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**Forest Conservation Initiatives and Practices
among Transylvanian Saxons in the 18th Century**

The article focuses on the endeavors of Transylvanian Saxons to conserve forests in the 18th century. It will, thus, reveal whether this ethnic community promoted similar principles and ideas as in Western Europe on forest sustainability, as well as how the Austrian administration influenced them from 1699, when the province came under Hapsburg rule, to 1868, one year after the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867. However, the article will also discuss the ideas pertaining to forest conservation that circulated in the period leading up to the establishment of Hapsburg rule.

Throughout the 18th century, provincial and local authorities in Transylvania were intensely preoccupied with conserving forests through legal measures and practical endeavors. Mention should be made here of the legal requirement to reforest deforested areas, the introduction of stereotyped forest management, the banning of goats from young forests, the introduction of wood (timber) saving methods and techniques in the industry and among the population, the replacement of timber with fire-resistant building materials, measures to prevent and extinguish fires, and the introduction of fast-growing plants. All this points to the interests of the population and the authorities to save wood (timber) long before the 19th century.¹ The idea of forest conservation emerged in Transylvania in 1699.

State of the art

As of yet, no scholarly work on the Transylvanian Saxons' forest conservation initiatives and practices has been published. However, there is a considerable number of historical works on Saxon town and city forests –some of them published after 1945, others still in manuscript–written by forestry engineers. These works mainly focus on various aspects of the relationship between the urban communities and their respective forests.

1. Dorin-Ioan Rus, *Wald- und Ressourcenpolitik in Siebenbürgen des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, Paris, Brussels, London: Peter Lang, 2017), 129-131.

Mention should be made of Eduard Zaminer's study on the city of Braşov, *Geschichte des Waldwesens der königlichen freien Stadt Kronstadt* (Braşov, 1891), which can be viewed as a textbook on forestry in Transylvania as well. In 1929, the fifth volume of the *Economic History* of the Bârsa Region, edited by the historian Erich Jekelius, was published in Braşov. It includes, among others, historical studies on forestry in this Saxon region: the historian Otto Witting wrote "The History of Forestry" (*Die Geschichte der Forstwirtschaft*),² "The History of Hunting" (*Die Geschichte der Jagd*),³ and "The History of Fishing" (*Die Geschichte der Fischerei*);⁴ Heinrich Wachner wrote "The Secondary Uses of Forests" (*Die Nebennutzungen des Waldes*),⁵ Erich Jeckelius presented the "Collecting Economy among the Gypsies" (*Die Sammelwirtschaft der Zigeuner*)⁶ and Hans Kaufmes wrote "the History of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry" (*Die Geschichte der Landwirtschaft und Viehzucht*).⁷ As for Sibiu, one should point out Josef Binder's book *Geschichte des Waldwesens der Stadt Hermannstadt (Nagyszeben)*⁸ that mainly deals with contemporary issues pertaining to forests in the area. It is rather a collection of experiences from the author's professional career that spanned more than five decades (1852-1908). As regards Sighişoara, the most relevant contribution was brought by the forestry engineer Konrad Siegmund who collected all the information on the forests surrounding this town in a manuscript⁹ kept at the Transylvanian Archive in Gundelsheim. In addition, mention should be made of other works focusing on the attitudes of the citizens of Sighişoara

2. Otto Witting, "Die Geschichte der Forstwirtschaft," *Das Burzenland* 5, No. 1 (1929): 3-38.

3. Otto Witting, "Die Geschichte der Jagd," *Das Burzenland* 5, No. 1 (1929): 41-95.

4. Otto Witting, "Die Geschichte der Fischerei," *Das Burzenland* 5, No. 1 (1929): 107-25.

5. Heinrich Wachner, "Die Sammelwirtschaft," *Das Burzenland* 5, No. 1 (1929): 99-102.

6. Erich Jeckelius, "Die Sammelwirtschaft der Zigeuner," *Das Burzenland* 5, No. 1 (1929): 102-04.

7. Hans Kaufmes, "Die Geschichte der Landwirtschaft und Viehzucht," *Das Burzenland* 5, No. 1 (1929): 125-223.

8. Josef Binder, *Geschichte des Waldwesens der Stadt Hermannstadt* (Hermannstadt: Selbstverlag, 1909).

9. Siebenbürgisches Archiv Gundelsheim, A VIII 189, Konrad Siegmund, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Stadtwaldes von Schäßburg*, Manuscris, Bd. 2

toward the surrounding woodland over the centuries, such as Paul Abraham and Hans Brandsch,¹⁰ Karl Fabritius,¹¹ Adolf Höhr,¹² Grete Kloster-Ungureanu,¹³ Gustav Lander,¹⁴ Franz Lenz¹⁵ and Johann Teutsch.¹⁶ The collective work on forests in Bistrița-Năsăud County, coordinated by the high-school teacher Simion Lupșan and entitled *Pădurile județului Bistrița-Năsăud din cele mai vechi timpuri și până astăzi* (Forests in Bistrița-Năsăud County from Ancient Times to the Present Day) and published in Bistrița in 2005, has an unscientific and nationalist character, neglects scholarly works and archival sources, and focuses very little on the Saxon town of Bistrița.

The analyzed authors describe the forest as an energy source, overlooking its social aspects and cultural role. One should, also, highlight their recognition of the connection between forests and agriculture, as well as the inclusion of the history of hunting and fishing – two secondary uses of forests.

In my study “Forestry and Resource Policy in 18th century Transylvania” I attempted to describe the attitudes of Transylvanian Saxons, Hungarians, Szeklers and Wallachians toward forests by comparing the Saxon town of Sighișoara with localities inhabited by the other ethnic groups that I mentioned above.

Theoretical concepts

The wood (timber) crisis prompted the authorities to develop long-term management plans for state forests for economic purposes, although the concept of sustainability (Nachhaltigkeit) –which is central to modern forestry– had not yet been clearly outlined. The implementation of the

10. La biblioteca din Gundelsheim, Paul Abraham and Hans Brandsch, *Landwirtschaft und Waldbau der Stadt Schäßburg bis 1945*, Manuscris depus în anul 1994.

11. Karl Fabritius, “Der Brand Schäßburgs im Jahre 1676,” *Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 1, No. 2 (1853), 220-37.

12. Adolf Höhr, “Das alte Schäßburg,” *Die Karpathen*, III, Kronstadt 1909, 3.

13. Grete Kloster-Ungureanu, “Ein Schäßburger Bienensegen,” in *Beiträge zur siebenbürgischen Kulturgeschichte*, ed. Paul Philippi (Köln-Wien: Böhlau 1974), 91-108.

14. Gustav Lander, *Der siebenbürgische Imkerverein als Bienenzuchtabteilung der Siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Landwirtschaftsvereins* (Kronstadt: Markus, 1939).

15. Franz Letz, *Schäßburg. Monographie einer Stadt* (München: Selbstverlag, 1976).

16. Johann Teutsch, “Beiträge zur klimatologischen und statistischen Kenntnis der Stadt Schäßburg,” *Programm des evangelischen Gymnasiums in Schäßburg* (Hermannstadt: S. Filtsch, 1867), 1-80.

concept of sustainability, which ensured a durable use of forests, occurred only under the reign of emperor Joseph II (1781-90).¹⁷

Travelers who visited Transylvania in the 18th century, among them Joseph II, mention the bad management of forests in the province. The consulted archival sources indicate the dwindling wood (timber) resources around towns and mining centers that required great quantities. However, the same sources mention sprawling forests that, because of the bad and underdeveloped road infrastructure, could not be sufficiently exploited.

As regards their geographical location, forests were mostly located in the south, east and west of Transylvania, while the central and northern areas, especially Cluj County, were stuck in an almost perpetual wood (timber) crisis.¹⁸ This is why one can argue that in Transylvania there was a regional wood (timber) crisis before the issuance of the 1781 Forestry Ordinance.

The eighteenth-century European wood (timber) crisis also affected the forest-rich Hapsburg province of Transylvania. Thus, this century witnessed the publication of numerous studies that tried to find solutions to it. Most contemporary scholars perceived forests as a source of energy for the mining sector. Among them were Samuel Köleseri jr. (1663-1732),¹⁹ Jan Fridwaldszky (1730-86),²⁰ Ignaz von Born (1742-91),²¹ Johann Ehrenreich von Fichtel (1732-95),²² Andreas Xaverius

17. Rolf Hocker and Wolfgang Wessel, "Die Waldwirtschaft in Kurköln zur Zeit des Kurfürsten Clemens August," in *Eine Gesellschaft zwischen Tradition und Wandel, Alltag und Umwelt im Rheinland des 18. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Frank Günter Zehnder (Köln: DuMont 1999), 209-25.

18. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Kriegsarchiv, K VII k 341: von Preiß: Historisch-Politische Beschreibung des Großfürstentums Siebenbürgen, written on behalf of the Supreme War Council on 18 May 1771, manuscript, 1775, s.p.

19. Samuel Köleseri jr., *Auraria romano-dacica* (Hermannstadt, 1717).

20. Jan Fridwaldszky, *Minero-Logia (magni) Principatus/Transilvaniae/seu/metalla, semimetalla, sulphu/ra, salia, lapides et aqua/conscripta/a/Joanne Fridwaldsky/Societatis Jesu sacerdote anno Sal. MDCCLXVII*, (Claudiopoli, 1767).

21. Ignaz von Born, *Briefe über mineralogische Gegenstände auf einer Reise durch das Temesvarer Banat, Siebenbürgen, Ober- und Unterungarn*, (Frankfurt, Leipzig: no publisher, 1774).

22. Johann Ehrenreich von Fichtel, *Mineralogische Bemerkungen von den Karpathen* (Wien: Johann edlen von Kurzbeck, 1791).

Stütz (1747-1806),²³ and Franz Joseph Müller von Reichenstein (1740-1825).²⁴ All of them went on scientific trips to the province and later published the findings of their mineralogical research.

In 1793, the Lutheran Evangelical priest Daniel Filtsch²⁵ wrote a treatise on coal,²⁶ becoming one of the first scholars to propose the replacement of fuel wood with another type of fuel. This work, based on the findings of his research on the coal in sulfur deposits in the province, which he conducted on behalf of the Austrian authorities on 1771, is also one of the first works to discuss the wood (timber) crisis in Transylvania.²⁷ The fact that the authorities commissioned Filtsch to conduct the aforementioned research demonstrates their strong interest in forests and wood (timber) harvesting for various purposes. The publication of this work twenty years after the start of the research is indicative of the authorities' commitment to long-term research, to their need to initiate field research in an area that was almost unknown to most European intellectuals, and to their interest in combining theory and empirical research.

Another highly relevant scholarly work to forestry in Transylvania is the Lutheran pastor Johann Theophil Ziegler's doctoral dissertation, "De Re sylvestri" that he started in late 18th century and published in

23. Andreas Stütz, "Physikalisch- mineralogische Beschreibung des Gold- und Silberbergwerks bei Nagy-Ág in Siebenbürgen," *Der Gesellschaft Naturforschender Freunde zu Berlin, Neue Schriften* 2 (1799): 1-97.

24. F. J. Müller von Reichenstein, "Versuche mit dem in der Grube Mariahilf in dem Gebirge Fazeby bey Zalathna vorkommenden vermeinten gediegenen Spiesglanzkönig," *Physikalische Arbeiten der einträchtigen Freunde in Wien* (1783): 63-9;^[L]_[SEP] "Fortsetzung der Versuche mit dem in der Grube Mariahilf in dem Gebirge Fazeby bey Zalathna vorkommenden vermeinten gediegenen Spiesglanzkönig," *Physikalische Arbeiten der einträchtigen Freunde in Wien* (1784): 49-53;^[L]_[SEP] "Nachricht von den Golderzen aus Nagyag in Siebenbürgen," *Physikalische Arbeiten der einträchtigen Freunde in Wien* (1784): 85-7;^[L]_[SEP] "Fortsetzung der Versuche mit dem in der Grube Mariahilf in dem Gebirge Fazeby bey Zalathna vorkommenden vermeinten gediegenen Spiesglanzkönig," *Physikalische Arbeiten der einträchtigen Freunde in Wien* (1785): 34-52.

25. Daniel Filtsch (1730-83) studied in Jena and then worked as a teacher at the Gymnasium in Sibiu where he was appointed rector in 1763. In 1772 he was appointed dean in Sibiu. G. D. Teutsch, "Daniel Filtsch," *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 7 (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1877), 9-10.

26. Daniel Filtsch, "Physisch-ökonomische Beurtheilung der in Siebenbürgen entdeckten Steinkohlen," *Siebenbürgische Quartalschrift* (1793): 1-28.

27. Filtsch "Beurtheilung," 5-6.

1806. It investigates the situation of Transylvanian forests and proposes new methods for the conservation and protection of oak and coniferous forests. He argues that bad management, the precarious professional training of foresters, and illegal activities seriously jeopardized Transylvania's forests.²⁸ The main focus of his work was to demonstrate how important it was for Transylvania's forests to introduce sustainable timber harvesting.²⁹

Forestation

Ordinance no. 6155 issued by the Seeberg Gubernium in 1754³⁰ highlighted the need to conserve forests and stipulated that deforested areas should be reforested. Thus, each ten-year-old boy had to plant two oak saplings, enclose them in a small fence, and take care of them until they married. However, the ordinance was not implemented.

From 5 June to 10 August 1795, Andreas Xaverius Stütz (1747-1806), who was head of the Natural History Collection in Vienna at the time, came to the province to inspect the gold mines at Săcărâmb (in Hungarian: Nagyág) and to study the extracted gold.³¹ Stütz was disappointed with the bad state of the forests, which in his opinion resulted from their mismanagement. He decried the destruction of saplings and the harvesting of young trees, as well as the lack of reforestation.³² Goat, cattle and horse herds were wreaking havoc with³³ saplings and small trees: "Where there are no goats, there are cattle and horses that, upon returning unbridled from field labor, either run to the pasture

28. De Re Sylvestri habita imprimis ad M. Transsylvaniae Principatum reflectione Dissertatio; quam pro loco inter professores gymn. Cib. Avg. Conf. solemniter obtinendo die XXIII. Aprilis Horis a X ad XII in Auditorio collegii Mai cum Adnexis Thesibus publice defendet Ioan. Theop. Ziegler, (Cibinii, 1806).

29. For further details on the subject, see Christoph Ernst, *Den Wald entwickeln. Ein Politik- und Konfliktfeld in Hunsrück und Eifel im 18. Jahrhundert* (München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2000), 91-101.

30. Siegmund, *Quellen*, no. 92, 25.

31. Andreas Stütz, "Physikalisch – mineralogische Beschreibung des Gold – und Silberbergwerks bei Nagy-Ág in Siebenbürgen," *Der Gesellschaft Naturforschender Freunde zu Berlin Neue Schriften* 2 (1799): 1-2.

32. "Those who plant trees or make others plant them are mocked." (Stütz, "Beschreibung," 41).

33. Born made a similar observation. He decried that the goat herds of nobles were destroying sprouts. (Born, *Briefe*, 96).

where they indulge themselves or take shelter from the heat of the sun in the shadow of a forest where they feed on the tender sapling shoots.”³⁴

Wood-saving strategies

i. Bricks instead of wood

Traditional house building³⁵ was one of the main causes for the over-consumption of timber and the destruction of forests. Some eighteenth-century travelers describe the wooden homes with shingled roofs as well as the wooden stables, sidewalks and roads. Wooden houses were not only very vulnerable to fire, but also badly built, as the Anonymous Latin³⁶ claims in the account of his travels in the province.³⁷ Others describe the brick- and stone-walled houses they encountered in their peregrinations. For instance, Johann Lehmann and Cristoph Seipp³⁸ describe the Saxon villages between Orăștie (Broos/Szászvaros) and Sebeș (Mühlbach/Szászsebes) with their eye-pleasing and beautifully-lined brick houses on both sides of the road: “All houses in Saxon villages have the best-quality walls and big windows, are naturally-lighted, mostly one-storied, and tile-roofed.”³⁹ According to the Josephine

34. Stütz, “Beschreibung,” 41.

35. Until late eighteenth-century, most houses of Wallachians, Saxons and Hungarians were made of wood. On their building-method, see Valer Butură, *Străvechi mărturii de civilizație românească. Transilvania* (Early Evidence of Romanian Civilization in Transylvania) (Bucharest: Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1989), 96-160.

36. The “Anonymous Latin,” in fact a Franciscan friar from Glatz (Silesia), visited in 1738 a few important Transylvanian friaries and towns as secretary of the Franciscan Commissioner Rochus Ulbricht. The first translation of his travel account, *Diarium itineris ex Provinciae Bohemiae Conventu Glacensi ad Transylvaniam, No.173* 8 was published in 1872 in “Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde,” *Călători străini despre țările române* (Foreign Travelers in the Romanian-inhabited Provinces), ed. Maria Holban, 9, (Bucharest: Academia Română, 1997), 216-22; W. Wattenbach, “*Diarium itineris ex Provinciae Bohemiae Conventu Glacensi ad Transylvaniam*,” *Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, N.F., X (1872): 452-73 and XI (1873): 118-39.

37. Anonymus, “*Diarium*,” 120.

38. The actor Christoph Ludwig Seipp (1747-93) traveled in 1781 and 1791 between Preßburg and Sibiu/Hermannstadt. He published his first travel account *Reise von Preßburg nach Hermannstadt in Siebenbürgen* under a pseudonym in Dünkelspiel and Leipzig in 1785.

39. Johann Lehmann (Seipp), *Reise von Preßburg nach Hermannstadt in Siebenbürgen* (Dünkelspiel and Leipzig, 1785), 178-79.

Survey (Josephinische Aufnahme), Sighișoara had three churches and stone-walled houses uptown.⁴⁰

As regards the forestry policy, Joseph II tried to replace timber with stone or brick as building materials. Paragraph 32 of the Forestry Ordinance refers to forest conservation and wood (timber) saving, recommending the replacement of wooden houses, stables and sheds with beaten earth for the floors and crude non-fired bricks or rubble for the walls.⁴¹

Regulations regarding the replacement of timber with other materials in the building of houses were issued as early as 1769 in Cincu (Großschenk/Nagysink). The main reason for this was “the strong decline of forests.” The use of timber was allowed in frameworks and in the fences that enclosed the property, but only if the alternative materials were too expensive for the owner and only where it was necessary.⁴²

Brick manufacturers were allowed to use any type of low-quality wood that was hard to sell, for instance pieces of wood lying on the forest floor, as well as stumps and trees that had no other purpose.⁴³ For instance, the 1779 Forestry Ordinance of the town of Sighișoara stipulated that pieces of wood fallen on the forest floor and the wood that stayed after cuttings could be used in brick manufacturing. In addition, local roofers received tax exemptions, which facilitated the sale of their products to the citizens.⁴⁴

The first roofers in Sighișoara were mentioned in 1717 in connection with the payment of firewood for the Town Hall.⁴⁵ Each town had its own brickworks. In 1784, the local brickworks were leased on condition that the leasers deliver to the municipality 100 of the 1,000 bricks pro-

40. Annex to Kriegskarte des Großfürstentums Siebenbürgen. Drittes Buch. Worinnen verschiedene Anmerkungen über die Sectiones 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158 159 und so weiter bis inclusive 208 enthalten. In: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, B IX a 715, Sektion 191, no. 9, III, 682.

41. Josephinische Waldordnung 1781, §32.

42. Fr. Schuller von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler der Siebenbürger Sachsen. B. Den MarktFlecken Groß-Schenck in concreto betreffend. (Von anno 1638 bis 1769),” *Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 7 (1867): 364.

43. Josephinische Waldordnung 1781, §42.

44. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 43-44.

45. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 11.

duced. In addition, they also received free firewood from the community forest.⁴⁶

The transition from timber roofs to tile roofs was supported and encouraged by the state. On 5 July 1779, local authorities in Sighișoara ordered that the local population be provided with the firewood quantity needed in the manufacturing of bricks for domestic purposes.⁴⁷ In 1780 the Sighișoara Town Hall set the maximum prices for the manufacturing of bricks so that the local population could purchase them cheaper. Moulders who obtained cheap firewood from the municipality were allowed to ask 3 kreutzers for a brick and 6 kreutzers for a tile.⁴⁸ In general, however, production costs were low. For instance, in 1745 the manufacturing of 5,000 tiles cost 56 florins.⁴⁹

The construction of new houses was also supported by the state. For instance, in 1787 authorities ruled that the owners of burned down houses were entitled to bricks, timber, money in advance and in-kind donations, but they were forbidden to build wooden houses. Furthermore, the roofs of the new houses had to be tiled, not thatched or shingled, and only stables and sheds could be made from wood.⁵⁰ However, the state had also provided help before the 1781 law by guaranteeing transportation and by favoring the purchase of high-quality bricks.⁵¹

The use of timber in home building was generally forbidden. The Sighișoara Town Hall regularly rejected applications for wooden constructions. For example, in 1780 the application of citizen Balthes for timber was rejected on the grounds that a previous government ordinance, based on Seeberg's Ordinance, stipulated that buildings had to be made of brick, not wood.⁵²

Additional measures, pertaining to building methods, were introduced in 1793. An ordinance issued by the Town Hall of Sighișoara

46. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 50, Protocol of 21 March 1785.

47. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 44.

48. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 45.

49. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 16.

50. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 54.

51. In 1774, 4,000 tiles were brought to Agnita (Agnetheln/Ognitheln/Szentágota) from Sibiu in order to cover the burned houses. The building of brick-walled houses was overseen by two district aldermen. Given that the building of a brick house was expensive, the citizens of Agnita were allowed to purchase tiles in exchange for fruits. (Schuller von Libloy, "Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler," 356-359).

52. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 45.

entitled “Über die Menagierung der Waldungen” restricted the use of timber in the construction of brick- or stone-walled and tile-roofed buildings. For this type of buildings, unless they were more than three fathoms wide, citizens were allowed to use beams made from timber harvested in closed forests.⁵³

The situation remained mostly unchanged until the mid- 19th century. Outbuildings, however, were increasingly brick- or stone-walled, but most sheds were still made of wood and built at the back of the yard in order to be protected from fires. In the 19th century, newly constructed buildings had bigger windows with blinds and more rooms.⁵⁴

ii. Fences

The building of fences required a lot of timber as well.⁵⁵ They were more important for hill and upland farming than for lowland farming. Fences were, also, present in towns and villages, where they physically delineated properties and provided protection against wild animals in the proximity of wooded areas. In the analysis of fence, types it is relevant to consider each agricultural system used in the places chosen as case studies.

In hilly (pre-alpine) areas they practised a field grass economy and mostly used wooden fences that delineated pastures and property limits and prevented the cattle’s access to closed pastures.⁵⁶ On the Transylvanian Plain they practised the three-field system. Given that it alternated between ploughing and pasturing, they built only temporary, mobile and easily removable enclosures. The placement of these fences also depended on the grazing period. On the other hand, permanent fences separated yards from gardens, while woven fences mainly marked roads on agricultural lands.⁵⁷

The first known measure against the use of wood in building fences was introduced in Seeberg’s Gubernial Ordinance of 1753. It specifically banned the use oak twigs because it had a negative impact on the

53. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 60-61.

54. Michael Ackner and Karl Johann Schuller, “Der Hermannstädter Stuhl im Großfürstenthum Siebenbürgen,” *Pittoresken Österreich* (Wien: Müller, 1840), 1-35, here 23-25.

55. Martin Stuber, *Wälder für Generationen. Konzeptionen der Nachhaltigkeit im Kanton Bern (1750-1880)* (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 2008), 126.

56. Butură, *Străvechi mărturii*, 88-90.

57. Binder, *Geschichte des Waldes*, 120.

development of oak forests.⁵⁸ Art. 49 of emperor Joseph's 1781 Forestry Ordinance stipulated that gardens, where mulberry trees were planted, had to be enclosed with hedgerow or small ditches.⁵⁹ Art. 31 banned the use of tree-branch fences and encouraged the use of hedge fences because they only grew in width and did not become trees.⁶⁰ The replacement of wood with hedges is also attested by toponymy. In Transylvania, the German name "Horst" or "Hurst" meant a small forest where wood for enclosures was harvested. The names "Hirschel" and "Heirschel" had similar meaning in southern Transylvania.⁶¹

Hedge fences presented several advantages: they could be easily planted, ordered in two rows and intertwined and in case they were also surrounded by a small ditch, they provided protection against the cattle.⁶² The disadvantages were that they grew slowly, needed constant care and required more space than wooden fences.

Royal Decree no. 2458 of 19 November 1783 referred to the observance of the forestry law and to the creation of hedge fences (hedgerows) and protective ditches (in Latin: circa observantiam Normae sylvestris erectionemque vivarum saepium et fossatorum). Local authorities were required to report to the governor on the implementation of the ordinance and on the progress of forest conservation. Transylvanian town halls, counties and districts submitted reports on their achievements in this respect. There were, however, a few notable exceptions such as the district of Bardóc where people refused to plant hedgerows and dig ditches because, they claimed, there was plenty of wood. The Gubernium demanded civil servants to compel the population to comply with the law because there was a looming wood (timber) crisis. Civil

58. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 21-22.

59. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 49.

60. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 31.

61. Wolff denies the hypothesis that the term "Hurst" or "Hürst" was related to the millet culture. Johann Wolff, "Siebenbürgisch-deutsche Waldnamen," *Korrespondenzblatt des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* (1884): 85-90, here 88-9. The toponym can be found at Biertan/Birthälm. According to Nägler, the name "Hirsenberg," as well as "Hürsenberg," could be related to the Germanic "Hurst" (Gesträuch = shrubbery), thus indicating that in this particular place (for instance, a hill) they harvested/cut ("gehüestet") wood for enclosing the house and the yard. In addition, in his opinion, this also proves that the respective hill was once forested. Thomas Nägler, *Marktort und Bischofssitz Birthälm in Siebenbürgen* (Munich: Siebenbürgisch-Sächsische Stiftung, 2004), 32-50.

62. Josephinische Waldordnung, §32.

servants in the district of Reußmarkt wanted a ban on woven fences in fields.⁶³ However, there were also technical difficulties that made the implementation of the law more difficult.⁶⁴

In Transylvania, initiatives for the enclosure of fields with protection fences had been launched almost a decade earlier in Saxon towns. In 1775, the *Magistrat* in Sighișoara ordered based on the Gubernial Ordinances of 6 August 1775 the enclosure of fields with protection ditches for the purpose of saving wood and “a faster development of forests” (einem besseren Aufkommen der Wälder).⁶⁵

For a better implementation of the Royal Decree of November 1783, the Gubernium issued Decree no. 10093 on 5 January 1784. In Sighișoara, two sub-inspectors and two inspectors from the district of Schäßburg were tasked with implementing it.⁶⁶ From this, it can be inferred that the state organs regularly supervised the implementation of this legislation, and that owners had to abide by the law and create hedge-rows or hedge fences. The following year, the Community of Sighișoara banned twig enclosures,⁶⁷ and in 1800 the same local institution ordered the replacement of wooden fences with protective ditches between neighboring courtyards.⁶⁸ Official documents and accounts released in the following period testify to the limited success of the aforementioned legal measures. In early 19th century, Ziegler decried the excessive use of wood for fences, noted that in Transylvania no wood-saving measure had been introduced, and mentioned fences as one of the causes of timber-wasting.⁶⁹

63. Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL), Erdélyi Országos Kormányhatósági Levéltárak, Gubernium transylvanicum levéltára, Gubernium transylvanicum in politicis, Ügyratok F 46, year 1784, Nr. 7382.

64. For instance, the city of Alba Iulia spring floods damaged many streets and bridges, hindering transportation, communications and implicitly the plantation of hedgerows; in the Maros and Zarand districts, plantation was inefficient because of the improper soil; in Gherla (Armenopolis) the decree as not applied because there was no forest to protect, and no hedgerows were planted; in the Reps district they had not yet sold the necessary seeds until the date when the report on the application of the law had to be submitted. MOL, F 46, year 1784, no. 7382.

65. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 34.

66. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 49.

67. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 60, Protocol of 21 March 1785.

68. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 73.

69. Ziegler, “De re sylvestri,” 21.

iii. Energy-saving stoves

One of the most important wood-saving methods was the introduction of energy-saving stoves. While in Western Europe the propaganda for the introduction of masonry stoves proved very effective,⁷⁰ in Transylvania it was quite the opposite. Until late 18th century –both in the countryside and in small towns– the big tile stove could be found in most households. In Transylvania, they built light and small-size ovens in the street, which they used for special occasions such as weddings.⁷¹

In his treaties on forests, Ziegler argues that the old heating technique was a cause of the massive consumption of wood. He claims that stoves were very different, but they generally lost a great amount of heat because of manufacturing mistakes: they were over-sized and had lateral openings. In Ziegler's opinion, glass works, and distilleries were also great wood consumers.⁷² This demonstrates that in the 18th century the European theories and practices pertaining to fire technique were unknown or very little known in Transylvania.

Only in 1805 did the so-called “Regulatory Points” (in German: Regulativpunkte) order that saving stoves be used in villages instead of the energy inefficient ones.⁷³ In addition, stoves, pipes and chimneys were built so badly that they were a constant fire hazard for the “Neighborhoods” (in German: Nachbarschaften). Therefore, they were regularly checked by local civil servants and “Neighborhood leaders” (in German: Nachbarschaftsväter).⁷⁴

70. Stuber, *Wälder für Generationen*, 107-14.

71. Joseph Haltrich, “Zur Geschichte von Sächsisch-Regen seit den letzten hundert Jahren,” *Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, (1858), N.F., III, no. 1, 286.

72. Ziegler, “De re sylvestris,” 22.

73. Verwaltung Siebenbürgen, *Sammlung aller vom Jahr 1795 bis zum Jahr 1805 für die sächsische Nation in Siebenbürgen von allerhöchsten Orten erlassenen Regulationsvorschriften* (Hermannstadt: Theodor Steinßausen, 1861), 74.

74. According to the fire safety ordinance issued in Mediaș in 1759 and amended in 1772 builders and potters were forbidden to build and use improvised pipes. Friedrich Schuler von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler der Siebenbürger Sachsen. Local-Constitutionen der K. freyen Stadt Mediasch. 2. Entwurf zu einer Feuerlösch-Ordnung der königl. Frey-Stadt Mediasch nach Anleitung der Wiener Feuer-Ordnung ddto. 2. Mai 1759 und nach Beschaffenheit der hiesigen StadtVerfassung,” *Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 7 (1867): 326-30.

Even though the population was unfamiliar with the technical innovations, one can presuppose that upon observation of the heating procedure, the optimal wood-saving solutions were found in this respect as well.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the introduction of energy-efficient stoves represented a shift in habitation culture.⁷⁶

iv. Protection against fires

Significant quantities of wood were wasted because of the frequent fires. Contemporary chroniclers describe devastating fires that occurred in various Transylvanian towns and cities. They usually started during military operations, or were caused by arson, negligence or natural phenomena.⁷⁷ The reconstruction of the gutted buildings required the harvesting of significant quantities of timber. Another measure, apart from replacing timber with fire-resistant materials, was protection against fires. It had two major components: (1) the identification and elimination of fire hazards (fire safety) and (2) extinguishing fires (firefighting).

Both municipalities and the provincial government (the “Gubernium”) introduced special measures to prevent and combat fires. The first firefighting regulation in Transylvania was drawn up in Bistrița in 1710.⁷⁸ In 1723 the “Gubernium” issued an ordinance on the prevention

75. Joachim Radkau, *Holz. Wie ein Naturstoff Geschichte schreibt* (Munich: oekom, 2007), 201-4.

76. In this period, the entire family lived in a room and gathered in front of the fireplace. In the second half of the 19th century, changes were made to the structure of the habitation; one of them was the separation of rooms, which allowed family members to live separately.

77. In April 1769 Gypsies set fire to seven of their houses in Bistrița, “[...] to make light; the great church was as bright as daylight! There was great terror. [...] The fire did not extend into the town, [...] but only obliterated the Gypsy neighborhood.” François-Xavier de Feller, *Itinéraire ou voyage de Mr. L'abbé de Feller en diverses parties de l'Europe: en Hongrie, en Transylvanie, en Esclavonie, en Bohême, en Pologne, en Italie, en Suisse, en Allemagne, en France, en Hollande, aux Pays-Bas, au pays de Liège etc.*, (Paris: Auguste Delalain, 1820), 19.

78. This piece of legislation included the following measures: The “Nachbarschaft” (Neighborhood) selected six men tasked with checking fireplaces every two months and fine those citizens whose chimneys or fireplaces were dirty. Furthermore, those citizens who caused accidental fires were also fined. Each “Nachbarschaft” had to be equipped with four spades, four fire ladders and ten leather buckets. Firefighters were allowed to demolish any wooden building that they considered a fire hazard. Citizens storing flammable materials close to the fireplace, such as hay, thatch, hemp and

of fires.⁷⁹

Another cause of fires was agricultural work. For example, in spring and autumn there were many forest fires caused by the habit of burning dry grass and leaves (in Hungarian: *avarégetés*) close to wooded areas. In order to protect forests and ensure their proper development, the “Gubernium’s” Ordinance no. 6293 of 6 August 1775 banned this activity.⁸⁰ In addition, the aforementioned Josephine Forestry Ordinance also identified this bad habit as a serious threat to wooded areas, especially in windy conditions.

The Josephine Ordinance prohibited young shepherds and servants from using fire strikers and to smoke pipes in wooded areas in spring and autumn. Apart from this, authorities employed forest rangers tasked with extinguishing fires and applying corporal punishment to younger (beating with a stick) and older (whipping) lawbreakers alike. It was strictly forbidden to set fire to dry or healthy trees, logs and wood lying on the forest floor, and to kindle fir-tree or spruce branches to be used as torches. In order to make these rules clear to everybody and to prevent anybody from escaping punishment, the law had to be published at the start of each spring and autumn.⁸¹

Authorities identified several serious fire hazards, such as storing flammable materials in the proximity of fire sources,⁸² making fire next

other similar materials, were also fined. Fridrich Schuller von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler der Siebenbürger Sachsen. 3. Anno 1710 d. 7. Aug. Sub Judicatu Generosi Domini Johannis Klein a Straussenburg. Als die Nachbarschaften unserer Königlichen Freyen Stadt Nösen eingerichtet und jedweder Nachbarschaft. Ihr Vorsteher und Vater, samt einem jungen Nachbar Vater vorgestellt wurde, sind Ihnen folgende Articul ad observandum et exequendum vorgelegt worden...” *Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 7 (1867): 336-37.

79. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 14.

80. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 34.

81. Josephinische Waldordnung § 35.

82. The fire safety regulations introduced in Bistrița and Mediaș prohibited storing highly flammable materials close to the fireplace, raking and storing hay and straw in rooms, and entering stables or other flammable premises with portable lights. Von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler,” 326-30 and 348-50.

to flammable substances,⁸³ neglect,⁸⁴ engaging in activities that required the use of fire,⁸⁵ storing large quantities of wood in the yard,⁸⁶ improperly building chimneys,⁸⁷ and firing weapons in built-up areas.⁸⁸

Two devastating fires that occurred in the summer of 1788⁸⁹ in Sighișoara provided the local municipality with the opportunity to introduce the first firefighting measures⁹⁰ and to purchase firefighting equipment.⁹¹ Another measure introduced by the municipality was to provide fire victims with fir timber for roofing. If need be, the fir timber and oak timber (only if there was a surplus) could be harvested from closed forests. This set of measures, however, also mentions the need to conserve forests: “[...] for a simultaneous and efficient protection of forested areas, one must visit the closed forests and harvest all those disposable oak trees that stand too close to others and prevent their proper growth.”⁹²

The new buildings in Sighișoara had to be built according to the new

83. In 1779, the gun powder carrier had to leave the billet due to the big danger of explosion. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 42; Gun powder traders in Mediaș, were allowed to store a maximum of 12 lb. (1 lb.=0,45 kg.) in their stores. Von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler,” 326-30.

84. In Bistrița, owners that started fires by negligence were fined. Von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler,” 348-50.

85. For instance, according to the regulations introduced in Mediaș in 1759 and 1772, it was forbidden to singe slaughtered pigs in closed yards or in windy conditions. Von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler,” 326-30.

86. In Mediaș, the municipality prohibited the storage of more than 6 fathoms of wood in one place. Von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler,” 326-30.

87. Medium-sized chimneys had to be cleaned every three months and large ones every month by authorized chimney sweeps. Their cleanliness was checked by the “Nachbarschaft” leader. Local authorities prohibited wooden chimneys as well as dangerous fire pipes and other improvisations. Von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler,” 326-30.

88. The firing of weapons was prohibited in Sighișoara in 1788. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 54.

89. On 15 July 1788, a great fire engulfed Hüll and Schaser Streets; in three hours 150 houses burned to the ground and 180 families became homeless. The fire started on Hüll Street at the wooden house of a woman who had forgotten to watch the fire. She was arrested for eight days. The fire on Mühl Street started in a shed, and authorities could not determine the cause. On 22 July another fire broke out on Bajer Street and devastated the side lying between Mühl Street and the square. As a result, 80 houses were gutted. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 54.

90. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 54.

91. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 54.

92. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 53.

building methods, which included their fireproofing. In 1791, a local senator inspected the burnt houses at Saschiz (Keisd/Szászkézd, a village close to Sighișoara) and demanded from villagers to observe the forestry law, promising that they would be provided with free timber if they followed the fire safety rules.⁹³

Firefighting consisted of various rules of conduct during fires, rules pertaining to the acquisition, management and handling of the equipment, to the signalling of fires inside and outside towns, to the safeguarding of personal possessions, etc.⁹⁴

v. Limitations to the use of timber, firewood and utilities

There had been interdictions on wood harvesting as early as 6 January 1743 when the Town Hall of Sighișoara banned the harvest and sale of oak timber and firewood.⁹⁵ The 1753 Forestry Ordinance of Sighișoara banned the use of oak as firewood, allowed oak harvesting for timber only based on a special permit issued by the Town Hall, established open and closed forests, limited the quantity of firewood allotted to the local population to only 4 fathoms per household, and banned the storage of firewood in forested areas.⁹⁶

In 1765, local authorities in Sighișoara limited the use of timber for the wheelwright, cooper and blacksmith guilds. This measure was introduced with a view to conserving the forest: “As for the future, in order to manage the local forests according to the wishes of the Community, no guild shall be allowed to harvest the necessary wood from these forests.”⁹⁷ The primary aim of the municipality was to save on oak. In addition, in 1770 local civil servants banned the manufacture of oak frames,⁹⁸ in 1771 and 1772 they compelled coopers to procure their timber from other localities because “local forests are smaller with each passing day”⁹⁹ and banned together with the Comes Saxorum the use of oak as firewood,¹⁰⁰ and from 1778 oak started to be imported to Sighișoara.¹⁰¹

93. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 58.

94. Von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler,” 326-30, 348-50.

95. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 17.

96. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 23.

97. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 30.

98. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 31.

99. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 30.

100. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 31, Ordinance of 19 April 1772.

101. In a report, mayor Köhler explained how the use of oak as firewood generated “the biggest and most irresponsible disorder”. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 39.

An ordinance issued by the *Magistrat* of Sighișoara in 1774 stipulated that only wood fallen onto the forest floor could be used as firewood.¹⁰² Four years later, however, it was imported from other localities.¹⁰³ In 1779 the firewood crisis was so severe that it was no longer possible to find any pieces of wood on the floor of open forests.¹⁰⁴ In spite of this, the professor at the local Catholic school received six cartful of firewood for domestic use each year.¹⁰⁵

Paragraph 46 of the 1781 Forestry Law stipulated that nobody was allowed to harvest trees for timber without special permission from the owner or the Town Hall. Timber, especially that which had not been in contact with water or snow, was harvested in December or January.¹⁰⁶ There was a forewarning to leave straight trees with fewer branches standing in certain pre-established sectors in order for them to be used later for building and manufacturing purposes.¹⁰⁷ Covering this need was very difficult for the citizens of Sighișoara, because many forests were closed and the Josephine Law stipulated that new buildings had to be built of brick or stone instead of wood. Thus, timber was allowed to be used for bridges¹⁰⁸ and only partially for buildings.¹⁰⁹ In 1791 the municipality allowed timber harvesting in closed forests for public and/or private buildings, only if the allowed quota had already been harvested in the open forests.¹¹⁰

The limitations to the use of timber extended from harvesting in certain places¹¹¹ to certain trades,¹¹² time periods,¹¹³ and tree species,¹¹⁴

102. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 33.

103. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 40.

104. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 41.

105. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 43.

106. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 44.

107. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 5.

108. For example, timber was harvested to rebuild the bridge destroyed during the 1785 flood. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 50.

109. An ordinance issued by the Town Hall of Sighișoara in 1789 stipulated that in the building of sheds, stables and barns oak timber could be used only for thresholds, support beams and strips. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 56.

110. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 58.

111. Carpenters were allowed to harvest timber in certain areas of the forest or to collect wood fallen on the forest floor. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 14.

112. Wheelwrights were prohibited from harvesting timber in remote forests for fear that they might conceal logs and branches and steal useful wood. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 18.

113. Harvesting timber for shingles, grape vine stakes, beams and other similar products was only allowed in winter. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 44.

114. For timber they preferred straight, hardwood trees. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 5.

After 1784, each timber allotment was conducted only with the mayor's approval¹¹⁵ or in exchange for a fee.¹¹⁶

The population reacted by breaking the law. Therefore, the number of thefts increased rapidly. In order to put a stop to them, civil servants in Sighișoara decided to give to each guild-master a certain quantity of wood.¹¹⁷ In addition, citizens were allowed to continue making oak timber frames if the timber was procured from remote areas or ditches.¹¹⁸

In Sighișoara, where viticulture and winemaking were important to the local community, coopers faced special difficulties. Their requests for oak timber were rejected in 1785 and 1788¹¹⁹ on the ground that harvesting timber in closed forests was prohibited. In 1783, however, the local coopers' guild was allowed to harvest only two oak trees in accordance with the Josephine law.¹²⁰ Until the 19th century, firewood was the only heating source for the rural population. In Transylvania, firewood was distributed based on the right to urban citizenship.¹²¹

Firewood could only be sold with permission from local authorities. After the municipality noted that the open forest called "Kreischgrat" was emptied of firewood, the St. Urban Monastery of Sighișoara requested in 1783 the creation of a new forest where trees for firewood could be felled.¹²² Therefore, the Town Hall redivided forests in accordance with the 1781 Forestry Law and the local ordinance of 1779. The aim of this reform was "the best possible conservation of forests." Based on the new division, certain forested areas were closed, and a two-year ban on wood/timber harvesting and cattle-grazing was imposed. Firewood could only be collected in the so-called open forested areas.¹²³

115. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 49.

116. In 1783 the blacksmiths' guild in Sighișoara requested wood for charcoal from the municipal forest, which it ultimately received in exchange for a fee. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 48.

117. For example, in 1780 the coopers' guild requested oak timber for barrels since they could acquire lumber for hoops only from other towns. (Siegmund, *Quellen*, 45)

118. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 46, of 1 March 1782; in 1788 they were allowed to make vine poles of oak timber Siegmund, *Quellen*, 56.

119. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 51, 54.

120. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 48.

121. Georg Adolf Schuller, *Aus der Vergangenheit der siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Landwirtschaft* (Hermannstadt: Verein für siebenbürgische Landeskunde, 1895), 114-115.

122. MOL F 46, year 1783, no. 5982, 14-16.

123. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 48, of 9 July 1783.

In 1787, because a significant amount of wood was stolen, the Community decreed that any amount of wood procured illegally from closed forests, such as the Wolsen forest, will be seized and stored in the local yard. A 3-florin fine was imposed for each cartful of stolen wood. In addition, “those [caught] taking firewood to pawnbrokers” would also be fined. As a precautionary measure, the municipality also hired forest rangers.¹²⁴

In 1788, the proposal to allow access to forests twice a week in order to prevent unlawful tree harvesting for firewood was rejected on the ground that “on the one hand, the population would suffer because of this limitation and, on the other, tree harvesting for firewood must be banned in summer months”.¹²⁵ In 1789, the Community decreed that only old oak branches could be harvested for firewood.¹²⁶ In order to put an end to thefts, two additional forest rangers were appointed. It was also decreed that (very likely) a cartful of firewood could be sold for a maximum of 42 kreutzers.¹²⁷

There were limitations imposed regarding the time periods when tree harvesting for timber and firewood was allowed. In 1787, the “Gubernium” decreed, based on § 44 and 46 of the Forestry Law, that tree harvesting had to be conducted only in winter and had to meet firewood, timber and lumber requirements for an entire year. Furthermore, the harvested trees had to be immediately chopped/processed and stored.¹²⁸ A 1786 Ordinance of the “Gubernium” decreed that, for a more efficient protection of forests, owners had to allow their subjects a few days for tree harvesting.¹²⁹

The great number of ordinances issued in the 18th century, which stipulate limitations of tree harvesting for timber and firewood, demonstrates that wood-saving measures were imposed through monitoring and fines. On the other hand, high wood/timber prices led to an increasing number of thefts and complaints to the authorities.

124. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 53.

125. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 55.

126. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 56.

127. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 56.

128. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 53.

129. Siegmund, *op. cit.*, 52.

vi. The ban on goat grazing in forests

Goats were the most unloved species of domestic animals due to the damage they caused to trees. The goat was considered “the poor man’s cow” given that it needed little food and a small pasture.¹³⁰ They found themselves in a controversial situation because, on the one hand, their feeding habits were harmful to forests and, on the other, they were indispensable for many people from the lower social-economic strata.

Historical descriptions of eighteenth-century Transylvania mention the local population’s great interest in goat farming in comparison to cattle farming. This century witnessed a considerable growth of the province’s population, which increased the demand for agricultural land and food, and goat farming became, for many, household the only food source.¹³¹

Cattle grazing in forests and in their proximity is first mentioned in the “Articuli Civitatis Segesvariensis,” a document issued in Sighișoara in 1608,¹³² and then in two separate regulations issued in Bistrița in 1707¹³³ and 1713, respectively.¹³⁴ The latter two regulations allowed goat and cattle grazing, but also took into account the necessity to protect wooded areas and the needs of the citizens of Bistrița.

The 1753 Ordinances issued by the Seeberg government banned goat grazing in forests and ordered that it take place on empty pastures.¹³⁵ By the time the 1781 Josephine Forestry Law was passed, many wooded areas in the province had suffered significant damage due to

130. Bernward Selter, *Waldnutzung und ländliche Gesellschaft* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1995), 195-196.

131. In 1780 there were 411,369 horses and oxen, 21,312 cows, 79,901 calves and bulls, 662,826 sheep, 63,783 goats, and 249,312 pigs in Transylvania. (Thomann), *Siebenbürgische Landesbeschreibung. Beschreibung von Siebenbürgen*, Manuscript, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, K VII 343, 40-41.

132. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 3-5.

133. In 1705, the Town Hall of Bistrița banned the herding of pigs into forests. Schuller: *Landwirtschaft*, 92-95.

134. A 1713 Regulation from Bistrița prohibited the herding of cattle onto closed fields, but allowed it onto certain fields that were guarded by a shepherd. In addition, sheep and goats were prohibited from grazing on the territory of Bistrița. Goat and sheep grazing was allowed only in those places where “there were no trees in the bud because there they could not damage them”. Von Libloy, “Deutsche Rechtsdenkmäler,” *Archiv des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 7 (1867): 340-6.

135. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 21-2.

goat grazing.¹³⁶

In Sighișoara a ban on grazing in closed forests had been in force since 1774.¹³⁷ The “Ordinance on the Damage to Forests and Forest Edges” (in the German original: “Ordnung der Wald und Hattertschaden”¹³⁸), issued on 20 May 1778, imposed a ban on goat farming,¹³⁹ thus aiming to protect wooded areas from irreversible damage: “The presence of goats is no longer tolerated on this territory because no forest can develop unless it is free of goats that feed on buds, thus, preventing trees from developing. As a result, all goats must be sold until the next market or else they will be shot”.¹⁴⁰ In 1779, the ban was reconfirmed following a thorough investigation conducted by a local commission.¹⁴¹ The principal aim of this ordinance was the conservation of wooded areas and the local population’s supply with the required quantities of firewood.

Emperor Joseph’s Forestry Ordinance banned livestock grazing in forests for at least ten years in order to protect them.¹⁴² Goat grazing

136. On 21 March 1760, the centumvirs of Sighișoara reported on the damage done to firewood in Bajendorf by the goats of Romanians living in Valea Crișului (in German: Kreischgrund). The same happened in 1774. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 29, 33.

137. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 33.

138. Hattert is the Saxon name for edge.

139. Such tendencies were also noticeable in other Transylvanian towns. For instance, on 3 April 1771 the Town Hall of Sebeș reported that the forests had been devastated by goat farming and that it ordered the inhabitants of the District “to sell or get rid of” all their goats until St. George’s Day. Johann Wolff, “Zur siebenbürgisch-deutschen Feld- und Waldwirtschaft,” *Korrespondenzblatt des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 9 (1884): 97-105, here 102; In 1784, the mayor of the town of Miercurea Sibiului (Reußmarkt/Szerdahely) declared that goats had to be exterminated because they were harmful to forests. (MOL, F 46, 7382, year 1784, Bericht des Stuhls Reußmarkt vom 12. Juli 1784 bezüglich der Beobachtung der Waldordnung).

140. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 39-40.

141. The protocol of 1 March 1779 recorded the decision of the *Magistrat* to issue a new forestry regulation for Sighișoara, written based on this commission’s report. The new division of forests was conducted based on the principle of supplying the local population with firewood and of conserving forests simultaneously. Therefore, the wood was distributed exclusively from the yearly forest plots, while the others remained closed or under ban. Those who herded their livestock into closed forests received a fine because “no cattle [was] allowed to enter, and especially goats had to be removed”. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 43-4.

142. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 38.

was especially harmful to forests because it seriously damaged and destroyed saplings (young trees). In addition, town halls had to make sure that goats were not herded into forests until saplings grew tall enough so that their branches were out of reach for them.¹⁴³ Forest huts, livestock grazing in forests, and the numerous paths that led to these huts seriously damaged forests. They had to be removed and allowed only with special permission from the respective owner or *Magistrat*.¹⁴⁴

Joseph's Forestry Ordinance was strictly observed in Saxon villages and towns. In 1784, authorities in "Großkokel" County reported that inhabitants had to be compelled to sell their goats that, according to the Ordinance, damaged the forests.¹⁴⁵ The report also hints at the inhabitants' poverty and servitude: "At Nadeş, a shepherd herded many goats into the closed forest and the viscount Benjamin Szentpáli sentenced him to receive 24 strokes in front of the community".¹⁴⁶ Public punishment reflected the authorities' resolve to implement the law and to deter potential lawbreakers.

Authorities in Sibiu, also, introduced protection measures against goat grazing in wooded areas as early as the 18th century. Thus, they decided to protect the town's wooded areas, pasturelands and arable lands by enclosing them with fences. In addition, they banned hunting in these places.¹⁴⁷

In 1773 Maria Theresa ordered that shepherds be hired in the context of a sharp increase in the number of cattle and horse thefts as well as arson cases.¹⁴⁸

The bans on goat grazing meant that many households lost their most valuable food source. At Frauendorf (Assonyfalva) –a Saxon village between the towns of Mediaş and Sighișoara– goats were returned to peasants after having been seized. However, they were ordered to sell them until the end of April, which the peasants did. On the other hand,

143. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 25.

144. Josephinische Waldordnung, § 39.

145. MOL, F 46, 5852, year 1784, Bericht des Kommitats Kükülö bezüglich der Beobachtung der Waldordnung.

146. MOL, F 46, 5852, year 1784, Bericht des Kommitats Kükülö vom 20. Juni 1784 bezüglich der Beobachtung der Waldordnung.

147. Binder, *Geschichte des Waldes*, 115-16.

148. Kaufmes, *Landwirtschaft*, 190.

other reports mention communities¹⁴⁹ that wanted to keep their goats claiming that “those who graze only one or two goats are in majority and poor” and that “they [will] keep them for milk at least until the next autumn”.¹⁵⁰ Further, they claimed that they would herd their goats to graze together with the calves and will not let them into the forest.¹⁵¹

Another type of reaction was “non-compliance” with the law. A 1784 report, on the compliance with the 1781 Forestry Ordinance in the “Großkokel” district, mentions that the inhabitants of the village of Viișoara (Hohndorf/Hiindref/Hundorf), who owned many goats “were herding them into the forest, claiming that this privilege had been bestowed upon them by the *Magistrat* in Dumbrăveni and that, apart from this institution, no one else had the right to decide on forests and goats in Viișoara”.¹⁵²

Certain forest names demonstrate their use for cattle grazing. Thus, the word “Hart” in the Transylvanian Saxon dialect designates a forest where herdsmen grazed their cattle. As a name, it can sometimes appear alone, such as the variant Huortlef (a forest located in Amnaș/ Hamlesch/Omlás), while other times it appears shortened as the ending “-ert”, such as in Jetschert and Binkert – both designating forests in the vicinity of the town of Reghin.¹⁵³ The environs of this town also includes an oak forest known as the “Goat forest” (Ziegenwald/Kerekerdö).¹⁵⁴ The origin of its name has not yet been clarified.

149. For instance Feldioara, Nadeș, Pipea, Țigmandru, Bălăușeri, Filitelnic, Măgheruș, Sântioana, Ormeniș, Hărănglab, Deaj, Idiciu, Chendu, Dorlätz (this village no longer exists), Ernea, Viișoara și Seleuș. In Rodna, the elders decided to remove goats from forests even before emperor Joseph’s 1781 Forestry Ordinance. (MOL, 5852/1784, Gubernium Transylvanicum levéltára, Bericht des Kommitats Kükülö vom 20. Juni 1784 bezüglich der Beobachtung der Waldordnung).

150. MOL, 5852, year 1784, Gubernium Transylvanicum levéltára, Bericht des Kommitats Kükülö vom 20. Juni 1784 bezüglich der Beobachtung der Waldordnung.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid.

153. Wolff, “Waldnamen,” 87-8.

154. According to Fr. Keintzel Schön, the word “Ziegenwald” (in the Transylvanian Saxon dialect: tsiȳbăș) does not refer to goats because the German word for goat in Transylvania is “Geiß”. He argues that the word tsiȳ comes from the Hungarian word “szeg” which he wrongly translates as “corner”. Fritz Keintzel-Schön, “R.N. Ziegenwald in Sächsisch-Regen,” *Korrespondenzblatt des Vereins für siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, no. 3 (1929): 40-1. “Szeg” actually means “peg” or “nail”. There-

In his 1805 dissertation Ziegler argues that goats were a serious threat to forests and that their access had to be strictly prohibited.¹⁵⁵

vii. Other wood-saving measures

Another measure introduced by the Town Hall of Sighișoara in conformity with Royal Decree no. 2458 of 1783 banned the setting up of maypoles¹⁵⁶ “on Pentecost in churches and in the streets as well as at weddings and other events” because this practice was harmful to forests. This measure, extended over the entire Schäßburg district, targeted both Protestants and Catholics.¹⁵⁷

Conclusion

Several factors contributed to the degradation of forests: gold, silver, iron ore, copper and cinnabar mining, ore and metal melting, ship- and home-building, coal burning, rebuilding endeavors in the aftermath of devastating fires, the building of roads and bridges, timber exports to Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, goat, cattle and sheep grazing with devastating effects, and deforestation by burning in order to expand agricultural lands. One should, also, consider the significant growth of the population, a factor that led to economic development and, consequently, to the expansion and restructuring of urban settlements which, in turn, impacted forested areas. Forests were a focal point in the life of the urban and rural population alike.

The introduction of wood-saving measures was only moderately

fore, the name “Ziegenwald” could derive from the word “Zäke” which means “mosquito”. The oak forest enclosing a hilltop close to the town of Reghin was planted in 1727. Haltrich “Zur Geschichte von Sächsisch-Regen,” 280.

155. Ziegler, “De re sylvestris,” 14.

156. Maypoles had been symbols of spring until the beginning of the twentieth century. In Sighișoara they used to say, “On the 1st of May I fetched a maypole from the forest” (in the Transylvanian Saxon dialect: Um erschten Moa hadde mir es Moan eos dem Bäsch brocht). Saxon lads would place them under the window of their beloved, while the mayor, guild masters, and “Nachbarschaft” leaders expected them to be set up before their homes and in village squares. Maypoles were also used to announce a wedding. Because this custom required the felling of many trees, thus taking a toll on forests, maypoles were banned by Royal Decree no. 2458 of 1783 and then by the Forestry Act of 1857. Carl Göllner, *Im Kreislauf des Jahres. Historisches Brauchtum der Siebenbürger Sachsen* (Bucharest: Kriterion, 1987), 65-8.

157. Siegmund, *Quellen*, 49-50, Protocol of 14 March.

successful. In Saxon towns, town halls made every effort to implement the measures introduced by the central and provincial government as strictly as possible. However, the Hungarian, Szekler and Wallachian regions these measures were fully implemented only in the 19th century.

Evangelos P. Dimitriadis – Dimitris P. Drakoulis***

**The Ottoman Railway Network in the Southern Balkans and Asia Minor and the New Railway Ports at the End of the 19th Century.
The Role of the European Powers in West-Middle East Relations**

Methodological foreword

The study of the transportation network in relation to historical space is the subject of transport geography,¹ as well as historical geographical space, a branch which examines human geography, and, in particular, the sub-branch of historical human geography, or historical geography.² Thus, we have established the scientific framework of this work, which is directly connected with the related branch of economic history and social anthropology.³

The arrangement of the railway network in the late Ottoman Empire is examined in relation to society, the economy, though, mainly the geopolitical situation in the southern Balkans and Asia Minor at the end of the 19th century. Therefore, knowledge of the historical dimension (historical-geographical framework) is crucial. A basic element of the study is the role of railway transport as a factor in geographical changes

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1. Alan M. Hay, entry “Transport Geography,” in *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, eds. Robert J. Johnston and Derek Gregory and Peter Haggett and David M. Smith and David R. Stoddart (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 350-352.

2. Georgios P. Tsotsos, «Ιστορική γεωγραφία και κύριες θεωρητικές προσεγγίσεις του χώρου» (Historical geography and basic theoretical approaches of space), in *Ιστορική, Κοινωνική και Πολεοδομική Ανάλυση του Χώρου. Αφιέρωμα στον Καθηγητή Ευάγγελο Π. Δημητριάδη*, eds. Dimitris P. Drakoulis and Georgios P. Tsotsos (Thessaloniki: A. Stamoulis, 2014), 73-91; Evangelos P. Dimitriadis, «Μια πρώτη εκτίμηση της μεταπολεμικής Ιστορικής Γεωγραφίας στην Ελλάδα με πλαίσιο την αγγλοαμερικανική εξέλιξη του κλάδου» (A first evaluation of post-war historical geography in Greece, within the English-American evolution of the branch), *Ανθρωπολογικά* 8 (1985): 5-19.

3. Roger Lee, entry “Economic Geography,” in *Dictionary of Human Geography*, 91-96.

(e.g. its influence on the agrarian hinterland, on urban development, on the siting of industry).⁴

From the historical-oriented study of transportation networks, it is concluded that their form is linked with other geographical variables, such as soil morphology, restrictions, population density, economic growth, but principally with the economic, social and political framework of decision makers, which in our case, is the Sublime Porte and the European powers.

Transport geography developed simultaneously with human geography in the period 1950-1970. It studies a) the transport networks (roads, railways, canals, and so on.) with techniques such as Graph Theory,⁵ in terms of population density, economic development and the natural environment and b) the transportation terminals, such as ports, airports, and so on. In particular, in our case, the railway ports in the geographical region under discussion will be investigated. Also, studies c) the movement of goods and people, carried out by using special simulation models, for example the Gravity Model.⁶ In the everyday life of modern cities, intervention by transport geography and the use of contemporary technological tools is increasing fast (e.g. modelling).⁷ The trend is combined, as well as helps in the small and large scale programming of changes in anthropogeography in the rural, urban, regional and national area.

The geopolitical and historical-geographical framework

i. The notion of the West in the period in question

In geographical terms, the West covered the North Atlantic up to the European shores, and extended to various landmarks (the English Channel, the Rhine, and so on), depending on each geopolitical circumstance, up to the Urals, which are also the frontiers of Europe with the Far East. Historically, the colonial interest in the Middle East, shown by the Europeans, coincides with the emergence of two new empires, the Ottomans and the Safavid monarchy of Persia. From the early 16th

4. Evangelos P. Dimitriadis and Georgios P. Tsotsos, "Transport geography and local development in 19th century Thrace," *Balkan Studies* 40, no. 2 (1999): 281-307.

5. Alan M. Hay, entry "Graph Theory," in *Dictionary of Human Geography*, 139-140.

6. Alan M. Hay, entry "Gravity Model," in *Dictionary of Human Geography*, 140-142.

7. Derek Gregory, entry "Model," in *Dictionary of Human Geography*, 221-223.

century these two powers engaged in a tough struggle for supremacy in the Middle East, the Ottoman's eventually prevailing. In the mid-19th century, the Crimean War (1853-1856) led to Great Britain and France joining the Ottomans against the Russians.⁸

ii. The new European powers and colonialism at the beginning of the 19th century

The Congress of Vienna (September 1814-June 1815), presided over by Europe's monarchies, set out to establish rules for a new system of international relations with a view to ending the years of warfare. The four victorious monarchies (Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia), signed a peace treaty with the defeated France. One of the main issues of the Congress was the redistribution of territories, intended to achieve a balance of power on the continent of Europe. In this context, numerous decisions were made regarding the relations among the fledgling states. Based on the treaties of the time, a system of two superpowers would result. Britain would dominate the sea, while Russia would command the land.⁹ This equilibrium held until the Crimean War (1853-1856), whence the Vienna system collapsed. In the rebuilding of Europe, new basic concepts were introduced, such as Nationalism, Imperialism, technology, religious tensions and the communication revolution.¹⁰

Around the turn of the 20th century, colonialism emerged as an economic factor, according to which certain European states were to exploit the resources of foreign regions, in fact approximately 35% of the

8. Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). The page numbering refers to the Greek edition of Bernard Lewis, *Μέση Ανατολή και Δύση. Παρελθόν, Παρόν και μέλλον* (Athens: Papazisis, 1970), 23-31 (translated by K. Chatziargyris).

9. Hans Dieter Dyroff (ed.), *Der Wiener Kongress – Die Neuordnung Europas* (München: DTV, 1966). Following Napoleon A Bonaparte's crushing defeat in the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) by the monarchies of Europe, new systems of balance were sought amongst the victors at the Congress of Vienna. The Quadruple Alliance of the victorious powers was renamed the Quintuple Alliance at the joining of France in 1818.

10. Heinz Duchhardt, *Der Wiener Kongress. Die Neugestaltung Europas 1814/15* (Beck: München, 2013); Evangelos P. Dimitriadis, *Ιστορία της πόλης και της πολεοδομίας. Ευρωπαϊκοί πολιτισμοί. Μυκηναϊκοί χρόνοι ως τις αρχές του 20ού αιώνα* (History of the City and Urban Planning. European cultures. Mycenaean times until the beginning of the 20th century) (Kyriakidis: Thessaloniki 1995), 225-228.

surface of the Earth.¹¹ The dominant European powers sought unbridled access to raw materials and foodstuffs in the European colonial regions, such as the undeveloped Balkans and the Middle East.¹² In particular, already as early as 1815, Great Britain was conducting importation – exportation with its colonies, controlling 65% of trade in Europe. In the emerging markets, it sold steel industry products, engine construction industry products, coal etc., it imported raw materials, it sold on afterwards (e.g. grain, cotton, fruit, etc.). It played an important part in expanding the rail network, as well as infrastructure projects in building docks in the harbours, in improving mines, industrial plants, and so on.¹³

iii. Industrial revolution, economic reorganisation – technology

In the Industrial revolution, Great Britain stood out at a technological level from the rest of Europe, which was still at an early industrial stage.¹⁴ In Britain, the continuous growth of towns was a structural characteristic, with the attendant reorganisation of the industrial system mainly through the use of mechanical energy. Farming was, also, reorganised in combination with both domestic and foreign trade. The economic as well as the social geography of towns shifted, forming a system of regionalisation. Each part of Europe became structurally linked up with every other part and vice-versa. This geography was fundamentally transformed with the disastrous First World War (1914-1918), whereby a new Europe was to emerge with new nations, altered frontiers and new expectations. The new financial centres of America and Asia appeared. The application of the steam engine in industrialisation and the establishment of railway – economic transportation would demonstrate that, apart from the reduction in human labour, industry

11. Thomas Benjamin (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism Since 1450* (Macmillan Reference: Detroit – New York, 2006); Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Princeton, NJ: M. Wiener, 1997).

12. Norman John Greville Pounds, *An historical geography of Europe* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge - New York 1990), 349 and table 11.1. The Austro-Hungarian Empire sought to control the southern areas of the Danube. Russia had its eye on the oil in the Middle East via the Balkans. Russia wished to exercise control over the Ottoman Dardanelles Strait to secure free sea passage into the south-east Mediterranean. Finally, Great Britain and afterwards France wanted to put breaks on the presence of every large power from controlling international trade in the south-east Mediterranean as well as the western Black Sea.

13. Dimitriadis, *History of the City*, 228-232.

14. Pounds, *An historical geography of Europe*, 313-316.

could move away from energy sources and locate to suitable urban (industrial) areas.¹⁵ Thus, in Britain the rationale of concentrating a segmented industry close to consumer centres and harbours, served by an integrated railway network and other infrastructures (e.g. banks, warehouses, commercial centres, etc.), is established.¹⁶

iv. The era of the railway and the railway ports.

In the mid-19th century, Western Europe began to set up an integrated transportation system by combining the old inland waterway system of communication with the newer railway network and sea commerce. However, it soon became clear that the railway network was less of an economic initiative than a political one. That said, by the third quarter of the 19th century, an almost entire railway network had been completed in Europe. The basic internal trade of central and Western Europe was carried out by rail, while the heaviest and cheapest goods were transported by ship (e.g. coal, timber, building materials, etc.). The rationale of carrying out trade had radically changed the existing siting of Europe's ports. Fierce competition among Europe's ports appeared, those with the greatest range of products prevailing compared with those of their hinterlands. One solution to the situation that had arisen was provided by the "railway-port," adapted with the appropriate loading-unloading technique for large-size ships and with suitable docks, sheltered from adverse weather conditions.¹⁷

Economic and political-ideological ambitions of the Sublime Porte in the Balkans and the Middle East

i. The broad and narrow concept of the Middle East

The term "Middle East" was coined in 1902 by the American historian and naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1913) so as to geographically determine the area between India and Arabia, with the Persian Gulf at the strategic epicentre.¹⁸ The term, which in its broadest sense

15. Dimitriadis, *History of the City*, 294-296, 329-330.

16. The profits of industry in the first half of the century tended to be ploughed back into industry and so a surplus was created in Europe's industrialized nations for provisions in public services, such as foodstuffs, clothing, public health, etc.

17. Pounds, *An historical geography of Europe*, 429-437, especially 434, fig. 11.63.

18. Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Persian Gulf and international relations," in *Retrospect and prospect; studies in international relations, naval and political* (Boston:

covers large areas of SW Asia and North Africa, was accepted by the British government, and gradually replaced the earlier term, “Near East,” which included peoples living under Turkish administration.¹⁹ The subsequent appearance of the term “Far East” led to the use of the narrow meaning of areas under Ottoman state administration. By contemporary criteria, the countries of the Middle East were: Turkey, Persia, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and the states of the Levant. This area on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean includes Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and later Jordan, Egypt and Israel. The region had traditional ties from the times of the crusades with the English (Iraq, Palestine) and the French (Syria, Lebanon). The northernmost frontiers of the Middle East coincided with Russia’s southern border.²⁰

ii. Geographical features

The geographical and ecological features of the Middle East are vast expanses of desert, with limited rainfall, a small number of forests and few fertile areas.²¹ Farming depended on continuous irrigation and human endeavor to hold back soil erosion. The deserts of the Middle East are traversed by large rivers, such as the Nile in Egypt, the Tigris and Euphrates in today’s Iraq, as well as the smaller ones in Turkey (e.g. Kızılırmak–Halys, Seyhan–Saros, Asi–Orontes). In the valleys of the main rivers ancient, creative societies developed which lived in concentrated, bureaucratic regimes with autocratic methods of rule. Egypt and Iraq had always competed as political-military centres and exercised a profound influence on neighbouring countries as far as their ideology and organisation were concerned. The nomads of the desert population were livestock farmers, due to the difficulty in cultivating the earth, and

Little, Brown, and Company, 1902), 209-254; C. R. Koppes, “Captain Mahan, General Gordon and the origin of the term, ‘Middle East’,” *Middle East Studies* 12 (1976): 95–98, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263207608700307>.

19. Roger Adelson, *London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902-1922* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1995).

20. Arthur Jr Goldschmidt, *A Concise History of the Middle East* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999); Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years* (New York: Scribner, 1995); Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, 1-7.

21. Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, 3, 209, note 4. One relatively fertile strip of irrigated and cultivated land is the so-called “Fertile Crescent” in north Arabia, which belonged in part to Iraq, to the southern regions of Persia, the Syro-Palestinian area and to the SW Nile Delta as well as its valley.

bred them for meat production and transportation, while taking part in various ways in trading in the caravan route of the desert. The discovery of oil by the West, led in the long run to radical social, economic and political changes.²²

iii. Cultural characteristics

The Middle East was the cradle of three great religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and three dominant languages (Arabic, Persian and Turkish). The sense of unity of the Islamic peoples derived from the religious dogma of the Koran ("The prophet Mohammed is one") as well as from a complex theological and legal edifice (civil, penal and constitutional law), which shaped centuries of the teachings of the sacred law of the Muslims. Thus, religion and culture were closely connected and formed their corresponding objective and symbolic notions of society. These notions influenced Islamic art, creating rules of continuity in geometric decoration, poetry, music and architecture (e.g. arcades, minarets, the arabesque), cuisine and so on, but even more influenced the ideas of citizens regarding government institutions.²³

iv. The position of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East

From its establishment at the beginning of the 14th century, the Ottoman state was a small realm at the fringes of the Islamic world, set on jihad, holy war, against the Christian infidels. This little-known mini state gradually took over the former byzantine territories of Asia Minor and the Balkans, which following the conquest of the Arabic areas around 1517, became the major power in the Islam world. The Ottoman Empire during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566) had taken on the mantle of a global power thanks to its consecutive military successes stretching from Europe to the Indian Ocean. The Empire's dynamism turned to the West in the 17th century. The power of the Ottomans began to degenerate in the 18th century due to the obvious superiority of the

22. Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, 3, 6-8.

23. Lewis, *op.cit*, 9-10, 18-22.

western powers, leading to the Ottomans' political and economic dependency on Europe.²⁴ In its final stage, the survival and expected disintegration of the Empire became a European political problem (the "Eastern Question").²⁵

The Southern Balkans

i. The socio-economic condition in the Macedonian-Thracian area

The accounts of travellers of the time relate to Macedonia being known in Europe for tobacco, cotton and vegetable production.²⁶ The population lived below European standards, lacking in communication and provisions in its everyday conditions, with swingeing tax within a feudal system of medieval provenance. The boundaries between agrarian and urban areas were blurred, with the countryside clearly dominating.²⁷ The absence of industry and the minimal public works, meant there were many unskilled labourers and artisans and the extensive in-

24. Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*, translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 17-18.

25. Michael Laskaris, *Το Ανατολικό Ζήτημα, 1800-1923* (The Eastern Question) (Thessaloniki: Pournaras, 1978), 11. The term related to West-East competition on the political and diplomatic fronts. It dominated events from the mid-18th century until the early 20th century and was pertinent to the maintenance and cohesion of the Ottoman Empire. The various issues within the "Eastern Question" were the following: the Greek Revolution (1821-1830), the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Treaty of Berlin (1878), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the Treaty of London (17/07/1913) and Treaty of Bucharest (18/07/1913) and the ending of the First World War (1914-1918).

26. Georgina Muir Mackenzie and Adelina P. Irby, *Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey-in-Europe* (London and New York: Alexander Strahan Publisher, 1866), 20-22; Konstantinos A. Vakalopoulos, *Οικονομική λειτουργία του Μακεδονικού και Θρακικού χώρου στα μέσα του 19ου αιώνα στα πλαίσια του διεθνούς εμπορίου* (The Economic Function of the Macedonian and Thracian Region in the mid-19th Century in the Context of the International Commerce) (Thessaloniki: Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1980), 15-16, 91-95.

27. Basil C. Gounaris, "Railway construction and labor availability in Macedonia in the late nineteenth century," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 13, no. 1 (1989): 139-158, here 140.

volvement of all family members on agricultural land ensured a subsistence income. Local migration was significant.²⁸ The railway network favoured the transportation and processing of large numbers of goods from Macedonia at the railway port of Thessaloniki, where the most important factories were located.²⁹

In Thrace, competition between the mainly Turkish feudal ownership and the newly established urban and agricultural capitalism was in evidence in primary production, while traditional small-scale agricultural holdings remained.³⁰ In secondary production, industry remained roughly at the same level of small manufacturing of local significance.³¹ In the tertiary sector, the market was regulated principally by European capitalistic penetration. Industrial and colonial products were imported, while local agricultural goods were exported. European trading companies were established in the ports and the largest towns in the area, though mercantile capitalism could not penetrate systematically into the agrarian hinterland or the agricultural centres of Thrace. This fact was due in large part to the absence of a satisfactory communication network. Thus, the region's communities did not develop industrially according to European models of the time. On the contrary, they remained stuck mainly in primary and less in secondary production.³² The seasonal network of trade fairs was combined with the network of the basic

28. Gounaris, "Railway construction in Macedonia," 142-143. Around 1870, 5,000-6,000 artisans from Albania arrived in the area around Thessaloniki. This seasonal migration continued into the winter months and in many other urban and semi-urban centers.

29. Giannis Megas and Manolis Andriotakis, *Θεσσαλονίκη 1896: Η χρονιά των Ολυμπιακών αγώνων* (Thessaloniki 1896: The Year of the Olympic Games) (Thessaloniki: Zitros, 2004), 124-125.

30. Nikolai Todorov, «Όψεις της μετάβασης από το φεουδαλισμό στον καπιταλισμό στα βαλκανικά εδάφη της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας» (Aspects of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in the Balkan lands of the Ottoman Empire), in *Η οικονομική δομή των βαλκανικών χωρών στα χρόνια της οθωμανικής κυριαρχίας ιε'-ιθ' αι.*, ed. Spiros I. Asdrachas (Athens: Melissa, 1979), 275-281.

31. Kalliopi Papathanasi-Mousiopolou, «Οικονομική και κοινωνική ζωή του Ελληνισμού της Θράκης κατά την Τουρκοκρατίαν» (Economic and Social Life of the Hellenism of Thrace during the Turkokratia), *Thrakika* 47 (1974): 240.

32. Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City, 1400-1900* (Seattle - Washington: University of Washington Press, 1983), 644; David M. Smith, entry "Industrialization," in *Dictionary of Human Geography*, eds. Johnston and Gregory, 167-168; Dimitriadis and Tsotsos, "Transport geography," 40-41. As in the large towns of the hinterland (Edirne, Kırklareli, Gümülcine, İskeçe, Dimetoka) and the important ports (Tekirdağ,

caravan routes and formed an integrated economic circuit, which vitally supplied local development.³³ From 1872 and onwards, the creation of the railway network combined with the establishment of European commercial agencies at railway stations brought on the decline and disintegration of the trade fairs, as well as the caravans, i.e. a centuries-old economic structure, without the creation of alternative ways to resupply the local economy.³⁴

ii. National Balkan states

In the Balkans, the liberating activities against the rule of the Ottoman Empire resulted in nation states: Greece (1832), Serbia (1835-1867), Bosnia (1875), Bulgaria (1878), while in Romania the Danubian Principalities and Moldavia achieved their independence (1862).³⁵ Ottoman rule in the Balkans was on the wane, while the Russian influence in the new Balkan states became significant (pan-Slavism).³⁶ The British navy dominated the Eastern Mediterranean, followed by the French. Other European states (Germany, Holland, Belgium) meanwhile sought new markets in the Balkans and Asia Minor as part of their industrial capitalism.

Gelibolu, Enez, Dedeğaç). The hubs of economic activity were the large annual trade fairs which took place mainly in small to medium-size towns such as Lüleburgaz, Çatalca, Midye mod. Kıyıköy, Bakırköy, Silivri, Şarköy, Malkara, Sofulu.

33. Spyros Asrachas, «Η κατάσταση του Ελληνισμού κατά την περίοδο 1669-1821: Οικονομία» (The condition of Hellenism in the period 1669-1821: Economy), in *The History of the Greek People*, v. 11 (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1975), 172-173.

34. Kyriaki Mamoni, «Θράκη» (Thrace), in *The History of the Greek People*, v. 13, ed. A. Bayas (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1977), 375.

35. Dimitriadis, *History of the City*, 222-224.

36. Louis L. Snyder, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism* (London: Academic Press, 1990) 401-402. Pan-Slavism was a nationalistic philosophy articulated by Russian intellectuals (1830-1840). The objective of this theory was to exalt the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe under the rule of Russia. This had an impact on the Catholic Church as it served to fuel its antagonism with Orthodoxy. The Russians turned against the Ottoman Empire, reasoning that it would be protecting the Christian peoples within the Empire, in accordance with the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji. See also Aslı Yiğit Gülseven, “Rethinking Russian pan-Slavism in the Ottoman Balkans: N. P. Ignatiev and the Slavic Benevolent Committee (1856–77),” *Middle Eastern Studies* 53, no. 3 (2017): 332-348, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2016.1243532>.

Asia Minor. Geographical restrictions, economic and the living space

The Asia Minor peninsula is delineated along an elongated, rectangular EW axis. It is surrounded by seas on three of its sides: The Black Sea and the Propontis (Sea of Marmara today) to the north, the Aegean to the west and the SE Mediterranean to the south. The eastern side is defined by an imaginary borderline between the cities of Rize to the north and İskenderun to the south. The center of the peninsula comprises high mountain ranges and are natural barriers to communications and commercial contact for the populations. Natural river passages, which crisscrossed the plateaus and emptied in the surrounding seas traditionally formed the trade and social channels of the coasts as well as the hinterland.³⁷

The Black Sea coasts as well as the coasts of the SE Mediterranean lack natural bays and harbours. In contrast to this, on the side of the Aegean, the rich geographical partitioning permitted, from antiquity, the development of excellent city-ports of Ionia (Miletus amongst others), and later on (e.g. Çanakkale, Ayvalık, Dikili, Kuşadası), particularly İzmir. The absence of a road communication network permitted, between 1830 and 1860, the growth of coastal shipping and marine commerce.³⁸ This in turn favored the permanent establishment of flourishing trading populations (Greeks, Armenians, Levantines, Europeans and others) in communities in the Aegean zone –though mainly in Smyrna-İzmir³⁹– as well as communities in the Black Sea zone (Sinop, Samsun, Giresun, Trabzon, until Rize), and also those in the hinterland.⁴⁰ The communities in the Black Sea zone, cut off from the railway network, were served by the land road routes, while, in contrast, those

37. A. N. Anagnostopoulos, *Γεωγραφία της Ανατολής* (Geography of Anatolou), v. 1 (Athens, 1922), 7-264; N. K. Spyropoulos, «Μικρά Ασία, Φυσική Γεωγραφία» (Asia Minor, Physical Geography), in *Μεγάλη Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Πυρσός*, v.17 (Athens: Drandakis, 1931), 175-177.

38. Philip Ernest Schoenberg, "The Evolution of Transport in Turkey (Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor) under Ottoman Rule, 1856-1918," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 3 (1977): 363-371, here 359-363.

39. Tzelina Charlaytis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping. The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the present day* (London: Routledge, 1996), 50-51.

40. Charles Dufayard, *L'Asie Mineure et l'Hellénisme* (Paris : F. Alcan, 1919), 43-52.

communities in the Aegean zone could make the use of the newly-fledged railway network.⁴¹

The political-military decision of the Sublime Porte to build a railway network in the Balkans and Asia Minor with the involvement of the Europeans

i. The alliance of the Sublime Porte with the European powers. The Crimean War and its implications

From the first half of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity was in a state of disintegration. One reason for this was the Russo-turkish wars (1828, 1853, 1877), though efforts were made by the Sublime Porte's leadership to influence European opinion favourably through a series of reformist policies (1839, 1856, 1864). Western powers (Great Britain and France) supported the Empire so as to control the maritime routes of the Eastern Mediterranean and the connection of Anatolia with Europe.⁴² On the 4th of October 1853, emboldened by Anglo-french support, the Ottomans declared war on Russia, while also throwing in its lot in the conflict – known as the Crimean War (1853-1856) – was the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The war concluded with the defeat of Russia and the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty.

The outcome of the Crimean War was interesting. The Russians waived the right to protect the Orthodox population against the Ottoman

41. Georgios Tsotsos and Eleni Gavra, "An approach to the route network of Asia Minor in early 20th century," *Balkan Studies* 52 (2017): 79-116, in <https://www.imxa.gr/publish/balkanstudies-index.htm>; Georgios P. Tsotsos, «Συμβολή στη μελέτη του δικτύου των πόλεων-λιμανιών της Μικράς Ασίας στο δεύτερο μισό του 19ου και τις αρχές του 20ού αιώνα» (A contribution to the study of port-cities network in Asia Minor in the second half of 19th and early 20th century), in *Proceedings of the International Conference "Port Cities and Maritime routes in Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea (18th - 21th century)"*, Harokopeio University, Athens 22-24/11/2018, map 1, (under publication); Evangelos P. Dimitriadis and Dimitris P. Drakoulis, «Τα σιδηροδρομικά λιμάνια του μακεδονοθρακικού χώρου του τέλους του 19ου αιώνα» (The railway ports of Macedonia and Thrace at the end of 19th century), in *Proceedings of the International Conference "Port Cities and Maritime routes in Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea (18th-21th century)"*, Harokopeio University, Athens, 22-24/11/2018, (under publication).

42. France's interest increased enormously following the decision (1854) and final implementation of opening the Egyptian Suez Canal (1869). On the other hand, Russia was applying strategies for gaining access to the Aegean and controlling the Dardanelles.

Empire (the revoking of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji 1774) and withdrew their ambitions regarding the Danubian Principalities. They also abandoned the Danube delta, while an international committee dictated shipping regulations on the river, while Russia was prohibited from shipping in the Black Sea. The Ottomans, for their part, wishing to show good will in an effort to join the great European powers, introduced the Hatt-i Humayun reforms by imperial decree in 1856, which allowed full equality to all the Empire's subjects, irrespective of race or creed. Also discussed on a political level, was the creation of a railway network in the Balkans.⁴³

ii. The political will of the Sublime Porte for the Istanbul-Vienna railway connection

The Sublime Porte decided in the 1870s, to proceed with an older plan, to build a railway line linking Istanbul with Europe. The objective was to increase the Sublime Porte's influence in the remote regions of the Balkans, while at the same time collecting the corresponding taxes. On the other hand, it was motivated to bolster its prestige in the eyes of the European powers, with whose help it had waged the victorious Crimean War (1853-1856). The Sublime Porte's plan coincided with that of European investors, while serving the geopolitical ambitions of Great Britain and France regarding their dominance over the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the Balkans and the Middle East (Table 1).⁴⁴

Though the ethno-political situation in the Balkans was not propitious for such a massive construction project, the Sultan Abdülaziz conceded the construction licence for the Istanbul-Vienna line to the representative of the European construction companies and capital, Maurice de Hirsch.⁴⁵ Hirsch, scion of a German banking family, established the construction company, the "Imperial Turkish European Railway" in


43. Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War, 1853-1856* (London: Arnold, 1999); Trevor Royle, *Crimea, The great Crimean War 1854-1856* (London: Abacus Books, 2003); Badem Candan, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

44. Peter Hertner, "The Balkan railways, international capital and banking from the end of the 19th century until the outbreak of the First World War," *Discussion papers* 53 (2006): 5-21.

45. Kurt Grunwald, *Turkenhirsch: A study of Baron Maurice de Hirsch, entrepreneur and philanthropist* (New York: Daniel Davey & Co., 1966), 9. O Maurice de Hirsch (1831-1896) was the main financier for the Vienna – Istanbul (Chemins de fer orientaux or CO) line which also served the famous Orient Express.

Paris in 1869. In 1875, the Sublime Porte faced a financial crisis as well as a great famine. Revolts raged in the Balkans, a Russo-turkish conflict was underway and Istanbul was threatened by a Russian-bulgarian-romanian power alliance. The Congress of Berlin of 1878 intervened and managed to restore peace.⁴⁶ Following a series of political and economic complications, the continuation of the works was eventually signed after long delays (1883). Inter-state agreements followed and the southern section of the Niš - Üsküp line was completed and connected with Serbia's railways (SDZ) in 1888. Thus, Selanik was eventually linked up with the rest of the European network and became a type of "railway-port" city.

Table 1: The position of the Ottoman Empire between the West and the Middle East




Source: Methodological diagram of the project

46. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878. Die Politik der Großmächte und die Probleme der Modernisierung in Südost-europa in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1982). The Berlin Congress also resolved to create a four-member committee (Austro-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire), since, due to the new political reality, the railway line fell under spatially the four abovementioned states.

iii. The railway line route in the Macedonian-thracian area

With the project now assigned to M. de Hirsch in 1869, construction of the railway network got underway, 335km of the 1,550km being the section crossing the macedonian region. The project began at the same time from Istanbul, Selanik, Dedeağaç and Vranji. By 1896, and after constant wrangling, 1,125km was delivered with Selanik being eventually connected with its hinterland. The construction was carried out in three stages: A) Selanik–Mitrovica via Üsküp (1871-1874) 352km, which also included B) a smaller secondary line of 85km Üsküp–Vranji (1885-1888), which linked Selanik to the European network via Niš. C) The final stage included two separate programmes: 1) Selanik–Manastır (mod. Bitola), (1891-1894) 219km with German capital, and 2) Selanik–Dedeağaç, (1893-1896) 440km with French and Dutch capital, which was the “uniting line” with Istanbul (Table 2 and Map 1).⁴⁷

Table 2: Sectional European connection of Thessaloniki–Vienna via the CO (Chemins de fer Orientaux) line



Source: Gounaris, “Railway construction,” 144.

47. Gounaris, “Railway construction in Macedonia,” 144.

Map 1: The route of the railway network in the southern Balkan area



Designed by: Dimitris P. Drakoulis

iv. The new railway ports in the Southern Balkans

Selanik (modern Thessaloniki)

Towards the end of the first half of the 19th century, when the area was passing through an economic phase from the feudal to mercantile Capitalism, Thessaloniki, with the primary features of a mercantile city, also gained the function of a railway port.⁴⁸ It should also be noted that through the transition from Ottoman feudal to mercantile Capitalism in the Balkans, two typical kinds of settlements emerged: A) the old type,

48. Evangelos P. Dimitriadis, "The harbour of Thessaloniki: Balkan hinterland and historical development," in *Αρμός: τμητικός τόμος στον καθηγητή Ν. Κ. Μουτσόπουλο*, ed. Georgios Velenis (Thessaloniki: A.U.Th., 1990), 541-561, here 547-554.

where the bazaar economy persisted⁴⁹ B) the “mercantile city” type, where conditions of the early capital market and storage of goods under the supervision of European investors operated.⁵⁰

In Ottoman Selanik, commerce concentrated around the traditional artisan markets, the centre of which being at the junction of today’s Venizelou and Egnatia streets, where the Bedesten was located, the market for valuable goods established at the end of the 15th century. The daily market (çarşı) comprised an ensemble of small stores grouped according to craft in a complex of small, narrow streets often covered by wooden-roof constructions.⁵¹ Between 1866 and 1875 the city’s sea-front underwent a transformation and following the demolition of the seawall (1866), opened out towards the sea with a new quay and road and acquired functions for leisure and commerce, coupled with the activation—linking up the port and the railway network. The city-railway port was modernised with an urban plan, introducing infrastructure (central water supply, public lighting, trams, etc.), principally from European companies in the section below Egnatia Street, while Ano Poli (the old upper town) remained still a city-bazaar. To the NW beyond the walls, an area of small manufacturers, transportation firms and dwellings of the low paid or refugees began to spring up around the port and railway station, while contrastingly on the eastern side of the city, those earning high incomes were concentrated. (Figures 1 and 2).⁵²

49. Clifford Geertz, “The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing,” *The American Economic Review* 68, no. 2 (May 1978): 28-32.

50. Evangelos P. Dimitriadis, “The Rebirth of the Settlements in Greece during the Late Ottoman Period,” in *A History of the Greek city*, ed. Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos (Oxford: British Archaeological Reports, 2009), 301-312.

51. Dimitris P. Drakoulis, «Η ιστορική αστική γεωγραφία της οθωμανικής Θεσσαλονίκης (17ος αιώνας). Η μαρτυρία του Evliya Çelebi» (The Historical Urban Geography of 17th century Ottoman Selanik. The evidence from Evliya Çelebi), in *Πολιτισμός και Χώρος στα Βαλκάνια. 17ος-20ός αιώνας*, ed. Eleni Gavra and Georgios Tsotsos (Thessaloniki: University of Macedonia, 2015), 143-170, here 154-157 and fig. 8.

52. Olga Traganou-Deligianni, «Η αρχή της βιομηχανικής ανάπτυξης της Θεσσαλονίκης» (The beginning of the industrial development of Thessaloniki), *Αρχαιολογία* 7 (1983): 97-101; Evangelos P. Dimitriadis, «Ο εκσυγχρονισμός της Θεσσαλονίκης κατά το δεύτερο μισό του 19ου αιώνα» (The modernization of Thessaloniki in the second half of the 19th century), in *Θεσσαλονίκη ανάδειξις. Χαρτών Ανάμνησις*, ed. Paraskevas Savvaidis (Thessaloniki: Ethniki Chartothiki, 2008), 143-155.

Dedeagaç (modern Alexandroupolis)


The choice of the relatively empty beach zone of Dedeagaç (Decree of 30/06/1870), with its numerous environmental drawbacks –it was a swamp, without a harbour, exposed to strong winds and virtually devoid of residents– was due to the decision that this location would be the terminus of the junction of two railway lines. Initially of a SW deviation of the eastern railways (CO) and later of the linking line Selanik–Istanbul (JSC).⁵³ Originally, there was a small settlement of fishermen from Samothrace in the area. Mainly labourers and technicians from the railway company formed the first urban core in 1872.⁵⁴ In the period 1876-1878, during the Russo-turkish War, the area was occupied by the Russian army and Russian officers-engineers, supported by the small local Greek community, laid out the street plan of the new town. The design for the new town extended along a seafront with a width of 150m and length of 500m (i.e. 7.5Ha). This comprised three series of blocks according to the “hypodamian system” (checkerboard grid), with a slight deviation from the parallel on the shore (15 degrees). The blocks had variable lengths in order from the shore of 48m, 36m and 24m and a breadth of 20-24m. The intention of forming identical plots is apparent. The average street width in the road network was around 8m and open spaces/squares were created between the 2nd and 3rd line of blocks, the first being cyclical (35m diameter) and the second oblong (35x60m). Despite its urban format of plots, the 1878 plan does not indicate the siting of public or other business spaces, apart from in the south section.⁵⁵ (Figures 3-4).

53. The choice of establishing the railway hub at Dedeagaç stoked intense controversy with the neighbouring pre-existing and commercially flourishing old town of Enez.

54. Maria K. Temirtsidi, «Από το Δεδέαγατς στην Αλεξανδρούπολη (η ιστορία της πόλης από το 1860 έως το 1920) » (From Dedeagats to Alexandroupolis [the history of the town from 1860 until 1920]) (Postgrad. diss., Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2009), 47-57.

55. Temirtsidi, “Dedeagats,” 62-71.

Figure 1: Selanik (Thessaloniki) in the early 20th century with the railway station and the port to the west of the city




Source: Meyers Reisebücher, *Mittelmeer und seine Küstenstädte* (Leipzig–Wien: Bibliographisches Institut, 1904), 390

Figure 2: The passenger railway station of Selanik between 1895-1900




Source: accessed 24/05/2019,
<https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Salonique-old-railway-station.jpg>

Figure 3: Street plan of the new city of Dedeāğaç, later Alexandroupolis, during its construction phase by the Russians in 1878



Source: Alexandra Karadimou-Yerolymπου, *Μεταξύ Ανατολής και Δύσης. Θεσσαλονίκη και βορειοελλαδικές πόλεις στο τέλος του 19ου αιώνα* (Between East and West. Thessaloniki and Cities of Northern Greece in the end of the 19th century) (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2004), 173


Figure 4: View of the harbour and railway station of Dedeāğaç, 1900



Source: P. S. Athanasiadis, «Αίνος εναντίον Δεδέαγατς για την κατασκευή του λιμανιού τον ΙΘ΄ αιώνα» (Enez vs Dedeāğaç for the construction of the port during the 19th century), in *Σελίδες από την ιστορία της Αλεξανδρούπολης και της γύρω περιοχής*, ed. Alexandra Botonaki (Athens: Σύλλογος Αλεξανδρουπολιτών Αθήνας, 2010), 174

v. The ottoman railway network in Asia Minor and foreign investors
In the second half of the 19th century, the Ottoman government with the financial contribution of the Europeans, built an important railway network in Asia Minor. Britain secured the first concession to build and exploit the İzmir–Aydın line as reward for helping the Sublime Porte in the Crimean War. The granting of other licences followed, while the British and French collaborated on individual railway lines. German investors appeared on the scene from 1871 to create a company for the Eastern Railways, completed in sections during the First World War. Table 3 shows the six basic railway lines with their total length, as well as the foreign companies assigned to build them (Table 3 and Map 2).⁵⁶

Table 3: Routes for the main lines of the ottoman railways in Asia Minor




Source: Kontoyiannis, *Geography of Asia Minor*, appendix

56. Pantelis Kontoyiannis, *Γεωγραφία της Μικράς Ασίας* (Geography of Asia Minor) (Athens: Σύλλογος προς διάδοσιν Οφέλιμων Βιβλίων, 1921), 426-430, appendix.

It is worth noting that in the period 1900-1908, which is beyond the scope of our study, the Ottoman government, for military-political as well as and more importantly for ideological reasons, resolved to build the Damascus–Medina line (1126 miles). This route was of great religious significance. Devout Muslims financed this effort with the assistance of German engineers, such as Heinrich August Meissner Pasha. Later on, the Germans developed Haifa as the Mediterranean terminal of the Hejaz Railway.⁵⁷

Map 2: The Ottoman Empire's railway network in Asia Minor and the Middle East at the end of the 19th century



Designed by Dimitris P. Drakoulis

57. William Otto Henderson, "German Economic Penetration in the Middle East, 1870-1914," *The Economic History Review* 18, no. 1/2 (1948): 54-64, here 61-62, doi: 10.2307/2590262; Robert Tourret, *Hedjaz Railway* (Abingdon, U.K.: Tourret Publishing, 1989); James Nicholson, *The Hejaz Railway* (London: Stacey International, 2005); Francis Richard Maunsell, "The Hejaz Railway," *The Geographical Journal* 32, no. 6 (1908): 570-585, doi: 10.2307/1777519.

vi. Foreign investors and the Europeans' special interest in the Middle East

As previously noted, from the middle until end of the 19th century, certain colonial European states showed an economic, political and ideological interest in investing in the Middle East. A) Great Britain invested 29% in the Ottoman government's public debt (1881), while purchasing 176,000 shares in the Suez company (1875). It possessed Cyprus (1878), its main political and economic objective being the Persian Gulf (Shattel Arab), while controlling Baghdad-Persian commerce. It, also, wished to suppress slavery and the illicit arms trade. The British company, Messrs Lynch Brothers carried out river transport on the Tigris and Euphrates and consolidated the British trade monopoly in the region. B) France invested 39% in the Ottoman's public debt (1881), wanting a stake in commerce in the Near East (Egypt and Syria). In 1902 France invested around 354 million francs in Asian Turkey. C) Russia expressed its growing interest in the Middle East after annexing Kars and Batumi (1878), while establishing a colony in the region of Transcaspien. Between 1888-1897 Russian-persian commercial transactions increased from £2 mill. to £3.5 mill., while the cargo ship Kornilou was undertaking the long voyage, Odessa-Persian Gulf-Bombay (1901).⁵⁸ D) Germany, under Bismarck, aspired to a powerful industrialized Germany which would impose itself economically over central Europe and the Balkans (Austro-Hungary, Pangermanismus⁵⁹). It, also, held ambitions to establish a series of settlements along the Danube as well as other communities along the German railway lines in Asia Minor. The basic economic and symbolic goal for German investors in Turkey was their involvement in the Berlin-Baghdad trunk line project together with other technical projects and in primary production. Between 1880 and 1890, German investors entered the Turkish economy, on the one hand participating in the Ottoman's public debt (1880-1881) and a little later with the setting up of the powerful Deutsche Bank (1887), which together with the other banks, financed

58. Henderson, "German Economic Penetration," 57.

59. Snyder, *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, 397-398. Pangermanismus was a nationalistic political idea carrying much weight in 19th century Germany. It strove to unite all German-speaking peoples under one nation, called "Großdeutschland". See also Mildred Wertheimer, *The Pan-German League, 1890-1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924); Roger Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

the Eastern Ottoman Railway company (1889). Further, Germany's Krupp-Essen factory supplied low-quality armaments at low cost. German shares in the Turkish government rose from 5% (1881) to 20% (1914), with total trade with Turkey rising from £5.5 mill. (1908) to £8.6 mill. (1911).⁶⁰

vii. The new railway ports of İzmir, Istanbul-Haydarpaşa and Mersin

İzmir

The urban complex of İzmir (ancient Smyrna) is located on the SE side of the Gulf of İzmir and is intricate in shape.⁶¹ Thus, an interesting morphological landscape is created with small bays and islets.⁶² The historical centre of the city was arranged around the small "harbour of Galleys," which was later reclaimed and included mixed Ottoman and Christian urban uses intended to serve administrative, religious and commercial objectives.⁶³

The city-bazaar still had a mixed national-religious character. Greeks and Europeans lived in the northern coastal part of the sandy, flat expanse called the Pointée, the Armenians were located in the upper parts, while the Jews were scattered, and the Turks were in the upper town. The inner part of the city had narrow, poorly made streets, a lack of ventilation and hygiene, etc. With regard to the population, the Austrian counsel, Karl von Scherzer (1870) provides the following indicative figures: a total of 155,000 residents, comprising: 45,000 Turks, 75,000 Greeks, 6,000 Armenians, 15,000 Jews and 14,000 Europeans.⁶⁴

60. Henderson, "German Economic Penetration," 54-58.

61. The gulf penetrates around 22km of the land section of Asia Minor, while narrowing to 700m up to the city.

62. Suburbs, such as Kordelio (Karşıyaka), Menemen, Bayraklı, and others, historically were sited there, and were served by coastal ships.

63. Aleka Karadimou-Yerolymou, «Όψεις του αστικού χώρου της Σμύρνης πριν και μετά από την καταστροφή: Εμμονές και ρήξεις» (Aspects of the urban area of Smyrna before and after the disaster: Persistence and ruptures), in *Σμύρνη: Η ανάπτυξη μιας μητρόπολης της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου (17ος αι-1922)*, eds. Ioannis Papachristos and Paraskevas Potiropoulos (Athens: Ethniko Typographeio, 2016), 263-286.

64. Karl Heinrich Ritter von Scherzer, *Smyrna. Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die geographischen, wirtschaftlichen und intellektuellen Verhältnisse von Vorder-Kleinasien* (Wien: Alfred Hölder, 1873), 46-53.

The city underwent qualitative and quantitative changes in the mid-19th century.⁶⁵ Thus, the upper and middle classes emerged, new modern neighbourhoods were built with water, gaslight etc. and a new “mercantile city” was developing. Shipping, commercial and passenger activity increased, while the loading-unloading problem was resolved by a modern dock built by the French company, the Dussaud brothers.⁶⁶ The dock of around 3,300m were divided into two sections, a commercial dock (1,250m in length), which extended from the tip to the customs house in the old town, and the passenger dock (2,075m) which extended from the customs house to the tip of Pointée’s tongue (new extension).⁶⁷

A contemporary street plan (1856-1857) was used for the construction of the section to the North with uniform residential blocks, where the homes of the Greeks were built. These changes to the quay meant that the historic neighbourhood of Frankomachalas (Rue Franque) moved towards the center, while the so-called Verchanes⁶⁸ no longer served the illicit sea trade (Figure 5).

With the city at its peak, the Sublime Porte, with the contribution of English companies, embarked on the creation of a railway network (Table 3 and Map 2) with: A) Alsancak station (1856-1888), in the north section of the Pointée, adjacent to the local harbor, for the Izmir–Aidin–Dinar route and branches at approximately 600km (Route I). B) Basmane station (1863-1893), at a central point, for the Izmir–Manisa route and with a branch to Bandırma (ancient Panormos) (Route IV), and one

65. For example, industry developed (yarn, textiles, food processing and tobacco), while at the same time, work in the tertiary sector increased.


66. Elena Frangakis-Syrett, “The making of an Ottoman port: The quay of Izmir in the nineteenth century,” *Journal of Transport History* 22, no. 1 (2001): 23-46, <https://doi.org/10.7227/TJTH.22.1.3>. For the construction of the quay, the old shoreline was pushed back by between 60 and 100 meters through land reclamation and a road of 18m in width was built, while in the north section, leisure activities (e.g. theatres and hotels) were established.

67. Sibel Zandi-Sayek, “Struggles over the Shore: Building the Quay of Izmir, 1867-1875,” *City and Society* 12, no. 1 (2000): 55-78, doi: 10.1525/city.2000.12.1.55.

68. These were elongated, stone buildings with a double frontage. They had a width of 10-20m and a depth of 70-100m. and were arranged in line in the area of Frankomachalas near Le Pont de Caravan. These caravans served the European-controlled trade from the hinterland and terminated at this bridge.

to Usak–Afyonkarahisar (520km) which met up with the Eastern Ottoman Railway (Route II). With its two railway stations by the end of the 19th century, Izmir had become an important railway port of the Mediterranean⁶⁹ (Figures 6-7).

Figure 5: Map of Smyrna (Izmir), showing the railway stations, Alsancak (top left) and Basmane (centre), and the city's harbours



Source: Demetrius Georgiades, *Smyrne et l'Asie Mineure: Au point de vue économique et commercial*, (Paris: Imprimerie et Librairie Centrales des Chemins de Fer, 1885), 119

69. K. Tsagridis, *Η πόλη της Σμύρνης: Από την Ουτοπία στον Τόπο* (The city of Smyrna: From Utopia to the Place) (Athens: Leader Books, 2001), 13-17, 45-51, 55-59, 62-64, 67-71, 89-96, 111-115.

Figure 6: The coastal railway station Alsancak connected to Smyrna harbour, early 20th century



Source: accessed 22/03/2019,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Alsancak_train_station_izmir.jpg

Figure 7: Smyrna's central railway station Basmane, early 20th century



Source: accessed 24/05/2019,
<http://www.eskiturkiye.net/resimler/izmir-basmane-tren-gari-ve-corakkapi-camii-1920ler.jpg>

The railway port of Haydarpaşa, Istanbul

The area, where the Haydarpaşa railway port was built, is of historical and strategic significance as it was once a Byzantine settlement, as evidenced by the many artefacts discovered there. It is located opposite Istanbul, on the far side of the banks of the Bosphorus, while in Istanbul, is the Ottoman European line's terminus, Sirkeci.⁷⁰ Haydarpaşa was conceded to Chemins de Fer Ottomans d'Anatolie (CFOA) of the Berlin–Baghdad line on the occasion of the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Istanbul in 1898. The Germans indeed had commercial and industrial interests, but more of interest was the political sway they could have on the Ottoman Empire.⁷¹

The railway station was built in 1872, while the port was designed a little later (1899-1903). The central building, rectangular in shape with protruding wings on both sides, was built on reclaimed land from the sea and is surrounded by the sea on three sides. Its neoclassical design was the work of architects Otto Ritter and Helant Cuno⁷² of the Halzmann company of Frankfurt. The building underwent alterations in 1894.⁷³ The harbour had a wide jetty and breakwater 600 metres long as well as a lighthouse on every side. It possessed large warehouses, granaries, cranes, workshops and served 6% of Turkish trade. Here, also, was the train-ferry terminus from the opposite shore, without passengers having to change. In 1912, it served 166 steamships and 179 ships. Between 1888 and 1892 the Haydarpaşa–Eskişehir, 323km, Eskişehir - Konya 433km and Eskişehir–Ankara 264km (Route III) line was completed. German engineers and manufacturers from the work sites established themselves in the nearby area of Haydarpaşa, in the Kadıköy neighbourhood, the population rising to 35,000. From 1888,

70. W.O. Henderson, "German Economic Penetration in the Middle East, 1870-1914," *The Economic History Review* 18, no. 1-2 (1948): 62; L. D. "Railroads in Turkey," *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* 47, no. 12 (1915): 934-940, 59-62; John Freely, *A History of Ottoman Architecture* (Boston: Wit Press, 2011), 424.


71. Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin–Baghdad Express. The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010), 32-53.

72. Freely, *A History*, 423; See also <http://www.trainsofturkey.com/pmwiki.php/Stations/IstanbulHaydarpasa> (accessed 24/05/2019).

73. In the First World War it was used by the British army. Its future is to date still under discussion, while at present it is one of Turkey's important container stations.

Deutsche Bank with other investors took over the control of the Anatolian Railway Company (Anatolische Eisenbahngesellschaft) (Figures 8-11).

Figure 8: Detail from a map of Istanbul, showing the Sirkeci station on the European side on the left and, below right, the Haydarpaşa railway station and port on the Asian side



Source: accessed 22/03/2019,
<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/IstanbulPU889.jpg>

Figure 9: Port facilities at the Haydarpaşa railway port



Source: accessed 24/05/ 2019, adjusted from
<http://www.trainsofturkey.com/uploads/Stations/track-haydarpasa.jpg>

Figure 10: The Sirkeci railway station in Istanbul



Source: accessed 24/05/2019,
<https://www.pinterest.com.au/pin/492088696762090219/?lp=true>

Figure 11: The Haydarpaşa railway station on the Asian side of Istanbul



Source: accessed 24/05/2019,
<http://www.trainsofturkey.com/uploads/Stations/constantinople-haydarpasa-old-station.jpg>

The Mediterranean railway port of Mersin

In the first half of the 19th century, Mersin was a small village, but thanks to the large-scale internal migration from the region's farming areas (Ancient Cilicia) with their rich agricultural resources, rapidly acquired the features of the "port-city" (Figure 12).⁷⁴ With the establishing of equality of citizens under the Tanzimat, more foreign traders, particularly Greeks and Levantines, took the opportunity to establish themselves. Around 1830 the coastal zone began to grow at a rapid pace, as did the town's commerce with France, Arab countries, Britain and Smyrna, whose boom was particularly helped by the American Civil War (1860), with exports of farm products from the hinterland,

74. Tolga Ünlü, "Transformation of a Mediterranean port city into a 'city of clutter': Dualities in the urban landscape—The case of Mersin," *Cities* 30, no. 9 (2013): 175-185, here 177-178, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2012.03.004>.

such as cotton, wool, barley, sesame etc. Growth continued initially with the building of the Mersin-Adana road (1878) and thereafter with the railway (1886) (Route V) (Table 3 and Map 2).


The existing customs' square with the new dock (110m in length and 12m in width) was traditionally the centre of the town with the surrounding buildings and the neighbouring yoghurt bazaar, farming and livestock market. Two roads, parallel with the coast, started from the customs: a) the western road, Kışla, which led to the retail market and the residential area and b) the eastern road, Uray which led to the international commercial area with its banks, warehouses, offices, and later extended to the railway station.⁷⁵ Between 1863 and 1882, the new street-planning regulation was implemented with new land plots according to the checker board grid system ("hypodamian"). And thus, the originally unplanned, organic town of Mersin became under the new plan, linear, developing along the length of the coast. Being dominated by the entrepreneurial elite and the multi-ethnic culture, it turned into a cosmopolitan center of the East, with its restaurants, casinos, entertainment centers, etc.⁷⁶ The Mersin–Tarsus–Adana railway line (67km) (1883-1886) was built by British investors, later to be sold to the French (1892) (Route V). The railway line was later integrated into the Baghdad railway company (Anatolian Railway Company – Anatolische Eisenbahngesellschaft) (Route VI) (Table 3 and Map 2).⁷⁷

75. Customs-railway station communication for transporting goods was originally achieved by dekoville and later (1920) by tram.

76. See Alfred Cuda, "Stadtaufbau in der Türkei," *Die Welt des Islams* 21 (1939): 43-47, and fig. 14, doi: 10.2307/1569072; Ünlü, "Transformation," 180. Following Hermann Jansen's urban plan (1938) the central republic square was built, which expressed the nationalist policy of the new Turkish state, in combination with the existing traditional Customs square.

77. <http://www.trainsofturkey.com/pmwiki.php/History/MTA>(accessed 24/05/2019).

Figure 12: Section of the town plan design of Mersin and a panoramic view of the town from the early 20th century



Source: Ünlü, “Transformation,” 179, figure 3

Observations

i. Economic, political and ideological ambitions of the Europeans in the construction of the Ottoman Empire’s railway network

Towards the end of the 19th century and at the turn of the 20th century, the railway network of the Ottoman Empire belonged to European investors (English, French, Germans) who represented their own economic, political and ideological interests. The Sublime Porte, in contrast owned, the unique railway line Hejaz (Damascus–Medina) which served religious and political-economic objectives.

British companies were the first in 1856 to undertake connecting Izmir with its hinterland, applying the “penetration line” model, where

the railway line set out from a port and penetrated the hinterland, transporting British goods and returning with raw materials from the interior.⁷⁸

The French involvement, religious and cultural, was mainly around the Levant, and whose ultimate objective was to establish a colony there. The French railway network served, as a “closed system” within the Ottoman Empire’s railway network, cities in today’s Syria, Lebanon and Israel (Aleppo, Hama, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem). At the same time, the French government interfered strongly into the affairs of the Sublime Porte. There was in general intensive competition between the English and the French over the management of the railway networks.⁷⁹

The German investors, a strong presence when it came to providing loans, technology and companies, were interested in trunk lines, such as the Berlin–Baghdad line, for the following reasons: A) As an alternative land route to the Middle East, on the one hand, while avoiding the control imposed by the British and the French at sea with the Suez canal (1869). B) On the other, because it was interested in products and cheap raw materials from the interior. C) They eyed military profits from the Sublime Porte in the event of war with the Europeans. Meanwhile, the Russians and the British baulked at the idea of building a Berlin–Baghdad line right up until the Potsdam Conference of 1909.⁸⁰

Finally, the unique 1,800km Hejaz line belonged to the Sublime Porte and was constructed by German companies through gifts from devout Muslims. After 1922, all the railway network returned to the ownership of the secular Turkish government, with multiple benefits, while being the “skeleton” for other countries, such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Saudi Arabia.⁸¹

78. L. D. “Railroads in Turkey,” *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* 47, no. 12 (1915): 935, doi: 10.2307/201343.

79. William I. Shorrock, “The Origin of the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon: The Railroad Question, 1901-1914,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1, no. 2 (1970): 133-153, doi: 10.2307/162437.

80. Charles H. Woods, “The Baghdad Railway and its Tributaries,” *The Geographical Journal* 50, no. 1 (1917): 32-56, doi: 10.2307/1779676.

81. Henderson, “German Economic Penetration in the Middle East, 1870-1914,” 62; L. D., “Railroads in Turkey,” 934-940.

ii. Assessing the Ottoman's railway network vis-à-vis the main railway ports of the southern Balkans and Asia Minor

The railway network of the southern Balkans was built between 1871 and 1896 in three phases by European investors with the contribution of the Sublime Porte and connected Istanbul–Vienna through two main railway hubs: A) Initially Istanbul–Edirne–Sofia–Vienna. B) and a little later Istanbul–Selanik–Üsküp–Niš–Vienna. The railway network followed largely the directions of the ancient Roman roads of *Via Militaris* and *Via Egnatia*. Settlements along or close by the ancient road network benefitted from the development of this route.⁸²

The first line was built in Asia Minor, starting from Smyrna, in the period 1856-1892, and then up until the turn of the century. The other routes followed in stages, under the same investment terms and supervision. The basic railway axis was the Istanbul–İskenderun line, which followed largely the pre-existing road axis. The Asia Minor railway network, as enlarged later, mainly served the western section (roughly 1/3) of Asia Minor and left out large swathes and important towns in the interior and on the coasts.

In both instances –the European and the Asian section– one observes an economic accommodation on the part of a submissive Sublime Porte to the needs of the investors. Investors attempted to oversee twice the eastern Mediterranean, by sea and land, with the respective railway ports which economically controlled their hinterland. On this subject, there was cooperation between European companies which had their headquarters in the basic railway ports and the local international commercial elite. However, since it had not received any state backing, the local economy participated little in the production–transportation–consumption chain, while at the same time being dealt a heavy blow by the new railway, which had seriously undermined the ancient trade fairs and caravan routes, which until then had met the needs sufficiently.⁸³

82. Arno Mehlan, «Οι εμπορικοί δρόμοι στα Βαλκάνια κατά την Τουρκοκρατία» (The trade Routes in the Balkans under Turkish Rule), in *The economic structure of the Balkan countries*, ed. Spyros Asdrachas (Athens: Melissa, 1979), 369-407.

83. Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 119.

iii. Western–Middle East geopolitical relationships at the end of the 19th century in view of the Ottoman railway network

Following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire between 1918 and 1945, the ruling powers in the Arabian East were Great Britain and France. After the Second World War, Britain retained its interest in the Arabian Middle East until one by one the countries of the old Ottoman Empire (Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and Libya) gained their political independence, while in 1948 the state of Israel was founded.⁸⁴ During the 19th century, the peoples of the Middle East became aware of the discomforting reality that their resources, civilization and even their way of life were under threat from a Europe which highlighted, to its own benefit, many areas of activities, including the military, the scientific and research. The original feelings of admiration were to be replaced by envy. Even the West's values themselves were open to challenge and criticism. Lamentably, it is generally admitted, that apart from vanishingly few exceptions, the values of the previous regimes were collapsing, without new values replacing the old, which would reflect middle eastern peoples. The geopolitical result was a geographical carve-up and the division into controlled states, which lacked, for various reasons, the concept of the "nation-state," already created in the southern Balkans over the 19th century. This slow process continued throughout the 20th century. The two World Wars demonstrated the significance of oil in the industrialised West and placed greater value on the Middle East, particularly through the large oil companies established in those areas. Thus, one by one, the control of the Middle East by the West, was turned from indirect to continuous and direct.

84. Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, 218-219, note 14.

Kriton Kuci – Emilio Cika***

**Narrating Albanianism.
Primordialist and Perennialist Themes in Albanian
Historiography¹**

Nationalism, nation and national narrative

It is widely accepted that Nationalism is an extensive, world-wide spread ideology that creates, reproduces and preserves nations. Nationalism, being one of the components of the modern world, is a feature of modernity and not older periods of history. Nationalism as an ideology has shaped modern common sense. The common sense we have about nationhood, nation, homeland and nationalism itself, as well as the psychology of national ties must be considered as products of Nationalism and placed within the historicity of Nationalism.²

This common sense includes a series of assumptions (considered self-evident) about what the nation, nationality and homeland is. About the fact that the world is composed of nations and divided between nations. About the fact that people who speak a common language have common roots and therefore deserve to have their own independent state. About the fact that “We” are autochthonous while “They” have come to “our” territories, “our” lands, so they have to leave where they came from. About the fact that the “Albanian” will never become “Greek” or vice versa. About the fact that the national identity is and should be the most important of all other identities one might have. About the fact that the religion of Albanians is “Albanianism,” etc. This common sense is an integral part of nationhood and plays an important role in the process of the social construction of the nation.

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1. A first draft of this paper was presented at the “Balkan Worlds IV: The “Great Ideas” of the Balkans (18th-20th c.) International Conference organized by the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece November 29th-December 1st, 2018.

2. Michael Billig, *Banal nationalism* (London: SAGE, 1995), 16.

Nationalism as an ideology, however, has also affected the ways we study nation and Nationalism itself. It is quite difficult to ignore these assumptions or ways of thinking, or not to be affected by common sense practices that derive from the fact that “we” live in a national environment, in a nation-state, and that the world consists of other nations, of “others” who like “us” live in “their own” nation states. There is a tendency to take the nation for granted, as something natural. This trend is present not only in our daily interactions, but in Social Sciences and Humanities Studies as well. Social Sciences tend to consider nation as a given unit of analysis. In this way, the image of a world composed of nations and divided between nations is naturalized and the nation state is presented as the natural political and social form of the modern world. This is what different scholars have named “methodological nationalism”³ that is, in simple terms, the tendency of social sciences to equate the nation-state with society.⁴ Social sciences perceive and analyze social phenomena around the boundaries of the nation-state, and this creates a set of obstacles in order to capture some important social interactions. The structure and content of the major Social Sciences has been linked to and shaped by the historic experience of the creation of modern nation-states. Main Social Sciences such as Sociology, Economics, Anthropology, International Relations etc. were constructed according to the principles of the nation states.⁵ The concept of the nation was considered such ordinary such banal (in Michael Billig’s words) as to disappear from the lens of the scientific research. History in the twentieth century was also written as history of particular nation states or as history of relations between nation states. By taking national stereotypes, national discourses and themes and sometimes even national myths for granted, history has contributed in the process of naturalizing the nation and the image of a world divided between nations.

3. Among others: Herminio Martins, “Time and theory in sociology,” in *Approaches to Sociology*, ed. John Rex (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974). Daniel Chernilo, “The critique of methodological nationalism: Theory and history,” *Thesis Eleven* 106, no. 1 (2011): 98-2011. Alex Sager, “Methodological nationalism, migration and political theory,” *Political Studies* 64, no. 1 (November 2014), doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12167.

4. Daniel Chernilo, *A social theory of the nation state. The political forms of modernity beyond methodological nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2007), 9.

5. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences,” *Global network* 2, no. 4 (2002): 301-334.

National historians when producing or reproducing national histories, speak of nations with unique languages, customs and traditions. Each nation has a distinct past, present and future, “its own” separate symbols and a single name. National histories present nation as something almost eternal, its roots are to be found in a distant and glorious past. National history as a narrative follows the rules of narrative discourse,⁶ it must have a beginning, a plot and a continuity. National histories talk about “Us.” “Us,” who are unique, who descend from the ancient “Greeks” or “Illyrians” or “Celts” and so on.

This uniqueness, however, is not unique because the world is made up of other nations, which in turn are unique as well. The national “Us” does not include only one national, unique community. It is precisely this “blend of universality and peculiarity that allows nations to proclaim themselves as nations.”⁷ If the nation is an imagined community⁸ than “the homeland,” every “homeland,” should also be imagined, “our” and “others” as well. We cannot imagine our own nation without the imagination of other similar communities. There is no “Us” without “Them.”

The historical national narrative chooses to deal with some elements of the past and chooses to neglect others. This reflects the dialectic relationship located at the heart of Nationalism, the relationship between memory and amnesia.⁹ The nation, has a collective amnesia just like it has a collective memory. This means that collective memory is always selective and therefore some not so flattering parts of “our” national history must be forgotten. The national narrative follows a selective path as well.

The nation, the national identity, the imagination of the homeland, are constructed (although not exclusively) through these selective historical national narratives. However, official nationalist narrative re-

6. Homi K Bhabha, “DisemiNation: time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation,” in *Narrating the nation*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 291-323.

7. Billig, *Banal nationalism*, 16.

8. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised edition* (UK: Verso, 2006).

9. Ernest Gellner, *Έθνη και εθνικισμός* (Athens: Alexandraia, 1992), 108; Billig, *Banal nationalism*, 37-43.

flects balances of hegemony, therefore national narratives are continually subject to change.¹⁰ In this sense the nation itself, the national identity and the imagination of the homeland, are always subject to change.

Albanian historiography between primordialism and perennialism

In recent years efforts have been made in order to review some periods and subjects of the Albanian history that traditionally have been presented through a nationalistic narrative,¹¹ however, the dominant discourse remains the nationalist one. The official Albanian historiography offers a “glorified” explanatory scheme¹² of the reasons for the emergence of the Albanian nationalism using terms such as “national re-birth,” “revival of the nation,” or “awakening of the nation,” which resemble the terms used by nationalists or primordialist scholars of Nationalism.¹³ The period 1830-1912 is called “National Revival” and the most important nationalists of the era are called “Renaissance men” (Rilindas).

10. Ibid.

11. Bernd Fischer states: “The traditional narrative accepted by most Albanian scholars, as well as some prominent western scholars of Albanian topics, was a narrative of struggle to free Albania from the oppressors which included all neighbors but concentrated particularly on the Ottomans who took control of Albanian lands beginning in the 15th century. Some more nationalist minded historians suggest that the struggle for freedom and independence dates as far back as 15th century, the era of the Albanian national hero Skanderbeg and progressed in linear fashion from that day. ...the more extreme official histories, particularly those from the socialist period which are still often repeated today, argue that substantial popular gatherings supported the nationalists/patriots and that on the eve of the Balkan Wars, a vast movement demanding independence arose across Albania, demonstrating the remarkable level of political maturity, the masses had achieved.” Bernd Fischer, “Albanian nationalism and Albanian independence,” *SEEU Review Special Edition*, Volume 10, Issue 1 (2014): 25-26.

12. Regarding the subject of the simplistic explanation of Albanian historiography on issues related to Albanian Nationalism and the relation between Communism and Nationalism during the Enver Hoxha regime, a very interesting scientific article is: Jonilda Rrapaj and Klevis Kolasi, “The curious case of Albanian Nationalism: the crooked line from a scattered array of clans to a nation state,” in *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Volume 43 (2013): 185-228.

13. Ernest Gellner states that the nationalist ideologist claims that nations exist by the very nature of things and they simply wait for them to wake them up. Gellner, *Εθνη και εθνικισμός*, 93.

Influenced by the “national-communist” ideology, Albanian history during the period 1945-1990 is analyzed in a dogmatic way.¹⁴ However even during the post-communist period, it seems that little has changed in the way in which Albanian historiography addresses themes related to Albanian nationalism.¹⁵ In 2002, the Academy of Sciences of Albania, the most important scientific and intellectual institution in the country, published the first two volumes of the four-volume project “History of the Albanian People.” In 2007 and 2008, the other two volumes were published. It is basically a re-publishing the earlier editions of the “History of Albania” published in 1959 and 1965. The new version avoids the Marxist approach of history but fails to avoid the nationalist approach. The title of the book has changed from “History of Albania” to “History of the Albanian People,” but the primordialist and perennialist approach to issues related with nation and Nationalism prevails.

The themes of common origin, territory and language¹⁶ related to the primordialist approach of Nationalism and the theme of the historical continuity of the nation¹⁷ related to perennialism, are widely present in the first two volumes. The common origin is the central theme of primordialism. Perennialism, also, supports the idea that ethnic community is a basic, timeless feature of human society throughout the recorded history and that the present nations are the result of an historical process and have developed over the centuries, therefore they are present in the Middle Ages and the Antiquity as well.¹⁸ Primordialism is

14. Robert Elsie, “Albania, a Modern History,” review of *Albania, a Modern History*, by Miranda Vickers, February 3, 1999 <<http://www.elsie.de/pdf/reviews/-R1999VickersAlbania.pdf>>. Robert Elsie, *Historical dictionary of Albania* (UK: Scarecrow Press Inc, 2010), 11.

15. Fatos Lubonja, “Mbi nevojën e dekonstruktimit të miteve” (The need for the deconstruction of the myths), *Përpyjekja*, Year VI, no. 15-16, (1999): 5. This edition of the Review “Përpyjekja” includes all papers presented at the Scientific Conference on “The Role of Myth in History and Development of Albania,” London, June 1999. Some of these papers were published in the book by Stephanie Schwander-Sievers and Bernd Fischer (eds.), *Albanian Identities. Myth and history* (UK: C. Hurst & CO Publishers, 2002).

16. Jonathan Hearn, *Rethinking nationalism. A critical introduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 20.

17. Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and modernism. A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998), 159.

18. Umut Ozkirimli, *Θεωρίες του εθνικισμού. Μία κριτική προσέγγιση* (Athens: Sideris, 2013), 100.

based primarily on the concept of ethnicity and secondly on the notion of nationalism. The first is extended to the second. Primordialists consider ethnicity central to the understanding of Nationalism. Nationalism is seen as a later evolution of earlier ethnic processes. Perennialism is a less extreme approach which emphasizes on the historicity and continuity of the nation. The modern character of Nationalism is not questioned, but on the other hand the nations are considered as a continuation of ethnicity that has been present in all periods of human history. So, the emphasis is placed on the historicity of ethnic and national ties, and not necessarily at their naturalness.¹⁹

According to official Albanian historiography, the Albanian nation, is the natural descendant of the Illyrians therefore, the history of the Albanian people begins with the Illyrians. The first part of the first volume of the “History of the Albanian People” is entitled “The Illyrians.” According to Muzafer Korkuti, the theories of the Illyrian origin express two views: “According to the first view, Illyrians have come to the Balkan Peninsula, according to the second they are an autochthonous population formed in the historic land of Illyria.” Then he follows: “the theories that Illyrians have come and are not autochthonous to the Balkan Peninsula have inconsistencies,” while the other theories “consider the Illyrian culture as a phenomenon that has historically been formed in the Illyrian territory through a long and uninterrupted process.” He argues that “archaeological research over the last 50 years in Albania shows that Illyrian ethnicity should not be linked to the coming of populations from the northern Balkans but as a long and complex autochthonous process.”²⁰

The modernist approach of Nationalism rejects these perennial themes and considers nations as social and historical constructions, emphasizing on the modernity of nations and Nationalism.²¹ However, in the “History of the Albanian people” the historical continuity of the nation is presented as a natural phenomenon. This is suggested not only

19. Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and modernism. A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998), 159.

20. Skender Anamali and Kristaq Prifti (eds.), *Historia e popullit shqiptar. V.1. Ilirët, mesjeta, Shqipëria nën Perandorinë Osmane gjatë shek.XVI vitet 20 të shek.XIX* (The history of the Albanian people. V.1. The Illyrians, the Middle ages, Albania under the Ottoman Empire rule through XVI century-first 20 years of the XIX Century) (Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave, TOENA, 2002), 40-41.

21. Ozkirimli, *Θεωρίες του εθνικισμού*, 119-121.

by the content of the book but by its structure also. The book begins with the Neolithic period and continues with the Illyrians, their origin, their territories and their language. Then the book deals with the Illyrian states. It devotes a chapter to Epirus and the Epirote League to continue with the Illyrian wars and the Kingdom of Dardania. The second part concerns the Middle Ages. The writers use the terms “Albania” and “Albanians” to describe what they earlier described as “Illyria” and “Illyrians.” The first sub-chapter of the second part is entitled “Albania in the Byzantine Empire” with the subtitle “Albania and Byzantium.” From this point the terms “Albania” and “Albanian” are used in the headings of chapters and subchapters. The theme of the historical continuity of the nation prevails and this seems to be clear by the use of the term “Illyrian-Albanian lands,” used in the second part of the first volume to describe a vast geographical area, but also by the use of the term “Illyrian-Albanians” to describe the inhabitants of these areas. The term “Illyrian -Albanian territories” is used along with the term “Albanian territories” only on some pages related to the period from 395 BC to 500 AD.²²

Later on, the terms “Albanian territories,” “Albanian coasts,” “Albania” and so on are used. At about the same time, the inhabitants of these areas are called “Illyrian-Albanians” and terms such as “Illyrian-Albanian origin,” “autochthonous Illyrian-Albanian populations,” “Illyrian-Albanian groups” are used.²³

The perennial theme that nations develop organically from a pre-existing ethnic background²⁴ prevails. When analyzing the “structure of the Albanian space in the Middle Ages” it is stated that: “From the seventh to the eighth century, the ethnic situation in the Balkans has stabilized.” In the same chapter the writers refer to Albania as the “medieval homeland of the Albanians.”²⁵ The idea of the natural expansion and transformation of ethnicity into a nation is present not only in this book, but it characterizes the Albanian historiography in general. Kristo Frashëri is considered one of the most important Albanian historians.

22. Anamali and Prifti (eds.), *Historia e popullit shqiptar* (The history of the Albanian people), 199-205.

23. Ibid, 527-565, 206.

24. Jonathan Hearn, *Rethinking nationalism. A critical introduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 20.

25. Anamali and Prifti (eds.), *Historia e popullit shqiptar* (The history of the Albanian people), 202, 207.

His book “Etnogjeneza e shqiptarëve. Vështrim historik” begins with the following phrase: “Just like it happens with individuals, nations are interested in knowing where they come from, who were their ancestors, where and when they lived, what were their values and so on. This is because every nation, whether ancient or medieval, has its genetic ancestors, of which it has inherited the territory, the language, the material and the spiritual culture, and in some cases the name too.”²⁶ It is widely suggested by the Albanian historiography that nations create Nationalism and not vice versa.²⁷ This position is strongly rejected by modernists who consider that it is Nationalism that creates nations.

Albanian historiography analyzes and describes the past in glorious and glamorous ways using terms and criteria belonging to the era of Nationalism to describe phenomena of earlier times.²⁸ A characteristic example is sub-chapter 4 of the fifth chapter entitled “International relations of Albania in the period of Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbej (1443-1468),” which analyzes “Albania's international relations with the states of Southeastern Europe.”²⁹

Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbej is the central figure around which “the mythology of Albanian nationalism” was constructed,³⁰ Skenderbej’s “mythology” was reinforced by Albanian writers and poets during the first phase of the Albanian nationalism and continued throughout the existence of the Albanian state. Fatos Lubonja states that the fact that

26. Kristo Frashëri, *Etnogjeneza e shqiptarëve. Vështrim historik* (The ethnogenesis of the Albanians. Historic overview) (Tiranë: Botime M&B, 2013), 9.

27. “The Albanian National Revival was linked to a higher level of development of the Albanian nation, with its consolidation, which led to the creation of a new movement in terms of its content and its aims, of Nationalism...” Anamali and Prifti (eds.), *Historia e popullit shqiptar* (The history of the Albanian people), 18.

28. According to Fatos Lubonja “The history that the Albanians have learned and continue to learn, according to the official national-communist historiography of the time of Enver Hoxha, analyzes the important historical periods in a glorious way. The Illyrian period: their culture is compared to its evolution with the Greek civilization. The middle Ages are considered a period of blossoming of the Albanian culture. The Ottoman invasion is considered as the main cause of regression. The National Awakening is considered as a great effort to liberate from Turkey and recover the lost European identity. Independence is seen as the result of a battle that Albanians gave...” Lubonja, “Mbi nevojën e dekonstruktimit të miteve” (The need for the deconstruction of the myths), 5.

29. Anamali and Prifti (eds.), *Historia e popullit shqiptar* (The history of the Albanian people), 438.

30. Schwander-Sievers and Fischer, *Albanian Identities*, 92.

Skenderbej had changed several times his religion (from a Christian he became a Muslim and then again a Christian) matched the “historical construction” created by one of the most important Albanian nationalists, Pashko Vasa, who in his most famous poem wrote the verse: “Do not look at churches and mosques/The Albanian religion is Albanianism.”³¹ This remains to date the motto of Albanian nationalism.

It goes without saying that Albanian historiography contributed to this effort. In recent years attempts have been made in order to analyze the period of Skenderbej and Gjergj Kastrioti Skenderbej himself from a more critical, more realistic perspective.³² However, any attempt to deconstruct myths of the Albanian historiography provokes a reaction from the majority of Albanian historians and the public opinion.³³

During the communist period, Albanian historiography was based upon nationalist concepts such as the “Albanian national movement” or

31. Cecilie Endresen challenges this perception that has become an integral part of the dominant public discourse in Albania. Through interviews with the religious leaders of the four religious communities of Albania, also through the analysis of the newspapers, books and periodicals of these communities, Endresen demonstrates the fluidity and complexity of the relation between nation and religion in the case of Albania. Cecilie Endresen, *Is the Albanian's religion really "Albanianism"? Religion and nation according to Muslim and Christian leaders in Albania* (Harrassowitz Verlag, 2012). Also Cecilie Endresen, “Faith, Fatherland, or both? Accommodationist and neo-fundamentalist Islamic discourses in Albania,” in *The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. From Identity to Religiosity*, eds. Olivier Roy and Arolda Elbasani (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

32. Oliver Schmitt, *Skënderbeu* (Tiranë: Shtëpia Botuese Fjala, 2014).

33. Kristo Frashëri published a book in order to oppose Schmitt's findings. The title of the book is *Skenderbej deformed by a Swiss historian and some Albanian analysts*. Frashëri explains the reasons why he wrote such a book them in the first pages: “After 1990, many books have been published for Skenderbej by foreign writers. Their content has not caused any reactions from Albanian public opinion. That's because the writers have taken the same steps followed by the Albanian historiography. Each of them notes the historical value of Skenderbej –as a national hero who guided his homeland in a liberating war against the Ottoman conquerors– an important leader who, besides the war, was the first who created a central Albanian state... On the contrary, the Swiss historian doesn't follow this path and presents us a different Skenderbej.” Kristo Frashëri, *Skënderbeu i shpërfytyruar nga një historian zviceran dhe nga disa analistë shqiptarë: vështrim kritik* (Skenderbej deformed by a Swiss historian and some Albanian analysts: critical review) (Tiranë: Dudaj, 2009), 14.

the “Albanian national consciousness.”³⁴ The nationalist discourse of the late nineteenth century was simply associated and paradoxically reinforced by the concept of class struggle. The structural changes of the early 1990s disassociated historiography from the ideological weight of Marxism. This ideological vacuum, however, was quickly filled by the ideology of Nationalism. Different periods of the Albanian history (especially those associated with the rise of the Albanian nationalism and the formation of the Albanian nation) continue to be described in glorious terms. An extract from the “History of the Albanian People Volume II” is descriptive: “The changes that took place during the (national) Revival brought the reinforcement of the Albanian national consciousness, expressed in their awareness of their joint affiliation to a common ethnic group, to a common nation, a nation that lived in a common territory, which had common origin, language, values, history, and which was different from the others. These characteristics had gained stability as a result of the eternal resistance of the Albanian people against foreign invasions especially the Ottomans. These characteristics were preserved and inherited by Albanians during the Revival era.”³⁵

Reading this extract, it seems that even the terms “ethnic group” (ethnie) and “nation” are used as synonyms. There is a confusion in the Albanian terminology of nationalism. In addition to the terms “ethnie” (etni) and “nation” (komb), the term *etnos* is often used. This term is used to describe the primitive societies which existed before the formation of “ethnic groups.” However, this is not always clear³⁶ and these two terms *etnos* and *etni* (ethnic group), but also *komb* (nation) or *kombësi* (ethnicity) are sometimes used almost as synonyms, which increases confusion. Kristo Frashëri, and other Albanian historians as well, often uses these terms, even in the same sentence, without any distinction: “... the population that inhabited the Illyrian territories was

34. Nathalie Clayer, N. *Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar. Lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane në Evropë* (The origins of Albanian nationalism: birth of a predominantly Muslim nation in Europe) (Tiranë: Botimet Përpyjekja, 2012), 12.

35. Anamali and Prifti, *Historia e popullit shqiptar*, 19.

36. Muzafer Korkuti claims that: “...the concept of civilization is broadly the same with the concept of *etnos*... We believe that in the Chalcolithic and the Bronze Era the degree of harmonization between culture and *etnos* is almost absolute and therefore a common cultural group is the same as a common ethnic group.” Muzafer Korkuti, *Parailirët, ilirët, arbërit: histori e shkurtër* (Proto Illyrians, Illyrians, Arbers: Short history) (Tiranë: Toena, 2003), 5.

divided into two major social groups: the free inhabitants belonging to the Illyrian etnos and the slaves, who belonged to non-Illyrian nationalities (kombësi)...³⁷

Conclusions

Albanian historiography continues to analyze different parts of the “national history” from a nationalistic perspective. This is something that has not changed in comparison to the period of Real Socialism. Based on the primordialist and perennialist tradition, the nation is considered an organic part of human society, but also its historicity and continuity, is being emphasized. That is why the emergence of the Albanian nation is not considered as “birth” but as “rebirth” as the “re-awakening” the “revival” of something that existed before, but it was in lethargy.

Albanian historiography continues to operate between these two approaches, during the period of Real Socialism and in the post-1990s period as well. The nation is taken for granted and its existence is not questioned. The existence of “other” nations is taken for granted as well. As we mentioned in the above section, the existence of a nation, every nation presupposes the existence of other nations. Even for the most extreme of nationalists, the nation exists in a world made up of nations. Albanian historiography offers us a view of the past which resembles the modern world, a world of nations. By taking the existence of the nation for granted, the image of a world composed of nations and divided between nations is naturalized.

The continuity of the nation is one the most important themes of the Albanian historiography. As mentioned above, themes of “national revival,” “re-awakening of the nation,” “Albanian renaissance men” are widely treated by Albanian historiography during the post Real Socialism period. These terms are not accidental nor innocent. Terms never are. Someone must have fallen into lethargy in order to “re-awake.” Someone must have died in order to be “re-born.” However, in both cases it is taken for granted that the nation has existed before the era when the “Albanian renaissance men” chose to wake it up, to bring it back to life.

Concepts such as “language,” “dialect,” “homeland,” “sanctity of the nation,” “national sovereignty,” “territory,” “national interest,” are deeply

37. Frashëri, *Etnogjeneza e shqiptarëve*, 200.

integrated into the common sense of nationhood. In order to analyze issues related to Nationalism, nation and national identity, historiography needs the use of these concepts. However, such issues are taken for granted by the Albanian historiography, as if they do not need more detailed analysis, as if any reader would not need further clarification. Of course this is not the task of historiography *per se*, but the fact that in all the editions we analyzed we haven't found the slightest effort to clarify any concept, supports Billig's position that "with the triumph of Nationalism and the establishment of nations across the globe, the theories of Nationalism have been transformed into familiar common sense."³⁸ The readers should know that nations have continuity, that they originate from ancestors who have lived in the same territories for thousands of years, that they have spoken the same language as "We" do today, that "They" are not autochthonous but have come from elsewhere to "our territories" and so on.

38. Billig, *Banal nationalism*, 63.

*Ledia Dushku**

**“Let’s Take our Eyes off Turkey”!
Perception on the Ottoman Turks in the Discourse
of the Provisional Government of Vlora (1912-1914)**

“Now, what course of government control shall Albania as a kingdom follow? The Turkish model or the one of European states? We are quite convinced that Albania shall stick to the second, namely that of the European states: otherwise it shall be bound to end up as badly as Turkey did...”

Përlindja e Shqipëniës, 27 August 1913¹

“...Albania needs to keep far away [from the Ottoman Empire], as it is not Anatolia and Albanians are not Anatolians either. The dire fatal ending that swept Turkey should serve as a lesson for Albania and Albanians so as to do away with any Anatolian remnant and vestige, not only Turkish mark and spirit, but no trace at all, nothing whatsoever from the rotten Turkey, also none of its laws and judicial system if we really want to play a proper role as a European nation and state and as people of knowledge, civilization and progress.

Let’s leave behind the five hundred year bondage, let’s pass all miseries and scimmages as well as wrongdoings of the Turkish tyranny; Today, when Turkey renounce from us, when it exiled from the Albanian borders, Albanians should take their eyes off Anatolia, they take their eyes off Turkey and inherit nothing from the Asiatic barbaric despotism and laws and canons of Turkey either, which can never lead and forge ahead, among other nations, the Albanian nation and our Fatherland Albania...”

Përlindja e Shqipëniës, 3 September 1913²

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1. Gjon Bud, “Propagandat e masat e Qeverriës” (The propagandas and government’s measures), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, August 27, 1913, 2-3.

2. Kristo Floqi, “Gjyqësia në Shqipërië” (Judiciary in Albania), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, September 3, 1913, 3.

Introduction

Twelve years after the Albanian Declaration of Independence, Mid'hat Frashëri (Lumo Skëndo), minister of Public Services in the provisional government of Vlora, published the pamphlet *Plagët tona. Çë nga mungon? Çë duhet të kemi?* (Our wounds. What do we lack? What should we possess?) Through concise analysis, of both historical and sociological nature as well, the offspring of Frashëri family seeks to identify the wounds of the Albanian society and also find out “the remedy” to cure them. Notably, in the second part of the study entitled *Të metat tona. Të veprojmë* (Our deficiencies. Let's act), he reveals the long-lasting Ottoman rule as one of the reasons for the Albanians' backwardness.

The five hundred years of Turkish rule, one of the most ominous ever in the world history, Mid'hat Frashëri highlights, added to our past deficiencies, thereby shrinking our virtues: Turkey taught us to be increasingly lazier, more frantic; ...it taught us to dislike the law, disregard and disobey to it. It taught us to live at the expense of others rather than earn our own living... Education acquired among Janissaries made us be worse and unfair against our weaker brothers, lose any feeling and virtue of nation, find ourselves wild, hostile and divided with each other, totally disunited, disdainful to progress, away from every material goods, as disunited as possible, without collaboration and without solidarity...”³

Mid'hat Frashëri's perception over the rule and Ottoman Turks is not a separate case. It runs naturally and in unison with the main lines of the Albanian Renaissance activists' perception, as a constituent basic part of their discourse regarding both East and West, since at least the second half of the 19th century.

3. Lumo Skëndo, *Plagët tona. Çë nga mungon? Çë duhet të kemi* (Our wounds. What do we lack? What should we possess?) (Tiranë: Mbrothësia, 1924), 13-15.

1. *The model of the Albanian Renaissance activists for the orientation of the Albanian Society: Away from the East and towards the West*

The political, cultural and social discourse of the Albanian Renaissance activists, in its entirety, runs in parallel with the European classic orientalism⁴ that evidences a constant clash, often dynamic one, between the two worlds.⁵ The East, or as otherwise commonly known the Orient, was regarded as an immovable state, eventually determined and left behind in time. This world is relevant to the meanings of backwardness, disorder, mystery, tyranny, corruption, war, anarchy and misery. Opposite of it, was the other world: the West, which geographically implied the western Europe and America. A western state was perceived to be developed, orderly, peaceful and prosperous and, rushing towards it, was considered progress.

Upon this discourse, Renaissance activists perceived the Albanians and Albania on a long and difficult journey, with a clearly defined destination: the West. This ongoing process, depicted by the sociologist Enis Sulstarova as a flight, as an escape, was perceived as a rescue from anarchy, “scrimmages and evils,” which the East carried per se. Hence, the East and the West were articulated as two opposite mentalities, two political-social systems, two cultures or philosophies, two different worlds that formed opposing binary structures, which had constantly affected the fate of the Albanians.⁶

4. In this article the term “orientalism” is used in the sense vested by the British historian, Alexander Lyon Macfie. According to him, “orientalism” means understanding or knowing the countries and peoples of the East. Orientalism means the existence of a certain subject or author outside the Orient, who specifies the Orient as an object of survey, understanding and classification. A. L. Macfie, *Orientalism* (London, New York: Pearson Education, 2002), 25-30.

5. As to the perception of the East and the West by orientalist, see: Edward W Said, *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient* (India: Penguin Books, 1991); Macfie, *Orientalism*.

6. Enis Sulstarova states that “Escape of Albanians from the ‘East’ and rushing to the ‘West’ has served as an imaginative horizon, as a regulatory foundation for the views of political and intellectual elites of the modern Albania and European identity of the albanian nation. As a counter-thesis of what ‘West represented’, both ‘the other’

“Two civilizations have shaped the world: civilization of the West and civilization of the East,” evidenced the newspaper *Shkopi*, in the article entitled “Konstitucioni ndë Turqi” (Constitution in Turkey). The first was shaped by Christianity while the second by Muslimanism. Regrettably, these civilizations were shaped with special habits: properly for this reason they are enemies, they fight with each other; and amid such an unrelenting and unreasonable war, civilization of the West emerged winner and no doubt shall always be as such... I shall never cease saying: be it good or bad, only civilization of the West can save our nation and Albania, and can guarantee our proper place at the heart of Europe, since only this civilization advances all over the world and develops people in compliance with the current requirements, which in turn, are subject to constant change. The world advanced upon the help of such a civilization; remember how Europe used to be and how it is today; look at how Japan progressed since it took to political habits of Europe and civilization... look at where Turkey is, just because it chose to follow a separate pathway while at the heart of Europe.”⁷

As a modernizing discourse of the Albanian domestic political and intellectual elites, the discourse of the Renaissance activists based on West/East distinction. In this approach, it constituted the contraposition of the European-albanian race to that of Asian-turkish one, similar to christian nationalisms of the Balkan, borrowing European-christian-centric clichés over despotism and Turkish-oriental barbarism.⁸ Since at least the second half of the 19th century, Turks were depicted as quite opposite to Albanians, with low features, which Albanians did not have and did not want to have either. They were Asian, barbaric, fierce, destructive people, bigoted as well as backward, without anything in common with Albanians, who did not come from Asia, but were the oldest nation in Europe.

and his lack, stood the ‘East’.” Enis Sulstarova, *Arratisje nga Lindja. Orientalizmi shqiptar nga Naimi te Kadareja* (Escape from the East. The Albanian Orientalism from Naim to Kadare) (Tiranë: West Print, 2013), 26.

7. “Konstitucioni ndë Turqi!” (Constitution in Turkey), *Shkopi*, Kajro, November 15, 1908, 1.

8. Sulstarova, *Arratisje nga Lindja* (Escape from the East), 38.

“Who are the Turks?” Sami Frashëri asked in his work *Shqipëria ç’ka qënë, ç’është e ç’do të bëhet? Mendime për shpëtimt të Mëmëdheut nga rreziket që e kanë rrethuarë* (Albania what was it, what is it and what will become of it? Insights on the salvation of our Motherland from the risks embracing it), first published in Bucharest in 1899, considered the manifesto of the Albanian National Renaissance. “They constitute a cruel nation coming from the wilderness of North Asia with a goad in hand. They captured, upon their characteristic cruelty, the most beautiful and civilized countries worldwide; and after mercilessly exploiting, utterly ruining and still showing interest for them, they are as yet keeping them under ferocity, poverty, tyranny that has terrified the world at large. Among all these countries... one is the miserable Albania... Do we have to do with them? Do we share the same origin? No, never! We are neither Turks nor descendants from the wilderness of Asia. We are the oldest nation in Europe; we have our own rights more than any other nation all over Europe.”⁹

Turks are articulated as the main responsible for the misery and ignorance of Albanians. “Turks, who have been their masters for over five hundred years,” Sami Frashëri stated, “failed to provide Albanians with work, craftsmanship and knowledge, instead, they taught them how to struggle and pillage.”¹⁰ Basically, the same discourse is used even by Kristo Dako. According to him, “...only one nation has remained in the dark and misery. This is the Albanian nation, which is the oldest one worldwide... today they caused it to be forgotten, lost somewhere, away from the civilization!”¹¹

Following disappointment caused by the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution (1908), Albanian/Turk distinction is visibly evidenced in

9. Sami Frashëri, *Shqipëria ç’ka qënë, ç’është e ç’do të bëhet? Mendime për shpëtimt të Mëmëdheut nga rreziket që e kanë rrethuarë* (Albania what it was, what it is and what it will be? Thoughts on saving the motherland from perils that beset it) (Tiranë: Naim Frashëri, 1962), 63-64.

10. Frashëri, *Shqipëria ç’ka qënë, ç’është e ç’do të bëhet?* (Albania what it was, what it is and what it will be?), 44.

11. Kristo Dako, “Cilët janë Shqipëtarët” (Who are Albanians), *Tomorri*, June 10, 1910, 4.

the media, mainly in that of Diaspora. Now publicistic writings are enriched with the use of offensive epithets about Ottoman Turks, such as “dull” and “Anatolian.” These epithets will be constantly used and will also represent mentality or habits of backwardness and conservatism.

Jani Vruho stated in the newspaper *Liri e Shqipërisë* that “Turkey is nothing but the Mongolian-converted Turkey, the tartar-converted Turkey, it is the one that ruined, overthrew, burnt down, grabbed, robbed, broke, overturned, pull down and destroyed anything reminiscent of Enlightenment and civilization!”¹² “Every day appear before us dull people, with their behaviors and instincts, which, except to Anatolians, are irrelevant even to Africans. Although we are the noblest and the most ancient European race; although we have never demonstrated fanatic Anatolian qualities and we have never killed each other on account of religious affairs, Anatolians want to draw us in dirty Anatolian affairs and kill our brothers, with dull people inciting us through religion.”¹³

The same perception line permeates also articles of newspaper *Kombi*, in Boston, America. In the article entitled “Zëmë të lëvizim” (We took to rise up), the author who has preferred to remain anonymous, not only identifies the low state that had overwhelmed the Ottoman Turks, but also highlights their inability to lead peoples already “more advanced than their people,” implying so Albanians: “The Turkish people are, as it is commonly known, at the lowest level of all European nations. They possess nothing of what civilization requires; then why are they so selfish as to lead other peoples by the nose or become leaders of peoples actually more exalted than their people?”¹⁴

Meanwhile, the lyric poet A. Shkaba, in his verses, presents a certain kind of ambiguity between the backward Turkey, as a grief that worries Albanians, and Turkey as a friend, which had saved them from covetous neighbors. Through verses, he acknowledges that:

12. Jani Vruho, “Turqia kurrë s’ka dhënë të drejtë përveç se kur ja kanë marrë duk’e i thyer turqit me grusht” (Turkey has never given us the right, except when we got the Turks by smashing with fists), *Liri e Shqipërisë*, September 21, 1911, 2.

13. Jani Vruho, “Tyrqit edhe Shqipëtarët” (Turks and Albanians), *Liri e Shqipërisë*, May 10, 1911, 2.

14. “Zëmë të lëvizim” (We took to rise up), *Kombi*, Boston, September 11, 1908, 2.

“Look Albania lamenting,
A grief is worrying her,
Which is nothing but,
An old wound,
Hundreds of years ago,
A friend came and there remained,
It stuck to it so,
And caused to be irksome
This friend is Turkey...”¹⁵

Since the end of the 19th century, Renaissance activists would pay special importance to articulation of links between Albanian nation and Europe, therefore conditioning judgment on historical and cultural links of Albanians with Turks within the Ottoman Empire. The latter, in their view, was increasingly representing Asia, despotism and backwardness. As the main founders of Albanian identity, they strove to detach their compatriots from the impact of the East and connect them with the West. To achieve this, they aimed at making use first the *evidence of ancientness* and second *the contribution paid by Albanians to the European civilization*.

In the discourse of Naum Veqilharxhi, Pashko Vasa, Frashëri brothers, Jani Vreto, Jeronim de Rada, etc., the image of Albanians is conceived as a very old European nation, already united far beyond religious affiliation.¹⁶ “Albanians, whether Muslim, Orthodox or Catholic actually are and shall always remain as they were thirty centuries ago the oldest people in Europe, the less mixed race of all known races, a race which as a phenomenon can be best considered a miracle impossible to be explained, it managed to face the time factor which ruins and

15. *Liri Shqipërisë*, Sofje, November 15, 1911, 4.

16. In relation to their views expressed through present publicistic writings see: Nathalie Clayer, *Në fillimet e nacionalizmit shqiptar: Lindja e një kombi me shumicë myslimane* (Aux origines du nationalisme albanais. La naissance d’une nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe), trans. Artan Puto (Tiranë: Përpjekja, 2009), 125, 226-229, 235, 246-248, 264.

transform,” Pashko Vasa, an Albanian intellectual of catholic confession, stated in his book *E vërteta mbi Shqipërinë dhe shqiptarët* (The truth on Albania and Albanians), published in Paris, in 1879.¹⁷

The ancientness evidence was considered as a proof of participation in the European civilization. Therefore, orientation of Albanians towards western modernity was considered as the natural course of their progress.¹⁸ It would be a long and strenuous pathway and as such, it could be faced only with the help of Europe. According to the Renaissance narration on the history of the nation, Albanians constituted not only the roots and kinship to the Old Continent but were also self-sacrificed about it. This is best presented to the reader through the Skanderbeg figure and his wars against the Ottomans.

Sami Frashëri stated that “For over forty years Skanderbeg resorted to fighting by killing and inflicting serious damages to the enemies; ...All European powers, at that time, relied on Skanderbeg and expected salvation of Europe to come from Albanians...”¹⁹

While his brother Naimi, one of the main figures of the Albanian National Renaissance, in his poem *Istori' e Skënderbeut* (History of Skanderbeg) highlights the fact that Europe of the 15th century was incapable of defending itself and salvation from Turks took place only due to Albanians war led by Skanderbeg. In the verses 265-268, song XIV of the poem, Naimi discloses to the reader that:

“Were it not for Albania
The whole blind Europe
Would be under Turkey control

17. Vassa Effendi, *E vërteta mbi Shqipërinë dhe shqiptarët* (The truth on Albania and Albanians) Studim historik. Përkthimi nga frëngjishtja dhe komentim prej Mehdi Frashërit (Tiranë, Shtypshkronja Tirana, 1935), 61; Dritan Egro, “Perceptimi i Perandorisë Osmane dhe Evropës në doktrinën nacionaliste shqiptare” (Perception of the Ottoman Empire and Europe in Albanian Nationalistic Doctrine), *Studime Historike*, 3-4 (Tiranë 2013): 51-61.

18. Sulstarova, *Arratisje nga Lindja* (Escape from the East), 51.

19. Frashëri, *Shqipëria ç'ka qënë, ç'është e ç'do të bëhet?* (Albania what it was, what it is and what it will be?), 25.

And salvation no more.”²⁰

2. *Implementing the model: The provisional government of Vlora and the beginnings of the “deottomanization” process in Albania*

While the western orientation of the National Renaissance had expressed the desire of the political and intellectual elites that the Albanian nation enter the path of progress, the Declaration of the Independence and the existence of the state offered to them the opportunity to implement the experiment of Albania’s modernization. This would avoid the possible labeling that could be made to the Albanian state as a “Muslim state,” which allegedly belonged to the East rather than Europe.

“Now, what course of government control shall Albania as a kingdom follow? The Turkish model or the one of European states? We are quite convinced that Albania shall stick to the second, namely that of the European states.” This was just the question asked to the reader of the newspaper *Përlindja e Shqipëriës*, official periodical of the provisional government of Vlora and the answer concerned the course of Albania following the Declaration of Independence, on November 28, 1912. Secession from the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Albanian independent state placed institutions and their organization within a new political, legal and administrative reality, other than the one they had already operated in thus far. The Albanian government led by Ismail Kemal Vlora was focused on fundamental issues of governance, in which prevailed building of centralized secular systems, typically a characteristic feature of western governments.²¹ Such an attempt

20. Sulstarova, *Arratisje nga Lindja* (Escape from the East), 70.

21. According to the Professor Bernard Lewis, the term “secularism,” “as first used, it denoted the doctrine that morality should be based on rational considerations regarding human well-being in this world, to the exclusion of considerations relating to God or the afterlife. Later it was used more generally for the belief that public institutions, especially general education, should be secular not religious.... Secularism in the modern political meaning the idea that religion and political authority, church and state are different, and can or should be separated is, in a profound sense,

can be considered as the beginning of a long state formation and “de-ottomanization” process, across which Albanians and their state would go through. Successful conclusion of this process was nothing but implementation in the field of the model of Albanian Renaissance activists: Away from the East and towards the West.

Building of centralized secular system is considered as an important initiative for Albania at that time, which aimed at invalidating the heterogeneity and power of the religious authority, as a leading, organizing and fragmentary power within the new state. Albanians should perceive their own state as a secular one. As such, it could not belong to any specific religion, but to all. Due to this process was enabled homogenization of the relation between the society and governance and was also universalized the state formation process by way of a national administration, a unique education system and one language, not only semantic but also practical. Accordingly, the Albanians’ conscience as well as various social and religious institutions formed cohesion with the political system, beyond borders which kept Albania still fragmented internally.²²

Initially, secularism was designed in the justice system. On May 5, 1913 the provisional government adopted the “Kanun of Jury,” which is a combination of European principles of law with Ottoman Sharia (Shari’ah). Unification of civil and criminal matters was also in place and their judgment would be conducted by state courts rather than by Kadi. As to the criminal matters, was set up the jury system. Sheria trials, chaired by Mufti, would only address cases of religious character.

Christian. Its origins may be traced in the teachings of Christ, confirmed by the experience of the first Christians; its later development was shaped and, in a sense, imposed by the subsequent history of Christendom. The persecutions endured by the early church made it clear that a separation between the two was possible; the persecutions inflicted by later churches persuaded many Christians that such a separation was necessary.” Bernard Lewis, *What went wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (Oxford University Press, 2002), 96.

22. Sokol Gjermëni, “Aspekte të jetës komunitare në Shqipëri përgjatë vitit 1913” (Aspects of the religious communities life in Albania during 1913), *Studime Historike*, 3-4 (Tiranë 2014), 86.

Addressing of criminal and civil matters by the new courts, practically, led to the merger of religious courts, inherited from the Ottoman system. The provisional government of Vlora appointed the grand Mufti, as the titular head of the Muslim community in Albania and also the chief Kadi. Both appointments were made without the consent of the Istanbul, thus breaking subordination to the Ottoman Shaikh ul-Islam (Şeyhülislam). At the same time, this was the first and the biggest step regarding separation of mosques in Albania from the Caliphate. The government adopted the functioning of Mufti post, defining the relevant territorial placement, the salary and the language to be used about decisions of religious matters. From the religious point of view his position was approved only by the grand mufti.²³

The secularization process swept, also, the new state administration. Since 30 August 1913 the provisional government imposed the mastery of Albanian language, as a fundamental condition to all actual employees and those newcomers who wanted to work in state institutions. Meanwhile, was launched the work on administrative reorganization and appointment of new officials, while the government appealed to intellectuals both in Albania and abroad, to make their knowledge available to the state.

The activity of the state administration was put on a legal basis, on November 22, 1913, following announcement of the "Current Kanun of the Civil Administration." This law was drafted based on the principle of unified power, setting aside the idea of canonization, although it was supported by the head of the provisional government. Rightfully, several ministers and a part of the public opinion considered canonization as inappropriate, under circumstances when Albania, like never before, needed unity. "The Current Kanun of the Civil Administration" was not essentially a fundamental law and as such, it dealt only with local administrative matters, their units and powers. It also contained

23. *Qeveria e Përkohshme e Vlorës dhe veprimtaria e saj (28 nëntor 1912-22 janar 1914)* (The Provisional Government of Vlora and its activity [28 November 1912-22 January 1914]), botim i Drejtorisë së Përgjithshme të Arkivave Shtetërore të R.P.SH (The General Directorate of Albanian State Archives) (Tiranë: Mihal Duri, 1963), 130.

specifications of certain articles about religious communities. This was intended to establish closer links and to better organize the operation of religious communities in their relations with state civil and administrative institutions. Hence, the government institutionalized the operation, powers, duties and organization of the religious communities pursuant to the Albanian state legislation. Separation of the state from religion and efforts to institutionalize the legitimacy of the governance created premises for further development of secular components, making them part of the institutional, cultural, political and public organization and operation within the Albanian society.²⁴ Despite the drawing up of “The Current Kanun of the Civil Administration,” the provisional government of Vlora was still far from drafting and implementing a comprehensive secular legislation, due to replace the Ottoman legislation.

The Albanian provisional government strove to extend secularism in the area of education, intended to establish a national educational system rather than a religious one. The minister of Education, Luigj Gurakuqi, was seriously committed to such a process. Under this policy, in August 1913, it was decided “to open in every district a preparatory normal school where students would be admitted on the basis of certain conditions.”²⁵ Conditions were set under the decision of the Ministry of Education, dated 31 August 1913, according to which, the elementary education was compulsory to all students of Albania, while special schools would operate only if they met the criteria stipulated by law.²⁶ The whole educational system should be subject to the laws of the Albanian state. Schools should receive official permit from the government, use the Albanian language as the teaching language, have programs and textbooks recognized by the ministry of Education. As decided, the learning process would be conducted in Albanian language, schools of religious and foreign communities included. Regarding

24. Gjermëni, “Aspekte të jetës komunitare në Shqipëri” (Aspects of the religious communities life in Albania), 86.

25. “Urdhër i Ministrisë së Arsimit” (Order of the Ministry of Education), *Përlindja e Shqipëries*, Vlonë, August 6, 1913, 2.

26. “Urdhër i Ministrisë së Arsimit” (Order of the Ministry of Education), *Përlindja e Shqipëries*, Vlonë, September 13, 1913, 2.

teachers' preparation was reopened the Normal School of Elbasan, and its director was the devoted teacher Aleksandër Xhuvani. Another normal school started to operate in Berat. Through the educational directorates in the relevant prefectures were organized courses for employees to be better familiar with the Albanian language, both in writing and reading. On the other hand, the provisional government responded positively to the request of the Italian and Austro-hungarian governments with reference to granting scholarships for students to study abroad.²⁷

The ministry of Education paid attention, also, to the preparation of Albanian terminology for branches of administration, education as well as other spheres of life in the country. Accordingly, a commission was set up, which in June 1913 prepared the required words and terms in the military and justice field. In November 1913, the government foresaw the establishment of a scientific center concerned with the study of native language-related matters, syllabuses and textbooks. Basically, this was the project for the establishment of a National Academy regarding the use of language and school programs.

3. Perception on Ottomans in the external and internal discourse of the government of Vlora (December 1912-January 1914)

In the internal and external discourse²⁸ of the government of Vlora, perception about Ottoman Turks is not unique. It is fluid, taking different tones depending on the attitude held by the Great Powers against the Albanian Question in the Conference of Ambassadors in London.

27. *Haus und Hof Staats Archiv, Wien, Politisches Archiv, Albanien* in: *Arkivi i Institutit të Historisë në Tiranë* (hereinafter: *AIH*), Vj. 23-20-2057, Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austro-Hungary to the Albanian youth scholarships, November 1913.

28. In this article the term "external discourse" is used in the sense of the discourse that the Albanian provisional government and its president Ismail Kemal Vlora use abroad, in relation to the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile "internal discourse" takes into account the discourse used by the provisional government of Vlora within the state, among Albanians themselves.

The weight that the internal and external discourse occupies in the general discourse essence of the provisional government of Vlora, appears to be fluid as well. From December 1912 to May 1913, when the Great Powers in London sustained the decision for Albania's autonomy under the Sultan's suzerainty, the external discourse became the focus of attention. The final aim of Vlora's government was to persuade the Great Powers that Albanians deserved their independent state. In May, the Great Powers changed their attitude by agreeing to suspend any connection of the Ottoman Empire with the Albanian state and take over themselves its future. They expressed the final decision on July 29, 1913. According to it the Great Powers recognized the independent Albanian state, headed by a foreign prince and retained their influence in Albania through the establishment of the International Control Commission. During this period (May-July 1913) in the discourse of the Albanian provisional government is noted a balance in the ratio between both the external and internal discourse. Since August 1913 it was the internal discourse to become the focus of attention.

3.1 Characteristics of the external discourse

In the external discourse of the Albanian government, perception about Ottoman Turks holds diplomatic and institutional connotations, which is a distinctive characteristic even in the earlier speech of its president, Ismail Kemal Vlora.²⁹ As part of the Ottoman political and diplomatic

29. Ismail Kemal Vlora personified the statesman with progressive and liberal ideas, with rare diplomatic skills, whom the Ottoman regime had attempted to make harmless, not only by keeping him away their homeland, but also offering him high ranking positions in the Ottoman state pyramid, which fitted his level. From official in the Legal Office of the State Council or secretary general of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, Ismail Kemali was appointed mayor of Ioannina Municipality, to continue in the upcoming years as a governor of Beirut and Tripoli vilayet. Qualified as anti-ottoman, but not anti-empire, Ismail Kemal had constantly opposed the centralizing policies of the Porte, occasionally aggravating relations with it. He was partisan of reforms in the Turkish public life, while had openly supported the radical Mid'hat Pasha, the father of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. I. Kemal shared with him also the sympathy about the Great Britain and France. Following the revolution of Young Turks and restoration of the Constitution, in July 1908, he led the Ottoman Liberal

elite, under continuous and intensive relation with western statesmen, the discourse essence of the publicistic writings of I. Kemal shows moderate tones, usually cold and neutral ones. Although confrontation between East and West is already present, it is articulated devoid of both religious connotations and the presence of sharp terms. In the interview given to *Mokattan* newspaper of Egypt, on March 13, 1901, the offspring of Vlora family stated as follows: “In the East there is a barrier to the progress of Muslims and the cause is Muslims themselves. They are unwilling to benefit from the lessons of their neighbors, they claim to be the most intelligent of all other peoples, they call all those not belonging to their religion as less developed and are quite reluctant to have relations with them. Today’s great civilization belongs to Europeans who are largely Christians. Accordingly, my co-religionists believe that such a civilization is Christian, while it actually is just a social one. Therefore, they do not adhere to this civilization and stay away from those considered as its initiators...”³⁰

In the discourse of Vlora family’s offspring, institutional, political and social reformation of the Ottoman Empire was considered indispensable and necessary to its longevity and preservation of *status quo* in the Balkan. Turkey was part of Europe and its reformation should be done in cooperation with it. According to the researcher Nuray Bosbora, only intervention of the Great Powers would force the sultan to carry out reforms in the Ottoman government institutions.³¹ In the interview given to the Italian newspaper *La Tribuna*, on July 27, 1907, Ismail Kemal courageously stated that “Turkey is part of Europe, even though we

Party (AHRAR). For more information see: Ledia Dushku, *Kur historia ndau dy popuj fqinj. Shqipëria dhe Greqia 1912-1914* (When history separated two neighbour nations: Albania and Greece 1912-1914) (Tiranë: Kristalina-KH, 2012), 59-65.

30. *Ismail Qemali, 1888-1919* (Përmbledhje dokumentesh) (Ismail Qemali, 1888-1919 [Documents edition]), edited by Teuta Hoxha (Tiranë: 8 Nëntori, 1982), 68. The interview of Ismail Kemal, 13 March 1901.

31. Nuray Bozbora, *Shqipëria dhe nacionalizmi shqiptar në Perandorinë Osmane* (Albania and Albanian nationalism in Ottoman Empire), trans. Dritan Egro (Tiranë, Dituria dhe Shtëpia e Librit & Komunikimit, 2002), 236.

should distinguish an oriental mass that cannot be entirely assimilated in real Europe.”³²

As regards Albania, orientation to the West is not openly articulated, but is implied upon its dream, rushing towards “the ideal of freedom and independence.” As it was the case with the Ottoman Empire, even its progress should be made with the support of Europe. Under a candid tongue, in the interview given to the Italian daily *La Tribuna*, Ismail Kemal made known to the public opinion that: “Albania has its own language, its own literature, history and traditions, it has its own right to require national assertion following the ideals of freedom and independence. Her dream deserves the support of the civil civilization, more specifically of Latins in general and Italians in particular.” The Albanians’ evidence of ancientness³³ was brought to the reader’s attention. “We Albanians, he stated, are the oldest nation, the most respectable of all European nations. We were here before Greeks came, before Romans existed, before Byzantines were born!”

Perception about Ottoman Turks in the discourse of Ismail Kemal, commonly corresponds to the format of a careful and experienced diplomat, without using offensive words, such as barbaric, cruel or uncivilized. Only in one case we could find a negative statement, reflected in *Shkupi* newspaper, dated June 2, 1912. There, the Turk is considered “barbaric,” a race that knows no “progress and civilization.” Although the editor of the newspaper is suspicious on the truth of the news, it is important not to detach it from the historical bed. At that time Ismail Kemal Vlora was trying to organize an all-Balkan uprising, which was expected to achieve the overthrow of the Young Turks’ government and arrival to power of an Ottoman liberal government. In this context, he appealed to Albanians, Greeks and Bulgarians: “Albanians, Greeks and

32. “La politika nei Balkani,” *La Tribuna*, July 27, 1907, 1.

33. The evidence of ancientness is part of the discourse of Ismail Kemal Vlora also in the two appeals addressed to Albanians, in 1900 and 1909. “...let’s ensure to our self the assistance of the European nations, whom we can reasonably call brothers, and moreover, just because we are the oldest nation in Europe), he stated in the appeal addressed to Albanians in 1900. See: *Ismail Qemali 1888-1919* (Përmbledhje dokumentesh) (Ismail Qemali, 1888-1919 [Documents edition]), 61.

Bulgarians unite, let's drive this barbaric Turk out today! Turks are a race that knows no progress and civilization.”³⁴

After the Albanian Declaration of Independence, in the external discourse of Ismail Kemal Vlora and the government he headed, the diplomatic and institutional language is not circumvented. Precaution to adopt a balanced position to the Ottoman Empire constitutes one of his distinctive features. In the memorandum of the provisional government of Vlora sent to the Conference of Ambassadors in London on January 2, 1913, the fact that Albania “was unable to follow the western nations in their magnificent development towards progress and civilization” is clearly shown on its front page, but the causes of such backwardness are not expressly articulated. They are generalized with expressions such as “inadequate conditions surrounding it” or “it has suffered so much under the yoke of the foreigners,” without accusing the Ottoman Turks as the cause of the backwardness. In an effort to avoid exacerbations with them, at a time when the Great Powers had decided for Albania to be autonomous, in the memorandum is prudently avoided the use of Skanderbeg figure and his wars, but is not bypassed the definition of the Albanian national identity as opposite to the East as well as treatment of Albanians as different from Turks, although they were Muslims in their majority. The evidence of ancientness is brought to the attention of the international factor as a borrowing from the Renaissance activist's model. Albanians were the oldest nation in Europe which manifested liberal views and had not “lost its merit before the western nations, whose progress it aims to achieve on a land opting solely to flourish.”³⁵

Although with somewhat dim tones, constituent part of the external discourse of the provisional government of Vlora are also the state sec-

34. “Ismail Kemali tha kto fjal” (Ismail Qemali said those words), *Shkupi*, Juine 2, 1912, 2.

35. *Qeveria e Përkohshme e Vlorës dhe veprimtaria e saj* (28 nëntor 1912-22 janar 1914) (The Provisional Government of Vlora and its activity [28 November 1912-22 January 1914]), 98-100. The memorandum of the provisional government of Vlora sent to the Conference of Ambassadors in London on January 2, 1913.

ularization, religious pluralism, equality of religious communities before the law and state, as characteristics that would grant a European spirit to the newborn state, thus bringing it closer to the West and away from the East. In the interview given to the French newspaper *Le Matin* in April 1913, Ismail Kemal made known to the public opinion that in Albania: "...it shall be spoken a single language, we shall all have the same rights. No differences shall exist between Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox, all shall be equal. No religious division shall ever exist among us."³⁶

3.2 Features of the internal discourse

As to the reports within the state, the discourse of the provisional government of Vlorë assumes the civilizing mission to the society, minorities or certain other suburban categories (peasants, highlanders, etc.), whose perception and way of life did not fit in the elite's vision, namely the government, about the state and society. In this case it concerns what the civilization researcher Ferdinand Braudel considers as "work of oneself on oneself."³⁷ Through publicistic writings, in the newspaper *Përlindja e Shqipëriës*, Albanian intellectuals took over the emancipating role of the nation in the course of state formation and modernization process. Hence, they became the consciousness of the nation, the voice of public moral and visionaries of Albanians' cultural and social development.

Although a significant part of Albanian intellectuals of that time constituted a part of the Ottoman context of state reformation, they strove to separate from the past, by differentiating Albanians from Ottoman Turks insofar as possible, even though their majority belonged to the same religion, namely the Muslim one. The argument already referred to in this case was the same with the one used by Albanian Renaissance activists. It concerned the fact that Turks were Asian people, according

36. "Ç'thotë Ismail Kemali" (What Ismail Qemali says), *Liri e Shqipërisë*, April 22, 1913, 2.

37. Ferdinand Braudel, *Gramatikë e qytetërimeve* (Grammaire des civilisations), trans. Fatos Kongoli, (Tiranë: Instituti i Dialogut dhe Komunikimit, 2005), 66.

to which progress, knowledge and civilization, were considered to be foreign dimensions. By contrast, the Albanian nation had its roots from and was essentially Europe. As such, it could progress rapidly “like all civilized and freed nations among European countries,” especially now following secession from the Ottoman Empire. Unlike external discourse, the language used is direct and devoid of diplomatic gloves. The long-lasting ottoman rule is overtly considered as the main cause of Albanians’ backwardness and their distance from the European civilization. In an article dated 16 August 1913 in *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, it was perceived as “a black veil, encompassing Albania and as a huge cloud, overshadowed it all around thus hindering the dazzling rays of the Sun to warm the heart and enlighten Albania with the light of civilization and education.”³⁸ The Ottoman Empire was the evil, barbaric, Asian, tyrannical which had plunged Albanians in ignorance, poverty, misery and backwardness, “...without roads, buildings, without any proper city. Turkey left us totally bare-naked. It undid whatever it met, seized everything and left us even worse.”³⁹

The distinction between the two worlds, East and West, is clearly evidenced in the newspaper. In the article of the publicist Dionis Karbonara, they appear figuratively as two queens, obviously with different features and qualities. The first, which personifies the West “...pallid blue-colored, slowly walking along with fragrant and violet sandals on its white feet, wearing a dressing gown embroidered with stars and a silver crown on top, it was called Hope,” while the other, namely the East “...with night-like black eyes, tears always slipping down its face and the chest saddened of groaning, disorderly wearing a fervent garment.”⁴⁰

38. Beri, “Kufiët e Shqipëriës. Shqipëria e lirë” (The borders of Albania. Independent Albania), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, August 16, 1913, 2.

39. Grigor Cilka, “Gjindja e Shqipëniës” (The situation in Albania), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, January 11, 2014, 2.

40. Dionis Karbonara, “Të dy Mbretneshat” (Two queens), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, August 6, 1913, 3.

As a part of the internal discourse on the pages of *Përlindja e Shqipëriës* appears, also, the resistance made over the centuries by Albanians to the Ottoman rule. Unlike the external discourse, in the present case is conspicuously used the figure of Skanderbeg and his wars which carried a dual character: the Albanian resistance and the protection of Europe from “barbaric” Turks. Upon strong nationalist doses he is regarded as “the first of this land,” “great warrior,” “king” who unleashed “fervent spears, dazzling and golden spears over Albania, spears of freedom, European civilization and education,”⁴¹ “the immortal national hero Gjergj Kastrioti, who for too long, obstructed the advance of Asian invaders who came to extinguish the European civilization light, bringing Asian barbaric darkness.”⁴²

The figure of Skanderbeg is now undauntedly revoked also in the discourse of the president of the provisional government, Ismail Kemal Vlora. In his speech, on November 28, 1912, he appeals to the exalted Albanians with the following words: “It seems like a big dream to me such a great change of our fatherland which suffered terribly for 500 years under the Turkish yoke, and which recently, was almost dying, extinct and completely exterminated, this Albania which once was shining from unmatched bravery of its sons; this Albania which, when Europe was threatened by Turkish invasions, under its undying mighty leader, Skanderbeg, became the iron gate against fierce attacks of the most savage sultans ever in Turkey.”⁴³

Another feature of internal discourse is obvious identification of the distinction between Albanians and Turks as well as perception of Albania as the opposite of Turkey, having nothing in common. “Albania is not Anatolia, and Albanians are not Anatolian either,”⁴⁴ while “what is

41. Beri, “Kufiët e Shqipëriës” (The Albanian’s borders), 2.

42. Kostë Çekrezi, “Shpresë, Punë, Bashkim!” (Hope, Work, Unity!), *Përlindja e Shqipëriës*, August 20, 1913, 1-2.

43. Ismail Qemali, 232.

44. Floqi, “Gjyqësia” (Judiciary), 3.

good for Turkey may be bad to Albania.⁴⁵ To avoid a fatal end, Albanians should “take their eyes off Anatolia, take their eyes off Turkey,” separate completely from the Ottoman past, look to the future and embrace the European civilization, “whose model is the proper salvation to the progress of our nation.”⁴⁶

“...The dire fatal ending that swept Turkey should serve as a lesson for Albania and Albanians so as to do away with any Anatolian remnant and vestige, not only Turkish mark and spirit, but no trace at all, nothing whatsoever from the rotten Turkey, also, none of its laws and judicial system if we really want to play a proper role as a European nation and State and as people of Enlightenment, civilization and progress. Let’s leave behind the five hundred year bondage, let’s pass all miseries and scimmages as well as wrongdoings of the Turkish tyranny; Today, when Turkey renounce from us, when it exiled from the Albanian borders, Albanians need to take their eyes off Anatolia, they need to take their eyes off Turkey and inherit nothing from the Asiatic barbaric despotism and laws and canons of Turkey either, which can never lead and forge ahead among other nations the Albanian nation and our Fatherland Albania...,” Kristo Floqi, one of the most prominent pens, argued in the newspaper *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*.⁴⁷

The Ottoman institutional legacy, especially in the justice system, is viewed as the main barrier to channel Albania on the Western line. The lack of an organized unique educational network in the mother tongue was also perceived as another barrier to the Albanian elite-supported homogenizing project, which so far considered the Albanian nationalism undetached from the mission for the Europeanization of Albania. Pursuant to the provisional government’s policy, special attention was paid to the secularization in governance. Albanians were to embrace the secular state, as the supreme authority that allowed religious pluralism and provided

45. “Propaganda e armiqve” (The enemy’s propaganda), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, January 21, 1914, 1.

46. “Gëzimi” (The joy), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, February 18, 1914, 1.

47. Floqi, “Gjyqësia” (Judiciary), 3.

equal conditions to all communities. “In Albania itself people do not differentiate due to religion, out of which many evils may derive –which enemies sought to use as a dirty tool– but Albania, as opposed to it, respects all religions considering all compatriots as brothers...”⁴⁸

In the early 20th century Europe the word “progress” was converted into the word key, while the ability to advance was considered as one of the criteria for accepting and recognizing the new national states from the Great Powers. “The government should press for organization of Albania endowing it with the European color and spirit rather than the Asian one so as to follow the civilization pathway,” appealed to Albanians, the intellectual Mihal Grameno.⁴⁹ In his capacity as the chairman of the Political and Criminal Court of Vlora, Kristo Floqi drew the reader’s attention on the justice system, clearly identifying the necessity to the division of powers. Here’s how he states: “One of the tasks of the government is putting under way the Justice system, which is one of the three greatest and first powers of the Body, as there are also the Legislative and Executive body.”⁵⁰ While Mihal Grameno focuses on the educational system: “We should do away with schools and practices inherited from Turkey since they prove to be harmful and bring nothing beneficial but for lose! Albania is a European state and therefore it should be civilized and follow the European school, or otherwise it is doomed to lose sooner or later... Do you think that Albania will become a minor Turkey and head to the old? No never!”⁵¹

In addition, all those social categories, forms of social organization, subcultures or mentalities, within the Albanian society inherited from Ottomans, which were considered by the elites as unacceptable to modern times, are unhesitatingly termed as oriental and evil, and “im-

48. Mihal Grameno, “Cilët jemi” (Who we are), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, August 16, 1913, 2.

49. Mihal Grameno, “Organëzimi i Shqipërisë” (The organization of Albania), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, August 27, 1913, 2.

50. Floqi, “Gjyqësia” (Judiciary), 3.

51. Mihal Grameno (1913), “Për nëpunësit” (About officials), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, September 3, 1913, 2.

mensely dangerous as they are innumerable and cannot be written either,” emphasis was placed on the low level of the employees, laziness and corruption.

“Employees should be educated, learned, honest, fair and hard-working. Laziness and favoritism should not exist and so bribery either, since except dismissal, even imprisonment and punishment will follow... Only when all Albanians fulfill their own task, more specifically by dealing with trade, craftsmanship, agriculture, industry or official jobs, Albania will soon flourish and advance and will be counted as one of the most civilized countries! Therefore, to achieve this, we should hastily get to work and do away with sinister legacies inherited from Turkey.”⁵²

Conclusions

While the provisional government of Vlora proclaimed decisions regarding the implementation of the western model of governance and, its representative *Përlindja e Shqipëniës* was trying “to make Albanians,”⁵³ naturally the question arises: Was the Albanian society prepared to accept it?

The answer is short and flat: No. Despite the will of prominent elements of the provisional government of Vlora, the secularization reform remained on paper and proved to be premature. The basic reasons of this outcome should be sought in the backwardness of the Albanian society, the lack of an organized life over national institutions, the lack of cultivating Albanian as a written language, inadequacy of both material and human infrastructure. It was rather difficult, immediately after secession from the Ottoman Empire, to impose on the Albanian society, a part of the elite included, a secular modern and European system, different from the Ottoman one, moreover, when a significant part of it

52. Mihal Grameno, “Trashëgimet e liga që fituam nga Turqia” (The evil legacies we gained by Turkey), *Përlindja e Shqipëniës*, August 23, 1913, 2.

53. “Albania was made but Albanians are to be made!” - this is how Kristo Floqi stated in his article in 1913. Kristo Floqi, “Gjyqësia” (Judiciary), 3.

had adversely reacted to the reforms that the Ottoman state itself had undertaken before 1912.⁵⁴

The Ottoman civilization basically relied on the doctrine of Muhammad, while the European one in that of Christ, primarily moral, separating religion from governance. By contrast, the doctrine of Muhammad was not only moral and religious, but it was everything: political, social, legal, etc., a fact which gave a theocratic and authoritarian nature to the Ottoman State. Obviously, differences between the Muslim world and European one, involved also legislation which regulated relationship between individuals, families and, also, between state and individual. In addition, religions and beliefs always create certain habits, certain specific mentality, which for their believers becomes an obstruction to accept the other developed civilizations. All mentioned above, was reflected in the Albanian society as an organic part of the Ottoman one. It was evidently stratified, traditional, closed, authoritarian and patriarchal. The Ottoman tradition and heritage already present in Albanians' outlook could not disappear only by drafting in a flash, the legal framework. According to Fernand Braudel, a certain society is generally highly afraid of embracing a cultural good that questions its deeper structures.⁵⁵ "We are Ottomans," Esad Pashë Toptani, an Albanian important political, reminded his supporters in Central Albania, in June 1913. "Although Albania seceded, you, the people as a whole should be comfortable as Ottoman citizens,"⁵⁶ he concluded. Subsequent historical and social developments in Albania will show that Albanians' adaptation to the process of replacing or changing traditions, worshipping system, ecclesiastical organization and their relationship with their state, would prove to be a long-lasting and difficult process.

54. Regarding reaction of the Albanian people to the Ottoman reforms, ranging from those of Tanzimat, see: Bozborra, *Shqipëria dhe nacionalizmi shqiptar* (Albania and Albanian nationalism), 121-128.

55. Braudel, *Gramatikë* (Grammaire), 64.

56. *AIH*, A-IV-335. Archival materials collected by Alex Buda, Kristo Frashëri and Stefanaq Pollo, Volume II (May 1913-September 1913), 83.

Anastasia Yiangou

Anglo-Hellenic Relations in Cyprus: Exploring the 1940s

This paper offers an overview of the development of relations between Greek Cypriots and the British during the 1940s, a period which proved fundamentally crucial for the course of the Cyprus Question. To begin with, the experience of the Second World War transformed political realities on the island and had a profound impact on the way the British and the Greek Cypriots viewed each other. Furthermore, the second half of the 1940s witnessed a hardening of attitudes of both Greek Cypriots and the British: the former demanded forcefully the union (“*Enosis*”) of Cyprus with Greece, whereas the latter were not prepared to give in to such demands for reasons which this paper will discuss. This study will further explore the role of the acting archbishop, the bishop of Paphos, Leontios (1933-1947), elected as archbishop of Cyprus in June 1947. Leontios remained a key figure of developments of Cypriot politics during the 1940s until his sudden death, a month following his enthronement. Undeniably developments that occurred during this decade –not least events concerning the acute polarization between the Cypriot Right and Left– had far reaching consequences for the future of the island.

The Experience of the Second World War, 1939-1945

The first half of the 1940s was crucial for the development of relations between Greek Cypriots and the British. The war experience placed this relationship in a new context. The fundamental reason for such an outcome was the firm loyalty Cypriots demonstrated towards the British once hostilities in Europe broke out. Governor Battershill, who assumed duties in August 1939, addressed the Advisory Council¹ in early September emphasizing that “Cyprus, not less than Britain and the Empire, has to play her own part in the present war... I am convinced that the people of Cyprus are willing and prepared to share the sufferings, the

1. Following the suppression of the 1931 Revolt, the British abolished the Legislative Council. In 1933 an Advisory Council was set up exclusively comprised by appointed members.

disasters and the trials which will come until we accomplish the final victory.”² Despite grievances experienced during the 1930s, Greek Cypriots affirmed their support towards the British Empire once hostilities in Europe broke out.³ This element is crucial in understanding the unfolding Anglo-hellenic relationship in later years. Overall, the Cypriot contribution in the war effort was overwhelming. In February 1940 a Cyprus Regiment was formed in which thousands of Cypriots served.⁴ This contribution was acknowledged in British official circles as well as in the British press.⁵ One further reason which influenced relations between Greek Cypriots and the British was the re-emergence of the “*Enosis*” movement once Greece, following the Italian invasion, entered the war by the side of the Allies in October 1940. Indeed, Greece’s entry in the war, and by extension her alliance with Britain enforced the revival of the “*Enosis*” movement (the power of which the British had tried –unsuccessfully as it turned out– to curtail ever since 1931). When the news of Greece’s entry to the hostilities broke out, Cypriots immediately held demonstrations in all major towns for which the governor exclaimed that “the spirit of excitement reached the bounds of hysteria.”⁶ The press and local politicians now pointed to the common Anglo-hellenic struggle. While the Greek consulate was placed at the center of popular attention, the key figure in the pro-Hellenic demonstrations on the island after 28 October 1940 was the acting archbishop, bishop of Paphos, Leontios. A seminal figure of modern Cypriot history, Leontios served as acting archbishop (or as *Locum Tenens*) following the death of Archbishop Cyril III in 1933. The absence of the bishops of Kitium and Kyrenia (they were exiled once the 1931 disturbances were suppressed) became an obstacle to the canonical election

2. “Η χθεσινή ομιλία του Κυβερνήτου ενώπιον του Συμβουλευτικού Σώματος” (Yesterday’s speech of the Governor to the Advisory Council), *Ελευθερία*, September 5, 1939.

3. See one indicative example in press, “Όλοι μας παρά το πλευρόν της Αυτοκρατορίας” (All of us by the side of the Empire), *Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ*, September 2, 1939.

4. According to recent research the exact number of Cypriots who served in the Cyprus Regiment was 12216. See Petros Papapolyviou, *Οι Κύπριοι Εθελοντές του Β’ Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου: Τα μητρώα, οι κατάλογοι και ο φόρος του αίματος* (Cypriot Volunteers during the Second World War: The registers, the lists and the blood tribute) (Nicosia: Ministry of Culture and Education, 2012), 22.

5. “The Cypriots’ War Record,” *The Times*, April 15, 1940.

6. Cypher telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 1 November 1940, CO 67/308/10, The National Archives of the UK (henceforth TNA).

according to the Charter of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. The acting archbishop soon emerged as a leading personality capable of making life difficult for the colonial authorities.

The Orthodox Church and the movement for volunteers in the Greek Army

This held true during Cyprus' wartime experience. For example, Leontios initiative to organize a volunteering movement for enrollment in the Royal Hellenic Forces instead of in the Cyprus Regiment is revealing of the new circumstances in Cyprus. Indeed, soon after the entry of Greece in the European hostilities, the Greek consul in Nicosia, Eleftherios Mavrokefalos, became the recipient of a stream of Greek Cypriot applications offering their services to the Greek forces. Leontios played a leading part in organizing the movement of volunteers for Greece. The desire of Greek Cypriots to enroll to the Greek army instead of to the forces of the Cyprus Regiment, although not illegal, posed potential embarrassment for the British, particularly since volunteers for the latter were paid. In December, Leontios requested an urgent interview with the governor to discuss the matter⁷ to which request the governor agreed, but for a later date, pleading other, more immediate obligations.⁸ While the governor in Nicosia tried to convince his superiors in London that there was no genuine desire of Greek Cypriots to enroll to the volunteer movement,⁹ the overwhelming response to the call of the acting archbishop to all eligible men to present themselves in the archbishopric made things all the more complicated.¹⁰ With this move, Leontios made the Orthodox Church responsible for the organization of the volunteers and himself the Ethnarch of Greek Cypriots.

7. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Ο Τοποτηρητής του Αρχιεπισκοπικού Θρόνου Κύπρου προς την Αυτού Εξοχότητα τον Κυβερνήτη της Κύπρου (The Locum Tenens of the Archiepiscopal See of Cyprus to His Excellency the Governor of Cyprus), 10 December 1940, Book IH (18), 51.

8. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Colonial Secretary to the Locum

Tenens of the archiepiscopal See, 16 December 1940, Book IH (18), 57.

9. Telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 11 December 1940, FO 371/24912, R 8974/150/19, TNA.

10. "Εκκλησία της Κύπρου – Γνωστοποίηση" (Church of Cyprus – Announcement), *Ανεξάρτητος*, December 20, 1940.

Discussions between the Foreign Office, the British ambassador in Athens and the colonial authorities in Nicosia ensued as to how to handle the matter. Eventually, it was the Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Lloyd who settled the question by noting that:

“Quite clearly the Greek government should be asked to say that they do not approve of the Locum Tenens’ step and that all Cypriots, who wish to serve the Allied cause, should join the British Army and the Cypriot section of it. The F.O. should so be told. We *must* make the Greeks do this.”¹¹

Following these instructions all involved parties acted accordingly. The Greek consul in Nicosia was instructed to ask Leontios abandon his effort. Consequently, the movement was discreetly halted although this did not forbid many Greek Cypriots travelling to Greece at their own expense to assist the Greek war effort. The episode is revealing of the British determination to deflate any Greek expectation while the war still went on. Leontios, on his part, would continue to promote the “*Enosis*” cause in every way possible.

Greek Cypriots, therefore, attested time and again their desire to be united with Greece. Conversely, Cyprus remained a focus of Greek irredentism and this held particularly true in the new circumstances created by the war. In early 1941 the Greek premier, Alexandros Koryzis, raised the subject of a future cession of Cyprus to Greece with the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. Koryzis told Eden:

“As the Greek people will be required to offer the greatest of sacrifices, they will need, in order to maintain the excellence of their morale, an immediate satisfaction of their demands. I cannot tell you how impressive in these hours of crisis, would a British gesture be whereby Cyprus should be ceded to Greece. I am simply putting forth a thought which will require further study and I am not demanding an answer.”¹²

11. Secretary of State for the Colonies note, 13 January 1941, CO 67/308/10, TNA. Emphasis in the original.

12. Constantinos Svolopoulos, “Anglo-Hellenic Talks on Cyprus during the Axis Campaign Against Greece,” *Balkan Studies* 23 (1982): 200.

Eden refrained from addressing the matter immediately. In April 1941, King George II again raised the issue and requested permission from the British for the establishment of an interim Greek capital in Cyprus.¹³ While, initially British officials did not entirely dismiss the request, William Battershill's urgent warnings convinced London that it would be impossible to cede even a small territory of Cyprus to the Greeks. The governor urged officials in London that ceding even a small part of the island to the Greek government would provide an overwhelming boost to the "*Enosis*" movement. Battershill was adamant, than no matter what guarantees would be made as to the temporary character of the movement of the Greek government to Cyprus, Greek Cypriots would anyway look upon it as their own, a fact which would antagonize both Turkish Cypriots as well as Ankara itself.¹⁴ However, following dramatic events of May 1941, the possibility of the movement of the Greek government to Cyprus reappeared. While further discussion on the matter took place, which revealed the capacity of the Cyprus Question in dividing British officialdom,¹⁵ the final decision lay with the prime minister himself. Winston Churchill emphasized that it would be better to leave all territorial settlement until after the War ended. The British prime minister stressed: "I have followed very closely all that has happened in Cyprus since I visited the island in 1907. I suppose you are aware there is a substantial, Moslem population in Cyprus who have (sic) been very loyal to us, and who would very much resent being handed over to the Greeks."¹⁶ Winston Churchill's intervention sealed the final decision on the fate of Cyprus during that critical time. In the years to follow, until at least the close of the 1940s, Athens would be too dependent on British assistance to raise more forcefully the question of Cyprus. Internal political turmoil, which climaxed with the onset of the Greek Civil War, was to seriously undermine Greece's ability in exerting pressure on Britain regarding the Cyprus Question.

13. From Athens to Foreign Office, 11 April 1941, CO 323/1864/7, TNA.

14. Officer administering the Government of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the colonies, 13 April 1941, CO 323/1864/7, TNA.

15. For a discussion and further analysis of the incident see Anastasia Yiangou, *Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010), 55-58.

16. Prime Minister's personal minute, 2 June 1941, FO 371/29846, R 5841/198/19, TNA; The minute is also cited in CAB 120/499, TNA.

The Remaking of Cypriot Politics

As the war went on, assisted by the relaxation of repressive measures, the island also witnessed the revival of its political life, which had been halted following the suppression of the 1931 disturbances. The foundation of the Progressive Party of Working People (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού – AKEL), in April 1941, was to have profound repercussions for the future. While local protagonists did not immediately grasp the importance of this development, it soon became clear for all that a new political power had emerged. Initially, AKEL maintained a discreet level of activity. However, the entry of the Soviet Union in the war, in June 1941, allowed the party to act further in the open, particularly in the villages, and to soon pose as a serious challenge for the colonial authorities. For example, the party called on workers to support the fight against the Axis powers by working voluntarily for one day a week at defense works, a call to which around 6000 people responded to by November 1941.¹⁷ During that month, Trade Unions managed to coordinate their efforts in organizing under one leading organ when the Pancyprian Trade Union Committee (Παγκύπρια Συντεχνιακή Επιτροπή – PSE.) was founded. By the end of the year, AKEL, under the influential leadership of its General Secretary Ploutis Servas, also positioned itself in favour of “*Enosis*.”¹⁸ Even though the British were determined to deflate any expectations on “*Enosis*,” while the war still went on, it was obvious that a new political power on the island had arrived.

Tension between the traditional Right-Wing powers and the Left took place as early as 1942, when the two camps held divergent views as to if and how the Greek Independence Day on 25 March should be celebrated.¹⁹ The expanding influence of AKEL in the rural areas also caused the reaction of the more conservative elements. The foundation of the Pancyprian Farmers’ Union (Παναγροτική Ένωση Κύπρου – PEK) in May 1942 served thereafter as the bastion of the more conservative rural elements on the island. The following year AKEL scored

17. Political Report for November 1941, CO 67/314/10, TNA.

18. The party had the opportunity of positioning itself in favor of “*Enosis*” in the wake of the Greek Premier Tsouderos speech in London in which he had envisioned Cyprus as part of Greece. The speech upset greatly British official circles and Tsouderos was even admonished by Anthony Eden. See Yiangou, *Cyprus in World War II*, 69-71.

19. Yiangou, *Cyprus in World War II*, 74-76.

important victories in the municipal elections (the first to be held since 1931) revealing the new state of political affairs which now existed in Cyprus. A call of the party to its members on 16 June 1943 to enroll in the Cyprus Regiment was met with considerable success. Simultaneously, that month also witnessed establishment of the Cypriot National Party (Κυπριακό Εθνικό Κόμμα – KEK), under the leadership of the mayor of Nicosia Themistocles Dervis. This revival of political life went hand in hand with an intense antagonism between the Cypriot Left and Right. In 1944 the Labor Movement split into the “new” (Right-wing) trade unions and the “old” (Left-wing) ones. This rivalry only deepened as the war reached its close – itself a reflection of dramatic events then unfolding in Greece. All in all, by the end of 1940s acute polarization was to become a dominant feature of Greek Cypriot politics, the genesis of which can be traced during the war. At the center of this antagonism, during and immediately after the war, remained the acting archbishop since his moderate policy towards AKEL alienated and frustrated the more hard-core elements of the Right, particularly those supporting the exiled bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios.²⁰ Criticism for Leontios, also, arose from his anti-british policy: it, perhaps, remains an irony, especially in the light of later developments, that for the Right-Wing politicians, “*Enosis*” should be pursued strictly within the frame of Anglo-hellenic friendship. For their part, the British did not accept either AKEL or the Right and the Orthodox Church as acceptable partners on the island. Indeed, any possibility of cooperation between the two caused profound anxiety to the colonial authorities. Testimony of this was the relief expressed by the British when a common effort by Greek Cypriot parties failed: in the background of Greece’s liberation all political parties finally agreed, in late November 1944, to pursue together an “*Enosis*” agenda under the leadership of Leontios. This fragile agreement, however, collapsed once the Dekemvriana events broke out in Greece.²¹

20. Makarios Myriantheas, later Makarios II (1947-1950).

21. Acting Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for the colonies, 9 January 1945, CO 67/327/16, TNA.

The End of the War: Discussions for the Future of Cyprus

The end of the war, which saw the Allied victory against the Axis powers, was as elsewhere celebrated in Cyprus. In Nicosia, crowds gathered at the main square of the city and, according to the governor, the Union flags were flown almost as much as the Greek flags;²² an indication of the loyalty and faith the majority of Greek Cypriots bestowed on the British. The Trade Unions organized a procession which led to the Greek consulate, where the Greek National Anthem was sung, while the following day the representatives of the Trade Unions delivered a memorandum to the Government House while the crowd present shouted for “*Enosis*.”²³ Representatives of the Right-Wing political forces also addressed the crowds and sent telegrams to the governor and to the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The governor, along with Greek and British civil and military officials attended a service in the Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia whereas similar celebrations took place in all main towns of the island.

Furthermore, the end of the war witnessed an unprecedented expectation for “*Enosis*,” which was understandable: Greek Cypriots had demonstrated their loyalty towards Britain in a war fought for liberty and democracy. Self-determination and union with Greece could only be the recompense for their services in the war. Indeed, any reports of such prospect coming from abroad served in intensifying such expectations. For example, in early 1945 an article featured in the *New York Times* reported that the United States favored the cession of Cyprus to Greece.²⁴ At that time, Washington was rather critical of British intervention in Greece and in this context, there was an American tendency to look favorably upon the union of Cyprus with Greece. Edward Stettinius, the US Secretary of State, stated in a press conference that the *New York Times* reporter had “apparently saw some departmental study paper that was private and not final.”²⁵ The incident, however, was circulated in Greek Cypriot press giving rise to widespread speculation

22. Political Report for May 1945, CO 67/323/4, Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the colonies, TNA.

23. Political Report for May 1945, CO 67/323/4, Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the colonies, TNA.

24. George Kelling, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus 1939-1955* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 46-47.

25. *New York Times* report on United States policy concerning the cession of Cyprus

and many telegrams of gratitude were sent to the United States. The mayor of Nicosia and leader of the National Party, Themistocles Dervis, for example, addressed to the *New York Times* a telegram in which he thanked Washington for its “support to the just national desire of the Greek people of Cyprus.”²⁶ However, small the incident and tentative US policy may have been this represents the first involvement of American policy-makers in Cypriot affairs, which was later to become increasingly prominent.

The future of Cyprus was once again discussed in British official circles in early 1945 as the close of the war was approaching. The Foreign and Colonial Offices held sharply divergent opinions on the Question of Cyprus. During 1944-1945 the Foreign Office was clearly favorably disposed towards Hellenic aspirations. Indeed, memorandums prepared during that period overall favored the cession of Cyprus to Greece.²⁷ On the other hand, the Colonial Office as well as the governor in Nicosia disagreed with such possibility. By that time Governor Woolley was determined to deflate any expectations on the future of the island. In fact, Woolley had insisted during the war –and had done more so as the war neared its end– that a definite statement about the future of Cyprus should be made, one which would reinforce the notion that the British had no intention of retreating from the island. As the British were prepared to announce a ten-year economic development plan for Cyprus, which was hoped to divert Greek Cypriot focus from “*Enosis*” aspirations, and for which Greek Cypriot cooperation would be needed, the necessity for making British intentions clear became imperative. The Secretary of State for the colonies, Sir Oliver Stanley, approached his Foreign Office counterpart, Sir Anthony Eden, requesting his support on such announcement, but also enquiring whether London could approach the Greek government in order to secure its promise that “*Enosis*” would not be part of any postwar settlement.²⁸ Eden, however, just

to Greece, From Foreign Office to Washington, 4 January 1945, FO 371/48360, R 708/708/19, TNA.

26. *New York Times* report on United States policy concerning the cession of Cyprus to Greece, From acting Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the colonies, 19 January, FO 371/48360, R 1653/708/19, TNA.

27. See for example, The Greek claim to Cyprus, Research Department of Foreign Office, March 1944, CO 67/319/5, TNA.

28. S. E. V. Luke to the Under-secretary of State for the Foreign Office, 12 March 1945, CO 67/327/16, TNA.

like Churchill, was adamant that no decisions bearing on Greece should be made prior to a Peace Conference, a position which was inextricably connected to uncertainties regarding Dodecanese and the role of Turkey after the war, which had finally entered the war in February 1945. Discussions on Cyprus continued in months to follow, while the advent of Clement Attlee's Labor Government, in July 1945, was hailed by the Greeks of Cyprus as a step closer to "*Enosis*." However, in September, the chiefs of staff report on the future of Cyprus turned the tide decisively towards the retention of the island by the British. This was a crucial turning point since thereafter Cyprus was established as a fixed designation in British calculations, and further assessments about Egypt and Palestine always took the Cyprus factor into account.²⁹ Therefore, the proposal put forward by Greek regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, during his visit in London in September 1945 suggesting the transfer of Cyprus to Greece in exchange of bases (not only on the island but also anywhere on the Greek mainland) fell on deaf ears.³⁰ But it is important to note that voices of sympathy for the Cypriot cause in the Foreign Office were not immediately silenced and can be in fact traced until at least 1947. For example, Sir Oliver Harvey, Deputy Under-secretary of State noted in September 1947:

"We can now do little materially to help Greece, although it is of the first importance to maintain her confidence in Great Britain and herself. I suggest therefore that further consideration be given to the question of the cession of Cyprus... We have in fact never made use of the island for military purposes and we have spent next to nothing on its material and social betterment. We have nothing to be proud of here. It can hardly be questioned that Greece, who has long governed Crete effectively, and has now been given the Dodecanese, can equally well govern Cyprus (there is a small Turkish minority whose rights would be secured)... I would strongly advocate that consideration be

29. Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Post war Imperialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 210.

30. Ioannis D. Stefanidis, "The Cyprus Question, 1949-1952: British attitude, American reactions and Greek dilemmas," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 15, (1991): 214.

given to the very early cession of Cyprus to Greece, before the Cypriot campaign is embittered by violence and before cession can be represented as yielding to force.”³¹

By then, however, developments in Europe as well as elsewhere in the world made containment of Communism an absolute priority for the British. “*Enosis*” then was ruled out and this remained a permanent parameter of British policy until the final collapse of the relationship with Greek Cypriots in the 1950s. Simultaneously, the new Labor government of Clement Attlee went ahead with withdrawing from other parts of the Empire, the retreat from India in 1947 posing as the most notable example. In this *milieu* Cyprus’ strategic importance was elevated and London became increasingly resistant to any challenge to the *status quo*.³² Retaining control over Cyprus became all the more imperative and this further hardened British attitude at a time when the Greek Cypriot position became equally intransigent.

Political Developments in Cyprus, 1945-1946

The internal situation in Cyprus reflected such considerations since the colonial authorities became increasingly worried about AKEL and what they regarded as a potential danger from the Left. At the same time, it was observed that dissensions within Church circles had seriously damaged its influence. In 1945, Governor Woolley had noted to the Colonial Office that:

“The influence of the Church has greatly diminished. In 1931 the Church was the power which inspired and organized sedition. All contemporary accounts emphasize not only that the bishops were the leaders of insurrection, but that the forces of disorder largely depended on Church influence. The Church was

31. Cyprus policy, minute by Sir O. Harvey, FO 371/67084, 26 September 1947. See also Yiorgchos Leventis, *Cyprus: The Struggle for Self-determination in the 1940s: Prelude to Deeper Crisis* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002), 129-132.

32. Robert Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 218.

the rallying point of sedition and based its influence as much as on its nationalistic as its religious appeal. The reaction following the restoration of order, coupled with the lack of effective direction of ecclesiastical affairs and dissensions within the Church itself reduced the hold of Church on the people to an extent, which would have been impossible had its leadership been more spiritual and less political. Today both the power and the inclination to create disorder have almost entirely passed from the hands of the Church to the new political organization, which until a year or two ago openly attacked organized religion... With an equal cynicism and opportunism, the AKEL party has stolen both the policy and the champion of its opponents.”³³

Also, the end of the war highlighted the need for collective action on the “*Enosis*” front. Leontios pressed towards that direction with the formation of a “Bureau of Ethnarchy” in January 1945.³⁴ In its first statement, the bureau claimed to be above all parties and asked for the cooperation of all Greek Cypriots in order to best promote the national cause.³⁵ Following events at the village of Lefkoniko in March 1945, which signaled the climax of wartime confrontation between the local Right and the Left, voices were again heard from various quarters of Greek Cypriot society, which urged Leontios to assume the initiative, as the Ethnarch, for the promotion of the “*Enosis*” movement.³⁶ Particular pressure towards such an outcome was exerted by a new movement, ELES (Ενώση Λεμεσού Εθνικής Συνεργασίας – Limassol Committee for National Cooperation), which was founded in Limassol and was under the influence of AKEL. ELES appealed for the cooperation

33. Governor Woolley to Oliver Stanley, 31 March 1945, CO 67/324/4, TNA.

34. In 1941, Leontios had founded the “Popular Advisory Committee of the Church of Cyprus,” an advisory body under his leadership that assumed full administrative responsibility for the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.

35. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Statement of the Bureau of Ethnarchy, 5 January 1945, Book ΙΣΤ (16), 2. The Bureau’s members were Stavros Stavrinakis, Georgios Makrides, Ioannis Clerides and Achilleas Emilianides. Reserving members were Cyrillos Pavlides and Nicolaos Iacovides.

36. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Evsevia Greek Club to the Locum Tenens, 21.4.1945, Book ΙΣΤ (16), 34; See also Letter submitted to the Locum Tenens by Chr. Papadopoulos, Chr. Ieronimides, M. Papapetrou, P. Xioutas, Pigm. Ioannides, Book ΙΣΤ (16), 35.

and coordination of parties under the leadership of Leontios. For their part, the National Party (KEK), the Pancyprian Farmers Union (PEK) and the Pancyprian Hellenic Socialist Vanguard (Παγκύπρια Ελληνική Σοσιαλιστική Πρωτοπορία – PESP) went ahead with the formation of their own “plan for national action.” According to their own communiqué addressed to the *Locum Tenens*, they would wholeheartedly support any national body which the Ethnarchy would establish provided such a body would not include persons considered suspicious of damaging the national cause through their “anti-national and anti-Hellenic” stance.³⁷ Finally, the three parties declared their faith that Leontios would make the “proper choice of persons” who would be members of a national body enforced with the task of coordinating the “Enosis” struggle.

Leontios proceeded to the re-organization and expansion of the Bureau of Ethnarchy. In doing so, he tried to invite members from all political parties. Leontios’ efforts, however, were met with criticism from the bishopric of the Kyrenia. As long as Leontios refused to denounce Communism in general and AKEL in particular, the supporters of the bishop of Kyrenia, especially the secretary of the Kyrenia See, Polikarpus Ioannides, retained a rather critical attitude towards the acting archbishop.³⁸ Such reactions were probably the reason why Leontios did not include any members of the Left in the new synthesis of the body: the seven members were now increased to a total twenty-one³⁹ and included both secular and clerical members from all towns. The enlargement of the Bureau of Ethnarchy was criticized by ELES and the Left in general, which asked for the establishment of a National Council, elected by all Cypriots.⁴⁰

37. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Statement by Char. Hatziharos, Chr. Galatopoulos and Them. Dervis, 8 July 1945, Book ΙΣΤ (16), 41.

38. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Polikarpus Ioannides to the *Locum Tenens* Leontios, 22 July 1945, Book ΙΣΤ (16), 50.

39. This number included: four regular secular members and two reserving secular members from the bishopric districts of Famagusta, Paphos, Larnaca and Limassol. It also included six Abbots (four of them regular, the rest reserving members of the Council). The seats of the bishopric of Kyrenia remained vacant; a reminder that the bishop of Kyrenia did not agree with this development. See also Kostis Kokkinoftas, *Αρχιεπίσκοπος Κύπρου Λεόντιος* (Archbishop of Cyprus Leontios) (Nicosia, 2015), 146-147.

40. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Ioannis Kyriakides to the *Locum Tenens* Leontios, 27 July 1945, Book ΙΣΤ (16), 67.

Notwithstanding these tensions and reactions, the enlarged Ethnarchy Council had its first meeting, under the leadership of the acting archbishop, on 19 September 1945. Leontios reminded the rest of the members that the primary aim of the Council was the union of Cyprus with Greece; that it remained above all parties and ideologies and that it would continue to follow the policy of the Greek government on the National Question. Greek Cypriots, the acting archbishop continued, was also to be by the side of Greece's ally, Britain.⁴¹ In the months that followed, Leontios continued to promote a moderate policy in relation to internal political developments and towards AKEL more particularly a fact which dissatisfied certain Right-Wing circles and brought further divisions with the Cypriot Right. Such divisions unavoidably affected the potential power of the Church and the Right especially when the acting archbishop publicly refused to denounce Communism, insisting that the national cause concerned all Greek Cypriots.⁴²

Simultaneously, British concern towards AKEL and trade unions increased and was exemplified immediately after the end of the war. Governor Woolley ordered the search of all AKEL and Trade Union premises which turned up documents considered to be seditious.⁴³ Over the next few months the leaders of PSE were tried on various charges, including conspiracy to overthrow the *status quo* and in early 1946 the organization was declared illegal. Inevitably, this series of repressive measures inaugurated a period of acute tension between the colonial authorities and the Cypriot Left. Trade Union action, nevertheless, continued and March 1946 witnessed the foundation of the Pancyprian Labor Federation (Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία – ΠΕΟ). When in late May 1946 AKEL scored further victories in the municipal elections, this brought more anxiety to the British as well as to the local Right.

41. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Cyprus' National Question: The First Meeting of the Ethnarchy Council, 19 September 1945, Book ΙΣΤ (16), 73.

42. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Archive of Archbishop Leontios, Book 16, Announcement of Ethnarchy Council, 24 April 1946; Report for Political Situation in Cyprus in March 1946, CO 67/323/4, TNA.

43. Prosecution of members of the Pancyprian Trade Unionist Committee, 24 October 1945, CO 67/323/5, TNA. See also Notes on whether AKEL and PSE are cooperating or affiliated bodies, 31 January 1946, FCO 141/2894, TNA.

The 1946 Delegation to London

Precisely because the British had decided to retain the island, some reform in the internal situation of Cyprus should be implemented. On 23 October 1946, the Secretary of State for the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, announced the convening of a Consultative Assembly with Cypriot participation to draft a new constitution. Simultaneously, it was further announced that a new governor, Lord Winster, was to assume duties on the island. The re-introduction of political reforms was to be accompanied with a ten-year plan for the economic development of the island. Furthermore, the British announced the repeal of the 1937 ecclesiastical laws which, until then, formed an impediment for the conduct of an election for a new archbishop and allowed the 1931 exiles to return home. Governor Woolley had, once the war ended, repeatedly urged London to put an end to the “Ecclesiastical Question.” Woolley had advised London that solving the Ecclesiastical Question was a matter of vital importance for Greek Cypriots. Resolving the matter would, the governor believed, counteract the force of the “*Enosis*” movement and would moderate public reactions when it would be officially announced that the British intended to keep the island.⁴⁴ The governor believed that repealing the ecclesiastical laws would also bring Leontios in a difficult position, since he had repeatedly declared he did not intend to stand as a candidate. For Woolley, the return of the exiled bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios Myriantheas, was not to be without advantages for the British. On one hand, Makarios was staunchly anti-communist. On the other hand, he was, the governor believed, to promote the cause for “*Enosis*” strictly within the bounds of the Anglo-hellenic relationship. Governor Woolley, paradoxically urged London that the only likelihood in preserving a political balance on the island – especially once a statement regarding the future of Cyprus was made – was in a revived Orthodox Church.⁴⁵ This did not mean that the traditional suspicion towards the Church ceased to exist. On the contrary, as with AKEL, the British remained deeply opposed to Leontios and the Church in general.

Introducing a new constitution, however liberal, was not an easy

44. Extract from Top Secret Letter from Charles Woolley to Sir Andrew Dawe, 23 March 1946, CO 67/321/8, TNA.

45. Ibid.

course to follow precisely because of the war experience. Having sided with the British in a war for “freedom and Greece” meant expectations in the postwar era were running high. Unavoidably, disappointment dominated Greek Cypriots once the announcement was made, especially as many had believed Woolley was to be the last governor to serve on the island.⁴⁶ The ten-year development program was also confronted with disbelief, since it was understood by Greek Cypriots as an effort to distract demands for “*Enosis*.”⁴⁷ Consequently, under the leadership of the acting Archbishop Leontios, a national delegation was formed to visit London, via Athens, to pursue its national demands.⁴⁸ Correspondence between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Governor of Cyprus reveals that the former feared that any possible stop of the delegation in Athens would be exploited to the full by Greek communists and suggested that no permission should be granted to its members to stop in the Greek capital.⁴⁹ Woolley, however, advised that any such move, at this point, or any effort indeed, to prevent the departure of the Delegation would only provoke immediate crisis. In Woolley’s view the Delegation was committed to refuse cooperation with communists and he believed that it would hardly travel beyond Athens.⁵⁰ Although some uncertainty ensued as to if and when the Delegation would depart for its destination, it finally did so on 10 November 1946. It arrived in Athens where it was enthusiastically welcomed.⁵¹ Its members met with the Greek premier, Constantinos Tsaldaris, as well as with other prominent members of the Greek political arena. Nevertheless, despite offering moral support, the Greek government did not wish to upset in any way the British: The Delegation was not allowed to present its case in the Greek Parliament.⁵² The Delegation reached London in December 1946 where it remained until February 1947. After much

46. Political Situation October 1946, CO 67/323/7, TNA.

47. Ibid.

48. The other members were Ioannis Clerides, D.N. Demetriou and Zeno Rossides.

49. Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Cyprus, 1 November 1946, FCO 141/2978, TNA.

50. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the colonies, 3 November 1946, FCO 141/2978, TNA.

51. See generally CO 67/352/1, TNA. For telegrams of support which reached the Delegation during its stay in London see CO 67/351/4, TNA.

52. Secretary of State to Governor of Cyprus, 2 December 1946, FCO 141/2978, TNA. See also Kokkinoftas, *Leontios*, 167.

waiting, the members of the Delegation met with the Secretary of State for the Colonies Arthur Creech Jones, to whom they submitted a memorandum. The memorandum stressed the Greek character of Cyprus, the right for self-determination and “*Enosis*” and dismissed the constitutional and economic measures, which were announced by the British.⁵³ The Secretary of State for the colonies asked whether the process for constitutional reform could proceed in case Britain rejected the Greek Cypriot claims for “*Enosis*” to which the members of the Delegation gave a negative reply. Creech Jones then gave the stereotype statement that no change was contemplated in the status of the island, something which he formally confirmed on 27 February.⁵⁴ Frustration and disappointment dominated the members of the Delegation, who could now not agree whether they should remain in London to pursue their efforts or return to Cyprus. In the meantime, in Athens a new government had been formed in January 1947 under Demetrios Maximos. On 28 February, the Greek Parliament, unanimously approved the call for the union of Cyprus with Greece, although such resolution was carefully formulated so as to not displease Great Britain.⁵⁵ In Cyprus where developments were followed closely, a national rally was held presided by the Acting Chair of the Ethnarchy Council, the Bishop of Kyrenia Makarios, who had finally been allowed to return from exile in late 1946. Makarios referred to the Cypriot contribution in the war, to promises made by Allies, which were now abandoned and urged everybody to contribute to the National Question in all ways possible. He also stressed that Greek Cypriots would always act in the lines of the Anglo-hellenic friendship.⁵⁶ A resolution was in the end approved, which was addressed to the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee.⁵⁷ The visit of the

53. National Delegation to the Secretary of State for the colonies A. Creech Jones, 7 February 1947, CO 67/352/1, TNA.

54. See details of meeting on Note of Meeting, 7 February 1947 and E. Edmonds to National Delegation Cyprus, 27 February 1947, CO 67/352/1, TNA.

55. “Greece and union with Cyprus,” *The Times*, 1 March 1947, cited in CO 67/352/1, TNA.

56. Commissioner of Police to colonial secretary, 17 February 1947, FCO 141/2978, TNA.

57. Bishop of Kyrenia, Acting Locum Tenens to the acting Governor of Cyprus, 19 February 1947, FCO 141/2978, TNA.

Cyprus Delegation in the UK was also discussed in the House of Commons.⁵⁸ Eventually, the Ethnarchy Council in Nicosia called the Delegation to return home in an environment in which tensions had peaked.

The Climax of Political Tension, 1947-1950

In March 1947, the new governor, Lord Winster arrived in Cyprus and he quickly authorized the conduct of archiepiscopal elections. This finally brought an end to the long-standing question of the vacant archiepiscopal throne. A few remarks ought to be made about the elections. The British hoped that Leontios would not be elected and that a more moderate figure would rise as the new archbishop.⁵⁹ Leontios himself had repeatedly stated that he would not be a candidate for the throne and only yielded to pressure at the very last moment. AKEL supported his election to the throne. The second candidate for the archiepiscopal throne, the Bishop of Sinai Porfirios, was supported by the Right. The archiepiscopal election, the first to take place since 1916, formed the ground for bitter antagonism between the two camps. Developments taking place in the Greek mainland, where the Civil War was in full force, also contributed towards such polarization. Interestingly, the Greek ministry of Foreign Affairs was also involved in the election. In seeking to minimize the influence of AKEL in Greek Cypriot society, the Greek government favored the election of Porfirios. Such election, it was believed, would ensure that the new archbishop would align himself with the Greek policy and would cooperate with colonial authorities, thus, acting strictly within the frame of Anglo-hellenic friendship.⁶⁰ Eventually, contrary to what the colonial authorities repeatedly asserted – that Leontios did not enjoy the support of Cypriots – he was elected as the new archbishop on 20 June 1947.⁶¹ The crucial element in the election was the support Leontios received from AKEL, which

58. House of Commons Debates, 12 March 1947, volume 434, columns 1318-1319.

59. Francois Crouzet, *Η Κυπριακή Διένεξη 1946-1959* (The Cyprus Conflict 1946-1959) (Athens: National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, 2011), vol.1, 200-201.

60. Vasilis Protopapas, *Εκλογική Ιστορία της Κύπρου: Πολιτευτές, κόμματα και εκλογές στην Αγγλοκρατία 1878-1960* (History of elections in Cyprus: Politicians, political parties and elections during the British rule 1878-1960) (Athens: Themelio, 2012), 421-422.

61. From Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the colonies, 20 June 1947, CO 67/337/4, TNA.

held an intensive campaign in his favor. Indeed, the party strengthened by the victories of the 1946 municipal elections, now posed as the more powerful political power on the island. At the same time, however, AKEL's successes convinced the Right for the need of effective and quick reorganization.⁶²

In early July, Lord Winster invited Cypriot representatives to join the works of the Consultative Assembly. Leontios rejected the governor's invitation. This was to be the final – yet extremely important – political move of the archbishop, who suddenly died on 26 July 1946. By rejecting the invitation, Leontios turned down any possibility of cooperation with the British. Indeed, any hopes the British might had entertained that the election of a new archbishop would result in the improvement of relations with the Orthodox Church were refuted. Simultaneously, Leontios distanced himself from AKEL, which had supported his election and accepted the governor's invitation. An analysis of the works of the Consultative Assembly has been explored in existing bibliography.⁶³ Here, it suffices saying that the experience served in widening the gap of division between the Cypriot Left and Right. The latter and the Ethnarchy rejected participation, while AKEL agreed to participate. However, the party's representatives withdrew from the Assembly when, following discussions, the British offered a Greek Cypriot majority in the Legislative Council (a long-standing Greek Cypriot demand) but refused to grant self-government.

Following Leontios' death, the election in December 1947 to the archiepiscopal throne of Makarios, bishop of Kyrenia, was another turning point in developments. Makarios II positioned himself strongly against the introduction of a constitution insisting on the "Enosis and only Enosis" policy. Indeed, the Church took the lead in rejecting participation in the Consultative Assembly and in condemning AKEL's decision to participate. Simultaneously, new bishops were elected, the most important being the new Bishop of Kitium, Makarios (later Archbishop Makarios III). The failure of the Consultative Assembly left the Cyprus Question at an impasse. Lord Winster resigned and

62. Cyprus National Party, 22 June 1949, FCO 141/4281, TNA.

63. Rolandos Katsiaounis, *Η Διασκεπτική 1946-1948: Με επισκόπηση της περιόδου 1878-1945* (The Consultative Assembly 1946-1948: With an overview of the period 1878-1945) (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000).

was replaced by Sir Andrew Wright. The latter's appointment proved to be more of a "Bourbon restoration" rather than provide any actual opportunity to break the deadlock.⁶⁴ Indeed, no new initiative on the constitutional aspect would resume. Instead, emphasis was placed on the implementation of the development program. In the meantime, however, further internal unrest ensued as the polarization between the political parties and in Greek Cypriot society in general peaked. Furthermore, the confrontation of AKEL with the British was also expressed in labor relations especially during 1948. Indeed, the year witnessed large-scale strikes such as the strike of the Cyprus Mines Corporation (CMC), of the Asbestos mines and of builders in the main cities. Supported by AKEL, the workers sought to improve their working conditions, including *inter alia*, an increase in wages and an eight-hour working day. The campaign of AKEL resulted in the intense reaction not only of the colonial authorities, but also of the Right. The former reacted with police action and repression, while the latter also confronted the strikers. Such social and political intensity intertwined with the reflections of the Greek Civil War on the island. The split in Greek Cypriot society was most profoundly evident in the declaration of an "economic war" between the Left and the Right in 1948. Consequently, the supporters of each coalition avoided purchasing goods or employing services offered by the "other" group. Similarly, all athletic and social clubs were divided into Right-Wing and Left-Wing ones.

Greek nationalist agitation on the island also intensified and in early 1949 AKEL, having previously briefly supported a policy line of self-government as a preliminary to full self-determination, now reversed to unconditional pursue of "*Enosis*." This decision had followed the visit of AKEL leaders (Fifis Ioannou and Andreas Ziartides) to Nicos Zachariades, leader of the Greek Communist Party seeking advice.⁶⁵ Zachariades criticized AKEL's readiness to discuss any constitutional development under British "imperialist" auspices. The party consequently reversed its policy to the "*Enosis* only" policy. This, however, signaled

64. Ronald Hyam (ed.), *The Labor Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951* (London: HMSO, 1992), xli.

65. Fifis Ioannou, *Έτσι Άρχισε το Κυπριακό* (This is how the Cyprus Question began) (Athens: Filistor, 2005), 319-354.

an important blow for the party, which appeared to give in to the pressure exerted by the Church and the Right. The party consequently experienced a crisis within its ranks –following also a change of guard in the leadership of the party as Ezekias Papaioannou replaced Fifis Ioannou as the new general secretary– and suffered setbacks in the 1949 municipal elections (the first since its foundation in 1941), giving the Right and the Church in particular room for reorganization and regaining its influence.⁶⁶ Simultaneously, the victory of the anti-communist camp in the Greek Civil War boosted the confidence of the Right-Wing forces in Cyprus, which was also assisted in its resurgence by the fact that the British sought to reassert their authority on the island by taking steps, which were mainly directed against AKEL. Indeed, the Right had managed to impose its “*Enosis* only” line on the National Question and by January 1950 with the organization of a Greek Cypriot “*Enosis*” plebiscite assumed the initiative on the promotion of the National Question.

By the close of the 1940s therefore Cyprus was ready to enter a new phase of its turbulent history. The British were not prepared to withdraw from the island, and this was reaffirmed in a new chief of staff report in 1950, which reasserted that retention of Cyprus was vital for British interests in the Middle East. By then, however, disappointment, mistrust and suspicion came to be the main components of the Anglo-cypriot relations. In such *milieu* the Cypriot Left and Right would continue to remain far apart from each other. The rise of Archbishop Makarios III in 1950 would –along with other developments– lead to the intensification of the “*Enosis*” struggle. As the bishop of Kitium, Makarios had played an instrumental role in the organization of the plebiscite for “*Enosis*” in January 1950. His speech on the eve of the plebiscite was revealing of the new state of affairs: “The plebiscite,” Makarios told his audience, “is a key which is designed to open the doors of our bondage. Should the foreign ruler refuse to open them, we shall force them open.”⁶⁷ The 1950s would indeed witness the collapse of the Anglo-cypriot relationship, as Greek Cypriots would openly defiance their colonial rulers.

66. The Influence of the Orthodox Church, 22 June 1949, FCO 141/4281, TNA.

67. A patriotic speech by the bishop of Kitium, 14 January 1950, FCO 141/3155, TNA.

Spyros Tsoutsoumpis

Governance and Violence during the Axis Occupation of Greece: A New Approach

The present article will focus on one of the least explored aspects of life inside “Hitler’s Greece;” the formation, development and role of the “counter-states” created by the Resistance forces between 1942 and 1944. Nazi-occupied Europe has been often presented as a monolithic entity that was ruled efficiently and tyrannically by the Wehrmacht and its assorted agencies.¹ However, “fortress Europe” was much more penetrable and fragmented than suggested. The Wehrmacht had to rely on a series of often undependable allies that included fascist parties such as the Croatian Ustasha,² hyper-conservative clerics such as Cardinal Tiso,³ ultra-right aristocrats like Admiral Horthy⁴ and semi-criminal militias such as the French Milice⁵ and the Greek Special Security Service of Colonel Lambou.⁶ Accordingly, the most distant and impenetrable areas of Europe; forests, swamps, mountains and working class slums, remained consistently outside the control of the Wehrmacht. These areas provided ideal hiding places for resisters in the early period of the occupation and served as the basis for the development of a number of shadow-states that ranged from the Byelorussian forest fief of Bielski⁷ to the Maquis redoubts in the wastes of Vercors⁸ and from the partisan

1. M. R. D Foot, *Resistance: European Resistance to Nazism* (London: Biteback, 2016); Werner Ring, *Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler’s Europe* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982).

2. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Hitler’s New War Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia* (London: Hurst, 2008).

3. James Mace Ward, *Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Josef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia* (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 2013).

4. Mario Fenyo, *Hitler, Horthy and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941-1944* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

5. Krisztián Bene, *La Collaboration Militaire Française dans la Seconde Guerre Mondiale* (Paris: Codex, 2012).

6. Menelaos Haralabidis, *Η Εμπειρία της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης στην Αθήνα* (The Experience of Resistance and Occupation in Athens) (Athens: Alexandria, 2012).

7. Tec Nechama, *Defiance: The Bielski Partisans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

8. H. R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

republics set up by Tito's guerillas⁹ to the Resistance's outposts in the Cretan White Mountains, where British Liaison Officers moved about in full uniform in broad daylight.¹⁰

As the Axis grew weak these shadow-states developed into fully fledged parallel governments that controlled vast areas. For peasants in the Auvergne, the Pindus Mountains or the Ukrainian steppe, the real government was neither the Wehrmacht nor its local puppets, but the partisans who exacted taxes, punished collaborators and miscreants, provided health care for the ailing people and drafted their sons and daughters into their armies. However, the study of these practices and institutions has been neglected in favor of high politics and the more salacious aspect of the Resistance, such as collaboration and violence. As a result, we know very little about the institutions set up by the guerilla organizations, their governance practices or about civilian responses to these ventures. Nevertheless, the decision to support the Resistance or join a collaborationist militia was not taken in a void. Such choices were shaped by the civilians' relations and encounters with the Resistance organizations. Studying these phenomena outside the context of rebel governance leaves us with a partial and often distorted understanding of Resistance policies and civilian choices, as Ana Arjona argued "whether a social contract exists between a community and a group, and what specific behaviors the group adopts, should be taken into account when trying to understand why civilians behave in the way they do in war zones."¹¹

The lack of research is even more impressive, if we consider the extent to which these governance structures shaped the life of civilians and the course of the war, as David Kilcullen noted "rebels play a central role in defining how civilians live their lives during wartime not only through violence, but equally through the development of structures and practices of rule."¹² In fact, governance took precedence over military activities from early on and eventually became the main task of the Resistance forces. The Resistance organizations were aware of

9. Milovan Djilas, *Wartime* (London and New York: Harcourt, 1977).

10. Xan Fielding, *Hide and Seek: The Story of a Wartime Agent* (London: The Folio Society, 2013).

11. Ana Arjona, "Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda," *HiCN Working Paper* 169, (2014): 37.

12. David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (London: Hurst, 2010), 2.

their weakness vis-à-vis the Wehrmacht and knew that any head-on collision would result in a catastrophe. Their ultimate purpose was not to oust the Axis troops by force of arms, but to set up a “competitive system of control over the population” that would allow them to mobilize the population and set the foundations for a future takeover. In short, the guerillas aim was not to “outfight” but to “outgovern” the Axis and its allies. If they managed to do this, they had a good shot at surviving the occupation and at seizing the reigns once the war was over. Effective governance was, therefore, the key to the victory, as David Galula argued “If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgency, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”¹³ Yet, winning the allegiance of the civilian population was seldom easy since “persuading local inhabitants to give support voluntarily guerrillas must either adapt their message to local beliefs, or educate civilians to change their preferences.”¹⁴

However, as several recent studies showed not all armed actors choose to engage with the civilian population and those who do often adopt strikingly different methods and policies. Some organizations such as the Colombian FARC¹⁵ or the Maoist rebels in India provided their constituents with services such as healthcare, education and disputed resolution.¹⁶ Other groups like *The Shining Path*¹⁷ adopted a predatory form of government and steered clear of providing such collective goods. Scholars have attributed these differences to a series of different factors. Jeremy Weinstein argued that governance strategies are shaped by resource endowment availability. According to Weinstein resource,

13. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice* (London and New York: Praeger, 1964), 6.

14. Nelson Kasfir, “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: The National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981-86,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43 (2005), 281-282.

15. Gary Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency* (New York: Zed Books, 2012).

16. Bert Suykens, “Comparing Rebel Rule through Revolution and Naturalization: Ideologies of Governance in Naxalite and Naga India,” in *Rebel Governance in Civil War*, ed. Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir and Zachariah Mampilly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 138-158.

17. Gustavo Goritti, *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Lewis Taylor, *Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006).

poor groups are depended on civilian consent to acquire provisions, material and recruits. Such groups, therefore, adopt pro-civilian policies to placate their constituents and earn their support. At the same time, such groups tend to abstain from acts of violence against the civilian population. Accordingly, resource rich groups tend to adopt predatory forms of governance and engage in large scale violence against their constituents.¹⁸ Other scholars stressed factors such as territorial control, the form and quality of pre-war governance institutions¹⁹ and political ideology.²⁰ The latter was also underlined by Resistance scholars like Mark Mazower, who attributed the success of Left-Wing Resistance movements like EAM to their “stress on social reform and ideological propaganda among the rank and file...self-identification as an ‘organization’ based upon social rather than kinship roles... [and]... deliberately low-profile leadership.”²¹

The present article will contribute the understanding of this phenomenon and shed new light on these controversial issues by providing a comparative study of rebel governance in Axis occupied Greece. The study will build on a series of new and unexplored sources; British SOE and Resistance archives, oral testimonies, memoirs, diaries and the Resistance press to address three questions: What was the role and function of the guerilla counter-state? How did group ideology impact governance strategies? How and in what extent civilians endorsed or resisted such strategies and what was their contribution to making of these institutions? The article will track the origins and development of the rebel “counter-states” in free Greece, discuss the tactics pursued EAM in its effort to win over the civilian population and explore civilian responses to their efforts. This approach will not only shed light on this little-known aspect of the Resistance but will also provide new insights on contested issues such as violence and collaboration.

18. Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

19. Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011).

20. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, “Ideology in civil war: instrumental adoption and beyond,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (2014): 213-226.

21. Mark Mazower, “Structures of Authority in the Greek Resistance, 1941-1944,” in *Community, Authority and Resistance to Fascism*, ed. Tim Kirk and Anthony McEligott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 122.

Bandits to Liberators: The Making of Free Greece

The emergence of the Greek Resistance movement has been usually presented as a response to social and political grievances that arose during the occupation. A recent study encapsulates this narrative as follows, “the partisans came out of hiding and entered the villages, where they promoted national liberation and the need for struggle against the enemy – an initiative that impressed the villagers and resulted in many of them joining the partisans.”²² However, the appearance of the Resistance and the establishment of “Free Greece” was a much more gradual and tortuous process. The two largest Resistance organizations EAM, a loose coalition of various radical parties that was dominated by the Greek Communist Party (KKE), and the republican EDES (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos – National Republican League of Greece) were formed in late 1941. Yet, the first guerilla bands did not appear until a year later. In fact, some areas were completely devoid of guerilla activity until the spring of 1943. Moreover, such bands were hardly representative of the rural population. Most guerillas were highly educated urbanites, professional officers and KKE members.²³

Fielding the bands was not a simple process since both organizations had to solve a series of crucial issues from procuring weapons and equipment to finding suitable recruits. More importantly, they had to determine the most effective tactics to gain the trust and support of the peasantry. David Galula noted that “Revolutionary warfare is first and foremost a political contest since in this type of warfare the objective is the population itself, the operations, designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgency), are essential of a political nature.”²⁴

Victory was, thus, depended on the ability of the insurgents to mobilize civilian support. However, such support was not a given. Rural

22. Yannis Skalidakis, “From Resistance to Counterstate: The Making of a Revolutionary Power in the Liberated Zones of Occupied Greece, 1943-1944,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 33 (2015): 162.

23. Giannis Katsantonis, *Πολεμώντας τους κατακτητές* (Fighting the occupiers) (Athens: Sinhrone Epoxe, 1979), 18; Giorgos Houliaras (Pericles), *Ο Δρόμος είναι άσωτος* (The long and winding road) (Athens: Oionos, 2006), 8; Giannis Privovolos, *Μόνημοι αξιωματικοί στον ΕΛΑΣ οικειοθελώς ή εξ ανάγκης* (Regular officers in ELAS, volunteers or coerced) (Athens: Alfeios, 2009), 348.

24. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 7.

Greece was a land of conservative, small proprietors who viewed both the left and the anti-monarchist republicans of EDES with suspicion. Deciding which course to follow was therefore of pivotal importance and debates over the appropriate tactics were particularly fierce. For instance, a series of meetings between EAM political cadres, prospective military leaders and KKE politicians in the Peloponnesian city of Patras in late 1942 ended up in a shouting match between the military cadres, who insisted that the “peasants only respected force,” and the political cadres, who insisted that they should provide a modicum of social services and try to recruit the brightest and bravest peasants in the EAM before they resort to violence.²⁵

Guerrilla bands might have lacked a road map for success, however, most of them counted on the peasants’ patriotism and the more optimistic expected to be greeted as liberators. Yet, during this period villagers were much more likely to flee before them or betray them to the Axis rather than to join them in the spot. An ELAS officer from the area of Thessaly noted that the first time his band ventured into a habituated area “the peasants locked themselves in, we tried to raise their spirits with our singing, however, they refused to show up, we ultimately had to drag them out by force.”²⁶ EDES cadres also complained often that the peasants were “bereft of patriotism” and were “in no mood for Resistance.”²⁷

How can we explain such reactions? The peasants were certainly patriotic, and it is quite probable that the nationalistic proclamations of the guerrilla bands did not lack a certain appeal among veterans of the recent Greco-Italian War. However, as a recent study of civilian attitudes in occupied Eastern Europe noted, “in the eyes of the occupied population, the partisans’ practical impact on everyday life was more directly important than the partisans’ long-term aims.”²⁸ Indeed, while peasants were not entirely without sympathy, they were first and foremost concerned about the wellbeing of their families. This led many of them to steer clear from the guerrilla bands, since their presence put

25. Privovolos, *Αξιωματικοί στον ΕΛΑΣ* (Officers in ELAS), 119.

26. Giannis K. Douatzis, *Ημερολόγιο Καπετάν Όθρυ* (The diary of Kapetan Othri) (Athens: Aixmi, 1983), 230.

27. Iosif Papadakis, *Το ημερολόγιο ενός αγωνιστή* (The diary of a fighter) (Chania: Self-Published, 2009), 26-27.

28. Ben Shepherd and Juliette Pattinson (ed.), *War in a Twilight World: Partisan and Anti-Partisan Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1939-45* (London: Palgrave, 2010), 3.

their families and communities in dire danger of reprisals and placed an overwhelming strain on their resources.

The ragtag appearance of many guerrillas who were dressed in a motley assortment of uniforms and equipped with antique weapons as well as their constant demands for food and provisions, also, did little to help their cause, as it led many peasants to dismiss them as “loafers, vagabonds and thieves” who only took up arms “to live at the expense of the peasants.”²⁹ Such accusations were not altogether inaccurate. An ELAS guerilla from the Olympus area noted in his memoir, “provisioning was done during the night when we requisitioned sheep from the shepherds. The shepherds took us for bandits and after all that’s how we acted to take what we wanted.”³⁰ Many of the first bands actually survived in the raid and extortion, while others acted as henchmen to local notables. The first ELAS bands in northern Peloponnesus survived by leasing their services to affluent farmers. The guerillas protected their estates from raiders and bandits, helped them “deal” with their personal rivals and on occasion performed contract killings. In return they received money, provision and hide-outs.³¹

These alliances might have seemed at odds with the radical proclamations of the Resistance, however, guerilla leaders knew that “guerilla warfare is like the elections, you first have to attract the support of the power-brokers before you attempt to do anything.”³² Indeed, what often determined the success or failure of a band during this early period was neither strength of arguments nor the rhetorical prowess of the guerilla leaders, but their ties to local communities and ability to mobilize local support networks. Armed groups do not operate in a void, as Paul Staniland noted, “insurgent groups are built by mobilizing prewar politicized social networks. These preexisting social bases provide information, trust, and share political meanings that organizers can use to

29. Elias Reggas, Autobiography (Unpublished, Personal Archive), 143.

30. Αρχείο Σύγχρονης Κοινωνικής Ιστορίας (Hereafter ASKI), Archive KKE, Box 429, File-26/4/13.

31. G. Bouratzis, «Το αντάρτικο κίνημα στην Ηλεία 1943-1944» (The guerrilla movement in Ileia Peloponnesus), *Ιστορικό Αρχείο Εθνικής Αντίστασης* 13 (1959): 71; Pantelis Moutoulas, «Το ΕΑΜ στην Ηλεία. Η συγκρότηση της λαϊκής ηγεμονίας 1941-1944» (EAM in Ileia, the construction of popular hegemony) (PhD diss., Pantheon University, 2012), 181.

32. Napoleon Zervas, *Απομνημονεύματα* (Recollections) (Athens: Metron, 2002), 151.

create new armed groups.”³³ Lack of access to such ties could have dire consequences. ELAS successive failures to establish a foothold in eastern Macedonia and Peloponnesus were to a great extent to the lack of local cadres. Accordingly, ELAS was able to establish a foothold in the ragged uplands of Tzoumerka, a region which according to a local cadre “thoroughly lacked revolutionary traditions” thanks to the support of extended pastoral clans like the Tsakas and Tsoumanis families.³⁴

However, such alliances operated on a *quid pro quo* basis. Local communities and notables expected to receive a series of “services” from the guerillas. Protection from rivals and predators was the most important among them. Stathis Kalyvas has argued that the foremost mechanism for allowing rebels to gain support is “shielding” – i.e. protecting the civilians from threats of violence by a rival violent actor.³⁵ The breakdown of social order and the outbreak of a dire financial crisis made such services particularly sought-after by peasant communities and notables. The division of the countryside into separate Italian, German and Bulgarian zones of occupation, the looting of the country’s wealth and resources and the allied blockade imposed from late 1941 onwards suffocated the economy and led to the prolonged financial crisis and eventually to a famine that claimed tens of thousands of lives in Athens, Thessaloniki and many Aegean islands.³⁶ Rural areas managed to weather this storm thanks to the intensification of farming and the emergence of a parallel underground market that facilitated the transfer of produce and material from the countryside to the cities.³⁷

In some cases, such transactions led to a profound reversal of social and financial relations. Farming communities in the plains of Macedonia and Thessaly and pastoral villagers were able to make a killing by

33. Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 7.

34. Διεύθυνση Ιστορίας Στρατού (Hereafter DIS), Archive Georgiou Agorou, File 12, Έκθεση δράσης του 3/40 συντάγματος, 5.

35. Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 124.

36. Violetta Hionidou, *Famine and Death in Occupied Greece, 1941-1944* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

37. Kostantinos Diamantis, *Μνήμες, πόλεμος και Κατοχή: Πάπιγκο 1940-1944* (Memories, resistance and civil war: Papigo) (Ioannina: self-published, 2006), 47; Harilaos Vagias, *Η Αρτα της Κατοχής* (Arta during the occupation) (Arta: n.p., 2004), 137.

trading in the black market. A contemporary report from Central Macedonia noted that the bourgeoisie and the poorer classes were suffering “however, for the peasants this is the best period in living memory.”³⁸ However, this newly found source wealth was constantly threatened by Axis troops, corrupt officials and bandits.³⁹ The collapse of the state and the withdrawal of the gendarmes allowed marauders and predatory mountain clans, such as the Zikos in Epirus and the Bakogiannis in Thessaly, to rob and extort protection money from peddlers, farmers and simple villagers alike. This situation had a debilitating effect on the underground economy, as it eventually deprived farmers of the incentive to produce a surplus and rendered peddlers increasingly unwilling to take risks. This situation, also, led to a further increase of the already inflated prices.⁴⁰

The inability of the state to deal with this situation led many notables and peasant communities to turn for protection to the guerrillas, “several murders took place after the gendarmes moved out from our village in early May,” noted a magistrate from a Maniate village in mid-1943; “the situation had become really dangerous, the villagers conferred and the majority decided to ask ELAS to take over the village, they proceeded to do so and the local authorities were abolished.”⁴¹ However, the guerrillas were certainly not Robin Hoods. In most cases, the guerrillas asked and obtained a portion of black-market profits and imposed a tax in kind to all peasants. Ultimately, their foremost aim was not to liberate the peasants from the scourge of banditry, but rather to gain control of the black-market routes. The guerrillas hoped that the income from racketeering would allow them to solidify their presence, expand their activities and recruit more men. In short, the guerrillas aimed to re-organize the local rackets and replace an erratic and inefficient form of

38. Ελληνικό Λογοτεχνικό και Ιστορικό Αρχείο (Hereafter ELIA), Archive of the Bulgarian Occupation, September-December 1942, Απόσπασμα Δελτίου Πληροφοριών μηνός Αυγούστου 1942.

39. Dimos Votsikas, *Στη Θύελλα: Αναμνήσεις από την Εθνική Αντίσταση και την δράση του Δημοκρατικού Στρατού Ελλάδας στην Ήπειρο και στη Δ. Μακεδονία* (Into the Storm: Recollections from the Resistance and the Civil War) (Athens: Self-Published, 1985), 41.

40. Vagias, *Η Αρτα της Κατοχής* (Arta during the occupation), 138.

41. Γενικά Αρχεία του Κράτους (Hereafter GAK), Archive Emmanuel Tsouderos (Hereafter AET), Αποστολή Α/File/2/Δελτίο Πληροφοριών υπ’ αριθμόν 1/12.

extortion with a methodic and efficient one. Early guerilla bands operated in a manner that closely approximated “the activities of blue-collar criminals.” The growing availability of resources allowed them to move from “once-for-all, predatory operations to parasitical ones that yield a steadier, more dependable flow of income” i.e. taxation, a tactic that approximated those of organized crime groups.⁴²

This change had significant repercussions for the function and form of the rebel-state. The establishment of a monopoly of violence and the formation of extensive zones of control allowed the guerrillas to start providing a series of state-like functions; education, health care and infrastructure maintenance. The provision of these social services had a twofold rationale. To stem defection and legitimize their presence to local societies. Memoirs abound with images of enthusiastic peasants. However, even after the successful anti-bandit drives, recruits were scarce. Moreover, the existence of multiple guerrilla organizations often led the peasants to “shop around” for the best deal. Many peasants casually defected from one organization to the other in the hope to gain material rewards, exact revenge or simply placate the strongman of the day. An EAM report noted that peasants in the uplands of western Roumeli “would declare for EAM whenever one of our bands appeared and when EDES guerilla showed up they would defect and join them.”⁴³ A cadre from Epirus similarly complained that “the locals are willing to sell themselves for a few breadcrumbs... neither we nor our rivals [EDES] can claim that they prevail in this, as the side that is willing to give the most to the locals will be the one to finally prevail in this area.”⁴⁴ At the same time the guerillas were aware that “taxation and extortion are two sides of the same coin,”⁴⁵ and many peasants believed that by accepting the guerrillas rule, they simply replaced a mercurial and somewhat irrational set of predators with a much more organized and ruthless one. The guerillas, thus, hoped that by diverting funds to such activities they would be able to show that “that at least part of the

42. R.T. Taylor, “The insurgent economy: Black market operations of guerrilla organizations,” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 20, (1993): 13.

43. ASKI Digital Archives/<http://62.103.28.111/neolaia/rec.asp?id=53147&nofoto=0>.

44. Ibid (accessed 10 January 2015).

45. Kasfir, “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation,” 286.

funds directly benefited local residents,” and thus to endow their presence with a veneer of normalcy and respectability.⁴⁶

The increased attention to hearts and minds, also, coincided with an effort to tone down violence and centralize administration. Bandits and collaborationists weren't the only victim of the guerrillas. Indeed, the arrival of the guerillas provided thousands of peasants with a perfect pretext to settle accounts that lingered for years. The ferocity of denunciations and the ruthlessness of many guerillas terrified even seasoned cadres such as G. Douatzis, an ELAS kapetanios in Euboea who noted to an audience of EAM cadres “the people were terrified... I have already made myself clear in the meeting we held two nights ago, when I said that we are people's fighters and not murderers... as I understand, both our people and the peasants have misunderstood badly our mission and aims since they are bent on killing anyone who has even exchanged a few words with an Italian.”⁴⁷ This was not an isolated incident. In fact, some cadres went even further by forming “red republics” in small towns such as Kalabaka, Almyros and Dimitsana.⁴⁸ In these towns the arrival of ELAS was accompanied by executions, large scale looting and destruction of property. EAM tried to nip in the bud such attitudes, since they undermined its effort to build support across the political spectrum under the umbrella of the Popular Liberation Front. Radical cadres were thus denounced as leftist deviation and were quietly moved to different areas. During the same time EAM, also, made efforts to include a number of “reactionaries” in its administration hoping that this would sooth the worries of the more conservative segment of the peasantry.⁴⁹

This shift is encapsulated in a small how-to guide that was distributed to new officers from mid-1943. The small booklet covered a series of topics from military tactics to social etiquette when dealing with the peasants. The anonymous author warned guerrilla officers that bravery and smarts were not enough to attract peasant support. In fact, their first duty should be to win hearts and minds by protecting the peasant's

46. Suykens, *Comparing Rebel Rule*, 150.

47. Douatzis, *Ημερολόγιο*, 290-291.

48. Giorgos Papadopoulos, *Η Αντίσταση στη Θεσσαλία* (Thessaly during the Resistance) (Athens: Papazisis, 2015), 125-130; Pantelis Moutoulas, *Πελοπόννησος 1940-1945* (Peloponnesus 1940-1945) (Athens: Vivliorama, 2004), 523.

49. ASKI, Archive KKE, Box 418, File 24/2/91.

property and setting up institutions that would help to disseminate EAM agenda. According to the pamphlet, the guerrilla ought to be “a leader, a missionary... the guides of the peasantry.” The pamphlet underlined that the guerrillas must appear as the “guardian angels of their properties and the sweat of their brow” and assist the peasantry in their everyday toils: “the purposes of guerrilla warfare are not limited in this [warfare], but are extended into the field of the urgent practical needs of our people... and follow faithfully the activities of EAM in the cities. [ELAS] does not only fight for freedom, but also for the bread and the livelihood of the rural masses... thus the guerrillas of ELAS protect the people from brigandage, re-establish the law, restore justice.”

However, despite the increase in remittances and rapid territorial expansion, this emphasis on hearts and minds would have remained a dead letter without the ample help of a third party; the British Special Operations Executive. The British Secret Services had established a presence in the country since before the war. Their presence increased during the North-Africa campaign and accelerated even further in the eve of the Sicily landings, when several SOE missions were established across the country. The purpose of these missions was to augment the guerillas military and operational capabilities by providing money, equipment and know-how. The presence of the British was a major boost to the guerilla organizations, since it provided them with much needed financial help, EAM received a little over 100.000 golden sovereigns in the spring of 1943 and helped them to legitimize their presence to the eyes of the more affluent peasants and the small town bourgeoisie, who viewed the guerillas as little better than bandits. British financial help allowed the guerillas to provide an even greater range of social amenities and led to a rapid improvement of living conditions in Free Mountain Greece,⁵⁰ a British officer noted that the food available on some guerilla strongholds “was better... than most people in Britain would have at the time.”⁵¹

While these changes led to a considerable improvement in peasant-guerrilla relations, the threat of violence was never far off. Indeed,

50. Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives [Hereafter LHCMA], The Papers of Brigadier Edmund Charles Wolf Myers /1/3/Greece–Sidelights of Activities in the Mountains During the War, 2.

51. Imperial War Museum/12578/H. W Hainsworth, *Special Missions* (1989), 110.

many peasants felt that they had no choice, but to comply with the guerrillas demands. A peasant who was approached by ELAS guerrilla to provide his mules noted that “the guerrillas gave me a receipt, they told me “here take this and when we’ll take over the state we’ll pay you back,” I honestly didn’t expect to get paid, but they had guns and I didn’t, what could I have done?”⁵² While he was not threatened, he certainly felt that he had no choice, but to do what was asked of him. Another peasant noted that “the guerrillas had guns, we had no choice but to support them, thus, many of us enlisted in ELAS, others joined EAM and many applied for a KKE membership.”⁵³

However, peasants were not completely helpless. Indeed, many used the weapons of the weak; humor, cunning, ridicule and minor sabotage to resist the guerrillas demands and assert their rights. Many peasants recalled with a great sense of pride how they managed to outsmart the guerrillas by feigning support or by providing them with useless advice. A Thessalian peasant recalled that “we had to become good actors” to cope with the situation and adopt “a theatrical attitude.”⁵⁴ One shepherd from the area of Tzoumerka recalled that he had learned by heart many ELAS songs and the names of local big-wigs, which he used whenever he came into trouble with the EAM authorities. In one occasion, he retorted to a guerilla band that tried to requisition a part of his flock by stating “I have contributed for the struggle much more than any of you” and dared them to contact a local EAM bigshot whom he claimed as a personal friend. The guerrillas were unable to call off his bluff, so he was able to keep his flock intact.⁵⁵ Similar methods were used to protest against the overthrowing of respected community leaders. One of the first acts of ELAS, after entering a village, was to ask for the replacement of local leaders and the creation of an EAM committee in their stead. Peasants were rarely able to reject such demands; however, they often managed to resist and subvert them by staffing such committees with underage children or even individuals with mental disabilities. In

52. P. T., Oral Testimony, Igoumenitsa 2008.

53. Mihalis Kosviras, *Από το βουνό στον Αμβώνα* (From the mountain to the pulpit) (Athens: Taxideftis, 2009), 110.

54. Kosviras, *op. cit.*, 114.

55. Kostas Stasinou, *Το Αθαμάνιο των Τζουμέρκων* (Athamanio in Tzoumerka) (Athens: Self-Published, 2000), 73.

one case an 8-year old girl was elected as village *ipefthinos* (“responsible one”) by her compatriots.⁵⁶ When such tricks did not pay off, the peasants could always retort to bribery or ask the help of a relative who served in the Resistance organizations.⁵⁷ However, there were limits to the guerillas’ tolerance. While they allowed individuals “to voice disagreements with the specifics of rebel governance,” any efforts to challenge the resistance project in its entirety were punished with outmost brutality.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, guerilla cadres didn’t see such acts of Resistance as a form of political reaction or an outcome of their short comings. Instead, most of them appointed it to the peasants’ innate conservatism and backwardness. Most mid-ranking and senior cadres were urbanite intellectuals and laborers, who saw the peasants as the proverbial sack of potatoes. Yet, the same cadres, also, believed that the peasants were malleable and prone to change after all such attitudes were, but a by-product of Capitalism, a social system that was in acute crisis and bound to disappear after the end of the war.⁵⁹ The task of EAM was to hasten this collapse and the inevitable transformation of society by re-educating the peasantry and enfranchising a range of social groups; youths, women and minorities that had been marginalized by the pre-war regime. EAM appointed women to village councils and in the spring of 1944 accelerated the transformation of gender roles in rural Greece, by giving women the right to vote and join the armed forces for the first time in the country’s history.⁶⁰ EAM brought equally radical changes to the lives of youths. The first step taken by EAM was the creation of a youth section, EPON, in the summer of 1943. EPON was divided into a military branch that was soon absorbed by ELAS and a civilian branch

56. Lazaros Arseniou, *Η Θεσσαλία στην Αντίσταση* (Thessaly during the Resistance), Vol. 1 (Larisa: Ella, 1999), 279.

57. ASKI, KKE Archive, Box 415, File-23/8/46.8.5.44.

58. Ana Arjona, “Civilian Resistance to Rebel Governance,” in *Rebel Governance in Civil War*, ed. Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir and Zachariah Mampilly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 186.

59. GAK, Βασιλικά ανάκτορα, File 369/165, Έκθεσις 1944.

60. For the changes brought in women’s lives see: Tasoula Vervenioti, “Αντάρτισσες του ΕΛΑΣ και Μαχήτριες του ΔΣΕ” (Women fighters in ELAS and in the DSE), *Kleio* 3 (2006), 163-187; The PEEA was a provisional government established by EAM in April 1944. Its main role was to act as a counterweight to the government in exile. However, it remained a figurehead, as true power rested with the KKE.

whose task was to “organize culture in every village” and, thus, prepare the new generation to become the “builders of the new Greece.”⁶¹

EPON had a twofold purpose; to serve as a breeding ground for future cadres and provide much needed social services to the peasantry. EPON cadres cultivated the fields of guerillas and war invalids, repaired roads, tended to refugees and displaced persons, while many volunteered as nurses and teachers. Moreover, EPON cadres were responsible for the steady diet of propaganda fed to the peasants. They wrote slogans and scribbled graffiti on the walls of public buildings that were known as “Efimerides Toihou,” the wall newspapers, edited newspapers and periodicals and delivered fiery speeches to the peasantry during national holidays.⁶² However, while EAM had the monopoly of propaganda in its territory, and censored news and information carefully⁶³ this propaganda had a very moderate effect, in fact, “most of it went over the villagers’ heads... especially the older ones, they really did not understand what was going on, and they were only interested where the next bit of food was coming from it seems to me, for themselves and for their children.”⁶⁴

Moreover, not all cadres were supportive of such radical changes. Indeed, in many areas the social *status quo* persisted with EAM’s blessing. In many cases EAM cadres refused to allow their female relatives to take part in the organization. Such attitudes were not confined to “reactionary” mountain villages but were quite widespread in the “red” villages of the Thessaly plain, where many cadres vetoed the refusal of women in the village administration. In one case, an EAM council leader threatened to defect to the Germans along with all his fellow villagers unless EAM sanctioned the dissolution of the local village women’s committee. The prefectural EAM commission obliged and the women’s organization was promptly disbanded.⁶⁵

61. ASKI Digital Archive, <http://62.103.28.111/neolaia/rec.asp?id=50953&nofoto=0> (accessed 10 August 2017).

62. ELIA Press Archive, Δράση, 25-08-1944; John Ponder, *Patriots and Scoundrels: Behind Enemy Lines in Occupied Greece 1943-1944* (Melbourne: Hyland House Publishing, 1997), 167.

63. National Archives, HS5/5/695/Capt. J. H. Childs, Report on my stay in Greece-May 1943-April 1944.

64. Imperial War Museum, Thomas Raymond Mason, Oral Interview.

65. ELIA, Archive EAM Παλαμά-Καρδίτσας, Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο (EAM), Πανθεσσαλική επιτροπή, 24-4-1944.

The same problems were evident from one of the more lauded institutions of EAM: The “Peoples Courts.” EAM strove to impose a monopoly of violence and create an alternative judicial system from early on. The creation and success of such a system was of pivotal importance, as Zachariah Mampilly noted “the establishment of a force capable of policing the population, followed by a broader judicial mechanism to regulate disputes... is the key determinant as to whether the rebel group is able to make the transition from a roving insurgency to a stationary one.”⁶⁶ The guerillas attacked gendarmerie stations and encouraged the peasants to stop using the services of local courts and village councils that were replaced with their own committees run by an *ipefthinos* or “responsible one” who substituted for all intents and purposes the pre-war village mayor. The *ipefthinos* often doubled as the president of the “Peoples Courts” that were set up by EAM in most towns and large villages. Such courts, that were in theory comprised by the most respected and educated citizens, tried a wide array of cases that ranged from domestic violence to arson and petty theft. More serious infractions such as treason and murder were tried by military courts. The decisions of the courts were enforced by ELAS and the *Ethniki Politofilaki* (National Guard).

Post-war memoirs lauded the *ipefthinos* and the Peoples Courts as instruments of impartial administration and swift justice. Yet, archival material and personal testimonies present a very different picture. Corruption and maladministration were the rule in many parts of free Greece. Often the *ipefthinos* used their positions to extort money for favors, persecute their enemies and enrich themselves and their families by appropriating EAM funds. A senior EAM member who travelled from Athens to Thessaly noted in his report: “We always thought that the *ipefthinos* would be those forced to endure the greatest sacrifices, deprivations and hardship, yet in the countryside they have a very different idea of their position. In fact, the *ipefthinos* and their relatives are those who endure the least hardship ... we can certainly claim that those who occupied such positions were not the appropriate persons, but rather self-seeking crooks and you can certainly appreciate how much harm this does to our cause.”⁶⁷

66. Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers*, 63-64.

67. ASKI, Archive KKE, Box 418, File-24/2/91.

In more than one occasions the *ipefthinos* dissolved the people's courts and replaced their members with their own relatives and friends. People's judges were also far from incorruptible. Many of them showed preferential treatment to their relatives, friends and anyone who could afford to pay them off. Others tried cases while heavily inebriated. It was no wonder therefore, that these institutions in many cases created far more problems than they set out to address.⁶⁸

EAM cadres' familiarity with such narratives led them to turn with a profound fury against "deviants" such as prostitutes, many of whom were brutally murdered, homosexuals, whom like their Yugoslav counterparts they viewed as "freaks" and believed that "no perverts could hold positions or be party members,"⁶⁹ drunks and drug addicts. Moreover, EAM put a strict prohibition on the fraternization between male and female cadres.⁷⁰

ELAS officials marketed their organizations as the heralds of radical change. Yet, while leading cadres might have embraced such ideas, their foremost concern was to prevail over their rivals and outlive the Axis. If they managed to achieve this, they had a good shot at seizing power in the aftermath of the war. However, in order to achieve this, they had to gain the support of the peasantry. Resistance cadres were pragmatists, they knew that those who joined them took considerable risks and therefore expected considerable returns both in the short term and the long term. The Resistance therefore had to provide its faithful with a series of perks; privileged access to resources and positions of powers and immunity from prosecution, were the most important. At the same time, both organizations were ready and willing to sacrifice their principals when occasion called for it. Thus, influential men were allowed to stop their wives from joining EAM, brutalize civilians and toe the line of EAM whenever it didn't suit their personal interests. Corruption and favoritism allowed the Resistance organizations to keep their clientele, however, they also undermined the organizations legitimacy and effectiveness. A blowback was not far behind.

68. ELIA, Archive EAM Παλαμά-Καρδίτσας, Προς το Θεσσαλικό γραφείο του ΚΚΕ, 3-2-1944.

69. Djillas, *Wartime*, 127; Georgoulas Beikos, *Η λαϊκή εξουσία στην ελεύθερη Ελλάδα* (The people power in Free Greece), Vol.2 (Athens: Themelio, 2005), 225-226.

70. Moutoulas, *Πελοπόννησος*, 526-527.

Crisis and transformation

The summer of 1943 was the high point of the Resistance. The Italian capitulation allowed the two organizations to expand rapidly towards the lowlands and acquire a huge amount of weapons and materiel. The growing availability of weapons and the almost unlimited supply of British funds led to a massive increase of the guerrilla forces. Within a few weeks EDES expanded from a mere 1500 to over 8000, while ELAS forces almost tripled.⁷¹ Yet, this expansion had an important side-effect; it diluted the nucleus of the guerilla bands and with it their discipline and ideological character. Most early resisters were hard, determined and highly ideological men, who were willing to put their lives on the line for their cause. Moreover, in the early days of the Resistance most recruits were carefully vetted since the partisans were wary of traitors and infiltrators. Finally, the majority of recruits received careful and consistent indoctrination.⁷² Such precautions were hereafter neglected by the guerrilla organizations that started to use recruitment tactics they had previously shunned. For instance, in Epirus EAM and EDES cadres gave new recruits a cash payment, that ranged between three to five sovereigns and promised continuation of payment for at least two more months. This situation was not confined to Epirus and it persisted well into the autumn of 1943, despite the repeated instruction of the BMM that it was “not allowed or possible to offer or promise money ... in order to move ‘Andartes’ to their org” and the strict prohibition against guerrillas remaining “in or near their place of residence.”⁷³

As news of the Resistance organizations largesse spread in the countryside scores of déclassé peasants and criminals; petty thieves, thugs, rapists, rustlers and even former collaborators rushed to enlist. Vasilis Papapanos, a law student and communist youth member described his new fellow-fighters as “derelict men...the most rotten and useless elements of our society, dregs... who only joined us so as to get a plate of

71. Lars Baerentzen (ed.), *British Reports on Greece* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1982), 78.

72. ASKI, Archive KKE, Box 429, File-26/4/13.

73. LHCMA, Myers 1/4 in 1/4-6, National Band of Rebels, JGHQ, Instruction No. 7, 18 August 1943.

food.”⁷⁴ The presence of these men had a catastrophic impact on the bands discipline, combat worthiness and relations with the civilian population. Many of the new recruits engaged in criminal activities such as racketeering, pimping, drug dealing and murder for hire.⁷⁵ An ELAS guerilla from the area of Boeotia recalled that several guerillas dubbed in black market and protection rackets, “when [ELAS] broadened the recruit basis... many of those who joined, did it to satisfy their personal interests.” ELAS guerillas in Attica and Boeotia requisitioned oil and sheep from peasants and sold them in the bustling Athenian black market.⁷⁶ Soon, even Resistance newspapers started to complain of the guerillas attitudes and warned the leadership that unless they curtailed such behaviors the peasants would turn against them. An article in *Smolikas*, the official newspaper of the western Macedonian ELAS, noted that “our relations with the people are going from bad to worse ... the people see us as tyrants, as an occupation army... instead of the protectors of their honor and property; this is because of our unscrupulous behavior and the violence that has been so often used.”⁷⁷

The situation reached breaking point in the winter of 1943-1944. ELAS and EDES had clashed repeatedly with the Axis forces. However, this time the situation was different since Wehrmacht unleashed some of the deadliest counterguerrilla operations of the occupation; Operation Panther began on 18 October and had as its main goal the opening of the Ioannina–Kalabaka motorway; it was followed by operations Tiger, Puma, Adler and Hubertus. The aim of these operations was two-fold: to re-open specific strategic routes that were held by the guerrillas,

74. Vasilis Papananos, *Το αντι-ηρωικό ημερολόγιο του ανταρτοεπονίτη Βασίλη Παπαπάνου* (The anti-heroic diary of the antarto-eponite Vasilis Papananos) (Athens: Oddyseas, 2006), 86.

75. ELIA Press Archive, Μηνιαίο Δελτίο, 1-2-1943; ELIA, The Archive of the 12th ELAS Regiment, File IE, Η Ταξιαρχία, 12ο σύνταγμα, αριθ. πρωτ. 694/16/3/44/EAM and KKE.

76. Dimitrios Vlahos Grivas, *Το Χρονικό ενός αγωνιστή, μνήμες και γεγονότα από τον Β΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο στην Αττικο-Βοιωτία* (The chronicle of a fighter, memories and events from the Second World War in Attiko-Beotea) (Acharnes: Self-Published, 1996), 48-49.

77. ELIA Press Archive, *Smolikas*, Issue 1, 18-7-1943.

and to destroy the material and social basis of the Resistance by carrying out a scorched-earth policy.⁷⁸

The guerrilla armies were unable to resist the onslaught of the Wehrmacht. Within a matter of days both ELAS and EDES were chased out of their mountain strongholds, while entire units disintegrated before firing a single shot against the advancing troops. During the same period ELAS attacked EDES strongholds in Epirus. The fight between ELAS and EDES soon degenerated into an all-out civil war, during which neither side gave nor expected quarter. Prisoners were often murdered and tortured, while peasants were looted with abandon by all sides.⁷⁹ The guerrilla armies soon came to resemble the Landsknecht columns that terrorized the central European peasantries during the Thirty Years War. Dressed in a combination of peasant rags, stolen clothes and Axis uniforms and armed with a motley assortment of weapons the guerillas stole from friend and foe alike and savaged those, who attempted to resist. Peasants were murdered and tortured for failing to provide a few kilos of grain or a pack animal, an EDES cadre noted, “the destruction they have perpetrated is often far worse than what the German did... many houses were completely looted and many people have been left without clothes on their backs... protests, curses, threats are all that we hear every single day.”⁸⁰ The incompetence and cowardice of the neophyte guerillas was finally admitted by the upper echelons of ELAS authorities who noted that “the rapid expansion of ELAS had landed in the ranks... a number of men who are completely foreign to the character and the goals of ELAS... they use the guns that were given them to protect the honor, the property and the freedom of the people... to satisfy their own personal interest.”⁸¹

78. Dimitris Kostantinides, *Επιχείρηση Πάνθηρας* (Operation Panther) (Trikala: self-published, 2009); Stratos Dordanas, *Το αίμα των αθώων: αντίποινα των γερμανικών αρχών κατοχής στη Μακεδονία 1941-1944* (The blood of the innocent: reprisals of the occupation authorities in Macedonia 1941-1944) (Athens: Estia, 2007); Hermann Frank Meyer, *Blutiges Edelweiß. Die I. Gebirgs-Division im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Ch. Links-Verlag, 2007).

79. National Archive, HS5/697/Personal Report, L, Sjt. Smith, K., H.q. Force 133, M.E.F, 10 Jan 44.P.

80. Georgios Romanos, *Μια αθηναϊκή βεγγέρα του 1944* (A gala in Athens in 1944) (Athens: Potamos, 2008), 201.

81. ELIA Press Archive, *Flabouro*, 6 January 1944.

Guerilla infighting and Axis raids had a catastrophic impact on the rural population and the Resistance organizations. EDES lost to EAM over half of its territory, however, EAM fared little better. The violence and venality of the ELAS troops and EAM administrators led to a thorough counter-revolution in northern Greece where local peasants, many of them of Pontic Greek origin, formed militias under the auspices of the German forces.⁸² Blowback was equally fierce in Peloponnesus where ordinary peasants, die-hard royalists and disenchanted former EAM members, joined the government sponsored “Security Battalions” militias.⁸³ These militias were formed in low-land affluent areas that had suffered from EAM’s exactions, such as the plain of Imathia and Pieria, the fertile Messenian lowlands and the olive and grain producing areas in the islands of Euboea and Lefkada. However, presenting the militiamen as outraged peasants does not capture their full range of motivations. Many of them came from the rural demimonde and were galvanized by the prospect of loot and violence, while others came from ethnic minorities and sided with the Axis to address grievances and settle scores, that dated from the time of the Balkan Wars.⁸⁴

Many of these organizations, also, set out to form their own parallel states. Security Battalion officers in Euboea and Messenia exacted taxes, tried peasant disputes and offered a number of services that were previously provided by EAM.⁸⁵ However, such efforts were seldom successful. Collaborationist militias lacked a coherent ideology. Many of these militias were home-guard units that were formed to protect a specific village or area from the exactions of EAM. Infighting between different militias was, also, far from uncommon, as was violence and

82. Nikos Marantzidis (ed.), *Οι άλλοι καπετάνιοι: αντικομμουνιστές ένοπλοι στα χρόνια της Κατοχής και του Εμφυλίου* (The other kapetanioi, anti-communist fighters during the occupation) (Athens: Estia, 2006).

83. Stathis Kalyvas, “Leftist violence during the Occupation,” in *After the War was Over: Reconstructing Family, State, and Nation in Greece, 1944-1960*, ed. Mark Mazower (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 142-183.

84. DIS, File 956/A, Αγγλική υπηρεσία πληροφοριών, Αναφορά για τα τάγματα ασφαλείας, 5-6.

85. ELIA, Douatzis Archive, File 1.2, Διεύθυνσις ευζωνικών ταγμάτων Εύβοιας, Αριθ. πρωτοκόλλου 6418, Πρόσκλησις, Ο στρατιωτικός διευθυντής των ταγμάτων ασφαλείας Εύβοιας, 13-9-1944; ELIA, Douatzis Archive, File 1.2, Ελληνική πολιτεία, Νομαρχία Εύβοιας, Αριθ. πρωτ. 5315 προς τον δήμο Χαλκηδέων.

corruption. Units like the Poulos Battalion in Central Macedonia essentially operated as an organized crime group.⁸⁶ The members of this group blackmailed peasants, extracted protection payments and engaged in robbery, theft and rape. Some militia leaders like major S. Stoupas tried to curtail such attitudes.⁸⁷ However, their efforts came to naught. Some ethnic militias, like those raised by Cham Albanians in north-western Greece, were slightly more successful in this respect, however, most of the militia leaders were essentially little different than warlords, whose only concern was their personal prestige and the protection of their own small kingdoms.⁸⁸

Yet, the presence of the militias threatened the very existence of ELAS since collaborationist formations controlled some of the more productive areas and many important mountain passes. Furthermore, despite their lack of governance skills, militia leaders were fierce and capable warriors and such militias bested ELAS in more than one occasions. Military setbacks and loss of territory undercut ELAS' financial basis, dealt a crippling blow to the underground barter economy and weakened the political grip of ELAS, as many cadres either opted for neutrality or defected to the other side. In the areas of Karditsa and Trikala, local EAM cadres repeatedly vetoed ELAS operations against local collaborationist militias and some even brokered agreements with militia leaders, who agreed to protect them in exchange for their support in case ELAS emerged victorious.⁸⁹

However, these were not the only problems faced by the Resistance groups. Anti-guerilla operations had led to the thorough destruction of many prosperous communities. A Red Cross representative, who travelled to Thessaly and Epirus in late-1943, noted the "flourishing communities of Pindus lay in ruins, their population, dishevelled and devastated, has taken refuge in the mountains... all their property has been

86. Stratos Dordanas, *Έλληνες εναντίον Ελλήνων: ο κόσμος των ταγμάτων ασφαλείας στην κατοχική Θεσσαλονίκη 1941-1944* (Greek against Greek: the world of the security battalions in occupied Thessaloniki) (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2006).

87. Ioannes Bougas, *Ματωμένες μνήμες 1940-1945* (Bloodstained memories 1940-1945) (Athens: Pelasgos, 2009), 211.

88. ELIA, Archive of the Bulgarian Occupation, File 2/2.3, 22-1-1944.

89. ELIA, ΑΕΡΚ, Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο (ΕΑΜ) Πανθεσσαλική επιτροπή, 24-4-1944.

destroyed.”⁹⁰ This crisis, also, had serious social repercussions, since poverty and hardship had reduced many areas to an anarchic state. A Red Cross official noted “there is no safety neither in the forest nor in the mountains...hunger has brutalized the people and narrowed their consciousness; banditry offers relief from hunger and looting is used to quell their needs.”⁹¹

Guerilla rule was often harsh and exacting; however, peasants knew that if they followed a certain set of rules they would be protected and allowed to carry on with their lives. Ultimately, the guerillas won the completion for government because they were able to provide the peasantry with the rarest and dearest collective good; safety. However, the inability of the guerillas to face up to the Wehrmacht and the lawlessness of the guerilla bands eventually broke the covenant between the organizations and the civilians and legitimized the mobilization against the guerrilla bands.

EAM, therefore, had to start its state-building efforts from scratch in the midst of a profound political and humanitarian crisis. ELAS responded by militarizing its administrative apparatus and unleashing a fresh wave of violence, that was aimed against defectors and collaborators of every hue. At the same time, EAM in an effort to raise its prestige, set up a rival administration to the internationally recognized government in exile. This “government” was known as PEEA (Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis – Political Commission for National Liberation). EAM officials hoped that this move would serve to legitimize their “state” and undermine the efforts of their rivals, who presented them as mere bandits and usurpers. The militarization of administration had a significant impact on the policies of EAM and its relations with the civilian population. EAM increased taxes, imposed stricter restrictions on the movement of people and goods and diverted funds and personnel from civilian institutions and organizations such as EPON to the guerilla bands.⁹²

These changes helped ELAS deal with his rivals, however, they had a detrimental effect on civilian administration. A senior cadre from the

90. ELIA, AVZ, Comite central du Dist. De Trikala, Trikala le 9/11/43/commission de gestion pour les secours en greece. D.3/Div.

91. GAK, Archive Emmanuel Tsouderos, Αποστολή Α, File 2, Έκθεση επί της καταστάσεως των πυρόπαθων περιοχών Ηπείρου και Αιτωλοακαρνανίας, 2.

92. GAK, Archive Βασιλικών Ανακτόρων, 369/165, Έκθεση 1944.

area of Fthiotida described in early 1944 the state of self-government in his region as “deplorable.” He noted that village committees were non-existent, people’s courts had stopped working and schools were shut, as a result EAM enjoyed “no authority or prestige” in much of the region.⁹³ The situation was similar in the nearby area of Fokida, where guerrilla involvement in civilian affairs had become “a usual phenomenon, since those who hold the weapons often feel that they are strong enough to ignore the will of those who support them.”⁹⁴ Tensions between ELAS and the peasantry were not helped by the persistence of anomic behavior among ELAS troops who sought rents, terrorized the civilians and shunned peasant mores and sensitivities.⁹⁵

EAM was aware of peasant disenchantment, however, it had no way to alleviate such pressures since the British had cut them off financially. The SOE dispensed humanitarian help to peasants in EAM’s area but refused to divert money to EAM as they were wary, they would be used for military purposes.⁹⁶ The organization had to rely on alternative methods to finance its struggle and keep the civilian population sated. Since EAM lacked the funds to keep its administration running it allowed some communities and band leaders to operate as privateers and use the proceedings to cover their needs. For instance, in the Preveza area of Epirus pro-EAM communities engaged in regular raids against lowland villages, which as a rule were either neutral or leaned towards EDES. The reserve ELAS forces of large villages taxed rival communities, confiscated the livestock of alleged reactionaries and requisitioned food, which was brought to the community and divided among EAM supporters.⁹⁷

As time went on these tactics became increasingly common. Many military units relied on plundering raids for their survival. The 50th regiment of ELAS presents a characteristic case. This unit operated in the ragged Pieria region. The regiment was almost destroyed in the winter

93. ASKI Digital Archive, <http://62.103.28.111/neolaia/rec.asp?id=53092&nofoto=0> (accessed 10 August 2017).

94. Georgios Lefkaditis, *Αναδρομές: ένας πρώην Επονίτης θυμάται* (Throwbacks: an ex-member of EPON remembers) (Lamia: Self-Published, 1998).

95. ELIA, Archive Gianni Douatzi, File 16, Διάφορες διαταγές, έκθεση του Υψηλάντη; ASKI, Archive KKE, Box 410, File-23/2/27.

96. Richard Clogg, *Greece 1940-1949: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War* (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002), 136.

97. DIS, Archive Georgiou Agorou, Diary, 80-8.

of 1943-1944 when it lost almost half its strength. The unit was restructured in February 1944 and survived hereafter by attacking and looting the rich villages that laid in the foothills of the two mountain ranges. A leading cadre recalled that between July and August the regiment requisitioned over 141.000 okas of wheat and several thousand heads of sheep and cattle.⁹⁸ These raiders were often accompanied by throngs of civilians; most of whom were EAM members and black-market peddlers, who looked to make a killing by buying and selling loot on site. However, the efficacy of such tactics was mixed. Requisitioning expeditions often resulted in scuffles among guerillas, while much bootie was privately commandeered by senior cadres and ELAS officers.⁹⁹ Moreover, the majority of loot and requisitioned food was diverted to the guerillas, while civilians were left to fend for themselves. A British officer stationed in Thessaly was impressed by the disparity in the lifestyles of the guerrillas and the peasantry: “where the village stocks have not been seriously depleted by the Germans in their various drives, they are depleted by the andartes ... I have not yet seen an ELAS outpost where the andartes were not eating wheat bread and having a meat meal at least once every three days.”¹⁰⁰

Violence was combined with a relentless propaganda effort. Despite its dire financial problems, EAM and ELAS continued to publish a huge number of newspapers and periodicals that reminded the “faithful” about the efforts of infiltrators, traitors and enemy agents, who constantly undermined EAM’s efforts. An EAM newspaper warned its readers that “the enemy lurks everywhere, he hides within our ranks and in the home front; he must be crushed without mercy.”¹⁰¹ This mantra was repeated ad nauseam in newspapers, speeches and became the main theme of numerous theatrical plays staged by EPON members. EAM newspapers constantly reminded their readers of the perils of careless talk and their duty to report subversion: “our gravest duty... is vigilance... even the most insignificant words uttered by the lips of the en-

98. ASKI, Archive KKE, Box 413, File/23/6/98.

99. ASKI, Archive Nikolaou Moirou, Box 1, File 7, Επαρχία Γόρτυνος, Επαρχιακό συμβούλιο αυτοδιοίκησης, εγκύκλιος για το κοινοτικό συμβούλιο, 9-8-1944.

100. IWM, The Private Papers of Major M Ward, 13345, Report on visit to Greece – 21 Oct to 25 Dec 1943 by Capt. M. Ward, 5.

101. ELIA Press Archive, *Λαϊκός Αγωνιστής*, 9/18-8-1944.

emies of the people and the fatherland,” and reminded them that “sentimentalism and gullibility are two psychological attitudes that hurt vigilance.”¹⁰²

The fixation with treason and spies created a morbid climate of fear and suspicion. The slightest pretext was enough to lead someone to a firing squad or one of the numerous ELAS prison camps that were springing up in “free Greece.” A protest over the lack of food and the continuous requisitions in the village of Valtetsiniko in Peloponnesus resulted in the execution of 14 locals, who were falsely accused of being the leaders of a German spy ring, that extended from Athens to Tainaron.¹⁰³ Scores of civilians lost their lives in the numerous prison camps. A post-war EAM report estimated that over 1000 persons were executed in the Feneos prison camp alone. The situation was even worse in the prison camp of Koumani in Achaea, that was run by Vrasidas Makris, a pathological sadist and sexual deviant, who was denounced and probably murdered by his comrades after the war.¹⁰⁴

However, men like Makris were not renegades. Makris was a dedicated party member, who followed the line laid down by the Peloponnesus bureau of the KKE that decreed in the spring of 1944 “the measures... against the reaction had been relaxed,” and consequently decided that “we should make carefully planned disappearances of reactionaries and traitors.”¹⁰⁵ Local cadres were encouraged to bring “knife blade to the reaction,”¹⁰⁶ while newspapers urged civilians to bring “fire and axe to those who had bent the head, wipe them out, do not spare even their youngest, hot lead to these families of snakes.”¹⁰⁷ This was no mere rhetoric, indeed by labelling entire villages as “fascists” or “traitors” the EAM essentially gave the guerillas license to kill any and all of their residents. Sometimes entire families including children, young than ten years of age were murdered by guerrillas often after gruesome torture.¹⁰⁸ Partisans believed that such brutalities would deter further defection, however, they only led violence to spiral further

102. ELIA Press Archive, *Μηνιάτικος αντάρτης*, Issue 6, June 1944.

103. Grigoris Kribas, *Γενική εικόνα, γεγονότα από το Μοριά*, Vol. 1 (Athens: Self-Published, 2012), 115.

104. ASKI, AKKE, Box 418, File-24/2/90.

105. ASKI, AKKE, Box 418, File-24/2/102.

106. Ibid.

107. ASKI, Archive Nikou Moirou, προκήρυξη στον λαό της Αρκαδίας.

108. Anastasis Krespis, *Το Χρέος* (The Debt) (Athens: Pelasgos, 2014).

and led to a plummeting of morale and eroded the more standards to the degree that it became difficult to keep violence focused against collaborators.

Communal justice in rural Greece emphasized conciliation between the rival parties in a conflict. The ideology of EAM and its rivals “emphasized eradicating the enemy.” Such views helped to obliterate the “‘gray zone’ of communal jurisprudence... in favor of a reading in black and white” that led communities and parties to embrace increasingly radical ways of conflict resolution. Yet, civilians were not just victims, they were often enthusiastic participants who took advantage of the guerilla struggle to settle their own scores. Merchants got rid of unwanted business partners, whom they presented as agents of the reaction, farmers wreaked revenge on neighbors who had been trespassing on their land, and neighboring communities settled their differences over water access and land rights through deadly raids. This radicalization of violence was, also, augmented by the replacement of the old elites with young militants. Both EAM and its rivals put a premium on youth and in many cases replaced experienced and respected notables with militant youths, whose claim to authority rested on their ability to enact violence and their blind devotion to their organization’s goals. Expectedly such men had no time or respect for traditional forms of conflict resolution or compromise.

The acceleration of civil conflicts, the drop-in living standards and the continued anomie of ELAS guerillas had a detrimental effect even among the staunchest supporters of the Left. The “Indian summer” of free Greece was over. A British officer, who toured Thessaly and Epirus in the spring of 1944, wrote in a dispatch: “the peasants... are opposed to the organization and I think would back anything, which offered freedom from such interference.”¹⁰⁹ The situation was little better further north in Macedonia where “on the quiet locals tend to speak against EAM and ELAS quite harshly, complaining of requisitioning and shooting of non-party people... many would welcome a British occupation until an honest plebiscite was held.”¹¹⁰ Indeed, by mid-1944 the “Indian summer” of the Resistance was truly gone, as the bands had outlived their purpose and had become an unbearable burden to the citizenry whose only wish was to be left alone by all warring parties.

109. IWM, Ward, Report on visit to Greece, 4.

110. TNA, HS/5/701 Report on Kaimaxala area by T. J. Johnson, 48.

Conclusion

In the autumn of 1943, an ELAS squad visited the farm of Mitsos Tratsas near the small Thessalian village of Rodia. The guerillas asked for several kilos of wheat, fresh meat and a pack animal. Tratsas protested and told the guerillas that he had already contributed his fair share for the struggle. However, the guerillas had none of it. He was finally forced to back down, but not before telling the squad leader, “I’ll do what you want because you have those damned guns in your hands, I was in the army once and I know how it feels to have a gun in your hand....so I have to back down.” The case of Tratsas was far from unique. In fact, it encapsulates the dilemmas faced by the guerrillas and civilians during this turbulent period.¹¹¹

David Galula wrote that revolutionary warfare “is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political.”¹¹² The Resistance organizations were aware of this axiom and the need to mobilize popular support. However, this was seldom easy since their actions put in harm’s way the very same people whom they claimed to protect. Peasants were caught in the middle of a ruthless struggle between two opponents, who demanded unquestionable obedience. Refusing material assistance and intelligence to either had dire repercussions. If and when they helped the guerillas, they would be targeted by the Axis troops as pro-Resistance. At the same time, if they refused help or if they tried to protect their properties and tried to mediate with the Axis troops, they would be arrested and manhandled by the guerrillas who accused everyone, who did not provide them with unquestionable support, of being Germanophile.

However, civilians were not entirely helpless and small acts of Resistance were common and widespread. Peasants used cunning, deception and sabotage to resist the impositions of the Resistance bands. Such acts were often successful and forced the guerillas to change their policies *vis-à-vis* the civilian population. Yet, the guerillas’ tolerance had a limit and while many guerilla leaders were happy to remove a crooked official, lessen the tax burden or provide some small perks to the peasants, whole-sale criticism of their policies was not tolerated. The limits

111. Vasiliki Papagianni, *Κραυγές της Μνήμης, Κατοχή-Αντίσταση-Εμφύλιος* (Screams of Memory-Occupation-Resistance-Civil War) (Athens: Sokolis, 2005), 491.

112. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 65.

of tolerance were further narrowed after the disastrous winter of 1943-44. Very few believed that the guerillas were able to take on the Axis troops on, however, most assumed that they would be able put up a staunch fight. Such hopes went up in flames along with scores of villages in “free Greece.” The catastrophic defeat in the hands of the German troops coincided with the outbreak of a ruthless civil war and the defection of tens of thousands of civilians who formed pro-Axis militias.

These events finally broke the covenant between the guerillas and the civilians and led to a radical re-alignment of Resistance policies. EAM proceeded to grant almost unlimited powers to ELAS commanders and diverted funds and resources from civilian administration and social services to its armed forces. The militarization of the Resistance was also accompanied by an acceleration of violence. EAM and ELAS were desperate to deflect the accusations of incompetence and cowardice. The recent setbacks were, thus, appointed to the pernicious influence of subversives and traitors of all hues. Accordingly, civilians who expressed even the slightest objection to EAM’s tactics and policies were persecuted as traitors and scores of them were led to the numerous makeshift prison camps set up by ELAS. Unavoidably, this policy stemmed all kinds of criticism since the slightest protest was punished with the outmost severity.

The increasing severity and paranoia of civilian and military leaders led many communities to react by defecting to the Axis and receiving arms to set up home-guard militias. Very few of those who accepted arms had any illusions about the outcome of the war or the eventuality of an Allied victory. However, like most civilians in occupied territories, “they formed their attitude towards partisans by assessing the balance between the privations inflicted by irregular warfare and the benefits of eventual victory.”¹¹³ The civilians initially sided with the guerilla movement because of the partisans’ ability to guarantee their property and safety. The successive defeats of the guerillas, the profound lack of concern for civilian safety and their constant impositions amply demonstrated that they weren’t able to do either, civilians, thus, defected in the hope that a temporary alignment with the Axis troops was their best chance to survive the privations of the war.

113. Alexander Statiev, “Soviet Partisan Violence against Soviet Civilians: Targeting Their Own,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, 9 (October 2014): 1528.

Yet, despite these setbacks ELAS was able to prevail over its adversaries. This victory has been attributed to ELAS' superior military capabilities, and the power of ideology. However, such explanations are patently inadequate to explain the resilience of the Left-Wing guerillas. Kilcullen noted in his pivotal study of counter-insurgency that insurgents do not have to be particularly good rulers, they just have to be better than their adversaries, rebel governance "is a competition: you don't have to be perfect, but you do have to do better than the other side."¹¹⁴ EAM prevailed because it managed to out govern its rivals for the duration of the Occupation. This was made possible because of their extreme adaptability and profound ruthlessness. EAM leaders were ardent ideologues, however, they were also aware that they had to adopt to the circumstances of the war, indeed, ideology might have provided a roadmap, however, its imperative was "modified as guerrillas learn[ed] how to stay alive and how to use their immediate environment."¹¹⁵ EAM's rivals were often hardy and pugnacious, however, they were unwilling and unable to step into EAM's shoes and govern the civilian realm. As a result, these organizations were unable to coordinate their military actions and mobilize the majority of the population against ELAS. Isolated, disorganized and hopelessly divided, they were, thus, picked one by one and destroyed by the ELAS bands.

114. Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 159.

115. Kasfir, "Guerrillas and Civilian Participation," 274.

*Paschalis Valsamidis**

Armenian Communities under the Jurisdiction of Derkon Metropolis¹

The Armenian patriarchate² is located in Constantinople and populous communities exist with churches and schools³. The Armenians claim that the number of people of their nationality living in Constantinople is almost 40.000. It is said that there are also 10.000 Armenians living in Pontus and in the mainland of Asia Minor. Almost 3.400 Armenian student attend the primary, secondary and high schools.

Until the forced migration (1923), the Derkon Metropolis had under its jurisdiction 41 villages.⁴

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1. The present study is a revised version of a paper presented at the International Conference "Russian and Armenian Folklore: Tradition and Modernity (19th c. – early 21st century)," organized by the Department of Languages, Literature and Culture of the Black Sea countries of the Democritus University in Thrace, Greece which took place at Komotini from 30th October until 1st November 2015.

2. The headquarters is at Kumkapi.

3. See Anastasios Iordanoglou, «Η Αρμενική κοινότητα της Κωνσταντινούπολης μετά τη συνθήκη της Λωζάνης» (The Armenian community in Istanbul after the Treaty of Lausanne), *Βαλκανικά Σύμμεικτα* 8 (1996): 181-190.

4. For the villages see S. Boutiras, «Εκθεσις του Διοικητικού Συμβουλίου περί των εργασιών του πρώτου συλλογικού έτους» (Report of the Administrative Council about the operations of the first year), *Επετηρίς του Θρακικού Φιλεκπαιδευτικού Συλλόγου* 1 (1872-1873): 58-104; Boutiras, «Εκθεσις της Εκπαιδευτικής Επιτροπής του Θρακικού Συλλόγου περί της ενεστώς καταστάσεως της εν Θράκη ελληνικής παιδείσεως» (Report of the Educational Committee of the Thracian Association about the greek education's situation in Thrace), [hereafter] *Επετηρίς του Θρακικού Φιλεκπαιδευτικού Συλλόγου* 2 (1873-1874): 85-93; Dimitrios Kalemis, «Η επαρχία Δέρκων. Εκκλησίαι-σχολεία-αριθμός κατοίκων-ήθη και έθιμα» (The region of Derkon. Churches-Schools-Number of citizens-Customs and traditions), *Ημερολόγιον της Ανατολής* 5 (1886): 135-157; A. P., «Η Μητρόπολις Δέρκων» (The Metropolis of Derkon), *Ημερολόγιον Εθνικών Φιλανθρωπικών Καταστημάτων Κωνσταντινουπόλεως του έτους 1906* (Konstantinoupolis: 1905), 145-158; Athena Gaitanou-Gianniou, «Από την Ανατολικήν Θράκην η επαρχία Δέρκων» (From Eastern Thrace the region of Derkon), *Θρακικά* 12 (1939): 161-209, 13 (1940): 108-156; Basil Stavridis, *Η Ιερά*

One of these was called Hemenikoy,⁵ whose villagers used to be Armenians, speaking both Greek and Bulgarian. Nowadays, it has within its jurisdiction only five communities. In Bosphorus: Therapia, Buyukdere, Geni Machale and in Propontis: Saint Stephanos and Machrochori.

There are organized Armenian communities under the jurisdiction of the Derkon Metropolis: in Saint Stephanos, in Machrochori and in Buyukdere. Other Armenians live in the suburbs of Sariyer, Geni Machale, Kilyos and in other neighbourhoods created at the peak of Upper Bosphorus. Most of them were Orthodox Armenians and only a few were Catholic Armenians.

In Saint Stephanos,⁶ according to the Armenian priest of Saint Steph-

Μητρόπολις Δέρκων. Οικουμενικόν Πατριαρχείον (The Metropolis of Derkon. Ecumenical Patriarchate) (Thessaloniki: 1991); Basil Stavridis, *Επισκοπική Ιστορία του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου* (History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate) (Thessaloniki: 1996), 164-167; Akilas Millas, *Σφραγίδες μητροπόλεων Χαλκηδόνης-Δέρκων* (Stamps of the Metropolis Chalkidon-Derkon) (Athens: 2000), 263-391, 406-416.

5. Today its place name is Ihsaniye. Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, *Οργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (Entity of Istanbul) (Athens-Giannina: 1984), 55; *Επετηρίς του Θρακικού Φιλεκπαιδευτικού Συλλόγου* 2 (1873-1874): 90-91; Kalemis, «Η επαρχία Δέρκων» (The region of Derkon) 149; A. P., «Η Μητρόπολις Δέρκων» (The Metropolis of Derkon), 155; Gaitanou-Gianniou, «Από την Ανατολικήν Θράκην» (From Eastern Thrace), 194-195; Stavridis, *Η Ιερά Μητρόπολις Δέρκων* (The Metropolis of Derkon), 65-66.

6. For Saint Stephanos see *Επετηρίς του Θρακικού Φιλεκπαιδευτικού Συλλόγου* 2 (1873-1874): 92; Kalemis, «Η επαρχία Δέρκων» (The region of Derkon), 152; A. P., «Η Μητρόπολις Δέρκων» (The Metropolis of Derkon), 151; Gaitanou-Gianniou, «Από την Ανατολικήν Θράκην» (From Eastern Thrace), 173-181; Stavridis, *Η Ιερά Μητρόπολις Δέρκων* (The Metropolis of Derkon), 48-51; Io Lambiri, «Ο Άγιος Στέφανος» (Saint Stephanos), *Απόστολος Ανδρέας*, Δεκεμβρίου 27, 1952, 4; Io Lambiri, *Ο Άγιος Στέφανος (Ο άγιος, το χωριό, ο ναός)* (Saint Stephanos [Saint, village, church]) (Thessaloniki: έκδοσις Ι. Μητροπόλεως Δέρκων· επί τη εκατονπεντηκονταετηρίδι του Ιερού Ναού του Αγίου Στεφάνου Γεσηλκιοί 1845-1995, 1995); Alexandros Paspatis, «Τα Θρακικά προάστεια του Βυζαντίου» (The Thracian suburbs of Byzantium), *Ελληνικός Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* 12 (1877-1878): 40; Manuel Gedeon, «Παλαιάς ευωρίας θρακικά κέντρα», *Θρακικά* 7 (1936): 28; Millas, *Σφραγίδες* (Stamps), 316-323; Paschalis Valsamidis, «Η κοινότητα του Αγίου Στεφάνου και το έθιμο της προσφοράς θυσιών (κουρμπανιών)» (The community of Saint Stephanos and the custom of sacrifice), *Ο Πολίτης*, Φεβρουάριος, 2002, 21; Murat Belge, *İstanbul gezi rehberi* (Istanbul travel guide) (İstanbul: 1995), 207-208; Haluk Karlık, “Yesilköy” (Yesilkoy), *Dünden bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* 7 (1994): 510-512.

anos' church Drtad Uzunyan, live almost 7.000 Armenians.⁷ The church is dedicated to Saint Stephanos and it was rebuilt to replace the old church in 1826 with the expenses of Simon Amira Dayan (1777-1834). During 1843 it was renovated by his son Boğos Dadyan (1800-1863) and its dedication took place in 1844 by the Patriarch Advan-zadour (1841-1844). Later, the church was restored, but we do not know any details. We know that in 2000 it was considered necessary to be restored and its dedication was completed by the Patriarch Mesrop the B' (1998).⁸ Behind the altar area of the church there are graves where, among others, members of the Dadyan family were buried. In the wall surrounding the church there are the offices of the community, the sacristan's house and the cells. When we visited the church, the priest Drtad Uzunyan informed us that the relationships between the Greek Orthodox (Romioi) and the Armenians are excellent.⁹ The Greek Orthodox priest of Saint Stephanos' church, Georgios Gioumouscagia¹⁰ was a frequent visitor during the important feasts of the Armenians, like Christmas, Easter and the feast for the Dormition of the Mother of God. The Armenian priest also returned these visits to the Greek Orthodox community. Next to the Armenian church there is the Armenian primary and secondary school where, according to the priest Drtad Uzunyan, approximately 290 students attend.¹¹ By the webpage of the Armenian patriarchate of Constantinople we are informed that on December 23, 1954, the community asked for permission by the Turkish Ministry of National Education to operate the community school,¹² which request was approved on January 9, 1956.¹³ In 2003 the school was renovated with the contribution of the Armenian villagers and the rich people of the area. Today it operates as a primary and secondary school.¹⁴ In April

7. We were informed during our visit in the offices of the church on October 14, 2015.

8. <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/surp-stepanos-ermeni-kilisesi> (December 16, 2016).

9. On October 14, 2015.

10. He passed away on April 29, 2016.

11. We were informed on October 14, 2015.

12. <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/yesilkoy-ermeni-ilkogretim-okulu-cemaat-okullari> (December 16, 2016).

13. Süleyman Büyükkarcı, *İstanbul Ermeni okulları* (Armenian schools in Istanbul) (Konya: 2003), 63-64.

14. <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/yesilkoy-ermeni-ilkogretim-okulu-cemaat-okullari> (December 16, 2016).

1991 a fellowship under the name Graduates of the Armenian School of Saint Stephanos was founded.¹⁵

Machrochori (Bakırköy)¹⁶ has more Armenian people than Saint Stephanos. The church is dedicated to Virgin Mary (Surp Asdvadzadzi) and was built by Hovahannes Dadyan (1798-1869) in 1844.¹⁷ The relevant firman was passed by the Ottoman government in 1847. The church was occasionally repaired. The last time it was renovated was in 1999 and its dedication was completed by the Patriarch Mesrop B' (1998-).¹⁸ The central gate of the church lies on Ebuziya Street and it is decorated with a marble slab, on which there is the inscription SURP ASTVAZAZİN/ERMENİ KİLİSESİ (Armenian Church of Virgin Mary). Above the entrance the church steeple dominates. Nowadays, the entrance is not used. The faithful come into the church through the second entrance on the Ömer Nacı Street, on which the honored church and the year of its foundation (1844) is written in the Armenian language. Since 1840¹⁹ a cemetery has been located in this community,

15. <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/yesilkoy-ermeni-okulundan-yetisenler-dernegi-dernekler> (December 16, 2016).

16. For Makrochori see Athena Gaitanou-Gianniou, *Το πνευματικό Μακροχώρι του καιρού μου* (The spiritual Machrochori on my time) (Ισταμπούλ: 1951); Gaitanou-Gianniou, «Από την Ανατολικήν Θράκην» (From Eastern Thrace), *Θρακικά* 13 (1940): 108-138; Nikos Tziras, *Το Έβδομον του Βυζαντίου και η Ελληνική Κοινότητα Μακροχωρίου* (The Seventh of Byzantium and the Greek Community of Machrochori) (Athens: 1992); Paschalis Valsamidis, *Ιστορία του Ιερού Ναού Αγίου Γεωργίου Μακροχωρίου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (History of the Saint George's Church in Machrochori Istanbul) (Thessaloniki: 2015); Rasin Örsan, *Kaybolan Bakırköy* (İstanbul: 1989); Nikos Ginis and Constantinos Stratos, *Εκκλησίες στην Κωνσταντινούπολη. Ζώντα μνημεία της Ορθοδοξίας* (Churches in Istanbul. Living monuments of Orthodoxy) (Athens: 1999), 152-153; *Επετηρίς του Θρακικού Φιλεκπαιδευτικού Συλλόγου* 1 (1872-1873): 55; 2 (1873-1874): 92. Kalemis, «Η επαρχία Δέρκων» (The region of Derkon), 152; A. P., «Η Μητρόπολις Δέρκων» (The Metropolis of Derkon), 150-151; Gedeon, *Παλαιάς ευωρίας θρακώα κέντρα*, 26-27; Stavridis, *Η Ιερά Μητρόπολις Δέρκων* (The Metropolis of Derkon), 39-48; Millas, *Σφραγίδες* (Stamps), 304-315.

17. Pars Tuğlacı, *İstanbul Ermeni kiliseleri* (Armenian churches in Istanbul) (İstanbul: 1991), 118-120; Valsamidis, *Ιστορία* (History), 31. Nikos Tziras mentions that the permission was given on April 7, 1844. Tziras, *Ελληνική Κοινότητα Μακροχωρίου* (Greek Community of Machrochori), 299.

18. <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/dzinunt-surp-asdvadzadzi-ermeni-kilisesi> (December 16, 2016).

19. <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/bakirkoy-ermeni-mezarligi-mezarliklari> (December 16, 2016).

where the Armenian residents of Saint Stephanos are being buried, owing to the fact that their cemetery in Saint Stephanos was located next to the Greek Orthodox one²⁰ and it was expropriated by the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian residents of the Machrochori community preserve their good relationships with the Greek Orthodox of the homonymous community. Bogos Dadyan built the primary school in 1844 next to the church. At the beginning, the Armenian workers' children of the powder factory²¹ attended the school. In order to express their gratefulness, the community suggested naming the school after him, but he did not accept it²² and it was named Arzoujyan. In 1892, after Dadyan's death, his son Arntin Dadyan (1830-1901) renamed the school Dadyan. Within the period 1892-1894 the kindergarten was founded. Since the school year 1958-1959 the secondary school has also been operating.²³ By the Ebuziya Street there is the old entrance of the school-today a secondary school-where the year of the school's foundation in 1844 is inscribed along with a sign under the title MİLİEGİTİM BAKANLIĞI/ İSTANBUL-BAKIRKÖY/ÖZEL/DADİAN ERMENİ/ ORTAOKULU /1844 (Turkish Ministry of National Education, Dadyan Private Secondary School of Machrochori Constantinople 1844). At the back side-on the Ömer Nacı Street in the second entrance of the school, the year 1844 and the name of its founder, Dadyan, are inscribed along with a sign with the following inscription MİLİ EGİTİM BAKANLIĞI/ İSTANBUL-BAKIRKÖY/ÖZEL/DADİAN ERMENİ/İLKOKULU-ORTAOKULU /1844 (Turkish Ministry of National Education, Dadyan Private Secondary School of Machrochori Constantinople 1844). In the early 1990s, almost 1.500 families used to live there, and 600 students attended the school.²⁴ During the school year 2015-2016 both the primary and the secondary school had 391 students.

20 Greek Orthodoxies of Saint Stephanos are also being buried in the Greek Orthodox Cemetery of the Makrochori community.

21. Tziras, *Ελληνική Κοινότητα Μακροχωρίου* (Greek Community of Machrochori), 299.

22. http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dadyan_Ermeni_Okulu (Oktober 3, 2016).

23. <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/dadyan-ermeni-ilkogretim-okulu-cemaat-okullari> (December 16, 2016).

24. Tziras, *Ελληνική Κοινότητα Μακροχωρίου* (Greek Community of Machrochori), 299.

In what follows, we are going to examine the Armenian communities that lay at the ecclesiastical limits of the Derkon Metropolis, in the area of Bosphorus.

Therapia,²⁵ which is the Seat of the Derkon Metropolis, used to be inhabited by Greek Orthodox²⁶ before the events of September 6/7, 1955 and the Greek citizens' deportation. It was a place with very few Armenians and Turkish people. In the summer, a good number of Armenian families used to spend their vacations there, as compared to the significantly less Roman Catholic families coming from the center of Constantinople. Today, almost 50 Greek Orthodox and only a few Armenians live there.

In 1870, Andon Tingir Yaver Pasha,²⁷ who was Armenian and Catholic, visited Therapie for his summer vacations. The magical and therapeutic atmosphere of Therapie fascinated him. He occupied a high-ranking position in the Ottoman Empire, and he was held in great esteem by the Sultan. He bought a plot in the hillock of Therapie, after asking for permission in 1871, and he built a private family church in

25. See Skarlatos Bizantios, *Η Κωνσταντινούπολις* (Constantinople), Vol. II (1862): 150-153; Manuel Gedeon, *Κωνσταντινούπολις* (Constantinople) (Konstantinoupolis: 1882), 41; Ioannis Kifiotis, *Κωνσταντινούπολις και προάστεια αυτής μετά της Θράκης* (Constantinople and its suburbs with Thrace) (Konstantinoupolis: 1880), 74-77; *Επετηρίς του Θρακικού Φιλεκπαιδευτικού Συλλόγου* 1 (1872-1873): 54; 2 (1873-1874): 86; Kalemis, «Η επαρχία Δέρκων» (The region of Derkon), 141-142; A. P., «Η Μητρόπολις Δέρκων» (The Metropolis of Derkon), 146-147; Gaitanou-Gianniou, «Από την Ανατολικήν Θράκην» (From Eastern Thrace), 195-202; Stavridis, *Η Ιερά Μητρόπολις Δέρκων* (The Metropolis of Derkon), 19-26; Ginis and Stratos, *Εκκλησίες* (Churches), 145-148; Millas, *Σφραγίδες* (Stamps), 272-281; Georgios Zarifis, *Οι αναμνήσεις μου. Ένας κόσμος που έφυγε. Κωνσταντινούπολη 1800-1920* (My memories. A leaving world. Istanbul 1800-1920) (Athens: 2002), 130-135, 285-290, 343-346; Orhan Türker, *Therapia'dan Tarabya'ya. Boğaz'ın diplomatlar köyünün hikayesi* (Therapia to Tarabya. The story of the village of diplomats of the Bosphorus) (İstanbul: 2006); Belge, *İstanbul gezi rehberi* (Istanbul travel guide), 276-277.

26. See Zarifis, *op. cit.*, 130-135, 343-346.

27. He was born in Constantinople in 1810. His parents were Hovser and Loutsika Kiltisigian. When he was young, he lost his father and he inherited his fortune. By the end of his studies, when he was only 24 years old, he was seated by the Ottoman Empire as a translator in the Embassy in Paris and in numerous high ranked positions. In 1850 he got married with the rich daughter of the French banker Davit Glavan, Phani, who died in 1903. Apart from his mother tongue, Andon was also speaking Turkish, Greek, French and Italian. He passed away on April 11, 1908 and he was buried inside Saint Antonios church. Hamiyetsever Andon Tingir Yaver Paşa. www.bolsohays.com (2009).

memory of his protector Saint Antonios and two adjoining houses. The church was built by the architect M. Razi. In the external gate of the church there is a sign in the Armenian language where 1871 is inscribed. The church was dedicated to Saint Antonios and it was completed at Tingir Antoni's²⁸ son expense. On May 5th, 1877 he offered the church and the houses to the Armenian Catholic patriarchate.²⁹ In the following years Masses were attended to the church by the Armenian Catholics who used to spend their vacations in the area as aforementioned. Thereon it was used to celebrate the memory of Saint Antonios and a Mass was attended that day by faithful people from different areas of Constantinople. When the years passed, the church was no longer in an operating condition and it was abandoned. During the last recent years, it was renovated along with the houses. In Therapia neither an Armenian school nor a cemetery has ever existed.

The brothers Kevork and Garabet Karayan, who came from Yozgat, came in Constantinople after 1840 and founded a factory in the village Bahcekoy.³⁰ Then, they brought Armenians from their country and hired them to their factory. They were very faithful and they would go either by cart or on foot to attend the Mass in the armenian church of Neochori (Yeniköy) in Bosphorus, which is dedicated to Virgin Mary (Surp Asdvadzadzni).³¹ They would leave early on Saturday morning, because the distance was very long by the means of transport of the past and they would return on Monday afternoon. They would pray on the Sunday's liturgy and then they would have a dinner in love and peace. In order, for their workers and their families, to avoid the discomfort of the long journey and to achieve a better operation of their factory, the brothers Kevork and Garabet thought it was wiser to build a church at a

28. Tarabya Surp Andon Kilisesi. www.bolsohays.com (2009).

29. Tuğlacı, *İstanbul Ermeni kiliseleri* (Armenian churches in Istanbul), 291; <http://www.istanbulermenivakiflari.org/tr/istanbul-ermeni-vakiflari/vakif-listesi/tarabya-surp-andon-ermeni-katolik-kilisesi-vakfi/71> (December 6, 2016).

30. Stavridis, *Η Ιερά Μητρόπολις Δέρκων* (The Metropolis of Derkon), 54-55; Milas, *Σφραγίδες* (Stamps), 334-336.

31. The church was built in 1760. As the years passed by it collapsed and it was rebuilt. Its dedication was held on June 24, 1834. In Yenikoy there is also an Armenian Catholic church, which was built in 1866 and is in memory of John the Baptist.

close distance to their factory, just outside the suburb Buyukdere,³² which was closer to Bahcekoy. So, they proceeded to the necessary actions towards the Sublime Porte, in order to build the church.

On the external wall of the community hall there is a marble sign, which is inscribed in the Turkish language informing us that the church was built by the brothers Kevork and Garabet Karayan and it was wooden. Its dedication took place on June 15th, 1848. It was rebuilt with stones in 1886. We are, also, informed that the Patriarch Khoren Ashikian A' (1888-1894), in the year 1893, was given permission by the Ottoman government and he repaired the roof, the dome and the pillars. The repair cost 15.000 piasters. The church was seriously damaged by an earthquake that occurred on July 28th, 1894. The walls, the cells and the dome collapsed. It was repaired at Abraham Eramyan Pasha's expenses (1833-1918). In 1927 works were done on the steeple, which was also damaged. The church was also repaired in 1933, 1960, 1963, 1999 and 2010. The most recent works took place on the area behind the altar area and since then meals of love are being served and receptions are being held during summertime. During the winter, the meals and the receptions are served in the spacious community hall, which is placed in the yard of the church. In the surroundings of the church there are commemorative stones, where the repairs that were made in the church are inscribed as well as the donators. There is, also, an old but impressive shaft and old fountains. The church is dedicated to Saint Hripsimantz.

The recent years the church has been performing a Mass every two weeks³³ and believers from both Buyukdere and various areas of Constantinople have come to attend it. They have even travelled by bus in order to be present. In important feasts, the church may gather almost 250 believers.³⁴ The priest of the church is Sirvan Murzyn, who is also

32. Bizantios, *Η Κωνσταντινούπολις* (Constantinople), 155-159; Stavridis, *Η Ιερά Μητρόπολις Δέρκων* (The Metropolis of Derkon), 26-29; Millas, *Σφραγίδες* (Stamps), 286-291.

33. This piece of information was provided by the president Murat Surme, Buyukdere on October 17, 2015.

34. This piece of information was provided by the president Murat Surme, Buyukdere on October 17, 2015.

the hieratic authority of the Armenian church Saint Yeritz Mangantz Boyacikoy.³⁵

According to the president of the Buyukdere community Murat Surme, the elderly of Buyukdere (around 70-80 years old) are speakers of the Greek language.³⁶ Moreover, he himself informed us that his relationships with the priest, the curators and the churchwardens of the Saint Paraskevi church in Buyukdere are excellent and he pays a lot of visits. The same feelings are also shared by the priest of the Saint Paraskevi church in Buyukdere, Antonios Karatzikos, who pays a lot of visits to the Armenian church, too.

In Buyukdere, apart from the Roman Catholic Church, there is also an Armenian Catholic one, which is in memory of Saint Paul. In 1838, Bogos Amira Bilezikciynin bought a site and in 1847 he built a chapel.³⁷ As the years were passing by, Armenian Catholics got increased and the chapel could not serve their religious needs. For this reason, they asked from the Ottoman government their permission to build a church, which was given to them, and in September 29th, 1885 its dedication was held. Its architect was Krikor Hourmouzian. Next to the church they also built cells and a school,³⁸ which nowadays does not operate. The church was open regularly until the 1980s. Then on, it was open only once a month and on important feasts. Since summer 2016, it has been closed, due to the absence of a priest in the community.

35. The first church was built in 1840, in place of which the contemporary church was rebuilt in 1884. Its dedication was held on September 8, 1885. Tuğlacı, *İstanbul Ermeni kiliseleri* (Armenian churches in Istanbul), 195.

36. This piece of information was provided by the president Murat Surme, Buyukdere on October 17, 2015.

37. Tuğlacı, *op.cit.*, 294-295; <http://team-aow.discuforum.info/t14542-Istanbuldaki-Ermeni-Katolik-Cemaatinin-Kiliseleri.htm>; <http://www.istanbulermenivakiflari.org/tr/istanbul-ermeni-vakiflari/vakif-listesi/buyukdere-surp-bogos-ermeni-katolik-kilisesi-vakfi/66> (December 7, 2016).

38. Hovhannes Tcholakian, *L'Eglise Armenienne Catholique en Turquie* (Istanbul: 1998), 85-86.

In Buyukdere there was not an Armenian Orthodox school. The president of the Armenian community of Buyukdere, Murat Surme, informed us that in the past the Armenian students would attend the Greek Orthodox urban school of Buyukdere,³⁹ which closed in 1974.⁴⁰

Before the Cyprus dispute, the majority of residents in Buyukdere were Greek Orthodox. There were Armenians, Roman Catholics and Turkish, who were gathered in a mahalla (neighborhood), which was called Turkish Mahalla.⁴¹ During summertime, both Greek Orthodox and Armenians, who came from various areas of Constantinople, spent their holidays there and, as a result, the suburb was full of people. After the events of September 6th/7th, 1955 and mainly after the invasion of the Turkish army in Cyprus (1974), Armenians were obliged to migrate in France, Belgium, Switzerland, America, etc. They either sold their properties for only a small amount of money or they abandoned them, in order to escape from the hostile atmosphere that was prevailing against the minorities. Today, there are only 50 people left.

Armenians, also, live in the neighboring suburbs of Sariyer,⁴² Geni Machale,⁴³ Kilyos and in the newly-established neighborhoods in the ridges of Upper Bosphorus. Armenians of Sariyer and Geni Machale were, and still are, many more than those of Buyukdere. There is no church in the area. In Geni Machale there was a school, though, which now is closed. The building of the school is still preserved, and the community makes efforts to renovate it.

In 1910, the Italian M. Frankini donated a site in the area of Tsargibasi, which he divided into four parts, so as to be used as cemeteries of

39. For the communities and the schools in Buyukdere see Paschalis Valsamidis, *Μελέτες ιστορικές για την Ανατολική Θράκη και την Μακεδονία κατά την ύστερη Οθωμανική περίοδο* (Historical studies about Eastern Thrace and Makedonia during late ottoman period) (Thessaloniki: 2011), 186-212.

40. See Phaedon Constantinidis, «Ζητήματα εκπαίδευσης των Ελλήνων στην Τουρκία από τη Συνθήκη της Λωζάνης ως σήμερα» (Greeks' educational issues from the Treaty of Lausanne until today), *Θρακική Επετηρίδα* 5 (1984): 202, 208; Aris Tsokonas, *Μητρόπολις Δέρκων* (Metropolis of Derkon) (Istanbul: 2015), 67.

41. This piece of information was provided by Vural Atik, Buyukdere on October 12, 2015.

42. Bizantios, *Η Κωνσταντινούπολις* (Constantinople), 170-176.

43. Bizantios, *op.cit.*, 173-175; Stavridis, *Η Ιερά Μητρόπολις Δέρκων* (The Metropolis of Derkon), 30-33; Millas, *Σφραγίδες* (Stamps), 392-296.

Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Armenian Orthodoxies and Greek Orthodoxies.⁴⁴ The Armenian people who live in the area make their funerals in the church of Buyukdere and most of them are buried in the cemetery of Tsagirbasi.

In what follows, we are going to refer to the relationships between the Armenians and the Greek Orthodox of the Derkon Metropolis.

A characteristic example is the case of Hovahannes Dadyan, who owned a powder factory. It is said that the Sultan Mahmut B' (1808-1839) appreciated his services to the Empire and offered to him the whole area from Atakoy to Floryaas a gift.⁴⁵ Dadyan first built a family church in Saint Stephanos and at a close distance from the church he donated a site to the Greek Orthodox community, where the church of Saint Stephanos was rebuilt in 1845. Dadyan was a Hellenist, as were also his sons Ardin, Arakel, Agkop, while his daughter Nektar was French-speaking. Ardin was an honored member of the Greek Philology Association of Constantinople.⁴⁶ In the narthex of the church, above the entrance gate of the main temple, there is this sign: «Ἀνεκαινίσθη ἐκ βάθρων ὁ θεῖος καὶ ἱερός οὗτος ναός τοῦ ἁγίου πρωτομάρτυρος καὶ ἀρχidiaκόνου Στεφάνου διὰ συνδρομῆς / καὶ δαπάνης τοῦ πανευγενούς καὶ φιλοχρίστου Ἀρμενίου Βογός Δαδιάν συνεργούντων τούτῳ πολλῶν φιλευσεβῶν καὶ φιλονάων Χριστιανῶν. / Ἐγκαινιάσθη δε παρά τοῦ αἰοιδίμου οἰκουμενικοῦ Πατριάρχου Μελετίου τῷ 1845 Σεπτεμβρίου 9. Mariam Dadyan is also one of the benefactors of the community».⁴⁷

It is said that the Armenian patriarch, called Hovahannes Dadyan one day for a banquet in the Armenian patriarchate of Constantinople. During this banquet, it is said that he told to Hovahannes: “you are making powder for the Ottoman Empire, but the Armenian community has not received any benefits from you, and he asked the patriarchate to help.” Hovahannes, who had donated a lot of money for the construction of churches, schools and hospitals got very angry with the patriarch

44. <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/buyukdere-ermeni-mezarligi-mezarliklar> (December 3, 2016).

45. <http://dadyanailesi.blogspot.gr/2012/10/gecmisten-gunumuze-gelen-dadyan-ailesi.html> (December 11, 2016).

46. Lambiri, *Ο Άγιος Στέφανος* (Saint Stephanos), 31-32, 34-35.

47. Paschalis Valsamidis, *Κωνσταντινοπολίτικα ανέλεκτα* (Istanbul's unsaid) (Thessaloniki: 2015), 54-55.

and he offered no help to the Armenian patriarchate. In reaction, he occasionally deposited amounts of money to the Ecumenical Patriarchate.⁴⁸

At the church of Saint Paraskevi in Buyukdere, the Vesper of Love is celebrated in magnificence by every bishop of Derkon and both Armenians and Roman Catholic clerics are invited. In the past, deacons and priests from the churches of Saint Hripsimyantz and Saint Paul in Buyukdere would also come to the church of Saint Paraskevi. On April 12th, 2015, the Armenian Orthodox priest Sirvan Murzyn was present. The tradition in the community is as follows: The Metropolitan bishop of Derkon puts on the sacerdotal vestments in the community hall and then the litany of the icon of Resurrection along with a procession in the surrounding area of the church follows. The procession is followed by the guest clerics of the other Christian doctrines. They come into the church and they take a seat next to or opposite the bishop's throne, where according to the rules, they deliver along with the Orthodox clerics the Gospel reading of the day in their own language. By the end of the reading, each one comes in front of the Beautiful Gate and the bishop gives him Easter eggs and they exchange blessings. During the years of the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon, Konstantinos (1977-2011), by the end of the evening vesper the Armenian priest with his escort chanted hymns in their language and the Eastertroparion of "Christos Anesti." The evening vesper is, also, attended by Armenians and Muslims. By the end of the evening vesper, the Metropolitan bishop gives to the faithful eggs and there is an afterward reception in the community hall, where they have the opportunity to talk with the few Greek Orthodox who are still living in the community, to exchange blessings and to crack Easter eggs.

Similar visits are paid in the important feasts of the Armenians by the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon and by the priests in the Armenian churches, who are under the jurisdiction of the Derkon Metropolis. Furthermore, the Armenian priests and members of the church committee pay visits to the Metropolitan bishop and the priests in the important feasts, like Christmas, Easter and name days.

The Metropolitan bishop of Nikaia, Konstantinos (2011-) informed us that in the early 1950s, when he was serving as a deacon⁴⁹ in the

48. http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dadyan_Ermeni_Okulu (December 8, 2016).

49. He was a deacon from December 17, 1950 till June 1952.

church of Saint Georgios in Machrochori, he was paid a visit by the Armenian patriarch, Karekin Khachadourian (1951-1961), and he showed him around. What, is also important, is that the patriarch himself shepherded the Metropolis of Derkon for 35 years⁵⁰ and his relationships were perfect with the Armenians of his province and Constantinople in general.

On September 2nd, 1979, during the pastorate of the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon, Konstantinos, the patriarch of the Armenians, Shnor Kalusdian (1961-1990), officiated at the church of Saint Hripsimantz in Buyukdere. The Armenian Church committee invited officially the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon, Konstantinos, so as to honor by his presence the officiating of the patriarch. The Metropolitan bishop was unable to be present, but he sent, as his representatives, his assistant bishop of the Metropolis of Derkon, Arianzos Germanos (1972-1987), the hieratic authority of the Saint Paraskevi church in Buyukdere, Theodoros Enotiadis (1962-1981)⁵¹ and the churchwardens Konstantinos Tsalidis, Georgios Kostas and Hermis Christidis. During the liturgy, a memorial service for the Armenians of the Buyukdere community was also solemnized. By the end of the liturgy, a meal of love was served, where the bishop and the hieratic authority were present. During the meal they chanted Armenian ecclesiastical hymns, they recited religious hymns and poems. At the end of the meal, the patriarch presented to the faithful the representatives of the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon, Konstantinos, and he stated his gratification and his gratitude for their presence and via them, the presence of their patriarch, too. The bishop expressed the blessings on the part of the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon, Konstantinos, to the patriarch and he thanked them for all the attention they received, the hospitality and the beneficent atmosphere. The patriarch asked to communicate his honest regards and his true love to the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon and he wished for the repetition of these fraternal contacts in the future. The next day, on September 3,

50. From March 15, 1977 till August 29, 2011.

51. Theodore served from May 1, 1962 until his death March 24, 1980.

the Armenian community rushed to publish to the Armenian newspapers of Constantinople *Nor Marmara*⁵² and *Jamanak*⁵³ about the liturgy that took place in the community hall and stated their delight for the presence of the representatives of the Derkon Metropolis.⁵⁴

In the afternoon of October 28th, 1979, in the Armenian Church Holy Trinity Galatasaray/Beyoğlu⁵⁵ the marriage between Aram Emyan and Herpsime Tzamzyan, daughter of Anastazia, resident of Therapia was solemnized. The Bishop Arianzos Germanos and the hieratic authority of the Saint Paraskevi church of Therapia, Nikolaos Palaiologos (1973-2006), were also present. At the end, they expressed their blessings to the newly-married and their parents on behalf of the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon, Konstantinos.⁵⁶

On December 29th, 1979, the patriarch of Armenians, Shnork Kalusdian, solemnized the Great Vesper in the church of Saint Hripsimyan in Buyukdere and inaugurated the renovated Holy Bema of the church with Holy Oil (Ozum). The ecclesiastical committee of the Armenian Church invited to the liturgy the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon, Konstantinos, who sent as his representative the assistant bishop of Derkon Metropolis, Arianzos Germanos. At the end of the vesper followed a reception in the community hall. Germanos expressed the congratulations and his fraternal blessings to the patriarch of the Armenians on behalf of the Metropolitan bishop of Derkon, Konstantinos. The latter, in return, expressed his blessings to the Metropolitan bishop.⁵⁷

By the records of the Derkon Metropolis we are informed about the death of Maria Kardoman, daughter of Mingir and Ioanna, 82 years old, who passed away in Koutsouk Tsekmetze on May 31st, 1983. Her funeral was held in the cemetery church of Analepsis in Machrochori on

52. It has been published since August 31, 1940. For more information <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/nor-marmara-gunluk-gazete-basin> (December 16, 2016).

53. The first issue was published on October 28, 1908. The founders of the newspaper are the brothers Sarkis and Misak Kocunyan. For more information <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/jamanak-gunluk-gazete-basin> (December 16, 2016).

54. Archive of Derkon Metropolis, Chronicles of the Derkon Metropolis [hereafter: ADM, CDM] 1, September 2, 1979, 20-21.

55. Tuğlacı, *İstanbul Ermeni kiliseleri* (Armenian churches in Istanbul), 196-207.

56. ADM, CDM1, October 28, 1979, 32.

57. ADM, CDM1, December 29, 1979, 48.

June 1st, 1983, by the priest Louka Katsoni (1967-1989), with the agreement of the Great Protosyncellia and the community of Saint Stephanos.⁵⁸ We are also informed about the death of Venetian Christodoulou on September 1st, 1983. We also learn about her funeral, which was held at the church of Saint Stephanos in Yesilkoy on September 19th by the Bishop Arianzos Germanos, the hieratic authority of the church, Louka Katsoni, and the hieratic authority of Saint George church, Georgo Laphiatis (1970-1993).⁵⁹

In the baptism registries of the Derkon Metropolis there are records from Armenians who embraced the Orthodox Church through chrism. Moreover, in the marriage registries there are records of mixed marriages and in the funeral registries there are records of funerals of Armenians who embraced Orthodoxy.

Finally, as it becomes obvious from the above information, by the records kept in the Derkon Metropolis and by the Armenians clerics and civilians we met, their relationships, despite the doctrinal differences between the Armenians and the Greek Orthodox, remain excellent both at an ecclesiastic and a personal level.

58. ADM, CDM2, June 1, 1983, 832.

59. ADM, CDM2, September 19, 1983, 916.

APPENDIX

The entrance of the Saint Stephanos Armenian church (October 13, 2015)



The Armenian church of Saint Stephanos (October 13, 2015)



The sanctuary of Saint Stephanos church (October 13, 2015)



A specific view of Virgin Mary church in Machrochori (October 10, 2015)




The godchild of Virgin Mary church in Machrochori (October 14, 2015)



The font of Virgin Mary church in Machrochori (October 14, 2015)



Machrochori. The Dadyan school, which was built in 1844 (October 10, 2015)



Therapia. The Armenian Catholic church of Saint Antonios (April 4, 2015)



Therapia. The founder's sign above the entrance of the church with the encription:
*1871. The church was dedicated to Saint Antonios and it was completed at
Tingir Andon's expense* (April 4, 2015)



A western view of the Armenian Catholic church of Saint Antonios in
Therapia (April 4, 2015)



The church Surp Hripsimyants in Buyukdere (October 18, 2015)



A founder's sign above the entrance of the church Surp Hripsimyants in Buyukdere (October 18, 2015)



The godchildren church Surp Hripsimyants in Buyukdere (October 18, 2015)



A snapshot by the liturgy in the church Surp Hripsimyants in Buyukdere,
October 18, 2015



A snapshot by the Eucharist in the church Surp Hripsimyants in Buyukdere, October 18, 2015



A snapshot by the Holy Communion in the church Surp Hripsimyants in Buyukdere, October 18, 2015



A snapshot by the Dismissal in the church Surp Hripsimyants in Buyukdere,
October 18, 2015



The Armenian Catholic church of Saint Paul in Buyukdere (October 18, 2015)



A snapshot by the procession of the Resurrection icon in the surrounding area of Saint Paraskevi church in Buyukdere. Easter, April 19, 2009



The Armenian deacon and the chanter chant Armenian Resurrection hymns in the Vesper of Love in the Greek Orthodox church of Saint Paraskevi in Buyukdere, April 24, 2011



A snapshot by the Vesper of Love service in the Greek Orthodox church of Saint Paraskevi in Buyukdere. The Roman Catholic priest and the Armenian deacon, April 24, 2011



A snapshot by the procession of the Resurrection icon in the surrounding area of Saint Paraskevi church in Buyukdere. Easter, 2015. The Armenian priest Sirvan Murzynis discerned first, April 12, 2015



A snapshot by the Vesper of Love service in the Greek Orthodox church of Saint Paraskevi in Buyukdere. The Armenian priest Sirvan Murzyn is blessing before the reading of the Gospel reading of the day, April 12, 2015



The Derkon Metropolitan Bishop Apostolos, who, during the Vesper of Love service in the Greek Orthodox church of Saint Paraskevi in Buyukdere, offered Easter eggs to the Armenian priest Sirvan Murzyn, April 12, 2015



A snapshot by the procession of the Resurrection icon in the surrounding area of Saint Paraskevi church in Buyukdere, April 16, 2017



A snapshot by the Vesper of Love service in the Greek Orthodox church of Saint Paraskevi in Buyukdere, April 16, 2017