Ελλάδα, Γραφείο Αρχηγού, “Ναπολέων Ζέρβας προς την Επιτροπήν Εθνικού Αγώνος Θεσσαλονίκη,” Nr. 494, November 5, 1943.

But the unification was not successful. Most of these ex-guerrilla groups collaborated as “village self-defence units” with the German authorities against ELAS under the name of EES (*National Greek Army*).¹⁰⁷ Despite of that, Zervas proceeded to put under his command the collaborationist militia of EES in western and central Macedonia.¹⁰⁸ But the British officers by EDES did not give the permission for such a cooperation. Zervas was put under pressure to give up his plan.¹⁰⁹

The outbreak of the civil war between EDES and ELAS in October 1943 was a turning point in the history of Greek resistance. Zervas had declared his will to liberate Greece from the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and to support the nationalist cause in the Balkans, perhaps having Mihailović in mind.¹¹⁰ But the civil war had further consequences. As John Hondros writes, “the attack on Zervas pushed the guerrilla leader into developing a special relationship with the German forces in Epirus.”¹¹¹ The German military authorities, well aware of the Greek internal affairs, initiated –as they did in Mihailović’s case– the first secret contacts with the leader of EDES in October 1943 and offered him an armistice, which would give EDES a chance to continue the struggle against ELAS without the fear of a German attack on its back. The negotiations between Zervas’ representatives and the head of the German Army in Epirus (XXII. Geb. Armeekorps) General Hubert Lanz, who had the permission of the Army Group E in Salonika for the negotiations with Zervas, at the beginning of 1944 led to the so-called “gentlemen agreement.”¹¹² This would last from February until June/July 1944.

107. To EES see Kalogrias, *Okkupation*, 243-48.

108. PRO/FO 371/43694 R 17346: “The nationalist organization EES,” No 8018, October 25, 1944.

109. C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord. A Survey of recent Greek politics in their international setting* (London-New York 1948), 95.

110. Smith, “«Ο πρώτος γύρος»,” 94.

111. Hondros, *Occupation*, 171.

112. For a detailed account, see Heinz A. Richter, “General Lanz, Napoleon Zervas und die britischen Verbindungsoffiziere,” *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 1 (1989): 111-38.

During the above period EDES and Wehrmacht made no use of arms against each other. This secret agreement –only a few loyal adherents of Zervas knew about that– enabled the leader of EDES to protect the civil population from German reprisals and to maintain his power in Epirus using Wehrmacht as a buffer between EDES and ELAS.¹¹³ “For Zervas,” as Woodhouse put it, “it was a matter of survival, and he knew that his survival was vital to Papandreou and the British.”¹¹⁴

From the other side, the German authorities did not wish to see EDES weakened or destroyed, and they certainly did not want to see ELAS controlling the strategic road between Arta and Ioannina. They preferred a divided resistance and not one which could be monopolized by the Communists or the Nationalists. They were always afraid of the unification of armed resistance and the establishment of a common anti-German front. They also thought that Zervas could be useful to them as a leader who could mobilize conservative circles in the struggle against “Bolshevism.” But also they had to consider his close ties to the British and that EDES could become a major threat during an allied invasion in Epirus. As in the case of Mihailović an official agreement with Zervas was undesirable. Important was to stop the conflict between the German troops and EDES and to exchange information about a common enemy, ELAS.¹¹⁵ Indeed, Zervas informed Lanz about his anti-ELAS operations and assured him that he would never attack Wehrmacht units, not even by an allied operation. The Germans paid no attention to his assurances.¹¹⁶ But Zervas didn’t mean it seriously.

In his diary he wrote only that a few days after Stauffenberg’s assassination attempt on Hitler, Lanz informed his agent Asterios

113. Hondros, *Occupation*, 198-99.

114. Woodhouse, *The Struggle*, 91-92.

115. Hondros, *Occupation*, 183, 186. Woodhouse, *The Struggle*, 60-61. Richter, *Griechenland zwischen Revolution und Konterrevolution*, 369.

116. BA-MA RH 19VII/31: Okdo.H.Gr.E – Ic/AO, Nr. 362/44 gKdos., 11.2.1944. Zervas also informed the German authorities about the peace negotiations in Plaka between EDES, EAM/ELAS and EKKA (Colonel Psarros). BA-MA RH 19VII/31: Okdo.H.Gr.E – Ic/AO, Nr. 462/44 gKdos., 20.2.1944.

Mihalakis that he wished to come to terms with the British. Zervas assumed that Lanz was somehow involved in the *coup d'état* against the *Führer* of the Third Reich.¹¹⁷ The British sources confirmed the negotiations between British agents in Epirus and Lanz about the unconditional capitulation of the German troops in western Greece.¹¹⁸ In mid-August 1944 Zervas lanced an attack on the German troops in Menina, in accordance with British instructions.¹¹⁹

The “gentlemen agreement” initiated a temporary military coexistence between EDES and the Wehrmacht. After the beginning of Zervas’ attacks against the German troops, the Army Group E decided to destroy EDES and to capture Zervas –this “imminent danger” in western Greece– as well as the BLOs of his Staff.¹²⁰ On August 19, 1944 a representative of Zervas informed the German military authorities that a) Zervas could not keep longer his “neutral position,” b) EDES’ attacks were ordered by the British, and c) Zervas disagree with the German occupation of the Epirus’ coast.¹²¹ According to Zervas, on September 9 Mihalakis informed him about the proposal of Lanz to give up the towns of Arta, Preveza, Ioannina and Metsovo, if Zervas would stop the operations against his troops. But the Greek Colonel denied his “offer.”¹²²

On September 24 Zervas’ delegates proposed to Army Group E that EDES should be allowed to move unhindered toward Athens. Army Group E demanded again that the hostilities against the Wehrmacht should be stopped immediately; EDES should take action against ELAS; Zervas should accept the leadership of all Greek anti-

117. Thanas, *Ημερολόγιο*, 563-65, 572-73.

118. PRO/FO 371/43691 R 12991: Boxshall to Laskey, EGB/GR/7721, August 19, 1944; also 371/43692 R 14558: Boxshall to Laskey, EGB/GR/7785, September 1, 1944; also R 14558: Boxshall to Laskey, EGB/GR/7842, September 11, 1944 and R 14558: Boxshall to Laskey, EGB/GR/7898, September 23, 1944.

119. Thanas, *Ημερολόγιο*, 574-75. In the next time Zervas was under British pressure to take action against the German troops. *Ibid.*, 589.

120. BA-MA RH 19VII/31: Okdo.H.Gr.E röm. 1a 6396 geh., 8.7.1944. BA-MA RH 19VII/31: Ic, 13.7.1944.

121. BA-MA RH 19VII/31: Okdo.H.Gr.E röm 1a 8049 gKdos., 20.8.1944.

122. Thanas, *Ημερολόγιο*, 595-96.

Communist groups (inclusive the collaborationist forces) and, more important, he should break with the Allies.¹²³ In contrast, Zervas asked for German permission to establish a military EDES organization to enter into Macedonia and to crush ELAS, which cooperated with “Russians, Bulgarians and Tito.” The members of the “Security Battalions” –i.e., the local anti-Communist militia of EES– should join EDES, and EDES should take control of the Halkidiki peninsula. With Halkidiki as a military base, EDES’ units could fight against ELAS and the Bulgarian Army in northern Greece. Perhaps they could achieve to enter into Bulgarian territory. Zervas also underlined the fact that he could not openly cooperate with the German troops in Macedonia.¹²⁴ The goal of his proposals was not to cover the German withdrawal from Greece, but to extend his own operation zone from Epirus to Thrace. Zervas did not want to see northern Greece falling into ELAS’ hands. According to bourgeois and conservative circles, KKE was planning to proclaim –with Tito’s help– an independent Macedonian state.¹²⁵

The discussions between Zervas and Lanz took place at a time when Bulgaria changed sides and France was in the hand of the western allies. The end of the German occupation was a matter of time. Because of that, the German Army had to cancel “Operation Verrat” against EDES. The liberation found Zervas’ guerrilla army controlling the main part of Epirus. At the same time Zervas’ *capetani* started military operations against the collaborationist militia of

123. Hondros, *Occupation*, 197.

124. BA-MA RH 19VII/31: Anlage zu FA Kdo. 311 Br. B. Nr. 391/44 gKdos., “Vorschläge des Generals Servas an die deutsche Truppenführung betr. Aktion der EDES im mazedonischen Raum,” 27.9.1944.

125. On this issue, see Christophorou A. Naltsa, *Το Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα και η Σοβιετική Πολιτική* (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 1954).

the Chams that led to the expulsion of the Albanian-speaking minority.¹²⁶ In spite of Zervas' orders to respect lives and property of the Chams, many acts of violence were followed.¹²⁷

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Mihailović and Zervas had started as sincerely patriotic resistance leaders. Cooperation with Axis did not belong to their original strategy. But gradually the Communist-led Partisans became a more dangerous enemy than the occupation forces. Communism was understood as a major threat for the bourgeois future and the pro-Western orientation of Yugoslavia and Greece. Both of them were regarded by the Communists as typical representatives of the "reactionary old regime." Unlike Pavelić Mihailović was neither an ally of the Germans, nor a friend of National Socialism. The same is to be said about Zervas. Both leaders did not act within the framework of the *New Order* – like Nedić, Ljotić or Rallis. But Mihailović did not succeed to achieve control of the Chetnik movement and came into conflict with the British policy. Zervas was able to maintain the control over EDES and to avoid a conflict with the British. His military cooperation with the BLOs was a successful one.

The fate of both men was decided to a great extent in London. London abandoned Mihailović but it supported Zervas. Serbia became a part of Tito's "Federal Yugoslavia," while Greece remained under British influence. Mihailović was arrested in eastern Bosnia in March 1946 and brought to trial in Belgrade. He was found guilty of 'high treason' and was executed on July 18, 1946. Zervas was luckier. He made a short political career as founder of the right-wing *National Party of Greece* and became in 1947 Minister of Public Order. He served again as Minister of Public Works in 1950/51.

126. For further details, see James Pettifer, *Woodhouse, Zervas and the Chams* (Tirana: Onufri, 2010). Also see Ilias G. Skoulidas, "Οι σχέσεις Ελλάδος Αλβανίας," in *Βαλκάνια 1913-2011. Εκατό χρόνια θύελλες και χίμαιρες*, ed. Society for Macedonian Studies (Thessaloniki: Kyriakidis, 2012), 203-23, 218.

127. Thanas, *Ημερολόγιο*, 585-86.

Manolis G. Sergis*

**The Shifts in the Significance of Symbolic Monuments:
The Case of the *Lion of Samos***

1. Theoretical considerations: The monuments as official and unofficial mnemonic landscapes

The concept of *monument* is so general that it can include everything, e.g., the architectural constructions of all ages, the works of art, and all human artifacts no matter when they were created or whether they are collaborative or individual creations. The monuments function as material imprints of history and reinforcers of memory of a wider civilisation “preserving and commemorating the values, the customs, the mentalities, the habits, the way of thinking and the volition of the era that produced them and the people that founded them,”¹ and are therefore valued as important tools for History learning.²

The monuments commemorating heroes (usually sculptured) as “official”/state mnemonic landscapes belong in a way to what Alois Riegi described as “conscientious monuments,”³ to those, in other words, that are connected and correlated with clear intentions and

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1. Nikolaos-Ion Terzoglou, “Ιστορία–Μνήμη–Μνημείο,” in *Μνήμη και εμπειρία του χώρου*, ed. Stavros Stavridis (Athens: Alexandria, 2006), 273.

2. P. Bruce Uhrmacher and Barri Tinkler, “Engaging Learners and the community through the study of monuments,” *International Journal of Leadership in Education: Theory and Practice* 11.3 (2008): 225-38.

3. Terzoglou, “Ιστορία–Μνήμη–Μνημείο,” 262.

ambitions: to achieve an impressive and continuous mnemonic outcome. As Auster comments⁴ public monuments act as “important centres around which local and national political and cultural positions have been articulated.”

They have diachronically been public symbols of patriotism, faith in the sacred values of the Nation, symbols of perseverance and obedience;⁵ they are not mere artistic creations that adorn an outdoors space but they constitute living narrative practices, which enhance the collective memory⁶ or foreground self-determined or imposed elements on a society to consume. The symbolisms of the monuments are the visible traces of the invisible perspectives of a society and they motivate its members to participate in social and national endeavours.⁷

The “official” sculptured monuments, as human spatial constructions, as material foundations of memory, transform in the material evidence of the discourse that each official state articulates for the past and the history of the people. The monuments are icons of a concrete reading of the historical past that usually coincides with the national discourse each time in power and the related to it social memory. They constitute thus the visible version of the dominating

4. Martin Auster, “Monuments in a Landscape: the question of ‘meaning’,” *Australian Geographer* 28.2 (1997): 219-27.

5. Elias Mykoniatis, “Το Μακεδονικό Ηρώο της Θεσσαλονίκης. Τέχνη και πολιτική στον Μεσοπόλεμο,” *Ελληνικά* 44 (1994): 159.

6. See Maurice Halbwachs, *Η συλλογική μνήμη*, trans. Tina Plyta (Athens: Pappazisis, 2003).

7. Russell Johnson and Michael Ripmeester, “A monument’s work is never done: The Watson Monument, memory, and forgetting in a small Canadian city,” *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 13.2 (March 2007): 117-35.

national interpretation. As symbols⁸ and mnemonic landscapes,⁹ they realise the nationally, top-down imposed and “legitimising reading,” they reproduce the past in the present. The monuments – preserving the trace of the era that created them– bridge “the conception of space with the idea of the human, the history with memory.”¹⁰ In this sense, they are “entirely symbolic,”¹¹ since they are not a mere construction in a landscape but end to literally constitute a *text*, in which meanings on the basis of typologies, mnemonic associations, memories, ideas, etc. are attached. They refer, in other words, to things *other* than the *object* itself.¹²

The way the state power selects to construct and project its past through the monument always depends upon the prevalent conditions and needs of the present. The “national narrative” does not remain stable; it changes and is redefined, restated through new narrations and interpretations. As Seth Dixon maintains “statues and monuments are not merely static pieces of art, but fluidly constructed and contested touchstones of a collective national, political and social identity embedded within public spaces.”¹³ The each time hege-

8. Clifford Geertz described eloquently the meaning of symbols: the human beings adapt to everything but cannot face the irrational world they cannot foresee or control. The main mechanism they have invented in order to control the nature, comprehend themselves and the others and deter the evil are the symbolic systems. The systems of symbols –considered as knowledge sources– guide the people to their way of living; they constitute criteria of ethical conduct and regulatory terms which tune their action. They exist when they are recognised, put to oblivion or earned in the course of history. People are united or divided for symbols.

9. See Pierre Nora, ed., *Les lieux de la memoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984); idem, “‘Τόποι μνήμης’. Συνέντευξη του Πιερ Νορά στην Χρυσάνθη Αυλάμη,” *Ιστορη* 14 (2005): 179-98.

10. Terzoglou, “Ιστορία–Μνήμη–Μνημείο,” 262.

11. Auster, “Monuments in a Landscape,” 219-27.

12. *Ibid.*, 220.

13. Seth Dixon, “Symbolic landscapes of identity: Monumentality, modernity and memory on Mexico city’s *Paseo de la Reforma*,” PhD dissertation, The Pennsylvania State University, 2009, 10, <http://gradworks.umi.com/33/74/3374479.html> (accessed May 2015).

monic national classes control the production of culture, they practice their hegemony through it aiming at imposing the historical view that abides by their ideological world and thus they interfere with any shift in significance of the monuments in the course of time.¹⁴ As highlighted by Johnson and Ripmeester “the memory entrepreneurs will nurture those specific mnemonic traditions that best serve to legitimate particular understandings of the past. ...we are instructed as to the things we should remember as well as those things that we should forget” aiming at social conformity and smooth reproduction of the system. However, “popular expression of the past works to mediate this effort at control.”¹⁵

The monuments, therefore, constitute a continually transforming recording of the historic memory and play an important role in the creation and perseverance of the folk and collective memory. Their conceptual content varies, is interpreted in multiple ways not merely by the shifting of the ideological discourse of the state power but by the society or the micro group itself, confirming thus their characterisation as *living narrative practices*. The symbolisms that they include evoke mnemonic associations to the members of a particular society, they “demand” a general consensus, not, however, to an absolute degree since they remain “open” to different interpretations. Each society creates its own symbolic cosmos, its members feel at ease with it since abiding by it is reinforced by all relevant to social learning mechanisms targeting the preservation and reproduction of each society. Actually, individuals use the symbols on a daily basis and they thus consciously or unconsciously undergo their impact on them. In this sense, the x or y historical event and its iconic repre-

14. I remind that many traditions and memory landscapes have eventually been shown to be “inventions,” outcomes of construction procedures or invented traditions. See for the term Eric Hobsbaum and Terence Ranger, *Η επινόηση της παράδοσης*, trans. Thanassis Athanasiou (Athens: Themelio, 2004); and that the *memory landscapes* are the monuments, the historical sites, the museums, the artifacts, the documents of any kind, the traditions, the literary pieces, etc.

15. Johnson and Ripmeester, “A monument’s work is never done,” 119.

sentation on the monument is likely to embed new or altered expectations and meanings in order to continue to remain meaningful to the society which, however, cannot be controlled by the official state.¹⁶ In addition to the above, in wider groupings, namely, cities, states, nations, “the globe,” persons use the symbols “to express discriminations between different social units.”¹⁷

The monuments erected by other social associations (non state ones), such as, cultural associations, trade unions, ethnic groups, municipalities and communities, social groups of a right or left wing political direction, etc., either abide by the official ideology or express the unofficial memory, the counter-memory,¹⁸ the bottom-up one, their own collective memory, which is likely to be different from the one accepted by the ethnocentric or some other dominant narratives. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan call this “collective remembrance” because it is the outcome of the action of specific subjects or groups that act publicly.¹⁹ Such monuments are usually a reaction to the conscious silencing of historical particular events, to the manipulation of memory and the amnesia imposed *top-down* for such events or certain historical persons. The persons or certain groups of persons attribute at times different meanings and conceptualisations to memory landscapes, they transform them into a familiar mnemonic space, into a field that contributes to the formation, crystallisation and enrichment of their own collective memory. One example from the post civil-war Greece follows:

16. *Ibid.*, 120.

17. Joy Hendry, *Οι κόσμοι που μοιραζόμαστε. Εισαγωγή στην Πολιτισμική και Κοινωνική Ανθρωπολογία*, trans. Chrysoula Mentzalira (Athens: Kritiki, 2011), 174.

18. Michel Foucault, *Language, counter-memory, practice: Selected essays and interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1977).

19. Giannis Giannitsiotis, “Ο Άρης Βελουχιώτης επιστρέφει στη Λαμία: Χωρικές διαμάχες γύρω από έναν μνημονικό τόπο,” in *Αμφισβητούμενοι χώροι στην πόλη. Χωρικές προσεγγίσεις του πολιτισμού*, eds. K. Giannakopoulos and Giannis Giannitsiotis, (Athens: Alexandria, 2010), 273.

The liberation of the country from the Nazi occupation has never become an official celebration day, the members of the resistance groups of both parties have never been honoured, the resistance movement has never become “a glorious part of the national reading of history,”²⁰ as has been done in the rest of Europe, since one part of this movement (the EAM one) had been associated to the communist activity.²¹ Therefore, it seems quite difficult to build a monument for the Greek anti-Nazi resistance that would express the full range of the Greek collective memory since it is highly divided in this aspect. During the same period, Europe, however, had invented “resistant narrations” and a dominant unifying European myth, which is absolutely necessary for the construction of the post-war European identity. De Gaulle considered the myth that created Vici as “something that never occurred.”²² Nora proved that the history of France was articulated around mnemonic landscapes, where history and memory interact and define each other.²³

The aim, nonetheless, in the aforementioned cases is for the viewer citizen to approach *emotionally* the historical reality (the emotional load that monuments carry is one of their symbolic elements)²⁴ to identify with the honoured heroes and turn them into its models, to cancel the time by connecting the past with the present. Consequently, the class in power that manipulates the past forms the social reality, instilling in the persons the system of ideas and representations embraced by it, which is the dominant ideology. The one who controls the past determines the future as Orwell said. The past

20. Eleni Paschaloudi, *Ένας πόλεμος χωρίς τέλος. Η δεκαετία του 1940 στον πολιτικό λόγο, 1950-1967* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2010), 31.

21. Typical is the example of Aris Velouhiotis. See indicatively, Giannitsiotis, “Ο Άρης Βελουχιώτης επιστρέφει,” 267-314.

22. Anna-Maria Droumbouki, *Μνημεία της λήθης. Τχνη του Β' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου στην Ελλάδα και στην Ευρώπη* (Athens: Polis, 2014), 40.

23. Nora, *Les lieux de la mémoire*, XXXIV-XLI.

24. Such issues are discussed in Joan Lewis, *Symbols and sentiments. Cross cultural studies in symbolism* (New York, S. Francisco: Academic Press, 1977).

is certainly continually affected by shifts in significance by the present, by the position and the role it has in our consciousness,²⁵ and simultaneously it creates and fosters identities. The persons come to know each other through it appealing to common experiences and traditions. The objects in general are *agents* since they have an effect on the human beings, they cause various feelings and they affect their social life. In this sense, the monuments –as objects– are not inactive subjects when viewed but they act. The symbolic memory that is embedded in monuments contributes to the self awareness, self evaluation and creative reinterpretation of the person since it links via the “shortest route” its past, present and future in one unit; they place a preponderant role in the process of creation of stable ethic values, especially the classical ones, since they imprint in space a permanent, durable trace which remains in the passing of time a foundation of the mnemonic and historical coherence of landscapes.²⁶ The persons’ tendency to be attached to the past (devaluing the present) is well-known and has been interpreted *inter alia* as an inner need to connect to what they were as a community/nation and “golden eras” of their prime in particular. This has to do with the persons’ existential, unconscious in most cases need to find a meaning in life. The visible monument-symbol constitutes in this sense a tangible evidence of what they are seeking for, given the fact that symbols are “tangible expressions of conceptions, abstractions of reality crystallised in observable forms, concrete incarnations of ideas, attitudes, judgments, desires or beliefs.”²⁷ Let us add here that the past tends to be “holified” by the people because of the cosmological perception of the cyclical structure of time, the perceptual recycling of everything according to which the present (and whatever takes

25. Antonis Liakos, *Πώς το παρελθόν γίνεται ιστορία*; (Athens: Polis, 2007), 121.

26. Terzoglou, “Ιστορία–Μνήμη–Μνημείο,” 273.

27. Clifford Geertz, *Η ερμηνεία των πολιτισμών*, trans. Th. Papadellis (Athens: Alexandra, 2003), 99.

place during it) constitutes a mere reiteration of what happened once for a first time (*ille tempore*, of M. Eliade).²⁸

Finally, the monuments have an artistic value; they are works of art that express simultaneously the degree of progress of the pictorial art during the specific period of time when the monument was created. They comprise several qualities (morphological, material choice, symbolisms, etc.) that compose the trends of the dominant aesthetics or in some other times a totally different, maybe avant-garde one or a completely traditional or obsolete one. Their evaluation as works of art undertakes numerous specialists, scholars, representatives of opposing waves, the “dominant rule” (or the “national rule of thumb) or another one consciously marginalised by the previous ones. The simple individual, however, facing the monument is invited to decode the system of its “signs” and thus, on the one hand, develops a social relationship with the monument, and, on the other hand, makes up their personal view of memory. I indicatively mention the “distortional artistic language” that rendered the recognition of the elements of the statue of the fighter for the liberation of Macedonia Kotta impossible (Florina 1960) by the people and caused a storm of protest by the local society. The depiction of the hero the very moment of his sacrifice was considered disparaging and anti-heroic.²⁹ Nowadays, to Gialouri, the aesthetics of the depiction of the embedded in each monument ideas becomes more abstract and aims at involving the viewer and at activating the dialectical relationship between the public and the public event more.³⁰

28. Mircea Eliade, *Κόσμος και ιστορία. Ο μύθος της αιώνιας επιστροφής*, trans. Stratis Psaltou (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 1999); idem, *Το ιερό και το βέβηλο*, trans. Nikos Delivorias (Athens: Arsenidis, 2002).

29. Sophia Tsiara, *Τοπία της εθνικής μνήμης. Ιστορίες της Μακεδονίας γραμμένες σε μάρμαρο* (Athens: Kleidarithmos, 2004), 171-85.

30. Eleana Gialouri, “Η δυναμική των μνημείων: Αναζητήσεις στο πεδίο της μνήμης και της λήθης,” in *Αμφισβητούμενοι χώροι στην πόλη*, 309.

2. *The case of the monument of Samos: A Great Tradition choice*³¹

In 1930 the century anniversary of the national Independence was celebrated with grandiose celebrations all over Greece (1830-1930). Apart from the celebration in the capital city of Athens, every other city was entrusted with the organisation of similar events at a local level. A relevant circular had been circulated by the government of Eleftherios Venizelos of that period, which additionally suggested the construction of “commemorating works of art” which, in turn, would constitute the centre of such manifestations. One hundred years after the national restoration the Greek state will thus reactivate some symbolic elements of its cohesion (the foundation of memory sites, celebrations, memory rituals, speeches, performances, etc.)³² so as to transform the living throughout the 19th century memory of the Greek revolution into a collective memory and thus become the possession of the national community. The centre of these manifestations through which the gratitude towards the fighters of the Greek revolution in 1821 would be expressed and the achieved national progress in various domains would be revealed was the foundation or erection of monuments which would either be symbolic or would depict historic persons. Committees of celebrations and erections of monuments were formed in various areas.

The local committee of Samos decided to build a monument of symbolic nature and assigned the task of finding the ideal for the case solution to the scholar Vasilios Theophanidis. This person, after having consulted Greek and foreign archaeologists (the Great tradition) ended with a monument that would depict a lion.

The sculptors Nikos Dimitriadis, Andreas Panagiotakis and Ioannis Koulouris sent to the referee committee their proposals. The lat-

31. Robert Redfield, *The Little Community, peasant society and culture* (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

32. See Paul Connerton, *How societies remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

ter unanimously accepted Koulouris' proposal, which was then accepted by the Municipality Council of the city of Limin Vatheos Samos (Port of Vathy).



The lion was 2.5 metres high and from white marble from Penteli Mountain. It was erected on the 15th of July 1930 on a pedestal made of blue marble 2.75 metres high. On the main side of the pedestal the following inscription was engraved: TO THE 1821 FIGHTERS/SAMOS WITH GRATITUDE/1930 while on the left side: MAYOR G. D SOUTOS and on the right side: I. KOULOURIS/FROM TINOS MADE/ATHENS.³³

As soon as the above decisions were made known, the oppositional Press of the island, with the editor of the newspaper *Samos* being the leader, attacked sharply the committee and his opponent in politics Mayor of the city G. Soutos a supporter of Venizelos. He used cruel personal insults in this attack. In this sense, an issue connected to the herein highlighted terms “opposing Press” and “a “Mayor supporter of Venizelos” are set: the reasons behind the opposing persons’ reaction (editor of the aforementioned newspaper and its ideological supporters) have to do with pure political criteria, with a fanaticism against the opposite part, which motives are concealed behind the projected various arguments (historical, aesthetic, etc.). I would like to introduce a priori in this study the political motives of their actions as a likely interpretive parameter of the facts and situations that follow, the study of which, however, reveals that similar subsequent behaviours of the critics of the lion (see below) are possibly not spurred by such motives.

33. For all the above see the comprehensive study by Dora Markatou, “Τα δημόσια μνημεία στην Ελλάδα του 1930. Η περίπτωση της Σάμου και του Ηρακλείου,” in *Η Σάμος από τα Βυζαντινά χρόνια μέχρι σήμερα. Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου*, vol. 2 (Athens: “Nikolaos Dimitriou” Cultural Foundation of Samos, 1998), 299 onwards.

3. *The critique of the opposing the monument scholars. Queries and explanations*

The critique of the opposing the lion scholars and the interpretation of the symbol concluded to the following points. I discuss them under the prism of Turner's analysis³⁴ of the "level of endogenous interpretation/explanation" of symbols, and, in particular, the one connected to *manufactured/imported* symbols, in which the "anti-lion" group included the lion:

a. The decoding of a symbolic monument is difficult by the folk people

This is possibly the most powerful and convincing argument of the anti-lion group. The lion (the symbol that demands decoding) to them is incomprehensible because it does not belong to the realm of the familiar samian culture, it is irrelevant to the cultural memories of the folk people, it does not have any value for them, it does not evoke any feelings to them. This symbol has been imposed to them top-down by the Great Tradition, the national and scholarly one, which B. Theophanidis represents. I consider of crucial importance to cite his view about symbolism at this point that determined his choice: "Symbolism reveals a developed conceptualisation and it is the only medium that leads to the depiction of feelings and ideas. The impersonal and symbolic monuments speak deeply in the hearts of people because they represent a whole world. Therefore the idea of the construction of monuments dedicated to the 'Unknown Soldier' has been well embraced worldwide after the last great war."³⁵

Ortner's theory on key symbols³⁶ also facilitates the comprehension of the aforementioned argument: *key symbols* constitute the

34. Victor Turner, *The forest of symbols* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), 50-51.

35. *Ανγάλιον*, no. 1839 (8.4.1930), 1.

36. Sherry B. Ortner, "On key symbols," *American Anthropologist* 75.5 (1973): 1339.

only source from which the persons “discover, rediscover and transform their culture from generation to generation, because they belong to the public symbol system and as such they are easily recognised and elaborated by their users.” R. Brown believes that the symbols in general “make consensus possible as far as sensus of the social world is concerned, a consensus that has a fundamental contribution to the reproduction of the social class; the ‘logical’ integration is the prerequisite of the ‘ethical’ integration.”³⁷ Every society (wider or local) accepts the microcosmos of the familiar to them symbols, its members are used to them, they guide them since they embed their social values compliance is ought to.

b. Only Samians and not foreigners should have decided on the selection of the monument, therefore the Committee should have been purely “Samian”

This argument is very interesting from a folklore angle and has been verified in numerous research efforts in the Modern Greek case. The *foreigner* is generally projected in the local persons’ consciousness as the *Other* who invades with a plethora of usually manufactured qualities to conquer the local dominion. It constitutes a visible danger for the locality. It is usually considered irrelevant to the local culture and the needs of the bearer people. In this sense it is devalued and rejected by the social, cultural and economic activities. The risk that its entanglement in such activities would contribute to a more permanent presence in the future is also there. The “struggling localism”³⁸ is a diminution of the nation and its relation to the Other-coming from a different country.

37. In Pierre Bourdieu, *Γλώσσα και συμβολική εξουσία*, trans. Kiki Kapsambeli (Athens: Kardamitsa, 1999), 240.

38. I borrow this term from Efthymios Papataxiarchis, “Εισαγωγή. Τα άχθη της ετερότητας,” in *Περιπέτειες της ετερότητας. Η παραγωγή της πολιτισμικής διαφοράς στη σημερινή Ελλάδα*, ed. Efthymios Papataxiarchis (Athens: Alexandria, 2006), 36.

- c. The particular monument does not honour the Samian fighters or relate to the Lion of Cheronia since the latter expresses a fruitless battle

This is an argument of a historic character. The scholar editor interprets the symbol subjectively. Symbols are in any case unclear and part of their significance is subjective and thus subjectively interpreted, and in them the individuality along with the community/entirety are compromised; they receive a different meaning from people of various ages, education, social status or political orientation. They are transformed on the basis of systemic and personal factors.³⁹ The symbols epitomise and classify the conceptual categories of their users and orient them towards culturally acceptable activities. The symbolic knowledge is not merely knowledge of objects or words but one of memory of objects and words, representations of perception.

The editor nonetheless interprets the symbol-lion within the framework of the particular historical reading of the island of Samos. The battle of the Samian people for their incorporation in the national body (1912) possibly cannot be symbolised by the same motif/symbol that was used in a previous historical coincidence totally different from the Samian one; the Cheronia battle in Viotia signals in essence the beginning of the domination of the Greek political reality by the Macedonians for almost a century. The defeat of the federation of city-states by the Macedonian King Philippe at Cheronia sealed the end of the constitution of the city-state as such. During the period of the 4th century BC and onwards this crisis was culminated and new forms of coexistence of the city-states in wider unions were sought (sacred unions, communities, amphictyonies and federations). In this vein, using Foucault, the monument being a mnemonic landscape, constitutes *un espace autre* (ετεροτοπία), since it refers

39. Anthony Cohen, *The symbolic construction of community* (London: Routledge, 1989), 21.

to a different time to the one it wants to express and to other ideals and conceptions of the memory procedure.⁴⁰

d. The Lion expresses bragging about our ancestors and anachronism

The selected symbol is to them anachronistic and obsolete. The former criticism seems to imply and express political ideology terms (the case of modern Greeks bragging about their glorious ancestors). The latter expresses the criticsers' aesthetic preferences.

e. "it is far from the layful of the church the priests to burn incense in front of it during commemorative rituals"⁴¹

It is probably one of the weakest arguments. I remind herein that prophet Samuel is depicted in early Christian monuments (sarcophagus, cemetery paintings) been surrounded by lions. It has also been considered an emblem of the evangelist Mark,⁴² who is always depicted in one of the four bases of the domes of all churches. The story of Daniel "in the hollow of lions" symbolises God who redeems people from sin. *The Anapeson*, the icon of the painter Manouel Panselinos at the Protaton of Karyes at the Mount Athos, was inspired by Jacob's prophecy "Judas lion whelp; my son you have risen from a sprout, falling you slept as a lion and as a whelp. Who will raise him?" The lion also stands as a symbol of Jesus Christ, possibly due to its royal power and its magnificence. "Look at the lion coming from the tribe of Judas won, the root of David" (*Apocalypse* 5.5).⁴³

40. Michel Foucault, "Des espaces autres," in *Dits et écrits*, vol. II (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 1571-81. See Michel Foucault, *Ετεροτοπίες και άλλα κείμενα*, trans. T. Mpetzelos (Athens: Plethron, 2012), 255-70.

41. See *Ελλάς*, no. 1272 (12.7.1972), 4. (*Hellas*, Independent newspaper of Samos, owner-editor Kostas I. Ptinis, Samos).

42. Alberto Rizzi and Georgios Ploumidis, "Οι λέοντες του Αγίου Μάρκου," *Ηπειρωτικά Χρονικά* 36 (2002): 341-51.

43. Later, however, the animal is depicted (occasionally along with the dragon) as a symbol of the powers of Evil, the *roaring lion*, in contrast to the "good shepherd" Christ, who will liberate the faithful persons from its deadly mouth. The lion becomes thus a symbol of Devil.

Some folklore questions and some thoughts that should guide the reader deriving from the aforementioned arguments follow:

1. Can the local scholar editor be considered an expresser of the Little tradition that is the one of the people of the city? How many and who does he represent after all? His opponents as it is revealed at the apposition of their own rationale (see below) believe that his arguments have few supporters. We need to agree with their reasons on the basis of the following according to which, the monument in the course of time became the consciousness of the inhabitants of the city.

2. To what extent is the lion irrelevant and incoherent as a symbol to the (familiar, eternal, tested) symbolic system of the Samian society? Isn't it covered by a great cultural analysis, isn't it invested with familiar to the island cultural terms? Are what I refer in detail in the final section of this study totally disconnected from the Samian people? I believe that they are not.

3. How folk is the perception of the symbolism of a monument as the one of our case study? We are faced here with the issue of the theory of cultural duality which argued that the people reproduce what they accept as *gesunkenes Kulturgut* from the upper classes.⁴⁴ It goes without saying that the issue of whether the folk culture is self-existent or not has long been solved: elements from the "Great/upper" culture drop on the "lower" one and vice versa; Redfield's well known urban continuum. In our case I maintain that the prompted for the lion hegemonic discourse of the Press is what is "established" in the folk consciousness and moulds and eventually rein-

44. For relevant bibliography see Hans Naumann, *Grundziügr der deutschen Volkskunde* (Leipzig: 1922); Michael Meraklis, *Πέντε λαογραφικά δοκίμια για τη γλώσσα και την ποίηση* (Athens: Philippotis, 1985), 36; Stephanos Imellos, *Ιστορικά και μεθοδολογικά της Ελληνικής Λαογραφίας. Τεύχος Α'. Από την προδρομική φάση μέχρι την επιστημονική αυτοτέλεια* (Athens: 1995), 9, fn. 6; Manolis Varvounis, *Σύγχρονοι προσανατολισμοί της Ελληνικής Λαογραφίας* (Athens: Poreia, 1993), 15. For more bibliography see Manolis Sergis, *Εκκλησιαστικός λόγος και λαϊκός πολιτισμός τον 16^ο αιώνα: η περίπτωση του Παχωμίου Ρουσάνου*, (Thessaloniki: Kyriakidis Bros., 2008), 16-17.

forces in a top-down fashion the enriched with multiple interpretations and meanings initial symbolism of the lion (honour to the heroes of 1821).

4. *The enriched symbol and the shifts in its significance*

4.1. Signal of the city (*τοπόσημο*), part of its local identity

The monument of the lion was placed for obvious reasons on a central square of the city, the Pythagoras one as aforementioned, the one carrying the eminent name of the famous ancient Greek mathematician, philosopher. I remind here that the space constitutes the point where the social memory is projected and is socially constructed as is well known among folklorists; it is the outcome of a wide web of relations among groups of people and individuals. Just as the individual creates mnemonic spaces at a micro level of their wider personal space, the society, is demonstrating a similar characteristic, on space where it inscripts via the monuments its relation to the past.

For every city, region, or country there is a topography of memory, which depicts an hierarchy and thus “exemplifies the value of the various memories.”⁴⁵ The material monuments constitute points of orientation of memory in space; they are memory theatres,⁴⁶ real and symbolic street signs of memory. In this sense a citizen might lose his orientation for a minute if found in front of an empty space which used to be covered by a monument some time ago. Such experiences have been lived by ex-Soviet Union citizens, when the monuments of their “socialist culture memory” had been rapidly disappearing.⁴⁷ This fact confirms once more that the diachronic *damnatio memoriae* and the transfer of the political power from one group to another are interconnected and have always been expressed via the same media: burning of books, monument destruction, changes in language or imposition of another language, change of

45. Ute Schneider, “Ιστορία και κουλτούρες μνήμης,” *Ίστορι* 14 (2005): 29.

46. A term coined by R. Samuel, in Liakos, *Πώς το παρελθόν*, 110.

47. Schneider, “Ιστορία και κουλτούρες μνήμης,” 29.

place names, introduction of new calendars, etc. All these actions aim at the destruction of the memory and the past and the formation of new identities.

The lion remained in this location for forty three consecutive years and became, as described below, a familiar symbol but also a signal of the city since it was loaded with other symbolic interpretations.

First of all it gained other symbolic interpretations. The instrumental meaning of the symbols (their use and the emotional qualities connected to them) constitute to Turner important parameters. Being fluxional they can “adjust to the circumstances.”⁴⁸ It has become an inseparable part of the local identity⁴⁹ of the inhabitants of the city of Limenas. It is not only a symbol of their square (as elsewhere, e.g., an old plane tree or a fountain) but of the entire city, it has become its “trademark.” If the square⁵⁰ defines the central point around which the multitude of everyday activity of the inhabitants of the city takes place and the official time of celebrations is performed, the lion functions in this system as a signal of the city: it becomes a meeting point, a gathering point, an entertainment place, especially for children, etc. In this sense it gains in the inhabitants’ consciousness intellectual and spiritual qualities, it is personified and surveys all that happens under its gaze. As a supervisor of the everyday order and

48. Anthony Cohen, *Symbolising Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Cultures* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 9.

49. For definitions of the concept, see Maria Komninou and Efthymios Papataxiarchis, eds., *Κοινότητα, κοινωνία και ιδεολογία. Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραβίδας και η προβληματική των Κοινωνικών Επιστημών* (Athens: Papazisis, 1990), 332 onwards; Manolis Varvounis, *Εξελίξεις και μετασχηματισμοί στον Ελληνικό παραδοσιακό πολιτισμό* (s.l.: Fragmenta, 1995), 91 onwards; Vassilis Nitsiakos, *Λαογραφικά ετερόκλητα* (Athens: Odysseas, 1997), 65 onwards; Manolis Sergis, “Η ‘περιπέτεια’ μιας τοπικής ταυτότητας: πραγματικοί και συμβολικοί ανταγωνισμοί σε ένα ποντιακό χωριό της Ροδόπης (1923-1970),” in *Εύπλοια. Εόρτιος τόμος για την Δεκαετηρίδα του Τμήματος Γλώσσας Φιλολογίας και Πολιτισμού Παρευξινίων Χωρών* (Thessaloniki: Kyriakidis Bros., 2010), 252-54.

50. See Michael Meraklis, *Ελληνική Λαογραφία. Κοινωνική συγκρότηση, ήθη και έθιμα, λαϊκή τέχνη* (Athens: Kardamitsa, 2011), 35-36.

the “orderly conduct” of the celebrations it is pleased with the ceremonial atmosphere of the square “it laughs with all” the daily events, “with what is... heard strange and funny.” It contributes in other words to the cultural entrenchment... of the local society,⁵¹ it is through it that the city of Limenas is signalled. Actually every city portrays a particular way of living which is depicted on its monuments as Vassilios Aslanis maintains (in his way) in one of his articles: “the monument in our square has given to our city a characteristic form since 1930 and has turned into a distinctive mark of the city. All encyclopaedias, Greek and foreign, when they publish articles about Samos, they cite photographs of the square along with its lion. Millions of cards with the lion have been mailed to the end of the world and numerous photographs have been taken by the tourists who have kept visiting the island. A photograph of this well-known lion has been included in the recently published by the prefecture of Samos... well prepared album on the occasion of the celebration of the 150 years from the liberation of Greece. This album already adorns the libraries of the President of the government, the vice Presidents and all the Ministers, the Prefectures and Municipalities of the country and some other departments.”⁵²

Apart from similar to the above comments, our argument is supported by folk songs that were published during the period 1930-1973. Folk poetry is for Folklore a special and important “mnemonic space.” The folk poet, for instance Antonis Giokarinis published in *Grande-casa* in 1955 a long poem entitled *Pythagoras Plaza*, in which gracefully emerges its multi-dimensional social, economic, entertaining and theatrical dimension as a performance place:

*An old square full of grace – all the streets lead to it
And at all the lion laughs – which stands there in the middle.*⁵³

51. Cohen, *The symbolic construction*, 9.

52. *Ελλάς*, no. 1272 (12.7.1972), 4.

53. Antonis Giokarinis, *Απαντα. Ποήματα-πεζά-συνεντεύξεις-επιστολές*, ed. Manolis Varvounis (Athens: 1996), 205.

In another poem, on the occasion of the revival of the “wine celebrations” on the square in 1969, he wrote:

*Since it will take place⁵⁴ in the square now on
full of joy will be mentioned celebrations the marble Lion
which will laugh joyfully above the square
with all funny things and jokes that will be heard.⁵⁵*

Among the happenings included in the above mentioned celebrations, a parade of girls dressed seductively who “left none untouched” not even the lion:

*we were so aroused by the girls’ legs
that even the marble Lion⁵⁶ cast stolen glances at them,*

In the same vein at the Epiphany celebration:

*we celebrated joyfully the day before at Theophania
and when the girls’ band played
from the above the marble Lion enjoyed full of joy.⁵⁷*

The lion, therefore, enters and settles in an already structured cultural space (the square) that has not a distinct social profile (not loaded ideologically) but it is a social place of management of the spare time and the “sacred time” of people of all ages with the various performative practices of the rituals that take place there; a place of every day sociability. The monument nonetheless is not only integrated in the everyday life of people but it also provides an identity to the place that this life unfolds since it enriches and changes its

54. The celebration.

55. Giokarinis, *Απαντα*, 287.

56. *Ibid.*, 288.

57. *Ibid.*, 81.

meanings as will be shown below. Based on the aforementioned, the memory of the 1821 Greek revolution is located in the square.

4.2. Symbol of the Samian anti-Nazi resistance

The “psychic” unity between the monument/symbol and the Samian people has been further reinforced since the 1940’s when it was dressed with a wider mnemonic character. It was connected to the historic fate of the city, it was, in other words, associated to more modern aspects of the historic memory of the Samian people; it was feedbacked with new but similar historic symbolisations drawing from the modern Samian history. Since 1943 it turned into a *symbol of the resistance of the Samians against the Nazi conquerors of the island since its wounding by the bombardment of the city by the Nazis were identified with the wounds of the people who resisted to the Nazi occupation*; it commemorates as a monument the Nazi violence and remains ever since a continuous commemoration of the victims of the bloody bombardment. More specifically, I would say that it became a new mnemonic space of the Left. The scholar Aslanis writes in 1973: “the all white and plain symbolic work of art had been connected to the life of our society for 43 years and each one of us had associated it to a wealth of pleasant and even tragic memories. Its wounds from the barbarous Nazi bombardment in November 1943, have remained the only eternal commemoration of the 150 unable to fight and innocent victims.”⁵⁸ I also need to stress the fact that it was mutilated. In this way it was stigmatised. To me, this constitutes an example of the way the communicative power of a monument can be reinforced by its mutilated or plundered form.⁵⁹

58. *Ελλάς*, no. 1335 (24.12.1973), 1. From an article by Vassilis Aslanis once more.

59. See what Eleana Gialouri writes about the Acropolis in “Η δυναμική των μνημείων,” 356.

5. *The fight against the Lion continued: when the junta abolishes consecrated symbolic monuments*

The newspaper *Hellas* edited by Kostas Ptinis⁶⁰ undertook almost exclusively the defence of the lion in 1972 when the matter of its removal from the square had already become known (it thus takes the cane from *Aegeon* in 1930 for the defence of the lion). The “directing mind” behind the defence is the former notary (as he presents himself) aforementioned Vassilios Aslanis. His views on the issue ever since July 1972 are (to him) “the views of the great majority of the Samian community,”⁶¹ since the appointed by the junta municipal authority was carried away “by the opinion of a handful of citizens who have no adequate knowledge of history or aesthetics and dislike the symbolic representation of the lion on the monument.”⁶² The same person, in another article, clearly and fearlessly (the opponents of the Greek junta understand the meaning of these adverbs) discloses the *factional dimension* of the matter in 1930 and during the period 1969-1973.⁶³ The latter period is mentioned because the matter of the dismissal of the lion has been raised by the municipality with their n. 6/11th March 1969 decision according to which the lion should be dismissed from the square also ratified by the Prefecture. Therefore, to Aslanis, “none of the citizens took this information. In this way the two-month period when one could make an appeal to the court for this clear excess of power expired.”⁶⁴ The case is again defended with determined attitude by him in July 1972 when the decision of the municipal board leaked.⁶⁵ However, despite:

60. See fn. 32 in this study.

61. *Ελλάς*, no. 1274 (10.8.1972), 2.

62. *Ελλάς*, no. 1322 (8.9.1973), 1.

63. *Ελλάς*, no. 1272 (12.7.1972), 4.

64. *Ελλάς*, no. 1326 (11.10.1973), 4.

65. The Prefect of Samos in 1972 Loukas A. Fokas is taken to ignore the subject, since in response to Aslanis' article (12th of July 1972) a document signed by him was published in the newspaper *Hellas* addressing the Prefecture of Attica

- his struggle with deterring historical examples (“nowhere in our history such a dismissal of a monument is mentioned... Only after the communist hurricane has burst out... we observe this phenomenon.”),
- the fact that he brandished the law, a surely funny and ineffective argument for that “exceptionally democratic period in our country” (“our legislation, threatening with penalties, forbids any change or removal of historic monuments.”),
- the promotion of his dominant view about the “Greek Christian Culture” ([the lion is] “a symbol of the syncretism of the Greek ideology and the Christian faith; in other words it is the most perfect symbolism of the Greek Christian civilisation”),
- the evidence he provides about the political expediency in this case, which runs the risk of “contributing to the revival of the few remaining... elements of the accursed disunity of the nation”, he cannot eventually reverse the climate formed for a three-year period⁶⁶ and the Lion was dismissed miserably from its square. To the newspaper *Hellas*,⁶⁷ the Lion was removed “between the Town Hall and the church of Saint Spyridonas,” while the *Σαμιακόν Βήμα* [Samiakon Vima, edited by Michail K. Doukas]⁶⁸ mentions (with hatred) that its new position is “under the pine tree of the Town Hall where it belongs.”

The above mentioned descriptions, with an intense emotional shade, I believe, reflect the emotional loading of the majority of the citizens of the city of Limin Vatheos (Port of Vathy) since the fact

and Islands, in which he suggests that the Lion remains in the square and the “erection of the new monument in front of the to-be constructed governor’s building.” See *Ελλάς*, no. 1274 (10.8.1972), 1. Does the prefect ignore what he had signed three years before? Or isn’t the same prefect (we have not cross-checked this)? Nonetheless, when the carriage of the Lion took place at Christmas 1973 this person had been replaced by another prefect (since 20.9.1973. See *Ελλάς*, no. 1324 (25.9.1973), 1.

66. For all the above mentioned quotations see *Ελλάς*, no. 1272 (12.7.1972), 3-4.

67. *Ελλάς*, no. 1335 (24.12.1973), 1.

68. *Σαμιακόν Βήμα*, no. 2295 (22.4.1977), 1.

of the removal of the Lion coincides with (this association is gently made by Aslanis) the happy and joyful Christmas mood of those days: “the same fate as the babies of Bethlehem was kept these festive days, for the lion of our square, which has adorned with its lofty presence the monument of the 1821 fighters... for forty three years. The repulsive procedure of the depilation of the monument at Christmas time caused the love that the inhabitants of our city had for this lion to be demonstrated silently but spontaneously. They watched its cutting into pieces with inexpressible faces that nonetheless revealed a degree of wonder and surprise, and a query was timidly formed on their lips.... More surprise and psychic injury was caused to our children who for years have passed happy times in the evenings playing around the calm and dearest lion.”⁶⁹

In the same newspaper, in the regular column *Satirical Verses* the following poem entitled *The last Song of the lion of the square*, signed by The Lion, was published.⁷⁰ Most probably it is Aslanis’, if we assume that the poet “plays” with the Turkish origin of his surname (*aslan* means lion in Turkish). I believe it echoes the views and feelings of many of his co-citizens. The fact that the starting verse follows the pattern and reminds a folk song is quite interesting as well:

*Look at the time they selected, before charon takes me,
To be wrapped in green cactus grass,
So as not to see the Festival and the beautiful short skirts
Coming from Europe to burn the hearts...
For forty years I have been smiling silently to the pleiades,
Despite the ache at my croup.
Well, isn't this unfair, isn't this injustice for me,
Not to be drunk with the mini skirts and the flowers?
For those who erected me to guard them for years
Ungrateful they accept recently the scorn,
they don't grasp the envy and the heartlessness...*

69. *Ελλάς*, no. 1335 (24.12.1973), 2.

70. *Ελλάς*, no. 1180 (23.7.1970), 1.

they have an eternal Festival, a great KAVO-FONIA [Cape-Killer!]

Another dimension, a clearly satirical and caustic at some of its parts one, is attributed to the removal of the Lion by the folk poet A. Giokarinis:⁷¹

*All the burning issues have been solved indeed
And the marble lion was removed from the square
Where it has never known tranquillity
Since the then Mayor enthroned it there.
The quarrel for it has never seized
And it was harshly attacked by Doukas and Giagas
But it stood on its pedestal firmly
Since it was continually defended by a pen.
But it however did not stand this for long
And recently the Lion was removed at the Town Hall
Where it will guard the Municipality of Samos
And mainly its empty treasury.
The lion which was erected with ceremonies and a Band
It left the square and was kept aside
And that was its end – and of all these events
And (friend) Hercules has it as its companion now on!⁷²*

The “opponents” of the Lion, *Samiakon Vima* (= Michail K. Doukas) being the most important one, in an effort to provide an excuse for its removal, they repeat the criticism of 1930 without nonetheless preserving the matter for long, which is quite remarkable.⁷³ This was probably due to his feelings that his cause had been vindicated since the local political power was in the hands of adherent to his views persons (opponents of the lion) who could influence the central power which actually happened. At this point of my discussion, I

71. Giokarinis, *Άπαντα*, 118.

72. *Ibid.*, 89.

73. See, for instance, the issues of the newspaper after number 2187 of the month December 1973.

claim that the 1930 criticism was not spurred by factional reasons. At that period, El. Venizelos and the elected Mayor (supporter of Venizelos) were the target of this opposition. Now Doukas –and his followers– go together with the appointed by the junta communal authorities and the Prefecture. In this sense, there are no factional motives. Nonetheless they use the same arguments as in 1930: “The Lion, the carnivorous monster, which was unwisely put on a Sacred Monument... is finally removed to an unknown to us location.”⁷⁴

During periods of political turbulence (as was the case with the seven year Greek junta) when a new hegemony is established (Gramsci) we observe inter alia transformations mainly at the material representations of memory, the commemorating ceremonies which certainly associate to the establishment of the new ideology and the revision of the past; the novel rulers attach new interpretations to the materialism of memory with their new historical readings. In our case, the “opponents” of the Lion in 1930 simply revenged or the dictatorship regime being afraid of the association of the monument (since 1943) with the “left-wing” collective memory of the island looked to its removal, if not its complete disappearance as usually happens in such cases. (See, for instance, the removals of the communist leaders’ busts and statues in the ex-Soviet Union countries.) Most probably both are true. The erection of a monument and its removal constitute political actions with an expected huge ideological benefit for the new “new order” in power.

The empty place of the Lion was filled by a copper statue depicting a woman holding a sword, a *symbol of liberty* to its inspirers, “another monster” to the “hostile” to the Lion newspaper,⁷⁵ a view nonetheless published by Doukas after the fall of junta, in 1977!

The new monument was the aesthetic and ideological proposal of the persons who immediately associated with the junta regime; the

74. *Σαμιακόν Βήμα*, no. 2157 (8.2.1973), 1.

75. *Σαμιακόν Βήμα*, no. 2295 (22.4.1977), 1. In the issue no. 2304 (30.7.1977), 4, we read: “The statue of the woman has disappeared from the square. Was it afraid from the roaring of the lion, which will also receive wreaths and incenses? We are worth of praise oh! Lords of the Samian earth.”

local authorities appointed by the junta and the scholars and politicians who sympathised with it. The new monument was indeed a *symbol of liberty* to those who trampled upon it. It indeed referred to the Greek National Anthem, to well-known to the people conceptual and material presentations since they were drawn from its verses (the young woman/liberty, its sword). This symbol, however, turned to ridicule the regime of the time in the consciousness of the vast majority of the Samian people who quite cleverly ascribed the name “The shoddy Mary” or “Ritsa” (*Maritsa*). In this sense the monument lost completely the symbolic meaning that the political power wanted to attribute to it since, to those who know the microcosmos of the Samian society, this characterisation constituted a direct jeer *through the parody of an existing female person*, who was the subject of derisive comments on the part of the inhabitants of the small town. All the societies have their *fool* whom they invent even if s/he does not exist to feel safe. The whole issue, to our knowledge, took the form of resistance to the junta and the temporarily removed Lion was loaded with one more symbolic meaning; it turned into a symbol of the anti-junta fight of a large part of democrats of the Samian population, an island with strong “left-wing” political tradition. Its violent removal from the square was associated to the abolition of democracy in Greece since the square has always been the centre of democracy for modern Greeks; it constitutes the centre of the political dialogue, a place where political gatherings take place, new ideas are projected, political performances are staged, etc.

The monument-symbol of liberty remained in the place of the Lion during the seven-year junta.

6. *The restoration of Democracy in Greece and... the Lion in the Pythagoras Square (in 1974 and in 1977 respectively)*

V. Aslanis courageously had set the issue of the restoration of the Lion at Pythagoras square since 1973 with a “prophetic” warning to those who had removed it. He warned: “the people’s discontent is huge and the following days when the elections for the local authorities will be held the issue of the restoration of the monument will be

set again.”⁷⁶ So it happened and the matter was settled some years after the fall of junta in 1977 by the democratically elected municipal authorities of the city.

However, *Samiakon Vima* (signed by its editor) repeats the same criticism against the Lion on the occasion of its placing back on its pedestal at the square:

- a. he insists on connecting it to historical arguments (“But in which of our villages were the Samians exterminated fighting against the Lydians, the Medians, the Persians and the Turks to erect a similar to Cheronia marble lion to glorify them.”),
- b. he doubts its aesthetic value (“its legs look like the lamp-posts in our streets, a haircut and not a mane it has on its head, an open mouth and seated on its rear legs”),
- c. he speaks ironically (“why not erecting an elephant or a tiger which are more fierceful than the lion?”),
- d. he judges that this selection (“which is an insult to the Samian fighters”) “will insert sad thoughts and melancholic reflections to any well thinking Samian”.⁷⁷

On the other side of the moon, however, images and joyful feelings of the “days of 1977” are conveyed by the Athanasios Giannouloupoulos’ *Samiaki*. Its one and only issue we had in our disposal, he hosts a poem by G. Pyrgiotis framed by photographs of the gradual restoration of the statue to its previous location:⁷⁸

*To its old place the well known Lion of Samos returned
Its stone eyes saw again the green wonderful Malagari
A view deprived of it for an unknown reason by those who wished
its evil
And decided that it deserved to be put in jail, putting the blame on
it.
The poor lion smiled at them without harming them*

76. *Ελλάς*, no. 1325 (3.10.1973), 1.

77. *Σαμιακόν Βήμα*, no. 2304 (30.7.1977), 1.

78. *Σαμιακή*, no. 853 (5.8.1977), 1.

*It was not carnivorous or dangerous, never complained
 But its removal they sought and insisted on its returning to the
 jungle
 And maliciously they removed it from its pedestal almost ready to
 weep.
 But times have their ups and downs even for a lion
 And today it's back to its original place proud and happy
 And looks as if saying "I am back and have no hard feelings for
 anyone"
 I am the eternal symbol of Samos and I love all its people.*

7. The symbolism of the lion in the Greek folklore

In this last part of this study, being a member of the Great tradition myself, I abide by the view of the scientific team who undertook the task of supporting their choice in 1930. I identify with the conception of the monumental space via the symbol selected by the official national culture to develop and consolidate the dominant national collective memory. Within this framework, I explore whether the scientific group's arguments, who represent the national reading, coincide with the folklore interpretation of the symbolism of the lion. I state from the beginning that I will keep to examples from the Greek case to make known to the international readership the common – almost worldwide– elements of the symbol-animal.

The group of the lion's supporters defended the symbolic character of the monument, which, I maintain, *was familiar to the Greek audience*. What follows along with the fact that the first monument erected in the free Greek territory (at Pronoia Nauplio) contained a depiction of a lion and that, in 1930, a wealth of monuments comprising depictions of lions (e.g., at Karystos and the plans for the macedonian one which was never completed)⁷⁹ were constructed all

79. Markatou, "Τα δημόσια μνημεία," 311; Mykoniatis, "Το Μακεδονικό Ηρώο," 162-63. The first prize for the specific monument (designed by Emmanouil Lazarides) was a huge polyhedral pedestal, on top of which three lions

over Greece support my claim. The newspaper *Aegeon*, an ideological supporter of the Lion, undertook its defence with a plethora of articles and letters. From the numerous publications in the newspapers of Samos in 1930, I present below three quotations that assist my argumentation:

- a. “All cultures have their own symbolisms on which their entire history is summarised. For the construction the monument here the lion was selected as a symbol of faith and bravery.... By constructing such a monument symbolising the faith and bravery of the liberators in 1821 the ought-to honour and devoutness is demonstrated to all those who fought the great and sacred battle.”⁸⁰
- b. “The lion, this symbol of the fearless bravery and determination, the vigilant guard was erected then there... to state and proclaim that here once upon a time, when the Conqueror intended to enslave the free homeland, all the Greeks, united and fierce in front of the barbarian crowd they fought and fell to show that there is no higher and nobler sentiment than that of patriotism.”⁸¹
- c. “The placement of lions on the tombs... is undoubtedly a symbol of the bravery of the fighters.”⁸²

were put crowned by a winged Victory. The lions symbolised the three war periods of Macedonia (1903-1908, 1912-1913, 1914-1918). The third prize (by Kimon Laskaris) also included a lion.

80. *Αργαίον*, no. 1839 (8.4.1930), 1.

81. From an article by V. Theophanidis in *Αργαίον*, no. 1843 (19.4.1930), 1. See also *Ελλάς*, no. 1349 (13.4.1974), 1-3, at the column *Ημέρες του 1930*.

82. From an article by the archeologist Antonios Keramopoulos, a Professor and member of the Greek Academy, which was a reply to a letter by the Mayor G. Soutos (who asked for his opinion), in *Αργαίον*, no. 1862 (27.6.1930), 1. In the same issue we read P. Kastriotis (archeologist and Head of the National, Archeological Museum) and A. Sóchos (Professor of the Polytechnic University of Greece). I owe acknowledgements to Mr. Christos Landros (Head of the National Archives–Historic Archive of Samos) for his willingness to facilitate my study.

The lion therefore is a “sign” of *bravery, strength, determination, vigour, courage*, to its supporters, a view abiding by what the History and the Folklore maintain on this issue. This is testified by the presence of the lion on various monuments of the Greek art as a symbolic complement/jewel of a tomb or cenotaph usually dedicated to many men. The Greek art managed to attribute a high expression to the emblem of the lion and turned it into a symbol of heroic courage and strength. The tomb of Leonidas (and the dead Spartans) with Simonides’ inscription (“Θηρών μεν κράτιστος εγώ/θνητών δ’ ον εγώ νυν/φρουρώ, τω δε τάφω, λάενοσ/εμβεβαώσ”), the lion at Cheronia, the lion formerly standing at the entrance of the port of Peireas and now in Venice, the golden lions of the hearse carriage of Alexander the Great, the lion of Amphipolis, of Kea, of Naxos, etc.,⁸³ are but a few of such examples.

The Homeric tradition about the lion (to pass to the realm of the folk creation) is rich; it is mentioned 39 times in the *Iliad*, 12 in *Odyssey* and as *λις* three times.⁸⁴ This tradition, other ancient Greek myths (e.g., the myth of Alkathoos son of Pelopa who receives as an exchange the throne of Megareon and their princess),⁸⁵ the middle ages songs of Digenis who fought against the lions,⁸⁶ etc., influenced

83. For all the above, see Eythimios Kastorhis, “Περί του εν Χαιρωνεία λέοντος,” *Αθήναιον* 8 (1879): 501-03; Haris Koutelakis, *Το Πόρτο-Λεόνε. Ο Λέων του Πειραιώς. Η απαγωγή του στη Βενετία και τα προβλήματα που σχετίζονται με το μνημείο και τη χρονολόγησή του* (Piraeus: 2000).

84. Ioannis Giagias, *Λεοντάρι. Το αιμοβόρικο και δειλό θηριό. Πώς το χαρακτηρίζει ο Ομηρος* (Karlovasi, Samos: 1973), 2. I owe acknowledgements to Manolis Varvounis (Professor at the Democritus University of Thrace) for his kindness to let me know about this study along with a corpus of “journalistic material” from the archive of Vass. Aslanis, which he has in his possession and is related to the “adventures” of the Lion of Samos in 1973.

85. See Minas Al. Alexiadis, “Οι Ελληνικές παραλλαγές για τον δρακοντοκτόνο ήρωα (Aarne–Thompson 300, 301A και 301B). Παραμυθολογική μελέτη,” PhD dissertation, University of Ioannina, 1982, 53.

86. See, for instance, the labours of Digenis in Nikolaos G. Politis, “Ο θάνατος του Διγενή,” *Λαογραφικά Σύμμεικτα* 4 (1980): 98, 107; idem, “Η σελήνη κατά τους μύθους και τας δοξασίας του Ελληνικού λαού,” *Λαογραφικά Σύμμεικτα* 3 (1931): 207. Here the hero, in his effort to get back his wife fears three monsters as his possible opponents, the dragon, the lion and Avritis River.

immensely the folk poets and the rest of the people. Even if someone claimed that the folk poet tends to ignore matters and motifs that are not clearly connected to his immediate perception, we could nonetheless presume that due to this detachment of the poet from the symbol, the latter gained a powerful position in the folk consciousness. The “remote” and the “exotic” enrich the imagination. In the course of centuries with the oral (in the beginning) and the written (later) tradition of the myths, the historic events, the legends, the middle ages and more recent songs, etc., its symbolic power gained even wider “folk” power. Such indicative examples from the Greek folk songs that support the symbolism of the lion as a sign of bravery, strength and courage follow:

*Tell me, have you seen where Mbroufas fights,
Who has steel feet and a lion heart*

*Miserable man, you are born as a mouse,
you become like a lion, like the dew you are spoilt,*

*we have not found guerrilla fighters, we found lions*⁸⁷

*I had a lion heart but it broke because of you
Oh I wish your mother...*

*I could not see you Mount Olympus, you lion,
Who rain in May and hail in summer*

*Like the roe-deer he throws the stones in the stream
And with a lion anger he uses his sword*

*Go to the war and fight like a lion
Along with all your co-fighters, along with all your army leaders.*⁸⁸

87. The guerillas are likened to lions.

88. All the above examples come from the Archive of the Historical Lexicon of the Academy of Athens.

This symbolism of the lion is further supported by its presence in the every day folk vocabulary, the surnames or the funny names attributed to people, in proverbs (“it is better to be eaten by a lion than hide in the fox’s shade”),⁸⁹ in *similes* (we already mentioned some of them), in derivative verbs synonyms of bravery, in magnifying folk compounds (*lionchild*, *liondog*, *lionfight*, etc.),⁹⁰ even in texts found in dream-books (“if you see a lion in your dream you will hardly win a battle,”⁹¹ “if you see a lion coming in your dream then this means a great enemy”).⁹² The same plethora of names is observed with the more “folk” version of its name, namely the word *aslani* (= lion) (“he is as healthy as an aslani”). It is used to address young men and women (“my aslana!”), it is used metaphorically for good looking and strong young men or animals (“his patron fed it well and made it aslani”). In Aristophanes’ comedy *Thesmophoriazouses* the new-born child is called lion (verse 514) as in modern Greek as well,⁹³ which is similar to the modern Greek *dragon*, wishing thus the child to grow brave and courageous; the protection of the child via the magic use of the name⁹⁴ since the strength and vigour of the lion is expected to have a positive impact on the new born baby which is identified with the carrier of the name.⁹⁵ The proverb

89. The appeal to the feeble ones is useless but to the strong ones...

90. See Aggelos Afroudakis, “Μια περίπτωση μεγεθυντικής/υποκοριστικής σύνθεσης στα νεοελληνικά ιδιώματα,” *Λεξικογραφικόν Δελτίον* 19 (1995): 29.

91. Fr. Drexl, “Das traumbuch des patriarchen Germanos,” *Λαογραφία* 7 (1923): 440, verse 125.

92. Fr. Drexl, “Das anonyme traumbuch des cod. Paris Gr. 2511,” *Λαογραφία* 8 (1925): 362.

93. Nikolaos G. Politis, *Λαογραφικά Σύμμεικτα Γ* (Athens: 1931), 211, fn. 2.

94. Dimitrios D. Oikonomidis, “Όνομα και ονοματοθεσία εις τας δοξασίας και συνηθείας του Ελληνικού λαού,” *Λαογραφία* 20 (1962): passim. Antonis Georgoulas, *Αφανείς διαδρομές. Διαφοροποίηση, ταυτότητα, ονοματοθεσία* (Athens: Gutenberg, 1997), passim.

95. See indicatively Nikolaos G. Politis, “Παρατηρήσεις εις τα Σωζοπολιτικά παραμύθια,” *Λαογραφικά Σύμμεικτα* 4 (1980): 319-20; Stilpon Kyriakidis, *Ελληνική Λαογραφία. Μέρος Α'. Μνημεία του λόγου*, 2nd ed. (Athens: Academy of

“it is better to be devoured by an *aslani* than by a jackal” (a brave death is preferable to a ridiculous one)⁹⁶ reveals the respect that the folk people had for the animal.

There are also some cases in the folk songs when the lion (*aslani*) is identified with other “imaginary animals” (a dragon or a monster). The substitution of the monster, for instance, in the dragon-killing episodes with other monstrous apparitions the lion included,⁹⁷ the narration of certain folk tales (“a huge lion came...”), the image of the ancient Greek dragon in the modern Greek consciousness,⁹⁸ folk verses (as the ones that follow) provide sound evidence for the aforementioned arguments. In this vein, it does not incarnate only the strength (to which we herein refer to) but also brutality, wickedness, aggressiveness, maniac chase, etc.⁹⁹

*I filled in seven fathoms with noses and tongues
The tongues were in the dragons and the noses on the lions*¹⁰⁰

*Neither a bird rose nor a swallow
Neither the dragon's bowshot, nor the lion's stone*

*Her way was cut by a dragon.*¹⁰¹

The lion is also a symbol of a vigilant guard of cities and dissuasion of any enemy attack against those whom it guards. The Gate of

Athens, 1965²), 353; Oikonomidis, “Όνομα και ονοματοθεσία,” 447 onwards; Sergis, *Εκκλησιαστικός λόγος*, in the entry *όνομα*, where all the remaining modern (international as well) bibliography.

96. For more relevant examples see *Ιστορικό λεξικό της νέας ελληνικής της τε κοινώς ομιλουμένης και των ιδιωμάτων*, vol. 3 (1942), 187, in the entry *ασλάνι*.

97. Alexiadis, “Όι Ελληνικές παραλλαγές,” 44, 45.

98. See indicatively Nikolaos G. Politis, *Μελέτη επί του βίου των νεωτέρων Ελλήνων. Νεοελληνική Μυθολογία*, vol. 1 (Athens: 1871), 154 onwards.

99. See, for instance, Alexiadis, “Όι Ελληνικές παραλλαγές,” 45, 109, 127.

100. Christos Pantelidis, “Κυπριακά άσματα,” *Λαογραφία* 6 (1918): 586.

101. These examples also come from The Archive of the Historical Lexicon.

the Acropolis of Mycenae is guarded by two lions as is the case with Nineveh, the Sion of the Old Testament, Hattousa of the ancient Hittites. The same meaning can be attributed to the presence of lions in front of temples, at the entrance gates of early Christian churches but also of the cathedrals of the western countries (e.g., Ferrara 1140 AD) or on both sides of the bishop thrones.¹⁰² Furthermore, due to the well-known solar character of the symbol,¹⁰³ and the justice being one of the main functions of the royal institution, the thrones of kings-sovereigns were adorned with lions during the middle age period while the ecclesiastical justice was attributed among stone lions that bordered some temples.¹⁰⁴

Since the central entrance to the house, as a liminal point, determines the transition to the private space from the outer one, the modern Greeks' tendency to depict a lion at the entrance of their residence is quite characteristic.

In addition to its symbolism as a guard, the lion is also a *fountain guard*, as the one that Polydefkis saw on a fountain in Athens.¹⁰⁵ The major role of the fountains in the folk community life and its transformation to a centre of dozens of rituals, the faith in demons and fairies, spirits and "ghosts" that were hosted in the waters, the appeasing offers and the relevant traditions created are numerous.¹⁰⁶ In

102. In Efthymios Kastorchis, "Περί του εν Χαίρωνεία λέοντος," *Αθήναιον* 8 (1879): 505.

103. Jane Cooper, *Λεξικό συμβόλων*, trans. Andreas Tsakalis (Athens: Pyrinos Kosmos, s.a.), 62.

104. *Ibid.*

105. In Kastorchis, "Περί του εν Χαίρωνεία λέοντος," 503, where one can find more relevant ancient Greek testimonies and lexicographic references.

106. See indicatively Nikolaos G. Politis, "Τα δημόδη Ελληνικά άσματα περί δρακοντοκτονίας του αγίου Γεωργίου," *Λαογραφικά Σύμμεικτα* 4 (1980): 113, 210 onwards; Georgios G. Megas, *Ελληνικαί εορταί και έθιμα λαϊκής λατρείας* (Athens: 1956), 54, 69, 70; Alexiadis, "Οι Ελληνικές παραλλαγές" (see in specific the entries *λιοντάρια*, in the General Index: 179); Nitsiakos, *Λαογραφικά ετερόκλητα*, 55 onwards.

these lion-faced spouts¹⁰⁷ the lion is not the water holder, which is killed by the ancient Greek Kadmos or the Christian Saint George,¹⁰⁸ or the monster (ghost-dragon)¹⁰⁹ to whom the father-king of the Greek folk songs unwillingly hands his daughter as a gift to make him release the water of the well:

*Immediately he ordered her to be adorned as a bride,
to stand by the lion as a gift for it to dine.¹¹⁰*

it is, on the contrary, the guard of the water; it keeps it safe from the malicious powers that would probably hold the most precious good for life. The “appeased” monster functions in an almost homeopathic way and has eventually turned from victimiser to a guard and protector. It is thus met as a dominant symbol, after the cross,¹¹¹ on springs of water and fountains.¹¹²

The lion is used by the political rule as a *symbol of power and imposition*. In the ancient Greek civilisation it was connected to the power of rule since the late era of copper (1600-1100 BC) with the classic example of the aforementioned Gate of Lions at Mycenae. The hide of the lion of Nemea (met at the labours of Hercules) became one of the most representative symbols of the mythic hero and later of the king of Macedonia as depicted in the picture of Alexander the Great below.

107. See Adamantios Adamantiou, “Αγνείας πείρα. Μέρος Γ’ Λαογραφικόν,” *Λαογραφία* 3 (1911-12): 437 and in specific fn. 4.

108. *Ibid.*, 437-38. The motif appears many times. See indicatively Politis, “Τα δημώδη Ελληνικά άσματα,” 189; Alexiadis, “Οι Ελληνικές παραλλαγές,” 179.

109. A wide-spread motif. See Politis, “Τα δημώδη Ελληνικά άσματα,” 189. Alexiadis, “Οι Ελληνικές παραλλαγές,” 44, 45.

110. Politis, “Τα δημώδη Ελληνικά άσματα,” 230, song 30, verses 16-17. See also verse 25. This is another example of the substitution of the monster by a lion.

111. Anna Papamihail–Koutroumba, “Ο σταυρός στους διάφορους κλάδους του ελληνικού εθιμικού δικαίου,” *Επετηρίς του Κέντρου Ερεύνης της Ελληνικής Λαογραφίας* 26-27 (1990), 188, Index, entry *βρύση, βρύσες*.

112. Lefteris Bardakos and Alexis Totsikas, *Κρήνες* (Athens: Odysseas, 1989), 53-55. For relevant photographs see the cover page of the book and pages 28, 49, 50, 52, 53, 57, 58, 74, 89, 94, 95, 114.



During the middle ages of Hellenism we have the remarkable tradition of the golden plane tree,¹¹³ which was constructed by the emperor Leon and destroyed by his son Michael C: “sparrows seated on its branches were made to sing by a machine, and...”¹¹⁴ Nikolaos Politis rightly maintains that “all this was necessary to impress the nations,”¹¹⁵ they constituted manifestations of a glorious luxury and rituals clearly selected for political reasons to exert imposition and demonstrate the superiority to the foreign visitors. The central part of this formidable construction was the lion. During the Venetian occupation the winged-lion made its appearance in most fortifications held by the Venetians.¹¹⁶ “German lions” are also depicted on the royal coat of arms of the first King of Greeks Otto. Nowadays it can be seen on many escutcheons, coat of arms, and elsewhere as in almost all peoples.

113. See Dimitrios D. Oikonomidis, “Χρονογράφου του Δωροθέου τα Λαογραφικά,” *Λαογραφία* 19 (1960-61), 17-18 for all the text of the tradition.

114. These are the views of Michael Glykas, in Oikonomidis, “Χρονογράφου του Δωροθέου,” 52, 53.

115. Nikolaos G. Politis, “Βυζαντιναί παραδόσεις,” *Λαογραφία* 6 (1918): 357. See Micheal Meraklis, *Λαογραφικά ζητήματα* (Athens: Μπουρας, 1989), 235-36.

116. Rizzi and Ploumidis, “Οι λέοντες του Αγίου Μάρκου,” 341-51.

Concluding remarks

The various decodings of symbols that are not connected a priori strongly with values and the cultural past of a society sometimes leads to disagreements. A symbolic monument being a polyphonic, mnemonic space becomes the field upon which conflicting interpretations of the collective memory, aesthetic views and ideologisms are projected.

Even if we abide by the view that the imposed by the Great Tradition symbol of the lion was not compatible with the cultural capital of the Samian people, it nonetheless included a “transferable capital” since the people converted the *foreign* and *the complex* to *familiar* and attributed to it acquired functions, they shifted its significance using material from the historical and social circumstances and created a common framework for the interpretation of the present. The symbolic values that the particular monument acquired and embedded in specific historical and social coincidences further support the view that the symbols are social representations, polysemous, subject to shifts in meaning and carrying many condensed conceptions.