

Balkan Studies

Volume 52, 2017

ADVISORY BOARD

Chairman: Prof. Emer. I. Tsekouras
Members: Prof. P. Naskou-Perraki
Prof. Th. Dardavessis
Prof. Emer. G. Nakos
Prof. D. Ginoglou
K. Plastiras, Dr of Philology
Assist. Prof. El. Manta

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief: Assist. Prof. El. Manta
Members: Prof. K. Kentrotis
Prof. Il. Kouskouvelis

PUBLICATION
OF THE INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES
(ΙΔΡΥΜΑ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ ΧΕΡΣΟΝΗΣΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΜΟΥ)
P.O. BOX 50932, GR 54014 THESSALONIKI, GREECE

- Published once a year under the auspices of the Institute.
- Books for review should be sent in two copies.

Cover designed by †Karel Čížek

© Copyright 2017
by the *Institute for Balkan Studies*
31A, M. Alexandrou Str., GR 54641 Thessaloniki
All rights reserved

GR ISSN 0005-4313

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

<i>MAGDALENA ELCHINOVA</i> , Demographic Trends among the Orthodox Bulgarians of Istanbul	5-20
---	------

<i>IOANNIS S. CHALKOS</i> , The 1912 Ottoman elections and the Greeks in the Vilayet of Adrianople: A view from the Greek Archives.	21-42
---	-------

<i>BULENT GOKAY – DARRELL WHITMAN</i> , NO RACISM HERE: Modern Turkey and the question of race and national identity	43-60
--	-------

<i>KATERINA NIKOLAOU</i> , Byzantium and Byzantine women in the mid-twentieth century Greek “Classics Illustrated” comic books	61-84
--	-------

<i>SPYRIDON PLAKOUDAS</i> , The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Security and Stability of the Balkans	85-98
--	-------

<i>GEORGIOS TSOTSOS – ELENI GAVRA</i> , An approach to the Route network of Asia Minor in early 20 th century	99-116
--	--------

<i>JEAN-LUC ARNAUD</i> , Topographie de l’Europe centrale et des Balkans à la fin du XIX ^e siècle, une source méconnue	117-138
---	---------

<i>MANOLIS G. VARVOUNIS – NIKOS RODOSTHENOUS</i> , Religious Traditions of Mount Athos on Miraculous Icons of Panagia (The Mother of God)	139-150
---	---------

<i>BOOK REVIEWS</i>	151-156
---------------------	---------

<i>ABSTRACTS</i>	157-160
------------------	---------

Magdalena Elchinova*

Demographic Trends among the Orthodox Bulgarians of Istanbul

Introduction

The decline of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, followed by the emergence of the Balkan nation-states brought about sharpening nationalistic claims over the European territories of the Empire. The ultimate outcome was the partition of these territories among several states and the ethnic unmixing¹ of their populations, achieved through measures such as assimilation, migration, displacement, exchange of populations, etc. The article deals with the small community of Orthodox Bulgarians of Istanbul, formed as a result of the processes and policies that took place in that epoch.

The migration of Bulgarians to the Ottoman capital city started in the 17th–18th centuries; however it was not before the second half of the 19th century when a sizeable Bulgarian colony emerged in Istanbul.² The colony consisted of craftsmen, traders, intellectuals, as well as a few wealthy people with influence on the Sublime Porte. With its estimated number of no less than 40,000 people, the Bulgarian colony in Istanbul was bigger than any other Bulgarian town at the time being that is why Istanbul is often defined as the largest Bulgarian city of the 19th century.³ As their number got bigger, the Bulgarians in Istanbul became better organized and more socially active – they founded Bulgarian schools, churches, a culture club, and charitable organizations, published newspapers, journals and other literature. In the second half of the 19th century, Istanbul stood out as one of the centers of the Bulgarian movement for national liberation, particularly of the struggle for an independent Bulgarian church, the climax of which was the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870. The Exarchate remained seated in Istanbul until 1913, long after the establishment of the Bulgarian nation-state in 1878. The idea of Exarch Josef II was to preserve its influence in the regions of Thrace and Macedonia, still under Ottoman rule. With its substantial clerical and

* New Bulgarian University, Sofia

¹ Rogers, Brubaker, "The Aftermath of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples." In *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, eds. Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997).

² Barbara, Jelavich, *History of the Balkans XVIII-XIX cc*, Volume I, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1983), 191, 344; Toncho, Zhechev, *B'lgarskiyat Velikden ili strastite b'lgarski* [*Bulgarian Resurrection or the passions of the Bulgarians*], (Sofia: BAS Publishing House, 1995).

³ Toncho, Zhechev, *B'lgarski svetini v Istanbul (Tsarigrad)* [*Bulgarian Sacred Places in Istanbul (Tsarigrad)*], (Sofia: Balkani, 2002), 7.

educational activity,⁴ the Exarchate was the consolidating center of the Bulgarians in Istanbul, Macedonia and Thrace. This religious institution had a political agenda, too. It played an important role in the construction of Bulgarian national identity among the members of its diocese. With this, it entered into direct confrontation with the Constantinople Patriarchate over the spiritual and political dominance in Macedonia and Thrace. In Istanbul, the Exarchate left a considerable material heritage, a small part of which had been preserved until today, including St Stephen church and the Convent at the shore of the Golden Horn, the Exarchate House with St Ivan Rilski chapel in the Şişli neighborhood, the Bulgarian cemetery with St Dimitar church in the adjacent quarter of Feriköy.⁵ All these were a property of the Bulgarian religious community in Istanbul which in 1875 established the Bulgarian Exarchate Foundation in Istanbul (*Bulgar ekzarhlığı ortodoks kilisesi vakfı Istanbul*) in order to take care of them.

After the establishment of the Principality, later Kingdom of Bulgaria, the bigger part of Bulgarians in the Ottoman capital city headed back to their newly liberated places of origin. Only those who came from Macedonia and Thrace remained, because these regions were still part of the Empire. In the following decades new migrants from the same regions settled in Istanbul. They left for the big city driven by various reasons, economic and political alike, with the latter taking prevalence in the early 20th century. Migration was particularly intense in the aftermath of the Ilinden uprising in 1903, the Second Balkan War in 1913 and WWI. Consequently, within a relatively short span of time the Bulgarian colony in Istanbul underwent serious transformations – the number of its members significantly decreased and the bulk of them consisted of re-settlers who came from villages in the Aegean part of Macedonia.⁶

As of today, the Bulgarians of Istanbul do not exceed 450 people. According to their own estimates, over 90% of them are descendants of re-settlers from Aegean Macedonia (mostly from villages near Kastoria, or *Kostur* in the vernacular). The rest are individuals who trace back their origins to Eastern Thrace or Vardar Macedonia. Their community is highly organized and unified, and the Foundation (as I further call it for brevity), which represents it before the central and local authorities in Bulgaria

⁴ See for details: Toncho, Zhechev, *B'lgarskiyat Velikden ili strastite b'lgarski*; Voin, Bozhinov, *B'lgarskata prosveta v Makedoniya i Odrinska Trakiya. 1873-1913* [*The Bulgarian Enlightenment in Macedonia and Edirne Thrace. 1873-1913*], (Sofia: BAS Publishing House, 1982); Zina, Markova, *B'lgarskata ekzarhiya 1870-1879* [*The Bulgarian Exarchate 1870-1879*], (Sofia: BAS Publishing House, 1989).

⁵ About the Bulgarian sites in Istanbul see Hristo, Temelski, *B'lgarskata svetinya na Zlatniya rog* [*The Bulgarian Sanctuary at the Golden Horn*], (Sofia: Bulgarian Orthodox Church St Stefan in Istanbul, 2005); Hristo, Hristov, *B'lgarskite pametnitsi v Istanbul* [*Bulgarian Monuments in Istanbul*], (Istanbul, 2009); Toncho, Zhechev, *B'lgarskiyat Velikden...*

⁶ By 1958, the total number of Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul has been 1218; 69% of them came from Aegean Macedonia, 18% came from Vardar Macedonia, 6% came from Eastern Thrace, and another 6% came from Bulgaria, see Darina, Petrova, *Tsarigradskite b'lgari* [*Tsarigrad Bulgarians*], (Sofia: IMIR, 2000), 122.

and Turkey, arranges for a variety of its social and cultural activities.⁷ The habitual scene of their collective events is the above-mentioned Exarchate sites. The Istanbulites today are in close relations with both the Patriarchates in Sofia and in Istanbul.

Bulgarians of Istanbul are little known among the Bulgarian and Turkish societies. Only the local authorities in Istanbul with whom they regularly cooperate in their efforts to maintain their vakif properties recognize them as “the Bulgarian commune” (*Bulgar cemāti*); Turkish authorities in general treat them as non-Muslims. Their relations with the Bulgarian central authorities have been very fragile in the course of time. Until the end of WWII the Bulgarian state has supported the co-ethnics in Istanbul, providing textbooks for the Bulgarian schools in the city, as well as newspapers and other literature. The communist regime however which saw Turkey as one of its major ideological opponents has cut off all contacts with the community in Istanbul. After 1990, these contacts have been renewed and intensified. Bulgarian officials frequently exchange visits with the Foundation’s representatives. The Foundation has also been receiving financial and other support by the Bulgarian state. In recent years, the Istanbul-based Bulgarian community has been sporadically mentioned in Bulgarian media on various occasions. Istanbul Bulgarians have scarcely attracted scholars’ attention. The first detailed study combining methods of historiography and ethnography has been conducted during the second half of the 1990s.⁸ Between 2010 and 2013, together with a few anthropology students from the New Bulgarian University in Sofia under my supervision, I accomplished an anthropological study of the community, the results of which are discussed in a number of publications.⁹ Hereafter, I present part of my observations on the demographic processes characteristic of the community, as well as on other related social, political and cultural features. In particular, I analyze the reasons for the decreasing number of Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul, the ageing of the community, the steady emigration attitude among its younger members, as well as the impact of cross-marriage.

Factors Underlying Demographic Processes

The major demographic trends that characterize the existing community of Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul include the steady decline of their number, their rising average age, low birth rates, and widespread emigration. Inasmuch as demo-

⁷ See for details: Magdalena, Elchinova, “Memory, Heritage and Ethnicity. Constructing Identity among Istanbul-based Orthodox Bulgarians.” *Ethnologia Europea, Journal of European Ethnology*, 64:1, 2016, 99-113.

⁸ Petrova, *Tsarigradskite b'lgari*.

⁹ Magdalena, Elchinova, “Memory, Heritage and Ethnicity. Constructing Identity among Istanbul-based Orthodox Bulgarians.”; Magdalena, Elchinova, “Regards bulgares sur Istanbul,” *Anatoli*, № 7, dossier thématique Istanbul, capitale régionale et ville-monde, (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2016a), 269-292; Magdalena, Elchinova, *Nevidimata obshnost: pravoslavnite b'lgari v Istanbul [The Invisible Community: Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul]*, (Sofia: NBU, 2017)

graphic developments are influenced by various social, political, economic and cultural factors, I am going to briefly outline some important aspects of the formative sociocultural context of the Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul before proceeding with the discussion of concrete demographic indicators of their community. I am starting with migration which is the major driving force of the very formation of the community in discussion, as well as of its subsequent transformations. On the one hand, migration is a basic demographic indicator which, together with the number of births and deaths, shapes population growth. In the case of the Bulgarian Istanbulites, migration (especially emigration) accounts for the above-mentioned demographic characteristics of their community. On the other hand, migration is a complex social phenomenon, determined by a plethora of motives, such as global or local conflicts, national policies, economic conditions, social differentiation, cultural diversity, racism and so on and so forth. The present-day Bulgarian community in Istanbul has been formed as a result of continuous inbound and outbound migrations in the late 19th–early 20th century. After the establishment of the Turkish nation-state in 1923, migration from the region of Macedonia has ceased, whereas this from Eastern Thrace, which is within the boundaries of Turkey, has continued, though on a very limited scale.¹⁰ By the 1950s, the immigration of Bulgarians to Istanbul had practically stopped, which however did not affect the emigration. The largest emigration waves had taken place after WWI when 5,000 Bulgarians left Istanbul; proceeded in the 1930s, when another some 1,000 left after the implementation of the Turkish laws that limited the spheres for professional realization for non-Muslims;¹¹ after WWII, especially in the 1960s and the 1970s Bulgarians continued to leave Istanbul, this time heading mostly to the USA, Canada, and Australia. Today, many young Bulgarian Istanbulites study abroad, at Western-European or North-American universities. Upon graduation, part of them do not return to their home city because of the supposedly better professional opportunities and higher living standards they enjoy in the West. Due to the multidirectional nature of the migrations of Bulgarians from the region of Macedonia throughout the 20th century, now virtually each Bulgarian family in Istanbul has relatives in Bulgaria, the US, and Canada, some having kin also in Australia and Greece. Having close relatives abroad, especially in the West, may play the role of a pull factor for further emigration.

The shifting borders in the Balkans in the early twentieth century have re-categorized the Bulgarian re-settlers in Istanbul from internal to international migrants. Consequently, from subjects of the Sultan, part of the *rum millet*, they have become an

¹⁰ Very few Christian Bulgarians have remained in these regions after the ethnic cleansing undertaken by the Ottomans in 1913. About the exodus of the Bulgarians from Eastern Thrace which has affected as many as 300,000 people, many of whom lost their lives, and the rest found refuge in Bulgaria, see in Lyubomir, Miletich, *Razorenieto na trakiyskite b'lgari prez 1913 g.* [*The Devastation of the Thracian Bulgarians in 1913*], (Sofia: D'rzhavna pechatnitsa, 1918). The few Bulgarians who remained after the exodus in Edirne and Kırklareli (*Lozengrad* in the vernacular) have afterwards left for Istanbul to merge with the larger Bulgarian community there.

¹¹ Petrova, *Tsarigradskite...*, 119. The major destination of these earlier emigrants was Bulgaria. The communist regime which ruled the country between 1944 and 1989 put an end of this migration. Today, Bulgaria does not attract migrants from among the Istanbul-based Bulgarians.

ethnoreligious minority in Turkey, one which is not even officially recognized. Turkish authorities have adopted the clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne from 1923 regarding minorities. According to them, only Greeks, Armenians and Jews, or the largest non-Muslim groups in the country, are acknowledged as minorities.¹² These are the only ethnic groups mentioned by official statistics in Turkey. For the same reason Bulgarians in Turkey are not counted by the Bulgarian state, either. There is statistical data about them from the Ottoman period. The Bulgarian Exarchate has been particularly meticulous in keeping records about the members of its parishes. After it moved to Sofia, the Bulgarian state kept records only of the Bulgarian citizens on Turkish territory. Citizenship however is a variable (the same individuals and their descendants can change their citizenship in time due to various reasons) and it cannot be a reliable indicator about the total number of people born and living in Istanbul who define themselves as ethnic Bulgarians and East-Orthodox Christians.¹³ Here I will only touch upon the dynamic relation between ethnicity and citizenship. Originally, the Bulgarians in Istanbul were Ottoman subjects. During WWI in which Bulgaria and the Empire were allies the men from the community in Istanbul got the right to join the Bulgarian army. After the end of the war, they returned to their homes with Bulgarian passports for themselves and for their family members. After the introduction of Turkish laws that were quite unfavorable to foreigners,¹⁴ many of these Bulgarian citizens changed their citizenship. For many years, the members of the Bulgarian community in Istanbul have been of mixed citizenship – not only within the community but within the family, too. The dominant trend however has been towards increasing the number of the Turkish citizens in the community. It has particularly accelerated after WWII as a result of the ideological rivalry between Bulgaria and Turkey. In addition, in the 1950s an amendment in the Turkish citizenship law has stipulated that children born in Turkey automatically become Turkish citizens. At present, the vast majority of Bulgarian Istanbulites are Turkish citizens. When in 1990 the Turkish state allowed dual citizenship to the 1989 re-settlers from Bulgaria, Istanbul-born Orthodox Bulgarians also got such an opportunity. It became particularly appealing after Bulgari-

¹² Alexis, Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*. (Athens: Center of Asia Minor Studies, 1983), 77-104, 320-323.

¹³ It should be specified that there are several categories of Bulgarians currently living in Istanbul. The most numerous among them are the Bulgarian-born Turks, re-settlers in Turkey since 1989. Most of them, as well as their descendants born in Turkey, hold dual citizenship – Bulgarian and Turkish. There is no official statistics about their number either (see Ayse, Parla, "Irregular Workers of Ethnic Kin? Post 1990s Labour Migration from Bulgaria to Turkey," *International Migration* Vol. 45 (3), 2007, 156-181) but those living in Istanbul are at least a hundred times more than the native Orthodox Bulgarians. There are also a number of Bulgarian citizens who live and work in Istanbul – employees of international companies, of the Bulgarian Consulate in the city, university lecturers, etc. In the second half of the 1990s, according to D. Petrova they were between 2000 and 3000 (Petrova, *Tsarigradskite...*). The members of the Bulgarian Orthodox community in Istanbul differentiate from both of these groups.

¹⁴ Soner, Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); Alexandris, *The Greek Minority...*

ia joined the EU in 2007. The first community members who applied for Bulgarian passports however soon found out that the bureaucratic procedures were too clumsy and often resulted in rejection of their applications. That is why today the number of Bulgarian citizens among the community members remains small. Mostly businessmen who benefit from the EU citizenship are willing to undertake the precarious step to apply for Bulgarian citizenship. Alternatively, some of them apply for Greek passports which are said to be much more easily obtained.¹⁵

The reasons for the dominant demographic trends among the Istanbul Bulgarians are multifarious. On the one hand, it is important to view this specific group against the background of the demographic processes characterizing Istanbul's population at large, in order to see how and to what extent the general political, economic and sociocultural factors in a specific period have influenced this particular group. On the other hand, it is undoubtedly essential to take into account the impact of the official Turkish politics towards the non-Muslim minorities in the country. Even though these policies vary in time, for long periods they have been restrictive, hostile and coercive. Most of the laws aimed at non-Muslims have been introduced in the 1920s and the 1930s, but stayed in effect for long after. Part of the implemented measures was of an assimilationist nature, aimed at the Turkification of minority populations. Most of the measures however were directly intended for the economic discrimination of non-Muslims: a number of laws limited the professions they were allowed to exercise, there were laws which allowed the confiscation of their property under certain conditions, there were periods in which non-Muslims had to pay much higher taxes than Muslims¹⁶ or did not have the right to apply for bank credits; the state controlled the movement and travel of non-Muslims and took decisions about their re-settlement.¹⁷ In addition to these laws, there were also outbursts of physical violence, or pogroms, against non-Muslim communities. Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul were particularly affected by the pogrom of September 6–7th, 1955 which was originally instigated against the Greeks in the city.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the property of many Bulgarians was also destroyed by the attacking mobs. At the time, most of the Bulgarian Istanbulites were making their living by running small businesses – they were milkmen, bakers, butchers, greengrocers and florists, and their homes and shops were scattered in neighborhoods of predominantly Greek and other non-Muslim inhabitants. Most of the people of the community I met told me how their family property was destructed during the pogrom. Some families could never restore their businesses again and closed down, others managed to revive them at the price of

¹⁵ On citizenship see Elchinova, *Nevidimata obshtnost: pravoslavnite b' Igari v Istanbul*, chapter 4.

¹⁶ One of the most drastic measures against non-Muslims was the Welfare Tax, or Varlık Kanunu, in effect between 1942 and 1949. See for details in Reşat, Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities." In: *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997), 28; Alexandris, *The Greek Minority...*, 208-233.

¹⁷ Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey*; Alexandris, *The Greek Minority...*; Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities," 15-51.

¹⁸ Dilek, Güven, "Riots against the Non-Muslims of Turkey: 6/7 September 1955 in the Context of Demographic Engineering," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 12, Pt. II, 2011; Alexandris, op. cit., 256-270

hard work and deprivation, yet others left the country. To summarize, the politics of the Turkish state towards non-Muslims up to the late 20th century¹⁹ has led to ceaseless emigration, lower social-economic position of the representatives of these minorities, limited prosperity and, as a consequence, low birth rates and negative growth rates.

It would be however incomplete to explain the negative demographic trends with such factors as globalization, economic stagnation, or unfavorable minority policies. Other factors of a sociocultural character have catalyzed the same processes. These sociocultural factors include the place which the Bulgarian Istanbulites on the social ladder in Turkey, their self-identification as “true” Istanbulites, as well as the culture patterns which they have adopted and developed in congruence with this identification. Exploring the register of the deceased kept at the Bulgarian cemetery in Ferriköy, D. Petrova observes that all members of the community who died between 1977 and 1997 were born in Istanbul.²⁰ This is to say that in the 1970s an overall generational change has been completed; by that time the community consisted only of people who were born in the city, moreover, many of their parents were born there, too. Today, with very few exceptions, the community consists of people who are at least third generation born in Istanbul, i.e. their parents, grandparents, and even great grandparents were born in the city. This fact is accompanied by a process of gradual transformation in the identity of the Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul. The descendants of immigrants from rural Macedonia and Thrace have developed the mentality and behavior of urban people. Moreover they consider themselves “true” Istanbulites and practice typically urban cultural traditions and customs.²¹ The Bulgarians of Istanbul classify themselves as belonging to the middle-class city residents of secular orientation and are very attached to a certain lifestyle which corresponds to their social position.²² Their shared living standard and way of life, alongside the Turkish politics towards non-Muslims and some general processes and events that have affected life in the city on the Bosphorus in the course of time, have enabled the emergence of the demographic trends which I discuss below.

What Lies behind the Numbers?

Having faced the lack of reliable and systematic statistical data about the Bulgarians in Istanbul, I base the discussion about the demographic processes and

¹⁹ The negative attitude of the Turkish authorities towards ethnic Bulgarians in the country continued until the fall of communism in Bulgaria by the end of 1989.

²⁰ Petrova, op. cit., 122-124.

²¹ Their practices and patterns of behavior clearly mark their divergence from the cultural traditions of their forefathers, as well as their differentiation from other, more recent immigrants in Istanbul who have come from various underdeveloped regions in Turkey. These “newcomers”, according to them, have a lot of children but are unable to provide education and to take proper care of them. See for details Elchinova, *Nevidimata obshtnost*, chap. 2.

²² Elchinova, “Memory, Heritage and Ethnicity.”; Elchinova, *Nevidimata...*, chap. 3.

trends in their community on information, obtained through qualitative research methods, such as interviews, life stories, and direct observation. I refer to estimates made by individual community members and by employees of the Bulgarian Consulate in Istanbul about the number, average age, and birth rates of the community. The picture is completed by the evidence I derive from a book kept by the administrative director of the Foundation in which he registers the living members of the community by name and year of birth. Children born in mixed marriages are also considered members of the Bulgarian community in Istanbul and their names appear in the book.²³ According to this register, as of September 2011²⁴ Istanbul Bulgarians totaled 427 people. This number is close to the estimates, made by the Consular General of the Republic of Bulgaria in Istanbul – between 450 and 500 people. Darina Petrova, who did her research among Istanbul Bulgarians in the second half of the 1990s and who in her capacity as a Consulate's employee was in close relations with community members, approximates their number at the time at 500–550 people. According to her, in 1958 the Bulgarian colony in Istanbul had 1217 members and this number had dropped down to only 900 by the 1970s.²⁵ As loose as these figures may be, they show a consistent decline of the total number of Orthodox Bulgarians in the city on the Bosphorus. I have already mentioned the role of migration in the growth and then the decline of the community. In the second half of the 20th century, with still continuing outbound migration and virtually no new immigrants, the community's reproduction depended solely on natural increase, which in its turn also dropped down due to low birth rates. Thus, within a relatively short span of time, the community's size has halved.

The “book of the living” as I call it gives an idea about the shifting birth rate. Obviously, the data it contains about earlier years cannot be taken at face value because only the names of the people still alive by the time of registration appear in its pages. According to the book, the highest birth rate was recorded between 1953 and 1966 (between 5 and 14 babies per year). Data about recent years are more reliable (and striking): between 2000 and 2009 the number of births varied between one and two per year (the exceptions were four newborn babies in 2005 and three in 2000). In 2011, the Bulgarian Consular General in Istanbul mentioned a total number of 23 children in the community, when we discussed the possibility for opening a Bulgarian Sunday school. Because of the small number there was no such school at the time. At the very beginning of 2015, the Consulate General in Istanbul initiated the opening of a Sunday school for the children of all the Bulgarians in the city. The school was

²³ Other observations also testify about the demographic developments taking place in the community. One of the sources of such data is the Facebook page of the Foundation where information about significant communal events is regularly posted. Among other posts, there are announcements about weddings, baptizing ceremonies, funerals and commemoration services. Unfortunately, the majority of these messages are about deaths in the community, and only rarely about weddings and baptisms. My interviewees have observed the same: “*We have no weddings around here, only one in three years.*” Baptizing ceremonies are more often, once a year, but this number includes rituals organized by people coming from outside the community, usually from Bulgaria.

²⁴ All the figures I use here have been actual by that moment in time, when I examined the book.

²⁵ Petrova, op. cit., 122.

named “St St Cyril and Methodius,” just like the first Bulgarian school opened in Istanbul back in 1857.

The dwindling number of Istanbul-born Bulgarians is coupled with their rising erage age. When I asked the administrative director of the Foundation whether the young community members participate in its activities, the 64-year old man half-jokingly, half-seriously responded that “the young” were those of his age. He went to say that between 60 and 70 percent of the community’s population were in their and older. Indeed, today the people between 40 and 80 years old are the most part of the community as I have been able to observe during my fieldwork. people are dedicated rather to their professions or studies. This only comes to say age is a relative indicator: even though in general demographic terms people in their 60s are defined as elderly, in the context of the particular community such people are among the most active in communal initiatives and for that matter are often called “the young” within the community. Such a label sounds appropriate, taking into account the relatively high average age of the Istanbul Bulgarians. There is no statistics about the rate of life expectancy among them but according to the “book of the living” 52 women and men were above 79 years old in 2011. Just for comparison, life expectancy in Bulgaria is 78 years for women and 71 years for men, or 74.5 in total,²⁶ and in Turkey – respectively, 78.9 and 72.6 years, or 75.8 in total.²⁷ The man who keeps the register of the living community members presented the eldest ones so: “*The oldest woman was born in 1910, she is now 101 years old. (Who is she?) Alexandra Basheva. There is another woman, Svoboda Kolicheva, she was born in 1914. Then there are two women born in 1919 – Zhivka Dinova and Nevena Kalaydji.*”

Calculations, based on the data in the register, define the average age of the community members at 52.6. The people above forty are 2.9 times more than those below forty. 65 community members are aged 75 and above, 114 are between 60 and 74 years old, 140 are between 40 and 59 years old, 78 are between 21 and 39 years old, and 34 are 20 years old or younger. Low birth rate and high emigration promise further rise of the average age.

Judging by what I have heard from my interviewees, nuclear families prevail among the Bulgarians of Istanbul. The exceptions are when sick or widowed elderly parents live together with their children’s or grandchildren’s families. Customarily, upon marriage young couples move to a separate household. Historical demographic research reveals that nuclear families and simple households (such that consist of the members of one family only) have been prevalent for the population of Istanbul since the mid-1940s, with an average of 4 persons in a household and fertility of 2.5 newborns per mother in 1985.²⁸ Already by 1907 nuclear families (a couple with children) formed 25% of all the families in Istanbul. This is not to say

²⁶ http://www.nsi.bg/sites/default/files/files/pressreleases/LifeExpectancy_2011-2013_Q12YVG3.pdf

²⁷ <http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/turkey-life-expectancy>

²⁸ Gülbin Gökçay, and Frederic Shorter, “Who Lives with Whom in Istanbul?” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, № 9: 47-73, 1993, 52.

that extended family ties were not strong; on the contrary they remained tight at least by the end of the century. The reasons for the relatively high percentage of nuclear families and simple households in the early 20th century are to be sought in the high mortality rates and the late marriages which were caused by wars, the high risk of diseases and accidents, the bad economic conditions, the poor level of healthcare and so on.²⁹ Studies from the 1980s reveal that the differences between immigrant and native families and households in Istanbul had been small at the time. Such differences were more visible between migrants who came from the Eastern parts of Turkey and those who came from its Western parts; the former more often tended to keep the extended family and to have more children. The organization of life in the big city however made it easier to support simple households with fewer members. Nevertheless, systems of intergenerational support and close association among members of the extended family remained important and were preserved in various ways. Native-born Istanbulites were least prone to living in extended families and complex households³⁰ – a tendency which is supported by the organization of life of the community in discussion.

By the 1960s, families with two children had become typical for the Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul; in the following decades the number of families with one child began to grow. Some of my interlocutors however currently see a reversal in this tendency: “*Our generation, I am,*” say, “*in my 50s now, we have one child, but the young couples now have two children*” (female, born in 1966, college degree, housewife).³¹ The reasons for the small number of children are various. On the one hand, life in the big city leads to it (dominant forms of cohabitation, prices of real estate, household expenses, transportation expenses, education costs, etc.). On the other hand, there is the impact of the unfavorable position of non-Muslims in Turkish society. Circumstances allow them to maintain a certain living standard with only one or two children in the family: “*Few children, one, they don’t give birth to more children, nowadays when they grow up it is a big deal – private schools, big expenses*” (female, born in 1935, elementary school, housewife). The fewer the children, the higher the social prestige of the family, according to Istanbul-born Orthodox Bulgarians: “*Peasants, they have many children, they are more religious*” (the same informant).

The low birth rate is also related to the position that women hold in the family and society. According to my informants’ accounts, already the first generation of migrants who arrived in Istanbul has been much concerned with their sons’ and daughters’ education. Consequently, the educational level of people in the community has steadily risen in time. Among the elderly generations completing 5th to 7th grade has been considered sufficient for their realization; however for their successors (those born in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s) to graduate from high schools or colleges has

²⁹ Ibid., 64-66

³⁰ Ibid., 68

³¹ One can safely assume that the number of children of the Istanbul-born Bulgarian couples is much lower than that of their grandparents who came from the region of Macedonia. Thus for example, the owner of the popular dairy house “Pando kaymak” at the Fish market in Beşiktaş comes from a family of eleven children.

been a must, and today the majority of community members do not hesitate to support the university studies of their children in Turkey or abroad. Despite the degrees they get, until recently women in the community have tended to become housewives after marriage. Being a housewife is particularly wide-spread among women in their 70s, 60s and 50s. The way in which representatives of these generations discuss this fact leaves one with the impression that they consider it a sign of social position: “(Do you go to work?) *No, I don’t. I have never worked, here men usually go to work* (the respondent looks astonished to be asked such a question). *Women take care of the children. The young women go to work*” (female, born in 1952, high school graduate, housewife).

Housewives take care of the children, the household and the family and this does not make them inferior in the eyes of their fellow community members. Many of them hire help for the most demanding household tasks, which gives them extra time for socializing, charity and work for the community. It has not always been so. Women from the first and the second generations of re-settlers in Istanbul used to keep the household and to work together with their husbands in the family business (dairy house, bakery or garden). Not all families can afford to hire housekeepers today and the duties of such housewives are heavy but unpaid. The pattern of the working woman becomes more and more popular among women of the younger generations. Almost all of them have university degrees or study at a university; those who have graduated have jobs. Their jobs are mostly in the private sector. The command of foreign languages determines the high percentage of employees of foreign companies among them. Men in the community usually run their own businesses. The combination of all these factors –the aspirations to provide good education for their children, the popular nowadays pattern of the working woman and the still limited financial capabilities of the majority of community members– has cemented the trend of declining birth rates. The slightly increased number of childbirths –having two rather than just one child in the family– of which some of my interviewees have mentioned may be a result of the gradually rising social and economic status of the Bulgarian Orthodox families³² and the steadily increasing trend of cross-marriages. Furthermore, continuing emigration also contributes to the low birth rate – it is the young people who go abroad, usually to study at Western universities, and often stay to work and live in a foreign country after graduation. The families they make there and the children they give birth to, do not contribute directly to the growth of the community in Istanbul, accordingly, the average age and death rate among this community’s members get higher. Against these trends stands the relatively high life expectancy, characteristic of Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul. This indirectly supports the suggestion that the living standard and way of life are as equally influential upon demographic processes as are such negative factors as political persecution, economic stagnation or unfavorable minority politics.

³² There are no more professional restrictions on non-Muslims in Turkey. Nevertheless there are still no state employees in the community.

The Significance of Cross-marriage

Their progressively decreasing number upsets the members of the community, as do cross-marriages between Bulgarians and representatives of other ethnic and religious groups. For those Bulgarian Istanbulites who were born before the 1970s, and even for many of the younger ones, endogamy has been an imperative. Cross-marriages were rare among the elderly generations of community members because they were strongly disapproved of by their families and the community in general. *“Now it is different but before it was such a big deal, to marry a foreigner was awful. Now they get married to locals, Germans, Italians, Greeks”* (female, born in 1942, elementary school, housewife).

The way of life in the past enabled endogamy. Orthodox Bulgarians used to live in only a few residential areas of the city and this enabled intense communication among them on a daily basis. Moreover, they were closely related in all spheres of life – work, leisure, religious and secular holidays. The Bulgarian school was the scene where the young used to meet and get to know each other. The few foreign language schools chosen by most community members to continue their education made provided a further terrain for these connections. Endogamous marriages have remained a value by the beginning of the present century, but in the course of time they became less and less feasible. The shrinking size of the community led to a serious decrease in the number of potential marital partners within it. The actual number got even smaller because of the complex kinship ties already established between most families in the community. Little by little, Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul settled in various neighborhoods. After the last Bulgarian school in the mega polis was closed in 1972, young Bulgarians went to study at Turkish schools where they got mixed with classmates of another ethnic and religious background. These factors have contributed to lessening ties with young people from within the community and strengthening the connections with people from outside of it. Thus, cross-marriage has become a major alternative, even though it is still disapproved of by the elders. As the number of cross-marriages increases, the attitude towards them among community members slowly but irreversibly becomes more accepting. Endogamy is now interpreted in broader terms to include marriages with other Christians, especially Orthodox ones. The transformation of the customary norm has been explained with the similar cultural and value systems, shared by Orthodox Christians of all kind. *“What matters to me is to marry a Christian. /.../ The spouse can be an Italian but /s/he must be a Christian. /.../ Christianity is what matters”* (female, born in 1943).

In his comprehensive study of Constantinople Greeks, Alexis Alexandris specifies that mixed marriages became a possibility for the representatives of the various religious groups in Istanbul after the introduction of the Swiss civil code in Turkey in 1926. According to its regulations, decisions about marriage and divorce became a prerogative of civil authorities and not of religious institutions as it had been earlier.³³

³³ Alexandris, op. cit., 138-139.

This led to a looser control on religious and ethnic endogamy and paved the way for cross-marriages.

Cross-marriages between Orthodox Bulgarians and Greeks are the most conventional in the community. They are not an exception anymore. The number of mixed marriages with Turks is also on the rise, even though people in the community speak of such marriages reluctantly. *"I know of four or five mixed marriages with Muslim Turks registered in the last five years"* (male, born in 1963, mechanical engineer). *"Children can't get married, they marry Turks and this makes us very unhappy. We've got a Bulgarian son-in-law for our daughter but it is very risky for X (the informant's granddaughter). /.../ We don't want to get married to Turks at all, not at all! They are very different, another religion, how can I explain it? She may marry an Italian, a Frenchman or another but I don't want Turks! All we have is here and our children cannot get married, we have become so few, very few of us have left"* (female, elementary school, housewife).

When commenting cross-marriages with Turks, my interlocutors have usually stressed on the differences in mentality and culture which are the result not only of the different religion but of the belonging to a different social class: *"(Do you want your son to marry a Bulgarian girl?) Yes, yes, but it will be hard. (And what if he marries a Turkish girl?) It will be hard. I don't divide people by religion but it is hard, isn't it? It's not only faith, you know, they should be on the same cultural level. It's not only faith. There are not many old (Turks) who were born and grew up in Istanbul. They are like us but now in Istanbul so many have arrived from Anatolia and what can we do? They brought to Istanbul all their local customs and these customs widen the gap between us"* (female, born in 1966, high school, housewife).

One of the most often discussed cases of intermarriage is between a young Bulgarian woman and a Turkish man. It is telling how different people speak about this marriage. Most informants have been in a hurry to notify that the husband converted to Christianity before the wedding – a fact which supposedly makes the situation more acceptable. There are however individuals who do not believe that the conversion was real. When discussing the case with the young woman herself and with her mother, the latter insists that for her it was no problem that her daughter married a Turkish man: *"They are wealthy, good people"* (female, born in 1950, college education, housewife). Encouraged by her mother's words, the daughter adds: *"There was no problem, my parents approved of the marriage. There are no such problems in our community. We have people married to Turks, to Greeks, to whomever else. Besides, X (her husband) got baptized and now he is of our faith"* (female, born in 1980, MA in ballet pedagogy, on maternity leave). In the course of the conversation, it has become clear that her husband comes from a wealthy non-religious Turkish family. He is an IT specialist, works for a big company and often makes business trips abroad. He has been baptized at the church of the Constantinople Patriarchate. Their wedding took place in the same church and so did the baptizing ceremony of their baby daughter. The girl's name is of Greek origin

(Evangelia, Lia for short) and she is not named after any of her grandparents (as is custom within the community).

The mother's father however does not sound happy when he speaks about his granddaughter's marriage: *"Well, she has a Turkish husband and I was against their marriage but he is a good man, he has a big house at the Bosphorus. He got baptized but his parents don't know this. Look at those people at the table (the conversation takes place in the courtyard of the Exarchate House and the elderly man points at one of the tables there, where a few people are sitting and chatting), this man is a pure Turk but his son took a Bulgarian wife from Bulgaria. We know a lot of Bulgarians here and in Bulgaria but we didn't take a Bulgarian man, we took a Turk. Enough with this matter, it's shameful! We stick to each other here, do you understand?!"* (male, born in 1923, retired florist and goldsmith).

Younger community members demonstrate greater tolerance to cross-marriages and a modern attitude to marriage as a personal matter: *"It may happen that even if one marries a Bulgarian woman he is not happy. You never know, he might marry a Turkish woman and be very happy. But I prefer her to be at least from Sofia. (So, you are saying that ethnicity doesn't matter?) Of course, it doesn't."* (female, born in 1966, college, housewife).

"(What do you think about cross-marriages?) Well, they are OK now. Moreover, I don't think I have the right to interfere or comment. Everybody has a personal life and even if you comment for good or for bad, it doesn't make any difference. That's why I think there's no need to comment at all. The only thing is that after that some of these people (who have married outside the community) unfortunately do not come here anymore or come very rarely, they join another, really big community where they have more opportunities for socializing. (We talked to many elderly people and they were all very much against these mixed marriages.) Everybody is free to wish whatever they like but you can't control what you wish. That is why nothing depends on a given grandma, mother or father. This is not a problem particularly of the Bulgarian community in Istanbul, or I may be wrong to call it a problem at all, but this is a practice that can be observed all over the world" (male, born in 1963, mechanical engineer).

There still are younger individuals who insist on marrying an ethnic Bulgarian. Facing the limited choice of partners within the community, they hope to find a partner from Bulgaria. There are already a few such marriages, in which the wife comes from Bulgaria, and the husband is from the community in Istanbul. With the growing practice to study abroad, the chances for ethnic and religious exogamy have enhanced.

The perspective of cross-marriages becoming customary for the next generations is not welcomed by those community members who stick to the traditional norm of ethnic and religious endogamy. Many people think that mixed marriages endanger the coherence and unity of the community: new traditions are introduced in the family by the non-Bulgarian partner, children not only belong to two families, but are also a part of two cultures, often of two religions as well, families start to associate with other, larger communities and to take part in their cultural activities. Hidden behind the fear that the cultural and religious "purity" of the community would be lost, there is con-

cern that class boundaries may be transgressed causing the loss of social status. Luckily, so far there have been no mixed marriages that led to downward mobility of the Bulgarian partner. Rather, as in the case discussed above, the “foreign” partner stands higher on the social ladder. The similar economic and social position of the two partners is regarded as a guarantee for cultural affinity – one which is not a result of shared ethnic or religious affiliation but of pertaining to the same social layer.

Conclusions

In this article I have discussed demographic processes and related cultural practices among the Orthodox Bulgarians in Istanbul. Their community progressively decreases in size, the average age of its members gets higher, birth rate drops down, whereas mortality rate rises, and exogamy slowly but irreversibly takes over ethnic and religious endogamy. The direct reasons for these ongoing trends are to be sought in steady emigration, low birth and fertility rates and the tight web of kinship relations that intersect the community (the latter is a result of the small size of the of community and the long practice of ethnic endogamy within it). A variety of political, economic and sociocultural factors underlie these processes. Among the political factors, the impact of Turkey’s politics towards non-Muslim minorities has been of crucial significance. The implemented measures (e.g., the constraints on professions which non-Muslims have been allowed to exercise for long decades, the higher taxes which they had to pay, the expropriation and/ or destruction of their property, etc.) have stimulated emigration, limited the opportunity for economic prosperity of non-Muslims, and have not allowed their smooth integration in the larger society. Ethnic politics in Turkey has also brought about a change in the cultural identity of non-Muslim minorities by confining their right to run their own educational and cultural organization (minority schools, press in the mother tongue, etc.). The social-class affiliation which crosses ethnic and religious boundaries, have also affected demographic processes. In terms of social categorization, Orthodox Bulgarians of the community in discussion belong to the secular urbanized middle-class section of Istanbul’s population. Regardless of the linguistic, religious and other differences which divide the various groups of secular middle-class native-born Istanbulites, they all share similar lifestyles, values and attitudes, tastes and patterns of behavior. Some sociodemographic features, such as family type, birth rates, educational attitudes, patterns of socialization, are also strongly dependent on class and rank. The analysis of the demographic trends taking place among the Istanbul-born Bulgarians has revealed that their community will most likely not last, at least not the way it was known in the past and the way it is today. However, the discussion has also traced opportunities for the community’s survival and future wellbeing – through transformation and merging into larger supra-ethnic and supra-religious entities, within which the notions of ethnic and religious distinctiveness would be reconsidered and redefined.

**The 1912 Ottoman elections and the Greeks in the Vilayet of Adrianople:
A view from the Greek Archives.**

The Young Turk governments of the Ottoman Empire (1908-18) are widely considered as a part of the latter's modernization process.¹ The reforms, which had been initiated in the midst of the 19th century, were aiming at the homogenization of the society under the principle of Ottomanism. This was an effort of the Ottoman administrations to attract the loyalty of all their subjects to a new "Ottoman Nation" so as to block the centrifugal tendencies threatening the very existence of the empire.² However, there was an inherent dualism in this concept of egalitarianism promoted through the reforms: the millet system, the old classification of the Ottoman subjects in semi-autonomous religious communities governed by their own law, was preserved and gradually secularized resulting in the stimulation of the separatist nationalist movements.³ Regarding the Greek-Orthodox communities, the Bulgarian ecclesiastical schism of 1870 and the resulting Greco-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia had strengthened the Greek character of the millet (Rum millet) while the Greek Kingdom was gaining increasing control over its institutions.⁴

Still the road to an open rift between the Greeks and their Ottoman context was a long one. Developments were shaped and evolved in a changing social and political landscape which was dominated by continuity rather than specific turning points. The examination of the 1912 Ottoman elections presents an excellent opportunity for the exploration of this landscape. Until then, all the important factors that would cause the impressive future developments had been crystallized. In this article, it will be argued that, although by that time Athens had prevailed over the Patriarchate as the main "political center" of all the Greeks, a large amount of opposition had to be overcome at a local level. The elections, also, pointed to all the

¹ M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 7.

² Allegiance to the principle of Ottomanism did not mean the exclusion of other ethnic or even national identifications. See, Ileana Moroni, "The Transformation of Loyalties as a Continuous Process: Ottomanism and its Different Versions in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution." In *Balkan Nationalism(s) and the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Dimitris Stamatopoulos, Vol. III, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2015), 61-78.

³ Roderick H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire (1856-1876)*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 56 and Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A modern history*, (Tauris, 2004, 3rd edition), 62.

⁴ See, Dimitris Kamouzis, "Elites and the formation of national identity: the case of the Greek Orthodox millet (mid-nineteenth century to 1922)" in *State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945*, Benjamin C. Fortna et al, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 13-46 and Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία, 19^{ος} αι.-1919, οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες*, [Asia Minor, 19th century-1919, the Greek-Orthodox communities], (Athens, Hellinika Grammata, 1997).

cleavages which had been created in the Ottoman society and had alienated the Greeks from the Ottoman context. Thus, this article will discuss the issue at a local level taking as a case study the Vilayet of Adrianople (Edirne) corresponding to the geographical region of southern Thrace. The vilayet included the following sanjaks: Edirne, Dedeağaç, Gelibolu (Kallipolis), Gümülcine (Gumuljina), Kirkkilise kilise (Saranta Ekklisies) and Tekfurdağı (Raideostos). Ottoman Thrace could be described as a miniature of the multi-ethnic empire. According to the 1905/6 Ottoman census, there existed unevenly distributed populations of Muslims (618,604), (618,604), Greeks (340,908), Bulgarians (Exarchists) (119,476) and Armenians (26,144).⁵ Furthermore, Thrace, without presenting the tensions of Macedonia, was a bone of contention between the Greeks and the Bulgarians while it was considered as a core province by Ottomans themselves. Thus, the elections in this region were a crucial issue for communities, governments and political parties for both symbolic and practical reasons.

The Young Turks, the Greeks and the road to the 1912 elections

The Young Turks were a heterogeneous body with conflicting interests and ideologies. Their only common goal was the opposition to Hamidian absolutism and the restoration of the 1876 Constitution, which had been suspended by the oppressive Sultan.⁶ From the beginning, the movement was divided between two dispositions: there were the liberals, who believed that the Empire could survive through some form of decentralization and through the cooperation with the various ethno-religious groups; and the nationalists, who favored the creation of a centralized, unitary national state on the western model.⁷ The latter's instrument was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which dominated Ottoman politics from the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908 to the end of the First World War.

On the other hand, the Greek Kingdom, after the defeat of 1897, was pursuing a policy of friendship with the Ottomans and its primary aims were to contain Bulgarian nationalism in Macedonia and Thrace and improve the position of the Greeks in the empire. The inability of the Greek State to liberate the "unredeemed" Greeks instigated two chief architects of the Greek Macedonian Struggle, Ion Dragoumis, a Greek diplomat and, Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, a former officer of the Greek army, to believe that the Ottoman Empire could be succeeded by an Eastern Federation, in which all the ethnic groups would be equal under the aegis of Hellenism. For this purpose, they had formed a secret society in Constantinople (Society of Constantinople – SC), which had a great success between the upper and middle Greek bourgeoisie of

⁵ Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 166-7.

⁶ Doğu Ergil, "A reassessment: The Young Turks, their Politics and Anti-Colonial Struggle," *Balkan Studies*, 16.2 (1975): 26.

⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London and New York: Oxford University Press 1968, 2nd Edition), 213.

the Ottoman capital.⁸ Although their cooperation with the Greek Embassy under Ioannis Gryparis was close, their relationship with the Greek government was not always smooth. The Foreign Ministry was reluctant to approve the venture but had no reason to stop it.⁹

After the restoration of the Constitution, the SC set up a new organization, the Ithical League (PL), in order to direct the political activities of the Greeks. Initially, PL adopted a cautious attitude towards the Young Turks. The first frictions in the 1908 elections when the CUP did not accept Greek demands on proportional representation in the Ottoman Parliament and the Greek electors were unwilling to support candidates among the few Unionist Greeks. Finally, 24 Greek deputies were elected and this caused disappointment among the Greeks, who believed that they were underrepresented in the new Parliament.¹⁰ After the elections, the CUP embarked upon aggressive nationalist policies. The fusion of all the various ethnic groups into one nation and the imposition of complete equality between the subjects of the empire meant that all the communal privileges under the millet system had to be abolished. This was perceived as a major threat by the Greeks, who believed that their position as a distinct ethnicity in the Ottoman context was in danger. As a response, the Greek deputies of the PL formed a "Greek Party" in the Parliament in 1910 and promoted the "program of the ethnicities," a policy which advocated the creation of a common front with the other ethnic groups so as to impose their demands on the Ottoman government. This, as could be expected, created a rift between them and those Greek deputies who resented the PL's policies of confrontation. Thus, from then onwards, the Greeks were divided into two groups representing two contradictory policies for the future of the community.¹¹

At the same time, a major reexamination of the Greek foreign policy was taking place in Athens. In 1910, Eleftherios Venizelos, who was to dominate the Greek political scene for the next decades, formed his first government. He adopted a more active foreign policy, aiming at ending isolation and unconditional attachment to the Ottoman Empire out of fear of Bulgaria. Believing that a war was inevitable in the Balkans, he pursued a policy of rapprochement with Bulgaria in which the first step was the cooperation between the Greeks and the Exarchists against

⁸ For the Souliotis and Dragoumis' "Eastern Federation" see, Thanos Veremis, "The Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks: The Experiment of the Society of Constantinople." In *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi, (New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1999), 181-191; Diogenis Xanatalos, "The Greeks and the Turks on the eve of the Balkan Wars, A frustrated plan," *Balkan Studies*, 3.2 (1962): 277-296 and A. J. Panayotopoulos, "The "Great Idea" and the vision of eastern federation: a propos of the views of I. Dragoumis and A. Souliotis-Nicolaidis," *Balkan Studies*, 21.2 (1980): 331-365.

⁹ Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, *Greece and the Balkan Imbroglia, Greek Foreign Policy, 1911-1913*, (Athens: Σύλλογος προς Διάδοσιν Ωφελίμων Βιβλίων 1995), 25-26 and Kamouzis, "Elites and the formation," op. cit., 27.

¹⁰ Catherine Boura, "The Greek Millet in Turkish Politics: Greeks in the Ottoman Parliament, (1908-1918)." In *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism*, op. cit., 194-196.

¹¹ Ibid., 196-197 and Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία*, op. cit., 488-494.

the aggressive policies of CUP. Thus, the program of the ethnicities received the support of Venizelos' administration. Gryparis was appointed Foreign Minister and he promoted the cooperation of the Greeks with the PL.¹² In this way, the policies of the PL became a weapon in Venizelos' diplomatic arsenal.

In the meantime, the nationalist measures of the CUP had provoked the opposition of various elements in Ottoman society. In November 1911, the Liberal Union was formed (or Freedom and Accord Party), a political organization which united all all those opposing the CUP. The Liberals were attacking the CUP's nationalistic policies and asked the cooperation of the ethnic groups.¹³ The Greeks, despite their hesitations, helped the new party to score its first victory over the CUP in the Constantinople by-election on 11 December 1911 giving a great impetus to the opposition. The unionists, alarmed by those developments, hastened to dissolve the Parliament and proclaim new elections in order to strengthen their position.¹⁴

Before discussing the electoral process, a few important details need to be delineated. All males above the age of twenty-five were eligible to vote, provided they paid some direct taxes. The Electoral Law stipulated the sanjak as the basic electoral unit, and one deputy corresponded to 50,000–100,000 residents. Importantly, Ottoman elections were indirect: the voters of each nahiye (electoral district) elected electors (their number depended on the population – usually one elector for every 250–750 residents), who in their turn assembled in the capital of the kaza and voted for deputies.¹⁵ It is evident that the two-stage indirect nature of the electoral system fostered corruption since the candidacies were determined by the local communal authorities, namely according to the existing patronage relationships in each region. Moreover, the small number of the electors of the second phase made manipulation and bribes easier. Thus, political parties and ethnic groups had to use every means at their disposal to secure the success of their electors, whose final number reflected their political power in every constituency.

Electoral alliances and expectations

Although the PL was responsible for the electoral arrangements of the Greeks, the decisions were made in Athens. The Greek Consular authorities, cooperating with the Bishops, were in control of the entire procedure while every move, even on a local level, had to be met with the Ministry's approval. Although the decisions made in the center were meant to be applicable to the Greek population of the entire Ottoman territory, their application depended on the local circumstances.

¹² Gardikas-Katsiadakis, *Greece*, op. cit., 33.

¹³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks, The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 99.

¹⁴ Ibid., 100-102.

¹⁵ For more details see, Hasan Kayali, "Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 27.3 (1995), 269-271 and Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaïdis, *Οργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* [*The Society of Constantinople*], ed. Thanos Veremis and Catherine Boura, (Athens: Dodoni, 1984), 74.

Gryparis' first instructions concerning the Greek attitude to the Liberal Union were to combine "good intentions alongside reservation until this party demonstrates in practice that it shares the program of the ethnicities."¹⁶ When the Liberals agreed to ensure egalitarianism in the empire and to broaden the participation of the ethnic groups in the government, a protocol of cooperation was signed between them and the PL. However, this did not mean that the Greek authorities had ruled out the possibility of local cooperation with the CUP, if it accepted that the candidates would be chosen by the PL, something which the Unionists would find, of course, hard to accept.¹⁷ Antonios Chamoudopoulos, who was involved in these events, later recalled that the agreement with the Liberals provided for the election of 52 Greeks, a claim which should be considered an exaggeration, since for the region of Thrace this meant the election of at least 10 Greek deputies, something which went far beyond the most optimistic predictions of the journalistic organ of the PL.¹⁸ It is more likely that the election of about 40 Greek deputies was agreed upon, namely, the number that the two sides settled on for the next elections.¹⁹

Even before the signing of the protocol, the Liberals had been making overtures toward the Bishops of various cities in order to secure the support of the Greek element in every constituency. For example, in Adrianople, the representative of the Liberals approached the Bishop and suggested collaboration. The latter, waiting for instructions from the embassy in Constantinople, was positive to the prospect, but essentially referred him to the political association which would be founded in the city in the following days.²⁰ These associations were run by people loyal to the consular authorities and were in charge of directing the electoral activities. Such clubs appear to have been established in Adrianople and Xanthi, where cooperation with the Liberals was open and the Greek candidates were included in their ballots. Although in the Sanjak of Gomuljina the Greek population's small size did not warrant parliamentary representation, their militant attitude against the CUP and their close cooperation with the Liberals during the pre-electoral period resulted in the inclusion of a Greek candidate alongside the prominent opposition member Ismail Hakki in the liberal ballot.²¹ In the Sanjak of Adrianople, where the Greeks comprised one third of the total population, two Greek candidates were included in the liberal ballot along with the prominent Liberal Rıza Tevfik.²² These

¹⁶ Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter DI-AYE), 1912, 104.1, Gryparis to Constantinople Embassy, November 25, 1911.

¹⁷ DIAYE, 1912, 104.1, Alexandropoulos (Constantinople) to Foreign Ministry, December 13, 1911, 104.3, Alexandropoulos to Gryparis, January 12, 1912 and 23.3, Alexandropoulos to Foreign Ministry, January 7, 1912.

¹⁸ Antonios Chamoudopoulos, *Ελληνισμός και Νεότουρκοι* [Hellenism and the Young Turks], (Athens: 1926), 48 and «Η Εκλογική Κίνησις», *Τα Δίκαια των Εθνών*, January 15, 1912.

¹⁹ DIAYE, 1912, 104.4, Souliotis to Foreign Ministry, August 25, 1912.

²⁰ DIAYE, 1912, 104.3, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry and Constantinople Embassy, January 4 and 11, 1912.

²¹ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Chalkiopoulos (Xanthi) to Foreign Ministry and Constantinople Embassy, January 16 and 21, February 18 and March 2, 1912.

²² DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry, April 2, 1912.

brave concessions on the Liberals' side show the extent of their reliance on the non-Muslim vote, as well as their uncertainty concerning the final result.

The other equally important pillar of the Greek electoral strategy was the cooperation with the Exarchists. The understanding between the two sides started at a high political level with the meeting of the deputy of Thessalonici G. Chonaïos with the Exarch Joseph. They agreed to collaborate and stressed the need for the election of "national-minded" deputies.²³ The final agreement was reached on January 19, 1912. As for the Vilayet of Adrianople, the agreement stipulated the appointment of six Greeks and one Bulgarian deputy. The Greeks would include in their ballot a Bulgarian candidate in the Sanjak of Kirkkilise (Saranta Ekklesies) while the Bulgarians would have to support the Greek candidates in all the other sanjaks of the vilayet.²⁴ Then another condition was added to the agreement, according to which, if the Bulgarians did not manage to elect their candidate in Saranta Ekklesies and more than two Greek deputies had been elected with the exception of the Sanjak of Gelibolu (Kallipolis), then a Greek deputy would have to resign and relinquish his post to a Bulgarian. This condition caused the fierce opposition of Gryparis but since the balance was fragile due to the suspicion between the two sides, evidently no attempt to revise it was made.²⁵ At the same time, the Greek Minister in Sofia, Dimitrios Panas recommended that "we should avoid everything that can create suspicions to the Bulgarians."²⁶ Nevertheless, this agreement as a whole recognized the predominance of the Greek element in Thrace and was actually used later to support the Greek character of the region.²⁷

Simultaneously, the Unionists, observing the creation of this network of alliances against them, did not remain idle. Aiming either at wooing the Greeks or at breaking their alliances, the Ministers of the government and leading members of the CUP, Talaat Pasha, and Halil Pasha visited the Patriarchate and proposed collaboration to Patriarch Ioakeim. They promised an increase in the number of Greek deputies to 37, the participation of Greeks in the administration and the resolution of the issue of the communal privileges for a specific period of time.²⁸ Ioakeim seemed to favor those proposals. However, The Patriarchate, no longer controlled the mechanisms behind the politicization of the Greeks and was unable to impose its political wishes. As a result, it was enough for the PL to state via its journalistic organ that "the Holy Ark of the most valuable ethno-religious rights of Hellenism [...] did not need or have to become party chairman of the CUP or of any other party or union"²⁹ to deprive Ioakeim of every opportunity to be involved in the electoral process. The CUP made similar

²³ DIAYE, 1912, 105.1, Alexandropoulos (Constantinople) to Foreign Ministry, January 14, 1912.

²⁴ DIAYE, 1912, 88.1, Alexandropoulos (Constantinople) to Foreign Ministry, January 20, 1912.

²⁵ DIAYE, 1912, 105.1, Gryparis to Constantinople Embassy, February 12 and 16, 1912.

²⁶ DIAYE, 1912, 88.1, Panas (Sofia) to Foreign Ministry, February 3, 1912.

²⁷ Chamoudopoulos, op. cit., 47.

²⁸ Antonios Chamoudopoulos, *Η Νεωτέρα Φιλική Εταιρεία*, (Athens: Tsailas, 1946), 48; Boura, op. cit., 197-198 and DIAYE, 1912, 88.1, Alexandropoulos (Constantinople) to Foreign Ministry, January 18, 1912.

²⁹ «Αι Μαγδαληναί», *Τα Δίκαια των Εθνών*, January 21, 1912.

attempts at a local level as well. One day after his meeting with the Patriarch, Talaat visited the Bishop of Adrianople promising a parliamentary seat in the sanjak “as a sample of his sympathy towards the Greek element” and as an exchange, he asked for the contribution of the latter in Raidestos and in Saranta Ekklesies. Although the Consul General K. Dimaras did not totally reject the proposal, the two sides never reached an agreement because the Greeks could not accept the selection of their candidates by the CUP.³⁰

In Saranta Ekklesies, where the collaboration between the Greeks and the Bulgarians commanded the majority of the votes, some members of the CUP proposed to the Bishop collaboration and the appointment of a Greek and a Muslim instead of a Bulgarian deputy. The bishop answered in accordance with the instructions of the consulate but it seems that he favored the proposal while at the same time various members of the community acted in favor of the CUP opposing cooperation with the Bulgarians.³¹ This reaction must not be attributed only to the anti-Bulgarian sentiment of the population but also to the local notables, whose interests would be better served if the CUP remained in power. Thus, the consular authorities were called to face at the level of local micro-politics all those factors who would dispute the policy of the national center. As the Greek Vice Consul of Saranta Ekklesies mentioned:

*“Here there is the micro influence and the local interests of those who are called corbaci in Turkey [...]. It is true that everyone pretends that they will sacrifice all personal interests for the sake of the nation, but having studied people and things and knowing the secret desires and interests of a lot of people, I question their honesty. Luckily, I found the appropriate people who deserve my trust and obey the consulate and if I manage to secure their election, we have nothing to be afraid of.”*³²

Moreover, apart from local interests, the fear of the locals towards the “Turkish rage” was an equally important factor.³³ Thus, the fear of retaliation from the CUP, the local interests and the anti-Bulgarian sentiments made the work of the Greek Consul unachievable:

“As you can see, we are facing the risk of failing no longer because of the action of the Turks but instead because of the plots of the circles of those who like vultures surround the Bishops and Consuls and try to impose their opinion, which under the pretense of patriotism serves their own personal interests. In my opinion, we should either succumb to their desire giving a parliamentary seat in another region to the

³⁰ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, January 19, 1912.

³¹ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Tserepis (Saranta Ekklesies) to Constantinople Embassy and Foreign Ministry, January 27 and 31, February 20, 1912.

³² DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Tserepis (Saranta Ekklesies) to Constantinople Embassy and Foreign Ministry, January 31, 1912.

³³ DIAYE, 1912, 88.1, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, February 28, 1912.

Bulgarians or I should be given a small credit and your approval so as to impose your will using specific means."³⁴

On the other hand, the Bulgarians were right to protest against the coldness with which the collaboration was treated and against the refusal of the locals in Saranta Ekklesies to commit themselves that they would support the Bulgarian candidates, as the agreement stipulated. Similar accusations can be heard by the Greek Greek authorities, too: that the Bulgarians did not cooperate with them in the Sanjak of Adrianople where a Greek candidate had to be supported.³⁵ These examples prove that it was not the intervention of the CUP that caused the cracks in the fragile electoral alliance. In fact, the recent Greco-Bulgarian confrontation in the area had not been forgotten.³⁶ This becomes evident by the preference of many local people to cooperate with the Muslims instead of the Bulgarians. Anyway, it is certain that although Athens had imposed its choices in a central level, they had to fight a different battle in every region so as to implement them.

Based on this strategy, the aim of the Greek authorities was the election of six or seven deputies in the Vilayet of Adrianople.³⁷ However, how could they set such maximalist goals when during the last elections of 1908, which were held in a more liberal environment, only one deputy had been elected in the Sanjak of Kallipolis, with its overwhelming Greek majority? The answer is that they expected they would be able to repeat the success of the by-election of Constantinople, taking advantage of the division of Muslims into two political parties. So, where the Greeks and the Bulgarians outnumbered the Muslims, they could win the elections by themselves and where the Greek element was less powerful, this could determine the confrontation of the Muslims. In other words, the whole point was to ensure "the biggest possible number of electors... so as to hold the fate of the election in our own hands."³⁸ This called for the employment of different strategies in each sanjak. In Kallipolis, the Greeks could prevail because they formed the majority of the population. In Raideostos, with 53,000 residents in a total of 159,000, the Greeks could prevail only on condition that the Muslim element was divided although in this case the collaboration of the local Armenians with the CUP made this prospect difficult, as the Greek consular authorities readily noticed.³⁹ This strange collaboration could perhaps be attributed to the commercial competition between the Greeks and the Armenians on a local level. In Saranta Ekklesises, the Greek-Orthodox communities and the Bulgarians were the majority,

³⁴ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Tserepis (Saranta Ekklesies) to Constantinople Embassy, February 20, 1912.

³⁵ DIAYE, 1912, 88.1, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, February 28, 1912 and 24.4, Dimaras to Foreign Ministry, February 18, 1912.

³⁶ See for more, Paraskevas Konortas, "Nationalist infiltrations in Ottoman Thrace (ca.1870–1912): the case of the Kaza of Gumuljina." In *State Nationalisms*, op. cit., 73–100. Additionally, for the social factors that determined the national affiliations of the Greek-speaking and the Slav-speaking populations, see, Basil C. Gounaris, "Social cleavages and national 'awakening' in Ottoman Macedonia," *East European Quarterly* 29 (1995): 409–426.

³⁷ DIAYE, 1912, 105.1, Gryparis to Constantinople Embassy, January 23, 1912.

³⁸ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, January 13, 1912.

³⁹ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Koutsalexis (Raideostos) to Foreign Ministry, January 13, 1912.

so they could ensure success based on their own power. The same applied to De-deağaç, but since the preponderance was marginal, the support of the liberals was necessary because it was a single-seat constituency. In Adrianople, despite the compact Greek and Bulgarian populations, the majority was Muslim, and cooperation with the Liberals was necessary as it was in Goumouljina with its overwhelming Muslim majority.

Selecting the candidates

The effort of the Greek state to consolidate its control over the process is evident in the selection process of the candidate deputies. Despite the fact that sometimes the role of the PL is over-emphasized, the final responsibility for the selection laid with the Greek diplomats always in collaboration with the religious authorities. From the beginning, Gryparis made it clear that no candidacy should be announced unless it had his approval. Furthermore, the ex-deputies that had joined the “Greek Party” had to be supported again.⁴⁰ This meant the exclusion of all those who had cooperated with the CUP and those who were opposed to the PL. The only nationally legitimized candidates were those indicated by the PL and, by implication, by the Greek government. The “anti-nationals” were fiercely fought by the PL, which made the gap between the two rival parties of millet even greater. A characteristic example is a rumor according to which Pavlos Karolidis, a Greek deputy collaborating with the CUP, had converted to Islam.⁴¹ The intensity of the confrontation proves that a part of the Greeks disapproved of this ethnocentric turn of the millet. Apart from those who disagreed with the PL policies on ideological or practical grounds, there were also those who opposed it simply because they had not been included in its tickets. The latter believed that a clique was excluding the “competent” candidates. This very issue emerged during the selection of the candidate for the Sanjak of Kallipolis, where, due to the Greek preponderance, the election of any candidate was deemed easy. Gryparis had promised the nomination to the editor of the newspaper *Salpinx* in Mytilene, N. Paritsis, provided that the ex-deputy St. Narlis withdrew his candidacy.⁴² Eventually, Narlis did not withdraw and the minister appealed to Paritsis’ patriotism to withdraw his nomination so as not to divide the Greek votes. In his answer, the latter stated angrily:

“Nobody allowed ex-deputies who have done nothing to appoint themselves as national candidates whose negative vote is allegedly a crime against the nation [...]. I love my nation both in words and deeds. I have always in my mind the atrocities of the Young Turks, I am the right arm of our consulate and I boast about

⁴⁰ DIAYE, 1912, 23.1, Gryparis (Circular), January 5, 1912 and Gryparis to Constantinople Embassy, January 11, 1912.

⁴¹ Pavlos K. Karolidis, *Λόγοι και Υπομνήματα*, [Speeches and Memoranda], (Athens: 1913), τ' and Emmanuel Emmanuelidis, *Τα τελευταία Έτη της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας*, [The last years of the Ottoman Empire], (Athens: 1924), 307.

⁴² DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Gryparis to Constantinople Embassy, January 17, 1912.

it. I could ask for the greater sympathy from my free nation whose offspring I am too. I also appeal to Your justice and I dare to make the claim to be granted this."⁴³

Eventually, the minister, furious at Paritsis' attitude, imposed the will of the "national center" but he also promised him nomination in another sanjak of Thrace.⁴⁴ Thrace.⁴⁴ Together with displaying the national centre's difficulty in imposing options, this interesting incident nevertheless indicates the willingness of the candidates to recognize Athens as their authority. Aiming at changing the minister's mind, Paritsis showed great patriotism. It is therefore clear that the candidates largely depending on the acceptance of Athens were trying to claim from the Greek government their role as representatives of the nation.⁴⁵

Another crucial issue was the imposition of the consular authorities on the religious hierarchy. Even though the general rule was the clergy's obedience to the commands of Athens, the extent of their cooperation with the consular authorities varied according to the character, ideological identification and the interests of each Bishop. In fact, the confrontations between Consuls and Bishops were still recent in many parts of the vilayet where the former were trying to dismiss the latter if they did not serve the "national ideas." These confrontations had divided the local elites and the communities for many years.⁴⁶ In Saranta Ekklisies, where the opposition to the choices of the national center was strong, the Bishop had succumbed to the will of the local notables, thus making Greek Consul's work even harder: "I am afraid that our actions for the elections will fail because of the weakness of Bishop's character."⁴⁷ On the other hand, the example of the Bishop of Ainos, Ioakeim, is totally different. A strong and influential person, Ioakeim tried to impose his own choices on Athens. He threatened that if his candidate for Dedeğaç was not approved "he is discharged of any responsibility towards the R. Government."⁴⁸ Gryparis reacted decisively: "it is imperative that the Bishop of Ainos be informed that no excuse can exempt him from responsibility towards the R. Government and that he is not in charge of appointing candidates as this belongs to the responsibility of the national centers."⁴⁹ Consequently, the Minister had to confirm his authority not only towards the religious authorities who were against nationalist penetration but also towards those who, despite subscribing to a nationalist policy, exhibited tendencies towards independence.

However, the greatest difficulties emerged in the attempt to cooperate with the local elites. In order to eliminate local antagonisms, the consular authorities repeatedly

⁴³ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Gryparis to Mytilene Vice-Consulate, January 27, 1912 and Paritsis to Gryparis, January 29, 1912.

⁴⁴ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Gryparis to Mytilene Vice-Consulate, January 31, 1912.

⁴⁵ See also, Anagnostopoulou, op. cit., 485.

⁴⁶ Evangelia Choleva, "Εθνικές Αντιπαράθεσεις στη Νότια Θράκη: κοινωνικές, οικονομικές και ιδεολογικές παράμετροι," [“National Confrontations in Southern Thrace: social, economic and ideological parameters”], (PhD diss., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2015), 294-411.

⁴⁷ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Tserepis (Saranta Ekklisies) to Foreign Ministry and Constantinople Embassy, January 31, February 12 and 20, 1912.

⁴⁸ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Drosos (Dedeğaç) to Gryparis, February 28, March 2 and 16, 1912.

⁴⁹ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Gryparis to Dedeğaç Vice-Consulate, March 3, 1912.

tried to impose candidates who did not directly belong to the community, in the hope that such persons would be acceptable to all local factions. In Saranta Ekklesies, the elders preferred the local doctor Kirkos instead of the lawyer Eukleidis from Constantinople. The consular authorities consented on the condition that Kirkos, if elected, would resign to offer his place to another prominent candidate who had failed to be elected in another region.⁵⁰ Eukleidis had to face even more negative reactions in Raideostos, where the elders sent a letter to the Patriarchate to support the nomination of their preference. Although the Vice Consul finally managed to impose his candidacy, Eukleidis himself finally declined the nomination, disillusioned with the reactions.⁵¹ Eventually, Eukleidis was appointed in Dedeğaç where his candidacy was a mere formality since the outcome of the elections there had already been judged.⁵² In Adrianople, there was a big number of competing candidates and none of them could ensure the acceptance of all local factors. The Consul General Konstantinos Dimaras and the Bishop tried to further a compromise so as not to wither “their sought-after zeal for the elections.” The consultations lasted for more than one month but led anywhere and at the end, the two men were asked by the community to select the candidates themselves.⁵³ Those who were finally selected were close associates of the consulate and had distinguished themselves in the attempts to dismiss uncooperative Bishops over the last two decades. It is therefore apparent that the Greek diplomats had to take into account local alliances, personal interests and the ambitions of the local elites. Whether they opted for consultations or for a confrontation with the local element, they usually managed to impose their choices.

However, which were the criteria for the selection of the candidates? The primary condition was to commit themselves in advance that they would join the Greek Party in Parliament and that they would be loyal to the “Greek program,” something that was sometimes considered humiliating for their “pride.”⁵⁴ Furthermore, their influence in the community, their origin from a good family, their education and, of course, their “pure patriotic feelings” played a cardinal role. Equally impressive is the fact that those candidates characterized as “rather conservative” were excluded, even if they met the other criteria.⁵⁵ What did the Greek Consuls mean with this characterization? All the selected candidates were doctors or lawyers; none of them belonged to the upper social strata of the rich merchants, bankers, and powerful civil servants. They belonged to the middle classes which were not directly associated with the Ottoman establishment. Thus, the term “conservative” evidently meant people who were not close to the Ottoman administration.

⁵⁰ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Alexandropoulos (Constantinople) to Foreign Ministry, February 9, 1912.

⁵¹ DIAYE, 1912, 88.1, Koutsalexis (Raideostos) to Constantinople Embassy, February 17, 1912 and 24.4, Alexandropoulos to Foreign Ministry, February 27, 1912.

⁵² DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Drosos (Dedeğaç) to Foreign Ministry, March 16, 1912.

⁵³ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry and Constantinople Embassy, January 13, February 12 and March 12, 1912.

⁵⁴ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Gryparis, March 14, 1912.

⁵⁵ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, January 10, 1912.

The electoral campaign

Despite the fact that the elections of 1912 became known as "the big stick elections" due to the illegal means used by the CUP, they constitute a milestone in the political development of the Ottoman Empire. For the first time, two parties confronted each other in a full-scale electoral campaign, massive rallies were held, while the press not only covered the campaign but also took a lively part in the debate thus contributing to the political agenda. Nevertheless, the new legislation on press, public gatherings and society worked for the benefit of the CUP, as did its empire-wide organization.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the acute political rhetoric articulated by all sides instilled ethnic and sectarian-religious discord, which survived long after the elections.

In the Vilayet of Adrianople, the CUP managed to neutralize the efforts of the Liberals to organize themselves, let alone to conduct an electoral campaign. With violence, intimidation, displacement of candidates and open intervention by the local authorities in favor of the CUP, the Liberals avoided "to step out of their houses for fear of being murdered by the Committee and they are thinking of migrating to save their lives."⁵⁷ Even in the Sanjak of Gumuljina, where the opposition was stronger, the Greek Vice-Consul mentioned that "the lack of representatives of the Freedom and Accord Party in order to organize, encourage and indoctrinate the opposition to the Committee gives the impression that in the center of the opposition and throughout the Muslim community, the Young Turk autocracy prevails."⁵⁸ The Greek Consuls were disappointed with the lack of organization and the idleness of the new party and they were trying to give it a boost, even with financial contributions to its clubs.⁵⁹ They were also striving to mobilize the Greeks to help the opposition and they achieved it in Gumuljina, where the Liberals finally took action. This provoked the violent reaction of the Unionists. The peak of violence was the fierce beating of the prominent member of the opposition, Rıza Tevfik, who was transferred to the hospital only after the intervention of the Vicar Archimandrite Nikolaos.⁶⁰ With the exception of some isolated threats against specific persons, similar incidents did not take place against the Greeks, a fact indicating that the primary target of the CUP was the elimination of Muslim opposition. Indeed, in view of the decisiveness with which the CUP dealt with the situation, many of its members who had left before the elections, re-

⁵⁶ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 273 and Kayali, "Elections and the electoral process," *op.cit.*, 273-277.

⁵⁷ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Tserepis (Saranta Ekklesies) to Foreign Ministry, February 14, 1912.

⁵⁸ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Chalkiopoulos (Xanthi) to Foreign Ministry, February 9, 1912.

⁵⁹ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Drosos (Dedeğaç) to Gryparis, February 28, 1912.

⁶⁰ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Chalkiopoulos (Xanthi) to Foreign Ministry and Constantinople Embassy, February 28, March 2, 10 and 13, 1912.

turned.⁶¹ Reporting these developments, Dimaras had taken for granted the victory of the CUP and commented scathingly:

*“In Turkey, it is widely known that there is no public opinion. The people are un-structed and lack any political education. The prominent Muslims, either because of their education or because of their wealth, with a few exceptions, lack political pendency and they succumb to the powerful. [...] Who of the powerful Beys of Adrianople, who criticized harshly the Committee a while ago, appears now as its opponent? No one, not even the so-called candidates of the Freedom and Accord ty.”*⁶²

The political rhetoric used by the opposing parties is indicative of the toughness of the electoral confrontation. The main argument of the Unionists was that their policies would save the country, so whoever opposed them was an enemy of the state. On their part, the Liberals believed that the CUP centralizing policies were destroying the state and only with decentralization and liberalism that would be saved. However, the weak ideological content of the centralization-decentralization debate and the blurred lines between the two parties made their rhetoric adjustable to the local particularities of every region. Thus, trying to appeal to the non-Muslim vote, the Liberals were attacking the CUP for pursuing a policy of Turkification while the latter was refuting those claims pointing to its patriotic agenda.⁶³ The Greek rhetoric was based on the “program of the ethnicities,” which would be the only solution for the salvation of the Empire in contrast to the “Turkish” politics of the CUP.⁶⁴ However, as long as the Greeks were confronting the CUP, they were defending their national affiliations and this gave the Unionists grounds to question their allegiance to Ottomanism.

In Thrace, with the Liberals neutralized, the Unionist propaganda dominated the electoral process. Acting undisturbed, the CUP had managed to create a wide network of supporters, who were touring urban and rural areas spreading the Unionist propaganda. The latter identified the fate of the state with that of the CUP and claimed that “whoever follows the new party is an enemy of the Turkish Nation” because the former “united with the Christians, is working on the destruction of Turkey.”⁶⁵ These should be seen as indications of an emerging Turkish nationalism. However, the Unionist propaganda targeted equally the Christians, promoting against them a kind of nationalism chiefly based on religion. The editor of the newspaper *Valkan* in Filibe (Filippoupolis) visited almost all the sanjaks of the vilayet giving fiery speeches and exacerbating the situation. In Raidestos, he “at-

⁶¹ Kayali, op.cit., 274-276.

⁶² DIA YE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, January 19, 1912.

⁶³ Kayali, op.cit., 273-274.

⁶⁴ See for examples the journalistic organ of the PL, G. Bousios, «Εἰς τὰς Κάλπας», *Τὰ Δίκαια τῶν Εθνῶν*, January 15, 1912 and «Τὰ εθνικά κόμματα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ», *Φωνή*, January 29, 1912.

⁶⁵ DIA YE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, February 11, 1912 and Chalkiopoulos (Xanthi) to Foreign Ministry, February 3, 1912.

tacked the Greeks and the Bulgarians trying to inspire the hatred and aversion of the Muslims against them. He described the Greeks as traitors of the fatherland and the state, and as unworthy of Muslim people's trust. On the other hand, he portrayed the Bulgarians as savages and vicious killers. He suggested the abolition of Sunday holiday and the domination of the Turkish language in everything, because, as he pointed out, the state is exclusively Turkish."⁶⁶ In Saranta Ekklesies, he "expressed his surprise that too many Greek houses carried the colors of the Greek flag. In other places, he said, these would be burned down" and "the crowd was fanaticized and outraged against the Greek element."⁶⁷ In Dedeğaç, the former Şeyhülislam went even further: "The spilling of Kosmidis'⁶⁸ blood and of others like him does not bring harm, in other words, sin; the assassination of such people is a godly act. I will issue a fatwa for you. Kill them."⁶⁹ However, it is worth mentioning that these excesses were not reproduced by CUP formal political rhetoric. In his speech in Adrianople, the Minister of Public Works Cavid Bey did not make any references to such harshness. Instead, he stressed the need for a strong government and commented on several issues of foreign policy including the Cretan question with moderation.⁷⁰

Thus, the strategy of the CUP is easy to interpret. After the elimination of the opposition and the rallying of the Muslim element around the CUP, the Christians were left as the only supporters of the Liberals. This deprived the latter of any legitimization in the eyes of the Muslim population. Thus, the character of the confrontation changed from political to ethnic-religious, especially in the provinces where the Christians constituted the majority of the population. And since the Greeks were "enemies of the state" because they opposed CUP policies, their Ottomanism was in question, as did the legitimacy of their presence in the Ottoman context. At the same time, an early form of the emerging Turkish nationalism was evident in the middle and lower Muslim social strata. The latter played an increasingly important role, since the political influence of the elites was determined by their own vote. Therefore, the democratization of the political process caused the transformation of the political rhetoric in an interactive process.

Electoral irregularities and protests

The CUP was determined to use every means to secure the greatest possible preponderance in the new Parliament. If they used violence and intimidation in order to eliminate the Muslim opposition, they committed a series of electoral irregularities in order to limit the representation of the opposing Christian element. To some extent,

⁶⁶ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Koutsalexis (Raideostos) to Foreign Ministry, April 8, 1912.

⁶⁷ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Tserepis (Saranta Ekklesies) to Foreign Ministry, February 14, 1912.

⁶⁸ Padelis Kosmidis was one of leaders of the Greek Party and the PL. During the elections he was imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities for the republication of a British article which criticized CUP policies. «Η Φωνή και ο Υπεύθυνός της», *Δράσις*, February 10, 1912. For the article, see, «Εκ Λονδίνου», *Φωνή*, January 29, 1912.

⁶⁹ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Drosos (Dedeğaç) to Gryparis, March 2, 1912.

⁷⁰ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry, March 9, 1912.

the illegalities can also be attributed to the excess zeal of the local authorities, who owed their appointment to the favor of the CUP. Thus, their possible fall from would mean the loss of their offices.⁷¹

Throughout the Vilayet of Adrianople, irregularities against the Christians were the rule. They were even more flagrant where the Christians were the majority. In most electoral districts, the Greeks were almost excluded from electoral committees while the electoral districts which, according to the law, would have to meet the boundaries of each *nahiye* were arbitrarily delineated in order to secure a Muslim majority. In the electoral constituencies where the Christians were the majority, they used the number of 700–750 voters as an electoral basis for the appointment of each elector, whereas in regions where the Muslims dominated, the base was determined at 250–300 electors. Additionally, many Christian voters were arbitrarily deleted from the electoral registers and often elections were held at times when the Christian voters were unable to participate.⁷² The procedure was described as an electoral parody by the Greek Consul General of Adrianople while in his protest towards the government, the Patriarch complained about “the neutralization of the electoral forces of the Greek population.”⁷³ These irregularities did not determine the overall outcome of the elections since the CUP would probably have won even without them, but they significantly reduced the representation of the Greek element, actually placing it outside the Ottoman political frame. Nevertheless, the Ottoman authorities were not alone in the use of unfair means. In Dedeğaç, after primary elections were conducted and the Muslim electors commanded the majority, an attempt was made by the Greek consulate with Gryparis’s approval to bribe the Muslim electors in order to convince them to vote for the Greek candidate. However, this attempt was fruitless because even if the climate were favorable, they would have to bribe 7–10 electors, which would be very difficult.⁷⁴

Another crucial issue is how the Greeks reacted towards the electoral irregularities of the CUP. The Embassy in Constantinople organized a system of constant cycles of protests to the local Ottoman authorities up to the government itself.⁷⁵ As could be expected, most complaints were expressed by the religious authorities that formally represented the millet in Ottoman administration. This way, a plethora of complaints were evidently reaching the Ottoman authorities on a daily basis. Vague answers were given to these protests and no serious action was taken to remedy the complaints. Thus, it seems that the idea of abstention gained more and

⁷¹ Ergil, “A Reassessment,” op. cit., 43; Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, op. cit., 103–4; Kayali, op. cit., 276.

⁷² For the electoral irregularities in each sanjak see, *Ισοπολιτεία*, June 17, July 1, 15 and 22. Moreover, the sub file 24.4 of the Foreign Ministry Archive is full of such references.

⁷³ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry, March 22, 1912 and *Εκκλησιαστική Αλήθεια*, March 17, 1912.

⁷⁴ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Drosos (Dedeğaç) to Gryparis, March 16, 1912 and Alexandropoulos (Constantinople) to Dedeğaç Vice-Consulate, March 15, 1912.

⁷⁵ DIAYE, 1912, 23.1, Alexandropoulos (Constantinople), Circular, February 2, 1912.

more ground among the Greeks especially in Adrianople and in Goumouljina.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, Athens was staunchly opposed to such an eventuality for various reasons. Gryparis maintained that abstention, if opted for, would need to be universal to be effective, but due to the “loose cohesion of the Liberal Party,” this was not feasible. Furthermore, as some Greeks had already been elected with the CUP, abstention would not be justifiable. Last but not least, he stressed that in order for abstention to have an impact, it had to be the “beginning of a series of other measures of protest gradually applied from the weaker to the stronger. The Nation does not seem prepared for the implementation of such a series of measures.”⁷⁷ Indeed, if the Greeks abstained from the elections, they would actually decline their last bonds with the Ottoman political system. Abstention, thus, implied a breach for which neither the CUP nor the Greeks were ready. Thus, the minister recommended “the continuation of the joint struggle [with the Liberals] regardless of any pressure or arbitrariness by the Committee and the authorities.”⁷⁸

However, why did the Greek Government insist on the “struggle until the end” while the results of the successive protests proved negligible? The Greek policy-makers were well aware of the fact that these consecutive protests would not bring about any direct benefit. Yet, this process served the wider aims of Greek foreign policy. On the one hand, Athens wanted to make it clear to the Ottoman government that “the Christians keep a watchful eye on their constitutional rights,”⁷⁹ something compatible with the Greek desire for the improvement of the position of the Greeks in the empire. On the other hand, and this is of primary importance, the constant protests played a role in legitimizing the demand of the Balkan countries for the intervention of the Great Powers due to the oppression of Christian populations by the Ottoman authorities. It was not a coincidence that through the Greek diplomatic network, articles were published in Italian and Serbian newspapers that featured the oppression of the Christians during the Ottoman elections.⁸⁰ This way, an ostensibly internal Ottoman issue became an international one serving the national interests of Athens.

The electoral results

The results of the elections were a complete disaster for the opposition. The Liberals managed to elect only six deputies in a total of 275 while their most prominent members failed. The weakness of the Liberals to organize themselves into a solid party played a cardinal role in their defeat. This allowed for a drift of many of their members towards the CUP when its determination to win the elections became apparent. Furthermore, while the new party seemed to be reasonably successful in cities, it

⁷⁶ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, February 28, 1912, Chalkiopoulos (Xanthi) to Foreign Ministry, March 14, 1912 and Alexandropoulos (Constantinople) to Xanthi Vice-Consulate, March 17, 1912.

⁷⁷ DIAYE, 1912, 23.1, Gryparis to Constantinople Embassy, March 14, 1912.

⁷⁸ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Gryparis to Constantinople Embassy, March 15, 1912.

⁷⁹ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Constantinople Embassy, February 28, 1912.

⁸⁰ See the sub-file DIAYE, 1912, 23.1.1.

was almost unknown in the countryside. There, the CUP dominated fully, having managed to acquire the support of various local elites and their protégés.⁸¹ Thus, even if the CUP had not resorted to any illegal means, it is rather doubtful whether the Liberals would have been able to win the elections.

The Greeks who had identified with the Liberals saw a significant reduction in their representation in the new Parliament. In the end, only 15 deputies were the overwhelming majority of whom on the Unionist ballot.⁸² The PL failed to elect its candidates even in areas with a clear Greek majority, such as Chios and Lesbos. Only in Ioannina the two candidates of the PL were successful.⁸³ In the Vilayet of Adrianople, no Greek deputy managed to be elected. In all sanjaks, a Muslim majority in electors occurred, despite the presence of more than 300,000 Greeks in the region (see appendix).⁸⁴ Even in the Sanjak of Kallipolis where the Greek population was over twice as much as the Muslim, the candidate of the PL, St. Narlis, did not manage to be elected in contrast to the previous elections of 1908.

Despite the failure, the electoral alliances that had been contracted with the Bulgarians and the Liberals were more or less observed. At the Sanjaks of Adrianople and Dedeğaç, the Bulgarians supported the Greek candidates and only in the Sanjak of Saranta Ekklesies some leakages occurred.⁸⁵ The effective elimination of the Liberals from the electoral map did not benefit the Greek candidates. This meant that the Liberal Muslims were voted almost exclusively by Christian electors thus confirming the propaganda of the CUP accusing them of having “sold out to the Greeks.”⁸⁶ The only election that the Liberals won was that of the Kaza of Goumouljina. However, in the rest of the kazas of the sanjak, they did not manage to elect even one elector and the CUP easily won in this constituency as well.⁸⁷ These events confirm the claim of the CUP deputy Emmanuel Emmanuelidis that one of the main reasons why the Opposition “lacked any kind of power from the people, especially in the countryside, was its collaboration with the deputies of the PL.” He was also probably right in saying that “the patriotic actions and speeches of the PL were regarded by the Young Turks as useful for their own propaganda against the Turks [Turkish opposition].”⁸⁸

⁸¹ Ahmad, op. cit., 104 and Kayali, op. cit., 275.

⁸² Boura, “The Greek millet”, op. cit., 198 and Anagnostopoulou, op. cit., 493.

⁸³ DIAYE, 1912, 23.1.2, Ioannina Consulate to Foreign Ministry, June 16, 1912. Boura also mentions that the candidates of the PL were elected in Kallipolis and in Serres, something which is not substantiated by the Foreign Ministry Archives. For the Sanjak of Serres see, DIAYE, 23.1.2, Kavalieratos (Serres) to Foreign Ministry, May 18, 1912.

⁸⁴ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry, April 12, 1912.

⁸⁵ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry, April 2, 1912, Drosos (Dedeğaç) to Gryparis, March 16, 1912 and Tserepis (Saranta Ekklesies) to Foreign Ministry, April 12, 1912.

⁸⁶ Anagnostopoulou, op. cit., 492.

⁸⁷ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Chalkiopoulos (Xanthi) to Foreign Ministry, March 19 and April 20, 1912.

⁸⁸ Emmanuelidis, *Ta Tελευταία έτη*, op. cit., 307-8.

Defeat led to a transient questioning of the policy of the PL. Despite the reactions and the division of the millet, however, its alignment with the Greek state could not be disputed or reversed. The Greek voters supported the policy of the PL. In Thrace, the lack of “anti-national” candidates favored the rallying of the Greek population around the PL, thus making the elections more of a national than a political issue. Moreover, no mass protests were recorded. Of course, the restrictive climate imposed by the CUP played a crucial role, but as a whole, the picture that emerges is that the Greeks were too disillusioned to act vigorously. Dimaras had tried to explain this attitude just before the proclamation of the elections:

*“I can adamantly say that [the Christian element] is characterized by disbelief, pessimism and disillusionment. The various irregularities of the Committee during the last three years, the terrorism exercised by them, the tendency to turkify everything, thing, the plotting against the privileges of the ethnicities and generally all their irregularities eliminated any hope of the Christian element that the situation can ever be improved in Turkey.”*⁸⁹

This was also a strong legitimizing factor of Venizelos’ policy to participate eventually in the Balkan War against the Ottoman Empire.

Conclusions

In the 1912 elections, the stakes were not only the control of the Parliament. The opponents projected their ideas for the salvation of the empire and an issue of this magnitude naturally raised passions. Thus, the electoral confrontation magnified the cleavages between them. The means used by the Unionists discredited constitutionalism and made apparent that the CUP domination of the political process could not be disputed through legal means. In the summer of 1912, the CUP was overthrown by a military coup resulting in its further radicalization when it returned to power, also through a coup, next January.⁹⁰ This breach with legality, which had begun with the elections, affected all aspects of Ottoman society. By shaking the whole Ottoman edifice, the already fragile connections between ethno-religious groups suffered a serious blow.

This process is evident in the case of the Vilayet of Adrianople. The electoral confrontation turned into an ethnic or religious struggle while the Greeks supported the candidates of the PL thus legitimizing the involvement of the Greek consular authorities in the electoral process. The latter managed in most cases to impose the choices of the Greek Government on the millet despite random local resistance. However, this was a reciprocal process. The illegal means used by the CUP and the final lack of representation of the Greeks in the Ottoman Parliament either with the CUP or with the PL contributed to their full alienation from a system that they felt was trying to ex-

⁸⁹ DIA YE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry, December 8, 1911.

⁹⁰ Ahmad, op. cit., 105-120 and Kayali, op. cit., 277.

clude them. Consequently, it was quite natural that they would turn openly to Greece for the protection of their rights and the preservation of their ethnicity. This turn was accelerated and completed by the war that broke out a few months later.

Another dimension of the elections which has to be highlighted is that of Thrace as a bone of contention. For the Greek policy-makers, the election of Greek deputies in the province was considered as a testament to its undisputed Hellenic character. Respectively, the Exarchists' anxiety of electing their candidate in the Sanjak of Saranta Ekklisies was closely related to the territorial claims of Bulgaria. Moreover, although the Unionists tried to ensure the representation of Greek populations in other provinces, in the Vilayet of Adrianople, they included no Christians in their ballot except for an Armenian in Raidestos, who was considered "harmless" since neither an Armenian state existed nor the Armenians could ever claim a part of Thrace. With this move, the CUP evidently aimed to establish the unquestionable Muslim-Turkish character of the region. Besides, the symbolic value of Thrace and especially of Adrianople for the Ottomans is well-known. The fact that a few months after the elections, the CUP staged a coup in order to save Adrianople from the Bulgarian army is very telling. The whole process described here was a part of the transition from a pre-modern imperial state of affairs to one of nation-states on the western model.

INDEX

1. Electors in every sanjak in comparison with the population (male and female).⁹¹

Sanjak	Muslims	Greeks	Bulgarians	Armenians	Jews	Total
Edirne	134 (153,893)	38 (103,258)	6 (36,783)	2 (4,899)	5 (15,534)	185 (316,615)
Gümülcine	120 (239,870)	7 (21,545)	4 (28,614)	- (493)	- (1,290)	131 (292,120)
Gelibolu	32 (25,955)	26 (64,604)	- (1,474)	- (1,133)	2 (2,336)	60 (95,822)
Tekfurdağı	53 (76,813)	17 (53,427)	2 (5,746)	8 (19,014)	- (2,654)	80 (159,002)
Dedeağaç	29 (43,735)	14 (27,573)	3 (16,923)	- (456)	- (326)	46 (89,033)
Kirkkilise	64 (78,338)	21 (70,501)	6 (29,736)	- (149)	- (1,699)	91 (181,204)
Total	432 (618,604)	123 (340,908)	21 (119,476)	10 (26,144)	7 (23,839)	593 (1,133,796)

2. Electoral results of the second phase – numbers denoting electors⁹²A) Sanjak of Kirkkilise:

Emrullah (CUP): 69

Ömer Naci (CUP): 64

Bourilakov: 26

Kirkos: 22

B) Sanjak of Gümülcine:

CUP: 96 Muslim electors

⁹¹ DIAYE, 1912, 24.4, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry, April 12, 1912. For the population, Karpas, op. cit., 166-167.

⁹² DIAYE, 24.4, Tserepis (Saranta Ekklesies) to Foreign Ministry, April 12, 1912, Dimaras (Adrianople) to Foreign Ministry, April 2, 1912, Koutsalexis (Raideostos) to Foreign Ministry, April 3, 1912, Chalkiopoulos (Xanthi) to Foreign Ministry, April 7, 1912.

Liberals: 23 Muslim electors

7 Greeks

4 Bulgarians

Γ) Sanjak of Edirne:

Faik (CUP): 142

Emin (CUP): 142

Talaat (CUP): 141

Theofilidis: 44

Kallivoulos: 42

Rıza Tevfik: 33

Dilaver: 11

Δ) Sanjak of Gelibolu:

Hüseyin Ulvi (CUP): 34

Narlis: 26

NO RACISM HERE:

Modern Turkey and the question of race and national identity

Didier Drogba and Emmanuel Eboué, two top football players for the Galatasaray club from the Ivory Coast in West Africa, were subjected to vile racist chants from fans in the terraces during a match in Istanbul in May 2013.¹ Many leading figures in Turkish football and sport journalism were quick to criticise the behaviour of fans, saying such “rude” behaviour is unacceptable in Turkish football. There also was almost universal criticism of the fans’ behaviour as rude and totally unacceptable in such a passionate, football-crazy, and “peace loving” nation with a strong tradition of hospitality towards foreigners. However, there was an equally strong denial the fans’ behaviour was not racist, based on a claim Turkish identity and culture don’t include any racist aspects, and that racism is completely out of Turkish character.²

At a press conference, the Turkish football club, Fenerbahce, defended its fans waving of bananas at the players during the match, saying that there were no racist intentions. One fan who was photographed waving a banana claimed he had undergone a medical operation and was now on a fruit rich diet, and the banana was for his own consumption. He then added that some of his friends are black! Another fan, who was also filmed waving a banana, said he had also no racist intentions, claiming he didn’t even understand the term, racism, but rather was simply offered a banana by his friend to eat, and in the excitement of that moment of the match they shouted for their team while holding their bananas in their hands!³ These explanations were accepted and circulated by the majority of commentators, both in football journalism and in the wider media in Turkey, implying they were more credible than the idea there is racism at work in Turkish culture.

Not much occurs in this country that does not bear directly or indirectly on football. In February 2006, when Samuel Eto’o famously walked off the pitch after Real Zaragoza fans shouted racist slogans at him during a La Liga game, one Turkish journalist wrote that Eto’o was warming to the idea of coming to Turkey

* Bulent Gokay is Professor of International Relations, Keele University.

* Dr. Darrell Whitman, a founding member of the *Journal of Global Faultlines*, is an investigative journalist, currently based in Chisinau, Moldova.

¹ Palash Gosh, “As Erdogan Meets Obama, Africans in Turkey Face Racism, Discrimination,” *International Business Times*, 16 May 2013, <http://www.ibtimes.com/erdogan-meets-obama-africans-turkey-face-racism-discrimination-1265037> (accessed in December 2014).

² Emre Akoz, “Drogba’ya Muz: Terbiyesizce Ama Irkci Degil,” *Sabah*, 15 May 2013, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/akoz/2013/05/15/drogbaya-muz-terbiyesizce-ama-irkci-degil> (accessed in December 2014).

³ *Hurriyet Daily News*, 15 May 2013, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-football-goes-bananas-in-racism-row.aspx?pageID=238&nID=46955&NewsCatID=362> (accessed in March 2016).

because there is no racism in Turkey to bother him.⁴ This debate and publicity about racism in football reflects a wider problem in Turkish society. Football, which Eduardo Galeano described as “ritual sublimation of war,” occupies a very important place in Turkey,⁵ and has always been highly political. When Fuat Hüsni (Kayacan), a Military Academy student in the Ottoman Empire, formed the very first Turkish-Muslim team, the *Black Stockings*, in 1901, he was charged in a military court with “setting up goal posts, wearing the same uniforms as Greeks, and kicking a ball around.”⁶

The claim that there is and was no racism in Turkey is an illusion; there are no known societies in the world where racism has been rendered non-existent, in the sense that “no civilisation has a monopoly on racism.”⁷ In Turkey, however, this claim/ illusion is so widespread and embedded it has become one of the main clichés about Turkish culture shared by a majority of the population and repeated by journalists and politicians too often. Many citizens, political leaders and cultural elites from all sides of Turkish political spectrum, strongly deny there is racism in Turkey – arguing instead theirs is one of the most hospitable and inclusive cultures in the world. For example, Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc, claimed on 26 March 2015, “Thank God... there is no racism in Turkey; it has never found a base for its roots. When we look at Europe and other countries we see how far behind us they are, and we feel really sorry.”⁸

“The dominant race in a society, whether white or otherwise, rarely admits to its own racism. Denial is near universal. The reasons are manifold. It has a huge vested interest in its own privilege. It will often be oblivious to its own prejudices. It will regard its racist attitudes as nothing more than common sense, having the force and justification of nature. Only when challenged by those on the receiving end is racism outed, and attitudes begin to change. The reason why British society is less nakedly racist than it used to be is that whites have been forced by people of colour to ques-

⁴ *Internet Haber*, 27 February 2006, <http://www.internethaber.com/etoo-turkiyeye-geldi-2453h.htm> (accessed in March 2016); *Milliyet Internet*, 26 February 2006, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/02/26/son/sonspo01.asp> (accessed in March 2016).

⁵ Eduardo Galeano, *Soccer in Sun and Shadow*, translated by Mark Fried, (London and New York: Verso, 2003 – first published in 1998), 17.

⁶ “Futbolun ustundeki politika golgesi,” *NTV*, 22 February 2011, <http://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/spor/futbolun-ustundeki-politika-golgesi,BLZYs8j6JU6AOH50VARc3A/xbuKbXwS8U-ovWiRi6ENmw> (accessed in March 2016).

⁷ “Étienne Balibar: War, racism and nationalism,” *An interview with Etienne Balibar* by Clement Petitjean, 17 November 2015, Verso books blog, <http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/1559-etienne-balibar-war-racism-and-nationalism> (accessed in January 2016).

⁸ *Hurriyet Daily News*, 26 March 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/deputy-pm-says-there-is-no-racism-in-turkey-at-opening-of-renovated-synagogue-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=80216&NewsCatID=341> (accessed in September 2015).

tion age-old racist assumptions. Nations are never honest about themselves: they are all in varying degrees of denial.”⁹

Academic discussions of Turkey’s history and its contemporary politics and culture has generally been underpinned by the assumption, “Turkish nationalism is ethnic, or...cultural, nationalism. It is rather an inclusive civic nationalism.”¹⁰ Or, as another writer claims, “Kemalist nationalism is cultural and political, not racist... Turkish history and...textbooks...echo the inclusionary and homogenising character of Turkish nationalism.”¹¹ And, “the Kemalist notion of nationalism...is not based on race or ethnicity...it aimed at the creation of a homogenous Turkish nation based on the unity of culture, language and ideals,” claimed in another book by two significant political scientists on Turkish identity and nationalism.¹² And, “racism is a rare phenomenon in Turkey, even among nationalist thinkers,” claimed by another academic.¹³ These comments reflect a general contemporary assumption by many researchers, both in Turkey and outside, who argue that Turkish nationalism is among those most civic nationalisms of Europe, and therefore has no racist aspects.¹⁴

A number of critical studies appeared from late 1990s onwards. However, they mainly focus on the early republican period, arguing that avowedly secular Kemalist elite was not essentially racist, but its approach to ethnic and religious minorities was not in harmony with “egalitarian” and laic Turkish constitution.¹⁵ Murat Ergin, in his excellent sociological research of the early republican period, goes one step further and accepts that the issue of race was at the centre of Kemalist modernisation process and did perform an important function in the 1930s, “regulating the negotiations between Turkish identity and modernity.” To Ergin too, however, racial discourses adopted by early republican elite was rather accidental, an indirect result of a desperate search for finding a strong positive national identity within the context of 1930s’ European modernity.¹⁶

⁹ Martin Jacques, “The global hierarchy of race,” *the Guardian* (20 September 2003), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/sep/20/race.uk> (accessed in July 2015).

¹⁰ Metin Heper, “Kemalism/ Atatürkism,” *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey*, ed. by Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari, (Routledge, 2013), 139-148.

¹¹ Meral U Cinar, *Collective Memory and National Membership: Identity and Citizenship Models in Turkey and Austria* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 32-33.

¹² William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey, The case of the AKP* (London: Routledge, 2010), chapter 11.

¹³ Umut Uzer, “Racism in Turkey; The Case of Hüseyin Nihal Atsız,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 22, No. 1, 2002, 119.

¹⁴ Ayhan Aktar, “Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını ‘Doğru’ Yorumlamak” [“Interpreting the Jewish Incidents of Thrace Right”], *Tarih ve Toplum*, 155, (1996), 45-56; Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey. Who is a Turk?* (Routledge, 2006), 63-64.

¹⁵ N. Maksudyân, “The Turkish Review of Anthropology and The Racist Face of Turkish Nationalism,” *Cultural Dynamics*, 17(3), November 2005, 291-322; S. Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?*

¹⁶ M. Ergin, “Biometrics and anthropometrics: the twins of Turkish modernity,” *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2008, 282-304; M. Ergin, “Is the Turk a White Man?” towards a Theoretical

The purpose of this article is to challenge these claims by revealing there is a “dark side” to Turkish nationalism, and that the official discourse of Turkish nationalism as inclusive and civic suppresses another truth that an explicitly ethnic and racial discourse shaped Turkish nationalism in the early years of the republic and continues to define modern Turkish nationalism in the 21st century. We focus first on how “race” has been a central tenet in the formation and development of Turkish identity, and argue there is little or no evidence to support that claim, that an obsession with racial characteristics of Turks, such as blood and other allegedly unique physical aspects of Turkish race, continues. Secondly, we describe how the founders of the Turkish Republic interpreted Turkish nationalism by mimicking or emulating key aspects of white European racism, which suggested a “white race” was an “ideal,” which then became the signifier of citizenship in the new Turkey.

The (re-)birth of Turkish nation

The modern Turkish state emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire which which was on the defeated side in the First World War, 1914–1918. Immediately after after the end of the Great War, an independence war began against the Greek army in Anatolia, which was acting with the full support of the Allied powers. This extended the fighting on Turkish soil by an extra four years, and became to be known as the Turkish War of Independence. Following the defeat of the Greek military on 15 September 1922, the ceasefire of 11 October forced the Greek army to evacuated eastern Thrace leading to the opening of the Lausanne peace conference. While the conference maintained suspense over the conclusion of peace, in 1923 Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal began to establish basic institutions as well as policies for the new Turkey. During this time, Mustafa Kemal developed his critique of economic backwardness of his country and its culture, and introduced his main goal: how to achieve western standards of political and economic management, or in other words “how to make Turkey European.” The model for a new nation-state, Mustafa Kemal believed, was to be found in the civilization(s) of Europe and the West, where he believed modern thought and reason had made societies developed and prosperous.¹⁷

Mustafa Kemal genuinely believed that “new Turkey” should cut all its “Eastern/Muslim” origins adrift and define its new identity within the framework of the “white/Western” civilizations. Even at the moment of opposition to the plans of the European powers over Turkish lands, the self-Orientalised Turkish elite deployed Euro-Orientalist perceptions in the formulation of Turkish national-self and legitimacy.¹⁸ In doing this, the Turkish delegation at Lausanne sought to convince the British, French and Italian delegates that “new Turkey” had nothing in common with the “old Eastern/

Framework for Race in the Making of Turkishness, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 6 (Nov., 2008), 827-850.

¹⁷ Lord Kinross, *Ataturk. The Birth of A Nation*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pb edition in 1990 – first published in 1964), 411-464.

¹⁸ Suna Kili, *The Ataturk Revolution. A Paradigm of modernization*, (Istanbul: Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari, 2003), 83-90.

Muslim Turk” represented by the Ottoman Empire, and attempted to “prove” the Turkish race was part of the white European race and had nothing to do with ward Oriental/ Eastern races.”¹⁹

Such an emphasis on colour and on whiteness in particular, was in line with the general “scientific” context existing in late 19th and early 20th century Europe, where the concept of race was a preoccupation for the growing fields of human sciences. In particular, during the 1920s and 30s, the doctrine of race reached a crest of acceptability and popularity among respectable intellectual circles in Europe.²⁰ However, a large number of so-called scientific researchers were involved in developing the concept of Aryan supremacy, which later fuelled the institutional racism of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s. Mustafa Kemal’s thinking to a large extent was influenced by these ideas when he launched his version of Turkish-ness in the 1920s. By design, this new version of Turkish identity provided some comfort and an extra boost for Turkish national pride and self-esteem, which sadly had been undermined during years of decline in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. To accomplish this, physical anthropology, historical writing, and linguistics were tailored to produce tools to construct a “positive” national identity. This then started an official process of drafting/ constructing historical narratives for the younger generations as well as imposing a new identity from above.

A number of institutions were established to support this nation-building process. These collected “scientific” data to prove that the Turks were indeed a white European Aryan race. In this way, race was employed to legitimize and rationalize the political geometry of the emerging Turkish nation-state, giving it a position within the global hierarchy of races. As discussed below, the late 1920s and early 1930s witnessed the birth of the most significant tools for this campaign within three key institutions: The Turkish Institute of Anthropology, Turkish Historical Society and Turkish Linguistic Society.

The Turkish Institute of Anthropology was founded first in 1925, and enjoyed strong support from top officials of the state. The Institute was created as a unit within the Medical School of Istanbul University, and named the Anthropology Research Centre. Later, after the university reform, it was connected to the School of Science and then in 1935 it was transferred to the School of Languages History and Geography in Ankara. The centre began publishing *The Journal of Turkish Anthropology* in 1925 in two languages, Turkish and French, which funded research and published various claims about the Turkish race using physical anthropological methods. The first research article published in March 1926 was titled, “comparative analysis of the Turkish race and other races living in Istanbul.” In it,

¹⁹ B. Gokay, *A Clash of Empires*, (London: Tauris, 1997), 151-163.

²⁰ The Europeans’ belief in their inherent superiority found its most systematic expression in the doctrine of racial typology, according to which the human population consisted of a limited number of permanent human types with distinctive characteristics. (Michael Banton, *Racial Theories*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 54-56.)

Greeks, Jews and Armenians were named as “other races living in Istanbul,”²¹ a categorization clearly borrowed from the scientific racism of the West. Over time, Turkish researchers turned their attention to embryology and genetics to an effort to make a case to rejuvenate Turkish race as white-Aryan, and not Middle Eastern.

The Turkish Historical Society was established six years after the founding of Turkish Institute of Anthropology for a similar purpose, and became one of the major major instruments for manufacturing a kind of Turkish history to support the construction of a new Turkish ethnicity. These claimed links that connected the people of Turkey with a mythical bloodline to pre-Islamic “white” ancestors in ancient central Asia, and a handful of scholars and their research teams were employed to dig out relevant evidence to further develop this claim under the strict supervision of Atatürk himself.²²

The Turkish Linguistic Society was established in 1932 with the first Turkish Linguistic Congress which explained its task as “to bring light, the beauty and the richness of the Turkish language and to elevate it to the height that befits its value among the languages of the world.”²³ This purification of the language was soon extended to claims the Turkish language was the first and primeval language, and that all other languages were derived from it – the so-called Sun Language Theory. On the basis of such linguistic claims, the Kurds, who made up about one-fifth of Turkey’s population, were described as uncivilised, so-called “mountain Turks.” Ismail Besikçi, a Turkish sociologist, was likely the first to expose these were Turkish racist theories, which were introduced to support the denial of Kurdish ethnicity in official state discourse.²⁴

In 1925, Ismet Inonu, the first Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic and Mustafa Kemal closest associate, expressed this sentiment bluntly:

*“we are openly nationalists... and nationalism is our unifying feature. Other ethnic groups have no effect on the Turkish majority. Our job is to turn the non-Turks of this land into Turks! Those who are opposed to Turks and Turkishness will be cut off [from society].”*²⁵

²¹ Nazan Maksudyan, “The Turkish Review of Anthropology and the racist face of Turkish nationalism,” *Cultural Dynamics*, 17(3), (2005), 291-314.

²² For the history of the TTK, <http://www.ttk.gov.tr/index.php?Page=Sayfa&No=1> (accessed in September 2015).

²³ Turk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti Nizamnamesi (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1932), 3

²⁴ Ismail Besikçi, *Türk Tarih Tezi, Gunes-Dil Teorisi ve Kurt Sorunu* [The Turkish History Thesis, The Sun-Language Theory and Kurdish Question], (Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1991 – first published in 1979).

²⁵ Given in Zeynel Abidin Besleney, *The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey: A Political History*, (Routledge, 2014), 73.

Later in 1930, Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), the Justice Minister, was even more candid:

*"I am a member [of the CHP] because by doing what it has done to date, this party has reinstated the Turkish nation, the real master to its rightful position. I want to tell everyone, friend and foe alike, that Turks are the masters of this land. Those who are not real Turks have only one right in the Turks' homeland – that is the right to be a servant, the right to be a slave."*²⁶

From the beginning the new Turkey identified itself directly and immediately with the history, culture and perceptions and judgments of the western world, claiming a total break with the Ottoman and Islamic past. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself famously vowed to "cleanse the Turkish mind from its Arabic roots."²⁷ What is particularly interesting in this process, white supremacist racial definitions were borrowed and reproduced, identifying Turks as an ethnic group that was privileged at the expense of other groups. The category of the "white race" was originally invented in the late 17th and early 18th century, in Theodore Allen's words, "as a ruling class social control formation" meant as the means for powerful European-American elites to exploit and effectively control the labour power of black slaves. Tragically, it was adopted and used as a guiding principle in the new Turkish Republic,²⁸ which defined Turks as the "whites" of Turkey - more intelligent and civilised, more creative and morally upright than other, "inferior" races, and by extension other religious and ethnic minorities living in Turkey.

In 1935, the tomb of Mimar Sinan, the most acclaimed architect of the Ottoman Empire, was opened by a team formed by the Turkish Historical Society with the aim of measuring with compasses and other tools and proving that Sinan's centuries-old skull was a clear indication of his "pure Turkish stock."²⁹ Measuring skull sizes, craniology, was something which could not have been imagined in the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire.³⁰ Turkish Historical Congresses met in 1932 and 1937, where the "scientific" origins of Turkish-ness, blood and hereditary ties were debated openly, and an agreement was reached on essential purity and supremacy of Turkish blood. Eugene Pittard,³¹ the Swiss anthropologist, whose work was seen

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Merve Sebnem Oruc, "It's Our History, Idiot," *Daily Sabah*, 10 December 2014, <http://www.dailysabah.com/columns/merve-sebnem-oruc/2014/12/10/it-is-our-history-idiot> (accessed in March 2016).

²⁸ Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of The White Race*, vol. II, (London, New York: Verso, 2012 – first Verso ed. 1997), 107, 116-117, 562-568.

²⁹ "Peerless Turkish architect claimed to be headless in tomb," 7.9.2010, *Turkish Daily News*, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=-2010-07-09> (accessed in March 2016).

³⁰ Craniology was the belief that the size of the brain or skull represented the superiority or inferiority of certain individuals or ethnic/ racial groups.

³¹ Eugene Pittard, "Neolitik Devirde Kucuk Asya ile Avrupa Arasinda Antropolojik Munasebetler," *Belleten*, 2/5-6 (April 1938), 38.

and practiced as a racist account of humanity, not only participated but was announced as the honorary president of these congresses.³²

“[A]n open heart full of pure feelings and friendship” for all³³

It has always been claimed that recognition of a citizenship of Turkey was based on universal rights of the entire population, and that the new Turkish state considered all peoples of the world equal whatever their ethnic and religious backgrounds. This follows from Mustafa Kemal’s statement that “new Turkey” is structured on principles of humanism and the vision of a united humanity.

Mustafa Kemal was praised as a great humanist leader of modern times for these these much quoted words: “I look to the world with an open heart and full of pure feelings and friendship.”³⁴ However, like many other nationalist ideologies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Turkish nation-building process happened within the context of a particular hierarchy of races according to which non-Turkish groups were considered second class/ inferior compared with the dominant group of Turks. In 1936, influential historian Semseddin Günaltay gave a lecture titled, “The Homeland of the Turks and the Question of Their Race.” In the lecture, he described the supposed racial origins of Turks, classifying Turks as “pure white,” by virtue of the original homeland of the Turks in Turkistan, which he referred to as, the “cradle of the Neolithic age.” What makes these words more significant is Günaltay also was a prominent member of the Turkish parliament, a close associate of Mustafa Kemal, and a highly influential scholar who would later preside over the Institute for Turkish History. By insisting on Turks whiteness and Europeanness, Günaltay was playing within the existing racial hierarchy, trying to portray the Turkish race as close as possible to what he considered the dominant group, the white European, who were the standard bearer of cultural worthiness.³⁵

Racial hierarchy is the categorization of races on the basis of their physical and perceived attributes. Based on these characteristics, races are ranked at the top or at the bottom of the hierarchy. This structure then helps to shape the power and the prejudices of each race.

³² Afet Inan, Mustafa Kemal’s adopted daughter, gained her PhD in the University of Geneva in 1939 under the supervision of Eugene Pittard. Inan’s PhD thesis was on the racial characteristics of the Turkish people. (see Zafer Toprak, “Atatürk, Eugène Pittard ve Afet hanım. En büyük antropolojik anket,” *Toplumsal Tarih Dergisi*, no. 215 (January 2011), 20-24.) Eugene Pittard’s work was supporting “scientific racism,” i.e. the belief that the white race must avoid coming into contact with the non-white races for fear of racial contamination. Pittard wrote his *Race and History* in 1926 where he sets out a definite relationship between race and social behaviour based on a study of human skulls and brains and classified various racial groups according to their intellectual capabilities.

³³ <http://www.columbia.edu/~sss31/Turkiye/ata/hayati.html#peace> (accessed in March 2016).

³⁴ <http://www.columbia.edu/~sss31/Turkiye/ata/hayati.html#peace> (accessed in March 2016).

³⁵ Kader Konuk, “Eternal guests, mimics, and dönme: The place of German and Turkish Jews in modern Turkey,” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 37 (2007), 10.

*“The existence of a de facto global racial hierarchy helps to shape the nature of racial prejudice exhibited by other races. Whites are universally respected, even that respect is combined with strong resentment. A race generally defers to those above it in the hierarchy and is contemptuous of those below it. [...] This the centrality of colour to the global hierarchy. Other factors serve to define and force a race's position in the hierarchy-levels of development, civilisational values, history, religion, physical characteristics and dress - but the most insistent and spread is colour. The reason is that colour is instantly recognisable, it defines difference at the glance of an eye. It also happens to have another effect. It makes the al hierarchy seem like the natural order of things: you are born with your colour, something nobody can do anything about, it is neither cultural nor social but in origin.”*³⁶

The founders of the Turkish Republic accepted this hierarchy of races and tried to present Turks as part of the dominant white European group. This “whiteness”³⁷ thereafter provided a racially-coded discourse of power for Turkey’s self-consciously crafted “Western identity.”³⁸

Over the last 90 years, there have been accounts of prejudice, discrimination and open hostility experienced by the Republic’s minorities, non-Muslim groups as well as Muslim Kurds and Alawites. It’s worth noting that the terms “Turkish blood” and “Turkish ethnicity” have been used interchangeably in official documents, as well as in public statements made by state officials. When in July 2010 General Basbug, the highest ranking military officer in Turkey in 2010, referred to “real Turkish blood” in a speech on TV, or state officials, in a news conference in Eskisehir in January 2009 displayed placards with slogans as “No Armenians and Jews are allowed through this door... but it is free for dogs to enter,” they were revealing just the tip of an iceberg.³⁹

In the republican period, Mustafa Kemal and his close associates tried to create an ethnically homogeneous country, a “pure Turkish Turkey,” from the ruins of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire.⁴⁰ The ethnic cleansing of the Armenian citizens of the Empire in 1915 – the first major, brutal act of ethnic cleansing of the 20th cen-

³⁶ Martin Jacques, “The global hierarchy of race,” *the Guardian* (20 September 2003), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/sep/20/race.uk> (accessed in July 2015).

³⁷ For a detailed discussion of “whiteness” and “white privilege” see Leonardo Zeus, “The color of supremacy: Beyond the discourse of ‘white privilege,’” in E. Taylor, D. Gillborn and G. Ladson-Billings (eds), *Foundations of critical race theory in education*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 261-276.

³⁸ Meltem Ahiska, “Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Volume 102, Number 2/3, Spring/Summer 2003, 351-379.

³⁹ Radikal, 07 January 2009, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/kopekler-girermis-yahudiler-ve-ermeniler-giremezmi-915950/> (accessed in March 2016); Esra Ozyurek, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* (Duke University Press, 2006), 113.

⁴⁰ Erik Jan Zürcher, “Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908-1938.” In Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey*, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 150-179.

tury, which followed the population exchanges between Turkey and Greece under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, cleared the ground by cleansing large numbers of non-Turkish elements. Not accidentally, the forced Greco-Turkish population exchange of 1923 has been identified as a predecessor to Nazi ethnic population policies that followed.

This preconditioning can be seen in the way that the racist German press in the 1920s and 1930s linked Atatürk's policies and reforms to the debate over Nazi's ethnic homogeneity claims, and the perception of Turkey's "ethnically homogeneous" success story continued to appear explicitly in the Nazi discourse during the interwar period. For example, in 1922 the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the Nazi Party's weekly paper, praised Atatürk as the "Father of the Turks," "strong man" and real leader who embodied the "heroic spirit" and the *Führerprinzip* that demanded absolute obedience.⁴¹ Being against multi-ethnic entities Nazi commentators praised the so-called ethnic cleansing of Anatolia, from the 1915 Armenian genocide to 1923 Greco-Turkish forced population exchange, calling for the adaptation of "Turkish method" for an effective solution to its minority question.⁴²

The "enlightened" leaders of the new Turkey considered themselves as social engineers who could establish a "society of science."⁴³ The Turkification project as a part of this modernisation process was conceived racially, following the larger discourse of the time offered by advocates for white European, Aryan races. When Kemal spoke of the future of his country in terms of a western idea, he also was reaffirming the self-identity of a small Turkish elite of which he was a distinguished member. This adoption included the "performance for the imagined Western audience,"⁴⁴ such as adopting the "respectable taste and behavior" of dominant white European culture by imitating western styles. This included wearing western clothes, listening to western classical music, etc. The western-oriented Turkish elite also would and did use this privileged position to feel superior to their own people.

The adoption of this racially defined identity also enable the Turkish elite to articulate the "Eastern," the "Oriental," the "Muslim Turk," to a receptive Western audience, creating the appearance that as a "westernized" Turkish elite they were "*enlightened natives*." Yet, they were never regarded as authentically or accepted as white. For example, in 1927 a British official described Mustafa Kemal and his close associates in Ankara as follows:

"It is consequently disturbing to us to come suddenly upon the Asiatic in his natural nakedness, and it is only after close contact with the men in power in Turkey today that one bows to the essential truth that Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his entourage are

⁴¹ Dominic Green, "Why Hitler Wished he was Muslim," *The Wall Street Journal* (16 January 2015).

⁴² See Stefan Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* (Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2014).

⁴³ Sena Karasipahi, *Muslims in Modern Turkey*, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 48-49.

⁴⁴ Meltem Ahiska, "Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102, 2/3, 2003, 367.

*crude orientals, ...whose Western civilisation is still in the main no more than an ignorant aspiration...*⁴⁵

Eventually, Kemal's "modern Turkey" was accepted, but only as a useful outsider incorporated into the West as a weak partner.

The self-perceptions of individual members of the Turkish elite have remained closely rooted in the identity-formation processes of those early days, and therefore it wasn't difficult for the whole country to slip into an extreme nationalistic and racist frenzy against "others" from time to time. During the 90-year history of the Turkish Republic, racism and ethnic discrimination have been prevalent and institutionalised against non-Muslim and non-Sunni Muslim minorities, and there were many occasions when social and political feelings erupted into widespread violence against these groups. To cite just a few significant examples:

On 6 September 1955, the newspaper *Istanbul Express* published the news of the bombing of Atatürk's birthplace in Thessaloniki, claiming that the house was bombed by Greeks. Pro-government nationalist press then tried to incite the Turkish public against Greek and other non-Muslim minorities living in Turkey. The brunt of the damage was sustained by Greek businesses and residential areas in Istanbul, but the damage also was extended to Greek cultural centres along the Bosphorus, and Greek churches, with the Panayia, one of the oldest Byzantine structures, being gutted.⁴⁶ Hundreds of houses, shops, schools and churches were burned and looted. Three people were killed and 30 injured. Years later, it was revealed that the events had been planned and implemented by elements controlled by the Turkish intelligence services and contra-guerrilla groups with the knowledge of the government, and that the bomb had been planted by 21-year old Oktay Engin, an agent who was later appointed in 1992 as the governor of Nevsehir, a Turkish province in Anatolia.⁴⁷

In another example, in December 1978 right-wing conservative Sunni masses in the city of Kahramanmaraş attacked a neighbourhood, predominantly inhabited by Alawites (Turkish Shiites), destroying and burning 210 houses and 70 workshops and murdering 111 people. The offenders were Sunni Turks, led by fascist gangs of "Grey Wolves," who were part of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) allegedly backed-up by the local authorities. During this massacre, dozens of inno-

⁴⁵ Memorandum by Geoffrey Knox, acting British Councillor in Ankara, 20 May 1927, in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs*, Part II, Series B, vol. 31, Turkey March 1927-December 1929, ed. by Bulent Gokay, (University Publications of America), 17-18.

⁴⁶ *Internet Haber*, 6 September 2014, <http://www.internethaber.com/tarihin-utanc-sayfasi-6-7-eylul-olaylari-neler-oldu-718357h.htm> (accessed in September 2015); *Zaman* (8 February 2009), http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazarlar/mustafa-armagan/6-7-eylul-olaylarini-menderes-tertiplemisti_812750.html (accessed in September 2015).

⁴⁷ *Birgun* (12 December 2009), <http://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/baris-gazeteciliginden-sinifta-kaldik-16352.html> (accessed in September 2015); *Bianet* (6 September 2001), <http://m.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/4458-oktay-engin-devletin-sorumlulugu-var> (accessed in September 2015).

cent children, women and men were murdered based on the racial hate nourished by the fascist gangs against Alawites.⁴⁸

A third example can be found in the tragic events leading up to the assassination of Hrant Dink, the editor of AGOS, the only Armenian newspaper in Turkey.⁴⁹ Dink dared suggest that Sabiha Gökçen, Atatürk's adopted daughter and the first woman war pilot of the Turkish Republic and a leading figure in the early republican period, might be an Armenian orphan. This claim was considered an insult against her "pure Turkish blood" of Sabiha Gökçen. This prompted a series of court cases against Dink, where he was tried under the notorious Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code charging him with "denigrating Turkishness," an official accusation of insulting Turkish blood.⁵⁰ The trials took place in the midst of a lynching campaign led by an ultra-nationalist media, and were frequented by a mob of fascists attempting to attack him and his supporters. This intense campaign of hate against Armenians lasted over three years, with Hrant Dink shot dead outside his newspaper's office in Istanbul, on 19 January 2007.⁵¹

More than 90 years after the establishment of Turkish Republic, the limitations and contradictions of Turkish national identity are increasingly coming to the fore. As Turkey moves deep into the twenty first century, an existential crisis of identity and sense of confusion about ethnicity, nationhood, religion, secularity, and Turkey's role in the world is has intensified. Over time, the biological and cultural racism inherent in Turkish nationalism has manifested itself in a hierarchical structure that is increasingly separating "real" rulers (political and economic elite) of Turkey from the mass population. This toxic historical legacy going back to the 1920s and 30s remains as a powerful theme underlying Turkish identity in modern era, and culturally based racism and its physical manifestations have continued down to the present day.

In 21st century Turkey, even open, scientific racism (racism based on blood) is not some kind of historical throwback – it is very much alive and kicking. A hierarchical and racist mentality is left un-interrogated by the state and society – it's still commonplace in Turkey to emphasise racial purity, particularly purity of blood, and the lineage (bloodline) of the Turkish race. Many people in Turkey, and in particular the educated urban middle classes, still nonchalantly seize every opportunity to emphasise their "whiteness" in order to distinguish themselves as "European," separated from millions of their co-citizens who are considered traditional, religious and "Asian." Their Turkey is culturally and biologically close to those of the West European states, and they hold on to the idea it was an accident of history that Turkey

⁴⁸ *Hurriyet*, 21 December 2014, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/27816853.asp> (accessed in September 2015); B. Gokay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 108-110.

⁴⁹ Wikileaks, 10ISTANBUL6 09ISTANBUL376, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ISTANBUL374_a.html (accessed in September 2015)

⁵⁰ J. White, "Fear and loathing in the Turkish national imagination," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Volume 42 / Spring 2010, 215-236.

⁵¹ Ersin Kalkan, "Sabiha Gökçen mi Hatun Sebilciyan mı," *Hurriyet* (21 February 2004), <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/index/ArsivNews.aspx?id=204257> (accessed in September 2-15).

found itself in the Middle East with a majority that is not “civilized” and “European,” unlike themselves.

When in 1999 a powerful earthquake struck Kocaeli in western Turkey, the of Turkey’s Health Minister Osman Durmus shocked many. This event, one of the most devastating disasters in the recent history, which claimed more than 12,000 and displacement of a further 200,000 people, brought Greek and Turkish people together, including an overwhelming display of humanitarian empathy and action by Greece. For example, immediately after the earthquake Greek search and rescue teams, doctors and volunteers arrived in Turkey with money, basic necessities and blood donations from the Greek people. However, the Turkish Health Minister nounced that Turks did not need to be tainted with Greek blood,⁵² making it clear that in the 21st century Turkey the language of racist nationalism (a reminiscent of the *Manifesto of Racial Scientists*,⁵³ published in fascist Italy in 1938), can be used to maintain the purity of the self and prevent mixing with the “other,” even if it is self-harming.

In January 2008, then Chief of General Staff, General Buyukanit, was pictured on television showing a Turkish flag, painted with “real Turkish blood” by a group of school children. The flag was represented to commemorate the death of soldiers killed in the fight against PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) guerrillas. The students were apparently experimenting in a biology class to prick their fingers with a pin. Being motivated by the heavy patriotic atmosphere in the country where casualties were widely reported through ultra-nationalistic ceremonies, the students decided to use their own blood to paint a Turkish flag, now known as the “blood flag,” which is red with white crescent and star, and sent this to the Chief of General Staff with a letter saying that they would be happy to sacrifice their own blood in the fight for the homeland of the Turks. Funerals of soldiers killed in clashes with Kurdish guerrillas frequently turn into anti-Kurdish hysteria that are followed by attempts to lynch Kurdish citizens across Turkey. A number of doctors and teachers were reported to be disturbed by the students’ act, but General Buyukanit declared with pride on TV: “Such a nation is ours,”⁵⁴ and a nationalist daily distributed copies of the “blood flag.”⁵⁵

⁵² Patrick Comerford, “Turkish quake victims find many friends abroad, but few in their own government,” *The Irish Times*, 28 August 1999, <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/turkish-quake-victims-find-many-friends-abroad-but-few-in-their-own-government-1.221294> (accessed in March 2016).

⁵³ *The Manifesto of Racial Scientists*, published in Italy in 1938, also referred to as the Charter of Race or Racial Manifesto, identified some groups as inferior and warned the Italians not to mix with them. The Jews were the most obvious targets, but Ethiopians, Albanians and Arabs were also targeted in the Manifesto. (see Olindo de Napoli, “The origin of the Racist Laws under fascism. A problem of historiography,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, Vol. 17, issue 1, 2012, 106-122.)

⁵⁴ *Sabah*, 14 January 2008, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/01/14/haber,D5EF5E4296304355A36E7F0AEDE242A5.html> (accessed in February 2016).

⁵⁵ *Bianet*, 13 January 2008, <http://bianet.org/english/education/104134-buyukanit-spreads-militarism-among-children> (accessed in March 2016).

For most of the republican period, and not only during security crises and war, Kurds have been defined as racially inferior in Turkish popular culture. In Turkey's key's popular culture, Turks are portrayed with a European appearance, proper accents, and manner, and the absence of such attributes is used as a mark of Kurdishness.⁵⁶ Ismail Besikci describes this as "Turkish style racism...humiliating and looking down on the Kurds."⁵⁷ As the largest minority in Turkey, Kurds have been described in physical contrast to Turks, who are portrayed as light skinned, with blue blue or green eyes and a lack of facial hair. In contrast, Kurds are often described with with "inferior" physical qualities, such as darker skin and thick facial hair. Many humour magazines, and even in some left-liberal ones, as well as some daily newspapers, depict "Kurdishness" this way, which is then linked to a lack of "culture," or *kıro*.⁵⁸ Sometimes this stereo-type is used to describe Easterners and not just Kurds.⁵⁹ But such racial stereotypes do not correspond to reality, because it is not really possible to distinguish between a Turk from a Kurd, or from an Armenian or Jew, based on physical characteristics.

Racism against Syrian Refugees

In contemporary Turkey, every Turkish child grows up memorizing Atatürk's 1927 address to the youth, which says "the strength you need is already imbedded in your noble blood." Atatürk's words, "how happy the one who says he is a Turk," "One language, one people, one flag," and other similar slogans still inscribed on plaques and pedestals across the country, particularly often and in large formats in the Kurdish East and Southeast.⁶⁰ All primary and secondary schools still teach a "Turkish" history that begins with the Huns of Central Asia, which gives an exclusively ethnic, not civic, sense of Turkey as a nation. And nationalist demagogues still speak of "pure Turks," which clearly excludes Kurds and all non-Muslims, and which more

⁵⁶ Tanil Bora, "MHP'nin GÜc Kaynagi Olarak Kurt Meselesi," *Birikim*, 134-135, June-July 2000, <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim-yazi/3296/mhp-nin-guc-kaynagi-olarak-kurt-meselesi#.VsyNtLSJbAl> (accessed in February 2016). Dr. Ismail Besikci was arrested and spent 17 years in prison simply by writing books on oppression of the Kurds in Turkey. The charge lodged against him was "insulting the memory of Atatürk and undermining national feelings." (*New York Review of Books*, 12 August 1982, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1982/08/12/the-case-of-dr-besikci/>, accessed in April 2016)

⁵⁷ Ismail Besikci's statement to the judges in the court on 18 April 1990 following the publication and subsequent confiscation of his book *Interstate Colony - Kurdistan*. He was charged with "disseminating propaganda and undermining national pride," *Variant*, issue 6, http://www.variant.org.uk/6texts/Ismail_Besiki.html (accessed in May 2016).

⁵⁸ *Posta*, 8 September 2013, <http://www.posta.com.tr/PostaKarnaval/HaberDetay/Bizim-sosyete-biraz--kro-.htm?ArticleID=193816&PageIndex=2> (accessed in February 2016);

⁵⁹ Asena Gunal, "Mine G. Kırıkkanat ve Beyaz Türk Oryantalizmi," *Birikim*, 144, April 2001, <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim-yazi/5496/mine-g-kirikkanat-ve-beyaz-turk-oryantalizmi#.VssVrrSJbAk> (accessed in February 2016).

⁶⁰ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Gençliğe Hitabe*, 20 October 1927, <http://www.ataturkungencligehitabesi.com/> (accessed in February 2016).

recently has been used against (Muslim) Arabs as the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey increases.

According to UN figures, Turkey now has around 3 million Syrian refugees have come since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in March 2011. As the of refugees has grown, so too has widespread racism and xenophobia against refugees increased. Currently the world's largest refugee-hosting nation, Turkey initially praised for its open-door policy towards Syrian refugees and its work in its camps. However, recently it has been sharply criticised for failing to proper services and protection to them. Currently, only about 235,000 of these refugees live in the 22 state-run camps with another 515,000 registered as urban and the authorities does not support the remaining 2.25 million who live outside camps with shelter or food, even during cold winter months.⁶¹ Insults and open and covert racism against the Syrians are in evidence in the newspapers and on social dia. Everyday racism against Syrians also is common and widespread, as they are thought to be criminals, beggars and people of "low culture." This is all chronicled and reinforced by daily newspapers, which are full of headlines concerning "the of Syrian beggars" and warnings about how they will take away jobs from the real citizens, the Turks.⁶²

There's now increasing resentment of Syrians everywhere and they are being openly attacked and marginalized on a daily basis. Syrian asylum seekers have been exposed to attacks by local communities for various reasons such as causing housing rents to increase, pushing up the unemployment rate due to their lower wages compared to Turkish citizens, increasing the crime rate and even giving rise to traffic jams. Turkish newspapers are daily full of such horrific attacks against refugees by racist mobs. Right-wing nationalist groups, together with some local gangs, are hunting Syrian refugees in city streets, and when they are caught they are badly beaten. But sadly, millions of ordinary Turkish citizens, who are not part of such fascist gangs, have been bystanders offering little, if any, protection to their Syrian neighbours trying to survive increasingly in ever more desperate conditions. Further, racist attacks against Syrians receive almost no condemnation from officials or the public, and with language barriers, poverty, and lack of clarity and advice about their legal rights, these refugees are too often mistreated and taken advantage of. Apart from the lack of a clear legal status and full access to rights, this lack of compassion in Turkish society is an important reason why the Syrian refugees want to leave Turkey risking their lives.⁶³ Turkish people laud themselves

⁶¹ *TRT Turk* (14 January 2015), <http://www.trtturk.com/haber/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi-2015-103549.html> (accessed in September 2015).

⁶² *Haberturk* (1 August 2014), <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/975425-istanbulda-sariyer-nufusu-kadar-suriyeli-yasiyor> (accessed in September 2015); *Milliyet* (19 November 2013), <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/istanbul-da-suriyeli-dilenci/gundem/detay/1794783/default.htm> (accessed in September 2015); *Bugun* (29 September 2015), <http://www.bugun.com.tr/yasam/yasitlari-okulda-olan-suriyeli-cocuklar-1851942.html> (accessed in September 2015).

⁶³ *Haber sol* (11 May 2015), <http://haber.sol.org.tr/turkiye/istanbulda-suriyelilere-saldiri-116151> (accessed in September 2015); *CNN Turk* (3 May 2015),

for their sense of hospitality and generosity, but such long-standing claims are now being tested by their treatment of Syrian refugees.

The impression often formed from reading the popular press is that currently there is no worse insult for many Turks to dub them “Arabs,” in particular “Syrian Arabs.” There is a deep-seated and very ugly racism against Arabs in the, mainly so-called educated sectors of, Turkish society. A left-liberal comic magazine, *Penguen*, in June 2010 published an issue with the cover picture depicting Turkey’s president Tayyip Erdogan as a monkey wearing a traditional Arab outfit and saying, “I am not wearing underwear.”⁶⁴ *Penguen* was founded in 2002, and has become one of the country’s most widely read satirical magazines, described as “a breath of fresh air.” Yet, as left-wing magazine *Counterpunch* pointed out,⁶⁵ while it was apparently trying to provide a critical view of right-wing Islamist president Erdogan, it did so using a racist Arab image.

Turkey’s secular middle classes loudly and continuously voice their complaints about Syrian refugees and Middle Eastern Arabs in general by combining their critique of the authoritarian conservative policies of Islamist president, Tayyip Erdogan, and his AKP by denigrating him as a Middle Eastern, non-European. The implication of these references is that Erdogan and his followers are not refined and cultured like they are as white Western Europeans. Many leading members of Turkey’s secular urban elite also openly express their disdain for Syrian refugees, publicly referring to their language and different styles and criticizing the government for allowing the refugees turning Turkey into a “Middle Eastern” country away from the “civilised West.” Even though Turkey’s urban middle classes, in fact, are the least affected by the refugee situation, in the pages of secular-left magazines Syrian refugees and Arabs in general are scapegoated for a plethora of issues, including crime, traffic jams, rising prices, unwanted crowds in their gentile coffee shops and restaurants, and terrorist attacks.⁶⁶ Looking at the narrative of Turkey’s urban secular classes, notwithstanding their palpable animosity toward all things “oriental” Asian, Middle Eastern, and their disdain for “*kiro*” and Kurdish workers in the slums of Turkey’s cities, they may rightly qualify by analogy to the Euro-American white supremacists that have now resurfaced.

<http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/sanliurfada-suriyeli-gerginligi-3-yarali> (accessed in September 2015). 2015).

⁶⁴ *Radikal*, 26.01.2011, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/yilin-irkcilarini-seciyorlar-1037921/> (accessed in March 2016).

⁶⁵ Michael Dickinson, “Cartoon Capers,” *Counterpunch*, 31 March 2005, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/03/31/cartoon-capers/> (accessed in March 2016).

⁶⁶ *Milliyet*, 30.8.2014, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yoksa-biz-irkci-miyiz-pazar/haberdetay/31.08.2014/1933307/default.htm> (accessed in March 2016); Nur Banu Kocaaslan, “Suriyeli Yazar Bekir Sidki: Dun Kurtler, Hrat Dink Hedefi, Bugun Suriyeli Multeciler,” *Diken*, 29.8.2014, <http://www.diken.com.tr/suriyeli-yazar-bekir-sidki-ey-turkiyeliler-ulkenize-siginmamiz-size-kendi-dunyaniz-disinda-bilgi-edinme-firsati-veriyor/> (accessed in March 2016).

Postscript

Turkish nationalism, like other nationalisms, has many different forms which have evolved over time and influenced by internal and external conditions. As we argue here, racism is not new in Turkey, and supremacy-oriented ethnic and racist ideas have been an integral part of Turkish nationalism from the beginning of the nation-building project in the early 20th century. Thus, Turkish nationalism originated and was shaped by racist discourses borrowed mainly from European racist texts of the 1920s and 1930s. The problem of racism, however, didn't end in the 1920s or 1930s, but continued to evolve without serious challenges or revision and is now a key part of official Turkish identity. As it became embedded in institutional framework of the Turkish state, it remained more or less the same, and the ugly face of Turkish racism has always been just around the corner waiting to be ignited by a crisis or political manipulation. The European Union's Turkey progress report, published in October 2014, warned that Turkish media are using "hate rhetoric" to target minority groups, including Kurds, Alawites, Christians, Armenians, Jews and other non-Muslims.⁶⁷ But, it appears to have had little impact.

Hate crime and racist rhetoric sharply increased after the failed coup on the night of 15/16 July 2016. The AKP government declared its former ally, the religious group led by the US resident Fethullah Gülen, responsible for the coup attempt, and immediately after the coup attempt was defeated Erdogan's counter-coup was in full swing. The country witnessed a widespread right-wing Islamist outburst of violent attacks against not only those suspected supporters of the coup, but also all other critiques of AKP regime. In an attempt to fully complete his grip on all defiant oppositional layers of society, Erdogan called all his supporters to the street with guns and established control through right-wing Islamist mass mobilizations. With the support of police, pro-government gangs armed with guns, knives and axes, attacked Alevi and Kurdish neighbourhoods, such as Gazi or Okmeydanı in Istanbul, Tuzluca in Ankara, and Armutlu in Antakya. Similar gangs attacked people in bars and restaurants consuming alcohol in secular hip neighbourhoods of Istanbul, such as Moda and Suadiye, shouting slogans against drinking alcohol and the like.⁶⁸ Even six months after the failed coup attempt, racist and fascist attacks against minority groups, and in particular against Kurds and Alawis, continue all over Turkey without interruption.⁶⁹ In many of cases, security forces joined the armed pro-AKP paramilitaries, and state authorities generally

⁶⁷ *BBC Monitoring* (30 October 2014), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/hate-speech-on-the-rise-in-turkish-media> (accessed in September 2015).

⁶⁸ "Özgün: Alevilere yönelik saldırı tehlikesi devam ediyor," 15 September 2016, <http://anfturkce.net/guncel/ozgun-alevilere-yonelik-saldiri-tehlikesi-devam-ediyor> (accessed in September 2016).

⁶⁹ Violence against all minorities was widespread in the weeks following the failed coup, including violent murder of a well-known transgender activist in Istanbul and the beheading of a gay Syrian refugee. (*France 24*, 19 August 2016, <http://www.france24.com/en/20160819-turkey-lgbt-trasgender-activist-death-highlights-rise-hate-crimes-hande-kader>. Accessed in September 2016)

refused to provide any protection to Kurdish and Alawi citizens of Turkey, saying that these are “innocent and rightful responses by Turkish people against coup-plotters.”⁷⁰

Academic research on race regards racism as a multidimensional and highly adaptive system, which ensures an unequal distribution of resources between racial groups.⁷¹ Because the dominant group, which in this case is Sunni Turks in Turkey, builds and dominates all significant institutions, often at the expense of and on the uncompensated work of other groups, their interests are embedded in the foundation of Turkish state and society. While many individual members of the dominant group may not be racist, and may even act against racism in their personal life, they still benefit from the unfair distribution of resources controlled by their group. This in-built systemic and institutional control allows many members of the dominant group who are Sunni Turks, Turkey’s “whites,” to live in a social and political environment that protects and insulates them from race-based stress. In other words, all Sunni Turks gain privileges that come from not facing racism, even if some of those beneficiaries are not be completely aware of them. Many Sunni Turks can still have problems and face barriers, but systematic racism will not be one of them.⁷² This also explains why so many people in Turkey, including journalists, politicians and academics, vehemently deny there is a deep-rooted and widespread racism in the country.

In conclusion, modern Turkey was established on two essential principles of 1920s nation-states: white supremacy, and division of the world into “superior” and “inferior” races. This foundation has never been questioned critically, allowing racism to remain embedded within the Turkish state and society. Until this foundational aspect of racism is acknowledged, Turkey, or any other “modern” nation-state built on this foundation, one cannot fully and effectively deal with racism in the 21st century.

⁷⁰ “Tüm Türkiye Geneline Kürtlere Dönük Faşist Saldırıları Devam Ediyor,” *Telgraf*, 15 September 2016, <http://www.telgraf.co.uk/tum-turkiye-geneline-kurtlere-donuk-fasist-saldirilar-devam-ediyor.html> (accessed in September 2016).

⁷¹ Philomena Essed, *Understanding Everyday Racism. An Interdisciplinary Theory* (London: Sage, 1991).

⁷² Considering her own position as a white woman, US activist Peggy McIntosh writes: “I have come to see white privilege as an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was ‘meant’ to remain oblivious. White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks.” (Peggy McIntosh, *White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies*, Wellesley College, Center for Research on Women, 1988, 14.)

Byzantium and its perception in the mid-twentieth century “Classics Illustrated” comic books¹

A business endeavor launched in the United States in October 1941 was destined to change the way people approached world literary classics. Aiming at multiplying its theretofore select, numerically limited reading public, as well as expanding the latter’s age range by incorporating children and adolescents, Russian-born publisher Albert Lewis Kanter came up with the idea of creating a series that would combine the benefits of a “popular” narration with cheap illustrated publications.²

Elliot Publishing Company placed the literary masterpieces of the great authors in the service of the “ninth art,” in a series originally called *Classic Comics*.³ The first issue of the New York-based publication, *The Three Musketeers*, marked the nascence in the publishing firm’s comic book department of a product with stories that were not all about the antics, sentimental adventures or comedic goofs of pulp

* National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

¹ At the core of this study lies my paper on “Byzantium and Byzantine women in the mid-twentieth century Greek ‘Classics Illustrated’ comic books,” which I delivered at the conference *Transformation and adaptation – the reception of Byzantium between the 16th and 21st centuries* held in Poland (5-6 September 2014, University of Silesia in Katowice). I would like to thank the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and its Special Account for Research Grants for funding to attend the meeting. The text of that presentation has been modified and expanded, while keeping within the limits imposed by publishing in a scholarly periodical. The earliest discussions with my dear friend and colleague Konstantinos G. Tsiknakis on the topic of the presence and presentation of Byzantium in general, and of Byzantine women in particular, in the *Classics Illustrated* series date back many years. Once again I thank him.

² As noted in Thanasis Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας και το έργο του για παιδιά και εφήβους. Θέατρο–Ποίηση–Πεζογραφία–«Κλασσικά εικονογραφημένα». Ερμηνευτικές, θεματολογικές, ιδεολογικές, παιδαγωγικές προσεγγίσεις* [Vassilis Rotas and his work for children and adolescents. Theater–Poetry–Prose–“Classics Illustrated.” Interpretational, topical, ideological, and pedagogical approaches] (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2007), 531, there is a wealth of bibliography, both local and international, on the theoretical approaches to, and the study of, illustrated magazines. As a whole, this literary production goes far beyond the scope of the present study; for the needs of the latter, only brief references to the genre in question and some of its particular characteristics were deemed necessary. For the theoretical approaches to the comic-book genre, simply on an indicative basis and because its subject matter is closely related to the focus of our study, see Giannis Skarpelos, *Ιστορική μνήμη και ελληνικότητα στα κόμικς* [Historical memory and Greekness in comic books] (Athens: Kritiki, 2000), 27-52.

³ For a history of the *Classics Illustrated* series, see Dan Malan, *The Complete Guide to Classics Illustrated*, v. I-II (USA: Classics Central Com., 2006).

heroes; instead, in its pages it summarized the best-known works of literature. Lacking the development, depth and storytelling skills of their famous authors, but with the help of the pen of exceptional artists, it had the ability to stir an emotional reaction from the product user, thereby liberating his or her imagination, thus putting the literary text's invisible description on display for everyone to see.⁴

Starting with the fourth issue, *The Last of the Mohicans* (1942), Kanter (under the pseudonym Albert W. Raymond, a combination of the co-owners' first names) switched the publication to a company owned by himself, called Gilberton Publishing Co., and apart from editor, also served briefly as art director.⁵ In March 1947, with the series now numbering 34 titles, it began to be published under the banner *Classics Illustrated*; the next year saw a reduction in the number of pages from 56 (originally 64) to 48. Another series, *Classics Illustrated Junior* (1953-1971), was also published, containing fairy tales and stories for younger children. The visualization of the classical novels was done by pencillers and inkers that were well-known in the comic-book industry, such as Malcolm Kildale, Louis Zansky, Rolland H. Livingstone, Enter Iger, Henry C. Kiefer, Alex A. Blum, Lou Cameron, Norman Nodel, Reed Crandall, George R. Evans, Gray Morrow and others.⁶

The publication continued until 1962, when it ceased after 169 issues and sales that totaled 200,000,000 copies in the US alone. Its titles continued to be reprinted and in the following decades various unsuccessful attempts were made to revive the series.

After World War II, with American comic books beginning to flood the European market, *Classics Illustrated* were translated and published in many countries.⁷ Among them, Greece was a relative latecomer in becoming acquainted with the product in question, due to the Greek Civil War and subsequent political turmoil, and and so the flourishing of comics in Greece may be dated to the 1950s and later.

Despite the fact that magazines such as *Η Διάπλασις των Παιδών* [*Children's Edification*]⁸ had laid the groundwork for comic books to be more easily accepted by

⁴ This particular description of the *Classics Illustrated* series by Aris Malandrakis, «Οι Αριστοκράτες των Κόμικς» ["The comic-book aristocrats"], *Εννέα (Ελευθεροτυπία)*, no. 36, 2/5, may be found online at <https://www.mycomics.gr/classics/36ennea.htm> (accessed July 10th, 2017).

⁵ William B. Jones, Jr., *Classics illustrated: a cultural history* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2011 2nd ed.), 35.

⁶ Panayota Feggerou, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” και το ιστορικό μυθιστόρημα για παιδιά: μύθος και πραγματικότητα» [“Classics Illustrated” and the historical novel for children: Myth and reality”] (PhD diss., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2012), 281.

Aris Malandrakis, «Η λογοτεχνία στο περίπτερο» [“Literature on the newsstand”], *Επίλογος (Ελευθεροτυπία)*, no. 42 (January 26, 1992), 27-30.

⁷ The second volume of Malan, *The Complete Guide*, is devoted to the publication of *Classics Illustrated* outside the United States.

⁸ On the role and significance of this magazine for children, which dominated the field of children's literature for almost seven decades, see Vicky Patsiou, «Η Διάπλασις των Παιδών» (1879-1922). *Το πρότυπο και η συγκρότησή του* [“Children's Edification” [1879-1922]. *The role model and its construction*]. (Athens: General Secretariat for Youth, 1987).

the Greek reading public, the printing initiative of Atlantís Publications that hit the stands on March 1st, 1951,⁹ caused bewilderment and made fanatical enemies, as well as passionate supporters. Ten years after the series had made its first appearance in America, the Pechlivanídes brothers (Michális, Kóstas and Giórgos), experienced in publishing children's books as well as in offset printing, transplanted in Greece and its milieu the *Classics Illustrated* comic books they had come to know during one of their trans-Atlantic voyages – complete with four-color prints.¹⁰

It is true that the comic books in question were not noted for their strict to the rules of their genre: their illustrations did not promote the comical element, did they present recognizable formulaic heroes, frozen in time and in the series' tenuity.¹¹ They were in effect illustrated narratives, with proportionate amounts of text (speech) and image; in fact, speech played the principal part and did not function merely in support of the image, as was the case elsewhere. Thus, a certain degree of theatricality was achieved and the story evolved along with the text and the frame-by-frame successive images. Furthermore, there was also a narrator with a heavy workload: he explained the evolution of the plot, provided necessary information and connected the various parts of the work.¹²

The debut issue, Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*, similar in appearance to the corresponding American title, contained a set of instructions on how to read the book, but also a note from the publishers with which they wished to convey the new books' mission statement, while at the same time attempting to mitigate the expected backlash. Within a framework of widespread anti-Americanism that permeated many sections of Greece's post-Occupation society, a product that appeared to cheapen classical literature offered itself for negative criticism.¹³ So they

⁹ Victor Hugo, *Les Miserables*, was the first issue in the Greek series, 10 years after it was originally published in the US series. An analytical presentation of the first issue and its reprints may be found in Feggerou, *Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα*, 451-71.

¹⁰ The appearance of *Classics Illustrated* played a key role in their success. The quality of printing was excellent; the four-color process was used throughout, and they were printed the new offset system, on white European-standard paper. See Malandrakis, «Οι Αριστοκράτες», 3/5.

¹¹ Panagiota Feggerou, «Το Ιστορικό Μυθιστόρημα και τα Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα. Το Παράδειγμα του Ιβανόη» [“The Historical Novel and Classics Illustrated. The Case of Ivanhoe”], 5, old.primeedu.uoa.gr/Forum%20neon%20epistomonon/Panagiota%20Feggerou.doc (accessed July 18th, 2017).

¹² Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας*, 532.

¹³ Feggerou, *op. cit.*, 4. Regarding the reactions, debates and controversies –including those that took place in the Greek Parliament– caused by the circulation of *Classics Illustrated*, see *ibid.*, note 7.

An interesting point is the criticism leveled against comic books in general by Giannis Barges, «Τα κόμικς του Βασίλη Ρώτα. Μια άγνωστη προσφορά του Κορίνθιου ποιητή στο χώρο του παιδικού βιβλίου» [“The comics of Vassilis Rotas. The Corinthian poet's unknown contribution to children's literature”], *Πρακτικά Γ' Τοπικού Συνεδρίου Κορινθιακών ερευνών (Κόρινθος 28-30 Νοεμβρίου 1997)* (Athens, 1999), 170: “These pulp-fiction magazines mostly derive from the US sub-culture products of mass consumption, their subject matter revolving around war, crime, money, and romance. They abuse humanitarian ideas, disfigure and debase the language in a nightmarish fashion, lead to attitudes of contempt of human life, undervalue patriotic feelings and high ideals such as liberty and fatherland (words and terms that are nowhere to be found in their pages), and generally

wrote: “publication of these books throughout the world has limited the insipid, shallow and harmful pulp editions, the criminal, pornographic, gangster stuff. So, taking this into account as well, parents ought to recommend *Classics Illustrated* to their children, for in this way they help both develop their minds and protect their souls.”¹⁴

True to their aim, the Greek *Classics Illustrated* series [Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα] included, apart from the successful translations of corresponding American can titles, a number of issues with themes taken “From the Mythology and History of Greece”¹⁵ that did not depend, at least as far as History was concerned, on pre-existing literary texts, but constituted completely new creations. In this way, Greek children would not only come in contact with the works of great literature that, due to to political, social and economic conditions, were not always within their reach;¹⁶ they would also receive an education by fortifying their knowledge of history, since illustrated magazines or books are more easily and willingly understood and assimilated by children in the course of the learning process.¹⁷ A panorama of Hellenism unfolded in 83 titles¹⁸ dedicated to the full range of Greek history, from Antiquity and Byzantium to the War of Independence and the Cretan revolution, as well as to classical, medieval and Modern Greek literature, all viewed through the prism of ethnocentrism prevalent at the time.

After its rehabilitation in the minds of scholars during the second half of the nineteenth century, Byzantium had finally taken its place in official Greek historiography. Integrated as an inextricable link in the unbroken chain of national continuity, it was no longer treated solely as keeper of the legacy of Antiquity, but also as a creative force from which modern age flowed.¹⁹ It was this perception, this outlook of

maim children’s souls and emotions, gradually leading them to moral degeneration.” All these negative characteristics attributed to comic books are the extreme opposite of the utterly positive image of *Classics Illustrated* according to the same author; *ibid.*: “...they exuded humanitarianism and, what’s more important: they were fragrant with the sweet smell of Greece!”

¹⁴ Malandrakis, «Οι Αριστοκράτες», 3/5.

¹⁵ Greek-themed issues debuted in October 1951. The first issue produced by Greek contributors and inspired by a Greek theme was no. 43, *Perseus and Andromeda*, with text by Vassilis Rotas and illustrations by Kostas Grammatopoulos. See Giannis D. Barges, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” του Βασίλη Ρώτα. Θεματική και ιδεολογία» [“The “Classics Illustrated” by Vassilis Rotas. Subject matter and ideology”], *Ερευνα*, no. 13 (98), January 2001: 59 and note 5, with relevant literature. The names of the contributors are not recorded in the publication; the name of the scriptwriter is divulged in a list of *Classics Illustrated* printed by Atlantis Publications at a later date, while the paternity of the illustrations may be deduced by comparing them to similar ones from another issue which bore the artist’s signature. See Barges, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” του Βασίλη Ρώτα», 62 note 6.

¹⁶ Peggy Kounelaki, «“Κλασσικά” με τους ήρωες του Ομήρου. Τα μυθικά πρόσωπα της Ιλιάδας και της Οδύσσειας στη νέα σειρά των “Κλασσικών Εικονογραφημένων” της “Κ” σε διασκευή Βασ. Ρώτα» [“Classics” with Homer’s heroes. The mythical personages of the Iliad and Odyssey in the new series of “Classics Illustrated” by Kathimerini, revised by Vas. Rotas], *Καθημερινή* (February 16, 2003).

¹⁷ Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας*, 546.

¹⁸ Skarpeilos, *Ιστορική μνήμη*, 19 and 20, note 9, mentions 83 issues with Greek titles and content deriving from Greek history, mythology, and literature. Feggerou, *Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα*, 271, states that there were as many as 90 titles.

¹⁹ Vaggelis Karamanolakis, *Η συγκρότηση της ιστορικής επιστήμης και η διδασκαλία της Ιστορίας στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών (1837-1932)* [The Formation of Historical Scholarship and the Teaching of Histo-

Byzantium, that exceptional men (and women) of letters,²⁰ as well as distinguished painters and engravers, set out to serve.²¹ However, what must be particularly mentioned is the fact that 70% of the titles were the creation of militant members of the intellectual Left, Vassilis Rotas and Sophia Mavroeidi-Papadaki. The former was a notable playwright, poet, critic, prose writer and translator.²² The latter distinguished herself as a humanities educator, prose writer, author of plays for children, translator, and essentially a poet. Her poem *Εμπρός ΕΛΑΣ* [Forward ELAS!], written in the spring of 1944, had become the anthem of the Greek People's Liberation Army.²³ These creators, in an effort to make ends meet (at least that was the explanation provided by those close to Vassilis Rotas),²⁴ attempted to present a version of the past that would conform both to their own left-wing beliefs and to the right-wing perceptions forced upon society; the latter, nevertheless, ultimately gained complete dominance. However, even if the commitments they had undertaken vis-à-vis the publisher did not allow them to be completely true to their own ideas,

ry in the University of Athens (1837-1932)] (Historical Archive of Greek Youth 42), (Athens: Secretariat for Youth – National Hellenic Research Foundation/Institute of Neohellenic Research, 2006), 317-24.

²⁰ The names of scriptwriters (Vassilis Rotas, Sophia Mavroeidi-Papadaki, Georgia Deligianni-Anastasiadi, Stephanos Xenos, Th. Synodinos, Eirene Photeinou, Eleni Papadaki, Voula Damianakou) are recorded in 67% of the issues: Barges, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” του Βασίλη Ρώτα», 59. As noted by the author, *ibid.*, a systematic study of all the texts and illustrations in the Greek series of *Classics Illustrated* could yield the creators of even more issues: the names of illustrators would be easier to ascertain, those of the scriptwriters rather more difficult – and less complete.

²¹ Only 21% (19 out of a total of 90, according to G. Barges) of the issues contain illustrators' signatures. Thus, we only know the names of Kostas Grammatopoulos, Nikos Kastanakis, Vassilis Zissis, Giorgos Vakalo, Paulos Valasakis, Giannis Dragonas, Mentis Bostantzoglou (Bost), Nitsa Theologou-Savrami, Takis Katsoulidis, Gerasimos Livieratos, and Alkmini Grammatopoulou. See Barges, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” του Βασίλη Ρώτα» 59; Malandrakis, «Οι αριστοκράτες», 5/5; Feggerou, *Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα*, 282-3.

²² On the work of Vassilis Rotas for children and adolescents, see Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας*, and with regard to his contribution to *Classics Illustrated* in particular, *ibid.*, 531-48.

²³ On Sophia Mavroeidi-Papadaki see, among others,

http://www.mavroidi.gr/smp/smp.gr/smp_menu_main_gr.htm (accessed July 13th, 2017);

<http://www.ekebi.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=461&t=523> (accessed July 13th, 2017) with literature.

²⁴ Vassilis Rotas translated texts from the US series, but also wrote texts for Greek issues, in order to supplement his income, since “he was divorced at the time, and he needed the money for alimony,” according to an interview given by his last partner, Voula Damianakou; see Marili Margomenou, «Τα εικονογραφημένα τριών γενεών Ελλήνων. Πενάκι ανά χείρας και φύγαμε!» [“The illustrated publications of three generations of Greeks. Drawing pen in hand, and away we go!”], *Το Βήμα* (August 25, 1996). It was perhaps because he saw his involvement in this as a sideline that he never mentioned it while he lived; references to his participation in *Classics Illustrated* may be found in *Βασίλης Ρώτας*, a slim volume on his life and work published by Voula Damianakou after the author's death: see Barges, «Τα κόμικς του Βασίλη Ρώτα», 170, and Idem, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα”», 61.

they maintained their own high standards when it came to issues of literary and theatrical ethics.²⁵

The Greek series of *Classics Illustrated* dedicated a total of 13 issues to the history of Byzantium, eight to male protagonists or men in general and five to members of the female gender. The number may seem –and probably is– rather low when compared to the total number of 83/90 Greek titles; it should be noted, however, that *Classics Illustrated* was the only Greek comic-book series ever to deal with Byzantium and the history of Modern Greece.²⁶

Their pages sing the praises of the personalities and achievements of (in chronological order of reign) Constantine the Great, Julian the Apostate, Justinian, Heraclius, Basil the Bulgar-Slayer, Constantine Palaiologos, while they also describe the heroic deeds of Byzantine *akritai* and especially of Digenes Akrites. The five women selected were Athenaïs–Eudokia, Eirene the Athenian, Theodora the Blessed, Blessed, Kassiane and Anna Comnena – or rather her work, *Alexias*.²⁷

The questions that we will try to answer here is why them and not some others and, by extension, in what way were those particular personages presented.

The answers have to do both with the more general educational/ pedagogical role these comic books were called upon to perform and with the perception of Byzantium it was decided they would support and reinforce. As far as the first aim is concerned, comic books in general were and are, without a doubt, carriers of many many and various role models, either positive or negative, that influence the edification and socialization of individuals and thus contribute, to a great degree, to shaping the personality of their readers, including for the most part the younger reading public. Their content is related to fundamental life relations and promotes values such as heroism, friendship, love of country or of nature, dignity etc., that appear as eternal truths. Their principal motif is the opposition between good and evil²⁸ and the continuous struggle to secure justice, harmony and balance between the

²⁵ At least that was the case with Vassilis Rotas, whose work has been the focus of dedicated studies and has been praised by the authors for its high quality; see e.g. Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας*, 546. Cf. Barges, «Τα κόμικς του Βασίλη Ρώτα», 170: “even when he ‘worked’ under some publisher and according to standards that most probably did not satisfy him personally, onto even the most insignificant (to him) page he outlined he would pour all those juices that flowed through his more authoritative and personal literary work.”

²⁶ Skarpelos, *Ιστορική μνήμη*, 20.

²⁷ See Fig. 1. For the study at hand the following issues were used: *Ο Μέγας Κωνσταντίνος* [*Constantine the Great*] – no. 1231; *Ιουλιανός ο παραβάτης* [*Julian the Apostate*] – no. 1254; *Ιουστινιανός ο αυτοκράτωρ* [*Justinian the emperor*] – no. 222; *Ηράκλειος. Αυτοκράτωρ του Βυζαντίου* [*Heraclius. Emperor of Byzantium*] – no. 1193; *Βασίλειος ο Βουλγαροκτόνος* [*Basil the Bulgar-Slayer*] – no. 1041; *Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος* [*Constantine Palaiologos*] – no. 1110; *Βυζαντινοί Ακρίτες* [*Byzantine akritai*] – no. 1187; *Διγενής Ακρίτας* [*Digenes Akritas*] – no. 1035; *Αθηναΐς. Η αυτοκράτειρα του Βυζαντίου Ευδοκία* [*Athenais. The Byzantine empress Eudokia*] – no. 1219; *Ειρήνη η Αθηναία* [*Eirene the Athenian*] – no. 1241; *Θεοδώρα η Μακαρία* [*Theodora the Blessed*] – no. 1246; *Η Κασσιανή* [*Kassiane*] – no. 1229; *Άννα η Κομνηνή* (“*Η Αλεξιάς*”) [*Anna Comnena* (“*The Alexias*”)] – no. 1222.

²⁸ Skarpelos, *Ιστορική μνήμη*, 63.

world's beings. In every case Good defeats Evil and the villains are punished for their deeds.

The Graeco-Christian image of the Byzantine Empire had to conform to these positive role models and values, which brings us to the second intended aim. With the subject matter of the titles connected to the curriculum of elementary and secondary education, the point was to promote those heroes of a fundamentally Greek and dominantly Christian Byzantium who served that particular purpose. Thus, preference was given to historical figures who either gave utterance to the ideals of Hellenism through their work and their actions, supported the dominance and spread of Christianity, and defended or restored "Greek" territorial integrity, or – and I am referring here to the case of Julian – through their misplaced naïveté and concomitant failure highlighted, although this was not their intention, the grandeur of that which they vainly sought to fight. Therefore, one can easily perceive the rationale behind both the selection of protagonists and the orientation of the content; the latter is briefly presented in the following paragraphs.

Constantine I was portrayed as helping the Christians at a very young age, ing that he stood up for justice,²⁹ while he was made *augustus* by his dying father, who furthermore placed the crown upon his son's head himself.³⁰

The issue is dedicated almost in its entirety to the protagonist's course to single rule. His successive clashes first with Maxentius and then with Licinius are not presented as a fight for the survival of the strongest, but as the struggle of a just, wronged *augustus* to liberate the persecuted Christians in both West and East, to unite the whole population under the protection of the symbol of the Cross, to "re"build churches, to open the prisons and give properties back to those who had been deprived of them because of their faith.³¹ The story ends with his decision to build Constantinople; the latter's consecration was celebrated by a mass in the newly-built magnificent temple of the Christians (!).³² Almost simultaneously with

²⁹ *Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, 6.

³⁰ *Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, 11.

³¹ Constantine cries out: "The people of Italy expect us to liberate them" (*Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, 14); when he presents the *In hoc signo vinces* symbol to his soldiers, he declares: "We are not waging war to conquer, but to help those enslaved!" (*ibid.*, 17). The crowds receive the victorious Constantine in Nicomedia with the acclamation "Welcome, the liberator of Christians!" (*ibid.*, 39).

³² *Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, 43. Both text and illustration allude to the Hagia Sophia. The Justinian issue also makes a specific reference to the church of Hagia Sophia destroyed during the Nika Revolt having been built by Constantine the Great (*Ιουστινιανός*, 16). However, the earliest Hagia Sophia (a basilica, not the building depicted in the illustrations) was built by Constantius II, the son of Constantine; see Peter Schreiner, *Κωνσταντινούπολη. Ιστορία και Αρχαιολογία* [*Constantinople. History and Archaeology*], trans. Annette Fosvinkel (Athens: National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, 2014), 42.

The works of Constantine in the New Rome are almost unknown, as precious little is mentioned in contemporary sources. Only Eusebius, the emperor's biographer, made an effort to praise the city's Christianization, which he arbitrarily attributed to the emperor; see, Cécile Morrisson, «Η πρωτεύουσα», in ed. Cécile Morrisson, *Ο βυζαντινός κόσμος, τ. Ι. Η Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία (330-641)* [*The Byzantine world, v. I. The Eastern Roman Empire (330-641)*], trans. Anastasia Karastathi

the foundation of the New Rome (AD 324), the emperor's mother, Helena, set off on her journey to the Holy Land in order to find the True Cross.³³

Julian's stance against Christianity was attributed to the sensitive disposition of the protagonist, who was adversely influenced during his traumatic childhood by the insistence of his first tutor, Eusebius, bishop of Nicomedia, on Christian education and practice.³⁴ His philosophical studies at Pergamum, Ephesus and Athens, at the feet of pagan teachers and Neoplatonic philosophers, brought him closer to the Greece he loved. Julian's mistake, according to his crypto-Christian wife Helena, was that he sought to return to the worship of the Twelve Olympians, looking upon "the brilliance of a beautiful culture as the work of a specific religion."³⁵ But was it not so? The emperor acted as a dreamer, with the heart of a child, and, finding himself in the grip of a fallacy, he wished, like the Greek he claimed to be,³⁶ to revive Ancient Greece.

Justinian diverges from the absolute ideal served by the *Classics Illustrated* with regard to Byzantium. Yes, he was the Christian emperor whose "jewel in the crown" was the church of Hagia Sophia, but he was also the ruler that "restored the ancient Roman Empire as a unified global power."³⁷ Of the 13 "Byzantine" titles this is the one that stays more faithful to the historical sources, although it also includes the legends regarding the architectural plan of Hagia Sophia. The Nika Riot, narrated with a relatively high degree of accuracy, considering the genre, the imperial couple's love relationship and the friendship between Justinian and Belisarius that triumphs despite all the calumnies form the canvass on which the era of Justinian was embroidered. The work's highly knowledgeable author³⁸ did not allow himself to get carried away by jingoistic slogans; perhaps that is the reason why the issue has not reprinted in one of the series' repeated later republications.

(Athens: Polis, 2007), 270. Both pagan and Christian rituals marked the inauguration of Constantinople; see Albrecht Berger, *Κωνσταντινούπολη. Ιστορία, τοπογραφία, θρησκεία* [*Constantinople. History, topography, religion*], trans. Christos Tsatsoulis (Athens: Herodotos, 2013), 27-30.

³³ In actual fact, the emperor's mother set off on her journey to the Holy Land after the dramatic family events that took place in the palace in 326, i.e. the execution of Crispus, Constantine's first-born son, on his father's orders. Crispus' stepmother, Fausta, accused him of violating her honor. A few months later, Fausta was also put to death, having been charged with adultery. Helena began her journey in the summer of that year; Aikaterini Christophilopoulou, *Βυζαντινή Ιστορία, τ. Α': 324-610* [*Byzantine History, v. I: 324-610*] (Athens: Herodotos, 2012), 195 and note 78.

³⁴ *Ιουλιανός*, 5.

³⁵ *Ιουλιανός*, 26, while in *ibid.*, 28, Helena prays for the salvation of her husband: "Have mercy on him, Lord! He knows not what he does! And yet he has the heart of a child."

³⁶ When his counselors advised him to initiate a persecution of Christians, he responded: "No, no, I will not become a Nero! I am a Greek!": *Ιουλιανός*, 27.

³⁷ *Ιουστινιανός*, 45. Cf. *ibid.*, 30: "The great Roman state is restored," and *ibid.*, 31: "You have restored the Roman Empire." However, the "Brief Introduction" [Σύντομη Εισαγωγή] to the plot notes: "Thanks to his skills... the Byzantine Empire was organised into a highly efficient state and spread to Asia, Europe, and Africa, supplanting the decayed Roman Empire." There is no doubt that the terms are used here in a "Byzantinocentric"—"Hellenocentric" fashion, with no grounding whatsoever in rigorous academic work.

³⁸ The events are depicted according to the narratives of Procopius, John Malalas and the *Chronicon Paschale*.

**Byzantium and its perception in the mid-twentieth century
“Classics Illustrated” comic books¹**

A business endeavor launched in the United States in October 1941 was destined to change the way people approached world literary classics. Aiming at multiplying its theretofore select, numerically limited reading public, as well as expanding the latter’s age range by incorporating children and adolescents, Russian-born publisher Albert Lewis Kanter came up with the idea of creating a series that would combine the benefits of a “popular” narration with cheap illustrated publications.²

Elliot Publishing Company placed the literary masterpieces of the great authors in the service of the “ninth art,” in a series originally called *Classic Comics*.³ The first issue of the New York-based publication, *The Three Musketeers*, marked the nascence in the publishing firm’s comic book department of a product with stories that were not all about the antics, sentimental adventures or comedic goofs of pulp

* National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

¹ At the core of this study lies my paper on “Byzantium and Byzantine women in the mid-twentieth century Greek ‘Classics Illustrated’ comic books,” which I delivered at the conference *Transformation and adaptation – the reception of Byzantium between the 16th and 21st centuries* held in Poland (5-6 September 2014, University of Silesia in Katowice). I would like to thank the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and its Special Account for Research Grants for funding to attend the meeting. The text of that presentation has been modified and expanded, while keeping within the limits imposed by publishing in a scholarly periodical. The earliest discussions with my dear friend and colleague Konstantinos G. Tsiknakis on the topic of the presence and presentation of Byzantium in general, and of Byzantine women in particular, in the *Classics Illustrated* series date back many years. Once again I thank him.

² As noted in Thanasis Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας και το έργο του για παιδιά και εφήβους. Θέατρο–Ποίηση–Πεζογραφία–«Κλασσικά εικονογραφημένα». Ερμηνευτικές, θεματολογικές, ιδεολογικές, παιδαγωγικές προσεγγίσεις* [Vassilis Rotas and his work for children and adolescents. Theater–Poetry–Prose–“Classics Illustrated.” Interpretational, topical, ideological, and pedagogical approaches] (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2007), 531, there is a wealth of bibliography, both local and international, on the theoretical approaches to, and the study of, illustrated magazines. As a whole, this literary production goes far beyond the scope of the present study; for the needs of the latter, only brief references to the genre in question and some of its particular characteristics were deemed necessary. For the theoretical approaches to the comic-book genre, simply on an indicative basis and because its subject matter is closely related to the focus of our study, see Giannis Skarpelos, *Ιστορική μνήμη και ελληνικότητα στα κόμικς* [Historical memory and Greekness in comic books] (Athens: Kritiki, 2000), 27-52.

³ For a history of the *Classics Illustrated* series, see Dan Malan, *The Complete Guide to Classics Illustrated*, v. I-II (USA: Classics Central Com., 2006).

heroes; instead, in its pages it summarized the best-known works of literature. Lacking the development, depth and storytelling skills of their famous authors, but with the help of the pen of exceptional artists, it had the ability to stir an emotional reaction from the product user, thereby liberating his or her imagination, thus putting the literary text's invisible description on display for everyone to see.⁴

Starting with the fourth issue, *The Last of the Mohicans* (1942), Kanter (under the pseudonym Albert W. Raymond, a combination of the co-owners' first names) switched the publication to a company owned by himself, called Gilberton Publishing Co., and apart from editor, also served briefly as art director.⁵ In March 1947, with the series now numbering 34 titles, it began to be published under the banner *Classics Illustrated*; the next year saw a reduction in the number of pages from 56 (originally 64) to 48. Another series, *Classics Illustrated Junior* (1953-1971), was also published, containing fairy tales and stories for younger children. The visualization of the classical novels was done by pencillers and inkers that were well-known in the comic-book industry, such as Malcolm Kildale, Louis Zansky, Rolland H. Livingstone, Enter Iger, Henry C. Kiefer, Alex A. Blum, Lou Cameron, Norman Nodel, Reed Crandall, George R. Evans, Gray Morrow and others.⁶

The publication continued until 1962, when it ceased after 169 issues and sales that totaled 200,000,000 copies in the US alone. Its titles continued to be reprinted and in the following decades various unsuccessful attempts were made to revive the series.

After World War II, with American comic books beginning to flood the European market, *Classics Illustrated* were translated and published in many countries.⁷ Among them, Greece was a relative latecomer in becoming acquainted with the product in question, due to the Greek Civil War and subsequent political turmoil, and and so the flourishing of comics in Greece may be dated to the 1950s and later.

Despite the fact that magazines such as *Η Διάπλασις των Παιδών* [*Children's Edification*]⁸ had laid the groundwork for comic books to be more easily accepted by

⁴ This particular description of the *Classics Illustrated* series by Aris Malandrakis, «Οι Αριστοκράτες των Κόμικς» ["The comic-book aristocrats"], *Εννέα (Ελευθεροτυπία)*, no. 36, 2/5, may be found online at <https://www.mycomics.gr/classics/36ennea.htm> (accessed July 10th, 2017).

⁵ William B. Jones, Jr., *Classics illustrated: a cultural history* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 2011 2nd ed.), 35.

⁶ Panayota Feggerou, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” και το ιστορικό μυθιστόρημα για παιδιά: μύθος και πραγματικότητα» [“Classics Illustrated” and the historical novel for children: Myth and reality”] (PhD diss., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2012), 281.

Aris Malandrakis, «Η λογοτεχνία στο περίπτερο» [“Literature on the newsstand”], *Επιλόν (Ελευθεροτυπία)*, no. 42 (January 26, 1992), 27-30.

⁷ The second volume of Malan, *The Complete Guide*, is devoted to the publication of *Classics Illustrated* outside the United States.

⁸ On the role and significance of this magazine for children, which dominated the field of children's literature for almost seven decades, see Vicky Patsiou, «Η Διάπλασις των Παιδών» (1879-1922). *Το πρότυπο και η συγκρότησή του* [“Children's Edification” [1879-1922]. *The role model and its construction*]. (Athens: General Secretariat for Youth, 1987).

the Greek reading public, the printing initiative of Atlantís Publications that hit the stands on March 1st, 1951,⁹ caused bewilderment and made fanatical enemies, as well as passionate supporters. Ten years after the series had made its first appearance in America, the Pechlivanídes brothers (Michális, Kóstas and Giórgos), experienced in publishing children's books as well as in offset printing, transplanted in Greece and its milieu the *Classics Illustrated* comic books they had come to know during one of their trans-Atlantic voyages – complete with four-color prints.¹⁰

It is true that the comic books in question were not noted for their strict to the rules of their genre: their illustrations did not promote the comical element, did they present recognizable formulaic heroes, frozen in time and in the series' tenuity.¹¹ They were in effect illustrated narratives, with proportionate amounts of text (speech) and image; in fact, speech played the principal part and did not function merely in support of the image, as was the case elsewhere. Thus, a certain degree of theatricality was achieved and the story evolved along with the text and the frame-by-frame successive images. Furthermore, there was also a narrator with a heavy workload: he explained the evolution of the plot, provided necessary information and connected the various parts of the work.¹²

The debut issue, Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*, similar in appearance to the corresponding American title, contained a set of instructions on how to read the book, but also a note from the publishers with which they wished to convey the new books' mission statement, while at the same time attempting to mitigate the expected backlash. Within a framework of widespread anti-Americanism that permeated many sections of Greece's post-Occupation society, a product that appeared to cheapen classical literature offered itself for negative criticism.¹³ So they

⁹ Victor Hugo, *Les Miserables*, was the first issue in the Greek series, 10 years after it was originally published in the US series. An analytical presentation of the first issue and its reprints may be found in Feggerou, *Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα*, 451-71.

¹⁰ The appearance of *Classics Illustrated* played a key role in their success. The quality of printing was excellent; the four-color process was used throughout, and they were printed the new offset system, on white European-standard paper. See Malandrakis, «Οι Αριστοκράτες», 3/5.

¹¹ Panagiota Feggerou, «Το Ιστορικό Μυθιστόρημα και τα Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα. Το Παράδειγμα του Ιβανόη» [“The Historical Novel and Classics Illustrated. The Case of Ivanhoe”], 5, old.primeedu.uoa.gr/Forum%20neon%20epistomonon/Panagiota%20Feggerou.doc (accessed July 18th, 2017).

¹² Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας*, 532.

¹³ Feggerou, *op. cit.*, 4. Regarding the reactions, debates and controversies –including those that took place in the Greek Parliament– caused by the circulation of *Classics Illustrated*, see *ibid.*, note 7.

An interesting point is the criticism leveled against comic books in general by Giannis Barges, «Τα κόμικς του Βασίλη Ρώτα. Μια άγνωστη προσφορά του Κορίνθιου ποιητή στο χώρο του παιδικού βιβλίου» [“The comics of Vassilis Rotas. The Corinthian poet's unknown contribution to children's literature”], *Πρακτικά Γ' Τοπικού Συνεδρίου Κορινθιακών ερευνών (Κόρινθος 28-30 Νοεμβρίου 1997)* (Athens, 1999), 170: “These pulp-fiction magazines mostly derive from the US sub-culture products of mass consumption, their subject matter revolving around war, crime, money, and romance. They abuse humanitarian ideas, disfigure and debase the language in a nightmarish fashion, lead to attitudes of contempt of human life, undervalue patriotic feelings and high ideals such as liberty and fatherland (words and terms that are nowhere to be found in their pages), and generally

wrote: “publication of these books throughout the world has limited the insipid, shallow and harmful pulp editions, the criminal, pornographic, gangster stuff. So, taking this into account as well, parents ought to recommend *Classics Illustrated* to their children, for in this way they help both develop their minds and protect their souls.”¹⁴

True to their aim, the Greek *Classics Illustrated* series [Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα] included, apart from the successful translations of corresponding American can titles, a number of issues with themes taken “From the Mythology and History of Greece”¹⁵ that did not depend, at least as far as History was concerned, on pre-existing literary texts, but constituted completely new creations. In this way, Greek children would not only come in contact with the works of great literature that, due to to political, social and economic conditions, were not always within their reach;¹⁶ they would also receive an education by fortifying their knowledge of history, since illustrated magazines or books are more easily and willingly understood and assimilated by children in the course of the learning process.¹⁷ A panorama of Hellenism unfolded in 83 titles¹⁸ dedicated to the full range of Greek history, from Antiquity and Byzantium to the War of Independence and the Cretan revolution, as well as to classical, medieval and Modern Greek literature, all viewed through the prism of ethnocentrism prevalent at the time.

After its rehabilitation in the minds of scholars during the second half of the nineteenth century, Byzantium had finally taken its place in official Greek historiography. Integrated as an inextricable link in the unbroken chain of national continuity, it was no longer treated solely as keeper of the legacy of Antiquity, but also as a creative force from which modern age flowed.¹⁹ It was this perception, this outlook of

maim children’s souls and emotions, gradually leading them to moral degeneration.” All these negative characteristics attributed to comic books are the extreme opposite of the utterly positive image of *Classics Illustrated* according to the same author; *ibid.*: “...they exuded humanitarianism and, what’s more important: they were fragrant with the sweet smell of Greece!”

¹⁴ Malandrakis, «Οι Αριστοκράτες», 3/5.

¹⁵ Greek-themed issues debuted in October 1951. The first issue produced by Greek contributors and inspired by a Greek theme was no. 43, *Perseus and Andromeda*, with text by Vassilis Rotas and illustrations by Kostas Grammatopoulos. See Giannis D. Barges, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” του Βασίλη Ρώτα. Θεματική και ιδεολογία» [“The “Classics Illustrated” by Vassilis Rotas. Subject matter and ideology”], *Ερευνα*, no. 13 (98), January 2001: 59 and note 5, with relevant literature. The names of the contributors are not recorded in the publication; the name of the scriptwriter is divulged in a list of *Classics Illustrated* printed by Atlantis Publications at a later date, while the paternity of the illustrations may be deduced by comparing them to similar ones from another issue which bore the artist’s signature. See Barges, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” του Βασίλη Ρώτα», 62 note 6.

¹⁶ Peggy Kounelaki, «“Κλασσικά” με τους ήρωες του Ομήρου. Τα μυθικά πρόσωπα της Ιλιάδας και της Οδύσσειας στη νέα σειρά των “Κλασσικών Εικονογραφημένων” της “Κ” σε διασκευή Βασ. Ρώτα» [“Classics” with Homer’s heroes. The mythical personages of the Iliad and Odyssey in the new series of “Classics Illustrated” by Kathimerini, revised by Vas. Rotas], *Καθημερινή* (February 16, 2003).

¹⁷ Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας*, 546.

¹⁸ Skarpeilos, *Ιστορική μνήμη*, 19 and 20, note 9, mentions 83 issues with Greek titles and content deriving from Greek history, mythology, and literature. Feggerou, *Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα*, 271, states that there were as many as 90 titles.

¹⁹ Vaggelis Karamanolakis, *Η συγκρότηση της ιστορικής επιστήμης και η διδασκαλία της Ιστορίας στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών (1837-1932)* [The Formation of Historical Scholarship and the Teaching of Histo-

Byzantium, that exceptional men (and women) of letters,²⁰ as well as distinguished painters and engravers, set out to serve.²¹ However, what must be particularly mentioned is the fact that 70% of the titles were the creation of militant members of the intellectual Left, Vassilis Rotas and Sophia Mavroeidi-Papadaki. The former was a notable playwright, poet, critic, prose writer and translator.²² The latter distinguished herself as a humanities educator, prose writer, author of plays for children, translator, and essentially a poet. Her poem *Εμπρός ΕΛΑΣ* [Forward ELAS!], written in the spring of 1944, had become the anthem of the Greek People's Liberation Army.²³ These creators, in an effort to make ends meet (at least that was the explanation provided by those close to Vassilis Rotas),²⁴ attempted to present a version of the past that would conform both to their own left-wing beliefs and to the right-wing perceptions forced upon society; the latter, nevertheless, ultimately gained complete dominance. However, even if the commitments they had undertaken vis-à-vis the publisher did not allow them to be completely true to their own ideas,

ry in the University of Athens (1837-1932)] (Historical Archive of Greek Youth 42), (Athens: Secretariat for Youth – National Hellenic Research Foundation/Institute of Neohellenic Research, 2006), 317-24.

²⁰ The names of scriptwriters (Vassilis Rotas, Sophia Mavroeidi-Papadaki, Georgia Deligianni-Anastasiadi, Stephanos Xenos, Th. Synodinos, Eirene Photeinou, Eleni Papadaki, Voula Damianakou) are recorded in 67% of the issues: Barges, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” του Βασίλη Ρώτα», 59. As noted by the author, *ibid.*, a systematic study of all the texts and illustrations in the Greek series of *Classics Illustrated* could yield the creators of even more issues: the names of illustrators would be easier to ascertain, those of the scriptwriters rather more difficult – and less complete.

²¹ Only 21% (19 out of a total of 90, according to G. Barges) of the issues contain illustrators' signatures. Thus, we only know the names of Kostas Grammatopoulos, Nikos Kastanakis, Vassilis Zissis, Giorgos Vakalo, Paulos Valasakis, Giannis Dragonas, Mentis Bostantzoglou (Bost), Nitsa Theologou-Savrami, Takis Katsoulidis, Gerasimos Livieratos, and Alkmini Grammatopoulou. See Barges, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα” του Βασίλη Ρώτα» 59; Malandrakis, «Οι αριστοκράτες», 5/5; Feggerou, *Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα*, 282-3.

²² On the work of Vassilis Rotas for children and adolescents, see Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας*, and with regard to his contribution to *Classics Illustrated* in particular, *ibid.*, 531-48.

²³ On Sophia Mavroeidi-Papadaki see, among others,

http://www.mavroidi.gr/smp/smp.gr/smp_menu_main_gr.htm (accessed July 13th, 2017);

<http://www.ekebi.gr/frontoffice/portal.asp?cpage=NODE&cnode=461&t=523> (accessed July 13th, 2017) with literature.

²⁴ Vassilis Rotas translated texts from the US series, but also wrote texts for Greek issues, in order to supplement his income, since “he was divorced at the time, and he needed the money for alimony,” according to an interview given by his last partner, Voula Damianakou; see Marili Margomenou, «Τα εικονογραφημένα τριών γενεών Ελλήνων. Πενάκι ανά χείρας και φύγαμε!» [“The illustrated publications of three generations of Greeks. Drawing pen in hand, and away we go!”], *Το Βήμα* (August 25, 1996). It was perhaps because he saw his involvement in this as a sideline that he never mentioned it while he lived; references to his participation in *Classics Illustrated* may be found in *Βασίλης Ρώτας*, a slim volume on his life and work published by Voula Damianakou after the author's death: see Barges, «Τα κόμικς του Βασίλη Ρώτα», 170, and Idem, «Τα “Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα”», 61.

they maintained their own high standards when it came to issues of literary and theatrical ethics.²⁵

The Greek series of *Classics Illustrated* dedicated a total of 13 issues to the history of Byzantium, eight to male protagonists or men in general and five to members of the female gender. The number may seem –and probably is– rather low when compared to the total number of 83/90 Greek titles; it should be noted, however, that *Classics Illustrated* was the only Greek comic-book series ever to deal with Byzantium and the history of Modern Greece.²⁶

Their pages sing the praises of the personalities and achievements of (in chronological order of reign) Constantine the Great, Julian the Apostate, Justinian, Heraclius, Basil the Bulgar-Slayer, Constantine Palaiologos, while they also describe the heroic deeds of Byzantine *akritai* and especially of Digenes Akrites. The five women selected were Athenaïs–Eudokia, Eirene the Athenian, Theodora the Blessed, Blessed, Kassiane and Anna Comnena – or rather her work, *Alexias*.²⁷

The questions that we will try to answer here is why them and not some others and, by extension, in what way were those particular personages presented.

The answers have to do both with the more general educational/ pedagogical role these comic books were called upon to perform and with the perception of Byzantium it was decided they would support and reinforce. As far as the first aim is concerned, comic books in general were and are, without a doubt, carriers of many many and various role models, either positive or negative, that influence the edification and socialization of individuals and thus contribute, to a great degree, to shaping the personality of their readers, including for the most part the younger reading public. Their content is related to fundamental life relations and promotes values such as heroism, friendship, love of country or of nature, dignity etc., that appear as eternal truths. Their principal motif is the opposition between good and evil²⁸ and the continuous struggle to secure justice, harmony and balance between the

²⁵ At least that was the case with Vassilis Rotas, whose work has been the focus of dedicated studies and has been praised by the authors for its high quality; see e.g. Karagiannis, *Ο Βασίλης Ρώτας*, 546. Cf. Barges, «Τα κόμικς του Βασίλη Ρώτα», 170: “even when he ‘worked’ under some publisher and according to standards that most probably did not satisfy him personally, onto even the most insignificant (to him) page he outlined he would pour all those juices that flowed through his more authoritative and personal literary work.”

²⁶ Skarpelos, *Ιστορική μνήμη*, 20.

²⁷ See Fig. 1. For the study at hand the following issues were used: *Ο Μέγας Κωνσταντίνος* [*Constantine the Great*] – no. 1231; *Ιουλιανός ο παραβάτης* [*Julian the Apostate*] – no. 1254; *Ιουστινιανός ο αυτοκράτωρ* [*Justinian the emperor*] – no. 222; *Ηράκλειος. Αυτοκράτωρ του Βυζαντίου* [*Heraclius. Emperor of Byzantium*] – no. 1193; *Βασίλειος ο Βουλγαροκτόνος* [*Basil the Bulgar-Slayer*] – no. 1041; *Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος* [*Constantine Palaiologos*] – no. 1110; *Βυζαντινοί Ακρίτες* [*Byzantine akritai*] – no. 1187; *Διγενής Ακρίτας* [*Digenes Akritas*] – no. 1035; *Αθηναΐς. Η αυτοκράτειρα του Βυζαντίου Ευδοκία* [*Athenais. The Byzantine empress Eudokia*] – no. 1219; *Ειρήνη η Αθηναία* [*Eirene the Athenian*] – no. 1241; *Θεοδώρα η Μακαρία* [*Theodora the Blessed*] – no. 1246; *Η Κασσιανή* [*Kassiane*] – no. 1229; *Άννα η Κομνηνή* (“*Η Αλεξιάς*”) [*Anna Comnena* (“*The Alexias*”)] – no. 1222.

²⁸ Skarpelos, *Ιστορική μνήμη*, 63.

world's beings. In every case Good defeats Evil and the villains are punished for their deeds.

The Graeco-Christian image of the Byzantine Empire had to conform to these positive role models and values, which brings us to the second intended aim. With the subject matter of the titles connected to the curriculum of elementary and secondary education, the point was to promote those heroes of a fundamentally Greek and dominantly Christian Byzantium who served that particular purpose. Thus, preference was given to historical figures who either gave utterance to the ideals of Hellenism through their work and their actions, supported the dominance and spread of Christianity, and defended or restored "Greek" territorial integrity, or – and I am referring here to the case of Julian – through their misplaced naïveté and concomitant failure highlighted, although this was not their intention, the grandeur of that which they vainly sought to fight. Therefore, one can easily perceive the rationale behind both the selection of protagonists and the orientation of the content; the latter is briefly presented in the following paragraphs.

Constantine I was portrayed as helping the Christians at a very young age, ing that he stood up for justice,²⁹ while he was made *augustus* by his dying father, who furthermore placed the crown upon his son's head himself.³⁰

The issue is dedicated almost in its entirety to the protagonist's course to single rule. His successive clashes first with Maxentius and then with Licinius are not presented as a fight for the survival of the strongest, but as the struggle of a just, wronged *augustus* to liberate the persecuted Christians in both West and East, to unite the whole population under the protection of the symbol of the Cross, to "re"build churches, to open the prisons and give properties back to those who had been deprived of them because of their faith.³¹ The story ends with his decision to build Constantinople; the latter's consecration was celebrated by a mass in the newly-built magnificent temple of the Christians (!).³² Almost simultaneously with

²⁹ *Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, 6.

³⁰ *Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, 11.

³¹ Constantine cries out: "The people of Italy expect us to liberate them" (*Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, 14); when he presents the *In hoc signo vinces* symbol to his soldiers, he declares: "We are not waging war to conquer, but to help those enslaved!" (*ibid.*, 17). The crowds receive the victorious Constantine in Nicomedia with the acclamation "Welcome, the liberator of Christians!" (*ibid.*, 39).

³² *Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, 43. Both text and illustration allude to the Hagia Sophia. The Justinian issue also makes a specific reference to the church of Hagia Sophia destroyed during the Nika Revolt having been built by Constantine the Great (*Ιουστινιανός*, 16). However, the earliest Hagia Sophia (a basilica, not the building depicted in the illustrations) was built by Constantius II, the son of Constantine; see Peter Schreiner, *Κωνσταντινούπολη. Ιστορία και Αρχαιολογία* [*Constantinople. History and Archaeology*], trans. Annette Fosvinkel (Athens: National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, 2014), 42.

The works of Constantine in the New Rome are almost unknown, as precious little is mentioned in contemporary sources. Only Eusebius, the emperor's biographer, made an effort to praise the city's Christianization, which he arbitrarily attributed to the emperor; see, Cécile Morrisson, «Η πρωτεύουσα», in ed. Cécile Morrisson, *Ο βυζαντινός κόσμος, τ. Ι. Η Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία (330-641)* [*The Byzantine world, v. I. The Eastern Roman Empire (330-641)*], trans. Anastasia Karastathi

the foundation of the New Rome (AD 324), the emperor's mother, Helena, set off on her journey to the Holy Land in order to find the True Cross.³³

Julian's stance against Christianity was attributed to the sensitive disposition of the the protagonist, who was adversely influenced during his traumatic childhood by the the insistence of his first tutor, Eusebius, bishop of Nicomedia, on Christian education and practice.³⁴ His philosophical studies at Pergamum, Ephesus and Athens, at the feet of pagan teachers and Neoplatonic philosophers, brought him closer to the Greece he loved. Julian's mistake, according to his crypto-Christian wife Helena, was that he sought to return to the worship of the Twelve Olympians, looking upon "the brilliance of a beautiful culture as the work of a specific religion."³⁵ But was it not so? The emperor acted as a dreamer, with the heart of a child, and, finding himself himself in the grip of a fallacy, he wished, like the Greek he claimed to be,³⁶ to revive Ancient Greece.

Justinian diverges from the absolute ideal served by the *Classics Illustrated* with regard to Byzantium. Yes, he was the Christian emperor whose "jewel in the crown" was the church of Hagia Sophia, but he was also the ruler that "restored the ancient Roman Empire as a unified global power."³⁷ Of the 13 "Byzantine" titles this is the one that stays more faithful to the historical sources, although it also includes the legends regarding the architectural plan of Hagia Sophia. The Nika Riot, narrated with a relatively high degree of accuracy, considering the genre, the imperial couple's love relationship and the friendship between Justinian and Belisarius that triumphs despite all the calumnies form the canvass on which the era of Justinian was embroidered. The work's highly knowledgeable author³⁸ did not allow himself to get carried away by jingoistic slogans; perhaps that is the reason why the issue has not reprinted in one of the series' repeated later republications.

(Athens: Polis, 2007), 270. Both pagan and Christian rituals marked the inauguration of Constantinople; see Albrecht Berger, *Κωνσταντινούπολη. Ιστορία, τοπογραφία, θρησκεία* [*Constantinople. History, topography, religion*], trans. Christos Tsatsoulis (Athens: Herodotos, 2013), 27-30.

³³ In actual fact, the emperor's mother set off on her journey to the Holy Land after the dramatic family events that took place in the palace in 326, i.e. the execution of Crispus, Constantine's first-born son, on his father's orders. Crispus' stepmother, Fausta, accused him of violating her honor. A few months later, Fausta was also put to death, having been charged with adultery. Helena began her journey in the summer of that year; Aikaterini Christophilopoulou, *Βυζαντινή Ιστορία, τ. Α': 324-610* [*Byzantine History, v. I: 324-610*] (Athens: Herodotos, 2012), 195 and note 78.

³⁴ *Ιουλιανός*, 5.

³⁵ *Ιουλιανός*, 26, while in *ibid.*, 28, Helena prays for the salvation of her husband: "Have mercy on him, Lord! He knows not what he does! And yet he has the heart of a child."

³⁶ When his counselors advised him to initiate a persecution of Christians, he responded: "No, no, I will not become a Nero! I am a Greek!": *Ιουλιανός*, 27.

³⁷ *Ιουστινιανός*, 45. Cf. *ibid.*, 30: "The great Roman state is restored," and *ibid.*, 31: "You have restored the Roman Empire." However, the "Brief Introduction" [Σύντομη Εισαγωγή] to the plot notes: "Thanks to his skills... the Byzantine Empire was organised into a highly efficient state and spread to Asia, Europe, and Africa, supplanting the decayed Roman Empire." There is no doubt that the terms are used here in a "Byzantinocentric"—"Hellenocentric" fashion, with no grounding whatsoever in rigorous academic work.

³⁸ The events are depicted according to the narratives of Procopius, John Malalas and the *Chronicon Paschale*.

Heraclius, on the other hand, is totally embedded in the Graeco-Christian ideal. Revenge for the True Cross being carried away and for the destruction of presented as the sole motive behind his offensive campaign against the Persians (628).³⁹ The restoration of territorial integrity, in order to remedy the consequences of those lands having been previously lost,⁴⁰ is only deemed worthy of a single mention when recording the terms of the treaty Heraclius imposed on Siroes (Kavadh II);⁴¹ however, the first term is still the return of the True Cross.⁴² A crusading spirit dominates the whole book,⁴³ while Khosrau II's demand that the Byzantines change their faith and bow to his own Sun God is impressive.⁴⁴ A large part of the narration and the action is given over to the contribution of the Church in securing funds for the expedition, but also in the part it played during the siege of Constantinople by the Avars. Finally, during his long victorious march the emperor is seen liberating Greek men and women prisoners.

A distance of more than 300 years separates the next emperor. Was Byzantium from the seventh to the end of the tenth century really unable to produce a single ic figure worthy of treatment? Based on what was presented above, the answer be a resounding "No!" The Iconoclastic emperors were excluded from the pantheon of Byzantine heroes. According to the school of thought that dominated historiography, it was the members of the Syrian⁴⁵ and Phrygian dynasties that fought against the Church, sought to destroy the monasteries and eliminate the holy icons, persecuted and tortured the defiant "orthodox" Iconophiles. In other words, Iconoclasm and its instigators or supporters were cast out, regardless of the work they had accomplished in saving the empire, strengthening its position in the East and shaping its new character. This was done solely because on the one hand they had opposed the Church and the spirit with which the latter, through education, infused

³⁹ *Ηράκλειος*, 5-7, 10.

⁴⁰ The consequences of the Persian conquest of vital Byzantine living space were disastrous, and by the early 620s the empire was in a desperate state of affairs. Weighted down by these circumstances, Heraclius made the decision to launch a counteroffensive; see on this Morrisson, *Ο βυζαντινός κόσμος*, 118-21.

⁴¹ *Ηράκλειος*, 40.

⁴² *Ηράκλειος*, 39.

⁴³ *Ηράκλειος*, 10: "Onward for the faith and the Lord's Cross," says Heraclius when addressing his troops. It is true that the reclamation of the True Cross from enemy hands and its return to Jerusalem has led many historians to view Heraclius as a forerunner of the Crusades. Although similarities do exist, they are superficial and mostly the result of propaganda on the part of the Crusaders, in order to justify the movement. The Persians conquering the Holy Land and carrying away the True Cross were in no way the root cause behind the wars of Heraclius. His ideological platform was completely different. See Katerina Karapli, "*Κατενόδωσις στρατού. Η οργάνωση και η ψυχολογική προετοιμασία του βυζαντινού στρατού πριν από τον πόλεμο (610-2081)*" [*Bidding farewell to the troops. The organisation and psychological preparation of the Byzantine army before war (610-1081)*], v. I (Athens: Myrmidones 2010), 174-5.

⁴⁴ *Ηράκλειος*, 5.

⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the issue dedicated to Eirene the Athenian contains an appendix titled "The 'Iconoclastic' emperors. What was happening in Byzantium at the time of Eirene," which expounds the –rather sober for their time– theories of Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, who viewed the reforms of Leo III and Constantine V in a positive light.

the youth, and on the other because the treatment and interpretation of Iconoclasm at the time were one-sided and biased.

The first emperors of the subsequent Macedonian dynasty also had their fair share of weak and/ or dark spots. The founder of the dynasty, Basil I, was his predecessor's "ungrateful" assassin,⁴⁶ his son, Leo VI, went through four marriages, having previously lived with his mistress under the same roof,⁴⁷ while the third member of the family, Constantine VII, boasted no personal military achievements. None of the three measured up to the standards the *Classics* sought to promote.

On the contrary, the great military victories scored by the usurpers Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes against the infidels were included in the issue bearing the the misleading title *Basil the Bulgar-Slayer*, although hardly any "slaying of Bulgarians" was done by the emperor in it. The book did not narrate the war against the Bulgarians, while the "Historical Introduction" stated that the readers did not have have before their eyes "a faithful retelling of history, but a literary presentation." An effort was also made to accurately record the historical events, but it was not completely successful. The brief account of the life and times of Basil II (written by the publisher? by Vassilis Rotas as scriptwriter?) erroneously states that the sobriquet "Bulgar-Slayer" was attributed to Basil by the people of Constantinople on the day he returned to the City from his pilgrimage to Athens. With regard to the punishment (blinding) of large numbers of Bulgarian prisoners, it was claimed that it was unhistorical and that most researchers of Byzantine history found it questionable.⁴⁸

One wonders why this specific issue received that particular title, as it dealt mainly with the years between the death of Romanos II and the assumption of power by Basil and his brother. There was a deliberate effort to adapt and distort the events, with the writer having been influenced by Penelope Delta's historical novel *Στον καιρό του Βουλγαροκτόνου* (*In the times of the Bulgar-Slayer*).⁴⁹ The truth is that Vassilis Rotas

⁴⁶ See Irene Chrestou, *Αυτοκρατορική εξουσία και πολιτική πρακτική. Ο ρόλος του "παραδυναστεύοντος" στη βυζαντινή διοίκηση (τέλη 8^{ου} - αρχές 11^{ου} αιώνα)* [*Imperial authority and political practice. The role of the 'paradynasteuon' in Byzantine administration (late eighth – early eleventh century)*] (Athens: Herodotos, 2008), 143-151; Shaun Tougher, "Michael III and Basil the Macedonian: just Good Friends?" in ed. Liz James, *Desire and Denial in Byzantium. Papers from the Thirty-first Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, March 1997* (Aldershot, 1999), 149-58.

⁴⁷ See Shaun Tougher, *The Reign of Leo VI (886-912). Politics and People* (Leiden – New York – Köln: Brill, 1997), 133-63; Paolo Cesaretti, *Οι γυναίκες του αυτοκράτορα. Το σκάνδαλο της τετραγαμίας του Λέοντος ΣΤ' του Σοφού* [*The emperor's wives. The scandal of the four marriages of Leo VI the Wise*], trans. Efi Kallifatidi (Athens: Okeanida, 2016).

⁴⁸ There is a rather rich body of literature on the subject. In one of the more recent studies of Basil II it is claimed that the legends surrounding his person are not grounded in reality. He was called "Bulgar-Slayer" 150 years after the Byzantine subjugation of Bulgaria, and the use of the sobriquet intensified during the nineteenth and twentieth century for political and nationalist reasons. See Paul Stephenson, *The legend of Basil the Bulgar-Slayer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), passim (but esp. chapters 5-8).

⁴⁹ On the decision of Penelope Delta to combine her educational forays with Byzantium, a decision which was partly due to her worries regarding the nation, but also to the way she approached Byzantine history, see Tonia Kiousopoulou, «Η Π. Σ. Δέλτα και το Βυζάντιο» ["P. S. Delta and Byzantium"], in ed.

had his work cut out for him, since he had to deal with –and justify– assassinations (like that of Nikephoros Phokas), revolts and rebellions (for instance those of and Bardas Skleros), the power of the people behind the throne (key among them were Joseph Bringas and Basil Lakapenos), as well as to suppress the fact that the adulteress Theophano, the hero's mother, was implicated in the murder of her husband.⁵⁰

This is the issue that contains the greatest amount of fiction, but it also stands out for another reason. When republished in the 1970s, the original cover, harmless as well as unfaithful to history, was replaced by a new one, in a style different from that of the rest of the issue's artwork. During the Colonels' dictatorship (1967-1974), Basil II was portrayed as the vanquisher of the Bulgarians behind the Iron Curtain (who look suspiciously like *Komitadji* rebels), thus serving the official Two titles dedicated to the heroic *akritai* and to Digenes aimed, as was stated in the Introduction, at instilling a sense of triumphalism and pride in the "Greek" military virtue⁵¹ of those who had been appointed to guard the empire's frontier, in other words to protect Hellenism and its territorial integrity, preserving intact its core values and ideals. In the person of Digenes one could recognize Hercules, Theseus and Alexander the Great, while the battles fought by Byzantine *akritai* were also linked to the later struggles –wars of liberation or expansion– and uprisings from the period of Ottoman rule to World War II and the Resistance.⁵²

The last Byzantine emperor, the man who personified Byzantium's quintessence, became the focus of the *Classics'* first Byzantine issue published.⁵³ The depiction of the empire's agonizing final years before the fall of Constantinople was more or less faithful to the main events, the only possible exception being a reference to Constantine XI's triumphal coronation at Mistra.⁵⁴ However, the issue also

Al. P. Zannas, Π. Σ. Δέλτα – Σύγχρονες προσεγγίσεις του έργου της [P. S. Delta – Modern approaches her work] (Athens: Hestia, 2006), 291-312.

⁵⁰ For a brief presentation of the events, see ed. Jean-Claude Cheynet, *Ο βυζαντινός κόσμος, τ. Β'. Η βυζαντινή αυτοκρατορία (641-1204)* [*The Byzantine world, v. II. The Byzantine Empire (641-1204)*], trans. Anastasia Karastathi (Athens: Polis, 2011), 118-25.

⁵¹ «Εισαγωγή στο έργο» ["Introduction to the work"], *Βυζαντινοί ακρίτες*: "Let us transport ourselves, for a moment, to their land and age, to feel proud of their Greek valor!"

⁵² Skarpelos, *Ιστορική μνήμη*, 144-5.

⁵³ The commemorative issue –published May 1953, on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the fall of Constantinople– was the fruit of the collaboration between Eirene Photeinou (text) and Mentis Bostantzoglou (illustrations). It is considered one of the finest comic books in the Greek series. In one of his interviews, Bost has commented upon the way he worked and the sources he used in order to render the period. Malandrakis, «Η λογοτεχνία στο περίπτερο», 22, 27-30; cf. Feggerou, *Κλασικά Εικονογραφημένα*, 282.

⁵⁴ *Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος*, 8-9. However, research has definitely shown that the ceremony which took place at Mistra was the acclamation of Constantine XI, through which he was invested with imperial authority. An actual coronation of the last Byzantine emperor in church by the Patriarch never took place. On this see Aikaterini Christophilopoulou, *Εκλογή, αναγόρευσις και στέψις του βυζαντινού αυτοκράτορος* [*Election, acclamation, and coronation of the Byzantine emperor*] (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1956), 204-6.

included folk legends pertaining to the fall of Constantinople,⁵⁵ while every page extolled the Greeks' bravery and manliness, qualities that made the defenders of the City far superior to the enemy. With his self-sacrifice, Palaiologos "saved the soul of the nation," which "in the fullness of time spread its wings for new epic-making adventures."⁵⁶

Beyond the pantheon of Byzantine fighters, emperors and border warriors, the creators of the Greek version of *Classics Illustrated* also brought to the fore those Byzantine women who, by dint of either their personality, the decisions they took during their reign or, finally, their work, contributed to the shaping as well as to the ascendancy of the empire's Graeco-Christian identity, in the form that the latter was constructed and promoted by *Classics Illustrated*.

Athenaïs-Eudokia became, according to the publisher (or the script-writer, Sophia phia Mavroeidi-Papadaki), a leading figure in the development of "Graeco-Christian Christian civilization."⁵⁷ Across the issue's pages unfolds the story of the Athenian philosopher's educated daughter. After her father's death she was taken to Constantinople by her aunt in order to protest the injustice done to her regarding her patrimony.⁵⁸ The Emperor's sister Pulcheria chose her as the most appropriate bride for her brother, and Athenaïs became a devout Christian and Emperor Theodosius' devoted wife, in other words the embodiment of the ideal Byzantine *augusta*.⁵⁹

Given the pedagogical role of the *Classics*, one might think that a foray into the life and deeds of Eirene the Athenian would have been considered taboo.⁶⁰ However, in order to serve the higher purpose of highlighting her role in the ascendancy of Christian orthodoxy, i.e. the veneration of icons, the empress appeared as the first restorer of icon worship⁶¹ and not as a mother who blinded her own son, thus becoming

⁵⁵ As is to be expected, references are made to the Ottomans entering the City through the Kerkopoporta postern (*Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος*, 42), the story of the monk's half-fried fish (*ibid.*, 43), and the last Byzantine emperor's burial, as well as to the latter's location (*ibid.*, 47). A four-page appendix titled «Όταν θα ξαναπάρουμε την Πόλη» ["When we reclaim the City"] relates all the legends connected to the Fall of Constantinople, including the Holy Altar of Hagia Sophia sinking into the sea, as well as the legend of the Marble King.

⁵⁶ *Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος*, 48. Cf. *ibid.*, 7: "...all the forces of the nation".

⁵⁷ *Αθηναΐς*, «Περίληψη του έργου» [Summary of the work].

⁵⁸ For the reasons that led Athenaïs to the Great Palace, see Katerina Nikolaou, "The Contribution of Women to Byzantine Family Properties. Hagiographical, Epigraphical and Legal Evidence", in ed. Ria Berg, *The Material Sides of Marriage. Women and Domestic Economies in Antiquity* [Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae vol. 43] (Rome: Institutum Romanum Finlandiae, 2016), 153.

⁵⁹ In actual fact, Eudokia was not the perfect wife for Theodosius, as is mentioned below, p. 73. The better part of the study of Kenneth G. Holum, *Theodosian Empresses. Women and Imperial Dominion in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley – Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 79-228, is devoted to Theodosius II's sister and wife.

⁶⁰ The work of Ralf-Johannes Lilie, *Byzanz unter Eirene und Konstantin VI. (780-802) Mit einem Kapitel ueber Leon IV. (775-780) von Ilse Rochow* (Berliner Byzantinistische Studien 2) (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996), esp. 48-146, 220-91 (on the relation between Eirene and Constantine), is still one of the more fundamental studies of the reign of Eirene the Athenian. See also Judith Herrin, *Women in Purple: Rulers of Medieval Byzantium* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), 51-129.

⁶¹ The part played by Eirene on the issue of icon worship was recognized by the Church and is mentioned in the *Synaxarium* of Constantinople: Hippolyte Delehaye (ed.), *Propylaeum ad Acta Sanctorum*

the first *augusta* ever to exercise imperial power in her own name. This dark side of Eirene was obscured even more, or rather patently distorted. Her order to imprison the rebellious Constantine VI was disobeyed and, at a time when Eirene, in order to preserve the holy icons,⁶² was crowning herself “emperor of the Romans,” the executioner, under orders from her eunuch advisers, committed the atrocious act of blinding the legitimate ruler.⁶³ The writer was noncommittal regarding the origin of the decision and presented a grim image of the empress who, cut off from the world, gradually wasted away, tormented by guilt.⁶⁴ However, she does not appear to have completely forsaken the joys of life, since she briefly considered tempting her successor, Nikephoros, and become his co-ruler, even if in the end she stood by her decision to become a nun.⁶⁵

The next female issue was dedicated to the life of the second restorer of the a life full of adventures, achievements and adversities. Theodora prevailed over siane in the bride show⁶⁶ that was organized by Theophilos’ stepmother and included elements borrowed from the one which, according to the Byzantine sources, was organized by Eirene for her son, to which the granddaughter of Saint Philaretos had participated.⁶⁷ This is perhaps the only digression in an otherwise

Novembris, Synaxarium ecclesiae Constantinopolitanum e codice Sirmondiano nunc Berolinensi, sels, 1902), August 7, 782, l.2.

⁶² *Ειρήνη η Αθηναία*, 40: “I remain here for my work, to protect the holy icons.” [...] The imperial regalia were brought to her. She took the crown and placed it herself on her head. She then took hold of the scepter and shouted in joy ‘I rule... Sole *Basilissa* of the Romans.’” The event is devoid of any historical basis. Eirene was crowned *augusta* before her wedding to Leo IV [C. De Boor (ed.), *Theophanis Chronographia*, v. I (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1883), 444] and there was no need for her to be “crowned” anew, nor did imperial protocol make provisions for such an eventuality.

⁶³ *Ειρήνη η Αθηναία*, 41. In actual fact, even contemporary Iconophile supporters of Eirene’s work, although they tried to justify her decision, were unable to completely exonerate her; see Katerina Nikolaou and Irene Chrestou, «Οι αντιλήψεις των Βυζαντινών για την άσκηση της εξουσίας από γυναίκες (780-1056)» [“Byzantine perceptions on the exercise of power by women (780-1056)”], *Σύμμεικτα* 13 (1999): 55-6, 59.

⁶⁴ Not a single Byzantine source portrays Eirene in a similar fashion.

⁶⁵ *Ειρήνη η Αθηναία*, 65-7. Eirene was exiled after the successful palace coup of Nikephoros, the *logothetes* of the *genikon*.

⁶⁶ Bride shows have been studied by numerous researchers. Some accept their historicity; others reject it *in toto*; still others accept the historical accuracy of only some of these shows. See Lennart Rydén, “The Bride-shows at the Byzantine Court - History or Fiction?” *Eranos* 83 (1985): 175-91; Dimitry Afinogenov, “The Bride-show of Theophilos: Some notes on the Sources,” *Eranos* 95 (1997): 10-18; Warren Treadgold, “The historicity of imperial bride-shows,” *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik* 54 (2004): 39-52; Gerasim Petrinski, *Конкурсите за красота във византийския императорски двор: реторика, литература, пропаганда* [Bride-shows in the Byzantine imperial court. Rhetoric, literature, propaganda] (Sofia, 2015), with a comprehensive bibliography of earlier works on the subject.

In any event, even if bride-shows had been organised, the candidates came from within the boundaries of the Byzantine Empire, not from Egypt, Babylon, or the Indies and Russia, as is mentioned for the ninth century in the Kassiane issue; *Κασσιανή*, 13-5.

⁶⁷ *Θεοδώρα η Μακαρία*, 2-7. The scriptwriter was probably familiar with the story of St Philaretos, the great landowner of Paphlagonia whose granddaughter was selected in a bride show by Eirene, the emperor’s mother, to become the wife of Constantine VI. The meeting between the imperial envoys and Philaretos’ family, the fact that they received hospitality in his house, the inquiry about

faithful rendering of the reign of Theodora, which in any case offers itself to a fictional retelling. The court jester Denderis, Theophilos' daughters and the veneration of the icons, the *augusta's* merchant ship and the emperor's wrath, Petronas' unjust treatment of a widow, the emperor personally acting as judge,⁶⁸ all these unfold before the eyes of the reader.⁶⁹ The image of the *augusta* was supplemented with the emphatic presentation of her mental skills, the spirit of thriftiness that characterized her, and was rounded off with her reluctance to proceed with the restoration of the icons after her husband's death out of fear that it might besmirch his name.⁷⁰ Her people, however, led her to the right decisions and Theodora herself triumphed along with the icons, while the image of her son as Michael the Drunkard became the dominant perception of her successor.⁷¹

One of the individuals that played a key role in the aforementioned story, Kassiane, starred in a separate issue, one that obviously deserved to be dedicated to perhaps the most important woman hymnographer of Byzantium.⁷² This issue, however, did not feature the protagonist's exceptional work; it focused instead on a great unrequited love, one that led the well-educated intelligent woman to the monastery.⁷³ Pure, idealized love, pervasive throughout the Byzantine *Classics*,⁷⁴ was the dominant element in this drama and was even depicted as the reason that forced Euphrosyne, Theophilos' stepmother, to abandon the monastic habit in order to marry her beloved Michael II.⁷⁵

the female members of the household, the fitting of the model shoe to the candidate's foot, all these events may be found in the narrative contained in the saint's *vita*: Lennart Rydén, *The Life of St Philaretos the Merciful Written by his Grandson Niketas: A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation Notes and Indices* (Studia Byzantina Upsaliensia, 8) (Uppsala, 2002), 82-8.

⁶⁸ See on this Katerina Nikolaou, «Οι γυναίκες στο βίο και τα έργα του Θεοφίλου» [“Women in the life and works of Theophilos”], *Σύμμεικτα* 9 (1993), 137-51.

⁶⁹ *Θεοδώρα η Μακαρία*, 19-25, 26-7, 29-30, 31-4, 36-7.

⁷⁰ Sharpness of mind was a male characteristic, according to the perceptions of the Byzantines, a positive trait which the latter recognized in women who exercised authority in a dynamic and determined fashion, but also in those whose actions conformed to the views of the historians who recorded their reigns. On the way that Theodora was generally portrayed by Byzantine authors, see Nikolaou and Chrestou, “Αντιλήψεις,” 57-9, 63-4.

⁷¹ *Θεοδώρα η Μακαρία*, 44.

⁷² Ilse Rochow, *Studien zu der Person, den Werken und dem Nachleben der Dichterin Kassia*, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1967; Eva Catafygiotou-Topping, “Women Hymnographers in Byzantium,” *Diptycha* 3 (1983): 104-7; Niki Tsironi, *Κασσιανή η Υμνωδός* [*Kassiane the Hymnographer*] (Athens: Ekdoseis tou Phoinika), 2002.

⁷³ *Κασσιανή*, 26.

⁷⁴ Contrary to what took place in the texts of Byzantine authors, particularly those pertaining, or referring, to the period in which the events mentioned in the issue in question take place. See Paolo Odorico, “L'amour à Byzance. Un sujet de rhétorique?” *Europe* 822 (octobre 1997): 34-46, on the absence of mentions or descriptions of romantic love in Middle Byzantine literature.

⁷⁵ *Κασσιανή*, 2. On the true reason behind this wedding, i.e. the wish of Michael II to attach himself to the Syrian dynasty by marrying Euphrosyne, great-great-granddaughter of Leo III, see Warren T. Treadgold, *The Byzantine Revival 780-842* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988), 246-7.

The circle of Byzantine women is rounded off with the presentation of Anna Comnena⁷⁶ and the deeds of her father, Alexios I. The gifted emperor managed to instill respect to both friend and foe, to reap huge benefits for the beleaguered empire. Thus, in its struggle with various enemies, Hellenism⁷⁷ proved victorious. Despite a general tendency to whitewash individuals and events, the story of Anna Comnena does not shy away from the protagonist's ambition and the plots in which she participated in order to ascend the throne.⁷⁸ However, the emphasis given to contemporary military operations attests to the fact that the subtitle, "The Alexias," i.e. the emperor's deeds, was at the forefront. Anna Comnena was just a vehicle used by the dramatist (the script was written by Sophia Mavroeidi-Papadaki).

Generally speaking, every one of the Byzantine issues of *Classics Illustrated* rested on historical truth and, with the exception of Basil II, followed the historical realities of the age. However, there were distortions, fabrications and suppressions that have already been mentioned or implied, but not exhaustively. It is impossible, within the constraints of a limited study of the subject, to highlight and analyze the deliberate misrepresentations, historical mistakes and anachronisms –most of them blatant– that have been located both in the text and in the illustrations. After pointing out that each title could by itself form the subject of a separate study, I will limit myself here to only a handful of characteristic mistakes and misses.

Historical realities that failed to conform to the ideals set forth above and to the general educational policy were suppressed.

For instance, no mention is made to Eudokia's love affair with Paulinus, her husband's closest friend, an affair that led to her being banished from the palace and Constantinople, while costing her lover his life.⁷⁹ Whenever suppression of facts was not possible, whitewashing had to suffice. Thus, Justinian's Theodora

⁷⁶ On Anna Comnena and her times, as well as for an evaluation of her work, see ed. Thalia Gouma-Peterson, *Anna Komnene and Her Times* (New York – London: Garland Publishing, 2000).

⁷⁷ This issue too is full of clear references to Hellenism. See for instance *Άννα Κομνηνή*, 19: "The most powerful rulers of Europe presented themselves to the Greek emperor and swore allegiance and vassalage to him"; *ibid.*, 26: "There also arrived a unit of Greek troops led by one of Alexios' top generals"; *ibid.*, 28: "The Greeks of Nicaea received the great liberator with enthusiasm"; *ibid.*, 31: "Alexios declared holy war against the usurper Bohemund, who had betrayed the mutual agreements by capturing Greek cities."

⁷⁸ For instance, even when she was standing next to Alexios' deathbed, she and her mother would conspire in order for her to secure the succession to the imperial throne. *Άννα Κομνηνή*, 40: "... we must come up with some stratagem: Some sort of chrysobull, or a will appointing me heiress to the throne."

⁷⁹ For the actual events, see Holum, *Theodosian Empresses*, 176-94.

In the *Classics* issue, Eudokia decided on her own to leave Constantinople and retire in self-imposed exile to Jerusalem, because she could no longer tolerate the spineless, inactive Theodosius. On the other hand, at a later date Paulinus was accused of conspiracy by Pulcheria and the emperor ordered him executed (*Αθηναίς*, 43-6).

kept herself from starving to death by working in a circus,⁸⁰ a venue both familiar and endearing to the *Classics*' young readers, which in no way insinuated what Procopius described as Theodora's life before her marriage.⁸¹ Likewise, Martina was depicted as Heraclius' beloved wife – which she actually was. However, there is no reference to the negative feelings that prevailed among the ecclesiastical circles, as well as among palace officials, due to the illicit, incestuous union, since Martina was the daughter of the Emperor's sister.⁸² Finally, Theophano decided to murder Nikephoros Phokas out of fear for the life of her underage children, while she went on to become John Tzimiskes' wife.⁸³ And all that because the works' readership were on the one hand minors and on the other they had to be nurtured to have faith in heroes whose image no flaw could ever tarnish.

As far as the artwork is concerned –for which those who are more qualified than than me would have plenty to observe and comment upon– howlers are both numerous and diverse. Despite the fact that talented artists and engravers worked on the the illustration, the period was not faithfully rendered.⁸⁴ For example, Romanos II looks like someone out of the times of Peter the Great of Russia or of the *Three Musketeers* issue.⁸⁵ Members of the clergy and of the monastic world are all attired in the garb of their modern counterparts,⁸⁶ and churches are decorated with images in the midst of the Iconoclastic period.⁸⁷ During the siege of Constantinople, Flantanelas and his sailors wear the much later blue-and-white striped navy shirts,⁸⁸ Saracen ships and

⁸⁰ Theodora and her “two little sisters” helped their bear-keeper father at the circus, after his death they danced as “goddesses and nymphs” in *tableaux vivants*, and when she grew up she was forced to earn a living the hard way, by burning the midnight oil – according to the illustration, she stayed up all night knitting: *Ιουστινιανός*, 10.

⁸¹ On the way Procopius portrays Theodora before her marriage, see Paolo Cesaretti, *Θεοδώρα. Η άνοδος μιας αυτοκράτειρας* [*Theodora. The rise of an empress*], trans. Leonidas Karatzas (Athens: Okeanida, 2003), esp. 108–26.

⁸² See George Charizanis, «Αιμομικτικές σχέσεις Βυζαντινών αυτοκρατόρων. Οι περιπτώσεις του Ηρακλείου (610-641) και του Μανουήλ Α' Κομνηνού (1143-1180) και η στάση της Εκκλησίας» [“Incestuous relationships of Byzantine emperors. The cases of Heraclius (610-641) and Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180) and the attitude of the Church”], *Βυζαντινός Δόμος* 19-20-21 (2011-2012-2013), 65-72.

⁸³ Theophano was definitely worried lest the legitimate heirs, Basil II and Constantine VIII, be elbowed out of power in favor of the children of the *kouropalates* Leo Phokas; furthermore, she was indignant at the austerity of her pious husband. On the other hand, there were serious suspicions that a romantic liaison existed between her and John Tzimiskes, whom she never married, since he gave in to the demand of the Patriarch to cast her out of the palace. This was one of the terms imposed by Polyeuktos in order to crown Tzimiskes; see Cheynet, *Ο βυζαντινός κόσμος*, 120.

⁸⁴ Apart from the fidelity –or lack thereof– in rendering the age in which each legend or historical event took place, a more general view has been put forward, claiming that the Greek-content *Classics Illustrated* series, although featuring many notable artists, did not manage to stand out artistically, because the creators were unaware of the basic formulations with which their American colleagues were familiar: Malandrakis, «Οι αριστοκράτες», 5/5; Feggerou, *Κλασσικά Εικονογραφημένα*, 282.

⁸⁵ *Βασίλειος ο Βουλγαροκτόνος*, 1, 5 (fig. 2).

⁸⁶ *Αθηναίς*, 29, 39; *Ειρήνη η Αθηναία*, 8, 22, 25 (fig. 3).

⁸⁷ *Κασσιανή*, 27, 47 (fig. 4).

⁸⁸ *Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος*, 20, 34 (fig. 5).

forts fly the Jolly Roger,⁸⁹ women dancing at taverns or in the Hippodrome are dressed and coiffed like contemporary nightclub dancers or wear ballet shoes,⁹⁰ and Basil II's tutor has a globe in his study.⁹¹ Let us add to those few samples the depiction of bearded eunuchs,⁹² so that we can understand the artists' reasoning: on the one hand, they were using easy correlations; on the other, they did not wish to mystify their young readership or provoke negative impressions.

Particular reference should be made to the non-historic, intensive use –taking vantage of every possible or impossible opportunity– of the double-headed eagle the symbol of Byzantium, as early as the “highly Romanized” times of Theodosius II.⁹³ Another weakness that courses through the texts may be attributed to the writers: having only a general historical framework of Byzantium in mind and, in several occasions, not being familiar with the specific constituent elements of Byzantine culture at any given period, they made references to institutions, names, offices and titles irrespective of chronological period, as if these had been frozen in time.⁹⁴ Finally, the writers replaced stereotypes, such as Byzantine women busying themselves with weaving and knitting, with the female hobby popular in their own time, needlepoint,⁹⁵ thus projecting images and figures friendly and much closer to the young readers. Within the same framework, benefits such as girls' education, which the creators wanted to make desirable to their public, were made to look like the vested right for the whole Byzantine female population.⁹⁶ Occasioned by the

⁸⁹ *Βασίλειος ο Βουλγαροκτόνος*, 1, 2 (fig. 6).

⁹⁰ *Ιουστινιανός*, 10; *Βασίλειος ο Βουλγαροκτόνος*, 27 (fig. 7).

⁹¹ *Βασίλειος ο Βουλγαροκτόνος*, 28 (fig. 8).

⁹² *Ειρήνη η Αθηναία*, 1, 21, 24; *Θεοδώρα η Μακαρία*, 39, 45 (fig. 9).

⁹³ As there are too many instances, see e.g. *Αθηναίς*, 30-1; *Ιουστινιανός*, 30, 34; *Βασίλειος ο Βουλγαροκτόνος*, 12.

The eagle –though not a double-headed one– as a symbol of Rome was also one of the symbols of Byzantium (its presence is rather conspicuous in the Constantine the Great issue: *Κωνσταντίνος ο Μέγας*, passim). The date of the introduction of the double-headed eagle in Byzantium has been much discussed. It was definitely employed by the Palaeologan dynasty, but it was never the official emblem of the empire, although it was used as a decorative pattern on the emperor's saddles, socks, footwear, and the cushions on which he rested his feet. See ed. in chief Alexander P. Kazhdan, *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* (New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), s.v. eagles, 669.

⁹⁴ For instance, the captain of Heraclius' palace guard bore the title of grand *domestikos* (*Ηράκλειος*, 2); as early as the fifth century there was a *zoste patrikia* in the court of Pulcheria (*Αθηναίς*, 16), Thekla was Martina's *zoste patrikia* (*Ηράκλειος*, 3), while ladies bearing that title form the entourage of Justinian's wife Theodora (*Ιουστινιανός*, 12). On the other hand, Theoktiste, the empresses' mother, is mentioned in the Theodora issue as “the first *zoste*” *patrikia*, which she actually was; see Kazhdan, *The Oxford Dictionary*, s.v. *zoste patrikia*, 2.231.

⁹⁵ For instance, Martina embroiders double-headed eagles on cloth, in order to make sandals for Heraclius (*Ηράκλειος*, 4). Also, “sewing-kit baskets” are among the presents for the newborn daughter of Theodosius II and Eudokia (*Αθηναίς*, 29).

⁹⁶ Education was a commodity that was neither accessible to, nor necessary for, Byzantine women. Very few had either the opportunity or the ability to acquire basic reading and writing skills, while women who advanced beyond that level, especially in the Middle Byzantine period, were even fewer in number. See Katerina Nikolaou, *Η γυναίκα στη μέση βυζαντινή εποχή. Κοινωνικά πρότυπα και καθημερινός βίος στα αγιολογικά κείμενα* [*The Woman in the Middle Byzantine Period. Social*

cases of Eudokia, Kassiane, and Anna Comnena, who were actually the exceptions to the rule, the claim was put forward that “many women added luster to Byzantium in the field of culture.”⁹⁷ Also on the subject of women, who drove chariots⁹⁸ and moved freely about town, their outlined participation in the war effort alluded to the Greek women of Antiquity and the fighters of the recent Greek-Italian War. They took an active part in defense during sieges and publicly expressed their joy or sorrow for current developments.⁹⁹ The role models used in depicting the Byzantine mother and wife were the Spartan woman, who proudly saw her son off to war, and the Greek woman of 1940, who stoically faced the loss of son or husband in the Albanian front.

This last observation recapitulates everything that has been stated above and confirms the standing dualities in contemporary historiography: Antiquity-Byzantium and Byzantium-Modern Hellenism. Beyond the projected epic, Graeco-Christian dimension of Byzantium and the exemplary substance of the works’ main protagonists, there was a manifest tendency on the part of creators and publishers to help their young readers find in the pages of *Classics Illustrated* recognizable situations, familiar figures and known characters that would lead them to realize the direct connection to their historical past.

Models and Everyday Life in the Hagiographical Texts] (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation/Institute of Byzantine Research, 2005), 185-213.

⁹⁷ «Περὶ ἑκείνου τοῦ ἔργου» [“Summary of the work”], *Αθηναῖς*.

⁹⁸ *Αθηναῖς*, 36-7.

⁹⁹ *Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ Μέγας*, 36, 37.












Fig. 1




Fig. 2





Fig. 5




Fig. 6



Fig. 7



Fig. 8




Fig. 9

The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Security and Stability of the Balkans

The Arab Spring: Pandora's Box

The Arab Spring, though initially welcomed as the *third wave* of modernization and democratization of the Middle East and North Africa,¹ eventually spiralled downwards into a series of war and crises that still plague the region. Indicatively, the Syrian Civil War completely wrecked the birthplace of the Arab Nationalism² (at a cost of over 450,000 dead, 4,000 refugees and 7,500,000 internally displaced) and, far worse, destabilised the neighbouring countries (Lebanon and Iraq).³

Two major trends in the Arab World can be easily discerned in 2017: first of all, the “Balkanization”⁴ of the Middle East and North Africa and, secondly, the emergence of new threats for the security and stability to the Arab World and beyond (e.g. jihadist terrorism, transnational organized crime, tidal waves of refugees etc.).⁵ In fact, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen can be characterized as “failed states” in the post-Arab Spring Middle East, whereas other states (e.g. Lebanon) deserve the title of “failing states.”⁶ How do these negative developments affect the Balkans?

According to Robert Kaplan, geography determines a state's prospects for peace and war in a critical way.⁷ The Balkans, a rather volatile region in modern times,⁸ witnessed first hand the aftershocks of the Arab Spring and Islamic Winter.⁹ The refugee crisis in 2015 testifies to the magnitude of the aftershocks of the

* Assistant Professor in the American University in the Emirates

¹ Spyridon Plakoudas, “Causes of the Arab Spring: A Critical Analysis” (Athens: KEDISA, 2017), 2.

² In fact, Syria was the cradle of Arab Nationalism in the 19th century.

³ Spyridon Plakoudas, “The Syrian Civil War and Peace in the Middle East: A Chimera?” *KEDISA (Geopolitical Risk Analysis)*, 29/12/2016.

⁴ The term “Balkanization” refers to the eruption of sectarian conflicts and the dissolution of sovereign states into warring statelets – just like the Balkans during the Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001). Michael Zimmerman, “A Middle East Islamicised or Balkanized?” *Jerusalem Post*, 30/12/2012.

⁵ Spyros Plakoudas, “The Syrian War: A Geopolitical Chernobyl,” accepted for publication in the forthcoming volume of the Middle East Review of International Affairs.

⁶ Aaron David Miller, “Middle East Meltdown,” *Foreign Policy*, 30/10/2014; Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East” in Mehran Kamrava (ed.): *Weak States in the Greater Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-4.

⁷ Robert Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2012).

⁸ In fact, the Balkans witness constant wars and crises ever since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. For an analysis of these trends, see: Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: A Short History* (London: Phoenix, 2002), 116-151.

⁹ John R. Bradley, *After the Arab Spring: How the Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); John Davis (ed.), *The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).

Arab Spring and the vulnerability of Greece and the Balkans to them. The Arab Spring opened, in a way, Pandora's Box and various ills (the proliferation of weapons weapons of mass destruction, the rise and spread of jihadist terrorism, the security of of energy routes, and the tidal wave of illegal immigrants) threaten the security and stability of the Balkans.

ISIS and the "Green Corridor" in the Balkans

The Arab Spring inadvertently caused the rise and spread of jihadist groups in every country affected profoundly by the political revolution and the accompanying ing crises and conflicts – from Iraq and Syria to Yemen and Libya. ISIS (or Daesh) towers above all jihadist groups owing to its power and cruelty. ISIS established a "caliphate" in Syria and Iraq¹⁰ and expanded to Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan¹¹ and even the (western) Balkans. After all, the western Balkans and southern Russia remain remain the only two regions of the Old Continent with native Muslim populations.

After all, the Balkans were a fertile ground for the spread of jihadism. The Bosnian War (1992-1995) re-activated the old divide between Christians and Muslims during the concluding stages of the Eastern Question and thousands of mujahideen from all over the Islamic World arrived in Bosnia for jihad. And when the war ended ended in 1995, many of them inter-married with the locals and declined the invitation of the Bosnian state authorities to depart.¹² Unsurprisingly, these veterans developed a close cooperation with Al Qaeda and participated in various terrorist incidents.¹³ As early as 2001, the Central Security Operations Service (NOCS) in Italy, the police unit responsible for counter-terrorism, described the threat of a "green corridor" ("dorsale verde") in the western Balkans: "the project of Islamic colonization of the Balkans that aims at the gradual establishment of a green corridor to include all regions in which predominantly Muslim ethnic groups prevail."¹⁴

As the map clearly illustrates, this "green corridor" would encompass all the territories in the western Balkans with a majority of (Sunni) Muslims: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Tetovo (in north-western FYROM) and Sanjak (in south-western Serbia). Kosovo and Bosnia, two lands ravaged by inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, witnessed in recent years the spread of religiosity and even extremism among the otherwise moderate Muslim populations owing to the missionary

¹⁰ The Islamic State draws support primarily from the nomadic tribes of Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria chafing at the oppressive rule of the Shia-dominated central governments in Bagdad and Damascus.

¹¹ Uran Botobekov, "Is Central Asia Ready to Face ISIS," *The Diplomat*, 8/7/2016; Eleanor Ross, "Why Extremist Groups Are Gaining Strength in Central Asia," *Newsweek*, 12/4/2017.

¹² The mujahideen established the following military formations: 7th Muslim Brigade, Black Swans, Green Berets, Green Legion, El Mujahid and Patriotic League.

¹³ Osama bin Laden even visited Bosnia-Herzegovina twice. Evan Kohlmann, *Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network* (Oxford: Berg, 2004); John R. Schindler, *Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qaida, and the Rise of Global Jihad* (New York City: Zenith Press, 2007).

¹⁴ Cf. Fiorenza Saranzini, "Soldi E Moschee, Osama Avanza Nei Balcani" ["Money And Mosques, Osama Advances In The Balkans"], *Corriere della Sera*, 8/11/2001; "Kosovo and the Jihadist Green Corridor in the Balkans," *Global Politics*, 24/5/2017.

work by Turkey, Iran and other monarchies from the Persian Gulf (e.g. Qatar). Thus, ISIS readily spread its influence deep into the Balkans and recruited an estimated 875 mujahideen for jihad in Iraq and Syria according to the Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS): 217-330 from Bosnia, 90-210 from Albania, 232-300 from Kosovo, 100-146 from FYROM, 30 from Montenegro and 50-70 from Serbia. With a population of less than two million, the de facto independent Kosovo ranks the top country in volunteers for ISIS in comparison to its size (125 foreign fighters per capita for every 1 million citizens).¹⁵ Kaçanik, a town in south Kosovo, has been rendered a stout stronghold for ISIS in the Balkans.¹⁶ One of these volunteers, Lavdim Muhaxheri (Abu Abdullah al Kosova as nom de guerre), became the leader of the so-called “Balkan Brigade” of ISIS in Syria.¹⁷ Bosnia-Herzegovina is another such region. Nearly 28 villages in remote mountainous valleys of Herzegovina are inhabited by the former mujahideen and Sharia Law is practiced in defiance of the state authorities in Sarajevo; unsurprisingly, these villages offered recruits to Al Qaeda long before the rise of ISIS in 2014. Indicatively, a force of 600 police officers was required to storm Ovska and Gornja Maoča in 2010 in the context of an expansive counter-terrorism operation; a same operation was carried out in 2015.¹⁸

¹⁵ Francesca Astorri, “European Fears of the ISIS’ Black Flag Crossing from the Balkans,” *Al Arabiya*, 8/4/2017.

¹⁶ Julian Borger, “ISIS Targets Vulnerable Bosnia for Recruitment and Attack,” *Guardian*, 25/6/2015; Christos Tellides, “Kaçanik Scares the Balkans: A Village of Jihadists... Two Hours from the Border,” *Ethnos*, 30/8/2015.

¹⁷ Lavdim Muhaxheri was killed by a US armed drone in mid-2017. “Kosovo ISIS Leader Killed, Media Reports,” *Balkan Insight*, 8/6/2017.

¹⁸ Jenny Stanton, “A Far from Welcoming Village,” *Daily Mail*, 5/2/2015; “Islamic State: Bosnian Police Raid Gornja Maoča Village after IS Flags, Signs Displayed,” *ABC News*, 6/2/2017.



The Jihadist “Green Corridor” in the Balkans

ISIS does not utilize the western Balkans only for recruiting. ISIS additionally uses these territories as a transit route for funds, weapons and volunteers from Europe to the Middle East and vice versa. Between 2011 and 2015, 4,294 volunteers from Western Europe travelled through the Balkans to Turkey and, from there, to the battlefields in Syria and Iraq.¹⁹ Unsurprisingly, there is a strong connection between the cells of ISIS in the western Balkans and the repeated terrorist attacks in Western Europe. In fact, the terrorists involved in the attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 had spent a certain period of time in ISIS’s surfacing pockets in the Balkans.²⁰

ISIS forged close ties with the organised crime in the western Balkans to keep this “Balkan Route” open and running. Most notably, ISIS established an informal alliance with the mafia networks in Albania and Kosovo – two regions heavily infiltrated by the jihadist groups in recent years.²¹ The local mafias facilitate the movement of funds, weapons and volunteers by ISIS from Europe to the Middle East and, in return,

¹⁹ Approximately 30% of these mujahideen have already returned to Western Europe. Bibi van Ginkel et al., “*The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, Threats and Policies*” (Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016), 3-4.

²⁰ Europol, “Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State’s Terrorist Attacks” (Hague: Europol, 2016), 5-6.

²¹ Indicatively, Albanians constitute one of the ten most numerous factions within the jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. Tim Judah, “Balkan Fighters Abroad: Holy Warriors,” *Economist*, 21/8/2014.

they benefit from the lucrative drug and human trafficking by ISIS.²² Contrary to the Syria and Iraq where ISIS violently substituted the syndicates of organized crime, the jihadists co-opted the mafias in the western Balkans.²³

Albania is the iconic example of the synergy between Mafia and ISIS. A police raid at Lazarat, the stronghold of the Albanian Mafia, in 2014 severely weakened latter and ISIS moved in aggressively to fill the vacuum. Co-opting the now Albanian Mafia, ISIS usurped a significant portion of the lucrative trade in (over 5 billion dollars worth). Nowadays, most of the cannabis crops (which after 2014 spread beyond Lazarat throughout the country) are controlled by an alliance the Albanian Mafia and ISIS.²⁴ In Kosovo, another region with an overwhelming Albanian majority, the ties between ISIS and the Kosovar Mafia are well-established. As early as 2001 Al Qaeda had infiltrated Kosovo and established an alliance with the Kosovar Mafia.²⁵ Al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra (renamed in 2017 to Tahrir al-Sham), and ISIS profited from an alliance with the Kosovar Mafia²⁶ which controlled a significant portion of the region's economy and retained a privileged relationship with the former UCK leaders and current officials in Kosovo.²⁷

Thanks to these networks of the local mafias in western Balkans with the state authorities of certain weak states and the (Albania and/or Bosnian) diasporas in Western Europe, jihadist groups in the Middle East not only increased the power in the Levant but also established themselves firmly in South-eastern and Western Europe. Drawing new vigour from these spread-out cells, the jihadist groups increased their overall attacks in Europe by almost four times since 2011 in terms of number²⁸ and many more times in terms in lethality.²⁹

²² EU, "Europe's Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the European Union" (Brussels: European Parliament, 2012), 57-59; Lubov Grigorova Mincheva and Tedd Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliance and the State: Ethnosocialist and Islamic Challenges to Regional Security* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 159-178.

²³ Jamie Dettmer, "Syria's Jihadists Linked to Organized Crime," *The Daily Beast*, 12/9/2013; Ioannis Michaletos and Darco Trifunovic, "Nexus Between Terrorism and Organized Crime," *Radi-cal Islam Monitor in Southeast Europe*, 24/12/2015.

²⁴ Alan Hall and Dan Warburton, "ISIS Seizes £4bn Drug Ring from the Mafia to Fund its Brutal Terror Campaign," *Daily Mirror*, 16/1/2016; David Clark, "EU Cannot Ignore Albania's Descent into Disorder," *Financial Times*, 12/5/2017.

²⁵ Nicole Contegiacomo, "Rational Choice Theory and the Crime-Terror Nexus: How and Why Terrorist and Organized Criminal Groups are Working Together" (MA Thesis: University of North Carolina, 2007), 31-32.

²⁶ Ebi Spahiu, "Militant Islamists, Organized Crime and the Balkan Diaspora in Europe," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2015), 3-5.

²⁷ Unsurprisingly, Kosovo has been termed a "mafia state" and a "black hole of lawlessness" since this de facto independent state is the epicentre of human trafficking, drug and weapons trade and organs theft in Europe. Misha Glenn, "Criminal Gangs Running the Balkans," *BBC*, 28/4/2011; Chuck Sudetic, "The Bullies Who Run Kosovo," *Politico*, 23/7/2015.

²⁸ Thomas Hegghammer, "The Future of Jihadism in Europe: A Pessimistic View," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 10, No. 6 (2016), 156-170.

Since the jihadists practice an “apocalyptic religious terrorism” in pursuit of an Armageddon,³⁰ the former can potentially use weapons of mass destruction. The decline of Libya and Syria (two states with stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction) into failed states simply presented the opportunity to ISIS and other jihadist groups (e.g. Jabhat al Nusra) to obtain such lethal weapons. In February 2015 the Libyan state authorities stated that unidentified assailants (most likely jihadists of ISIS) had seized control of the small stockpiles of mustard gas and sarin that remained in the possession of the post-Qaddafi regime.³¹ And a few months later, in September 2015 senior US officials confirmed that ISIS possessed chemical weapons after the capture of a regime military base in northern Syria and used them more than once against the peshmerga of Iraqi Kurdistan.³² Therefore, an attack with chemical weapons in the Balkans or in Western Europe by jihadists from the western Balkans cannot be discounted as a possibility.

The Danger of Civil Wars

The infiltration of the Balkans by jihadists radicalized the native Muslim populations even further and sowed the seeds of renewed civil wars in the “powder keg” of Europe. After all, three countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM and Serbia-Kosovo, are demographically sensitive societies which have not yet recuperated from the traumas of sectarian conflict in the 1990s. All three countries “share” two trends: a recent ethnic/ religious war and a rising Muslim population which is increasingly radicalised.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is obviously the prime candidate for a renewed civil war. In a country literally devastated by sectarian passions, even the death toll of the Bosnian War³³ or the census³⁴ is a contentious issue. The Dayton Agreement in 1995 estab-

²⁹ For example, the truck attack in Nice cost the lives of 85 civilians in July 2016 whereas the co-ordinated attacks in Paris, the worst terrorist attack by jihadists in the Old Continent, cost the lives of 130 civilians in November 2015.

³⁰ Assaf Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008); Frances L. Flannery, *Understanding Apocalyptic Terrorism: Countering the Radical Mindset* (London: Routledge, 2015).

³¹ Abdul Sattar Hatita, “Libya Militias Capture Chemical Weapons: Military Official,” *Asharq al-Awsat*, 21/2/2015.

³² Adam Entous, “Islamic State Suspected of Using Chemical Weapons, U.S. Says,” *Washington Post*, 13/8/2015; Lizzie Dearden, “ISIS Manufacturing and Using Chemical Weapons in Syria and Iraq, US Official Claims,” *Independent*, 11/9/2015.

³³ In 2007, the Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Center published its report on casualties of the Bosnian War (“the Bosnian Book of the Dead”) and documented a minimum of 97,207 dead and missing. The Office of the Prosecutors at the Hague Tribunal calculated the minimum number of victims as 89,186, with a probable figure of around 104,732 souls. “Bosnian War Dead Figure Announced,” *BBC News*, 21/6/2007. “New War Demographics Feature on the ICTY Website,” *International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia*, 29/3/2011.

³⁴ According to the census in 1991, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina numbered 4,377,000 souls of whom 43.5% Bosniaks (Muslims), 32% Serbs and 18.4% Croats. The first post-war census was initially scheduled for 2011 but was successively postponed until October 2013 due to disagreements over the census methodology among the various parties. According to the new census, the total popula-

lished in effect a “Frankenstein State”: one country (Bosnia–Herzegovina), two statelets (Republica Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and three authorities (Serb, Croat and Bosniak). The recent census in 2013 revealed that the population of Bosniaks is constantly rising at the expense of the Serbs and Croats (from just 39.5% in 1981 to 50.11% in 2013) despite the fact that the Bosniaks suffered the vast majority of the war casualties.³⁵ The steady rise of the Bosniaks creates a “siege mentality” to the Serbs of the country who see their ratio of the population in constant decline since 1971: from 37.2% to just 30.8%.³⁶ This change in the delicate demographic balance could call into question the very foundations of the Dayton Agreement.

The recent terrorist incidents in Bosnia-Herzegovina only deepened the gap between the Republica Srpska and the (Croat-Bosniak) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 2015, an ISIS lone wolf murdered a police officer in Republica Srpska; a few months later, in November, a jihadist murdered two Bosniak soldiers Rajlovac (a suburb of Sarajevo). The actions of the local authorities in the two revealed the widening gap between them. The authorities in the (Croat-Bosniak) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina raided two villages—strongholds of ISIS and detained a few dozen suspects; in contrast, the authorities in Republica Srpska conducted “Operation Ruben” – a sweeping counter-terrorist operation which targeted the small Bosniak population of the republic en masse. And in 2016, Serbia and Republica Srpska conducted a joint counter-terrorism drill which testified to the growing military ties between Banja Luka and Belgrade.³⁷

The situation is further complicated by the actions of outside powers. Ideally the EU should be able to contain a crisis at its own backyard. However, the EU can offer only “carrots” (i.e. accession to the EU) and no “sticks” (i.e. military or diplomatic sanctions) to the parties involved. In other words, this inability of the EU corroborates the axiom that this union is an “economic giant, a political dwarf and

tion of the country had decreased to 3,791,622 people (a 20% decrease) of whom 50.11% Bosniaks (Muslims), 30.8% Serbs and 1.4% Croats. The census results were eventually published in 2016 owing to political wrangles. “Bosnia-Herzegovina Has Lost a Fifth of its Pre-War Population, Census Shows,” *Guardian*, 1/7/2016.

³⁵ Indeed, the Bosniaks suffered 61% of the casualties in the Bosnian War although they constituted 43.7% of the country’s population according to the data of the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo. Marie-Janine Carlic, “Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991–1995” in Charles W. Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds.), *Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2012), 139–140. For the demographic evolution of the country, see: Ondřej Žila, “Ethno-Demographic Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1971–1991 and its Propensity for Ethnic Conflict,” *Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis – Geographica*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2013), 5–25.

³⁶ Unsurprisingly, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs openly questioned the validity of the census results, citing certain problems with the methodology. Charles Recknagel, “Bosnia Erupts in Feuding Over New Census Data,” *Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty*, 30/6/2016; “Census Reveals Bosnia’s Changed Demography,” *Balkan Insight*, 30/6/2016.

³⁷ Tej Parikh, “How Islamic State is Putting the Balkans on Edge,” *The National Interest*, 30/10/2016; Dejan Anastasijevic, “Stirring Up the Spectre of New Balkan Wars,” *Balkan Insight*, 30/1/2017.

a military worm.”³⁸ The USA, the superpower that ended the Bosnian War, is not particularly interested for the time being at the western Balkans.³⁹ Moscow, on the other hand, is increasingly asserting its influence in this volatile region – primarily through the Serbs. The close ties between the Bosnian Serbs and Russia are evident – from posters of Putin in eastern Sarajevo to investments from oligarchs-friends of Putin.⁴⁰ After all, the room for maneuver is quite restricted for Russia in the Balkans. Almost every state in the Balkans is either member of NATO and/ or EU or has applied for membership in the EU and NATO. The support from Russia imbued the leadership of Banja Luka with a rising self-confidence and, unsurprisingly, the calls for secession within Republika Srpska are augmenting.⁴¹

The infiltration of Serbia by ISIS threatens to reignite old passions. Two regions in the south, Kosovo and Sandžak, are predominantly inhabited by Muslims (Albanians and Bosniaks respectively) who have been radicalised significantly in recent years. Kosovo already seceded from Serbia although the latter has not formally recognised the new status quo.⁴² Muslims (Bosniaks) constitute 48.4% of the population in Sandžak and, since 2010, they have been demanding in earnest a status of autonomy – just like their co-religionists in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴³ The Bosniaks discovered an external ally for their demands – a neo-Ottoman Turkey. In recent years Turkey infiltrated the region through cultural and religious undertakings in an effort to establish an “Ottoman Corridor” from Turkey all the way to Bosnia by using the various Muslim/Turkish minorities in the Balkans as “human links.”⁴⁴ ISIS, in addition, established a foothold on Sandžak and a new headache for Belgrade was added: the radicalization of a population that already demands its autonomy from Serbia.⁴⁵

³⁸ This statement is attributed to the then-Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Eyskens. For a detailed analysis of the failure of the EU in the western Balkans, see: “The EU-Balkans Relationship Is A Two-Way Failure,” *DW*, 27/8/2015.

³⁹ Valerie Hopkins, “Donald Trump’s Big League Balkans Problem,” *Foreign Policy*, 31/1/2017; Jeffrey Mankoff, “How to Fix the Western Balkans,” *Foreign Affairs*, 7/7/2017.

⁴⁰ For example, various towns in Serbia and Republika Srpska awarded Putin the title of honorary citizen. Maja Zivanovic, “Serbian Towns Queue to Make Putin Honorary Citizen,” *Balkan Insight*, 23/2/2017; Richard Palmer, “Will Putin Reignite the Balkans?” *The Trumpet*, 1/1/2016.

⁴¹ Republika Srpska announced in 2016 its intention to organize a controversial referendum about independence. However, the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina warned that separatism by the Bosnian Serbs would most likely force “an international intervention.” “A Referendum by Serbs Threatens Yet More Trouble for Bosnia,” *Economist*, 27/9/2016; Daria Sito-Sucic and Gordana Katana, “Planned Serb Referendum Vote Reawakens Fears of Strife in Bosnia,” *Reuters*, 22/9/2016.

⁴² In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo signed the Brussels Agreement under the auspices of the EU and promised to fully normalise their relations; the agreement, however, has not been implemented yet completely.

⁴³ For an analysis of the emergence of the “Sandzak Issue,” see: International Crisis Group, “Sandzak: Calm for Now” (Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, 1998); Marija Todorovic, “The Emergence of the Bosniak Identity Politics in Sandzak in the 1990s” (MA Thesis: Central European University, 2012).

⁴⁴ “Sandzak, The Balkans Region Where Turkey Is the Big Brother,” *DW*, 21/10/2016; Serkan Demirtas, “Turkey Dives into Balkan Diplomacy Amid Violence,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 10/11/2011.

⁴⁵ Milos Teodorovic and Maria Arnautovic, “Serbia’s Sandzak Becomes Balkans’ Latest Hot Spot,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 28/9/2010; “The Troubles of Sandzak,” *Economist*, 27/8/2011.

Already separated by Serbia, Kosovo is a region which ISIS infiltrated heavily. Although Albanians historically identified themselves as “Shqiptars” first and Muslims or Christians second, in recent years a growing number of Albanians in underscore their religious identity.⁴⁶ This new trend is owed primarily to Qatar and Turkey which heavily invested in the construction of mosques and madrassas in Kosovo. Unsurprisingly, ISIS established a firm foothold in the break-away area. A terrorist incident by jihadists against the remaining Serbian pockets in northern Kosovo or in the neighbouring Sandžak and Preševo would most likely ignite the old passions between the Albanians and Serbs. After all, the strategy of ISIS aims to accomplish just that: incite a civil war between Muslims (whether native populations or immigrants) and the “Others” and, thus, deepen its influence over the Muslims in Europe.⁴⁷ Preševo, in particular, is a “sleeping volcano.” Just after the end of the Kosovo War in 1999, an insurgency⁴⁸ erupted among the majority Albanian population of Preševo which was suppressed after almost two years at the expense of the separatist insurgents.⁴⁹

FYROM is yet another country of the Balkans that was added to the new list of “failing states.”⁵⁰ In fact, the old rivalry between Albanians and Slav-Macedonians was recently rekindled due to a drawn-out political crisis that was caused primarily Nikola Gruevski.⁵¹ Since 2016 the opposition has accused the ultra-nationalist and authoritarian Slav-Macedonian potentate of corruption and espionage and (violent and non-violent) protests against him.⁵²

⁴⁶ According to a recent report by the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), roughly 32% of the Albanians now declare themselves Muslim first and foremost. “Is Kosovo a breeding ground for Islamists?” *DW*, 25/12/2016.

⁴⁷ Steven Erlanger, “A Quandary for Europe: Fighting a War on ISIS within its Borders,” *New York Times*, 23/3/2016; Nassif Hitti, “ISIS Strategy of Provoking Civil War in Europe,” *The Arab Weekly*, 22/1/2017.

⁴⁸ The insurgency was launched by the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveda and Bujanovac (UÇPMB) – with the tacit support of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK).

⁴⁹ The armed uprising was quelled with difficulty due to the restrictions imposed on the Yugoslav Army in the aftermath of the Kosovo War. Zorana Brozović, *Territorial and Border Demarcation Disputes in the Western Balkans Case study: Territorial and boundary disputes between Serbia and Kosovo*, (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Belgrade, 2011), 7.

⁵⁰ A state is considered “failing” when it cannot provide governance, welfare and security to its citizens to a critical degree. Judy Batt and Dov Lynch, *What is a “failing” state and when is it a security threat?* (Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004).

⁵¹ The political crisis in FYROM started in April 2016 when the opposition orchestrated non-violent protests against former prime minister (and de facto leader of the country until May 2017) Nikola Gruevski on the grounds of the widespread corruption and increasing authoritarianism of the ultra-nationalist politician. The protests lasted for a few months (April–June 2016) and were labelled a “colourful revolution.” Pete Baumgartner, “Explainer: Roots of Macedonia’s Political Crisis Run Deep,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 15/4/2016.

⁵² In the early elections in December 2016, neither the ruling party nor the opposition won an absolute majority to form a one-party government; the negotiations for the establishment of a coalition government dragged on for months at the connivance of the country’s president (and an ally of the prime minister) and Gruevski acted as the de facto leader of FYROM. Stavros Tzimas, «Η Κρίση στα Σκόπια και η Ελλάδα» [“The Crisis in Skopje and Greece”], *Kathimerini*, 10/3/2017.

Unfortunately, other external actors were involved in this crisis. Albania, which under Prime Minister Edi Rama distanced itself from the EU in pursuit of a grandiose diose vision of “Greater Albania,”⁵³ intervened openly in the ongoing political crisis in the FYROM. In December 2016, Rama invited the leaders of the minor Albanian parties in Tirana and, after a few days deliberations, announced the “Tirana Platform” which encapsulated the demands of the Albanians in FYROM. The Albanians, who as recently as 2001 agreed to abandon their separatist objectives under the Ohrid Agreement, in essence demanded from the established Slav-Macedonian élite to upgrade them into partners of the new “nation.”⁵⁴ The EU could not intervene decisively to diffuse the crisis. The Pržino Agreement in 2015,⁵⁵ its crown achievement, was in fact violated by Gruevski and the EU possessed neither the capacity nor the willingness to compel him to comply.⁵⁶ Russia, on the other hand, offered open support to the nationalist Slav-Macedonian hard-liners in a desperate effort to acquire influence once again in a region outside the Kremlin’s orbit. Putin pledged openly support for two Slavic and Orthodox countries (FYROM + Serbia) against Albanian Irredentism and “colour revolutions” – two threats allegedly originating from the USA.⁵⁷ The USA did not initially intervene in FYROM to contain the crisis and only in May 2017 did Washington use its special weight to oust Gruevski. A new government between the Socialists and the Albanians was established under the auspices of the newly-appointed US ambassador.⁵⁸

The crisis still persists, however, as the violent provocation against the Socialists and Albanian MPs by ultra-nationalists in June proved eloquently.⁵⁹ A counter-terrorist operation against jihadist cells among Albanians in FYROM could provoke yet another crisis between Slav-Macedonians and Albanians as in 2015.⁶⁰ Wash-

⁵³ According to ultra-nationalists, Greater Albania would encompass Tetovo in north-western, FYROM, Preševo in south-eastern Serbia, Chamëria in north-western Greece and Malesija in southern Montenegro and Kosovo.

⁵⁴ Fatjona Mejdini, “Macedonian Albanian Leaders Plot Joint Strategy in Tirana,” *Balkan Insight*, 30/12/2016; Andrej Isakovic, “Albanian Prime Minister: EU Faces “Nightmare” If Balkan Hopes Fade,” *Politico*, 21/4/2017.

⁵⁵ This agreement stipulated that early elections would be organized in April 2016.

⁵⁶ Andrew Rettman, EU and Russia Step Into Macedonian Crisis,” *EU Observer*, 3/3/2017; Erwan Fouéré, “The Macedonian Crisis: A Failure of EU Conflict Management?” *Centre for European Policy Studies*, 5/5/2017.

⁵⁷ Miki Traikovski, “Russia and Macedonia: The Ghosts of Pan-Slavism,” *Balkanist*, 29/5/2015; Vladislav B. Sotirović, “Russia’s Balkan Politics: From the Politics of Pan-Slavic Reciprocity of the Tsarist Russia to the “Realpolitic” of the Republic of Gazprom Russia,” *Global Politics*, 18/10/2016.

⁵⁸ Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “Macedonia Parliament Approves New Gov’t After Prolonged Stalemate,” *Balkan Insight*, 31/5/2017; Aleksandar Dimishkovski, “Macedonia Has New Government, But Rocky Road Ahead,” *New York Times*, 1/6/2017.

⁵⁹ In late April 2017, ultra-nationalist protestors stormed the parliament in Skopje and injured several Socialist and Albanian deputies. “Macedonia: Protestors Storm Parliament and Attack MPs,” *Guardian*, 27/4/2017.

⁶⁰ Matt Robinson and Fatos Bytyci, “Gun Battle in Ethnic Albanian Region Deepens Macedonian Crisis,” *Reuters*, 10/5/2015; Chris Deliso, “Asymmetric Threats Challenge Macedonia before Easter and Elections,” *Balkananalysis*, 25/4/2016. A similar counter-terrorist operation in 2012 incited a crisis. Tej Parikh, “How Islamic State Is Putting the Balkans on Edge,” *National Interest*, 30/10/2016.

ington consistently pushed for the inclusion of the FYROM in NATO and the EU as a safety valve vis-à-vis the various security threats (i.e. separatism from Albanians and terrorism from jihadists); however, the chronic dispute with Greece over the name stands as a critical barrier.⁶¹ Although Greece blocks the entry of FYROM to NATO, Athens and Belgrade monitor with unease the spread of jihadism and the rhetoric about Greater Albania.⁶² After all, a crisis in FYROM could easily engulf in flames the rest of the Balkans. Since the 19th century, two issues caused repeated crisis and wars in the Balkans: the Macedonian and the Bosnian Questions.⁶³ The returning jihadists in FYROM (as well as Kosovo and the other regions of the Balkans) could easily conduct terrorist strikes and, in that way, inflame the passions of war between old rivals.⁶⁴

In summary, the Balkans do feature prominently in the overall strategy of ISIS the latter views the region as a transit zone and a stronghold. However, ISIS is not that popular among the local Muslim minorities/ majorities. Indeed, many moreunteers for ISIS originated from Western and Northern Europe (with Belgium first) than the western Balkans. In line with Resolution 2178 of the UN Security Council in September 2014, several countries of the western Balkans (FYROM, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and the de facto independent Kosovo) laws that criminalized the participation in foreign armed groups – an indirect reference to jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. These countries, however, must do much more to combat extremism in their native soil.⁶⁵

The Threat of Demographic Change

The Arab Spring opened Pandora's Box and caused, among other ills, the movement of wholesale populations from one country to another and from one continent to another. In 2015, Europe witnessed a refugee crisis of a scale unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and immigrants from the Middle East (as well as Central Asia and Africa) migrated en masse to Italy and, above all, Greece, by means of a perilous sea voyage.⁶⁶ Greece

⁶¹ Recently, Skopje assumed some initiatives to unlock this deadlock and end this chronic dispute. Helena Smith, "Macedonia and Greece Appear Close to Settling 27-Year Dispute Over Name," *Guardian*, 13/6/2017.

⁶² Aggelos Syrigos, «Η Κρίση στα Σκόπια και τα Διλήμματα της Αθήνας» ["The Crisis in Skopje and the Dilemmas of Athens"], *Stavroslygeros.gr*, 25/4/2017.

⁶³ For an exceptional analysis of the two questions, see: Misha Glenny, *The Balkans, 1804-2012: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers* (New York: Granta Books, 2012).

⁶⁴ Already over 150 foreign fighters, originally from Kosovo, either returned to Kosovo or reside in other countries of Europe according to the Executive Director of the Kosovar Center for Security Studies Florian Qehaja. Francesca Astorri, "European Fears of the ISIS Blag Flags Crossing from the Balkans," *Al Arabiya*, 8/4/2017.

⁶⁵ Chris Deliso, "Five Ways ISIS Can Destabilize the Balkans," *Balkan Analysis*, 2/7/2015; Hristo Voynov, "ISIS and the Balkans," *Vostokian*, 12/1/2016.

⁶⁶ Over 3,000 refugees and immigrants perished in the warm waters of the Mediterranean Sea in 2015. Tara Brian and Frank Laczko, *Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2014), 92-97.

did not welcome for the first time refugees from war-torn countries; in the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Albanians and other Balkan people had migrated to Greece.⁶⁷ However, 2015 was quite different from the 1990s. Within just 12 months, Greece and, by extension, the EU admitted over one million individuals from the Middle East – the vast majority of whom Muslims.⁶⁸ Although this figure may not appear high for a continent inhabited by 740 million people (508 million people within the EU), this number of immigrants can upset a sensitive demographic balances in the Balkans.

Bulgaria and Greece stand at the forefront of this refugee crisis since they share a land (and naval) frontier with Turkey – the terminus-a-quo of the tidal waves of immigrants and refugees. Already nearly 65,000 refugees from the Middle East are trapped in Greece and sheltered in refugee camps notorious for their meagre facilities.⁶⁹ Germany accommodated the majority (nearly 800,000 souls) of the refugees but other states in the EU are still unwilling to admit refugees from Greece and Italy – and that despite the repeated warnings by Brussels.⁷⁰ The refugee plight in 2015 demonstrated clearly the various threats to a country's national security. Especially since ISIS most likely infiltrated the waves of refugees and immigrants and, thus, accessed the Balkans and Western Europe unnoticed.⁷¹

Since Greece could not deal alone with the tidal waves of refugees, other agencies and in particular NGOs intervened to assist the beleaguered Greek authorities. However, certain NGOs did not operate on altruism but served other agendas. The Greek police authorities discovered that some of them either co-operated with the slave traders on the western Turkish coast or embezzled the various EU funds for the refugees' relief. Other NGOs even operated as Trojan Horses for Turkey and incited riots among these refugees (who already complained about their "entrapment" in Greece).⁷²

⁶⁷ For an analysis of the tidal waves of refugees in the 1990s in the Balkans, see: Ioannis Kyriakou, *Στατιστικά Δεδομένα για τους Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα* [Statistical Data for Immigrants in Greece] (Mediterranean Migration Observatory: Panteion University, 2004).

⁶⁸ In fact, 1,255,640 individuals from the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia applied for political asylum in the EU in 2015 – a 2,5 times increase from 2014 (562,680 individuals). "Asylum in the EU Member States," *Eurostat*, 4/3/2016.

⁶⁹ International Amnesty, «Παγιδευμένοι στην Ελλάδα: Μια Προσφυγική Κρίση που θα Μπορούσε να Έχει Αποφευχθεί» ["Trapped in Greece: A Refugee Crisis that Could Have Been Averted"] (Athens: International Amnesty, 2016); «Μουζάλας: Στους 65.000 Οι Πρόσφυγες και Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα – Το 30% Είναι Σύριοι» ["Mouzalas: 65.000 the Refugees and Immigrants in Greece – 30% of them Syrians"], *Banking News.Gr*, 10/2/2017

⁷⁰ For an exceptional analysis of the failed crisis management by Brussels, see: Silvia Merler, *EU Migration Crisis: Facts, Figures and Disappointments* (Brussels: Bruegel, 2016).

⁷¹ Tej Parikh, "Is Political Correctness Over 'Refugees' Putting Lives in Danger?" *Reuters*, 27/11/2015; Joshua Posaner, "German Intelligence Warns of ISIS 'Hit Squads' Among Refugees," *Politico*, 8/11/2016.

⁷² Indicatively, see: Chiotis Vasilis, «Χρυσές Μπίζνες με τους Μετανάστες» ["Golden Businesses with the Refugees"], *Vima*, 23/8/2015; Nefeli Lygerous, «Ο Άγνωστος Πόλεμος των ΜΚΟ – Έφερναν και Πρόσφυγες στα Νησιά» ["The Unknown War of the NGOs – They Even Shipped Refugees to the Islands"], *Proto Thema*, 22/3/2016; «Έρευνα για την ΜΚΟ που Φέρεται να Εκμεταλλεύεται Μετανάστες και Πρόσφυγες» ["Investigation for the NGO that Appeared to Exploit Immigrants and Refugees"], *News.Gr*, 29/5/2017.

Since the refugee waves decreased and did not cease the immigrant Muslim communities in Greece and Bulgaria will only increase in the foreseeable future. Both countries already accommodate sizable Muslim native populations in sensitive regions (adjacent to the frontier with Turkey): 98,000 in Greece (0.9% of the total population but 26% of the population of western Thrace) and 577,139 in Bulgaria (or 7.8% of the total population). Both countries suffer from a dire demographic crisis (especially Bulgaria whose population decreased by 2,000,000 inhabitants since 1991) but, surprisingly, the population of their Muslim (and partially Turkish) minorities remains rather stable.⁷³ Worse, Turkey (as a revisionist power since 1974) attempts to extend its influence over the lands of the Ottoman Empire and uses the various Muslim/ Turkic minorities in the Balkans as a vehicle for its grandiose neo-Ottoman visions.⁷⁴ This influx of immigrants threatens to radically transform the religious/ethnic composition of Greece or Bulgaria⁷⁵ and, therefore, result in the creation of a populous Muslim community whose leadership Turkey aspires to assume as the “protector” of Balkan Muslims.⁷⁶

After all, Turkey consistently facilitated in various ways the migratory flows the Middle East and Central Asia towards Greece in an indirect effort to weaken its old rival.⁷⁷ In recent years, Ankara has consistently acted as the self-designated “protector” of Muslims in Greece and adds issues with regards to Muslims (e.g. the construction of a mosque and cemetery in Athens) in the agenda of the Greco-Turkish disputes.⁷⁸ The degree to which Ankara is complicit to these migratory flows is evident in two facts: a) the senior security officers who are deeply involved in human trafficking⁷⁹ and b) the virtual stop of the refugee waves in Europe after the EU-Turkey deal in 2015.⁸⁰

⁷³ Marcin Stonawski, Michaela Potančoková, Vegard Skirbekk, *Fertility Patterns of Native and Migrant Muslims in Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University, 2012), 6-10.

⁷⁴ Selma Mujanovic, “Turkey’s Harmless Tango Between East and West,” *Epiphany – Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2013), 205-217.

⁷⁵ Indicatively of the new fears for a demographic imbalance owing to immigration, see: Veselin Zhelev, “Migration Threatens Demographic Balance, Says Bulgarian PM,” *EU Observer*, 24/4/2015.

⁷⁶ Indicatively of the influence of Turkey on Greece’s Muslims, the leader of the Muslim Association of Greece, Naim Elgantour, greeted Bilal Erdogan, the son of Erdogan, as “son of the great hero of Islam, Erdogan,” during the former’s visit in Thrace in 2015. Aggelos Athanasopoulos, «Η Άγκυρα Ρίχνει τα Δίκτυα της σε Όλους τους Μουσουλμάνους της Ελλάδας» [“Ankara Spring its Nets to all Muslims of Greece”], *Vima*, 24/5/2015.

⁷⁷ Özal, the former prime minister of Turkey, remarked in the 1980s that Turkey could simply overwhelm Greece with tidal waves of Muslim immigrants. Theodoros Katsanevas, «Η Επικείμενη Καταστροφή και Μουσουλμανοποίηση της Χώρας» [“The Upcoming Destruction and Islamization of the Country”], *Capital.Gr*, 23/1/2012.

⁷⁸ Christina Flaskou, «Τζαμί στην Αθήνα: Τι Κρύβει η Τουρκική Προθυμία για Χρηματοδότηση; Άρθρο-Ανάλυση» [“Mosque in Athens: What Does the Turkish Willingness for Funding Conceal? Article-Analysis”], *OnAlert*, 8/2/2013; Aggelos Syrigos, «Από το Τζαμί του Πορθητή στο Τέμενος του Βοτανικού» [“From the Mosque of the Conqueror to the Mosque of Votanikos”], *Stavroslygeros.gr*, 26/5/2017.

⁷⁹ Sotiris Balaskas, «Αποκάλυψη: Ο Μηχανισμός Τουρκίας και Δουλεμπόρων Που Πλημμυρίζουν την Ελλάδα με Πρόσφυγες» [“Revelation: The Mechanism of Turkey and Slave-Traders Who

The Absence of “Regional Policemen”

In summary, the Arab Spring acted as a catalyst that accelerated the ongoing instability in the Balkans ever since the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1990. The rise of jihadists (in particular ISIS), the strengthening of the local mafias (in association with with ISIS/ Al Qaeda) and the migratory flows are direct and indirect consequences of of the Arab Spring which only exacerbated the old rivalries (e.g. Slav-Macedonians Macedonians versus Albanians in FYROM) and problems (e.g. the Muslim/ Turkic minorities in Bulgaria and Greece and the revisionist policy of Turkey). For that reason, the prospect of increased instability or even new war in the western Balkans must not be discounted as unrealistic.⁸¹

That begs the question: what will the outside powers do to avert a new war? For the time being, the world hegemon, the USA, is unwilling to intervene decisively in the Balkans and avert a new war or even intercept the aggressive resurgence of the Kremlin in South-East Europe. On the other hand, Russia (and even China on a purely economic aspect) cement their influence in the region by capitalizing on the (until now) indifference of Washington. The EU is yet another actor who could exert a heavy influence in this troubled region but avoids doing so. The 2015 refugee crisis demonstrated quite clearly the inability of the EU member-states to act in unison vis-à-vis a pan-European problem. Since the EU cannot cope with the refugee crisis, how will it deal with a new war in the western Balkans? Last but not least, the Arab Spring vastly increased the “geopolitical weight” of Turkey in the Balkans and the Middle East; however, as the recent developments demonstrated, Turkey is part of the problem –not the solution– in the Balkans and Middle East.

Flood Greece with Refugees”], *Athens Agency*, 1/10/2015; Uzay Bulut, “Turkey: The Business of Refugee Smuggling, Sex Trafficking,” *Gatestone Institute*, 3/4/2016.

⁸⁰ Elizabeth Collett, “The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal,” *Migration Policy Institute*, 1/3/2016; Bodo Weber, *The EU-Turkey Refugee Deal and the Quite Not Closed Balkan Route* (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017).

⁸¹ Mathew Day, “War Is Brewing in the Balkans Again – the West Can’t Afford to Turn A Blind Eye Any Longer,” *Telegraph*, 25/5/2017.

An approach to the route network of Asia Minor in early 20th century

Introductory

As a geographical and historical space, Asia Minor attracts the interest of the Greek researchers because, during the ancient, Byzantine and Ottoman period, the Greek element played an important role in this area. The historical evolution of the Asia Minor area during the Late Ottoman period (19th and beginning of the 20th century) is connected with the one of the Balkan space, as the two peninsulas, the Balkan and the Asia Minor one, were neighbouring and interdependent parts of the Ottoman Empire and were indeed situated in the most central part of it, from the two sides (northwest and southeast) of the capital of Constantinople.

From the scientific perspective of historical human geography, which comprises also the scientific field¹ of the present project, the Late Ottoman period is characterized by the territorial shrinkage of the Ottoman territory and the changes in its economic and social space. These changes are caused, on the one hand, by the attempts of economic penetration and expansion of the geopolitical influence of the Great Western Powers of that period and on the other hand by the reform efforts to modernize the Ottoman state.² The study of the transport network³ of the Ottoman Empire of this period is of interest, since it contributes to the approach and understanding of the spatial phenomena related to the two interrelated phenomena: the European capitalist penetration to the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman state's at-

* University of Macedonia, Department of Balkan, Slavic & Oriental Studies.

¹ According to "New Beginning," an epistemological view of the historical human geography from the late 20th century, that is used in this paper, the geographical phenomena are related to the society and the economy of the period, see Evangelos P. Dimitriadis, «Μια πρώτη εκτίμηση της μεταπολεμικής Ιστορικής Γεωγραφίας στην Ελλάδα με πλαίσιο την αγγλοαμερικανική εξέλιξη του κλάδου» ["A first evaluation of post-war historical geography in Greece, within the English-American evolution of the branch"], *Ανθρωπολογικά (Anthropologica)* 8 (1985) 5-19, also Georgios Tsotsos, «Ιστορική γεωγραφία και κύριες θεωρητικές προσεγγίσεις του χώρου» ["Historical geography and basic theoretical approaches of space"], in D. Drakoulis and G. Tsotsos, eds, *Ιστορική, Κοινωνική και Πολεοδομική Ανάλυση του Χώρου. Αφιέρωμα στον Καθηγητή Ενόγγελο Π. Δημητριάδη [Historical, Social and Urban Analysis of Space. A Tribute to Professor Evangelos Dimitriadis]*, (Thessaloniki: An. Stamoulis, 2014), 73-92.

² Şevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 108-209.

³ The study of the transport network related to the geographical space is a special branch of geography named transport geography, see Robert J. Johnston and Derek Gregory and Peter Haggett and David M. Smith and David R. Stoddart, *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 350-352. By some experts transport geography is considered to be a branch of economic geography, see Robert J. Johnston, "The state, political geography and geography," in Richard Peet and Nigel Thrift, eds., *New Models in Geography. The Political-Economy Perspective*, v. 1 (London: Unwin Hymen Ltd, 1989), 305.

tempt to cope with the demands of the time, among others also by modernizing the transportation network of the empire.

The land transport network includes the route and railway network. In this paper, per, our objective is to compile as complete a picture as possible of the main route network of Asia Minor. As an approach to this, we try to find the lines of the main route network (which is classified to primary and secondary),⁴ and to trace them on the map. The railway network of the Asia Minor part of the Ottoman Empire has been described and studied adequately and repeatedly in both the Turkish⁵ and the international⁶ literature (but also in the Greek one).⁷ On the contrary, there is a lack of modern specific studies on the road network, for the creation, development and use of which the historical sources are inadequate and contradictory (in some cases with detailed information but without prioritization), while the available studies also usually refer to the whole of the geographical space of the Ottoman Empire and do not include detailed descriptions of the routes.⁸ Many information on Asia Minor's road network in the period before, during and after World War I are contained in two books of Greek writers, contemporary of the period (published in 1921-1922), describing the routes of the roads and giving a fairly detailed picture of the road network: Pantelis Kontoyiannis, *Geography of Asia Minor*⁹ and A. N. Anagnostopoulos, *Geography of Anadolou*.¹⁰ More detailed information about the road network and the road construction process of the Ottoman state is included in the classic geographic

⁴ About the roads' classification in modern times see, for instance, Department for Transport, "Guidance on Road Classification and the Primary Route Network," in <https://www.geoplace.co.uk/documents/10181/87438/Guidance+on+Road+Classification+and+the+Primary+Route+Network/b7144810-af9a-41a1-a4cf-0f9c6de015d4> (accessed June 20th, 2017).

⁵ Sena Bayraktaroğlu, "Development of railways in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey," M.A. Thesis (Istanbul: Bogazici University 1995), in http://www.levantineheritage.com/pdf/Development-of-railways-in-the-ottoman-empire-and-turkey-Sena_Bayraktaroglu.pdf (accessed July 2nd, 2016); Necla Geyikdağı, *Foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire: international trade and relations 1854-1914* (London - New York: I. B. Publishers, 2011).

⁶ Philip Ernest Schoenberg, "The Evolution of Transport in Turkey (Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor) under Ottoman Rule, 1856-1918," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13/3 (1977), 363-371; Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey 1800-1914* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 146-198.

⁷ Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία 19ος αιώνας-1919. Οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες. Από το Μίλ-λέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος [Asia Minor 19th century-1919. The Greek orthodox communities. From Millet of Rum to Greek Nation]*, (Athens: Pedion, 2013), 77-80.

⁸ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Şehircilik ve Ulaşım Üzerine Araştırmalar*, Izmir 1984, 140-147.

⁹ Pantelis Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία της Μικράς Ασίας [Geography of Asia Minor]* (Athens: Syllogos pros diadosin Ofelimon Vivlion, 1921).

¹⁰ A. N. Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία της Ανατολής [Geography of Anadolou]*, v. 1, *Φυσική Κατά-στασις της Ανατολής [Physical Nature of Anadolou]*, (Athens, 1922). The writer was officer of the Greek Army, Commander of the Greek Military Cartographic Service. A great part of the book is translated from a corresponding Turkish Military book, so it contains in details all the Turkish and Greek knowledge of the period on Asia Minor's geography.

work of Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie, Géographie administrative*,¹¹ which also contains other detailed descriptions about the geography of Asia Minor. This work, due to the fact that it was published in 1892, does not contain the developments in the transport network since then and up until 1914, namely a period of time during which the Ottoman state has continuously expanded the road and, above all, the railway network.

The natural geographical context

As Asia Minor we define the whole of Asia Minor peninsula and the mainland its east up until the line that starts from the İskenderun (Alexandretta) Bay and northeast direction reaches the city Khopa, at the eastern end of the south coast of Euxinus Pontus (Kara Deniz).¹² This space is separated from the current eastern and southeastern Turkey with the mountain range of Antitaurus and the mountain complexes that form its extensions to the northeast, leaving out of Asia Minor space the valleys of the Euphrates River and its tributaries.

Typical for the natural Asia Minor¹³ geographical area is the extensive internal plateau, enclosed by mountain ranges, with a medium elevation 800-1100 m., generally smooth terrain and ground naked and steeply typed,¹⁴ but suitable for cereal crops and sheep husbandry. This plateau covers the central region of the Asia Minor peninsula and rises gradually to the east, while it lowers to the west, intersecting the long river valleys that drain it and flow into the Aegean Sea. These valleys direct from east to west and are approximately parallel to the north and south coast of the Asia Minor peninsula.¹⁵ They start from the central plateau and end up on the beaches of the Aegean Sea, where they expand forming small coastal plains, which are very fertile. In this way, the three longest of these, the valleys of the rivers Ermus (Gediz Nehri or Sarabat), Kaystros (Küçük Menderes) and Maiandrus (Büyük Menderes) penetrate from the west coast of Asia Minor deep to the inside, thus forming natural roads of communication between the low (lowland or hilly) coastal zone and the inner plateau.

¹¹ Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie, Géographie administrative* (Paris, v. 1, 1892. v. 2, 1891, v. 3, 1894, v. 4, 1894). According to the years of publication written on the books, it seems that the second tome was published before the first.

¹² On the geophysical borders of Asia Minor see Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 7-8.

¹³ For a description of physical geography of Asia Minor see Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 10-46; Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 7-264; Ioannis Kalfoglous, *Ιστορική Γεωγραφία της Μικρασιατικής Χερσονήσου* [*Historical Geography of Asia Minor peninsula*], (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 2001) (1st ed. 1899), 45-66; Ioakim Valavanis, *Περιγραφή γεωγραφική, ιστορική και αρχαιολογική της Μικράς Ασίας* [*Geographical, historical and archeological description of Asia Minor*], (without place and time of publication), 27-78; N. K. Spyropoulos, «Μικρά Ασία, Φυσική Γεωγραφία» [“Asia Minor, Physical Geography”], in *Μεγάλη Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Πυρσός* [*Great Greek Encyclopedia Pyrsos*], v.17 (Athens: Drandakis, 1931) 175-177; Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία*, 51-75.

¹⁴ About the soil of Asia Minor's lands see Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 110.

¹⁵ About the valleys of Asia Minor see extensive descriptions in Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 366-376.

The same roughly physical configuration is also present in the northwest end of the central plateau, to the coastal zone of the Sea of Marmara, where small and large rivers drain the central plateau and along their way to the shores form valleys, which are also natural roads of communication.

In contrast, to the north and south, the central plateau is surrounded by long and high mountain ranges: to the north are extended the densely wooded mountain ranges of Paflagonia and Pontus, which stand out between them from the valley of the down current of river Alys (Kızılırmak) and are crossed by a multitude of small rivers. These river systems form deep ravines that on the one hand facilitate somewhere the transports, as they form natural passages, but on the other hand they make them difficult somewhere else, as they are steep and most of them could be described as rutty canyons. To the south extends the high and forested mountain range of the Taurus, which prevents communication with the interior, which is accomplished through a few mountain passages. To the east, the plateau rises gradually to altitude and ends up in continuous and complex mountain clusters that separate the waters directed to the north and poured into the Black Sea from those feeding the river Euphrates. These mountain complexes complicate the transport of the Asia Minor plateau to the east internal areas with the lands of Armenia and Persia.

From the above it can be concluded that the geomorphological factor is essential for the development of the road network in Asia Minor,¹⁶ as transport within the vast plateau and between the central plateau and the western and northwestern coastal areas is favored, while communication between the plateau and the northern and southern shores, where the roads are forced to pass through specific and rutty mountain passages, is made difficult.

The financial and cultural framework of the period

Time of study of our project is the end of the Ottoman period, namely the beginning of the 20th century, and especially the period before World War I, the beginning of which (1914) meant the interruption of the construction of transport projects in the Ottoman Empire due to war events. We will have to date back to the previous period from the mid-19th century onwards, because in this particular period the construction of transport works (originally road and later rail ones) is initiated by the Ottoman state.¹⁷ The geographical space we defined for the needs of our project as Asia Minor belongs during the study period to the Ottoman Empire and includes the vilayets: Trabzon, Sivas, Kastamonu, Ankara, Konya, Adana, Hüdavendigâr, Aydin, as well as the Sanjaks Biga and Izmit.¹⁸

Since the mid-19th century, the political, social and economic situation of Asia Minor, as part of the Ottoman Empire that is in decline, is characterized by the European

¹⁶ Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία*, 75-84.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 80-82.

¹⁸ About the administrative division of Asia Minor's lands of the Ottoman Empire in vilayets and sanjaks, see Dem. N. Botsaris, *Η Μικρά Ασία και ο Ελληνισμός [Asia Minor and Hellenismus]*, (Athens: Mich. Mantzevelakis, 1919), 18-23.

economic penetration and the constant rise (demographic and economic) of the Greek element, which plays disproportionately a large role, in relation to its population, in the secondary and tertiary sector of the economy, particularly in trade. The role of the Armenian and Jewish element in economy is also important, as well as of the Western Europeans, mainly Latin Catholics, which are established in the Asia Minor area, especially in the west coast, and are known as Levantines or Franco-Levantines.¹⁹ The impact of the European capitalist economy and the development of international trade favoured the Christians rather than the Muslims.²⁰ In particular, they benefited, in addition to the European merchants and capitalists, the Greek-Christian element involved in the commodity trade.²¹ On the other hand, the expansion of the industrial revolution and the development of European capitalism into the Ottoman Empire resulted in significant structural changes in the organization of trade, but not in significant improvements in basic production technologies.²²

The time period 1839-1876 was called Tanzimât (reorganization) reform era, characterized by various attempts to modernize the Ottoman Empire and to secure its territorial integrity. The pressure of the Western powers for a reorganization of the Ottoman Empire resulted in two proclamations: The Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif or Tanzimât Fermânı (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayûnu (Imperial Rescript) (1856). In the same period, Ottoman Empire suffered by several wars, such as the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Russo-Turkish War (1876-1878) and later the Greek-Turkish war (1897), the Italian-Turkish war (1911) and the Balkan wars (1912-13).

The efforts to modernize the Ottoman state included, among other things, the development of the transport network. This was the pursuit of the Western Powers, aiming at the economic penetration and the increasing of their political influence in the Ottoman Empire. However, it was an imperative need also for the Ottoman State itself because of the military needs (troop and supplies transport) and the general need for economic development and geopolitical empowerment of the empire, which was seeing its vital territory, both territorial and economic, shrink constantly. The development of the transport network concerned more the land rather than the maritime network, as it is mentioned that the significance of land transport

¹⁹ On the historical background of Asia Minor's economy from 19th century to 1918, see Thanos Veremis and Kostas Kostis, *Η Εθνική Τράπεζα στη Μικρά Ασία (1919-1922)* [*The National Bank in Asia Minor (1919-1922)*], (Athens: Cultural Foundation of National Bank, 1984), 25-40.

²⁰ Kemal Karpat, "The Ottoman demography in the nineteenth century: Sources, concepts, methods," in *Economie et sociétés dans l'empire Ottoman (Fin du XVIII^e - Début du XX^e siècle)*, *Actes du colloque de Strasbourg (1er-5 juillet 1980)*, (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1983), 217.

²¹ (no writer), *Le caractère grec de l'Asie Mineure attesté par des auteurs étrangers* (Nancy, Paris, Strasbourg: Berger - Levrault, Imprimeures, 1919).

²² İlhan Tekeli, "Urban Patterns in Anatolia: Organization and Evolution," in Renata Holod, ed., *Conservation as Cultural Survival* (Philadelphia: Aga Khan Award for Architecture, 1980), 15-27, in <http://archnet.org/system/publications/contents/3549/original/DPC0069.pdf?1384775565> (accessed December 20th, 2016).

for the people of the Anatolian plateau lies in the continental outlook of the Turkish nation.²³

The evolution of the construction of the road network since the middle of the 19th century until 1914

In the Ottoman Empire of the late period (19th and early 20th centuries) the main road network between cities²⁴ consists of:

1) Routes, which are routes in the form of a trail (narrow or wide), shaped by their their multiannual use by people, animals and wagons, without any particular technical nical works. These routes have existed for centuries and many of them were remnants of old roads that had already been built from the Byzantine and Roman periods.²⁵

2) Roads, which were constructed as technical works (with road surface, retaining walls, care for water drainage etc.) by the Ottoman state, to initially host the movement of carriages and later cars.

Until the mid-19th century, in Asia Minor caravans provided most of the overland links,²⁶ and pack animals were used for carrying goods and passenger travelling. They transported expensive goods, of high cost and low volume (fabrics, craft products, spices).²⁷ The inland of the peninsula was crisscrossed by long caravan routes. Hans and Kervan Sarays²⁸ were built at appropriate intervals.²⁹ In winter, transport conditions in the route network were often difficult because of snow or sometimes deep mud.³⁰

After the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman state began to be interested in the improvement and the modernization of the land transports.³¹ The inadequacies of the transport system of the Ottoman Empire had been demonstrated during the Crimean War, due to the difficulties of the state to move a large number of troops and supplies

²³ B. G. Spiridonakis, *Essays on the Historical Geography of the Greek world in the Balkans during the Turkokratia* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1977), 64.

²⁴ On the kinds and forms of the land routes in southern Balkans (which were similar to those of Asia Minor) in late Ottoman period, see Giorgos Makris and Stephanos Papageorgiou, *To χερσαίο δίκτυο επικοινωνίας στο κράτος του Αλή Πασά Τεπελενλή* [*The land communication network in Ali Pasha Tepelenli's state*], (Athens: Papazisis, 1990), 67-80.

²⁵ On the byzantine route network of Asia Minor see Ioannis Demetrukas, «Οδικό Δίκτυο στη Μ. Ασία (Βυζάντιο)», in *Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού, Μ. Ασία* [*Encyclopedia for Major Hellenism, Asia Minor*] (2003), in <http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=5617> (accessed May 1st, 2016).

²⁶ Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 819.

²⁷ Donald Quataert, *Η Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία. Οι τελευταίοι αιώνες, 1700-1922* [*The Ottoman Empire. The last centuries 1700-1922*], (transl. Marinos Sariyannis), (Athens: Alexandria, 2006), 213.

²⁸ Eleni Gavra, "Chans et caravansérails dans le nord de la Grèce: de Thessalonique jusqu'à la ville de Sérres et autour d'elle de 1774 à 1913," in J.-A. Derens, and L. Geslin and M. Ortiz, eds., *Bazars ottomans des Balkans* (Paris: Non lieu, 2009), 135-141.

²⁹ Issawi, *Economic History*, 146.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 180.

³¹ Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία*, 80-84.

for the Turkish army over long distances in a short period of time.³² Thus, in 1865 a ministry of public works³³ was created in the Ottoman government. From 1865 to 1910 land route works were made mainly by forced labor, which was later replaced by cash payment.³⁴ After the middle of the 19th century, some work had been done, but with little result, on the roads: Samsun (Samsus/ Amissos) – Sivas (Sevasteia), Brussa (Prussa/Bursa) – Gemlik, Trebizond – Erzurum.³⁵ Under Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876), the Ottoman Empire made its first efforts to improve the highways. The Kars – Erzurum and Trebizond – Erzurum roads were finished respectively in 1868 and 1871.³⁶ Priority was given to the roads of the northeastern provinces, from the ports of Pontus to Persia, because Ottoman Empire's aim was to keep Persian trade out of Russian hands by offering better transport.³⁷

Between 1858 and 1895, the Ottoman Empire's total route network increased 6,500 to 14,395 km,³⁸ but in 1904 the entire Ottoman world contained only 24,000 km of roads, poor in quality and poorly maintained.³⁹ By 1914 there were 20,000 kilometres of highway roads built by the Ottoman Empire. However, the roads were rather narrow (eighteen feet wide), only partially finished, poorly constructed or unusable due to lack of maintenance.⁴⁰ From 1910 to 1914 attempts were made to modernize the route network through the involvement of a French company but they were not completed due to the war.⁴¹

During the First World War, the Russians built many roads for military purposes in the eastern Pontus areas they temporarily occupied (1916-1918), while they repaired and improved other roads to make them accessible.⁴² At the same time began the construction of the Vatum – Trebizond railway line.⁴³

Until 1910, the accessible roads were built for carriages but were also used by pack animals. From 1910 to 1914, the first cars began to circulate in Asia Minor,⁴⁴ but actually motorized transport did not exist in the Ottoman Empire before the First World War. In 1914, European writers observed that “the only roadway ca-

³² Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 363.

³³ Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 92.

³⁴ Issawi, *Economic History*, 150.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 150.

³⁶ Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 362.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 362.

³⁸ Iakovos Aktsoğlu, «Συμβολή στην Ιστορία του Ελληνισμού του Πόντου. Πληροφορίες για τη Γενική Διοίκηση Τραπεζούντος κατά το έτος αναρρήσεως στο θρόνο του Σουλτάνου Abdulhamid II (Εγείρας 1293 (1876))» [“Contribution in the History of Pontus Hellenism. Information about the Trabzon vilayet in the year of Sultan Abdulhamid II's accession on the throne (Egira 1293 (1876))”], in *ΣΤ' Πανελλήνιο Συνέδριο για τον ελληνισμό της Μικράς Ασίας (24-26 Νοεμβρίου 2000)* [6th Panhellenic Conference on Asia Minor's Hellenism (14-26 November 2000)], (Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2002), 100, note 5.

³⁹ İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, 818.

⁴⁰ Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 362.

⁴¹ Issawi, *Economic History*, 150.

⁴² Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 115.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 269.

⁴⁴ Issawi, *Economic History*, 150.

pable of sustaining traffic was the Constantinople – Brussa road.” In 1923, there were only 1,000 cars and trucks in the new Republic of Turkey.⁴⁵

Regarding the state of the transports in the Balkans during the same period (before the First World War), modern historians note the existence of a “wheel zone” in in the Balkans and “without a wheel-zone” in Asia Minor.⁴⁶ This state of transport is also present in the part of the Balkan Peninsula that still belonged to the Ottoman territory and shows that there was a difference in the development of the transport between the European and the Asia Minor part of the Ottoman Empire and the latter's lagging behind the first one too.

The state of the road network and the transport conditions

It appears that the efforts of the Ottoman state for the construction and maintenance of accessible roads in the period from the mid-19th century until the end of the the First World War did not succeed in creating a road network similar to that of the the European countries. The researchers' ascertainment, based on evidence found in in historical sources, of a substantial lack of a national, provincial and rural road network is general. In the nineteenth century foreign travellers, such as geographers, phers, archaeologists and ambassadors, in their visits to Anatolia complained that there were no roads at all, and that the Roman Empire had maintained better and more extensive roads.⁴⁷

Around 1920, the roads from Bergama (Pergamos) to Izmir (Smyrna), Edremit (Adrammytio) and Ayvali (Kydonies) are characterized as “all miserable,”⁴⁸ while the roads on the mountains of Kastamun “inadequate”⁴⁹ and their condition as “most wretched.”⁵⁰ Existing roads were not maintained, and during the winter they became impassable. Typical is the example of the road the Russians had built during the Russian occupation of the Eastern Pontus from Batum to Trebizond: after the Russians leaving the road was abandoned unmaintained and was completely destroyed, resulting in the fact that the traffic between the coastal settlements was carried out such as before 1916 only by sea.⁵¹

Problems in the road network were also caused by instable social conditions within Asia Minor, where robbery was endemic. European travellers' evidences about robbery incidents are abundant, which not only were making road transport dangerous but also destroying the roads. Thus, it is reported that in 1869 the road from Bergama to Dikeli was built, later it was destroyed, repaired by the Ottoman state, but the

⁴⁵ Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 362

⁴⁶ Quataert, *Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία*, 213.

⁴⁷ Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 362. Roman roads in Asia Minor were used and extended in medieval times (Dimitroukas, «Οδικό Δίκτυο στη Μ. Ασία», *op. cit.*).

⁴⁸ Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 317.

⁴⁹ Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 120.

⁵⁰ Christos Soldatos, *Ο Οικονομικός βίος των Ελλήνων της Δυτικής Μικράς Ασίας [The economic life of of the Greeks of Asia Minor]*, (Αθήνα: 1994), 162.

⁵¹ Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 115.

wooden bridges were dilapidated.⁵² In 1850-1860, European writers observed that even the largest caravans needed protection of the Ottoman state to be safe from highway robbers, as other remarked that only solitary travellers and small caravans had to worry about being attacked by marauding tribesmen. It seems that the later improved, as in 1913 another European traveller states that “he actually by himself through much of Anatolia during the Turkish-Italian War without any cident.”⁵³

In spite of the modernization projects on the transport network, the pack animals⁵⁴ continued to be the main means of transport throughout the Ottoman Empire, and thus in Asia Minor, even in the early 20th century. In the long caravan routes, camels were mainly the carriers, as well as horses, mules, donkeys and oxen were also used. The peasants and local merchants used horses and donkeys as the main beast of burden to carry freight for local purposes.⁵⁵ But wagons were also in use. For short distances, a two-wheeled wagon drawn by four oxen was used by peasants, as well as travellers and city dwellers usually used two-horse carriages for shorter distances. For long distances, men travelled on horseback, but women and children in taghtravans (long, narrow boxes hung by long poles between two horses).⁵⁶ It is mentioned that in 1863, in the area of Izmir (Smyrna), most of the transit trade was carried by camels, as horses and mules were used only for light weights and travelling, in opposition to in the area of Trebizond (Trapezus/ Trabzon), where most of the goods were carried by horses, mules and donkeys, as camels were seldom used.⁵⁷ This difference shows the impact of the natural environment on the choice of animals as a means of transport. In the mountainous areas, with particularly uneven relief and cold climate, there were preferred horses and mules, which could walk more easily on rugged and inaccessible mountain passages than heavy and bulky camels.

The weight that could be carried by each type of pack animal was as follows: The typical donkey or mule could carry 150 kilograms; a camel could carry 150 to 200 kilograms and a horse could carry 225 kilograms.⁵⁸ According to İlhan Teke-

⁵² Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 319.

⁵³ Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 363.

⁵⁴ About the circumstances and conditions of pack animals for transport means in the Balkans, see Demetres Anoyiatis-Pele, *Δρόμοι και διακίνηση στον Ελλαδικό χώρο κατά τον 18^ο αιώνα* [Routes and Transportation in Greek lands in 18th century] (Athens: Papazisis, 1993), 52-77; Georgios Tsotsos, «Ορεινοί δρόμοι στη Βόρεια Πίνδο κατά τον 18^ο και 19^ο αιώνα» [“Mountainous routes in Northern Pindus in 18th and 19th centuries”], in E. P. Demetriadis and A.-F. Lagopoulos and G. P. Tsotsos, eds., *Ιστορική Γεωγραφία: Δρόμοι και Κόμβοι της Βαλκανικής, Από την Αρχαιότητα στην Ενιαία Ευρώπη* [Roads and crossroads of the Balkans from antiquity to the European Union] (Thessaloniki: Dep. of Urban and Regional Planning, Aristoteleion University of Thessaloniki - Organization for the Cultural Capital of Europe “Thessaloniki 1997,” 1998), 180-182.

⁵⁵ Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 362.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 362.

⁵⁷ Issawi, *Economic History*, 177.

⁵⁸ Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 363.

li,⁵⁹ the camel's transport capabilities are greater: In caravans and in high temperature (heat) conditions, it transports 200-300 kg depending also on the distance. In cold weather it can carry up to 450 pounds in short distances. An Araba, a two-wheeled vehicle drawn by horses or oxen, could carry up to 3,000 kilograms.

Regarding the lengths of the journeys covered per day and the speed of the pack animals and wagons, the data is as follows: The camel could make 50 kilometres per per day and a horse 60 kilometres per day.⁶⁰ The usual speed of the caravan (mixed with camels, horses and mules) was 4-4.8 km per hour, and the usual date stage was was 24 to 47 km.⁶¹ Daily caravan driving time with camels was 7 hours.⁶² Thus, the horse trip from Trebizond to Erzurum (290 km) lasted 8 days⁶³ and the journey from Ankara to Izmit (Nicomedeia) 20days.⁶⁴

The cost of land transport was very large and unprofitable. Apart from the very short distances, the fodder for the pack animals cost more than the commodities.⁶⁵ Thus, it is reported that the camel, which was the cheapest means of transport, demanded from Sivas to Samsun half of the grain transported as a fare.⁶⁶

With the (limited) use of cars after 1910, distances have significantly decreased. Indicatively, the Mudanya – Brussa route, on a 31 kilometre accessible road, was driven by car in half an hour, while with a carriage in two and a half hours.⁶⁷

The rail network in relation to the road network

The railway network in Asia Minor was mainly constructed with European funds⁶⁸ in the second half of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century,⁶⁹ it facilitated foreign investments and increased the trading and production of agricultural products.⁷⁰ On the coast line, the construction companies were French and English, revealing the existence of a French and English sphere of influence, while in the interior it was a German one (German sphere of influence).⁷¹ Ground morphology was a key factor in the design of the railway network⁷² and that's why the first railway lines

⁵⁹ İlhan Tekeli, "On Institutionalized External Relation of Cities in the Ottoman Empire," *Etudes Balkaniques* VIII/2 (1972): 51-53.

⁶⁰ Schoenberg, "Evolution of Transport," 363.

⁶¹ Issawi, *Economic History*, 177.

⁶² Tekeli, "Institutionalized External Relation," 51-53.

⁶³ Quataert, *Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία*, 213.

⁶⁴ Issawi, *Economic History*, 150.

⁶⁵ Quataert, *Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία*, 209-210.

⁶⁶ Stamatis Antonopoulos, *Μικρά Ασία* [*Asia Minor*] (Athens: Printing Establishment of "State," 1907), 22-23.

⁶⁷ Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 63.

⁶⁸ Quataert, *Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία*, 217-219.

⁶⁹ For a short history of railway construction in Asia Minor (1860-1918), see Schoenberg, "Evolution of Transport," 364. For the railway network see Bayraktaroğlu, *Development of railways*, 76, table 5, and Geyikdağı, *Foreign investment*, 82-89.

⁷⁰ Veremis and Kostis, *Εθνική Τράπεζα*, 36.

⁷¹ Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία*, 77.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 79.

were made along the valleys leading from the port of Izmir to the hinterland of the peninsula.⁷³

By 1918 the railway lines were as follows:⁷⁴

Izmir – Manisa (Magnesia) – Afyon Karahisar – Adana

Izmir – Buldur/ Uluburlu/ Çivril

Afyon Karahisar – Eskişehir – Ankara

Eskişehir – Ada Pazar – Haydarpaşa

Mudanya – Brussa

Manisa – Bandırma (Panormos)

Mersina – Adana

The advantages of the railroad network were political, military and economic.⁷⁵ By 1913 railroads were playing the leading role in Ottoman transport⁷⁶ and by 1914 carried 48% of all goods shipped in Anatolia.⁷⁷

However, the construction and expansion of the rail network, which shaded land means of transport, contributed to the stopping of road construction as unnecessary.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the caravans found a new job by selling the goods to the train stations from the production sites.⁷⁹ In some cases, the railways were separated by mountain ranges, as between Izmir – Aydın and Izmir – Kasaba railways, so they were connected by caravan routes.⁸⁰ Thus, the existing road network was now functioning complementary to the railway, to which the Ottoman state gave priority.

In some cases, the failure to complete the railway network could lead to an urgent road construction: In the case of the need to cross the Anatolian plateau – Southern Cappadocia (Kapadokya) to Adana, through the narrow passage of Golek Boghaz (the ancient Cilician Gates), which is considered to be one of the most remarkable passages of the Taurus mountain range, during the First World War, the road was repaired and made accessible also to cars because the railway line leading to Bagdat⁸¹ had still not been completed.

Main route network

In the three geographical projects mentioned above as the main evidence of the period for the Asia Minor road network,⁸² there is listed a large number of roads,

⁷³ The first railway was from Izmir to Aydın (1856-1867). see Bayraktaroğlu, *Development of railways*, 76, table 5 and Geyikdağı, *Foreign investment*, 89.

⁷⁴ Bayraktaroğlu, *Development of railways*, 76, table 5; Geyikdağı, *Foreign investment*, 89.

⁷⁵ Schoenberg, “Evolution of Transport,” 363.

⁷⁶ Issawi, *Economic History*, 150.

⁷⁷ İnalçık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, 812.

⁷⁸ Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 369.

⁷⁹ İnalçık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, 821.

⁸⁰ Issawi, *Economic History*, 149.

⁸¹ Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 143-144.

⁸² Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής* and Cuinet, *La Turquie d’Asie*, v. 1, 2, 3, 4.

without a network prioritization. In addition, the information provided is uneven, heterogeneous and fragmentary, namely for some areas there is detailed information on the road network and for other ones minimum. For these reasons, we will attempt an effort to identify the main road network, namely the main road axes of the Asia Minor area, based, in addition to the aforementioned projects, on two other, later (second half of the 20th century) general studies on the geography and the economy of this area, which are also referring to the main road network. These studies include an approach to the prioritization of the road network, in the sense of identifying the major roads (in the first) and the roads that were suitable for cars (in the second).

According to Ch. Issawi⁸³ (also mentioned by Kontoyiannis and Anagnostopoulos, as below), the main roads in the 19th and early 20th centuries were:

1) The road Trebizond – Gümüşhane (Argyroupolis)⁸⁴ – Baipurt (through the narrow valley of Chorok river)⁸⁵ – Erzurum – Bayezit to Tabriz,⁸⁶ leading from the sea of Karadeniz (Euxinus Pontus) to the Persian frontiers. It was the route of the export trade of the Persian state to Europe.

2) The road Samsun – Amasya – Zile – Tokat – Sivas,⁸⁷ bifurcated one branch to Kayseri – Cilician gates – Tarsus, another to Deliklitaş – Harput – Diyarbakır (Mardin – Mosul or Urfa – Aleppo), which connects the seacoast of Karadeniz with the Central Plateau of Anatolia and from there to Syria. According to Anagnostopoulos,⁸⁸ the part from Samsun to Sivas and its branch to Harput was the most important road of Anatolia and especially the part Samsun – Sivas with a continuous and uninterrupted traffic. It was also considered to be the most important transport axes in Asia Minor since the end of the 19th century.⁸⁹

3) The road Izmit – Bolu – Tosya – Amasya. This road was connecting the capital Constantinople (Istanbul) via Izmit to the Pontus region, marching in the eastern direction, alongside the Paflagonia mountain ranges from their inner (southern) side. It had a vertical direction in relation to the previous one. By A. Sravridis,⁹⁰ it is called "the great postal road" that crosses Paflagonia, from Constantinople to Tokat.

4) The road Brussa – Aksehir – Konya (Ikonion) – Tarsus – Syria. This road crossed diagonally from northwest to southeast the interior of Asia Minor and was the shortest route for anyone who wanted to go from the Sea of Marmara to the Middle East, such as Syria, Mesopotamia (now Iraq).

⁸³ Issawi, *Economic History*, 146.

⁸⁴ Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 115.

⁸⁵ Aristomenis Stavridis, *Εγχειρίδιον Πολιτικής, Φυσικής και Εμπορικής Γεωγραφίας του Οθωμανικού κράτους* [Textbook for Political, Physical and Commercial Geography of the Ottoman State] (Mytilene: University of Aegean - Department of Social Anthropology, 1996) [1st edition Kydonies 1896].

⁸⁶ According to Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 92-93, it was a main road in the vilayet of Trabzon.

⁸⁷ By Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 92-93, it is, also, considered to be a basic road in the area of Pontus.

⁸⁸ Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 33, 118.

⁸⁹ Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, v. 1, 26.

⁹⁰ Stavridis, *Εγχειρίδιον*, 120.

According to a map by Besim Darkot,⁹¹ the roads passable by motor vehicles (which must be considered to be the main route network) circa 1915 were the following:

- Constantinople – İzmit

This road is bifurcated from İzmit to two roads:

- İzmit – Ankara – Kayseri (Kaisareia)
- İzmit – Konya – Adana

From Ankara, the two roads are bifurcated to five (four to the ports of Aegean and Black Sea, the fifth to the inlands of Anatolia):

- Ankara – Brussa – Balıkesir – İzmir
- Ankara – Afyon Karahisar – Denizli – İzmir
- Ankara – İnebolu
- Ankara – Samsun
- Ankara – Sivas – Erzurum – Kars

From Afyon Karahisar two roads lead to the ports of Aegean and East Mediterranean Sea:

- Afyon Karahisar – İzmir (through Manisa)
- Afyon Karahisar – Antalya (Attaleia)

Another road leads from Balıkesir to the Marmara Sea:

- Balıkesir – Bandırma

From Adana, a road leads to the inland:

- Adana – Malatya – Diyarbakır

Two main roads lead from the ports of Black Sea, in the area of Pontus, to the inland of Anatolia:

- Samsun – Sivas – Malatya
- Trabzon – Erzurum – Van

From Kontoyiannis,⁹² the quality of the roads Brussa – Mudanya and Brussa – Kios, which had been completed since 1865, is praised. However, these are roads of local importance that cannot be included in the main route network.

⁹¹ Besim Darkot, *Türkiye İktisadi Coğrafyası* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1958), 165, map “Roads passable by motor vehicles. ca 1915,” quoted from İlhan Tekeli, “Urban Patterns in Anatolia: Organization and Evolution,” in Renata Holod, ed., *Conservation as Cultural Survival* (Philadelphia: Aga Khan Award for Architecture), 1980, 22, in <http://archnet.org/system/publications/contents/3549/original/DPC0069.pdf?1384775565> (accessed December 20th, 2016).

⁹² Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 294.

Primary and Secondary route network

It is very difficult to make a classification of the main roads to a primary and secondary network, even for a specific and limited period of time, because many roads are mentioned by historians in a different way. They are sometimes reported as continuous lines, such as the Afyon Karahisar – Kayseri Street, characterized as “admirable” by a European traveler of the late 19th century⁹³ and sometimes they result as a sum of other routes, as the same road is mentioned in the above list of motorways as two roads (one separate and one second): (a) Ankara – Afyon Karahisar and (b) Izmit – Ankara – Kayseri. Therefore, not only the classification, but also the mere mention of the roads involves a degree of arbitrariness and depends on the writer's view.

In order to attempt a classification of the main routes to primary and secondary, we will make a combination of the above-mentioned information, and will include in the primary route network the routes listed as the most important by Issawi in general during the 19th and early 20th centuries (and as important by Kontoyiannis and Anagnostopoulos in 1920), but they also belong to the list of motorways mentioned by Darkot in 1915. These roads are the following (see map 1):

1) The road Trebizond – Gümüşhane (Argyroupolis) – Baipurt – Erzurum. The road was 5-6 m wide, with 2-8% slope altitude, and 314 km long to Erzurum.⁹⁴ The Trebizond – Erzurum section was completed, as we saw above, in 1871 because the Ottoman state attached great importance to this roadway, which was the way out for the Persian and Indian products to Karadeniz through the Ottoman Empire. The Trebizond – Tabriz route had flourished between the 1830s and 1860s, because 40% of the total foreign trade of Iran was carried out through this route. But in the early 20th century it was reduced, because of the opening of the Suez Canal and the development of Russian routes through Georgia.⁹⁵ According to A. Stavridis,⁹⁶ in 1896, the road was just finished. In the second decade of the 20th century, the section of the road from Trebizond to Erzurum was in excellent condition.⁹⁷

2) The road Samsun – Amasya – Zile – Tokat – Sivas – Deliklitaş – Harput. The road was 6-7 m wide, 6-12% slope altitude, 9 large bridges with chipped stone and 135 valley bridges. His study was made in 1862-1869 and the construction in 1869-1883.⁹⁸

3) The diagonal road that crosses Asia Minor from the coast of Scutari (Chrysoupolis) across from Constantinople through the Central Asia Minor Plateau to Cilicia and from there to Syria is described by Issawi as the road Brussa – Akşehir – Konya – Tarsus – Syria while on the list of the aforementioned motorways is described as road Constantinople – Ismit – Konya – Adana. It is the same route we will record by making a combination of the above as road Constantinople – Ismit – Akşehir – Konya –

⁹³ Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία*, 92, footnote 100.

⁹⁴ Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, v. 1, 22-23.

⁹⁵ İnalçık, and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, 820.

⁹⁶ Stavridis, *Εγχειρίδιον*, 136.

⁹⁷ Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 19.

⁹⁸ Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, v.1, 26.

Tarsus – Adana – Syria, considering the section to Brussa as a branch of this road given the fact that the section to Izmit and Constantinople must be considered more important, since it leads to the capital Constantinople. The sea transportation from Scutari to Constantinople was made with a variety of floating means, ranging from boats to ferryboats.⁹⁹

It seems that the road Izmit – Bolu – Tosya – Amasya, mentioned by Issawi in early 20th century, was of no great importance in 1915, since it is not mentioned as road for vehicles in Darkot's list.

In the secondary route network we will include all the above mentioned routes and are not included in the primary network (map 1):

Izmit – Bolu – Tosya – Amasya

Izmit – Ankara – Kayseri

Ankara – Brussa – Balikesir – Izmir

Ankara – Afyon Karahisar – Denizli – Izmir

Ankara – Inebolu

Ankara – Samsun

Ankara – Sivas – Erzurum – Kars

Afyon Karahisar – Izmir (through Manissa)

Afyon Karahisar – Antalya

Sivas – Kayseri – Cilician gates – Tarsus

Balikesir – Bandirma

Adana – Malatya – Diyarbakır¹⁰⁰

In addition to the above mentioned roads, which are included in the main route network (classified to primary and secondary), the abovementioned geographical books¹⁰¹ mention a large number of local roads, whose routes are described within the borders of the vilayets or sanjaks, where they are situated, usually without reference to whether they are accessible to cars and to their general geographical importance to the wider, beyond the local, space.

Conclusion: The relation of the road network with the economy and the settlement network

The state of a country's transport network is directly related to its economic development. In Ottoman Asia Minor of the first two decades of the 20th century there was a lag in the development of the road network in relation to the advanced European countries. The lack of a modernized transport network along with robbery and inadequate administration were reasons for not extending crops to land that could be cultivated if there was a way to channel agricultural products to markets, especially by exports to the international market.¹⁰² The result was that fertile

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 614.

¹⁰⁰ Most of this road is out of the geographical territory of Asia Minor, as it was defined.

¹⁰¹ Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, v.1, 2, 3, 4, passim and Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, passim.

¹⁰² Antonopoulos, *Μικρά Ασία*, 22-23.

areas of the Asia Minor plateau remained unexploited and infertile. In addition, the cost of transporting the products by animal packs or wagons (carriages) was very high. An economic effect of high transport costs was the restriction of the zone in which it was profitable to grow export crops: In Asia Minor, it would be profitable to to grow wheat for export up to 77 km inland (away from the coast), as in the United States (in the same time period) up to 309 km.¹⁰³ This situation created a closed economy covering a range of 50-70 km.¹⁰⁴

The lack of technological progress in transports, combined with a corresponding lag in agriculture and small industry, created a trade deficit and was an important factor contributing to the economic decline of the Ottoman Empire and its dependence, finally, on Western powers.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the underdevelopment of the transport network of certain areas to the detriment of others was also due to the penetration of western capital, which indirectly caused the change of the economic orientations of the Ottoman Empire,¹⁰⁶ since it was more concerned with the expansion of the railway network according to the wishes of the Great Powers of that period.

Through the construction of the roads (or the attempts to build, as many roads remained unfinished) from the Ottoman state in the mid-19th century to the end of the First World War, some cities benefited while others remained underdeveloped, either because they did not have a favorable position in the land transport network (road and rail) or because motorways and the railway did not reach their areas. It is noteworthy that up until 1920 there was no road network at the northwest and southwestern border of Asia Minor, in the independent sanjak of Viga¹⁰⁷ and the sanjak of Mentese of the vilayet of Aydin.¹⁰⁸ The examining of the relationship between transport and settlement networks requires special research, that's why we limit ourselves only on just a few examples regarding this topic.

Two cities with a favorable position on the road network were Izmir and Ankara. Izmir's geographic location is reported as excellent for transport, road and rail,¹⁰⁹ as a harbor located in the middle of the west coast of Asia Minor and at the exit of a long valley, the Ermus River (Sarabat), connecting it with the interior of Anadolu. Ankara presents itself as an important transport hub within the Asia Minor plateau, based on the list of motorways by Darkot.¹¹⁰ Six highways are developed to the west, east and north and the area seems to be the transport center of the Asia Minor plateau.¹¹¹ Obviously, this fact is also an important reason why a few years later it was chosen by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the capital of the newly established Turkish Republic.

¹⁰³ Issawi, *The Economic History*, 179.

¹⁰⁴ İlhan Tekeli, "On Institutionalized External Relation of Cities in the Ottoman Empire," *Etudes Balkaniques* VIII/2 (1972): 51-53.

¹⁰⁵ Veremis and Kostis, *Η Εθνική Τράπεζα*, 30.

¹⁰⁶ Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία*, 76.

¹⁰⁷ Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 214.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 349.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 300-301.

¹¹⁰ Darkot, *Türkiye İktisadi*, 165.

¹¹¹ Tekeli, "Urban Patterns," 19-21.

Trebizond also benefited from the Ottoman state's interest in the road to Erzurum and Persia, as it has been the main export port of Persian trade for a long time.

An example of a city benefiting from the extension of the railroad, although its sition was eccentric to the road network was Mersina. Up until 1840 it was an inland village, but then developed, because the railway line was extended from Adana¹¹² and its harbor was connected to the interior.

On the contrary, an example of a city affected by the progress of the railway work and the lack of a corresponding road is Kuşadası (New Ephesus), which the Smyrna (Izmir) railroad has cut off from the mainland. The city grew up, with the sult that the rich families abandoned it.¹¹³ Moreover, despite the existence of the Kios – Bursa road, Kios lost its value after the construction of the Bursa – Mudanya¹¹⁴ railway line.


Finally, an example of a city that was isolated and without a road (nor a railroad) was Muğla, the only sanjak town in Asia Minor where one could not reach either by sea, by rail or by road.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 106.

¹¹³ Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 320.

¹¹⁴ Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία Ανατολής*, 62.

¹¹⁵ Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία Μικράς Ασίας*, 349.



An approach to a classification of the main roads of Asia Minor in early 20th century to primary and secondary network.

Designed by Georgios Tsotsos on basemap: Map of Turkey 1969 (Index of /blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/11), in http://www.nathanbeaver.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/turkey_rel_1969-1024x660.jpg (access 20-7-2017).

Topographie de l'Europe centrale et des Balkans à la fin du XIX^e siècle, une source méconnue

Le XIX^e siècle est celui d'un développement massif de l'expansionnisme européen. Quelques pays seulement tentent de se partager le monde suivant un rythme qui ne cesse de s'accélérer jusqu'à la Première Guerre Mondiale. La répartition des contrées éloignées des centres de pouvoir s'organise dans le cadre d'alliances qui, le plus souvent, permettent d'éviter les conflits entre les prétendants. Au contraire, à la porte de l'Europe, les enjeux relatifs à la Péninsule balkanique sont trop immédiats pour que son partage puisse être l'objet d'un consensus. Dans cette région, plusieurs pays se livrent à une véritable guerre d'influence pour étendre leur autorité sur les nouveaux Etats qui naissent du démantèlement de l'Empire ottoman. Au gré de la succession des conflits et des multiples traités de paix: Paris 1856, Berlin 1878, Bucarest 1913..., l'Autriche, puis l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie d'une part la France et la Grande Bretagne d'autre part, se disputent chaque province de l'empire. Dans ce contexte, cette région du monde compte parmi celles qui ont été l'objet de la cartographie la plus abondante. Elle n'est pas seulement le fait des différentes armées, il s'agit aussi pour les Puissances de disposer d'une bonne connaissance des populations et des ressources naturelles pour préparer et négocier le partage des territoires ottomans.

Pour l'Europe centrale et les Balkans, la production austro-hongroise a été la plus abondante. Dès la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle, l'armée autrichienne acquiert de fortes compétences en matière de cartographie détaillée; en 1763, elle s'engage dans la préparation d'une carte de l'Empire autrichien qui compte plusieurs milliers de feuilles. Un siècle plus tard, son expérience lui permet de publier une première carte imprimée à l'échelle 1:75 000. C'est le début d'une longue liste de séries cartographiques à différentes échelles dont les périmètres dépassent largement celui de la double monarchie: une carte au 1:200 000, une autre au 1:300 000 et une dernière au 1:750 000. Cette production constitue la matrice d'une part importante de la cartographie des Balkans et d'Europe centrale jusqu'à la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. La série dont l'histoire a été la plus longue et la plus mouvementée est celle à l'échelle 1:200 000. Ses 265 feuilles couvrent pratiquement l'ensemble de la péninsule balkanique et une grande part de l'Europe centrale.

Par l'étendue de l'espace qu'elle représente aussi bien que par sa durée de vie, cette carte est un document d'exception. Elle constitue une source remarquable pour la connaissance de l'Europe centrale pendant la période considérée. On ne saurait dresser une liste des modes d'exploitation envisageables tant ils peuvent être divers. Mais cette richesse a deux contreparties qui ne facilitent pas son utili-

* Jean-Luc Arnaud, Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS, TELEMME, Aix-en-Provence, France

sation. D'une part, dès la première consultation, cette carte semble frappée de démesure. L'édition austro-hongroise originale compte plusieurs milliers de feuilles. D'autre part, la plupart des collections sont difficiles à exploiter car elles ne sont pas cataloguées. Par ailleurs, cette carte n'a jamais été l'objet de la moindre publication qui tenterait d'en définir les contours. Dans ce contexte, certaines particularités, au niveau de l'ensemble de la série comme au niveau de chaque feuille, apparaissent sur un trop faible nombre de documents pour qu'il soit possible de les interpréter sur la base de l'examen d'une seule collection.

Il n'est donc pas surprenant que cette carte soit peu exploitée, ceux qui en connaissent l'existence ne disposent pas des outils nécessaires pour le faire. Cet article en propose quelques-uns. Il examine plusieurs particularités qui, compte tenu de la dispersion des collections, ne peuvent pas être saisies sans un travail préliminaire de rassemblement des données à travers un catalogue général des feuilles.¹ Sur la base de cette compilation, les mentions, les légendes, les modes de présentation qui dérogent à la règle générale sont assez nombreux pour ne pas être considérés comme des exceptions et pour permettre de comprendre comment ils s'organisent. Ainsi, la plus grande part de cet article trouve son origine dans les documents eux-mêmes. Cette source se révèle d'autant plus pertinente que les rapports annuels de l'Institut géographique de l'armée austro-hongroise –*König und Kaiser Militargeographisches Institut*– KuK-MI – sont souvent très laconiques.²

Cette contribution est partagée en trois parties. Après une présentation générale du contexte de production de la carte et des particularités relatives à sa distribution dans les bibliothèques, elle examine la série dans son ensemble de manière indépendante des particularités de chaque feuille. La dernière partie est consacrée à ces particularités. Elle traite en particulier des difficultés relatives à la datation des feuilles et de l'abondance des informations qu'elles consignent.

Production et Conservation

La carte d'Europe centrale et des Balkans à l'échelle 1:200 000 est née d'un décret militaire du mois de juillet 1879. Dix ans plus tard, le KuK-MI, en publie les premières feuilles. A ce moment-là, il n'existe pas de carte équivalente. On dispose soit de documents à petite échelle qui figurent la région considérée en quelques feuilles seulement –les nombreuses cartes publiées par Heinrich Kiepert à Berlin en constituent les principaux exemples–³ soit de cartes militaires très détaillées.

¹ Ce catalogue a été dressé dans le cadre du programme *CartoMundi* –Valorisation en ligne du patrimoine cartographique, de l'université d'Aix-Marseille– <http://cartomundi.eu>.

² On a consulté les rapports annuels de l'Institut cartographique militaire austro-hongrois pour les années 1887 à 1896 et 1902 à 1912, soit 21 volumes. Ils portent tous le même titre: *Mittheilungen des Kaiserl. Königl., Militär-Geographischen Institutes Herausgegeben auf befehl des K. K.Reichs-Kriegs-Ministeriums* et la date de l'année rapportée. Les références ont été abrégées de la manière suivante *Mittheilungen*, DATE, pl. xx. A partir du volume de 1887, chaque livraison consacre une à deux pages à la carte au 1:200 000. Elles traitent de l'avancement des travaux, des techniques de relevé, des modes de reproduction... mais elles ne donnent pas de détail quant à la rédaction des documents.

³ *Antike Welten. Neue Regionen. Heinrich Kiepert 1818-1899*. Berlin: Verlag Kiepert, 1999, 79-132.

Dans ce contexte, l'échelle 1:200 000 –un centimètre sur la carte représente deux kilomètres sur le terrain– constitue un intermédiaire entre les cartes utilisées pour organiser les déplacements et les séjours de l'armée et les documents plus généraux qui permettent de visualiser les enjeux géopolitiques à l'échelle de l'ensemble d'une région. Elle correspond aussi à la métrique du nouveau moyen de transport qui devient alors stratégique: le chemin de fer. En effet, au moment où l'armée autrichienne s'engage dans la publication de cette carte, la jonction entre les voies ferrées du Nord et du Sud des Alpes est en cours. Elle favorise le développement de nouvelles voies en Europe centrale et surtout dans les régions situées entre le Danube et la Méditerranée qui, à ce moment-là, sont fortement sous-équipées.⁴

La production du Kuk-MI est alors considérable. Par ailleurs, la compétence des cartographes militaires austro-hongrois en matière de grandes séries cartographiques est remarquable. Depuis la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle, chaque région de l'Empire a été l'objet de trois campagnes successives de relevés et d'autant de cartographies manuscrites. A partir de 1872, ces documents sont rassemblés dans une version imprimée à l'échelle 1:75 000 qui ne compte pas moins de 752 feuilles.⁵ Mais cette production, malgré son abondance, était alors limitée au territoire impérial. Au milieu des années 1880, la carte au 1:200 000 témoigne d'une toute autre ambition. Sur les 262 feuilles qui apparaissent sur son premier tableau d'assemblage, 168 couvrent des régions situées hors des frontières de l'Empire; ainsi, plus de la moitié de sa surface représente des pays alors étrangers (fig. 1). D'Est en Ouest, elle s'étend de la mer Noire à la France et, du Nord au Sud, de la Pologne septentrionale à la Grèce, soit une surface de plus de trois millions de kilomètres carrés. Ce périmètre constitue un double indicateur. D'une part, il témoigne de la distance des régions vers lesquelles l'armée austro-hongroise envisage l'extension d'un éventuel conflit. D'autre part, il atteste de la capacité de cette armée à documenter de manière détaillée la topographie d'un espace aussi vaste. A cet égard, il est remarquable que cette carte soit mise en chantier quelques années seulement après la signature d'un accord d'aide mutuelle entre l'empire allemand, la double monarchie et l'Italie (1882). Cet accord a sans aucun doute contribué à la définition du périmètre de la carte, en particulier vers l'Ouest où elle intègre le comté de Nice et les Alpes françaises, territoires de la Maison de Savoie jusqu'à leur annexion par la France en 1860. Cette série cartographique est en service jusqu'à la fin de la Première Guerre Mondiale, son histoire se termine avec celle de l'Empire et son démantèlement.

Les Collections

⁴ Maxime, Hélène. *Les nouvelles routes du globe*. Paris: Masson, [s.d. ca.1882].

⁵ Kretschmer, Ingrid. "The mapping of Austria in the twentieth Century," In *Imago Mundi* Vol. 43 (1991): 9-20; Janko, Annamaria. *Magyarország katonai felmérései 1763-1950*. Budapest: 2007, 85-117.

Les cartothèques qui conservent des feuilles de cette carte sont nombreuses, pour établir le corpus exploité dans cet article on en a consulté dix-sept.⁶ On note tout d'abord une forte disparité. L'établissement qui en conserve le plus grand nombre de titres est le Service fédéral de métrologie et de topographie (*Bundesamt für Eich und Vermessungswesen*) de Vienne qui est l'héritier direct du service géographique de l'armée austro-hongroise. Sa collection regroupe 1938 documents pour la carte au 1:200 000. Il est suivi de près par le musée militaire de Budapest avec 1631 documents; vient ensuite la Staatsbibliothek de Berlin avec 991 documents, puis la bibliothèque de l'université Charles de Prague avec 892 documents; pour sa part, la cartothèque de l'Institut national de l'information géographique et forestière –IGN– à Paris en compte 539... Ainsi, 7548 documents ont été consultés et catalogués, ils constituent une liste de 3757 titres. Le faible taux de recouvrement entre les collections –chaque document a été consulté moins de deux fois en moyenne– montre que cette liste est très incomplète. Compte tenu de la forte propension des militaires autrichiens à produire des versions différentes de certaines feuilles –en particulier pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale– il n'est pas envisageable d'estimer le nombre de titre susceptibles d'avoir été effectivement publiés. Par ailleurs, il serait illusoire de tenter de compléter la liste dans la mesure où on peut sérieusement envisager qu'il ne reste aucun exemplaire de certaines versions publiées pendant la Guerre. Pour leur part, les rapports annuels du KuK-MI rendent compte de l'avancement de la publication à travers quelques lignes de texte et des tableaux d'assemblage, mais les informations qu'ils livrent quant aux mises jour successives sont trop incomplètes pour permettre de dresser une liste de l'ensemble des feuilles publiées.

Le chiffre brut des feuilles cataloguées semble important. Cependant, sa comparaison avec le nombre des feuilles effectivement publiées pondère cette impression. La liste des documents consultés apparaît alors dérisoire. Au cours de l'année 1902, le KuK-MI a imprimé 173 276 feuilles de la carte au 1:200 000.⁷ Ce chiffre dépasse 250 000 les deux années suivantes. Ensuite, il descend autour de 170 000 par an pour atteindre, 355 000 en 1910 et 446 000 en 1911. Ces chiffres ne sont pas disponibles pour toute la période de production, on peut cependant estimer que ce sont plus de cinq millions de feuilles qui ont été imprimées pour cette carte.

⁶ Liste des collections cataloguées. Bundesamt für Eich und Vermessungswesen, Vienne, 1938 titres; Musée militaire de Budapest, 1631 titres catalogués avec la collaboration de R. Banfi; Staatsbibliothek de Berlin, 991 titres; Bibliothèque de l'université Charles, Prague, 892 titres catalogués par la bibliothèque; Cartothèque de l'Institut national de l'information géographique et forestière, Saint-Mandé, 539 titres catalogués avec la collaboration de B. Joseph et I. Cloître; Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris, 329 titres; Archives nationales de Tchécoslovaquie, Prague: 298 titres; Bibliothèque nationale de Slovénie, Ljubljana: 276 titres; Cartothèque de l'université de Paris 8, Saint-Denis, 218 titres catalogués avec la collaboration de M. Valois; Collection privée Z. Krejci, Prague: 214 titres; Cartothèque de l'université de Bordeaux 3, Talence: 98 titres; Bibliothèque de géographie de la Sorbonne, Paris: 80 titres; Bibliothèque municipale de Marseille, Marseille: 45 titres. Et aussi, avec moins de 30 titres par établissement: Archives nationales autrichiennes, Vienne; Museum national d'histoire naturelle, Paris; Cartothèque de l'université d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-en-Provence; Bibliothèque nationale d'Autriche, Vienne; Archives militaires allemandes, Potsdam.

⁷ *Mitteilungen*, 1903, 28.

Sur cette base, les documents consultés représentent moins d'un deux millièmes de ceux qui ont effectivement été produits; ainsi, il n'est pas surprenant que la liste titres repérés soit incomplète – sans doute très incomplète.

Sauf à la bibliothèque de l'université Charles de Prague, les collections ne sont pas cataloguées feuille à feuille. Quelques établissements disposent de fiches de suites, c'est-à-dire de listes manuscrites qui permettent de recenser les éditions de chaque feuille. Mais, ce mode de description n'est pas opératoire pour les séries cartographiques dont les feuilles ont été l'objet d'un grand nombre d'éditions; pour plusieurs collections, ces fiches sont surchargées au point d'en être devenues illisibles. Dans les autres cartothèques, les feuilles sont regroupées par numéro ou par titre dans des portefeuilles. On y trouve le plus souvent plusieurs éditions différentes. Ainsi, à l'IGN par exemple, les 539 feuilles de la carte originale sont conservées avec plus de 1300 autres feuilles appartenant à vingt-sept éditions différentes.

Demesure

Une série cartographique n'est pas seulement un lot de feuilles, c'est aussi une unité de production organisée suivant des principes qui n'apparaissent pas à travers la description des feuilles, quelle que soit sa qualité. A ce niveau, la série est considérée comme un ensemble doté de caractéristiques propres. Elles se déclinent à travers ses sources, son mode de découpage et de repérage des feuilles et enfin, par la manière dont la répartition de sa production, dans l'espace et dans le temps, témoigne d'un retournement stratégique.

Sources

Au contraire des cartes plus anciennes à grande échelle, celle-ci n'a pas été dressée directement à partir de travaux de terrain mais par compilation de documents plus anciens et à plus grande échelle. La source principale est la couverture générale de l'Empire à l'échelle 1:75 000 publiée à partir de 1872. La première note consacrée à cette série dans les rapports annuels du Kuk-MI, explique comment chaque feuille de la nouvelle carte au 1:200 000 doit résulter de la compilation des huit feuilles correspondantes au 1:75 000 avec des relevés topographiques complémentaires (*Mittheilungen*, 1887, 24). Par contre, pour des raisons militaires évidentes, il ne donne aucune indication quant aux sources mobilisées pour les régions situées hors des limites de l'Empire et qui ne sont pas représentées au 1:75 000. Les rédacteurs exploitent alors des cartes étrangères et/ou divers documents rassemblés par les services de renseignement. Cette distinction se retrouve dans les mentions des sources portées sur les feuilles. Pour celles qui couvrent l'Empire, des mentions indiquent la date de publication des sources et/ou des travaux de terrain. Pour les autres, dans la mesure où les services de renseignement ne souhaitent pas révéler la liste des documents dont ils disposent, les feuilles ne portent pas de mention de source. On note cependant une exception; pour cinq feuilles qui représentent le centre de la Roumanie, on trouve

la mention d'un relevé [topographique] daté de 1856-1857.⁸ Les feuilles correspondantes ont été publiées à partir de 1898. Cet exemple montre que la documentation était rare et pas toujours très récente. Les cartographes ont dû composer avec des informations disparates, pas toujours aisés à interpréter et/ou à harmoniser. La faible qualité de certaines feuilles en témoigne. C'est le cas par exemple pour celles du Nord de la Grèce que les militaires français doivent compléter à la fin de l'année 1917 pour préparer la défense de Salonique.⁹

Lorsque les sources font défaut, la rédaction des feuilles correspondantes est différée. Ainsi par exemple, en 1914, alors que la plupart des feuilles de la série ont déjà été l'objet de plusieurs éditions, les cinq feuilles qui couvrent la région de Slatina –au Sud de l'actuelle Roumanie– restent encore à publier.

Découpage, Repérage des Feuilles et Projection

Compte tenu de l'étendue représentée par cette carte et de son échelle de réduction, elle est partagée entre plusieurs feuilles. Son mode de découpage témoigne de sa filiation avec la production antérieure. Ainsi, chaque feuille de la carte au 1:200 000 correspond à l'assemblage de huit feuilles de la carte au 1:75 000; de la même manière, chaque feuille au 1:75 000 résulte de l'assemblage de huit minutes manuscrites au 1:28 800 qui correspondent aux relevés effectués sur le terrain.

Par ailleurs, chaque feuille au 1:200 000 représente un espace d'un degré de latitude par un degré de longitude. Les feuilles sont juxtaposées côte à côte sans superposition. Le méridien d'origine de ce découpage et des coordonnées indiquées sur les feuilles est celui de l'île de Fer, déterminé par convention à vingt degrés à l'Ouest du méridien de Paris.¹⁰ Les limites des feuilles correspondent, en longitude et en latitude, à des demi-degrés de telle manière que leur centre est placé au croisement entre un méridien et un parallèle de coordonnées entières. Pour représenter une telle étendue de la surface terrestre –qui est sphérique– sur des feuilles de papier –qui sont plates–, les auteurs ont adopté le mode de projection polyédrique suivant lequel le centre de chaque feuille correspond au centre de sa projection. Cette méthode donne lieu à une carte dont l'assemblage des feuilles ne constitue pas une surface plane mais elle présente l'intérêt d'éviter les fortes déformations marginales. Ce système présente un avantage important sur tous les autres, il permet d'étendre l'espace représenté dans n'importe quelle direction en fonction des besoins éventuels. Ce n'est par exemple pas le cas de la projection de Bonne, utilisée au même moment par le Service géographique de l'armée française.

⁸ Feuilles *Zaječar* (40° 44°), feuilles de 1900 et suivantes, *Orsova* (40°45°), feuilles de 1900 et suivantes, *Gyula-Fehérvár* (41°46°), feuilles de 1898 et suivantes; *Nagy-Szeben (Hermannstadt)* (42°46°), feuilles de 1898 et suivantes; *Brassó (Kronstadt)* (43° 46°), feuilles de 1898 et suivantes.

⁹ *Rapport sur les travaux exécutés du 1^{er} août 1914 au 31 décembre 1919*. Paris: Service géographique de l'Armée, 1924, 336.

¹⁰ La plus grande part de la production cartographique austro-hongroise utilise ce méridien d'origine. Au contraire des méridiens de Paris et de Greenwich, il présente l'avantage de donner des coordonnées toujours positives pour les cartes de l'Europe.

Une Opération de Longue Haleine – Retournement Stratégique

La production d'une nouvelle carte aussi étendue que celle dont il est question ici mobilise des moyens considérables. C'est aussi une opération de très longue haleine, certaines feuilles sont publiées pour la première fois plus de vingt-cinq ans après les premières. Pendant cette période, les choix stratégiques des militaires austro-hongrois ont suivi l'évolution pour le moins mouvementée de la situation géopolitique de la région considérée. Les modifications apportées au périmètre de la carte en témoignent. En effet, au cours des trente années de service de cette carte, son périmètre a été soumis à plusieurs ajustements.

Le premier tableau d'assemblage, publié en 1887,¹¹ indique que les 262 feuilles de la carte devaient s'étendre sur 24 degrés de longitude –entre Nice et Odessa– et sur 13 degrés de latitude, entre le Nord de la Grèce et le Sud de la Pologne. Au tout début du XX^e siècle, suivant un nouveau tableau d'assemblage,¹² une vingtaine de feuilles complémentaires témoignent d'un important élargissement vers le Sud. Enfin, en 1919, l'assemblage des feuilles effectivement publié montre que l'armée austro-hongroise a renoncé à la publication de vingt unités qui devaient figurer le Nord-Ouest de la série. La répartition géographique de ces périmètres (fig. 2) indique qu'au cours des trente années considérées le centre de gravité de la carte s'est déplacé vers le sud.

La première édition a bénéficié des travaux à plus grande échelle déjà disponibles. Elle n'a cependant pas été réalisée en un jour, ni même en une décennie. Avec 38 feuilles publiées, la première année –1889– est la plus prolifique. Dès l'année suivante, ce rythme tombe à environ quinze feuilles par an de telle manière qu'après dix années de travaux (fin 1888), la carte compte 174 feuilles publiées, soit les deux-tiers de sa version finale. Ensuite, le rythme de la production de nouvelles feuilles diminue puisque on en compte seulement soixante-treize entre 1899 et 1909. Pour leur part, les dix-huit dernières feuilles de la série ont été publiées entre 1910 et 1916.

La répartition annuelle du nombre des nouvelles feuilles semble témoigner d'un essoufflement de la production à la fin du XIX^e siècle. Mais cette baisse est compensée par les mises à jour et les éditions successives des feuilles déjà publiées. Ainsi, à la fin de l'année 1898, pour 174 unités couvertes, on compte 254 feuilles publiées. Autrement dit, quatre-vingt feuilles, soit presque la moitié de la production initiale ont déjà été l'objet d'une seconde édition. La publication des feuilles mises à jour débute moins de trois ans après la parution des premières, en 1891, avec les feuilles *Miskolcz* (38° 48') et *Szatmár-Németi* (41° 48'). Dix ans plus tard, on compte déjà quatre éditions de dates différentes pour plusieurs feuilles. Ainsi, dès le début de la publication, la production est partagée entre

¹¹ *Mittheilungen*, 1887, 24 et pl. IV.

¹² *Mittheilungen*, 1901, pl. V.

l'extension de la surface couverte par la carte et l'entretien d'une collection à jour pour les feuilles déjà publiées.

Ce phénomène va croissant; entre 1899 et la fin de l'année 1909, on compte au total 359 feuilles publiées pour seulement soixante-treize nouvelles unités couvertes. Ainsi, à partir du début du siècle, la plus grande part de la production est consacrée aux mises à jour et aux rééditions. Durant la dernière période, on compte seulement dix-huit nouvelles unités couvertes pour une production totale de 641 éditions dont les deux tiers (424) sont publiées durant la Première Guerre Mondiale. C'est en 1914 que la production est la plus abondante avec 267 feuilles publiées soit l'équivalent d'une série complète. Mais, il ne s'agit pas d'une nouvelle couverture générale; certaines feuilles bénéficient d'éditions multiples alors que pour d'autres, qui figurent des régions peu stratégiques, les versions antérieures ne sont pas remplacées.

Autrement dit, l'approche chronologique des publications gagne à être complétée par l'analyse de leur distribution spatiale. Comme le rappelle l'abondance des mises à jour et des rééditions durant la guerre, cette carte a été dressée par des militaires et pour des militaires. La répartition chrono-géographique des premières éditions de chaque feuille témoigne des priorités territoriales pour chaque période.

Il est tout d'abord remarquable que l'ensemble de la carte dépasse largement le périmètre de l'Empire puisque plusieurs feuilles représentent des régions de France, de Pologne, de Grèce... très éloignées des frontières de la Double-monarchie. Comme une sorte de coque périphérique elles couvrent la plupart des pays frontaliers. C'est cependant vers l'Est et le Sud que la zone couverte par cette carte est le plus développée. Vers l'Est et le Nord-Est tout d'abord, elle représente des milliers de kilomètres carrés de l'Empire Russe avec lequel Vienne entretient des relations pour le moins tendues quant au partage des provinces européennes détachées de l'empire ottoman. Ainsi, la carte s'étend jusqu'à la capitale de la province ukrainienne –Kiev– et Odessa, son port sur la mer Noire. Cette rivalité est confirmée par l'extension de la carte vers le Sud-Est. Dans cette direction, elle couvre les pays slaves de religion orthodoxe –la Roumanie, la Serbie et la Bulgarie– sur lesquels la Russie tente d'étendre son influence. Elle couvre aussi les provinces ottomanes d'Europe jusqu'à Istanbul. Cette extension témoigne de la rivalité avec la Russie quant au contrôle du Bosphore et des Dardanelles. Le périmètre de la carte inclut ces deux détroits qui constituent un enjeu stratégique majeur pour toutes les puissances d'Europe occidentale. Il s'agit alors d'interdire aux Russes la prise de contrôle de ces points de passage. De manière plus circonstanciée pour l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces détroits constituent un débouché vers la Méditerranée de la principale artère commerciale d'Europe centrale: le Danube qui, avant de se jeter dans la mer Noire, traverse l'Empire sur plusieurs centaines de kilomètres et dessert ses plus grands centres politiques et administratifs: Vienne et Budapest.

Vers le Sud, la situation politique de la péninsule balkanique est sensiblement différente. Son organisation résulte pour une grande part du traité de Berlin adopté en 1878, antérieur d'un an seulement à la décision de dresser la carte au 1:200 000. Avec ce traité, l'Empire ottoman perd plusieurs régions. La Bosnie, l'Herzégovine et

l'Albanie passent sous protection austro-hongroise, la Serbie et la Roumanie deviennent indépendantes, La Grèce annexe la Thessalie et une partie de l'Épire, enfin, le Monténégro devient une principauté autonome. Pour leur part, les régions qui constitueront plus tard la Bulgarie obtiennent leur autonomie. Le sultan ottoman conserve les pleins pouvoirs sur un périmètre réduit à la Thessalie (Nord de la Grèce actuelle), la Macédoine et la Thrace.

Ce recul des frontières ottomanes est considéré par les puissances d'Europe et la Russie comme une première étape. Au cours des décennies suivantes, elles poursuivent leurs activités de démantèlement de l'Empire. Mais elles n'œuvrent pas de manière concertée, au contraire. Les deux prétendants principaux –la double monarchie d'une part et la Russie d'autre part– sont en concurrence ouverte. Dans ce contexte, la connaissance de la topographie des zones à influencer, à occuper ou à conquérir revêt une dimension stratégique. Ce n'est pas un hasard si, de leur côté, les Russes ont aussi une importante activité cartographique dans les Balkans au cours de la même période.¹³

Le tropisme de cette carte vers le grand voisin russe apparaît clairement dès le début de sa production (fig. 3). Les premières feuilles publiées portent exclusivement sur le Nord-Est de la série. En quelques années, la carte atteint son développement maximum dans cette région. C'est seulement à partir de la cinquième année d'activité, en 1893, que la production change d'orientation pour étendre sa couverture vers l'Ouest et dans une moindre mesure vers le Sud. Au tournant du siècle, alors que les deux tiers de l'étendue complète de la série sont couverts, les nouvelles feuilles publiées se développent à la fois vers le Sud le long de la mer Noire jusqu'en Thrace et à Istanbul ainsi que vers le Sud-Ouest en France et en Italie du Nord. Ces multiples phases ont donné lieu à un périmètre très régulier au Nord et à l'Est comme si celui-ci résultait d'une programmation *a priori*. Au contraire, les limites Sud et Ouest sont bien plus tarabiscotées; comme en témoignent plusieurs feuilles publiées pour la première fois durant la Première Guerre Mondiale, elles résultent de décisions militaires très conjoncturelles. Par exemple, la publication en 1915 des deux feuilles qui figurent l'entrée du détroit des Dardanelles et la presqu'île de Gallipoli n'est sans doute pas sans rapport avec le débarquement allié dans cette région dont les premières opérations débutent en avril 1915. Au contraire, au Nord et à l'Ouest, la plus grande part des feuilles programmées qui n'ont jamais été publiées correspondent à des territoires alors éloignés des théâtres d'opérations militaires. Le caractère stratégique de cette carte est confirmé par la distribution géographique des mises et jour. Elle montre bien comment les enjeux qui ont présidé à sa production ont changés durant la période considérée. De manière apparemment paradoxale, ce ne sont pas les régions traitées les premières qui bénéficient des mises à jour les plus abondantes. Ainsi, on assiste à un véritable retournement. La Bohême et la Moravie qui ont été l'objet

¹³ Comme en témoigne par exemple, la carte de Bulgarie à l'échelle 1:210 000 publiée en 59 feuilles en 1884.

des premières éditions, semblent présenter bien moins d'intérêt que les Balkans et l'Italie du Nord trente ans plus tard.

Les Feuilles

Dans une série cartographique, les feuilles ne sont pas seulement des sous-parties de l'ensemble. A partir du moment où chaque case du tableau d'assemblage constitue une unité de production et de mise à jour, chaque feuille correspondante bénéficie d'une autonomie éditoriale. Les différentes éditions d'une feuille –d'une même case du tableau d'assemblage– constituent en quelque sorte la troisième dimension de la série; elle se déroule dans le temps et témoigne de la singularité des relations entre le producteur et le territoire représenté. L'exploitation de chaque feuille débute par la mise en ordre chronologique de ses différentes versions au cours des trente années de service de la carte. Cette partie est donc tout d'abord consacrée à la datation des feuilles. On examine ensuite leur facture et le code graphique utilisé.

Dater les Feuilles

Avec l'exemple des sources exploitées pour dresser quelques feuilles figurant la Roumanie, on a noté que l'écart entre la date des relevés de terrain et celle de la publication des feuilles correspondantes pouvait atteindre plusieurs décennies. Les mentions de dates portées sur chaque feuille documentent parfois ce décalage mais elles ne sont jamais aisées à interpréter. Toutes les feuilles publiées comportent au moins une date chacune¹⁴ mais la plupart des feuilles en portent plusieurs, elles correspondent à des moments particuliers de leur processus de production. On peut les classer en six catégories: date des sources, de la minute, de correction ou bien de complément, d'impression, de référence et enfin, date du *type*. Cette catégorisation résulte d'une construction *a posteriori*, de nombreuses mentions de date n'indiquent pas à quels événements elles correspondent dans la production des documents.

Date des sources

Les dates des sources utilisées pour dresser chaque feuille sont indiquées dans une mention particulière, placée le plus souvent en bas au centre de la feuille. Lorsque c'est nécessaire, les sources sont indiquées pour chaque zone géographique couverte par la feuille. Mais ces informations ne citent jamais les sources d'origine étrangère. Les principales formes utilisées sont les suivantes:

* *Nach Spezialkarte 18xx-18xx* [A partir de la carte spéciale...]. La carte à laquelle il est fait référence ici est celle à l'échelle 1:75 000 qui couvre l'ensemble de l'Empire. On trouve indifféremment deux graphies: *Spezialkarte* ou *Specialkarte*.

¹⁴ Exception qui confirme la règle, une version de la feuille *Mailand* (27° 45') ne porte pas de date.

* *Inland nach Spezialkarte 18xx bis 18xx* [Territoire national à partir de la carte spéciale...], cette mention est utilisée pour les feuilles dont toute la zone couverte ne fait pas partie de l'Empire.

* *Inland nach Reambulierung 18xx* [Territoire national à partir de révisions détaillées effectuées sur le terrain].¹⁵

* *Inland nach Kartenrevision 19xx u 19xx* [Territoire national à partir de révisions de la carte].

* Rumanien nach Aufnahme 1856 ou bien 1857 [Roumanie à partir de levés (topographiques)]. Pour 5 feuilles seulement.

Date de la minute

La plupart des feuilles portent une date, indiquée sous la forme d'un millésime, dans l'angle inférieur droit de leur cadre. On la trouve de manière systématique jusqu'en 1909; ensuite, elle disparaît progressivement jusqu'en 1912. Les feuilles publiées après cette date ne portent plus cette indication. En fonction de la période de publication il semble que cette date change de signification. Sur la première version de chaque feuille, elle correspondre à celle de sa publication. Pour leur part, les versions suivantes, qui résultent d'une mise à jour, portent à la fois cette date inchangée et la date de la mise à jour. Ainsi, le millésime indiqué dans l'angle inférieur droit des feuilles ne correspond pas à leur publication mais plutôt à la date d'établissement de la minute originale, dernière étape de la rédaction avant impression. Tant que cette minute est en service et qu'on lui apporte des modifications ponctuelles son millésime n'est pas modifié. Les corrections de faible importance n'ont pas d'incidence sur cette date; ainsi, pour une même feuille, on peut trouver quatre ou cinq versions différentes qui portent la même date de minute mais des dates de correction ou bien de complément différentes.¹⁶

À partir de 1914, le millésime de la minute est remplacée par un numéro *d'Ausgabe* – Edition. Cette mention n'est pas systématique et elle n'est pas datée, la numérotation permet cependant de classer les feuilles suivant une chronologie relative.

Date de correction ou bien de complément

Les dates de correction ou de complément sont toujours plus récentes que le millésime de la minute. Elles sont rédigées sous plusieurs formes, les plus fréquentes sont les suivantes:

¹⁵ Le terme *Reambulierung* est spécifique à la production cartographique austro-hongroise, il correspond à une méthode particulière de révision sur le terrain de la carte de base à grande échelle.

¹⁶ Cette distinction semble correspondre à celle utilisée par les cartographes français qui distinguent la *révision* (de faible importance et qui n'a pas d'incidence sur la structure géométrique de la feuille) et la *réfection*, qui correspond à une reprise complète de la rédaction.

* *Corr. 18xx* [Correction en 18xx]. Cette mention est placée en bas à gauche de la feuille, dans l'angle du cadre opposé à celui du millésime. Elle est assez rare, on la trouve entre 1891 et 1895 seulement.

* *Nachträge 18xx* [Suppléments de 18xx]. Cette mention, est le plus souvent placée au centre de la marge inférieure de la feuille; on le trouve aussi dans d'autres positions. Elle est utilisée entre 1891 et 1899. A partir de 1898, elle indique le mois et le jour considérés; elle prend alors les formes suivantes: *Nachträge 11.X.18xx / Nachtr. 5.IV.19xx*. Cette mention est utilisée jusqu'en 1914 mais assez peu à partir de 1910.

* *Teilweise berichtet bis 10.VI.18xx* [Correction partielle le ...]. Cette mention est le plus souvent placée à droite dans la marge inférieure de la feuille, on la trouve entre 1897 et 1918 mais surtout à partir de 1910. A ce moment-là, elle commence à se substituer à la mention *Nachträge*. A la fin de la période d'édition de la série, entre 1912 et 1918, on trouve aussi, assez rarement, une variante sous la forme *Berichtigt bis 19xx*.

L'usage de ces mentions témoigne de plusieurs confusions. Tout d'abord, *Nachträge* et *Teilweise berichtet bis* peuvent être considérées comme équivalentes. Les rédacteurs ont utilisé ces deux mentions indifféremment pour désigner les mêmes opérations. Par exemple, on trouve deux éditions différentes de la feuille *Schweidnitz* (34° 51') en 1909. Elles portent la même date de mise à jour mais elles sont libellées de deux manières différentes: *Teilweise berichtet bis 1.X.1909* et *Nacht. 1.X.1909*. Pour sa part, la feuille *Varna* (46° 43') publiée en 1912 porte les deux mentions qualifiées par la même date: *Teilweise berichtet bis 5.XII.1913* (en bas à droite); *Nachträge 5.XII.1913* (en bas au centre). On trouve aussi des confusions entre *Nachträge* et la date de la minute. Par exemple, pour la feuille *Salzburg* (31° 48') la date de mise à jour –*Nachträge*– de l'exemplaire publié en 1900 devient la date de la minute de l'exemplaire publié deux ans plus tard et qui porte une nouvelle mention de mise à jour: *Nachträge 14.I.1902*. De toute évidence, ces mentions n'ont pas été l'objet d'une normalisation. Par ailleurs, dans la mesure où chaque date est indiquée au jour près, on peut se demander à quel événement elle correspond dans le processus de mise à jour d'une feuille. Entre le constat et le relevé des modifications de la planimétrie, leur report sur la minute et leur impression, le durée est parfois de plusieurs années, en tout état de cause, elle est souvent de plusieurs mois.¹⁷

Date d'impression

Les dates d'impression ne sont pas indiquées sur toutes les feuilles, on les trouve tout d'abord entre 1896 et jusqu'en 1902. Les principales formes sont les suivantes:

¹⁷ Vers 1895, en France, pour la carte d'état-major, pas moins de trois années s'écoulent entre les campagnes de vérification et la publication des versions mises à jour. Berthaut, Henri Marie Auguste. *La carte de France, 1750-1898, étude historique*. Paris: Service géographique de l'Armée, 1898, tome 2, 193.

* *Gedruckt am 12./3. 18xx* [Imprimé le ...], entre 1896 et 1898 la date d'impression peut aussi être indiquée de la manière suivante: 28./3. 96. Cette mention est toujours placée en bas à droite de la feuille.

* Entre 1898 et 1901, les dates d'impression ne sont pas explicites car elles ne sont pas accompagnées de texte. On peut cependant considérer qu'il s'agit de date d'impression par similitude de leur facture et de leur position avec celles de la période immédiatement antérieure. Elles sont rédigées sous la forme d'une date codée de la manière suivante:

8. 6./9.	pour: 6 septembre 1898
9. 21./11.	pour: 21 novembre 1899
0. 20./4.	pour: 20 avril 1900
1 4./2.	pour: 4 février 1901

Ensuite, les feuilles ne portent plus de date d'impression jusqu'à la fin de l'année 1913. A partir de l'année suivante, certaines feuilles portent une date inscrite en très petits caractères, verticalement le long du bord de la feuille, en bas à gauche, sous la forme: 12.VII.14 (pour 12 juillet 1914). Aucune mention n'indique qu'il s'agit d'une date d'impression mais celle-ci est la seule date dont le statut n'est pas précisé; par ailleurs, c'est toujours la plus récente parmi les autres dates indiquées sur la feuille. Enfin, après la Première Guerre Mondiale, le service de cartographie autrichien indique la date d'impression des feuilles, sous cette forme et dans cette position.

Date de référence

Cette catégorie de date apparaît en 1909 comme un complément des autres mentions. Ainsi, ce n'est jamais la seule indication chronologique portée sur une feuille; par ailleurs, elle est soit semblable soit plus récente que les autres dates.¹⁸

Cette mention, libellée sous forme de millésime, est imprimée en marge inférieure, en noir ou en couleurs, en gros caractères et en gras de telle manière qu'on la repère sans ambiguïté. Elle n'est précédée d'aucune indication relative à l'évènement auquel elle correspond. Cependant, on peut penser que face à l'abondance des dates portées sur les documents et à celle des versions pour chaque unité géographique, il n'était pas toujours aisé de distinguer les plus récentes des autres. Dans ce contexte, la date complémentaire constitue une référence qui permet d'éviter de rechercher et de déchiffrer les multiples mentions en petits caractères pour trier les différentes versions correspondant à une même unité géographique. Cette forme de datation n'est pas utilisée sur toutes les feuilles.

Date du type

¹⁸ Sauf pour la feuille *Troppau* (36° 50') qui porte 1913 en gros caractères et la mention *Teilweise berichtet bis 23.I.1914*.

Pour les séries cartographiques, on désigne par *type* l'ensemble des règles de composition des feuilles; leur taille, la position des mentions, la police et la couleur des écritures, la largeur et la forme des tracés, le dessin des figurés de la légende... Sur les cartes austro-hongroises, le *type* est désigné par la formule: *Nach Zeichenschlüssel 18xx*, cette mention est parfois suivie de: *mit folgenden Änderungen* [avec les modifications suivantes]. La date indiquée est celle de l'adoption du type. Cette date correspond à un évènement du processus de production de la série, mais ne présente pas d'intérêt quant à la datation du contenu des feuilles.

Suivant ces mentions, quatre types successifs ont présidé à la composition des feuilles; ils datent de 1894, 1905, 1913 et 1914. Mais elles sont assez rares, on les trouve sur 81 documents qui correspondent à 29 unités géographiques seulement. Leur répartition ne présente aucune particularité, elles sont dispersées dans tout le champ du tableau d'assemblage.

Multiplicité des dates

Jusqu'en 1912, les rédacteurs procèdent par accumulation successives des mentions de dates. Ainsi par exemple, la feuille *Klagenfurt* (32° 47') de 1897 comporte-t-elle cinq mentions: *Nach Spezialkarte 1876 bis 1881*; 1894 (en bas à droite); *Corr. 1895*; *Nachtäge 1897*; *Gedruckt am 3./9. 1897*. A la fin de la période, avec la suppression de la date de la minute à partir de 1913 puis de celles des sources à partir de 1915, les indications deviennent moins abondantes de telle manière que la plupart des feuilles publiées entre 1915 et 1918 comportent une seule mention de date, le plus souvent sous cette forme: *Teilweise berichtigt bis 20.V.1915* (en bas à droite). Les réimpressions publiées quelques mois ou années plus tard en comportent deux, ainsi: *Teilweise berichtigt bis 20.V.1915* (en bas à droite); *19.II.16* (en bas à gauche, verticalement).

Cette description correspond à une tendance générale mais les exceptions à la règle sont abondantes. Pour de nombreux exemples, la suppression des anciennes mentions de date semble avoir été laissée à l'appréciation des rédacteurs. Ainsi, on trouve de multiples exemples de versions différenciées seulement par les mentions de dates anciennes. Par exemple, la feuille *Stanislau* (42° 49') a été publiée en deux versions en 1912. La version 1 porte trois mentions de date: *Nach Spezialkarte 1876 bis 1877* (en bas au centre), 1889 (en bas à droite) et *Teilweise berichtigt bis 7. XII. 1912* (en bas à droite). La version 2 en porte une seule: *Teilweise berichtigt bis 7. XII. 1912* (en bas à droite). La comparaison des deux mentions de mise de jour montre qu'il s'agit de la même graphie; par ailleurs la version 2 porte des traces d'effacement des autres mentions. Dans ce cas, on peut restituer l'ordre de publication effective de ces deux versions. Dans d'autres cas, il n'est pas envisageable de lever les ambiguïtés. Par exemple, pour la feuille *Florenz* (29° 44'), on dispose de deux versions publiées en 1916. La première porte trois mentions de date: 1905 (en bas à droite), *Nachtr. 16.III.1909* (en bas au centre) et *20.VI.16* (en bas à gauche). La seconde en porte seulement deux: *Teilweise berichtigt bis 29.III.1915* (en bas à droite), *20.VI.16* (en bas à gauche). Ces mentions ne permettent pas de proposer un ordre chronologique entre les

deux versions Cet exemple ne constitue pas une exception; il montre que, malgré l'apparente minutie apportée à la rédaction des documents et l'abondance des mentions de date, la production manque parfois de cohérence.

L'attention portée à la date des documents est fondatrice de l'histoire de chaque feuille et donc de l'histoire des enjeux relatifs à chaque zone géographique. Pour les trente années de service de cette carte, on a repéré en moyenne plus de quinze éditions pour chaque case du tableau d'assemblage. Mais cette valeur cache de fortes disparités. Pour plusieurs feuilles on compte une seule édition tandis que d'autres ont été l'objet de très nombreuses versions différentes. La fréquence des mises à jour et leur distribution dans le temps dessine sur le tableau d'assemblage une géographie des intérêts militaires austro-hongrois pendant la période considérée. Par exemple, les feuilles Nizza (25° 44'), Zurich (26° 47'), Meningen (28° 51')... ont eu une seule édition; au contraire, 17 feuilles ont eu plus de vingt-quatre éditions chacune. La palme est détenue par Vienne (34° 48') qui en compte trente-huit. Mais la répartition de ces chiffres dans le temps montre aussi de fortes disparités. Les trente-huit versions de la feuille *Vienne* sont réparties de manière assez régulière entre 1893 et 1918. À l'inverse, certaines sont l'objet d'une forte concentration d'intérêt pendant de courtes périodes. Par exemple, pour la feuille Elbasan (38° 41'), on a repéré douze versions publiées entre 1898 et 1918; elles sont réparties de manière irrégulière au cours des vingt années considérées puisque pas moins de cinq versions datent de 1914. Au contraire, la feuille Laibach (32° 46') (actuelle Ljubljana) compte vingt-quatre versions publiées entre 1893 et 1916, seulement quatre ont été publiées entre 1914 et 1916 tandis que les vingt précédentes témoignent des enjeux portés par cette région – point de passage des voies terrestres et ferrées entre Vienne et l'Adriatique – en période de paix. Les trente et une versions de la feuille voisine vers l'Ouest–Triest (31° 46') – suivent à peu près la même distribution.

Facture et Code Graphique

Chaque feuille mesure 65 par 47 centimètres environ, elle est composée suivant un modèle unique. La marge supérieure porte le numéro et le titre de la feuille en caractères majuscules, par exemple: «35° 48° PRESSBURG». Le numéro est composé par les coordonnées géographiques de son centre, longitude (depuis le méridien de l'île de Fer) puis latitude; le titre correspond au nom du lieu remarquable le plus important figuré dans le champ de la représentation – le plus souvent une ville. En dessous de ce premier ensemble, on en trouve un second, composé de la même manière et écrit en petits caractères le long de la bordure extérieure du cadre. Il correspond au numéro et au titre de la feuille située immédiatement au Nord. On trouve l'équivalent au milieu de chaque côté de la bordure pour désigner les trois autres feuilles adjacentes, à l'Est, au Sud et à l'Ouest. À partir de 1906, sur environ vingt-cinq feuilles qui couvrent l'Albanie, la Grèce, la Macédoine et l'empire ottoman, on trouve dans la marge supérieure un schéma des principales structures géographiques de la zone représentée (fig. 4).

De manière générale, les marges latérales ne comportent aucune indication supplémentaire. Cependant, certaines feuilles portent en marge de gauche, un nombre écrit verticalement, en petits caractères, le long de la bordure extérieure du cadre. Il est composé de quatre ou cinq chiffres et ressemble parfois à une date. Cependant, de nombreux exemples ne correspondent pas à cette définition; il s'agit peut-être d'un numéro relatif au processus d'impression. La marge inférieure est la plus riche. A proximité des deux angles de la bordure extérieure, on trouve tout d'abord les noms des auteurs. Ils sont partagés entre ceux qui ont dressés et dessinés la feuille (mention *Geripp*, en bas à gauche) et ceux qui ont effectués les travaux de terrain (mention *Terrain*, en bas à droite). Pour chaque feuille, la liste de ses auteurs évolue dans le temps; à la faveur des nouvelles éditions les noms des auteurs des précédentes versions sont parfois supprimés au profit de ceux de la plus récente. Pour sa part, la mention *K.u.k. Militärgeographisches Institut*, portée au centre de la marge inférieure de chaque feuille, indique qu'elle a été publiée par l'institut militaire de l'armée austro-hongroise. Cette mention est la même pour toutes les feuilles publiées entre 1889 et 1918. Sur quelques feuilles de 1919, on trouve la même mention sans sa première partie –K.u.k.– qui désigne la double monarchie. A ce moment-là, la Hongrie est effectivement devenue une république indépendante.

Le champ géographique de chaque feuille mesure en moyenne 55,5 par 39 centimètres. Mais il est très légèrement trapézoïdal pour rendre compte du rapprochement des méridiens vers le Nord. Ainsi, la largeur inférieure de chaque feuille compte 4 à 5 millimètres de plus que sa largeur supérieure. Sur cette base, on compte plusieurs centimètres de différence de largeur entre les feuilles qui couvrent le Sud de la série et celles du Nord.

Alors que les indications marginales sont toujours imprimées en noir, la carte proprement dite est imprimée en quatre couleurs: le bleu pour l'hydrographie, le vert pour les régions boisées et les zones agricoles, le noir pour les autres indications. Le brun est utilisé dans les zones de montagne, pour les hachures qui figurent le modelé du terrain. Ces hachures sont placées dans le sens de la pente ou bien en biais, elles ont toutes de la même amplitude et semblent suivre un éclairage zénithal. Le résultat est assez médiocre, on reconnaît bien les lignes de crête mais il est plus difficile d'identifier les thalwegs. Cette figuration est heureusement complétée par des points cotés et par l'hydrographie qui permet de localiser les vallées. On ne s'en étonnera pas, la figuration du relief par des hachures construites sur la base d'un diapason qui permet effectivement de figurer le modelé du terrain nécessite des relevés détaillés qui n'étaient alors pas disponibles. Les informations topographiques sont complétées par des symboles et des abréviations. La légende de ceux qui sont le plus souvent employés est imprimée directement sur chaque feuille, elle compte alors entre deux et quinze entrées. Par ailleurs ces indications sont aussi détaillées de manière exhaustive sur une feuille particulière désignée *Zeichenerklärung*. Cette feuille était commercialisée au même titre que celles de la carte proprement dite. Elle est partagée en deux parties: la légende des symboles d'une part et une longue liste multilingue d'abréviations d'autre part.


Conclusion

Comme on peut s'en rendre compte à travers les exemples cités, la carte autrichienne d'Europe centrale et des Balkans à l'échelle 1:200 000 constitue une source remarquable à plus d'un titre. Son étendue géographique et la multiplicité des versions de chaque feuille permettent d'en développer des approches très différentes en fonction de l'aire et/ou de la période d'intérêt de chacun. Au-delà des aspects topographiques, cette carte peut aussi être exploitée de manière thématique à partir des signes et symboles qui figurent dans sa légende. On en compte entre 80 et 200 par feuille; sur cette base, ce sont les aspects économiques, les voies de communication, l'aménagement du territoire... qui peuvent être étudiés à partir de cette carte.

Mais cette richesse a sa contrepartie. L'abondance des documents n'en facilite pas la consultation et donc l'exploitation. Les 3757 feuilles repérées correspondent à plus de 800 mètres carrés de figuration cartographique. Quel que soit le mode d'investigation et/ou de traitement envisagé, il est difficilement concevable de traiter une telle masse documentaire avec des moyens manuels. Les questions relatives à la datation des feuilles sont cruciales et il s'avère souvent impossible d'interpréter de manière univoque les multiples mentions de dates qu'elles portent. Une opération concertée de numérisation collective permettrait de faciliter l'accès aux collections, elle offrirait aussi la possibilité d'utiliser des outils informatiques –système d'information géographique en particulier– pour en conduire l'investigation. Mais, actuellement, seulement quelques centaines de feuilles ont été numérisées et sont disponibles en ligne.¹⁹


¹⁹ La principale collection en ligne est celle de l'IGN, publiée sur le site web CartoMundi: <http://cartomundi.fr>. Elle est complétée par la collection du département de cartographie de l'université Eötvös Lorand de Budapest : <http://lazarus.elte.hu/hun/digkonyv/topo/3felmeres.htm> et par le site polonais Mapster : <http://igrek.amzp.pl/mapindex.php?cat=GM200>.

Légendes des figures




1. Une carte qui prépare l'expansion de l'Empire

Au contraire des publications militaires autrichiennes antérieures, cette série couvre un territoire plus vaste hors des frontières qu'à l'intérieur (dessin de l'auteur d'après Mittheilungen, 1887, pl. IV).



2. Retournement stratégique.

Alors que plusieurs feuilles programmées à la limite Ouest de la série ne seront jamais publiées, 27 feuilles sont ajoutées vers le Sud au début des années 1900 (dessin de l'auteur d'après: pour 1887: *Mittheilungen*, 1887, pl. IV; pour 1901: *Mittheilungen*, 1901, pl. III; pour les feuilles effectivement publiées: liste des feuilles cataloguées).



3. Du Nord-Est au Sud-Ouest

Les premières publications sont explicitement orientées vers le Nord-Est (dessin de l'auteur d'après la liste des feuilles cataloguées).



4. Feuille exemplaire

Toutes les feuilles de la série suivent le même principe de composition. Feuille 37°
48° *Budapest, Losoncz*, 1912. Document IGN.

Religious Traditions of Mount Athos on Miraculous Icons of Panagia (The Mother of God)

At the monasteries and hermitages of Mount Athos, many miraculous icons are kept and exhibited, which are honored accordingly by the monks and are offered for worship to the numerous pilgrims of the holy relics of Mount Athos.¹ The pilgrims are informed about the monastic traditions of Mount Athos regarding these icons, their origin, and their miraculous action, during their visit to the monasteries and then they transfer them to the world so that they are disseminated systematically and they can become common knowledge of all believers.² In this way, the traditions regarding the miraculous icons of Mount Athos become wide-spread and are considered an essential part of religious traditions not only of the Greek people but also for other Orthodox people.³

Introduction

Subsequently, we will examine certain aspects of these traditions, based on the literature, notably the recent work on the miraculous icons in the monasteries of Mount Athos, where, except for the archaeological and the historical data of these specific icons, also information on the wonders, their origin and their supernatural action over the centuries is captured.⁴ These are information that inspired the people accordingly and are the basis for the formation of respective traditions and religious customs that define the Greek folk religiosity.

Many of these traditions relate to the way each icon ended up in the monastery where is kept today. According to the archetypal core of these traditions, the icon was thrown into the sea at the time of iconoclasm from a region of Asia Minor or the Near East, in order to be saved from destruction, and miraculously arrived at the monastery. The fathers were notified by a vision or fiery column that identified the location where the icon existed, and they received it. The icon was placed in a

* Professor, Democritus University of Thrace

* Assistant Professor, C.D.A. College of Cyprus

¹ R. Cormack, "Miraculous Icons in Byzantium and their powers," *Arte Christiana* 76 (1988), 55-60; Nancy Patterson-Ševčenko, "Icons in the Liturgy," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 45 (1991), 45-57.

² Cf. *Ανωτέρα Επισκιάσις επί του Άθω, ήτοι διηγήσεις περί των θαυματουργών εικόνων της Θεοτόκου*, Agion Horos 2000 and Archim. Nektarios Ziompolas, *Σαράντα εικόνες της Παναγίας*, Athens 2004.

³ For these see Gerasimos Smyrnakis, *Το Άγιον Όρος*, Athens 1903 (reprint: Karies Agiou Horous 1988).

⁴ G. Mantzaridis–Euth. Tsigaridas, *Οι θαυματουργές εικόνες στο Περιβόλι της Παναγίας*, Athens 2013 [: THEPP].

location that the divine providence did not like, and by its miraculous movement, that usually repeated three times, it pointed out the location where it wanted to stay, which eventually became respected by the fathers.⁵

Icons of the Mother of God in Mount Athos' Monasteries

This basic narrative core is often enriched with narrative details, with an aim to make it more believable since it refers to the era of iconoclasm, during which monasteries and organized monasticism did not exist on Mount Athos.⁶ Thus, Panagia Eggiitria (Mother of God Surety of Sinners) of the monastery of Megisti Lavra⁷ is associated with the repentance of Saint Mary of Egypt (*THEPP*53), while monk Gabriel⁸ who finally pulled from the sea Panagia Portaitisa (the Iveron Mother of God) of the Iveron monastery walked on the waves⁹ (*THEPP*, 109), a story that has as source the evangelical description for Christ who walked on the stormy lake of Gennesaret (Matthew 14, 26).

In the latter case, the animal stood opposite the monastery, where today there is an icon case, where the litany of the icon ends, in commemoration of the miracle.¹⁰ Of course, the motif of a godsend animal that discovers holy water or a miraculous icon is common in similar traditions of Greek and other Balkan people.¹¹ In the case of Panagia Glykophilousa (the Sweet-kissing Mother of God) of the Philotheou monastery, the tradition connects it with the pious wife of an iconoclast patrician of the emperor Theophilos (829-842) (*THEPP*, 229). Also, miraculous movements from monastery to monastery are more rarely mentioned, as exemplified by the image of Panagia Odigitria (Our Lady of Guides) of the Xenophontos monastery (*THEPP*, 281) which was miraculously moved from the monastery of Vatopedi.¹²

⁵ L. Kretzenbacher, „Kreuzerhebung und Nachtliturgie auf dem Heiligen Berge,“ in his book *Ethnologia Europaea. Studienwanderungen und Erlebnisse auf volkskundlicher Feldforschung im Alleingang*, München 1986, nr. 6.

⁶ Cf. Kr. Chrissochoidis, “The Portaitissa Icon at Iveron Monastery and the Cult of the Virgin in Mount Athos,” in M. Vasilaki (ed.), *Images of the Mother of God. Perceptions of the Theotokos in Byzantium*, Norfolk 2005, 133-141.

⁷ Nikodimos Lavriotis, *Μεγίστη Λαύρα του Αγίου Αθανασίου Αγίου Όρους. Εικονογραφημένος οδηγός-Προσκυνητάρion*, Agion Horos 1988, 27-28, 39, 41-42.

⁸ Maximos Iviritis, *Ο όσιος Γαβριήλ ο Ίβηρ, ο διαγγελεὺς της Παναγίας Πορταΐτισης*, Thessaloniki 1990.

⁹ Cf. Th. Pazaras, «Ιστορία της θαυματουργικής έλευσης της εικόνας της Παναγίας Πορταΐτισσας στη μονή Ιβήρων», *Δελτίον Χριστιανικής Αρχαιολογικής Εταιρείας* 20 (1998-1999), 385-398.

¹⁰ I. Bozilov, “Macenie za zografskite monasi, Legendi i fakti,” in *Svetogorska Obitel Zograf* 2, Sofia 1996, 175-189.

¹¹ Cf. D. S. Loukatos, „Le motif de la chevre decouvrant des lieux sacres en Grece,“ in *Festschrift Matthias Zender*, Bonn 1972, 465-469. Also, M. C. Varvounis, «Ζώα που μίλησαν με το Θεό. Ελληνικές λαϊκές θρησκευτικές παραδόσεις», in Anna Lydaki – G. N. Baskozos (ed.), *Περί Ζώων. Με λογική και συναίσθημα*, Athens 2011, 268-275, with bibliography and examples.

¹² I. Tognazzi-Zervou, “L’ iconografia e la ‘Vita’ delle miracolose icone della Theotokos Brefokra-tooussa: Blachernitissa e Odigitria,” *Bolletino della Badia Greca di Crottaferrata* n.s. 40: 2 (1986), 219-287.

These traditions, on the one hand, aim to support Mount Athos narratives regarding the Byzantine origin of most of the monasteries that are not consistent the historical data, on the other hand, they are explanatory narratives related to the existence of holy water, at the borders of every monastery, of liturgy details that regulated by the typical of every monastery and of particularities regarding the location that each miraculous icon is placed and exposed to pilgrimage.¹³

It should also be noted that the miraculous movements of the icons, which according to the traditions indicate the location where the depicted sacred person the icon to be placed, are part of a whole category of similar hagiographical and pious Greek traditions, regarding building of temples and cities, whose origins lie the Byzantine times.¹⁴ In any case, in these traditions, the traditions concerning the owners of every monastery intertwine with possible historical information about origin of their well-known icons, which nevertheless are lost in the haze of each ological pious myth, shaping –and to a certain extent, explaining– the respective shipping and liturgical tradition of each monastery.

Following this tradition, associated with the basic idea of the popular belief that the depicted sacred person dwells inside the icon and performs miracles through it,¹⁵ are also the Mount Athos traditions hitherto mentioned in the monasteries of Mount Athos, in relation with the well-known and miraculous icons that each monastery possesses.

Folk Narrative Motives

The same basic principle of popular religiosity regarding the special power of icons as an expression of the actions of the sacred person that dwells inside them, which we find in many relevant Greek folklores,¹⁶ also express the Athonite traditions according to which the sacred person communicates with people through its icon. This communication has two sides, as it is compassionate and comforting for the pious and punishing for the wicked, in any case, it confirms the miraculous power of this icon.

A subcategory of these traditions is the one in which the wicked, layman or monk, who dared not to show obedience or reverence to the depicted holy person, or turned against it in various ways, expressing disrespect with his gestures and actions against the icon, is punished. In fact the wicked are often possessed or outraged monks, so their punishment is harder, in order to serve as an exemplification to the others, while they often become aware of their sin and ask for forgiveness by

¹³ Holy Monastery of Xeropotamou, *Θαυματουργές εικόνες της Παναγίας στον Αθω*, Agion Horos 1985.

¹⁴ M. G. Varvounis, "Notes on a Byzantine folk tradition," *Βυζαντικά* 16 (1996), 353-358.

¹⁵ St. D. Imellos, «Εικόνες αγίων δεσμευόμεναι», *Επετηρίς Κέντρου Ερεύνης Ελληνικής Λαογραφίας* 24 (1975-76), 60-64.

¹⁶ M. G. Varvounis, «Η λειτουργία του λαογραφικού στοιχείου στο έργο του Μ. Καραγάτση: η περίπτωση του μυθιστορήματος *Σέργιος και Βάκχος*», *Αρχείο Θεσσαλικών Μελετών* 11 (1995), 191-196, with similar examples.

hard practice, which they eventually take: the hungry, due to his tasks, deacon that stabbed with a knife Panagia Esfagmeni (the stabbed Icon of mother of God) of the Vatopedi monastery¹⁷ was blinded, and possessed, and stayed for three years in a stall across the icon before being forgiven, but his hand remained unable to move even after his death (*THEPP*81). Panagia Papadiki (The mother of God named Papadiki) of the Hilandar monastery threw into the water and drowned a heretic priest that pretended to be an orthodox during a litany (*THEPP*, 123).

Probably a pattern for all these punitive traditions is the most widely known story about Panagia Gorgoepikoos (Virgin Mary Gorgoepikoos) of the Docheiariou ou monastery (*THEPP*, 219),¹⁸ according to which in 1664 the refectory monk Nile was punished by blindness because he used to leave before the icon a lit taper and blackened her face, and did not obey when Panagia commanded him not to repeat it. His sight was restored, after sitting on a stall across the mural of Panagia for a certain period of time, begging for her forgiveness.¹⁹ It is quite typical that in these traditions the wounds the blasphemer brings upon the icon gush blood, or that the voice of the depicted holy person is heard, as a certification that it dwells within the miraculous icon.²⁰ In any event, these traditions had also a correctional function for any disobedient and undisciplined monk, as the promised supernatural punishment could contribute to their reformation to the monastic norms of gentleness and obedience.

Often the wicked and punished are not monks, but people of a different religion. In this case, the historical adventures of the monasteries of Mount Athos are recounted, especially during the times of the Greek revolution of 1821, given that the protagonists are almost always Ottomans and Muslim soldiers. Panagia Pyrovolithisa (Virgin Mary Pyrovolithisa) of the Vatopedi Monastery was shot in the right arm by a Turkish soldier, who went insane and hanged himself (*THEPP*, 93).²¹ Panagia Portaitissa (The Iveron mother of God)²² of the Iveron monastery gushed blood because of a pirate's hit, who then became a monk, taking the name of Damascus and repenting for his act for life (*THEPP*, 109). Panagia Esfagmeni of the monastery of Zografos was engraved on the neck by a Turkish officer's sword, which eventually went insane and had a horrible death (*THEPP*, 215).²³ Panagia Pyrovolithisa of the Xenofontos monastery was

¹⁷ E. Tsigaridas, «Η Παναγία Εσφαγμένη της μονής Βατοπαιδίου», in Γηθόσυνον Σέβασμα. Αντίδωρον τιμής και μνήμης εις τον μακαριστόν καθηγητήν της Λειτουργικής Ιωάννην Μ. Φουντούλην († 2007) 2, Thessaloniki 2013, 1957-1984.

¹⁸ Για τα σχετικά συναξαριακά και υμνογραφικά κείμενα βλ. Holy Monastery of Dochiariou, Παναγία Γοργοῦπηκος 1-2, Agion Horos 1999.

¹⁹ Βλ. σχετικά και Hierom. Philotheos Dochiaritis, «Η θαυματουργή εικόνα της Παναγίας Γοργοῦπηκούς», in St. Papadopoulos (ed.), Παρουσία ιεράς μονής Δοχειαρίου, Agion Horos 2001, 199 κ.εξ., with bibliography.

²⁰ Cf. L. Mavrodinova, “L’ icone miraculeuse de Docheiariou et l’ iconographie de la Vierge Gorgoepikoos dans la peinture medievale,” in Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου «Άγιον Όρος. Φύση-Λατρεία-Τέχνη» 2, Thessaloniki 2001, 75-79.

²¹ E. N. Tsigaridas-P. Papadimitriou, «Θαυματουργικές εικόνες της μονής Βατοπαιδίου και τα αντίγραφα τους», Μακεδονικά 36 (2007), 1-31.

²² L. Evseeva-M. Shvedova, “Afonskiie spiski Bogomateri Portaitissi I problema podobii v ikonopisi,” in Cudotvornaia ikona v Vizantii I Drevnei Rusi, Moskva 1996, 346-353.

²³ D. Zografski, Sveta Gora Zograf v minaloto I dnes, Sofia 1943, 28.

shot with a firearm by a Turkish soldier, who was killed by his own bullets, which were rebounded (*THEPP*, 305). In any case, the traditions give to the wicked room for painful repentance, while people of a different religion are immediately ished by death, a fact that is indicative that those traditions are teaching and moralizing or exemplary.²⁴

Another subcategory of these traditions refers to the communication of the depicted holy person with the people, monks and laymen, but which is not meant as a punishment for some sin or impiety, but as a correction, a teaching and a spiritual training. In these traditions, the motif of Panagia who through her voice that is through one of her icons is prohibiting the entrance of an Empress to a monastery, who attempted, sometimes by pious motives, to violate the avaton for women of monastic state of Athos, is usual. According to tradition Panagia Antiphonetria Virgin who-answers), of Vatopedi monastery, thus refused entrance to the to Gala Plakidia, daughter of Great Theodosius and wife of the Roman Emperor stantine III, which in order to atone built the chapel of St. Demetrius of the (*THEPP*, 89).²⁵

This story is without historical basis, designed to support the monastic point of view on the monastery's origins in early Byzantine years, which is however not established from the sources. The same is also referred many centuries later for Mara Brankovic, daughter of Serbian Prince George Brankovic and mother of Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror, who Panagia miraculously stopped halfway to the monastery of St. Paul, to where she was traveling carrying the gifts of Magi that she had rescued, to offer them to the monastery. In fact, on the location where the voice of Panagia sounded, an icon case is *built* (*THEPP*, 257). However, in this case, the correlation of Mara to the tradition of the relic in the Athos monastery seems to have a historical basis.²⁶ These traditions are intended to support by these miracles the respect for the avaton of Mount Athos, which for centuries suffered many attacks and several attempts of violation or ablation.²⁷

In fact, sometimes Panagia while addressing to the faithful and in order to support the monks is gushing myrrh [(Panagia Myrovlytissa (Virgin Mary the Myrrh-gusher) of the St. Paul monastery (*THEPP*, 247)]²⁸ and displays tears in her eyes [Panagia Dakryrooussa (Virgin Mary in Tears), of the cloister of Prophet Elijah (*THEPP*, 185)]²⁹ or answers to a monk complaining for the poverty of the monastery, who addressed to her specific icon, prompting him to care for the salvation of

²⁴ Cf. St. D. Imellos, *Η περί πειρατών λαϊκή παράδοση*, Athens 1968, 83-84, and P. Peeters, "Miraculum sanctorum Cyri et Johannis in urbe Monembasia," *Analecta Bollandiana* 25 (1906), 236-237.

²⁵ E. N. Tsigaridas-K. Loverdoy-Tsigarida, *Ιερά Μεγίστη Μονή Βατοπαιδίου. Βυζαντινές εικόνες και επενδύσεις*, Agion Horos 2006. Cf. E. Sandler, *Les icons byzantines de la Mere du Dieu*, Paris 1992, 123 κ. εξ.

²⁶ Mon. Moysis Hagioritis, *Προσκυνητάριον της ιεράς μονής Αγίου Παύλου*, Agion Horos 1997.

²⁷ I. M. Hatzifotis, *Η καθημερινή ζωή στο Άγιον Όρος*, Athens 1995, 239.

²⁸ St. Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ιερά Μονή Αγίου Παύλου. Εικόνες*, Agion Horos 1998, with bibliography.

²⁹ Archim. Ioakim Karachristos, *Ιερά Κοινοβιακή Σκήτη Προφήτου Ηλίου*, Agion Horos 1999, 34.

his soul and not to bother her again with similar requests [Panagia Glikofilousa of Philotheou monastery (*THEPP*229)], or prompts a monk who asks the icon of the way way of his salvation to leave the monastery and become a hermit³⁰ [Panagia Epakouousa (Virgin Mary Epakouousa) of Zografou monastery (*THEPP*, 197)]³¹ or moves miraculously a fisherman who fell asleep in front of her icon case, furthermore coated with his covers, in order to help him escape from a huge landslide [Panagia Arsaniotissa or Arsenarissa of Esfigmenou Monastery *THEPP*, 309)].

These traditions are Athonite variants of known traditions about icons that speak to speak to the faithful or display tears or gush myrrh as evidence for their miraculous properties and their particular worshipping value, since this way it is certified to the faithful that the depicted sacred person dwells within the icon and acts through it.³² This way some aspects of the monastic point of view on certain things are supported, such as the perception of the superiority of the ascetic versus the cenobitic monastic life, which is not based on the patristic tradition. The attribution to the supernatural through the traditions always gives special prestige and contributes to the spread of the worshipping honor of this miraculous icon, with all the consequences this has for the spiritual and the overall life of the monastery and the fraternity.

Traditions about miraculous Rescues

Another category of traditions refers to miraculous rescues of monasteries and brotherhoods, especially from the fires, which were frequent and destructive in Mount Athos. These traditions likely reflect historical events related to fires, which until today are a key risk for the Athonite monasteries and the holy relics. The first subcategory regards miraculous rescues of monasteries from fires through the litany of a specific miraculous icon,³³ to which the supernatural salvation is attributed. Usually traditions attribute the extinguishing of the fire to a heavy rain caused by Panagia, who extinguished the threatening to the monastery fire [2012: Copy of Panagia Triherousa (the Virgin with Three Hands) of the Hilandar monastery (*THEPP*, 143)], even though it had already affected buildings of the monastery [1948: Panagia Pyrosoteira (Mother of God rescuer from Fire) (copy of the icon of Panagia Gerontissa (Mother of God named Gerontissa)) of the Pantocrator monastery (*THEPP*, 173)]. In both cases, these are copies of the well-known miraculous icons of the monasteries in danger,

³⁰ I. Gergova – A. Kujumdjiev, “Novootkriti sceni ot zitiето na sv. Kozma Zografski v glavната carkva na manastira Zograf,” *Problemi na Izkustvoto* 3 (2002), 53-59.

³¹ E. N. Tsigaridas - Al. Trifonova, «Οι θαυματουργές εικόνες της μονής Ζωγράφου», *Μακεδονικά* 35 (2005-2006), 119-131.

³² See St. D. Imellos, *Η περί πειρατών λαϊκή παράδοση ... op. cit.*, 81-82.

³³ See M. G. Varvounis, «Αστικές εκκλησιαστικές λιτανείες», in Kyrillos katerelos – Ap. Glavinias – Gr. Larentzakis (ed.), *Σκευός εις Τιμήν. Αφιερωματικός τόμος επί τη συμπληρώσει 25ετίας από της εις Ἐπίσκοπον χειροτονίας καὶ 20ετίας ἀπὸ της ἐνθρονίσεως τοῦ Μητροπολίτου Αὐστρίας καὶ Ἐξάρχου Οὐγγαρίας καὶ Μεσευρώπης κ. Μιχαήλ*. Festschrift zum 25-jährigen Jubiläum der Bischofweihe und 20-jährigen Jubiläum der Inthronisation zum Metropoliten von Austria und Exarchen von Ungarn und Mitteleuropa Dr. Michael Staikos, Athens 2011, 67-75, with bibliography.

which got miraculous power from their original,³⁴ in accordance with the relevant Athonite stories and traditions.

In the second case, the same icons are thrown into the fire by heretics [Panagia Proangelomeni (Virgin Mary the Notifier) of the Zografou monastery (*THEPP*, 193)],³⁵ iconoclasts [Panagia Kathreptis (Virgin Mary Mirror) of the St. Paul monastery (*THEPP*, 253) - St. Stephen of the Konstamonitou monastery (*THEPP*, 325)] and disrespectful people of different religions [1800: Panagia ek pyros diasothisa (Virgin Mary rescued from Fire) of Nea Skiti (*THEPP*, 273)]³⁶ to be destroyed, but their miraculous power preserves them intact, and proves to the present, but also to each person listening to the narration of the tradition, that these are miraculous icons. Other times the icons are preserved despite the fact that the wing of the monastery [1722: Panagia Vivliothikarissa (The Mother of God the librarian) of the Hilandar monastery (*THEPP*, 139)]³⁷ or the temple where it was kept and exhibited was completely destroyed by fire [1535: Timios Prodromos o paleos (John the Baptist) of the Dionysiou monastery (*THEPP*, 153)], and retrieved intact from the ashes [Apostoloi Petros kai Pavlos (Apostles Peter and Paul) of the Karakallou monastery (*THEPP*, 225)]³⁸ without even a minimum alteration of the icon's colors [1761: Panagia Palaialogina or Pantanassa)Mother of God named Palaialogina or Pantanassa) of the Gregory monastery (*THEPP*, 305)].³⁹

These traditions correspond to the historical reality of the large fires that through the centuries have affected the monasteries of Mount Athos, and this is why some of them have been linked to specific and precisely dated historical events [Agios Panteleimon (Saint Pantaleon) of the St. Panteleimon monastery, who according to references saved the monastery from fire twice (*THEPP*, 313)]. In general, the narrative for the incorruptibility from fire, as opposed to natural laws, has as paragon the biblical narrative of the Tris pedes en kamino (Three Holy Children in the Fiery Furnace) (*Daniel* c), which by divine action remained unscathed by the fire of the furnace where they were thrown, and as a pattern is seen in other Greek traditions, designed to indicate and certify the relevant divine will, through the manifestation of a miraculous ability⁴⁰ to resist fire.

³⁴ Ar. Lidov, «Θαυματουργές εικόνες της Παναγίας», in M. Vasilaki (ed.), Μήτηρ Θεού. Απεικονίσεις της Παναγίας στη βυζαντινή τέχνη, Athens 2000, 47-57.

³⁵ A. Bozkov – A. Vasiliev, Hudozestvenoto nasledstvo na manastira Zograf, Sofia 1981, 36-37.

³⁶ P. Uspenskij, Putesestvije v afonskije monastyri I skity 2, Moskva 1880, 34.

³⁷ Th. Teneketzis, Ιστορία της ιεράς μονής Χιλανδαρίου, Agion Horos 1966, 67.

³⁸ I. M. Hatzifotis, Μονές του Αγίου Όρους 4. Η Παναγία και το Άγιον Όρος – Σταυρονικήτα – Ιβήρων – Καρακάλλου – Φιλοθέου – Μεγίστης Λαύρας, Athens 2009, 73. Cf. E. N. Tsigaridas, «Εικόνες του ασπασμού των αποστόλων Πέτρου και Παύλου, έργο του Κωνσταντίνου Παλαιολόγου στη μονή Καρακάλλου», in Θωράκιον. Αφιέρωμα στη μνήμη του Παύλου Λαζαρίδη, Athens 2004, 309-312. Idem, «Εικόνες από το δεύτερο μισό του 14ου αιώνα έως το τελευταίο τέταρτο του 16ου αιώνα», in Εικόνες Ιεράς Μονής Καρακάλλου, Agion Horos 2011, 57-134.

³⁹ I. M. Hatzifotis, Μονές του Αγίου Όρους 3. Ιερές Σκήτες και Ησυχαστήρια – Ξηροποτάμου – Σίμωνος Πέτρας – Γρηγορίου – Διονυσίου – Αγίου Παύλου, Athens 2009, 63.

⁴⁰ Cf. M. G. Varvounis, Θεμελιώδεις έννοιες και μορφές της ελληνικής θρησκευτικής λαογραφίας, Athens 2013, w. «ακαΐα».

Traditions about miraculous Cures and supernatural Events

Finally, some traditions refer to miraculous actions associated with specific icons, as well as to tradition or miraculous cures and supernatural events associated with certain icons, and form the basis for the special religious honor attributed to them. Each of them is special; some indeed are unique and cannot be grouped, so they are examined separately below.

The tradition for one of the most respected palladiums of Mount Athos, the icon of Panagia tou Axion Esti (Mother of God of Axion Esti) that is kept in Karyes Protaton, is well known.⁴¹ Following the iconographic type of Panagia tou Kykkou⁴² (Mother of God of Kykkos), according to the tradition it owes its name to the fact that an angel in the form of a monk sang for the first time in front of it, in the pantokratorino cell of Koimiseos tis Theotokou (Assumption of Mother of God) in Karyes,⁴³ where it was placed, the liturgy hymn “*Axion Esti os alithos ...*” delivering it this way to humans (THEPP, 33).⁴⁴ In the present case, the supernatural appearance of the angel is combined with the Byzantine tradition of the divine origin of a liturgy hymn, taught in a miraculous way to humans, continuing an old narrative material, and adapting it to new standards.⁴⁵

Some traditions aim at the justification of paradoxical iconographic types. So, for example, the existence of a third hand in the icon of Panagia Triherousa, of the Hilandar monastery became the basis for the tradition that this hand was added by St. John of Damascus, to whom the icon originally belonged, when the Muslim caliph of the region he lived in cut his hand as a punishment, and the Mother of God miraculously weld it back (THEPP, 117). Miracle cures and welding of excised members by icons are mentioned in Greek hagiological and religious traditions, and this tradition seems to draw from this older narrative material.⁴⁶

The traditions regarding the image of Panagia tou Akathistou Imnou (The Mother of God of the Akathist Hymn) of Dionysiou Monastery (THEPP, 147) follow the known pattern, from the hagiological traditions of the Greek people who in fact rely

⁴¹ Ioustinos Simonopetritis, «Ἀξιον Εστί», η θαυματουργή εικόνα του Πρωτάτου, Agion Horos 1985. Also, I. M. Hatzifotis, Ἀξιον Εστί, Katerini 1988.

⁴² E. N. Tsigaridas, «Η εικόνα Ἀξιον Εστί του Πρωτάτου και η Παναγία η Κυκκώτισσα», in Πρακτικά Συνεδρίου «Η Ιερά Μονή Κύκκου στη βυζαντινή και μεταβυζαντινή αρχαιολογία και τέχνη», Nicosia 2001, 181-190. Also see K. Spyridakis, «Η Παναγία εις την Κύπρον», Κυπριακά Σπουδαί 8 (1944), 135-137 and X. Pharmakidis, «Αι προσωνυμίες των εικόνων της Παναγίας εν Κύπρω», in Κύπρια λαογραφικά σπουδάσματα, Nicosia 1941, 20-25.

⁴³ B. Miljkovic, “Ikone Bogorodice Galaktotrofuse iz Isnosnice Svetog Save osvetjenog u Kareyi,” in Na Tragovima Vojislava J. Djurica, Beograd 2011, 167-184.

⁴⁴ P. Oikonomaki-Papadopolou, «Το Ἀξιον Εστί. Η αργυρή επένδυση της εικόνας», in Το Ἀξιον Εστί. Ιστορία – λατρεία, Agion Horos 1999, 25-30.

⁴⁵ M. G. Varvounis, Ὁψεις της καθημερινής ζωής των Βυζαντινών από αγιολογικά κείμενα, Athens 1995, 125 seq.

⁴⁶ L. Kretzenbacher, „Legende und Athos-Ikone. Zu Gegenwartsüberlieferung, Geschichte und Kult um die Marienikone der ‘Dreihändigen’ im Serbenkloster Hilandar,“ Südost-Forschungen 21 (1962), 22-44 (= Idem, Geheiligtetes Recht. Aufsätze zu einer vergleichenden rechtlichen Volkskunde in Mittel- und Südosteuropa, Wien-Köln-Graz 1988, nr.11).

on paragons from synaxaria, of the removal of a miraculous icon or ⁴⁷ relic from a monastery and its return with the threatening for the *sacrilegious* interference of saint. According to them, in 1592 pirates who raided against the monastery stole it, but Panagia appeared to their leader, who was forced to return it. But also in 1767 picture was stolen and found in Skopelos, where the Christians recognized it and not want to return it to the monastery, resulting in an outbreak of plague at the as a punishment, so that they were forced to return it to the monastery for their ment and salvation. In this case, the narratives of the infectious epidemic as a punishment of supernatural origins against the residents of a place who violated the will,⁴⁸ but also in order to break the curse upon the fulfillment of the divine will, are inherent, already found in the ancient Greek tradition.⁴⁹ In the case at point, these traditions give prominence to the spiritual stature of each monastery, but also to the spiritual relationship of the laity with these monasteries and the obedience of the laity in the callings of monks from fear of punishment, a concept vital to the survival of the monastery and the fraternity, particularly in the superstitious years of the Ottoman empire era. Managing of the divine will was always a means of serving the monasteries and clergy interests against the horrified, by the likelihood of divine wrath manifestations, laity cohabitants of the monasteries.

The tradition concerning some icons of Theotokos, especially from cloisters and monasteries of Russian, Serbian and Romanian influence, which the respective rulers or even the Russian czar in wartime requested to be transferred to the front and protect their troops, is frequent and repeated.⁵⁰ According to tradition, after the victorious outcome of the war they wanted to keep the icons, but after a miraculous intervention or appearance of Theotokos (Mother of God) they were forced to return them to Mount Athos, accompanied by rich offerings and large donations to the dominant monastery. Of course, this meant the wide dissemination of each icon's worship to the respective people, mainly through the miraculous traditions, that were widely disseminated.⁵¹

From the study of the preceded material, by the identification of the patterns contained in the traditions of Mount Athos regarding the miraculous icons of the sacred foundations of Athos, the miraculous effect of those icons is not in dis-

⁴⁷ St. D. Imellos, Η περί πειρατών λαϊκή παράδοση ... op. cit., 90-93, about the icon of Panagia Glykophilousa in the Holy Monastery of Philotheou.

⁴⁸ Cf. G. A. Megas, «Παραδόσεις περί ασθενείων», Λαογραφία 7 (1923). Μνημόσυνον Ν. Γ. Πολίτου, 465-520.

⁴⁹ See M. G. Varvounis, «Λαογραφικές παρατηρήσεις στον μύθο του Οιδίποδα», Επετηρίς Εταιρείας Βοιωτικών Μελετών 3: 2 (2000). Πρακτικά Γ' Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου Βοιωτικών Μελετών, 746-760.

⁵⁰ E. Tsigaridas, "L' icone de la Vierge AXION ESTI du Protaton et ses copies," Zbornik Radova Vizantoloskog Instituta 44 (2007), 341-352. Cf. Io. Tavlakis, «Η Παναγία Το Άξιον Εστί», in Το Άξιον Εστί. Ιστορία – λατρεία, Agion Horos 1999, 7-17.

⁵¹ A. A. Turilov, "Tales of the miracle-working icon of the Chilandar monastery in a 16th century Russian recording," in Cudotvornaia ikona v Vizantii I Drevnei Rusi, Moskva 1996, 510-553.

pute.⁵² Certainly, the study did not delve into matters of faith, but on the other hand, the presence of Panagia and the saints is always alive on Mount Athos,⁵³ and is manifested in many different ways. What emerges as a conclusion, is that often the old narrative material is used again with new combinations every time, and recycled, as in the case of the texts of synaxaria, as already observed.⁵⁴

Conclusions

It should also be noted here that in recent years the increase in the number of pilgrims to the Athonite monasteries, but also the construction of copies of the miraculous icons of every monastery, from the precious copies to the wood or paper versions distributed as a blessing,⁵⁵ combined with the extensive circulation of icon cases and printed material of every monastery, resulted in the wider dissemination of these traditions. It is material that is disseminated online through the church and monastic Orthodox Christian websites, contributing to the better connection of the broader concerned public with the Athonite religious traditions examined above. Moreover, as is well known, copies of the main miraculous icons of the Mount Athos circulated in the Orthodox world since the Byzantine and post-Byzantine period,⁵⁶ and they continued to be sent from Mount Athos to the world also in more modern times, even to the present day,⁵⁷ disseminating their worship and spreading the reputation of the dominant monastery, performing miracles and attracting pilgrims therein. Besides, this is why both images and their basic Athonite traditions are so well known to the orthodox peoples.

The traditions regarding these miraculous icons were the basis for building a special Athonite worship primarily of Panagia and secondly of the honored in the monasteries saints. They were disseminated by the companion monks in each sending of the miraculous icons copies to the Orthodox countries in the East,⁵⁸ particularly to the Orthodox people of the Balkans.⁵⁹ Through this process they became common knowledge of the people, and they influenced their folk religious faith and tradition, acquiring inter-Orthodox dissemination and prestige, creating a mythical "historic"

⁵² See. P. Huber, *Athos. Leben–Glaube–Kunst*, Zürich 1969. Cf. P. Huber, *Icones du Mont Athos*, Lausanne 1965.

⁵³ Archim. Th. Marinakis, *Θαυματουργές εικόνες της Παναγίας στο Άγιον Όρος*, Thessaloniki 2001.

⁵⁴ M. G. Varvounis, «Βίοι Αγιορειτών (19^{ος}-20^{ός} αι.) ως πηγές για την μελέτη της αγιορείτικης λαογραφίας», in G. Vozikas (ed.), *Πρακτικά Διεθνούς Επιστημονικού Συνεδρίου «Λαϊκός πολιτισμός και έντεχνος λόγος (ποίηση-πεζογραφία-θέατρο) 1*, Athens 2013, 117-128.

⁵⁵ Cf. M. G. Varvounis, «Χάρτινες μικρές εικόνες ευλογίας», *Εκκλησία* 85: 9 (2008), 717-721.

⁵⁶ See M. Masnic, "The Icon of the Holy Virgin Vatopedini with a portrait of Voevoda Ioan Radul," *Zbornik Radova Vizantoloskog Instituta* 40 (2003), 313-320.

⁵⁷ Cf. Archim. Dimitrios Stratis, *Η Πορταϊτίσσα στο Αιγαίο*, Athens 2002, with similar narrations.

⁵⁸ See Z. Schiztladre, "The Portaitissa Icon at Iviron and the Jakely Family of Samtskhe," *Bulletin of British Byzantine Studies* 21 (1995), 40-41.

⁵⁹ E. Bakalova, "Zwei Ikonen der Muttergottes Portaitissa (von Iviron) in Bulgarien," *Δελτίον Χριστιανικής Αρχαιολογικής Εταιρείας* 17 (1993-1994), 347-358. Idem, "La veneration des icons miraculeuses en Bulgarie. Aspects historiques et contemporains d' un pelerinage," *Ethnologie Française* 31 (2001-2002), 261-274.

consciousness in the people's traditions⁶⁰ and securing even more the dominant position of Mount Athos, and particularly its major monasteries that had the best-known and most miraculous icons (eg monasteries of Vatopedi, Megisti Lavra, Iveron, Docheiariou, Hilandar, Pantocrator) to the Orthodox peoples throughout the world. This process continues unabated until today,⁶¹ again mainly driven by these miraculous traditions, which continue to be narrated and disseminated.

⁶⁰ K. Chrisochoidis, «Παραδόσεις και πραγματικότητες στο Άγιον Όρος στα τέλη του ΙΕ΄ και στις αρχές του ΙΣΤ΄ αιώνα», *Αθωνικά Σύμμεικτα* 4 (1997), 99-147.

⁶¹ Cf. Th. Tsoulas, *Τα ιερά προσκυνήματα της Παναγίας ανά την Ορθοδοξία* 2, Katerini 1996, with examples.

