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*Elias Kolovos** – *Vanessa R. de Obaldia***
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**The Endowment Deed (*vakfiyye, vakıfnāme*)
of the Athonite Monastery of Simonopetra (9-18 March 1569)**

I. Historical and Documentary Context

The document was issued in the historical context of the confiscation of the ecclesiastical and monastic properties in the Ottoman Empire by Sultan Selim II in 1568, which was followed, in the case of the monasteries of Mount Athos, by the repurchase of their properties and the establishment of pious foundations, according to the specific legal guidelines set by the chief jurist of the empire, Mehmed Ebū's-ṣu'ūd Efendi (c. 1490-1574) and his redefinition of the Islamic Law.¹ In this context, every monastery of Mount Athos established a specific pious foundation (*vakf*), according to the Islamic Law, administered by a specific monk as trustee (*mütevelli*).²

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¹ John C. Alexander, "The Lord Giveth and the Lord Taketh Away: Athos and the Confiscation Affair of 1568-1569," in *Athos in the 14th-16th Centuries* (ed. Kriton Chrychossoidis) (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1997), 149-200; Alexandar Fotić, "The official explanations for the confiscation and sale of monasteries (churches) and their estates at the time of Selim II," *Turcica* 24 (1994): 33-54; Eugenia Kermeli, "The Confiscation and Repossession of Monastic Properties in Mount Athos and Patmos Monasteries, 1568-1570," *Bulgarian Historical Review* 28/3-4 (2000): 39-53. For a broader historical evaluation, see Elias Kolovos, "Monasteries, Economy, and Politics in the Orthodox World from Medieval to Modern Times," in: Roumen Avramov, Aleksandar Fotić, Elias Kolovos, Phokion K. Kotzageorgis (eds), *Monastic Economy Across Time: Wealth Management, Patterns, and Trends* (Sofia: Centre for Advanced Studies, 2021), 217-28.

² Cf. the endowment deed of Xeropotamou monastery published in Elias Kolovos, "Christian Vakıfs of Monasteries in the Ottoman Greek Lands from the Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries," in: Sabine Mohasseb Saliba (ed.), *Les fondations pieuses*

After 1569, the *vakfiyye* was significant in the resolution of contestations over properties and was often presented to the Ottoman authorities before whom the cases were presented. When a property was registered in a *vakfiyye*, like those in Longos, Vourvourou, and Trygi, the display of the *vakfiyye* was decisive for the outcome of the case, because, according to Islamic law,³ properties which were recognised as *vakfs* obtained an unchanged status and their borders could not be reduced, but only additions of land could be made.⁴ Therefore, the *vakfiyye* ensured an age-long privilege for the properties registered in it and, based on that, enduring security of tenure.⁵ The status of the

waqfs chez les chrétiens et les juifs du Moyen Âge à nos jours (Paris: Geuthner, 2016), 103-27.

³ See the last paragraph of *vakfiyye*, where is written that “the endowing (*vakfiye*) of the above ... it is a valid legal ruling and an explicit, valid, irrevocable, permanent and officially registered endowment (*vakfan-ı şarīhan, mer īyen, lāzıman, lāzıban ve müste‘cillen*)”.

⁴ For example the borders of the metochion “Vava” remained unaltered from the Byzantine period until the end of the Ottoman period, as we conclude from several Ottoman documents of the years 1577 (Ottoman Archive of Simonopetra Monastery [hereafter OASM], no 180), 1612 (OASM no 196, 197), 1845 (OASM no 157), 1868 (OASM no 377), 1869 (OASM no 274), 1870 (OASM no 275) etc., which describe them, and also two maps of the same metochion dating from the 19th century. Also, the boundaries of the two metochia of Simonopetra Monastery in Serres and Limnos remained unchanged. The metochion of Vourvoura obtained in 1614-1615 an additional significant area of land purchased from the community of the neighbouring village of Agios Nikolaos.

⁵ The example of the metochion of Limnos mentioned by Phokion Kotzageorgis, «Τα Αγιορειτικά μετόχια στη Λήμνο στην οθωμανική περίοδο» [Athonite properties (metochia) in Limnos during the Ottoman period], in: G. Konstantellis (ed.), *Λήμνος, Εκκλησιαστική Κληρονομιά*, vol. 1 (Athens 2010), 107-29, 124, is characteristic: “In 1588 land of the monastery in Limnos was sold to a Muslim of Myrina for 88,000 *akçes*, which seems to have ended up in the 17th century in the Monastery of Iveron. In 1797 the monastery (of Simonopetra) showed a keen interest in the full recovery of its old possessions in Limnos. For this purpose, they started a legal fight with the Monastery of Iveron, which resulted in the vindication of Simonopetra by the political power, based mainly on the great legal power of its *vakfiyye*, where the *çiftlik* Trygi was recorded. The Patriarchate was also involved in the dispute, which finally accepted that the metochio of Trygi belonged definitively to the Simonopetra monks, after a compromise between the two monasteries had been reached.” This example clearly demonstrates what the legal power of the *vakfiyye* in the context of the Ottoman administration of law.

monastic properties included in vakfiyyes of the Athonite monasteries was determined by the legal clause of Ebū's-su'ūd that was included in the official firman of 13 Şaban 976 (31 January, 1569) and placed under the property of each monastery in the Imperial Land Register (*deft̄er-i hākānī*): “when one of the monks dies, these lands will not be given to others by title (*tapu*) under the pretext of having a share in these lands; on the contrary, the share of those who die remains in the use of the others.”⁶

The vakfiyyes' copies, which the Athonite monasteries received from the registers (*sicils*) of Istanbul's Islamic courts, as well as the *şūret-i defters*, which the monasteries received from the respective tax registers (*tahrīr defters*), were both proof that they had satisfied the redefined law and completed the mortmain procedures according to the structures of Hanafi law.⁷ Yet the problem was that the registration of the properties in the tax registers of the Imperial Cadastral Registry was not very concise. They mention only the place where the property was located, the type of property and sometimes the surface area of some of its parts. This problem was resolved by vakfiyyes, which contain the description of the boundaries. For this reason, the boundaries included in the vakfiyye should be regarded as those of the Imperial Cadastral Register, that is, the boundaries by which the land was recognised by the Ottoman state as a monastic property. Finally, it is important to note a point about the linguistic interpretation of the boundaries. The Ottoman verb *varınca* is mentioned in more than one sections to refer to the limit of the borders of the property. For example, the correct interpretation of the description “Baħr ʔarafdan nehir-i kebīre varınca” would be “at the large river” rather than “towards the large river” as the last limit. It is clearly stated that the border reaches from the ends of the sea and thus encapsulates the entire perimeter of the demarcated area and not just orientation.

⁶ See Alexander, “The Lord Giveth,” 162-69; Elias Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί στην οθωμανική Χαλκιδική, 15ος-16ος αιώνες. Όψεις της οικονομικής και κοινωνικής ζωής στην ύπαιθρο και η μονή Ξηροποτάμου» [Peasants and Monks in Ottoman Halkidiki (15th-16th c.)], (Ph.D. dissertation, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2000), vol. 1, 143-46.

⁷ Alexander, “The Lord Giveth,” 169.

II. Description of Document and Contents

The Simonopetra vakfiyye of 1569 (facs. 1) measures 57x25 cm in terms of the actual dimensions of the document and 62x27 cm with the maximum area of the fabric at the edges; it is written in *ta'lik kırması*, that is broken *ta'lik* script. It has an original catalogue number of 1 which appears at the top right of the document. It is written on cloth and has been attached by its verso to green satin cloth with a red satin thin tape running down the right margin, extending past the margins by 1 to 3 cm. The cloth not only reinforces it but also emphasizes its value and the care the monks took with its preservation. Regardless, it has succumbed to the wear and tear of the ages and of handling, which is visible in the tears at the top and bottom parts of the document, thus, rendering impossible the reading of some of the names of the witnesses.

According to Mübahat Kütükoğlu, a vakfiyye traditionally contains twelve pillars or primary sections: expression of attestation, supplication, description, declaration of the trustee, description of the endowment assets, the conditions, revocability, the trustee's objection, the judge's ruling, curse against those who breach the endowment, the date, and the witnesses.⁸ The vakfiyye of 1569 contains most of these sections with the exception of the curse. The contents shall be examined in terms of actors, properties, and boundaries.

i. Actors:

The document is a rich source of prosopography, which can be divided into two categories: Athonite monks and Ottoman officials. Regarding the first lot, a total of seven Athonite monks are mentioned with minor details:

1. Gennadios, son of Dimos, having the permanent power of attorney and the recognition of endowment.
2. Papa Makarios, son of Giannis, Papa Kostas, son of Nikolas, and Isaiah, son of Thodoris, who are the leaders (*kethüdas*) of the monks of Simonopetra Monastery. They represent the thirty-one

⁸ Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı Belgelerinin Dili (Diplomatik)* [The Language of the Ottoman Documents (Diplomatics)], (Istanbul: Kubbealti Akademisi Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı, 1998), 359-68.

unnamed brothers of the monastery.

3. The hieromonk called Papa Mosko,⁹ son of Nicholas, from the monks of Iveron Monastery who gave testimonies.
4. David, son of Nicholas, from the monks of Docheiariou Monastery.
5. Makarios, son of Giannis.

As far as the Ottoman officials are concerned, the following three names are contained in the ratifications:

1. Mehmed bin Hürrem, the high judge (*el-müvellâ*) in Constantinople. His name appears also in the ratifying seal of the vakfiyye, below the validation, which is located on the top right of the document.¹⁰ The same judge issued the original endowment deed (vakfiyye) for Xeropotamou Monastery at exactly the same date [evâhir-i Ramazân 976 (9-18 March 1569)].¹¹ He is registered in the biographical dictionary of the Ottoman officialdom, the *Sicill-i 'Osmani*, by Mehmed Süreyya as Mehmed Şâh Efendi b. Hürrem bin 'Abdullah, born in Karaman. He careered initially as a professor, being appointed at the Çifteler Medrese of the Süleymaniye Mosque in Muḥarrem 969 (September 1561). He was appointed as a judge in Cairo in Cemâziyü'l-âḥir 971 (January-February 1564), in Edirne in the year 974 (1566/67) and, finally, in Constantinople in the year 976 (1568/69). He was dismissed in Receb 977 (December 1569). He passed away in Cemâziyü'l-evvel 978 (October 1571) while taking his ablution before the morning prayers.¹²
2. Mehmed, known through his family name, Baḳloz-zâde, the

⁹ The monk's name comes from the Greek name Moschos/Μόσχος (pronunciation [móskos]), which derives from the plant name μόσχος «musk».

¹⁰ The same Müvellâ Mehmed son of Hurrem, also validates and seals the original vakfiyye of Xeropotamou Monastery (there is also a false one without that name). See Kolovos 2016, Christian vakıfs, above, p. 117.

¹¹ Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. III, 103, his patronymic read as Hüsam with a question mark (see also Kolovos, “Christian Vakıfs of Monasteries,” 117). The Monastery of Xeropotamou holds a false vakfiyye as well, dated evâhir Ramazân 974 (=1-10 April 1567). Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. III, 88-93.

¹² See, with more details, Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), p. 1078-79.

müfti of Thessaloniki.

3. Finally, the document was ratified as well by the chief jurist (Chief Müfti or *Şeyhü'l-islām*) of the empire, Meḥmed Ebū's-su'ūd Efendi (c. 1490-1574), signing the document simply as Ebū's-su'ūd,¹³ without using a seal.¹⁴

In the lower part of the *vaḳfiyye* there is a list of witnesses, consisting of ten individuals including other unnamed and uncounted attendees who were all of the Muslim faith (some of the names are read with the help of the 18th-century copy of the *vaḳfiyye*): Muṣṭafā Çelebi ibn Balı Bey; İbrāhīm Ḥalife ibn el-imām; Meḥmed Çelebi ibn 'Alī, the scribe (*el-kātib*); Maḥmūd Çelebi ibn 'Alī, the scribe (*el-kātib*); Süleymān Çelebi ibn Ḥasan, the scribe (*el-kātib*); Maḥmūd Ağa ibn 'Abdullah, head of the bailiffs (*reisü'l-muḥzir*); Ḥasan Çelebi ibn Aḥmed; Yūsuf bin Naşūh; Mevlānā Mehemmed Çelebi ibn Aḥmed, the deputy judge (*nā'ib*) in the town of Ḥurpišta; the writer of this document (*muḥarrir-i ḥurūf*) Aḥmed; and other attendees.

It is interesting that between the witnesses appears the deputy judge (*nā'ib*) in the town of Ḥurpišta, a small town located in western Macedonia in Greece, close to Kastoria (today, the town is called Argos Orestiko). His presence as a witness should maybe be linked to the presence of the Müfti of Thessaloniki, who validates the *vaḳfiyye*. Furthermore, the document also mentions three historical figures on whose juridical judgements the law pertaining to non-Muslim endowments (*vaḳıfs*) are based: the theologian and jurist Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767), known as the Great Imam (*İmām-i a'zam*), who was the eponymous founder of the Hanafī school of Sunni jurisprudence. Ya'ḳūb ibn İbrāhīm al-Anşārī (d. 798), known as Imam Abū Yusūf, and Imam Muḥammad al-Şaybānī (d. 805), who were referred to as The Two Imams (*İmāmeyn*) in the texts of jurisprudence.¹⁵

¹³ He was the most famous Chief Müfti or Şeyhüislām of the Ottoman Empire, see Colin Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).

¹⁴ In the *vaḳfiyye* of Xeropotamou Monastery, the ratification has identical writing as in the *vaḳfiyye* of Simonopetra. It is also located at the same place of the document (top left) and does not have a seal of the *şeyhü'l-islām*.

¹⁵ For more on these jurists see: Kīrānawī, *Abū Ḥanīfa wa-aşḫābuhu*, Beirut 1989; J.

ii. Location:

The primary location is the Mount Athos Peninsula (Agion Oros, Ayanoroz) which was under the District of Sidreḱabsı in the Province of Ottoman Rumelia. Sidreḱabsı was the name of a town in the mountainous region of eastern Chalkidiki. The name comes from the Byzantine toponym Siderokausia (Σιδηροκάυσια), which is a compound word from «σίδηρος» (sideros), meaning iron, and «κάυσις» (kasis), meaning burning. The second component also has the form «-κάψι» (*kapsı*), which was ascribed in Turkish as *kapısı* (door).¹⁶ The town was developed in the Ottoman period due to the mines that existed in the area.¹⁷ Today it is abandoned.

While the subject of the document is Simonopetra, numerous other Athonite monasteries were also mentioned. Iveron and Docheiariou Monasteries are mentioned in relation to the monks from them who provided testimonies; the seven Monasteries of Gregoriou, Filotheou, Iveron, Xeropotamou, Stavronikita, Dionysiou, and Agios Pavlos as monuments demarking boundaries or as landmarks indicating the placement of the boundary.

IIIa: The Properties of Simonopetra on Mount Athos and their Boundaries

The vakfiyye begins with a detailed description of the Monastery of Simonopetra and its area inside the Athonite Peninsula.

The monastery is described as follows: thirty-six upper and lower

Schacht, "Abū Yūsuf," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, Volume I (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 164-65; E. Chaumont, "al-Şhaybānī," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, Volume IX (Leiden: Brill, 1997); L. al-Zwaini and R. Peters, *A Bibliography of Islamic Law, 1980-1993* (Leiden 1994).

¹⁶ Kosmas-Panagiotis Kyranoudis, "Linguistic Evidence on the Natural Environment of Halkidiki: Oiconyms and Toponyms," in: *Mines, Olives and Monasteries. Aspects of Halkidiki's Environmental History*, ed. B. Gounaris (Thessaloniki: Epikentro Publishers and Pharos Books, 2015), 265-322, 298.

¹⁷ For the history of the town in the Ottoman period see Elias Kolovos and Phokion Kotzageorgis. "Halkidiki in the Early Modern Period: Towards an Environmental History," in: *Mines, Olives and Monasteries. Aspects of Halkidiki's Environmental History*, ed. B. Gounaris (Thessaloniki: Epikentro Publishers and Pharos Books, 2015): 129-72, 136-41, 148-71.

monk cells, a large building known as the refectory (*trabeza*, which renders the Greek term *τράπεζα*), a kitchen (*maṭbah*), an infirmary (*dārū’ş-şifā’*),¹⁸ a guesthouse (*oda*),¹⁹ a stable (*aḥur*),²⁰ a fountain (*çeşme*),²¹ a building known as the tower (*burgaz*),²² a dockyard

¹⁸ It should be noted that the Turkish term *dārū’ş-şifā’* (infirmary) translates the Greek term *nosokomeion* [νοσοκομειον] (hospital), which usually had a dual mission in monasteries: to host the seriously ill monks as well as the elderly monks who could not live independently. More specifically, Simonopetra’s infirmary must have been constructed in the mid-16th century. This can be ascertained from a letter of Simonopetra’s Abbot/Hegumen Gregorios to the Salonican Doukas Kritopoulos, copied on f. 217v of the 16th century Codex no. 370 kept in the manuscript collection of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem (Panagios Taphos) in which it is mentioned that the Monastery had no hospital and was unable to take care of its elderly monks (*καὶ ἄλλον νοσοκομεῖον οὐκ ἔχομεν καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ τὰ γεροντάκια τὰ ἀδύνατα εἶναι εἰς πολλὴν κίνδυνον καὶ στενοχώριαν ἀπὸ τὴν ὑστέρησιν τοῦ νοσοκομείου. Καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐπίτῳχοι ἐξοδὸν οὐκ ἔχομεν τοῦ σκεπάσαι τὸν ναὸν καὶ ἀνακτίσαι καὶ τὸ νοσοκομεῖον*). The letter is dated to the 1530’s, see Cyril Pavlikianov, *Acta Graeca Simonopetrae (1516-1821)* (Sofia: “St. Kliment Ohridski” University Press, 2022), 73; Phokion Kotzageorgis and Monk Kosmas Simonopetritis, “The History of the Catholicon of the Athonite Monastery of Simonopetra until the 19th century based on written Sources,” *Hilandarski Zbornik* 14 (2017), 189-220.

¹⁹ The Turkish term renders the Greek word *archontarikion* (αρχονταρῖκιον) used in the monastic language to denote the special rooms (guesthouse) where the monks accepted visitors.

²⁰ The Turkish term *aḥur* ‘stable’ renders into the Greek term *vordonario* (βουρδοναριό), which means the stable residence for the mules of the monastery and the residence of the workers who take care of the mules. The monastery stables mentioned in *vakfiyye* are preserved until today outside of its gates. They are located against the top of the hill and abutting the south side of the aqueduct. The stables were on the ground floor of this building, and hay was stored on the upper floor. The *vordonario* is pictured in the sketch by Barskij (1744, fig. 3), see Ploutarchos Theocharidis, “The Architecture of Simonopetra,” in *Simonopetra, Mount Athos*, ed. Stelios Papadopoulos (Athens 1991), 84, fig. 7, illus. 23. Today the building has been restored, and it is used as a guesthouse.

²¹ The term *çeşme* (‘fountain’) maybe denotes the built-in fountain, which has been preserved until today outside of the Monastery at about 50 meters on the path (*καλντερίμι*) to its port, above the cemetery (fig. 4). This fountain appears in the drawing of Simonopetra’s monastery by Vasilij Barskij, *Τα ταξίδια του στο Άγιον Όρος 1725-1726, 1744-1745* (Thessaloniki 2009), 525, fig. 3. However, since the exact year of its construction is unknown, it is uncertain whether it was built at the same time as issuing of the *vakfiyye*. We cannot exclude that by this term the editor of the *vakfiyye* denotes the big aqueduct of the monastery (fig. 6), which was built in

(*tershāne*),²³ a storehouse (*anbār*),²⁴ and a mill, located on the water

the Byzantine period, and it was completed up to the middle of the 16th century. See Theocharidis, “The Architecture of Simonopetra,” 78, fig. 7; Kotzageorgis & Kosmas Simonopetritis, “The History of the Catholicon,” 193.

²² During the Byzantine and Ottoman periods the majority of the Athonite monasteries used to have fortifying towers in order to protect against the corsair raids, frequent since the late-Byzantine period until up to the 17th century. Most probably, the term *burgaz* in the *vakfiyye* does not denote a tower inside of the Monastery but the tower of the arsenal (*tershāne*) at its port (see fig. 4). This conclusion is derived from the mention of the tower after the description of the buildings inside of the Monastery, when the *vakfiyye* starts to describe the buildings outside of its walls (stable, fountain) and just before the dockyard (*tershāne*), which is located after the tower in the port of the Monastery on the seashore (fig. 5). This tower was built two years before the issuing of the *vakfiyye*. Its construction was completed on 1 March 1567 with money donated to the Monastery by the Epirote Ağa of Wallachia *Oxioti*, as it is written in an inscription above its gate (fig. 5): «άνοικοδομήθη ό πύργος ούτος παρά τοῦ εὐσεβεστάτου ἄρχοντος κυροῦ Ὁζιότ(ου) τοῦ ἀγά ἔτους ζοε΄ ἰν(δικτιῶνος) ἰ μήν Μάρτ(ιος) ἄ» (see Gabriel Millet, J. Pargoire, L. Petit, *Recueil des Inscriptions Chrétiennes de l’Athos*, Première partie (Paris 1904), 180, no. 536; Petre S. Năsturel. “Le monastère épirote de Giroméri et la Valachie: premiers contacts (1567-1568),” *Bulletin AIESEE* 30/2000 (2001): 198-201). The tower is one of the most outstanding works of 16th century Athonite architecture and it has survived intact in perfect condition, see Theocharidis, “The Architecture of Simonopetra,” 84-85, fig. 7, 42, 43, 233.

²³ The word *tershāne* is an Arabic loan-word in Turkish (*dār sinā’a*, for the etymology see Panagiotis Kyranoudis (Monk Kosmas Simonopetritis), *Μορφολογία των τουρκικών δανείων της ελληνικής γλώσσας* (The morphology of Turkish loans in the Greek language) (Thessaloniki 2009), 122. More specifically, *tershāne* in the *vakfiyye* denotes the *karavostasion* (boathouse) attached to the tower, which is clearly visible in Vasilij Barskij’s drawing (fig. 3). This boathouse was built at the same time as the tower (1567), as is clear from the first building phase which can be discerned until today, see Theocharidis, “The Architecture of Simonopetra,” 84.

²⁴ By the word *anbār*, the *vakfiyye* probably denotes the storeroom which occupies the entire floor above the boat-house. Therefore, the *vakfiyye* confirms Theocharidis, “The Architecture of Simonopetra,” 84 attitude, based on the features of the woodwork of the second floor of the boat-house, that the building was two-floored, although it is shown as single-storied in Barskij’s drawing. Moreover, according to his view the drawing of the arsenal (*arsanas*) suffers from some shortcomings, which may be attributed to the fact that Barskij created it from separate observations and sketches depicting the area from an imaginary viewpoint. We must further consider that the monks needed a storehouse (*anbār*) among the buildings of the port, in order to store their products there, because their transportation was done through this port and not through Dafni Port as is the case in today.

flowing in front of the monastery's gate.²⁵

The borders mentioned in the *vakfiyye* remained almost unaltered until today and almost all of them appear in the Ottoman-Greek map (water colour) titled “Map of Simonopetra Area” («Χάρτης τῆς Μονῆς Σίμωνος Πέτρας»), drawn by Alexander Phocaeus in 1878 (fig. 6).²⁶ The demarcation begins from Simonopetra's dockyard (*tershāne*, in the map *Simonopetra'nın tersānesi*), which is very close to the “Big Stream” (Büyük Dere) which is the clear natural eastern border with Gregoriou Monastery. In the map of 1878, this stream is denoted as Kebīr Dere (Μεγάλος Λάκκος). The limit follows the Big Stream until it meets the “Large Road” (Rāh-ı Kebīre) and this is the border with Gregoriou Monastery. As Large Road the *vakfiyye* denotes the main road of the Holy Mountain which, following the ridge, connected the Monasteries of Saint Paul, Dionysiou, and Gregoriou with Karyes. This road in the map of 1878 is denoted as Beylik yolu (Δρόμος Μπιυλίδικος), as it is known until today, and in the

²⁵ The Monastery's watermill was built on a stream that runs down from the mountain slopes above the Monastery and close to an old bridge that served as the crossing of the stream. The watermill, the bridge and the stream are clearly visible in Barskij's drawing (1744, fig. 3), in a copper engraving of 1836 (*Simonopetra*, ed. Papadopoulos figs. 2, 7) etc. The building of the watermill has been preserved, probably after some restoration. It is of the 'eastern' or 'Greek' type, with a horizontal wheel located below the milling floor. The upper story of the building contained the quarters of the monk-miller and storerooms for the flour (see Stefanos Nomikos, “Water Supply–Irrigation–Water Power,” in *Simonopetra, Mount Athos*, ed. Stelios Papadopoulos (Athens 1991), 88-111, 106 and illus. 27). The *vakfiyye* is correct when it writes that the water flows in front of the Monastery's gate. During the period of the issuing of the *vakfiyye* until the 19th century, the Monastery's gate stood at the end of a still existing arched bridge, which was spanning what was then the gorge with the stream which separated the rock on which the Monastery stands (see Theocharidis, “The Architecture of Simonopetra,” 78, illus. 3, 4, fig. 31, 231). The bridge above the gorge is clearly visible in Barskij's drawing (1744, fig. 3) and Robert Curzon's etching (1849, fig. 12), see *Simonopetra*, ed. Papadopoulos, figs. 7, 10. 16 The steep slopes descending from the monastery to the port on both sides of the path are full of olive-trees. It is certain that during the Ottoman period viticulture and olive oil milling were developed at the monastery, as we conclude from an existing building constructed in 1851, which still contains the olive-press, the grape press and the raki distiller (see Nomikos, “Water Supply–Irrigation–Water Power,” 106 and illus. 7).

²⁶ *Simonopetra, Mount Athos*, ed. Papadopoulos, fig. 15.

edict of John Unglesha²⁷ as «ὁδὸς ἡ ἐρχομένη ἐκ τοῦ κῶρ Γρηγορίου

²⁷ Dušan Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa kao ktitor Svetogorskog Manastira Simonopetre,” *Bogoslovlje* 20 (1976): 29-61, 42. The document of John Unglesha today survives in a Greek translation of the patriarchal sigillion of Kyrillos Loukaris dated 1623, issued upon the Simonopetra monks’ petition on the grounds that the original was torn. Therefore, the place names mentioned in it should be dated no later than 1623. Even by those who dispute the authenticity of the edict, see e.g. Kriton Chrysochoidis, “The Greek Documents,” in: *Simonopetra, Mount Athos*, ed. Stelios Papadopoulos (Athens 1991), 263-67, 264-65, it is considered certain that the foundation of the Simonopetra was accompanied by the issuance of an edict by John Unglesha. In any case the text copied by the patriarchal document is Byzantine and not of the period of Ottoman rule, according to many observations as following: Although the document contains a very large number of place names from several different areas (Mount Athos, Sithonia, Limnos island, Serres etc.), none of them are Turkish, as would be expected if it had been written in the 17th century. The document has no reference to any metochion or possessions of the monastery that are not Byzantine, such as the metochion of Kassandra peninsula which appears at the end of the 16th century or the metochion in Izvoros village, which appears in *vakfiyye* (1569). The document has no reference even to the metochion of Vourvourou, which was the most important metochion of Simonopetra during the beginning of 17th century, when we have several Ottoman documents about it. It is known that when the edict of Unglesha was issued (1368) the metochion of Vourvourou was in the ownership of Xenophontos monastery (see e.g. *Actes de Xénophon*, ed. Denise Papatryssanthou, (Paris: Archives de l’Athos XV, 1986), 207-10, doc. no. 29) so it would not be expected to have been included in the edict of Unglesha. The first known mention of it as Simonopetra’s metochion is in a *hüccet* of 1458 from Koutlounousiou. In the part about metochion of Limnos the edict mentions the census of Sevastopoulos and Cheilas, which is well documented from the Byzantine sources (see e.g. *Actes du Pantocrator*, ed. Vassiliki Kravari (Paris: Archives de l’Athos XIII, 1991), docs. 12, 15, 20, 21, 22, 26). The document uses for today city Komotini its Byzantine name *Κουμουτζιανὰ* (*Koumoutziana*). It is impossible that the reference to “*Nicholas the logariastes*” in the extract of the edict for the acquisition of *Vava* metochion in *Longos* is also fake. *Λογαριαστής* is the “steward of a despot’s estates” (see *Actes de Saint-Panteleemon*, ed. Paul Lemerle (Paris: Archives de l’Athos XII, 1982), 87-92, doc. no. 9), which was impossible for the would-be forger to know. As it is known *despot* was the title of John Unglesha when he took over the government of the small state of Serres. In the introduction of the edict, Unglesha makes precise reference to building works that the would-be forger could not have known about or at least it would be extremely difficult to know, such as the rebuilding of the monastery of *St. Nicholas the Makrys* (the Long) and the building of the hospitals of the monasteries Vatopedi and Esfigmenou (see Monk Nifon (ed.), *Ιωάννης Ούγκλεσης. Ο φιλόχριστος δεσπότης των Σερρών. Αφιέρωμα στα 650 χρόνια από τη μάχη του Έβρου (1371-2021)* [Jovan Uglješa. The Christ-Loving Despot of

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ κῆρ Διονυσίου καὶ τοῦ Ἁγίου Παύλου ἡ ἀπάγουσα εἰς τὰς Καρέας».²⁸ After the point where the Big Stream meets the main road, Filotheou Monastery area begins.

In close distance after this point is located the spring of Buzdum.²⁹ The spring is also noted in the map of 1878 as Buzdum biñari (Μποστούμ). The spring is important for the water supply of the monastery and for this reason the vakfiyye highlights that it belongs to Simonopetra, lying within its boundaries. The limit follows the main road (Beylik yolu) until it leaves Filotheou and meets Iveron Monastery. When the limit turns to the south, the area of Xeropotamou Monastery begins. The limit meets the “Black Lake” (Kara Göl). The hydronym “Kara Göl” is a translation of «Μαύρος Βηρός» (Mavros Viros), marked on the map of 1878 at the confluence of two streams. The same hydronym is mentioned in the Edict of John Unglesha as follows: «καὶ κατανατᾶ εἰς τὸν πυθμένα ὅπου ἦν ἡ συναγωγή τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ἐπονομάζεται Μαῦρος Βηρός»,³⁰ where «συναγωγή τῶν ὑδάτων» means “concentration of water.” The hydronym denotes

Serres. A Tribute to the 650 years since the Battle of Hebros (1371-2021)], Mount Athos 2022, 66). So, the conclusion is that Kyrillos Loukaris sigillion includes the original text of the edict that John Unglesha issued, to which some excerpts from Byzantine property documents were added.

²⁸ See Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 42.

²⁹ The hydronym *Buzdum* < Slavic *Bezǫbnъ* < adjective *bezǫbnъ* ‘bottomless’ < preposition *bez* ‘without’ + *ǫbno* ‘bottom’, see Bulgarian toponyms *Bezden*, *Bezdenica*, Serbian *Bezdan*, Greek *Μπισδοῦνι* (Epirus) from the same origin. For this etymology see Max Vasmer, *Die Slaven in Griechenland* (Berlin: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Kommission bei Walter de Gruyter u Co. 1941), 42; Haralambos P. Symeonidis, *Ετυμολογικό Λεξικό των Νεοελληνικών Οικωνυμίων* (Etymological Dictionary of the Modern Greek Oikononyms), vol. 1 (Lefkosia, Thessaloniki: Κέντρο Μελετών Ιεράς Μονῆς Κύκκου 2010), 987; *Bălgarski Etimologičen Rečnik* (Sofia: Bălgarskata akademija na naukite, 1971), 457-58. The change /e/ to /u/ must be rendered to the phenomenon of labialization due to the influence of the initial labial /b/. The hydronym also experienced later folk etymology to the Turkish *buz* ‘cold’ + verb *-dum*, that means ‘I was cold’, because the water of the spring is very cold, but the Slavic origin of it is undoubted. It appears also in the edict of John Unglesha, probably in the Byzantine period before the Ottoman rule: *ἔρχεται ἀντικρως εἰς τὴν βρύσιν τῆς ὑπὸ χαμαὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ῥάχης διακειμένης τῆς οὕτω ἐπονομαζομένης τοῦ Μπουδοῦμη*. In Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 42.

³⁰ Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 42.

a big natural pit of Dafni's flume, above Dondas' region and exactly above the cascade, which has a black colour, because of the big quantity of water."³¹ From Kara göl the limit goes down to the port of Dafni. As can be observed in the map of 1878, the limit followed the stream (river) of Dafni, which was the natural border with Xeropotamou Monastery, but after the purchase of Dondas' region from Xeropotamou by John Unglesha the limit passes west of the river, in an area which would belong to Xeropotamou, something which caused border disputes between the two monasteries for several centuries. For this reason, when the *vaqfiyye* mentions the Cell of Dondas immediately after the demarcation of the monastic area, it clearly mentions that it is located in the place of Xeropotamou Monastery. The borders of Simonopetra are Xeropotamou Monastery on the west, the sea on the south ("*bir taraflı İksiropotamu ve bir taraflı bahr ve bir taraflı mezbūr manastura muttasıl ki bizüm mülkümüz olduđı*"). Then, the boundary following the coastline ends up at the original boundary, the "Great River" ("*bir taraflı Likuryad manastırı bahr tarafından nehr-i kebire varınca*"). The Great River is previously mentioned as the Büyük Dere stream, which acts as a border with Gregoriou Monastery.

Near Xeropotamou Monastery, Simonopetra had the house (*ev*) called Dondas (Δοντάς),³² with a stable (*āhūr*), a winery (*şarābhāne*),

³¹ The hydronym derives from the Greek adjective *μαύρος* 'black' and the Old Slavic common noun *virъ* 'whirlpool' (> *Βηρός*), a very common Slavic word, which in Modern Bulgarian and Serbian denotes the points of a stream where small pools are formed of relatively great depth and width. The same common noun *virъ* has also given other toponyms in Greece and Mount Athos, such as the well-known Byzantine oiconym *Vira* (*Βήρα*) on the west bank of the river Hebros, where in the 12th century a monastery was built by the Komnenos family, around which developed a settlement, and which constituted an important centre during the Ottoman period under the Turkish name *Ferecik*. Moreover, the toponym *Viros* denoting a region in Mount Athos at the borders of Zographou and Konstamonitou Monasteries, which can be witnessed from 980. Kyranoudis, "Linguistic Evidence," 293-94.

³² The toponym *Dondas* comes from the adjective *dondas* "who has big teeth" < *dontia* (*δόντια*) "teeth" and has its origin in the serrated form of the ridge of the mountain located just above the cell of Simonopetra, which is now the natural border with Xeropotamou. The ridge consists of some natural rocky edges, resembling large teeth. See Kyranoudis, "Linguistic Evidence," 280.

a vineyard (*bağ*), an olive grove (*zeytūnlık bāğçesi*), and a water well (*biñār*). The vakfiyye denotes the farm of Dondas, which was located at the border of the Monasteries of Simonopetra and Xeropotamou, including the cell of Saint Nicholas, cultivated lands and mountainous terrain (fig. 8), which, according to the edict of the founder of Simonopetra, John Unglesha, the Serbian despot of Serres, bought from Xeropotamou for 247 coins, which then doanted to the dedicatory monastery.³³ The concession of the cell of Dondas in Simonopetra is mentioned in 1527-28 in a decision of the Great Assembly (Megali Synaxis, today Holy Community) of the Holy Mountain regarding land disputes between the two monasteries, according to which “the cell of Dondas with its region belongs all to Simonopetra monastery” (*«καί τού Δοντά τό κελίον: μετά τής περιοχῆς ὅλον ὑπάρχει τοῦ Σίμωνος Πέτρα»*).³⁴ Simonopetra and Xeropotamou had a long dispute for the region of Dondas, due to the fact that the cell with its region was located west of the river of Dafni, which is the natural border of the two monasteries,³⁵ meaning in the area which must have belonged to Xeropotamou Monastery. Through the centuries, Xeropotamou could not accept the fact that the cell in its region was sold to Simonopetra and tried to claim it on numerous occasions until the 19th century.³⁶ On 17 February 1877, the area of Dondas had become a field of unprecedented events for Mount Athos. An attack by the monks and labourers of Xeropotamou Monastery caused a lot of expenses in court cases over the next ten years, which ended in the Court of Cassation in Istanbul in Simonopetra’s

³³ Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence,” 280. It is well known that in the same period around 1365 Xeropotamou Monastery sold to the Serbian aristocrats and relatives of Unglesha, Radonia and Pagasis from Serres the ancient monastery of Saint Paul (Agios Pavlos), which was then in the status of a cell, see *Actes de Xeropotamou*, ed. Jacques Bompaigne (Paris: Archives de l’Athos III, 1964), 13.

³⁴ Greek Archive of the Monastery of Xeropotamou, No. 1, see an abstract in Paris Gounaridis, *Αρχείο της Ι. Μ. Ξηροποτάμου: επιτομές μεταβυζαντινών εγγράφων* (Archive of Xeropotamou Monastery, Summaries of Post-Byzantine Documents) (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1993), 15.

³⁵ See the Ottoman-Greek map (water colour) titled Map of Simonopetra area (Χάρτης τής Μονῆς Σίμωνος Πέτρας), drawn by Alexander Fokaeus in 1878 (fig. 6, published in *Simonopetra*, ed. Papadopoulos, fig. 15).

³⁶ For this long dispute see Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 1, 164-74.

favour, with the support of Patriarch Joachim III (1878-84).³⁷ From this period, in Simonopetra's archive is preserved an excellent map (water colour) of Dondas and its area (685x1,035), titled "A Map Showing the Boundaries of our House at Dondas, St Nicholas" (fig. 7), showing the aftermath of the attack, painted for the needs of the trial.³⁸ In the Ottoman documents of Xeropotamou Monastery, the cell of Dondas is called *Kızıl Elma* (Turkish) or Tservna Jabouka (Slavic), a translation of the Greek toponym Κόκκινη Μηλιά, which means "red apple tree."³⁹ A very important observation about the true owner of Dondas farm and farmhouse is that the cell (under the name *Kızıl Elmalı*) is mentioned in the *vakfiyye* of Xeropotamou Monastery as located out of the borders of the monastery, adjacent to Simonopetra Monastery.⁴⁰ In the false *vakfiyye* of Xeropotamou Monastery an addition with this cell has been made.⁴¹ However, no reference to the cell of Dondas either under this name nor under the name "cell of Saint Nicholas" (*Ayo Nikola Dondani kilisesi*) is preserved in the Byzantine and early post-Byzantine archives of Xeropotamou Monastery.⁴² On the contrary, the first documents that survive for this cell (1519 Ottoman, 1527/8 Greek⁴³) show that the cell was in the possession of the Monastery of Simonopetra. This observation confirms that the cell belonged normally to Simonopetra Monastery during the later Byzantine period, during the early Ottoman period and –normally– it was registered in the *vakfiyye* of Simonopetra as "*ev Donda*." Also, the two official Greek documents which were issued by the Great Assembly of Mount Athos and Patriarch Ieremias II in 1581, in order to register the property of Simonopetra after the destruction of the monastery's archives in the fire and to replace the burned property documents, record Donda's cell as the property of

³⁷ Kolonos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 1, 165.

³⁸ Χάρτης Εμπεριέχων τὰ Ὅρια τοῦ Ὀσπητίου μας Ὀδοντά Ἁγίου Νικολάου. The map was published in *Simonopetra*, ed. Stelios Papadopoulos, fig. 14.

³⁹ Kolonos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 1, 165-66.

⁴⁰ Kolonos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 3, 103-7, doc. no 120.

⁴¹ Kolonos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 3, 90, doc. no 106.

⁴² See *Actes de Xeropotamou*, ed. Jacques Bompaire, index, 249-93.

⁴³ See Kolonos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 1, 165-66, vol. 3, 32-34, doc. no 24; Gounaridis, *Αρχείο της Ι. Μ. Ξηροποτάμου*, 15, doc no. 1.

the monastery («ἔχει ἔνδον τὸ καλούμενον Κελλίον τοῦ Ὁδοντᾶ μετὰ τῆς περιοχῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λειμῶνων καὶ ἀμπελίων»⁴⁴). But, on the other side, the destruction of Simonopetra's property documents in the fire of 1580 exacerbated the dispute with Xeropotamou Monastery, even though the two most formal Christian Orthodox administrative and judicial institutions, the Great Assembly and the Patriarch of Constantinople, immediately after the fire (in 1581) duly recorded the cell as Simonopetra's property.

Nothing can be seen today of the early buildings of Dondas' cell mentioned in the vakfiyye, with the exception of various wooden construction items which were reused and incorporated into a two-story new building, erected in 1927, containing winepresses, boilers for making raki and labourers' accommodation. Among these items, a wooden capital, dating from the early Ottoman period can be recognised. The main building with the Church of Saint Nicholas was rebuilt in 1856. The land of Dondas maintains today its main use for viticulture and olive cultivation mentioned in the vakfiyye. A winery still operates on the lower floor of the main building.

In Karyes, the endowment deed mentions the still surviving cell of Simonopetra close to the Protaton Church, mentioned in the edict of the founder of Simonopetra John Uglesha, donated to the Monastery by the Protos of Mount Athos and the Great Assembly.⁴⁵

Finally, according to the endowment deed, on the border of Stavronikita Monastery, Simonopetra had a house with a church, a vineyard and an olive grove. By this is meant the cell of Prophet Elias, which was inside an area belonging to Stavronikita Monastery, close to the cell of Fakinos (*Κελλίον Φακηνοῦ*). This cell was bought from the "First" (*Πρώτος*) of the Holy Mountain and the Great Assembly by the founder of Simonopetra, John Unglesha, on behalf of his dedicatory Simonopetra Monastery, for 285 coins before the year 1368. That means at a time when there was no Stavronikita Monastery,⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Dimitrios Vamvakas, *Ιερά Μονή Σίμωνος Πέτρας: Κατάλογος του αρχείου* (Holy Monastery of Simonos Petra, Catalogue of the Archive) (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1985), 111, 124-26, docs. no 1 & 21.

⁴⁵ Kašić, "Despot Jovan Uglješa," 42.

⁴⁶ *Ἐξωνησάμην ἕτερον κάθισμα τοῦ Ἁγίου Προφήτου Ἡλιοῦ ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐστὶ σύνεγγυς τοῦ Φακίηνου μονῆς διὰ νομισμάτων διακοσίων ὀγδοήκοντα πέντε μετὰ τῆς νομῆς,*

which was founded in 1533. The cell of Prophet Elias was sold by Simonopetra to Stavronikita Monastery on 15 January 1724, for 308 *aslans* (*aslan gurus*, Dutch thalers). In the archive of Stavronikita Monastery survives the act of sale,⁴⁷ where the vineyard (*ἀμπελώνας*) is mentioned as it is in the *vaḵfiyye* (*bāḡ*), which was located close to the area of Fakinos («ἡδὲ περιοχὴ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ σύνορα ὑπάρχει ἀπὸ τοῦ κήπου καὶ τῆς πηγῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀνήφορον ἕως ὅπου πηγαίνει εἰς τὴν ράχην καθὼς τρέχουν τὰ νερὰ ἕως το μονοδένδρι καὶ κατεβένη ἕως τοῦ Φακιανοῦ ὅπου εἶναι ὁ ἀμπελῶν καὶ τελιώνει»).

IIIb: The Properties of Simonopetra Outside of Mount Athos

Outside Mount Athos, the endowment deed includes at first a Simonopetra property in Provlakas,⁴⁸ where the Athonite monasteries

καὶ περιοχῆς αὐτοῦ πάσης παρὰ τοῦ Πρώτου καὶ παρὰ πάντων τῶν μοναστηρίων χάρισμα. See Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 42. The absence of the mention to Stavronikita monastery is a sign that this passage of the edict is authentic, because if it was added in 16th or 17th century, it would be mentioned Stavronikita monastery, in which borders the Cell is located.

⁴⁷ Greek Archive of the Monastery of Stavronikita, no. 35, see an abstract in Antonis Giannakopoulos. *Αρχεῖο της Ι.Μ. Σταυρονικήτα: επιτομὲς εγγράφων, 1533-1800* (Archives of the Monastery of Stavronikita, Summaries of the Documents, 1533–1800), (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2001), 35. We owe thanks to the Abbot of Holy Monastery of Stavronikita, Archimandrite Tychon, for kindly providing a digital copy of the original document.

⁴⁸ The toponym *Provlakas* (Πρόβλακας) still denotes today the two-kilometre-wide isthmus which joins the hinterland of Halkidiki with the Athos peninsula, where Xerxes’ renown canal is located. The toponym is mentioned for the first time in 1008/1009 in the form *Pravlaka, i* (Πράβλακα, η: “εν τη τοποθεσία της Πράβλακας πλεισίον της Υπεραγίας Θεοτόκου”). It is derived from the Old Slavic *prěvlakъ* ‘diolkos’ (= ‘slipway for passage of ships across the Isthmus of Corinth’), ‘isthmus’ < Protoslavlic preposition *per-* ‘on, through’ + Protoslavlic verb **welk* ‘draw, drag, trail along’, survived in Bulgarian *provlak* ‘isthmus’, *prevleka*, *provlača*, Serbian *provlačiti* ‘pull, draw’. See Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence,” 299. The Slavic common noun *prěvlakъ* is possibly a calque from Greek *diolkos*. The Greek toponym *Diavripon* appears in the same region (*Διαυρίπον*: “ρύαξ του Διαυρίπου” ‘brook of Diavripon’ or “τάφρος του Διαυρίπου” ‘ditch of Diavripon’) < *enripos* (εὐριπος) ‘canal, ditch,’ which in Athonite documents from 982 up to the 14th century denotes the stream debouching into the western exit of Xerxes Canal. Consequently, the toponym Provlakas denotes the use of diolkos for the passage of ships from one seacoast to

used to cultivate land, mostly vineyards and fish farms. In Provlakas, the property of Simonopetra was located between properties of the Monasteries of Dionysiou, Esfigmenou, and Saint Paul (“*bir taraftı Dinonışad manastırı ve bir taraftı Şimeniter ve bir taraftı Aya Pavli*”). The name of Esfigmenou Monastery is denoted in the form *Şimeniter*, which derives from the Greek adjective (E)S(f)i(g)menites (*Εσφιγμενίτες*), which denotes the monks of Esfigmenou Monastery. The Ottoman scribe had also erroneously registered the name of the metochion of Dionysiou: instead of *Dyonışad* he wrote *Dinonışad*, adding an additional “n”. This form comes from the adjective Dionysiat(iko) (*Διονυσιάτικο*).

A Simonopetra property is included in the endowment deed in the village of Izvor (today Stratoniki),⁴⁹ where in 1568 most Athonite monasteries had houses.⁵⁰

the other, whilst the toponym *Diavripon* (*Διαβρίπον*), the existence of a ditch-canal. The Slavic toponym was later re-analysed in Greek as a compound from the preposition *pro-* and the noun *avlast* (*αύλαξ* ‘chute, groove’) and thus evolved the form *Proavlastas* (*Προαύλακας*). Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence,” 300.

⁴⁹ The oiconym *Isvoron* (*Ισβορον*), which was changed by the Greek state to Stratoniki (Στρατονίκη), in the region of today’s Arnaia in the vicinity of Sidirokafsia in western Halkidiki, comes from the Slavic common noun **izvorъ* ‘spring of water’ < Protoslavlic **jizwaru*, cf. Serbo-Croatian *izvor*, Bulgarian *izvor* with the same meaning, a frequent toponym in the Slavic languages, which has been given in Greek a large number of toponyms. The specific toponym in Halkidiki appears in 1445 as *Eizvoron* (*Εϊζβορον*). It is noteworthy that in the forged testament of Sister Agatha of the supposed date of 20 September 1441, the toponym appears in the form of *Gisvoron* (*Γήσβορον*) and is etymologically analysed by the forger as follows: “καί τό χωρίον Γήσβορον καλούμενον (ώς ἀληθῶς γῆς βοράν ὄν τῆς μεταλλείας)” (“and the village called Gisvoron (for in truth it is the food of the earth through mining)”). It is a folk etymology of the oiconym which is regarded as a compound of the words *gi* (*γη*) ‘land’+*vora* (*βορά*) ‘food’ (< cf. the ancient verb *vi-vro-sko* [βιβρώσκω] ‘eat’, from the same root). The forger reveals that in his time there was considerable mining activity giving the impression that they were “eating up” the earth. Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence,” 296. *Isvoros* was one of the twelve mining communities that made up the *Mademochoria* villages, which provided workers to the mines of Halkidiki during the Ottoman period. In 1806, when the English military expert William Martin Leake visited the mines of *Siderokavsia*, he only mentions the settlement of *Nisvoro* (i.e. *Isvoros*), with 300-400 houses, divided in two nearly equal neighbourhoods (*mahalles*) of Greeks and Turks (i.e., Christians and Muslims), situated half a mile apart. See Kolovos & Kotzageorgis, “Halkidiki,” 167.

The biggest part of the Longos (today Sithonia) Peninsula,⁵¹ already during the Byzantine period, was given by the Byzantine state to the Athonite monasteries, which had there their winter and summer pasturages, as the pasture of large animals was forbidden in the Athonite Peninsula due to the monastic rules. The same condition was preserved during the Ottoman period. Most of the villages of the peninsula developed due to the Athonite metochia existing near them, as the monks needed workers for the cultivation of their lands and the pasturing of their flocks. The metochion of the Simonopetra Monastery in Longos, known as “Vava,” from the stream of the same name that flows through it, which was an area of about 12,000 acres, was donated to Simonopetra in 1368 by its founder John Uglesha. It was located between the metochion of Pantokrator Monastery named Azapiko, the sea (Toroni Bay), the metochion of Koutloumousiou Monastery and the forest of the village of Sykia. The character of the area was predominantly pastoral (winter and summer pastures), but it also had considerable agricultural land. Its main productive assets were livestock farming (sheep and goats, cows, and water buffaloes were reared in the marsh of Trstenika), agriculture (grain and pulses), olive growing, viticulture, and sericulture. To the west of the metochion, near the characteristic peak of Tourlopetra, were the main metochial buildings, with a second building unit being to the east, in the Livadia area.⁵² Although most of the Byzantine and early Ottoman documents about the metochion in Longos were burned in a fire of the year 1580, various historical sources refer to it in the 15th century. In 1478, Simonopetra appeared in the Imperial Land Register among the monasteries holding lands in Longos.⁵³ An Ottoman document (*vesīka*) dated 26 April-4 May, 1486, refers to a dispute of the Monasteries of Xero-

⁵⁰ There was also a church belonging to Zographou Monastery. Some monasteries also had their own workshops and shops. See Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 1, 70.

⁵¹ *Longos* is the name of today's Sithonia Peninsula of Halkidiki and was in common use during the Byzantine and the Ottoman periods. It is written in Greek as *Loggos* (Λογγός) and comes from the Greek common noun *longos* (λόγγος) < Slavic *logъ* ‘forest’. See Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence,” 311.

⁵² As they can be seen in two maps dated after the mid-19th century, kept in the archive of Simonopetra.

⁵³ Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 2, 200-201.

potamou and Saint Paul with Simonopetra in Longos, which had existed since 1450.⁵⁴ In 1516-17, a letter of agreement between the Monasteries of Simonopetra and Koutloumousiou was issued, in which the former rented to the latter parts of its pasture in Longos.⁵⁵

The boundaries of Simonopetra's metochion (winter pasture) in the Longos Peninsula are the "pointed stone reaching down to the Valley, the Stream of Anilo, the sea, the Valley/ Stream of Variti, the Valley/Stream of Trestenikia, İzmiksi and Markovunyo." The toponyms are shown on a map of the metochion which was drawn during a trial in 1845 (fig. 9). The trial was between the monks of Simonopetra and its abbot Ambrosius against the inhabitants of Sykia Village. In the decision of the Sharia Court of Thessaloniki, which resolved the dispute in favour of the monastery, it is mentioned that "the aforesaid judge by autopsy recorded and drew the aforesaid boundaries and extracted a sketch of such places, expressly stating the boundaries and locations of the boundaries."⁵⁶ This map, having the title "*Longozda Vavo kışlağı Şimopetra manastırınıñ*," could be served also as a map of the area described in the vakfiyye. Based on this was another later watercolour map of the metochion of Sykia, without toponyms (fig. 10),⁵⁷ showing its buildings and those of the neighbouring metochia, the Sykia Village, the roads, the streams, the marshes, the boundaries, the vegetation, the threshing floors, etc. As regards the so-called pointed stone (*sivri taş* literally meaning sharp stone) in the vakfiyye, it denotes the toponym Tourlopetra (Τουρλόπετρα), deriving from the words troulos (τρούλος), meaning dome, and petra, meaning stone, a boundary between the metochia of Simonopetra and Pantocrator Monasteries in Longos.⁵⁸ The stone is

⁵⁴ See Phokion Kotzageorgis, *H aθwvιkή μovή Αγίου Παύλου κατά την οθωμανική περίοδο* (The Athonite Monastery of Saint Paul during the Ottoman Period) (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press 2002) 108-11, 228, 243.

⁵⁵ Greek Archive of the Simonopetra's Monastery, no. 29, see an abstract in Vamvakas, *Ιερά Μονή Σίμωνος Πέτρας*, 130, no. 29.

⁵⁶ OASM, court document (*hüccet*), No. 157 (1 Cemaziyülevvel 1261/8 May 1845): *hudūd-i mezkureyi mevlānā-i mümaileyh bi'l-mu'ayene ketb ve tahrīr ve hudūd ve sınırların mahallatını tasrīhan maḥal-i mezkūrün bir kit'a resmi ba'de'l-ihrāc*.

⁵⁷ The map is also published in *Simonopetra*, ed. Papadopoulos, fig. 16.

⁵⁸ Kyranoudis, "Linguistic Evidence," 281-82.

also noted in the map of 1845 (fig. 11) as *Sivri taş*, just above the central building of the metochion. The hydronym Stream of Anilo (Anilo Deresi) is probably a wrong attribution of the hydronym Anbelo Deresi where the Ottoman be (ب) was read as ye (Ϸ). Indeed, in the map of 1845, the limit Anbelo Laço (αμπέλου λάκος, stream of vineyard) is noted after the limit Anilo Deresi, because this stream runs through vineyards. This is the same stream, but the form Anilo Deresi also maintained in Greek, with the Greek adjective ανήλιος (sunless) being erroneously (folk etymology) regarded as the first component of the hydronym and the name as denoting a “stream that the sun cannot see.” More precise limits are given in the Edict of John Unglesha, where is written: «Τὸ σύνορον τοῦ αὐτοῦ τόπου τῆς κεκλημένης Βάβας ἄρχεται ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥάχης τῆς ὑψηλῆς πέτρας καὶ πηγαίνει εἰς τοῦ ἀμπέλου τὸν λάκκον».⁵⁹ The toponym the Valley/Stream of Variti (Variti deresi) comes from the name Areti of the cape situated there. A more precise limit is given in the Edict of John Unglesha: «εἶτα κατέρχεται εἰς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν τὴν λεγομένην Ἀρετὴν».⁶⁰

The first half of the toponym of the Valley/Stream of Trestenikia (Treste Niça Deresi), *Treste*, was written at the end of the twelfth line, and the second half of it, *Niça*, was written at the beginning of the thirteenth line of the vakfiyye. This means that the Ottoman scribe considered the word *Trestenikia* to be two words, even though it is one. The first definitive evidence for the appearance of the toponym Trestenikia, which today denotes a relatively important marsh on the south-west coast of the Sithonia Peninsula (region of Toroni), dates to 1491/2, when mention is made in the regulation of a dispute between Pantocratoros and Russian monasteries over a metochion in Longos: «ὁ τόπος περι οὗ εἰ φιλονικία: ἄρχεται ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἤγουν ἀπὸ τὸ κροτήριον τῆς Ἀρετῆς, ὅπερ ἔστι πλησίον τοῦ αὐτοῦ κροτηρίου βάλτα ὀνόματι Τρισκοινί(αι)α».⁶¹ The hydronym is mentioned also in the Edict of John Unglesha: «εἶτα κατέρχεται εἰς τὸν

⁵⁹ Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 44.

⁶⁰ Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 44. This toponym comes from the Byzantine Greek female baptismal name *Areti* (*Arete*/*Ἀρετή*) from the common noun *areti* ‘virtue’. This female name is registered three times in Trapp 2001: no 1302-1304.

⁶¹ Kravari 1991: No. 28, ll. 5-6.

*αἰγιαλὸν τὴν λεγομένην Ἀρετὴν, καὶ διαβαίνει εἰς τὴν Τρεστενικία».*⁶² A letter from the Metropolitan (Bishop) Ioasaf of Thessaloniki dated December 1567, defining the borders of the metochia of Pantokratoros and Simonopetra Monasteries in Longos, mentions the border «*Ἀρετὴ, ἣτις ἐστὶν πλησίον τοῦ καλάμου τῆς Τρεστενικίας*» (“Areti, which is situated close to the reed of Trestenikia”).⁶³ The word *kalamos*, literally meaning reed, is explained by the writer as “reed bed, mire.” The name also appears in the same form (*κάλαμος Τρεστενικίας*, reed of Trestenikia) in a patriarchal document of Anthimos II of July 1623.⁶⁴ In the Ottoman map of 1845, the hydronym is noted as *Trestenika Deresi*. The toponym *Trestenikia* originally denoted a swamp formed in the mouth of the stream *Vava* (Βάβα), deriving from the Slavic *baba* (old woman), in Toroni Bay. Afterwards, it was extended to denote the wider coastal area, including the southern part of the stream *Vava*.⁶⁵ The toponym *İzmiği* indicates the place where two streams meet. It comes from the Greek toponym *Σμίξη*, meaning the merging, from the verb *σμίγω* (merge). Indeed, in the map of 1845 the limit *Mülākāt Deresi/Σμίξη* is noted at the place where the stream *Vava* meets the other stream. The word *mülākāt* means “a meeting of one another.” Finally, the toponym *Markovunyo* comes from the initial *Makryvouna* (*Μακρυβούνα*)/*Makrovouna* (*Μακροβούνα*), meaning “a long mountain,” and is compounded by the adjective *μακρὺς* (long) and the substantive *βουνό* (mountain).⁶⁶

The endowment deed continues with the Simonopetra property in *Vourvoura*.⁶⁷ The headquarters (kathedra) of the metochion was lo-

⁶² Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 44.

⁶³ Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence,” 290.

⁶⁴ The form *Trestenika* comes from the genitive case **Trǣstĕnika* (cf. Bulgarian *Trǣstenik-a* accusative of *Trǣstenik*) of **Trǣstĕnikъ* ‘reed bed, marshy place’ < Old Slavic *trǣstъ* ‘reed’ + word-formation suffix *-ĕnikъ*. Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 291.

⁶⁶ After the metathesis of the liquid /r/ (*Makryvouna* / *Makrovouna* > *Markyvouna* / *Markovouna*) for phonetical reasons, the toponym was regarded as a compound of the Greek male name *Markos* (*Μάρκος*) and *vouno* ‘mountain,’ that means ‘Markos’ mountain’ (folk etymology).

⁶⁷ It is a form of the Byzantine toponym *Vourvourou* (*Βουρβουρού*), which denotes a marshy location on the coast in the northern-eastern part of Sithonia peninsula and comes from the common noun *vourvourou* (*βουρβουρού*) < *vorvorou* (*βορβορού*), a

cated very close to the two marshes of Livari (Λιβάρι) and Bara (Μπάρα) or Vromobara (Βρωμόμπαρα), where one can see the ruins of an early Christian church on the seashore and the metochion church with the ruins of its buildings. Thus, Vourvourou denotes a region of more than 20,000 acres, from Livari until the limits of the Koutloumousiou metochion called Kounoupades (Κουνουπάδες).⁶⁸ The Simonopetra metochion in Vourvoura, close to the village Agios Nikolaos, was acquired by the monastery before 1458, a year in which it appears adjacent to the metochion called Kounoupades of Koutloumousiou Monastery in the area of Mount Karvounas and the Reskos Stream. In 1569, the Simonopetra metochion had a large area of 14,500 acres, lying between a common pasture of the village of Agios Nikolaos and the metochion of Koutloumousiou. In 1615, the monks expanded it, acquiring from the inhabitants of Agios Nikolaos an adjacent pasture of 6,000 acres in the area of Roussikos Mylos (meaning “russian mill”) and Livari (fishery) by giving them a smaller area near the village, in the areas of Kamenikos and Kou-

form which appears in Cypriot and Pontic dialects) with a northern vocalism < vorvoros (βόρβορος) + suffix of feminine nouns -ov. The first written evidence of the toponym is of the year 1089, when appears the “μοναστήριον λεγόμενον τῶν Τερομνήμων ἦτοι τὰ Βουρβουροῦ”, given by Emperor Basil II to the Athonite Monastery of Xenophon as its metochion. See Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence”, 291-92. The toponym appears in 1300 in the form of the gender-neutral plural *Vourvoura* (Βούρβουρα) and it is described as a land of oaks (βαλανηφόρος τόπος των Βουρβούρων). Despite the fact that the feminine form (*Vourvourou*) prevailed, the gender neutral *Vourvoura* (Βούρβουρα) was kept in use at least up to 1569, when it appears in the *vakfiyye* of Simonopetra to denote its *metochion* situated there, which passed to it from Xenophontos Monastery before 1458. The toponym *Vourvourou* came most possibly from two marshes, which existed up to the mid-20th century on the eastern coast of Sithonia, namely *Livari* (Λιβάρι) and *Bara* (Μπάρα) or *Vromobara* (Βρωμόμπαρα). The toponym *Livaddyasi* is an attribution in Turkish of the Greek toponym *Livadia*, which comes from the plural of *livadi* ‘meadow’. The type *Livaddyasi* comes probably from a type *Livadias* which was either the nominative of a masculine Greek type (Λιβαδιάς, ο) or the genitive of a feminine Greek type (Λιβαδιά, η, [έως] της Λιβαδιάς). The ending -s was regarded in Turkish as the ending of an *idāfet* compound and the toponym was re-analysed as *Livad-dya-si*. *Riska* is a Byzantine toponym, which comes from the plural *ta reska* ‘mice’ of the neuter substantive *to reskon*.

⁶⁸ Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence,” 292.

koutsas, and paying an additional amount of 48,000 *aķçe*, as evidenced by an agreement with the community of Agios Nikolaos of 8 November, 1614,⁶⁹ and an Ottoman certification (*veṣīka*) of 31 March-9 April, 1615.⁷⁰ After acquiring this area, the Simonopetrites surrounded the northern side of the metochion with a large stone wall, which started from the beach and reached high up the mountain, in order to protect it from encroachment.⁷¹ This metochion was one of the most important of the monastery, with remarkable agricultural production, livestock, viticulture, and beekeeping, while it had two buildings: a central one on the coastal location Panagia, where the church, dedicated to the Virgin Mary, and a secondary one on Mount Karvounas.⁷²

Simonopetra, according to the endowment deed, had an estate in the district of Serres. Simonopetra's metochion was located in the east of the River Strymon, amidst the towns of Serres and Zihna, in the area of the villages of Varnarou⁷³ and Esphagmenou.⁷⁴ According to the

⁶⁹ Greek Archive of Simonopetra's Monastery, Mount Athos, no 32, see an abstract in Vamvakas, *Ιερά Μονή Σίμωνος Πέτρας*, 134.

⁷⁰ OASM, No. 199.

⁷¹ See a contemporary photo of it, fig. 12.

⁷² The toponym *Karvulo* renders the well-known mountain name *Karvounas* (*Καρβουνάς*), which is the highest peak in the Vourvourou region and in the Byzantine period it appears as *Chalkovounon* (*Χαλκόβουνον*), see Kyranoudis, "Linguistic Evidence," 298. The toponym has its origin in the common noun *karvounas* (*καρβουνάς*) 'who makes charcoal' < *karvouna* (*κάρβουνα*) 'charcoals' + productive suffix *-as* (*-άς*) denoting 'the one who makes [the object is denoted by the root],' given that charcoal was made on the mountain until the beginning of the 20th century. The first evidence for the toponym Karvounas is a court document (*hüccet*) of 1458 regarding the demarcation of the Koutloumousiou metochion Kounoupades, in which the toponym appears translated into Turkish as *Kömürlük* 'place where charcoal is made.'

⁷³ *Varna* is a form of the oiconym *Vernarus* (*Βερνάροϋς*), which has appeared in the Byzantine sources since 1304, when it is mentioned as *zeugelateion Bernarus*, where Saint Prodromos Monastery of Serres possessed the church of Saint Varvara. In 1309, it is described as *chorion Vernarus peri ten Paralimnion*. In the early Ottoman sources the village is mentioned as *Vernar* (1454/1455), *Pernar*, *Vernar* (1478/1479), *Virnar*, *Vernar* (1530) in the Kaza of Siroz. After 1926 the village was named *Paralimnion*. It is located 15 km south-west of Serres on the northern shore of today's drained lake of Achinos. The name is considered to be of Slavic origin (< *brъnie* 'mud', *brънаръ*, *brънjarъ*), but we cannot exclude that this is a folk etymolo-

edict of John Unglesha, this land belonged to the Master Georgios the Strategos and his brothers Nikolaos and Dimitrios («ἐτύγγανε κτήμα κὺρ Γεωργίου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ μετὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ ἀνταδέλφων Νικολάου καὶ Δημητρίου»), from whom Unglesha purchased it for 879 gold pieces in order to donate it to the Simonopetra Monastery. Inside the demarcated land in the edict, there were three churches, one dedicated to the Nativity of Christ, one dedicated to St. Paraskevi, and one near Varnarou dedicated to St. Dimitrios.⁷⁵ Most of the area of the metochion was suitable for cultivation.

Finally, the endowment deed includes the Simonopetra property on the island of Limnos, the metochion of Trygi.⁷⁶ Simonopetra had in Trygi extended cultivated land of 4,350 modioi. The metochion was acquired by the Monastery of Simonopetra in the second half of the 14th century, as confirmed by Byzantine building remains in the present church of the metochion, which was restored in 1706. A letter from a nameless superior of Simonopetra, who is writing to the residents of the Limnos Island requesting them to assist and facilitate an unnamed Simonopetritan monk who was sent to Limnos to collect money and food for Simonopetra, is the first known written evidence of Simonopetra's presence on the island, dating approximately to the year 1530.⁷⁷ From the middle of the 19th century and until the year 1934, the monastery took over the management of the metochion by

gy in Slavic of saint *Varvara* (*Barbara*), to whom the Byzantine church of the village was dedicated and which is mentioned in the first appearance of the oiconym in the Byzantine sources, see Peter Soustal, *Makedonien, südlicher Teil, Tabula Imperii Byzantini*, vol. 11 (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2022), 281.

⁷⁴ *Esfameno* is the name of a now abandoned village very close to *Paralimnion* and 2.5 km north of today's *Pethelinos* Village. The oiconym is mentioned as *Esfagmenou* (*Εσφαγμένου*) in Byzantine sources since 1305. In the early Ottoman sources the village is mentioned as *Skameno*, *İsfameno*, *İsfamino*, *Esfamino* in Vilayet Keshishlik (1454/1455, 1478/1479), and *Esfameno* (1530) in the Kaza of Zihne. The oiconym comes from the Greek past participle *εσφαγμένος* 'slaughtered' of the verb *σφάττω* 'slaughter'. Although *Esfagmenou* Monastery had two metochia in the region of lake Akhinos, the place name does not seem to come from the name of the monastery, as /a/ appears consistently in the syllable -sfa-.

⁷⁵ Kašić, "Despot Jovan Uglješa," 44-46.

⁷⁶ The toponym comes from the Greek common noun *trygi* (*τρύγη*) 'vintage' due to the vineyards existing there.

⁷⁷ See Kotzageorgis, *Η αθωνική μονή Αγίου Παύλου*, 124-26.

appointing monks as stewards. Today the monastery keeps in its possession the church of the metochion with the famous icon of the Virgin Mary of Trygi and some land around the central buildings of it.⁷⁸

The Trygi metochion of Simonopetra on Limnos was registered in the endowment deed of 1569 with the following boundaries: Κοζουνο–Αγίου Παύλου–Γαινάτος–Δραγασία–Παλοϊάνι–Λούτρα–Άγιος Γεώργιος Καλογέρα–Άγιος Γιάννης. As Κοζουνο is denoted the coastal area Kotsinas/Kotsinitis, which appears south of the area Trygi in the map of Limnos Island by the Hellenic Military Geographical Service.⁷⁹ The form Kotzinos (Κότζινος) is included in the Byzantine limitation of the metochion, which is recorded in the edict of John Unglesha («ἕτερα δύο μετόχια εἰς τὴν περιοχὴν τοῦ Κότζινου, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐν ὑπάρχει τῆς Ὑπεραγίας Θεοτόκου τῆς οὕτω λεγομένης Τρίγης»)⁸⁰ The area owes its name probably to the red colour of its soil. Αγίου Παύλου (Ayā Pavlo) is the name of a Byzantine chapel, dedicated to Saint Paul the Apostle, which, being restored many times, exists until today on the cape, a little northern from Kotsinitis. Γαινάτος comes from the common Greek male name Gaitanos/Gaitanas, which appears in the Byzantine limitation of the metochion: «καὶ ἀκουμβίξει εἰς τὸν μύλον τοῦ Γαῖτανᾶ.»⁸¹ Gaitanas was the Byzantine owner of the mill, who gave its name to the place.⁸² Δραγασία (Dirağasya) is identified with the limit dragasia of the Byzantine limitation («ἀνα-

⁷⁸ Αγιορειτική Βιβλιοθήκη Λήμνου της Ιεράς Μονῆς Σιμωνόπετρας Αγίου Όρους Ἄθω, *Τρύγη Λήμνου: Ἡ ἀναγέννηση ἐνός μετοχίου* [2023].

⁷⁹ No 223 (Moudros), 1938. The toponym comes from the idiomatic form *kotsinos* of the Greek colour adjective *kokkinos* (κόκκινος) ‘red’ with palatalisation of the palatal stop /k/ before the front vowel /i/ (*kokkinos* > *kotsinos* > *kotsinas*).

⁸⁰ Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 46.

⁸¹ Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 46.

⁸² The male name *Gaitanas* (Γαῖτανᾶς) appears as the name of landowners in Hierissos of Halkidiki (1279) and in Kephallenia (1264), also as the name of *paroikoi* in Kephallenia (1264: Γαῖτανᾶς Θεόδωρος and Γαῖτανᾶς Κωνσταντῖνος). PLP nos 3455-3458. The form *Gaynatos* in the *vakfiyye* came from a change in the position of the consonants /t-n/ to /n-t/ (antimetathesis). The name *Gaitanas* (Γαῖτανᾶς) comes from the medieval Greek *gaitanin* (γαῖτάνιν) ‘silk cord’ + productive suffix *-as* (-άς) denoting ‘the one who makes [the object is denoted by the root]’, so the meaning of the noun *gaitanas* (γαῖτανᾶς), which produced the male name, was ‘the one who makes *gaitania*, silk cords.’ For the productive suffix *-as* (-άς) in Greek, see Kyranoudis, “Linguistic Evidence,” 158-72.

βαίνει εἰς τὴν δραγασίαν»⁸³). Paloyani is an incorrect rendering in Ottoman Turkish of the toponym Paliopatis (Παλιοπάτης), which exists in the Byzantine limitation. Next is noted the limit Luṭra, which comes from the Greek common noun *loutra*, plural of *loutron*, meaning “bath.” The next toponym, Aya Yorgi Kaloyera, renders the Byzantine limit Saint George Kalyvitis (Ἅγιος Γεώργιος Καλυβίτης), where *Kalyvitis* means “hut dweller” («καὶ καταλύει εἰς τὸν Ἅγιον Γεώργιον τὸν λεγόμενον Καλυβίτην»). As *Kalyvitis*, in the history of monasticism, is known as the popular Byzantine Saint John Kalyvitis (5th century). Yet, in the case of the limitation of the Trygi metochion the first name of the saint is written as George. Therefore, we must regard that on this place there is no chapel of Saint John Kalyvitis, but that was the place of a holy man called George, who built a poor hut, in which he lived as an ascetic. This view is confirmed by the observation that in the *vaḡfiyye* the adjective *Kalyvitis* is replaced by the substantive *Kaloyera* (from the Greek *Καλόγερας* or *Καλογεράς*), which comes from the Greek *kalogeros* (*καλόγερος*), meaning monk (with the replacement of the Greek masculine suffix *-os* from its equivalent masculine suffix *-as*) and declares the status of Saint George as a monk, distinguishing him from the great martyr George. For this reason, we must consider that Aya Yorgi Kaloyera (Ἅγιος Γιώργης Καλογεράς) is not the name of a church, but the name of the place where this unknown saint of the island lived. The last limit of the *vaḡfiyye*, Aya Yani, denotes a chapel dedicated to Saint John the Baptist, as it is confirmed by the Byzantine limitation: «καὶ διέρχεται καὶ ἀκουμβίζει εἰς τὸν Ἅγιον Ἰωάννην τὸν Πρόδρομον»⁸⁸. This chapel, as shown in the map of the Hellenic Military Geographical Service,⁸⁹ is situated in the north-east of the village Propoulion (Προπούλιον), which is the closest settlement to the *metochion*.

⁸³ Kašić, “Despot Jovan Uglješa,” 46. The mediaeval common noun *dragasia* denotes ‘the place where the *dragatis* stays (hut on stakes, bed on a tree), watchpoint’. It comes from the subst. *dragatis* (*δραγάτης*) ‘garden or vineyard keeper’ + productive suffix *-ia* with palatalisation of the dental stop /t/ before the front vowel /i/ (/tia/ > /sia/). See I.N. Kazazis, T.A. Karanastasis, *Επιτομή του Λεξικού της Μεσαιωνικής Ελληνικής Δημόδους Γραμματείας 1100-1669 του Εμμανουήλ Κριαρά*, vol. 1 (Thessaloniki: Κέντρο Ελληνικής Γλώσσας, 2001), 342.

IV. Authenticity of the vakfiyye

The vakfiyye under study here is the original issued in 1569. Its authenticity is based on a variety of facts. The first fact is the existence of the seal of Mehmed bin Hürrem, the high judge in Constantinople who issued all the original vakfiyyes of all the monasteries and, on the other hand, the validation without seal by the chief jurist of the empire, Mehmed Ebū's-su'ūd Efendi (none of the original Athonite vakfiyyes bear his seal). The falsification of a seal during this period was very complex and dangerous since it incurred a harsh punishment. The existence of the seal of the high-ranking judge under his signature, who was also the issuer of the document, is proof that the document was issued in 1569. Furthermore, the rest of the vakfiyyes of the Athonite monasteries bear the same authentications and the same (only one) seal. However, as extracted from the juxtaposition of the vakfiyye of Simonopetra Monastery with the original vakfiyye of Xeropotamou Monastery, the authentication seal of the vakfiyye of Xeropotamou, under the name of the high judge Mehmed bin Hürrem, is exactly the same as the authentication seal of the vakfiyye of Simonopetra. Moreover, the authentications of the two vakfiyyes of Simonopetra and Xeropotamou and their positions (top right) are exactly the same, as well as the positions of the seal under the authentication and the line crossing the seal in the middle. We have also to underline that Mehmed bin Hürrem was actually a judge in Constantinople in the beginnings of 1569, according to the standard Biographical Dictionary of Ottoman officialdom.⁸⁴ Finally, most of the witnesses listed at the end of the vakfiyye of Simonopetra are identical to the witnesses listed at the end of the original vakfiyye of Xeropotamou.⁸⁵

The vakfiyye of Docheiariou Monastery bears the ratification Ebū's-su'ūd without a seal and the ratification of Mehmed bin Hürrem, the high judge in Constantinople with his authenticating seal.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ For his biographical information, see above, based on Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), p. 1078-1079.

⁸⁵ See Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 3, 103, doc. 120.

⁸⁶ See (Gerontas) Ierotheos Docheiarites, *Το μονύδριον του Καλλιγράφου* (The Calligrapher's Monastery) (Thessaloniki 1929), 57: «Ενεργηθήτω συνωδὰ τῷ περιεχομένῳ τοῦ παρόντος Χοδζετίου (ὑπογραφή) Ἐπουσσοουτ./ Μουχαμμέτ υἱὸς Χουσσ-

This is identical in the *vakfiyyes* of Pantokratoros⁸⁷ and Konstamonitou⁸⁸ Monasteries. The *vakfiyye* of the Russian Monastery of Saint Panteleimonos bears likewise the ratification of the same high judge with his authenticating seal on the top right and right beside it the ratification of Ebū's-su'ūd without seal.⁸⁹

Another proof of the authenticity of Simonopetra's *vakfiyye* is its date. The document was issued in the last ten days of Ramadan 976 (9-18 March, 1569), a date which is exactly the same with the date of the original authentic *vakfiyye* of Xeropotamou Monastery.⁹⁰ All the *vakfiyyes* of the Athonite monasteries were issued in the month Ramadan of the *hicri* year 976, just over some weeks after the pivotal *fermān* was issued, that means in a very narrow time interval, between 27 February and 28 March, 1569.⁹¹ On the contrary, a falsified *vakfiyye* of Xeropotamou Monastery also has a wrong date, i.e. *evāhir-i Ramaḍān* 974 (1-10 April, 1567), that means before the pivotal *fermān* was issued, something impossible to happen.⁹² Unlike today, getting a date right was no easy task for would-be forgers.

The original *vakfiyye* of Simonopetra bears an extra authentication in the middle section at the top of the document, while the original *vakfiyyes* of Athonite monasteries have two authentications: on the top right, which is the authentication of the high judge in Constantinople, Mehmed bin Hürrem, who issued the document, and on the top left, which is the authentication of the chief jurist of the empire,

σὰμ ὁ μουλλάς τῆς περιφρουρήτου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἐπιβεβαιοῖ (Τ.Σ.) Μουχαμμέτ». A published translation in Greek was made by El. Taniskidis and A. Christidis and the accuracy of it had been confirmed by the Translation Office of Thessaloniki in 1916. The translators had erroneously read the year of *vakfiyye* as 996 instead of the correct 976. We also have at our disposal the Ottoman original.

⁸⁷ The Ottoman original is in the Ottoman Archive of Pantokratoros Monastery, Mount Athos, no Θ/6, 10.077.

⁸⁸ See Archimandrites Symeon, Kathegoumenos (Abbot) of Konstamonitou Monastery, *Ιστορική Αλήθεια* (Historical Truth) (Athens 1932), 14.

⁸⁹ We have at our disposal the Ottoman original with a translation in Greek made by Ioannis Panagiotidis ratified for its accuracy by the Translation Office of Thessaloniki in 1917.

⁹⁰ Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 3, 103.

⁹¹ See Alexander, "The Lord Giveth," 149-200, 170-71.

⁹² See Kolovos, «Χωρικοί και μοναχοί», vol. 3, 88-94, doc. 106.

Mehmed Ebū's-su'ūd Efendi, who had established the legal status and legal value of the vakfiyyes. However, only the ratification of the high judge has his authenticating seal beneath it. Besides, the addition of one more ratification, i.e., of the Müfti of Thessaloniki, on the original vakfiyye, is not a sign of falsification but indeed a sign of its authentication. A possible explanation is that the Müfti of Thessaloniki was present when Ebū's-su'ūd Efendi was validating the Simonopetra vakfiyye and Ebū's-su'ūd honorably asked him to add his validation on it. This was not uncommon in Constantinople, as we also see the deputy judge of the city of Hrupishta (today Argos Orestiko) (Mevlānā Mehemmed Çelebi ibn Aḥmed *en-nā'ib bi-medīne-i Ḥurpišta*) signing as a witness in the vakfiyyes of Simonopetra and Xeropotamou. Such a practice was not uncommon even among Christian religious ministers either. For example, the Patriarch of Jerusalem Sophronius signed a patriarchal sigil with Patriarch Jeremiah II and two other bishops in 1590,⁹³ even though he had no ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Constantinople. Another possible explanation about the validation of the Müfti of Thessaloniki is that after the fire of 1580, the monks of Simonopetra took the original vakfiyye and they went to the Müfti of Thessaloniki, who placed his sign on it as a confirmation that this important document was saved by the fire and it was an authentic vakfiyye.⁹⁴ The absence of a seal on the authentication of the Müfti of Thessaloniki is a proof of its authenticity, as the original vakfiyyes of all the monasteries, as well as that of Simonopetra, also bear the validation of the Müfti of Constantinople without a seal.

A further argument in favour of the authenticity of Simonopetra vakfiyye relates to the properties mentioned. The boundaries of the apiary in Vourvourou do not include the area acquired by the monastery in 1614-15 by the inhabitants of Agios Nikolaos. The boundaries

⁹³ Vamvakas, *Ιερά Μονή Σίμωνος Πέτρας*, 113.

⁹⁴ It should be noted that the Athonite monasteries usually received more than one copy of their *vakfiyyes* in 1569. For example, Koutlounousiou Monastery possesses three copies of its *vakfiyye*. All three are authentic. One of them is labelled as a 'copy' (*suret*) and does not have a certifying seal, but the other two do bear certifying seals, see Alexander, "The Lord Giveth," 170. The originals of the *vakfiyyes* were registered in the *sicils* of Istanbul and the monasteries received copies of them as a proof that they had satisfied the new law (*ibid.*, 169).

of this area are included in an Ottoman *vesīka* (certification) of *evā`il-i Rebūū`l-evvel* 1024 (31 March-9 April, 1615) for the sale of a winter pasture by the residents of Agios Nikolaos to Simonopetra in the Vourvourou area for the sum of 48,000 aspers.⁹⁵ If the contents of the *vakfiyye* had been drawn up subsequent to 1569, it would undoubtedly have included this area as well, since until the end of Ottoman rule it was often infringed upon by the inhabitants of Agios Nikolaos.

In addition, all other properties of Simonopetra which were acquired shortly after 1569 and before 1607, when they were recorded in a cadastral extract issued in the same year, are absent from the *vakfiyye*. These properties were the urban metochion of the monastery in Thessaloniki (*maḥalle-i Çinar Kātīb· ḥane bāb: 6· bağçe kıta` I· dükkān bāb I*), the metochion (*çiftlik*) in Kassandra Peninsula (*çiftlik der Kesendire· bağ dönüm: 10· asiyāb-i hava bāb: I*), and a fenced place (*havlı*) in the island of Thasos (*havlı der nahiye-i Taşoz, hane bāb: I ve eşcār-i zeytun*).⁹⁶ It is clear that the *vakfiyye* describes the properties of Simonopetra in the year it was issued (1569), which are almost the same with those described in *tahrir defters* of the Imperial Land Registry one year earlier.

The authenticity of *vakfiyye* is also proven by the use of green satin cloth (*atłazi*), the sacred colour of Islam, attached to its verso (facs. 1b), proving the priceless value of the document and also the care for its preservation. The copy of the Simonopetra *vakfiyye* has a similar green cover, but in the original between the document and the green

⁹⁵ OASM, no 199. The boundaries are the following: *Ruşko deĝirmeninden dere deñize varınca ve deñiz [kıyı]sundan| İfteröti sınori tepesine varınca ve andan kuyulara varınca ve andan Petroya varınca ve andan Çingene Mnımadına varınca ve Longoz yolunuñ doğruluĝuna Livadyaya varınca*. The place where the two areas of the *vakfiyye* and *vesīka* met each other is Livadya, a toponym mentioned also between the first toponyms in the *vakfiyye* (*Livaddyası*).

⁹⁶ OASM, no 162, *şuret-i defter*, *evā`il-i Zıl-ḥicce* 1015/ 30 March-8 April 1615. The document was published by Monk Kosmas Simonopetritis, «Ο ρόλος των Ηπειρωτών στην αφιέρωση μετοχίων στις Παραδουνάβιες Ηγεμονίες τον 16ο αιώνα (οι περιπτώσεις του Γιόρμα και του Μιχαήλ Βοεβόδα)» [Epirotes' Role on the Donation of Metochia to Athos Monasteries in the Romanian Principalities (16th c.): the cases of Giorma and Michael the Brave], in *Mount Athos: Spreading the Light to the Orthodox World: the Metochia. Proceedings of the IX International Scientific Conference (Thessaloniki, 21-23.11.2014)* (Thessaloniki 2014), 219-48, 243-44, 246, fig. 1.

cloth there is another white linen cloth. The comparison of the writing and supporting materials of the original and the copy leaves no doubt that there is a considerable interval of time between them, which is of course the period of about two centuries that separates their issuing. Moreover, the document is very worn, and its bad condition proves its age and its continuous use in the affairs of the monastery. The very damaged yellowed paper of the original *vaḳfiyye* clearly demonstrates that the concern to preserve the document and the provision to support it with a double layer of fabric was fully justified.

Additional proof of the authenticity of the document is its preservation from the conflagration of 1580 which destroyed most of the documents contained within the archive of Simonopetra Monastery. At least fifteen, mainly Ottoman and Greek documents before 1580, are still preserved in the archive. The oldest Ottoman documents are court documents (*hüccets*) dated *Rebī'yyü'l-evvel* 955 (1548) and 12 *Şafer* 986 (20 April 1578), i.e., twelve years before the fire.⁹⁷ The oldest Greek document in the archive is a Greek agreement for the metochia of Sykia (Longos) of 1516/1517.⁹⁸ The *vaḳfiyye* was a document that would not infrequently be taken off the Athonite Peninsula due to its use in court cases and border disputes, the worn state of the documents being attributed to its excessive handling. Therefore, it makes perfect sense that the document was outside Simonopetra Monastery during the fire or, due to its value, that it was kept in another special place in the monastery along with other documents, in the monastery's coffers for example, which was saved from the conflagration.

The above analysis proves beyond any doubt that the *vaḳfiyye* of Simonopetra is an original, issued by the Sharia Court in Istanbul in the year 1569, saved from the fire of 1580, and that its contents are authentic.

⁹⁷ Vassilis Dimitriadis, "Turkish documents," *Simonopetra*, ed. Papadopoulos, 268.

⁹⁸ See an abstract by Vamvakas, *Ιερά Μονή Σίμωνος Πέτρας*, doc. 29, pp. 130, 132, pl. 5.

APPENDIX

Transliteration, translation, and facsimile of the endowment deed of 1569.⁹⁹

Transliteration

[Original “signature-formule” above the text, to the right of the document, in Arabic:] Mā zubire fihi min favāduhum ilā famavā fihi cerà beyne yedi'l-fakīr Meḥmed bin Ḥürrem el-müvellà bi-Dārü's-Salṭanati's-seniyyet-i Koṣtaṇiniyyet'il-maḥmiyye [Seal: Meḥmed bin Ḥürrem]

[“Signature-formule” above the text, to the centre of the document, in Arabic:] Yu'malu bi-maẓmūnihi 'inde ṣubūtihi ṣer'an ketebehü el-fakīr **ilā Allāh** el-ganī el-ḳadīr Meḥmed eṣ-ṣehīr Baḳloz-zāde el-müftī bi-medīnet-i Selanik 'ufiye 'anhu

[“Signature-formule” above the text, to the left of the document, in Arabic:] Yu'malu bi-maẓmūnihi 'inde ṣubūtihi ṣer'an ketebehü el-ḥaḳīr Ebü's-su'üd 'ufiye 'anhu

Sebeb-i taḥrīr-i kitāb-ı ṣer'ī ve müceb-i taṣtīr-i mer'ī budur ki

[1] Vilāyet-i Rumélinde Sidreḳabsı ḳazāsına tābi' Ayanoroz démekle ma'rūf cezīrede vāḳi' olan Ṣimopetra manastırı rāhiblerinüñ ketḫüdāları olub ve manastır-ı mezbūr rāhiblerinden Papa Maḳaryo veled-i Yani ve Papa Ḳosta veled-i Niḳola ve Sayiso veled-i Todori nām rāhibler

[2] cāniblerinden mezbūrün rāhiblerüñ ellerinde olān mülknāmede meṣtūr olan otuz bir nefer yoldaşları cāniblerinden İvir manastırı rāhiblerinden Papa Mosḳo veled-i Niḳola ve Doṣarīt manastırı rāhiblerinden David veled-i Niḳola nām rāhiblerüñ

[3] ṣehādetleriyle vech-i ātī üzere iḳrār-i vaḳfa ve rücū'a vekāleti ṣābite olān Yenadyo veled-i Dimo nām rāhib kendü cānibinden eṣāleten ve mezbūrün rāhiblerüñ cāniblerinden vekāleten meclis-i ṣer'-i ṣerīf ve maḥfil-i dīn-i münīfde manastır-ı mezbūr rāhiblerinüñ ketḫüdālarından

[4] Papa Maḳaryo veled-i Yani nām rāhib maḫzarında iḳrār-ı ṣaḫīḫ-ı ṣer'ī édüb:

⁹⁹ A transliteration and translation into French of the *vaḳfiyye* has already been published by Sophie Tzortzakaki-Tzaridou, “Le ‘vakf chrétien’: une institution ottomane adaptée aux besoins de la Grande Église,” *Études Balkaniques* 19-20 (2013/1): 135-52.

cümlemüzüñ iştirāk üzere mülk-i şahīh ve hakk-i şarīhī olub manastır-ı mezbūr kırbında vāki' olān fevkānī ve tahtānī otüz altı bāb-i hücerāt ve bir tirabeza démekle ma'rūf bir beyt-i kebīr ve bir bāb maṭbah

[5] ve bir dārü's-şifā' ve bir oda ve bir aḥur ve bir çeşme ve burgaz démekle ma'rūf bir beyt ve bir tersḥāne ve bir anbār ve manastır kıpusı öñünde cārī olan şu üzerinde vāki' olan bir göz değirmenümüz ki hudūd-ı erba'ası kendü emlakumuza müntehīdir ve manastır kırbında

[6] on beş dönüm yerde vāki' dört kıt'a bāğumuz ki bizüm mülkümüz olduğı meşhūr olmağın taḥrīrden müsteğnīdür ve mezbūr bāğa muttaşıl zeytūnlük ve bir çāyır ve manastır-ı mezbūrūñ baḥr kırafında vāki' tersḥānenüñ sağ kırafında büyük dere rāh-i kebīre varınca ve bir kırafı

[7] Liquryad manastır-ı ve bir kırafı Filotiye manastır-ı ve bir kırafı mezbūr manastıra muttaşıl ve manastır-ı mezbūr sınırında vāki' Buzdum biñārına varınca rāh-ı kebīre ve Filotiye kırşısına manastır-ı ve bir kırafı İvir ve bir kırafı İksiropotamu ve bir kırafı manastır-ı mezbūre

[8] muttaşıl ve aşāğa vārınca kara göl ve mezbūr kara gölden aşāğa varınca Dafni limanı ve bir kırafı İksiropotamu ve bir kırafı baḥr ve bir kırafı mezbūr manastıra muttaşıl ki bizüm mülkümüz olduğı meşhūr olmağın taḥrīrden müsteğnīdir ve bir kırafı Liquryad manastır-ı baḥr kırafından

[9] nehr-i kebīre varınca bizüm mülkümüz olduğı meşhūr olmağın ve mezkūr İksiropotamu mevz'inde bir ev Donda bir āḥūr ve bir şarābhāne ve bir bāğ ve bir zeytūnlük bāğçesi ve bir biñār ve hudūd-ı erba'ası 'inde'l-ehālī ma'lūm ve mezkūr ve Kıryesde vāki' bir bāb

[10] ev ve bir bāğçe ki hudūdu 'inde'l-ehālī ma'lūm ve meşhūr olmağın bizüm mülkümüz olub taḥrīrden müstağnīdir ve İstravonikita manastır-ı sınırında bir bāb ev ve bir kenīse ve bir bāğ ve bir zeytūnlük bāğçesi ve hudūd-ı erba'ası mezbūr manastıra muttaşıl olub

[11] ki bizüm mülkümüz olduğı meşhūr olmağın ve Pırovlağa mevz'inde vāki' bir bāb ev ve bir incir ağacı ve bir kırafı Dinonişad manastır-ı ve bir kırafı Şimeniter [*lege* Şimenitez] ve bir kırafı Aya Pavli ve hudūd-ı erba'ası manastır-ı mezbūre muttaşıl ve kırye-i İzvorda vāki' bir bāb ev ve bir āḥūr

[12] ve hudūd-ı erba'ası 'inde'l-ehālī ma'lūm ve Longoz ceziresinde bir ev ve bir kışlak-ı tavār mevz'ti ve bir bāb ev ve bir aḥur hudūdu bir kırafı sivri taş aşāğa varınca Anilo deresi ondan aşāğa baḥr bir kırafı Variti deresi Treste

[13] Niğa deresi ve bir kırafı İzmıksi (*supra lineam*: ma) ve bir kırafı Markovunyo ve hudūd-ı erba'ası manastır-ı mezbūre muttaşıl 'inde'l-ehālī

meşhür olmāğın ki bizüm mülkümüz olub taḥrīrden musteğnīdir ve Vurvura nām mevz'ide vāki' bir ḳovanlık ve bir ḫarafı

[14] baḫr limanı ve bir ḫarafı Livaddyası varınca ve bir ḫarafı Ḳarvulu ve bir ḫarafı Resḳa ve bir ḫarafı baḫr ki mezbūr manastıra muttaşıl 'inde'l-ehālī meşhūrdur ve Siroz ḳādılığında vāki' olan bir çiftlik bir ḫarafı Varna ve bir ḫarafı Esfāmeno ḫudūd-ı

[15] erba'ası ma'lūm ve İlimiye ḳazāsına tābi' Tirye çiftlikdür mevz'inde vāki' olub bir ḫarafı Ḳoçuno ve bir ḫarafı Aya Pavlo ve bir ḫarafı Gaynatos ve bir ḫarafı Dırağasya ve bir ḫarafı Paloyanı ve bir ḫarafı Luṫra ve bir ḫarafı

[16] Aya Yorgi Ḳaloyera ve bir ḫarafı Aya Yani ve çiftlik-i mezbūr manastır-ı mezbūre tābi'dür mev'zinde vāki' olub ve ḫudūd-ı erba'ası yine manastır-ı mezbūre muttaşıl olub bu cümle zıkr olunān ḫücerāt ve odaları ve bāğ ve bāğçeleri

[17] ve değırmenlerüñ bināsını ve bınarlar ve çeşmeleri ve zıkr olunan çiftliklerimizde olan elli re's şu şığırı ve yigirmi re's ḳaraşığır ve elli re's keçi ve otuz re's merkeblerimizi cemī' tevābi' ve levāḫik ile mülklerimizden

[18] iḫrāc édüb zıkr olunān binā'ları ve bāğları ve bāğçeleri ve değırmenleri ṫavārları vaḳf ve ḫabs édüb mütevellī olān Papa Maḳaryo veled-i Yani'ye teslīm édüb şöyle şart eyledük ki mütevellī evḳāf-i mezbūrenüñ

[19] her birini vechi lāyıkı ne ise istiğlāl édüb, ḫāşıl olan gallātı evellā evḳāf-i mesfūrenüñ meremmet ve ta'mīrine şarf édüb ve bāğlarıñ ve bāğçeleriñ ve değırmenleriñ ḫuḳūḳ-ı şer'ıyyelerin vérdükden soñra bāḳīsini

[20] manastır-ı mezbūrüñ fuḳarāsına şarf olunub ve āyende ve revendenüñ fuḳarāsına şarf olına ve zıkr olınan ṫavarlarıñ erkeğı satılub fuḳarāsına lāzım olan meşārıfına her gelüb giden fuḳarāya şarf olına ve dışları vaḳf olub

[21] vaḳf-ı mezbūr için zābt olına ve mütevellī manastır fuḳarāsı istediğı kimesne ola ve manastır fuḳarāsı evḳāf-ı mesfūreye ḫasbı nāzır olub mezbūr mütevellī daḫı evḳāf-ı mezbūrenüñ şerā'it-i merḳūme üzerine ṫaşarrufına mültezim

[22] olub cümlesini ḳabz eyledi dédükde mezbūr Papa Maḳaryo veled-i Yani muḳırr-ı merḳūmı cemī' aḳār yedinde vicāhen ṫaşdık etdükden soñra muḳırr-ı merḳūm ṫaḫrīr-i kelām édüb eğerçe emlāk-i mezbūreyi şerā'it-i mezkūre üzerine vaḳf édüb

[23] mütevellīye teslīm eyledük, lākin İmām-i A'zam ḫazretleri ḳātında yeri mülk olmyan binā'larıñ ve bāğlarıñ ve bāğçeleriñ ve değırmenleriñ

huşuŝen tavarlaruñ vaqfı ŝahih olmayub yeri mülk olan binā'laruñ vaqfı dağı eğerçe ki

[24] ŝahihdür lākin lāzım olmamađını rucū' édüb mütevellinden alub mülkiyet üzerine taŝarruf etdiñ taleb éderin dédükde mütevellī-i mezbür dağı bi'l-muvācehe cevāb vérüb ne'am İmām-i A'zam Hāzretleri kātında

[25] evkāf-i mesfūrenüñ kimi ŝahih deđildür ve kimi ŝahihdür ammā lāzım deđildür lākin İmām-i Ebū Yūsuf Hāzretleri kātında ŝahih olān lāzımdur ve İmām-i Muḥammed Hāzretleri kātında zıkr olunān menkūlātuñ vaqfı dağı ŝahihdür mütevellinden

[26] teslīm étdükten ŝoñra lāzımdur anlaruñ kavlleri mücebince hükm taleb éderin dédükde ḥākim-i ŝerī'at-i ŝerīfe (edāma'llahu ta'ālā 'izzetehu) dağı cānib-i vaqfı evveli ve āḫarı görüb İmāmeyn-i Hümāmeyn (raẓī Allahu ta'ālā 'anhumā) kavlleri

[27] müsted'āsınca zıkr olunan ebniyelerüñ ve deđirmenlerüñ ve bāğ ve bāğçelerüñ ve tavarlaruñ vaqfiyetine hükm édüb hükmen ŝahihen ŝer'ien ve vaqfan ŝariḫan mer'iyen lāzıman lāzıban ve müste'cillen filā biḫūd ba'dehu zālik

[28] tebdile ve tağayyüre cerā zalike ve ḥurrirehu fi evāḫir-i ŝehr-i Ramazān'l-mübārek li sene-i sitt ve seba'in ve tısa'miye.

Şuḫūd'l-ḫāl: Muŝtafa Çelebi ibn Balı Bey; İbrāhīm Ḥalife ibn el-imām; Meḫmed Çelebi ibn 'Alī el-kātib; Maḫmūd Çelebi ibn 'Alī el-kātib; Süleymān Çelebi ibn Ḥasan el-kātib; Maḫmūd Ağa ibn 'Abdullah reis'l-muḫzır; Ḥasan Çelebi ibn Aḫmed; Yūsuf bin Naşūḫ; Mevlānā Meḫmed Çelebi ibn Aḫmed en-nā'ib bi-medīne-i Ḥurpiŝta; muḫarrir-i ḫurūf Aḫmed; ve gayrihim mine'l-ḫuzẓār.

Translation

[Original “signature-formule” above the text, to the right of the document, in Arabic:] What is mentioned in the document, they acknowledged with their mouths from their hearts. This was written by the hand of Meḫmed bin Ḥürrem, the high judge (*el-müvellā*) in the Abode of the Sublime Sultanate, the well-protected Constantinople [Seal: Meḫmed bin Ḥürrem]

[“Signature-formule” above the text, to the centre of the document, in Arabic:] This document shall be applied, since it has been judged to be conforming to the Sharia. This was written by the humble servant of God the Al-

mighty, Mehmed, known as Baḳloz-zāde, the Müfti in the town of Salonica. May God pardon him.

[“Signature-formule” above the text, to the left of the document, in Arabic:] This document shall be applied, since it has been judged to be conforming to the Sharia. This was written by the humble Ebū’s-su’ūd. May God pardon him.

The reason for the writing of this document is the following:

The monk called Gennadios son of Dimos having –with the testimonies of the monks called Papa Moskos son of Nikolaos from the monks of Iveron Monastery and David son of Nikolaos from the monks of Docheiariou Monastery– the permanent power of attorney to acknowledge and revoke the endowment on the part of the monks called Papa [=Hieromonk] Makarios son of Yiannis, Papa (Hieromonk) Kostas son of Nikolaos, and Isaiah son of Thodoris who are the leaders (*kethūdā*) of the monks of Simopetra [=Simonopetra] Monastery in the peninsula known as Agion Oros [=Holy Mountain (*Ayanoroz*)], under the Judicial District of Sidreḳabsı in the Province of Rumelia; [on the part of] the monks of the aforesaid monastery, and the on the part of their thirty-one companions who [she names] are written in the freehold property deed (*mülknāme*) which is in the hands of the abovementioned monks, on his [Gennadios son of Dimos] behalf and as a representative of the abovementioned monks, made the following valid and legal declaration at the Sharia Court, in the presence of the monk called Makarios son of Yiannis, who was from among the representatives of the monks of the aforesaid monastery, saying:

We collectively have valid full ownership and explicit right (*mülk-i ṣahīḥ ve hakḳ-i ṣarīḥ*) of thirty-six upper and lower cells located near the aforesaid monastery [i.e., the central church, the *katholikon*] and a large building known as the refectory (*trabeza*), a kitchen, an infirmary, a small house, a stable, a fountain, a building known as the tower, a dockyard, a storehouse and mill located on the water which flows in front of the monastery’s gate, the four borders of which reach the limit of our estates.

And adjacent to the monastery, we have four vineyards located in a place of fifteen stremmata (*dönüm*) which have no need of writing because it is generally known that it is our property. An olive grove and a meadow adjoin the aforesaid vineyards.

On the right side of the dockyard located on the side of the sea of the said monastery the Great Stream reaches the large road and on one side [is] Grigoriou Monastery, on the other Filotheou Monastery, on the other, reaching the spring of Buzdum, which adjoins the above monastery and is located

within the monastery's borders, the large road meets Filotheou Monastery, on the other side Iviron, on the other Xeropotamou, on the other, the Black Lake, which reaches down and adjoins this monastery. From this Black Lake until the Port of Dafni, on one side [is] Xeropotamou, on the other the sea, on the other [the place that] belongs to the abovementioned monastery and needs no description, because it is known that it is our freehold property (*mülk*), and on the other Gregoriou Monastery. It is well known that [the place] from the side of the sea until the Great River is our property.

And in the aforementioned location of Xeropotamou [we have] a house [called] Donda [with] a stable, a winery, a vineyard, an olive grove, and a spring. Its four borders are well known to the neighbours and have been mentioned.

[We also have] one house and a garden located in Karyes, the borders of which need no description, because it is known and obvious to the neighbours that it is our property.

And a house, a church, a vineyard, and an olive grove on the border of Stavronikita Monastery. It is well known that their four borders belong to the said monastery [Simonopetra] and that it is our property.

A house and a fig tree located in Provlakas. On one side of it is the Dionysiatiko Monastery [lege Metochion], on the other the Esfigmenites [monks] and on the other Agiou Pavlou [monks]. Its four borders belong to the said Monastery [Simonopetra].

A house and a stable, located in the village of Izvor. Their four borders are known to the neighbours.

On the Longos peninsula, [there is] a house, a winter quarters for sheep and goats, a house, and a stable. Its border is on the one side the pointed stone reaching down to the valley of Anilo, from there downwards the sea, on the other side the valley of Variti [lege Areti], the valley of Treste Nika [lege Trestenika], on one side Smixi and Markovounio on one side. Since it is well known to the neighbours that their four borders belong to this monastery and that it is our property, they do not need a description.

An apiary (*kovanlık*) located in a place called Vourvoura, and a seaport on one side, on its other side until Livaddiası [=lege Livadia] on its other side Karvulu [=lege Karvuna], on its other Reska (or Riska) and on the other [ends] in the sea, which is well known by the neighbours that it belongs to the said monastery [Simonopetra].

An agricultural estate (*çiftlik*) located in the judicial subdistrict of Serres. On its one side Varna [=lege Varnarou], on its other Esfameno. Its four borders are known.

In Trygi, which belongs to the administrative district of Limnos, is an agricultural estate (*çiftlik*) and is located in this place. On one side [is] Koçunu [=lege Kotsinou], on the other Agiou Pavlou, on the other Gainatos [=lege Gaitanos], on the other Dragasia, on the other Paloyani, on the other side Loutra, on the other side Agios Giorgis Kalogeras, on the other Agios Yian-nis. The said agricultural estate belongs to the above monastery, is situated in this location and its four borders belong again to the abovementioned Monastery [Simonopetra].

All that was mentioned, cells, rooms, vineyards, gardens, mill buildings, springs, fountains, and in our above estates: fifty water buffalo, twenty land buffalo, fifty goats and our thirty donkeys, which are in our above estates, with all their dependencies and accessories, we detach from our freehold estates and endow the above buildings, vineyards, gardens, mills, and sheep and goats, and deliver them to Papa Makarios son of Yiannis, as the trustee (*mütevelli*), setting the following conditions:

That the trustee will collect the profit and revenues of each of the above-mentioned endowments (*evkâf*) in the appropriate way. He will spend the income he collects firstly for the repair and restoration of the abovementioned endowments. After paying the legal taxes of the vineyards, gardens, and mills, the rest must be spent on the poor of the said monastery [Simonopetra] and on its indigent visitors. The abovementioned rams and bucks will be sold, and the proceeds will be used for the needs of the poor [monks] of the above monastery and for each indigent visitor, [while] the females will be endowed and reserved for the abovementioned endowment. Whoever wishes the poor [monks] of the said monastery may become the trustee and the poor [monks] of the monastery to be the supervisor of the abovementioned endowments. Then, the said trustee had the right of usufruct of the abovementioned endowments, according to the conditions mentioned, and received them all.

After the abovementioned Papa Makarios son of Yiannis, confirmed to all the previous confessions of the confessor [Gennadios], the abovementioned confessor [Gennadios] orally stated the following:

Although we endowed the aforesaid properties in accordance with the aforementioned conditions and delivered them to the trustee, at the discretion of His Excellency, the Great Imam,¹⁰⁰ the endowment of buildings, vineyards, gardens, mills, and above all, sheep and goats, the land of which is not

¹⁰⁰ Abu Ḥanifa al-Nu‘man ibn Thabit al-Kuf (d. 767), known as the Great Imam (*Īmām-i a‘ẓam*) was the eponymous founder of the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence.

freehold (*mülk*), is not valid (*ṣahīḥ*) saying “Although the endowment of buildings of freehold land is valid, but it is not irrevocable, we took it from the trustee and possessed it as freehold and claim it.” The aforesaid trustee also replied in retaliation, saying:

In fact, according to His Excellency the Great Imam, some of the previous endowments are not valid, and some are valid, but they are not irrevocable. Nonetheless, according to His Excellency Imam Abu Yusuf,¹⁰¹ what is valid is irrevocable. And in the opinion of His Excellency Imam Muhammad,¹⁰² the endowment of the mentioned movable goods is also valid, and after delivery to the trustee is irrevocable as he said requesting a [court] ruling according to their assertions.

Also, the judge of the noble Sharia (may God Almighty prolong his glory) viewed the endowment favourably from the beginning and issued a [court] ruling, according to the assertions of the supreme imams (may God Almighty be pleased with them), for the endowing (*vakfiyet*) of the above buildings, mills, vineyards, gardens, and sheep and goats, that it is a valid legal ruling and an explicit, valid, irrevocable, permanent and officially registered endowment (*vakfan-ı şarīhan, mer'iyen, lāzıman, lāziban ve müste'cillen*). After which, without any further complication this event took place and [this court document] was recorded in the last ten days of the blessed month of Ramadan in the year 976.

Case witnesses:¹⁰³

Muṣṭafā Çelebi ibn Balı Bey; İbrāhīm Ḥalife ibn el-imām; Meḥmed Çelebi ibn 'Alī, the scribe (*el-kātib*); Maḥmūd Çelebi ibn 'Alī, the scribe (*el-kātib*); Süleymān Çelebi ibn Ḥasan, the scribe (*el-kātib*); Maḥmūd Ağa ibn 'Abdullah, head of the bailiffs (*reisü'l-muḥzir*); Ḥasan Çelebi ibn Aḥmed; Yūsuf bin Naşūḥ; Mevlānā Mehemmed Çelebi ibn Aḥmed, the deputy judge (*nā'ib*) in the town of Ḥurpišta; the writer of this document (*muḥarrir-i hurūf*) Aḥmed; and other attendees.

¹⁰¹ Yaqub ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari (d. 798) was known as Imam Abu Yusuf.

¹⁰² Imam Muhammad al-Shaybani (d. 805).

¹⁰³ Names not read due to damage to the original are completed from the eighteenth-century copy of the document.

Facsimiles



The 18th century copy of the original document


Figures

Figure 1. *Drawing of Simonopetra's Monastery by Vasilij Barskij, 1744*



Figure 2. *The Built-in Fountain of Simonopetra Monastery*



Figure 3. *The Tower of the Arsenal (tershāne) at Simonopetra's Port, Built in 1567*



Figure 4. *The Construction Inscription of 1 March 1567, of the Tower of the Arsenal*




Figure 5. *Aqueduct of Simonopetra Monastery, the Construction of Which Began in the Byzantine Period and Was Completed by the mid-16th c.*



Figure 6. Ottoman-Greek Map (water colour) titled “Map of Simonopetra Area” (Χάρτης τῆς Μονῆς Σίμωνος Πέτρας), drawn by Alexander Phocaeus in 1878




Figure 7: Map Showing the Boundaries of our House at Dondas, St Nicholas (1878-84)




Figure 8. Cadastral Extract of the Year 1607, Mentioning the Urban Metochion of Simonopetra Monastery in Thessaloniki, the Metochion in Kassandra Peninsula and in the Village Agios Nikolaos (Vourvour), and a Fenced Place on Thasos Island




Figure 9. *Map of Vava Metochion on Longos Peninsula Drawn during a Trial in 1845*



Figure 10. *Water Colour Map of the Metochion of Sykia without Toponyms*




Figure 11. *Modern Map Denoting the Area of Vourvourou Metochion of Simonopetra Monastery*



Figure 12: *The Large Stone Wall Built by Monks of Simonopetra at the Border of Vourvourou Metochion after 1615*




Figure 13: *Robert Curzon's Etching of Simonopetra (1849)*

*Konstantinos Diogos**

**Transatlantic Bridges: The Founder of Greek Evangelical Church,
Michael Kalopothakis, and the Spread of American Protestant
Modernity in mid-19th Century Greece**

Michael Kalopothakis' Apprenticeship in the United States

Michael Kalopothakis (1825-1911) was born in Areopolis of Mani, an area strongly influenced by his uncle, the powerful toparch Petrobeis Mavromichalis, under whom he found protection.¹ On Mavromichalis' initiative, two American missionaries, George W. Leyburn and Samuel R. Houston, were invited in 1835 to Areopolis, where they founded a Greek school. Young Kalopothakis was among its attendees.² This educational setting exposed him to the ideological tenets of American Protestantism, sparking a profound interest in the Bible.³ In 1841, he continued his studies at a gymnasium in Athens and subsequently served as headmaster of a Greek school in Gythio. In 1848, he enrolled in the Medical School of the University of Athens,

* Historian, PhD in Modern and Contemporary History.

¹ Kalopothakis' mother was the sister of Mavromichalis. Biographical information regarding Kalopothakis are available in various works: Giannis Tsevas, «Ο Μιχαήλ Δ. Καλοποθάκης και οι σχέσεις του με τις αμερικανικές ιεραποστολές: πραγματολογικές και κριτικές παρατηρήσεις» (Michael D. Kalopothakis and His Relations with the American Missions: Factual and Critical Observations), *Τα Ιστορικά* 50 (June 2009): 215-21; John O. Iatrides, "Evangelicals," *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*, ed. Richard Clogg (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2002), 50-5; Vasiliki Vasiloudi, «Ο Μ. Δ. Καλοποθάκης και η *Εφημερίς των Παιδών*: παράμετροι ενός παιδικού περιοδικού του 19ου αιώνα» (M. D. Kalopothakis and the *Child's Paper*: Parameters of a Children's Magazine of the 19th Century) (PhD diss., Democritus University of Thrace, 2003), 138-47.

² Sophi Papageorgiou, «Δύο αμερικανοί ιεραπόστολοι στη Μάνη» (Two American Missionaries in Mani), *Πρακτικά Α' Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου Πελοποννησιακών Σπουδών* 3 (1976): 22-8.

³ On the reasons for the suspension of the missionary school in Areopolis: *Report of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: 1842), 100-2; G. A. Perdicaris, *The Greece of the Greeks*, vol. 2 (New York: Paine and Burgess, 1845), 133-5.

graduating in 1853.⁴ During this period, he forged a strong relationship with Jonas King, a Protestant clergyman from the United States, who worked as a missionary in Greece and was fiercely persecuted by the Greek Orthodox Church as a blasphemer. Kalopothakis regularly attended King's lectures and sermons delivered every Sunday at his residence. This association with the American missionary proved pivotal in Kalopothakis' spiritual development and future career.⁵ King's trial in 1852, in which Kalopothakis served as a defense witness, and his judicial conviction, coupled with the refusal of nearly all Greek newspapers (save one) to allow the American missionary to rebut the false accusations against him, gave Kalopothakis the idea of creating a journalistic instrument dedicated to defending religious freedom and, consequently, freedom of speech.⁶

Following a brief tenure as a military doctor (1853-54), Kalopothakis decided to travel to the United States to pursue further studies in theology. In making this choice, the influence and assistance of King were paramount, as he furnished Kalopothakis with "introductory letters to acquaintances in America."⁷ The Atlantic crossing marked a profound shift in Kalopothakis' career and ideological orientation. Traveling to America was a conscious choice, to acquire theological training, organizational skills, and technical knowledge necessary to undertake a comprehensive evangelical mission upon his return to Greece.⁸ He enrolled at the Union Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church at Columbia University in New York, completing his degree in 1856. Subsequently, in 1857, he was ordained as a pastor of the East Hanover Presbytery in Virginia.⁹ The American experience proved pivotal in shaping Kalopothakis' ideological and intellectual

⁴ Iatrides, *op.cit.*, 53.

⁵ Reflecting on this bond, Kalopothakis later expressed: "I am linked to Mr. King by a bond of gratitude [...] love, and respect [...] I have defended him and will continue to do so, as I owe him my first impulse in education," *Astir tis Anatolis*, 22-4-1861.

⁶ Angelo Repousis, "'The Devil's Apostle': Jonas King's Trial Against the Greek Hierarchy in 1852 and the Pressure to Extend U.S. Protection for American Missionaries Overseas," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 5 (2009): 807-37.

⁷ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 22-4-1861, 9-12-1861.

⁸ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 21-2-1870.

⁹ *The Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York, Alumni Directory 1836-1970* (New York: The Alumni Office, 1970), 7.

development.¹⁰ There, he lived in an environment of religious tolerance, within a democratic and liberal society which enabled even an obscure young man from a distant country to study and develop. Throughout his life, Kalopothakis maintained close ties with the United States, making numerous transatlantic journeys and fostering ongoing communication with a wide array of American figures.¹¹ His ties with America developed into a “lifelong relationship,” as evidenced by his two marriages to American women. His first wife was Martha Hooper-Blackler, succeeded by Margaret Kyle after Martha’s passing.¹² Years later, at his behest, his son Demetrios attended Harvard for three years, subsequently becoming the first American-educated professor to teach history at the University of Athens.¹³

Nurtured within the milieu of American Protestantism, Kalopothakis forged a modernist vision for Greece, blending religious and secular objectives. He perceived Protestantism not merely as a vehicle for revitalizing religious life, but also as a driving force for the reform and modernization of Greek society, through the adoption of principles and practices inspired by the example of American democracy, which he had personally experienced and appreciated. Upon his return to Athens in 1858, he dedicated himself wholeheartedly to evangelical work, inaugurating a qualitative shift in Protestant discourse and activism within Greece. Until then, Protestantism had been propagated solely by foreign missionaries, mainly Americans. However, their

¹⁰ Kalopothakis later acknowledged that his four-year sojourn in America was tantamount to his personal salvation, drawing parallels to the influence of Adrien Buurt, a Protestant clergyman, on Korais, during his time in Amsterdam: *Astir tis Anatolis*, 23-6-1858.

¹¹ Plato Ernest Shaw, *American Contacts with the Eastern Churches* (Chicago: The American Society of Church History, 1937), 139-40.

¹² Martha Hooper-Blackler (1830-71) was also a missionary. She married Kalopothakis in 1858, accompanied him to Greece and assisted him in the publication of the children’s magazine *Ēfimeris ton Paidon*: Michael Kalopothakis, «Αγαπητά μου παιδιά» (My Dear Children), *Ēfimeris ton Paidon* 5, no. 49 (January 1872): 193; Margaret Kyle ran a nursery school in Athens: *Avgi*, 21-8-1875; *Ethnofylax*, 9-9-1875.

¹³ Vaggelis D. Karamanolakis, *Η συγκρότηση της ιστορικής επιστήμης και η διδασκαλία της ιστορίας στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών (1837-1932)* [The Formation of Historical Science and the Teaching of History at the University of Athens (1837-1932)] (Athens: IAEN, 2006), 198.

presence encountered fierce resistance from Orthodox circles. The persecution of King persuaded Kalopothakis that the most effective way to disseminate the protestant message was to rely on domestic forces, on Greek-origin Protestants, and to establish an autonomous Greek Evangelical Church, completely independent of any foreign administrative control.¹⁴ The Greek Evangelical Church was officially established in 1871, although its groundwork had been laid as early as 1858, and it bore the hallmarks of an American-style Puritan church overlaid with Greek cultural elements. Despite enjoying administrative autonomy, the church couldn't achieve financial independence. Until 1886, Kalopothakis relied on financial support from various American organizations.¹⁵ That was the main focal of criticism by his opponents, who accused him of acting as an agent of foreign interests. The Greek newspaper *Aion* called him "Greek Jesuit," who betrayed his faith and nationality for his "lust for money."¹⁶

The Journal Astir tis Anatolis

One of Kalopothakis' primary initiatives was the creation of a journalistic organ, *Astir tis Anatolis* (Star of the East), which ran continuously from 1858 to 1885. Faced with reluctance from many publishers to collaborate, he took matters into his own hands by founding the publishing house "Lakonia." In 1886 publication ceased, only to resume in 1894, albeit without the same vigor as in its initial decades. Kalopothakis staunchly defended the intellectual independence of his journal, adamantly refuting any suggestion that it was merely a tool of the American missionaries.¹⁷ In 1868, Kalopothakis broadened his publication endeavors with *Efimeris ton paidon* (Children's Newspaper), with

¹⁴ *Report of the Centenary Conference on the Protestant Missions of the World*, vol. 2 (London: Fleming & Rebell Company, 1888), 225-6; Shaw, *op.cit.*, 147-51.

¹⁵ From 1858 to 1872 Kalopothakis was supported financially mainly by the American and Foreign Christian Union and the Presbyterian Church of the Virginia Synod. From 1873 to 1886 he was under the support of the Southern Presbyterian Church of America: Rev. W.A. Alexander, *A Digest of the Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States* (Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1888), 124.

¹⁶ *Aion*, 6-11-1869; *Avgi*, 21-8-1875.

¹⁷ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 22-4-1861.

the aim of introducing Protestant ideology and literature to a burgeoning audience of young readers.¹⁸ For its publication he collaborated closely with two other American-educated young men, Georgios Konstantinou and Demetrios Z. Sakellarios, both former students of King.¹⁹

The publication of *Astir* in 1858 coincided with a pivotal transitional period in political history of modern Greece. The conclusion of the Crimean War (1853-56) had shattered hopes for the realization of the irredentist vision of the Great Idea and contributed to a gradual disillusionment with the political parties among the populace. The growth of urban populations, the expansion of education and literacy, and the increased circulation of books and newspapers had altered people's expectations and perception of life. Comparisons with the western world became inevitable and a growing number of individuals openly voiced their discontent with the inadequacies and shortcomings of the Greek state, its economic, political, and social backwardness and the necessity to adopt western models. The call for reforms dominated public discourse, reflecting the Greek people's will to modernize the country and redefine its identity amidst a rapidly evolving modern world.²⁰ Against this backdrop, the establishment of *Astir* took on a significant role. It represented Kalopothakis' will to engage in the ongoing public discourse and articulate his vision for Greece's future, through the lens of the American Protestant paradigm.

¹⁸ Vasiloudi, *op.cit.*, 36-56.

¹⁹ Georgios Konstantinou was born in Athens on January 1, 1833. Initially educated in Britain, he pursued postgraduate studies at Amherst College in the USA from 1859 to 1862, where he was ordained as a pastor. At the urging of Kalopothakis, the American Christian Union sent him to Athens, where he remained from 1863 to 1880, assisting in the publication of *Efimeris ton Paidon*. He also served as vice-consul of the United States in Athens and consul in Piraeus from 1864 to 1874. From 1876 to 1882 he edited the magazine *Athinais*. In 1880 he undertook pastoral work in Smyrna, at the invitation of the Evangelical Church there, and in 1883 he received the degree of Doctor of Divinity from the American Bates College. He passed away in Britain in 1891, at the age of 58. D. Z. Sakellarios also studied in the US, where he spent seven years. He served as an emissary of the American Baptist Missionary Union in Athens: Vasiloudi, *op.cit.*, 121.

²⁰ Gunnar Hering, *Τα πολιτικά κόμματα στην Ελλάδα 1821-1936* (Political Parties in Greece 1821-1936) (Athens: MIET, 2004), 320-60.

Astir was never an exclusively religious journal.²¹ While its primary articles usually centered on religious themes, its pages delved into a wide array of subjects encompassing history, politics, science, literature, social issues, philosophy, and current affairs. Its format mirrored that of encyclopedic magazines already popular in Britain and the United States, which Kalopothakis regarded as indispensable for societal advancement.²² This diverse content showcased the editor's broad-mindedness and positioned *Astir* within the realm of publications with broader political, social, and educational objectives. The journal's stance on political issues was anti-royalist, anti-authoritarian, and often leaned towards a pro-democratic perspective, drawing inspiration from the Anglo-Saxon world, particularly the USA. Despite its relatively small circulation, the impact of its ideas appealed to a readership beyond the confines of the small Protestant community in Greece. This is evidenced by the breadth of public debates sparked by Kalopothakis' interventions on various issues. The secular ideas proposed by Greek Protestants for reforming Greek society garnered support from many liberal intellectuals, without the latter necessarily embracing Protestantism.²³

The United States in Kalopothakis' Public Discourse

The American example served as a consistent reference point in the pages of *Astir*. The United States represented a powerful symbol in Kalopothakis' public discourse and were instrumentalized in order to support his attempt to transplant Protestant principles into Greek life and his vision of reforming Greek society. To underscore the renewing power of Protestantism, Kalopothakis sought a successful exemplar, finding it in the United States, with its undeniable political, eco-

²¹ On January 1, 1863, *Astir* was officially transformed into a "semi-political" publication.

²² *Astir tis Anatolis*, 1-1-1862.

²³ Konstantinos Diogos, *Το όραμα των Ελλήνων για τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής. Από την Ελληνική Επανάσταση έως τον Α΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο* (The Greek Vision for the United States of America. From the Greek Revolution to World War I) (Athens: Alexandria, 2024), 92-103.

conomic, and social advancement.²⁴ He projected American society both as a paragon of religious devotion and as a beacon of modernity. By religiosity Kalopothakis was referring to three basic characteristics of the Americans: religious piety, a strict adherence to a Protestant value system centered on the “work ethic,” and religious tolerance. Kalopothakis envisioned these values to be transplanted and flourish within Greek society. Thus, America ultimately represented a “plan of action” and a “political proposal” for reforming Greece.

The religious Piety of American Society

For Kalopothakis, the religious devotion and piety of the Americans was evident in every aspect of their lives. It not only shaped the ideology of the American nation but also served as the cornerstone for its progress and economic prosperity. Kalopothakis’ apprenticeship in the United States coincided with the onset of a significant period known as the “Revival of 1857-58” or the “Businessmen’s Revival.” It was a religious movement that swept across various parts of the country and occurred during a time of social, economic, and political upheaval, including the aftermath of the Panic of 1857, which was a severe financial crisis. Economic desperation prompted large segments of society to turn to religion as a means of finding solace or relief. The revival was characterized by fervent public preaching, group prayer meetings in the major urban centers, and an emphasis on personal conversion and spiritual renewal. Thorny issues, such as the containment of materialistic tendencies and the emancipation of slaves, were

²⁴ This commitment to the Anglo-Saxon world and the use of English-speaking sources was an intriguing counterbalance to the prevalent French scholarly influence in Greece, particularly in the field of journalism. Concurrently, Kalopothakis played a pioneering role in the dissemination of English, a language spoken by relatively few at the time, in contrast to the widespread dominance of French as the primary second language among literate Greeks. Relying on the continuous and rapid growth of the US population, Kalopothakis prophesied in 1858 that “the English language shall become universally dominant”: *Astir tis Anatolis*, 13-12-1858. *Astir* even promoted private English lessons offered by the newspaper’s American-born collaborators, Georgios Konstantinou and Anastasios Koulouriotis, along with occasional staff members from the American consulate: *Astir tis Anatolis*, 30-8-1863, 17-4-1864, 20-5-1867.

openly deliberated upon in public forums. The Revival of 1857-58 had a profound impact on American society, leading to increased interest in religion, missionary activities and social reforms.²⁵ Kalopothakis experienced this religious movement up close and interpreted it as proof of Protestantism's social dynamics. Upon his return to Greece, he eagerly documented his experiences and observations in the pages of *Astir*.²⁶

Religious revival [...] in the United States has begun and is gradually advancing from city to city and from county to county, penetrating all ranks of society, from the President to the farmer and industrialist, and from the University professor to the unlettered manual laborer. [...] All over the United States public prayer assemblies have been organized at noon. In the cities such meetings are led by the richest merchants. [...] Blessed and happy are the American people, who know their true interests and live by them.²⁷

According to Kalopothakis, the renewing power of prayer – particularly public prayer– served not only spiritual and metaphysical needs but also contributed to economic progress. Prayer was directly linked to the increase in productivity and solidarity between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Kalopothakis illustrated this with a personal anecdote from an American city, where he witnessed and participated in a “collective public prayer involving bankers, prominent merchants, factory owners, laborers, and clerks” at noon on a regular workday. While such an event might have appeared absurd if held in Athens, Kalopothakis emphasized its potential for “significant spiritual benefits.”²⁸ Hence, the religious devotion of the Americans was elevated to the status of a social, political, and economic virtue, a fundamental pillar of progress, the “secret of the greatness and wealth of

²⁵ Kathryn Teresa Long, *The Revival of 1857-58: Interpreting an American Religious Awakening* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3-10; John M. Giggie, “The Third Great Awakening: Religion and the Civil Rights Movement,” *Reviews in American History* 33, no. 2 (2005): 254–62.

²⁶ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 29-3-1858, 3-5-1858, 10-5-1858, 18-10-1858, 7-3-1859.

²⁷ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 3-5-1858.

²⁸ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 1-1-1871.

the United States.”²⁹ This virtue was fostered through initiatives such as Sunday schools, Gospel study, family prayer, Bible and Tract Societies and temperance movements. These practices were, in Kalopothakis’ view, lacking in Orthodox society. Consequently, he advocated for their introduction, promoting them in the pages of *Astir*.³⁰ In 1860 he established a Sunday school in his residence in Athens, inspired by the American model. However, it was forced to close after just two months of operation due to intense opposition.

The Protestant Work Ethic of the Americans

Kalopothakis utilized the successful example of the United States to persuade his compatriots of the efficacy of the Protestant moral code. Protestant USA constituted a feasible parallel from which the Greeks could draw models, attitudes, and behaviors conducive to liberating the productive forces of both citizens and the country from the constraints of the past.³¹ Kalopothakis admired the Americans’ commitment to a strict code of values, rooted in the Protestant work ethic.³² Values such as industriousness, diligence, frugality, temperance, prudence, rationality, practical spirit, self-discipline, and individual productivity and responsibility were regarded as key factors that contributed to the “American economic miracle” and could serve as guiding principles for any society aspiring to follow similar paths of success. The secular values embodied in the work ethic were compatible with the aspirations of the productive social classes in Greece, particularly the bourgeoisie. Although this class in the mid-19th century Greece was still in its nascent stage, there was a concerted effort to articulate a clearer and more solid public discourse and emerge as a dynamic force in the newly established state.³³

In the inaugural issue of *Astir*, in a lengthy article titled “Who Should Be the Hellene of this Present Age,” the editor compiled the

²⁹ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 7-7-1862.

³⁰ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 31-10-1859, 28-1-1861.

³¹ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 18-10-1858, 24-8-1868.

³² *Astir tis Anatolis*, 22-10-1866.

³³ John S. Koliopoulos–Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel, from 1831 to the Present* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), 194-9.

fundamental principles of Protestant ethics as applied in American society. Greece possessed all the objective conditions which could become sources of public and private wealth: favorable geographical position, maritime and commercial character, temperate climate, and fertile land. However, these advantages had to be combined with the “active and energetic spirit of the Americans,” which was lacking from the Greeks.³⁴ Kalopothakis emphasized that industriousness, frugality, and saving were fundamental principles upon which social prosperity and the accumulation and reproduction of wealth were predicated. The United States stood as the ultimate testament to the efficacy of the ethos of hard work, temperance, and charity:

During our time in America, we have been astounded by the sight of millionaires who not only labor tirelessly day and night but also exhibit austerity in their diet and thriftiness in their choice of clothing and housing. Their admirable qualities are further magnified when we witness them generously sharing from the fruits of their temperance and frugality, contributing thousands of dollars to support charitable and religious organizations.³⁵

Benjamin Franklin was praised within the pages of *Astir* as the quintessential embodiment of the work ethic. His renowned maxims regarding prudent money management, wealth accumulation, and efficient time utilization (e.g. time is money) were integral components of the journal’s content.³⁶ The figure of George Washington received a similar projection. Numerous articles emphasized his Christian upbringing instilled by his mother, elevating him not only as a leading political and military figure, as already recognized by the Greek public, but also as the epitome of Protestant virtue.³⁷ Kalopothakis also used the American Civil War (1861-65) as a rich source of instructive examples that proved the moral superiority of the American nation. He was a staunch supporter of the northern cause and he viewed the

³⁴ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 8-1-1858, 18-1-1858.

³⁵ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 5-11-1866.

³⁶ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 21-3-1858, 27-9-1858, 24-1-1859, 1-8-1859, 11-2-1861, 10-9-1866, 25-4-1870, 6-2-1871, 1-4-1872, 21-7-1879.

³⁷ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 25-1-1858, 24-5-1858, 15-11-1858, 10-1-1859, 4-6-1860, 11-2-1861, 2-9-1861, 2-12-1867, 15-2-1869, 9-8-1869, 5-5-1879.

preservation of slavery as unacceptable.³⁸ Personalities such as Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses Grant, Philip Sheridan, William Sherman, and Oliver Howard, along with dozens of ordinary American soldiers and citizens, were praised in *Astir* as models of protestant virtue and piety, capable of becoming “the guide of nations in their progress.”³⁹

Based on these universally acclaimed American personalities, Kalopothakis posited his fundamental argument that Protestant principles could serve as the foundation not only for securing the “hereafter” but also for enhancing one’s “present” life.⁴⁰ He contended that the Holy Bible teaches us not only how to prepare for death but also how to live well and that Protestant values were perfectly compatible with each individual’s pursuit of professional and economic advancement.⁴¹ This was a fresh interpretation of the Gospel, tailored to the needs and demands of the emerging bourgeois society and the exigencies of economic modernity. It may appear paradoxical that a religious publication like *Astir* incorporated fundamental principles of political economy along with advice on how someone can become rich. However, this was precisely the essence of Protestantism. Its dual nature resided in its capacity to simultaneously address both religious and secular realms, functioning as a “secularized religion.”

The United States as a Model of Religious Tolerance

Kalopothakis emerged as one of the most consistent advocates for the complete realization of religious freedom in Greece. He argued that the inclusion of religious tolerance in the first article of the Constitution of 1844 was insufficient.⁴² By recognizing the Eastern Orthodox Church as the “prevailing” religion, it granted Orthodoxy a privileged

³⁸ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 6-10-1862, 5-6-1865.

³⁹ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 13-11-1865, 12-2-1866.

⁴⁰ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 25-4-1870.

⁴¹ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 21-7-1879.

⁴² The first article of the constitution of 1844 stipulated: “The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ, and all other known religions are tolerated, and their worship is freely practiced under the protection of the laws, with the prohibition of proselytism and any other interference against the prevailing religion”: Alexandros Svolos, *Τα ελληνικά Συντάγματα 1822-1975/1986* (The Greek Constitutions 1822-1975/1986) (Athens: Stohastis, 1998), 153.

status over other denominations, thereby establishing a framework of religious tolerance rather than genuine religious freedom. The explicit prohibition of proselytism posed numerous problems in the operation of other religions or Christian denominations, as it failed to specify which actions were considered acts of proselytism and which were not. Thus, a nebulous landscape emerged, where other religions were only granted the right to worship, while various non-worship-related expressions of religious life (such as public sermons or the publication of pamphlets, brochures, and books) could potentially be construed as acts of proselytism, subjecting those involved to severe penalties under criminal law. Simultaneously, the constitutional prohibition against interference with the prevailing religion empowered the Orthodox Holy Synod to arbitrarily classify any form of dissemination of other religious messages as proselytizing. Consequently, religious tolerance, as it was applied in Greece, became a hindrance to the spread of Protestantism and facilitated the absolute dominance of Orthodoxy.

To propagate the Protestant message, Kalopothakis deemed it imperative to dismantle the regime of religious tolerance established by the Constitution of 1844 and embrace the principles of full and authentic religious freedom. This would allow all religions to freely conduct their activities and vie for the conscience of the faithful through the persuasiveness of their arguments. He pointed to the United States (though predominantly Protestant) as the epitome of a secular nation that respected the religious preferences of its citizens, highlighting that there “no religion is predominant [...] but all are equally recognized and protected by the laws of the States.” Kalopothakis envisioned the United States as not apprehensive of religious diversity, but rather religiously free: “In the United States anyone can erect altars and even sacrifice to idols if they wish [...] or even preach from the pulpit on Sunday that there is no God [...] without any interference from the government. They are also free to publish books, presenting their doctrines and arguments, and can freely distribute pamphlets and engage in door-to-door evangelism without encountering any obstacles. [...] Everything is done by the power of reason and persuasion.”⁴³

⁴³ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 17-5-1858. To bolster his arguments regarding religious freedom in the United States, Kalopothakis translated and published in *Astir* extensive

In Greece, the prevailing belief was that a nation should align exclusively with a single religion, viewing religious identity as an integral and inseparable component of national identity, as was the case with the close connection between Orthodoxy and Hellenism.⁴⁴ The absence of institutional recognition of a dominant religion in the United States was perceived by many Orthodox Greeks as a threat to nationalism and societal cohesion. One of the most common accusations hurled against Americans, especially through the conservative newspaper *Aion*, was that their multi-religious character rendered them a nation lacking in strong national sentiment. Consequently, American missionaries were accused of not only undermining religious consciousness of the Greeks but also eroding Greek patriotism.⁴⁵ Kalopothakis tried to refute this perception by emphasizing that religion “is an individual right [...] existing solely between the conscience of each person and his God” and that it should not be “considered a national attribute.”⁴⁶ He based his argument on the United States, where “the Papist, the Protestant, the Jew, the Sceptic, the Idolater or the Atheist, proudly declare ‘I am an American.’”⁴⁷ Regardless of their diverse religious affiliations or doctrines, the Americans demonstrate

excerpts from the work of clergyman Robert Baird “Religion in America.” This book provided a comprehensive overview of the diverse religions and Protestant denominations present in America, offering valuable insight into the country’s religious landscape.

⁴⁴ George Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case,” *West European Politics* 26, no. 1 (2003): 117-36; Effi Gazi, “Revisiting Religion and Nationalism in 19th Century Greece,” in *The Making of Modern Greece. Nationalism, Romanticism and the Uses of the Past*, ed. Roderick Beaton–David Ricks (London: Ashgate, 2009), 95-106.

⁴⁵ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 31-10-1859.

⁴⁶ On the relationship between religion and national identity, Kalopothakis stated: “It is wrong to think that the alteration of religion jeopardizes national identity. The Greeks remain bound to one another by our rich language; a history spanning three millennia, shared interests, and common aspirations for the future [...] Ethnicity is not defined by religion, as *Aion* fanatically preaches. For religion pertains to individual conscience and the relationship between each person and their deity, rather than constituting a collective national attribute”: *Astir tis Anatolis*, 14-11-1859.

⁴⁷ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 11-7-1859.

unity in their love for their common homeland and are ready to shed their blood for defending it in times of war.⁴⁸

These views represented an effort to “transplant” into Greek society an alternative way of viewing the process of national and political identity formation. Kalopothakis proposed a form of nationalism characterized by a strictly secular content, devoid of the notion of a “dominant religion,” rejecting the traditional association of Orthodoxy with Greek national identity.⁴⁹ However, he deliberately overlooked the distinct historical contexts in which the American and Greek nation emerged. The Americans, a population of colonists and immigrants of diverse religious backgrounds, consciously decided on the complete separation of church and state as a means of ensuring national cohesion and unity. Their nationalism was grounded in a shared commitment and will to establishing a new liberal and democratic state. On the other hand, Orthodoxy has been an inherent component of every endeavor of Greek national self-determination. However, the invocation of the American model of shaping national identity represented an innovation in Greek public discourse. Through this argument, Kalopothakis engaged in a broader public debate that had its roots in the years of the Greek Revolution. This debate revolved around the role of the Orthodox faith as a fundamental component of national and political identity, as well as a criterion for the granting of Greek citizenship.⁵⁰

Astir and the Formation of a Greek-American Public Sphere

Kalopothakis was one of the few Greek intellectuals of the mid-19th century with real, firsthand experience of the United States. This imbued his discourse with a sense of authority, establishing him as one of the earliest genuine “Americanologists.” His regular correspond-

⁴⁸ *Astir tis Anatólis*, 22-8-1859.

⁴⁹ *Astir tis Anatólis*, 12-3-1860.

⁵⁰ John S. Koliopoulos, *Ιστορία της Ελλάδος από το 1800. Το έθνος, η πολιτεία και η κοινωνία των Ελλήνων* (History of Greece since 1800. The Nation, the State and the Greek Society), vol. 1 (Thessaloniki: Vaniás, 2000), 66-80; Elpida Vogli, «Έλληνες το Γένος»: *Η ιθαγένεια και η ταυτότητα στο εθνικό κράτος των Ελλήνων (1821-1844)* (Greeks the Nation: Citizenship and Identity in the National State of the Greeks (1821-1844)) (Heraklio: ΠΕΚ, 2007), 37-82, 175-204, 323-7.

ence with notable figures in American intellectual circles, along with his role as a mediator, played a significant part in shaping a Greek–American public sphere.⁵¹ *Astir*'s influence transcended the confines of the small Protestant community in Greece, as it found readership among non-Protestants as well. Kalopothakis himself was a respected figure and his views were subjected to public scrutiny and commentary. One of the innovations introduced by Kalopothakis' journal was the fact that, in addition to being an instrument for propagating Protestant ideas, it became a stable medium for interaction with the United States. Both the content of *Astir*, which prominently featured American themes, and Kalopothakis' personal connections with significant figures in American and Greek intellectual circles played crucial roles in establishing a stable channel of communication between Greece and the USA.⁵² This facilitated the bridging of the gap between the two nations and fostered a unique “dialogue,” during a period when diplomatic relations between the two countries were more a rhetorical scheme than tangible reality.

Furthermore, Kalopothakis' relations with the personnel of the American consulate and later the American embassy in Athens were notably close and he became an integral member of the small circle of Americans who either permanently resided or visited Athens intermittently.⁵³ He also forged friendships with all American diplomats in

⁵¹ The term “public sphere” refers to Jürgen Habermas' concept of the formation, during the capitalist era, of a public space independent of state control, where citizens engage in the exchange of ideas and knowledge. Within this sphere, individuals come together through dialogue or print media, sharing their opinions. The proliferation of newspapers and magazines is closely associated with the rise of the public sphere: Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), 14-26, 31-42, 51-6.

⁵² *Astir* often republished articles about the USA from various Greek and foreign newspapers and magazines: *Astir tis Anatolis*, 29-1-1866, 22-7-1867, 26-8-1872, 18-5-1874, 1-2-1875, 15-2-1875.

⁵³ Actively engaging in official celebrations held at the American consulate on occasions like the 4th of July and Thanksgiving, Kalopothakis would publish detailed articles in *Astir*, featuring the speeches delivered during these events: *Astir tis Anatolis*, 15-11-1867, 16-11-1868, 1-2-1869, 5-7-1869, 27-11-1871, 18-11-1872, 16-11-1874.

Constantinople and Smyrna and maintained ongoing communication with numerous American intellectuals interested in Greek affairs and culture.⁵⁴ Their perspectives and insights were hosted in the columns of *Astir*, evoking both acclaim and criticism. Indeed, around *Astir* and its publisher, a small yet noteworthy Greek–American public sphere emerged, which for the first time was interested in discussing on a regular basis about USA, Americans, their ideas and their way of life. As a result, the Greek public, previously familiar only with the contributions of American philhellenes during the Greek Revolution of 1821, became acquainted with modern American intellectuals who were deeply interested in Greek culture. By showcasing the intellectual endeavors of American professors, scientists, writers, and artists, Kalopothakis challenged a prevailing stereotype about Americans: the supposed lack of high civilization and sophistication.

The case of Cornelius Conway Felton stands out as particularly noteworthy. The professor of Greek literature at Harvard University was an ardent Hellenist who delved into the works of both Ancient and Modern Greek writers. He made two visits to Greece, first in 1853–54 and then in 1858. During his initial trip, he was warmly welcomed not only by the English-speaking community in Athens but also by the Greek intellectuals of the capital. Felton meticulously toured all the archaeological sites and had the privilege of meeting the royal couple, King Otto and Queen Amalia, who expressed keen interest in American academic institutions and their study on ancient Greek language and literature. For Felton, Athens represented not just a nostalgic center of ancient Greek greatness but also a beacon of hope for the future. He was familiar with the state of modern Greece and the challenges faced by its people, particularly the deficiencies in education. Subscribing to several Greek newspapers from America, he kept abreast of Jacob Fallmerayer’s criticisms of Hellenism.⁵⁵ Felton penned articles for the *North American Review*, the venerable literary

⁵⁴ The newspapers also had subscribers in the USA: *Astir tis Anatolis*, 21–3–1858.

⁵⁵ George Veloudis, *O Jacob Philip Fallmerayer και η γένεση του ελληνικού ιστορισμού* (Jacob Philip Fallmerayer and the Genesis of Greek Historicism) (Athens: EMNE–Mnimon, 1982).

journal published in Boston since 1815, countering Fallmerayer's arguments.

Kalopothakis first met Felton in 1856 at his residence in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Their acquaintance flourished, leading to subsequent encounters both in America and during Felton's second visit to Greece, and evolved into a deep friendship, evidenced by their frequent correspondence. Through the pages of *Astir*, Kalopothakis systematically presented Felton's multifaceted work and praised his endeavors to introduce the teaching of Modern Greek language at Harvard University.⁵⁶ In 1860, Kalopothakis enthusiastically welcomed Felton's appointment as president of Harvard, praising the esteemed institution as a nurturing ground for great individuals. However, two years later, he mourned Felton's premature passing, penning a lengthy tribute in *Astir* that recounted their friendship and celebrated Felton's unwavering philhellenism.⁵⁷

Apart from serving as a hub for American thought, *Astir* also promoted a Greek–American dialogue that extended to literary, theological, and scientific matters. In October 1859, *Astir* hosted a scientific discussion between Konstantinos Asopios, professor of Greek literature at the University in Athens, and Howard Crosby, professor of Ancient Greek at New York University.⁵⁸ The occasion for this exchange was Crosby's publication of a study on ancient metrics, which he had sent to Asopios for critique.⁵⁹ Kalopothakis was hoping that "this scientific discussion shall become the means of solid acquaintance and connection between the two universities."⁶⁰ While Asopios eventually rejected the American professor's metrical theory, the initiation for the first time of a Greek-American dialogue on literary matters through a Greek publication held particular significance.

⁵⁶ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 4-10-1858, 28-2-1859.

⁵⁷ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 5-5-1862.

⁵⁸ Mary Crosby, *Memorial Papers and Reminiscences of Howard Crosby, D.D., LL.D.* (New York: William Knowles Publisher, 1892).

⁵⁹ Crosby's study was titled "Outline of a System for the Analysis of Classical Metres."

⁶⁰ Asopio's multi-page reply was published in six installments, followed by two letters of reply from Crosby: *Astir tis Anatolis*, 31-10-1859.

Another “Greek-American dialogue” took place in 1867 between the theologian and university professor Anastasios Diomedes Kyriakos and Lewis Packard, a professor of Ancient Greek language and literature at Yale University. Packard, a distinguished graduate of Yale, had shifted his focus to the classics after a brief visit to Greece in 1858, during his postgraduate studies in Berlin.⁶¹ After returning to the United States, he became a professor of Greek at Yale in 1863, at the age of 27, and developed a keen interest in theology. In the winter of 1866-67, he revisited Athens for a few months to study Modern Greek language. Apart from visiting archaeological sites, he was also active in supporting the then-developing Cretan struggle, mobilizing his contacts in the United States and writing articles in newspapers in New York and Boston. While in Athens, Packard read an article by Kyriakos in the ecclesiastical journal *Evangelikos Kiriks*, which criticized Protestantism, and he promptly responded with theological arguments.⁶² Kyriakos’ reaction was fierce. He sent a letter to the editors of all Greek newspapers, personally attacking the American professor. Kyriakos discovered “suspicious proselytizing purposes” in Packard’s arrival and stay in Greece, directed by the “ridiculous King.”⁶³ Packard, however, had no proselytizing mission in Greece. Nevertheless, this unfair attack by Kyriakos highlighted the extent of skepticism prevailing in certain Orthodox circles, which associated everything American with Protestantism and interpreted every American presence in Greece in terms of conspiracy. Kalopothakis, always sensitive to issues concerning America’s image, promptly published an article in defense of his American friend.⁶⁴

Every American who visited Greece or showed interest in the country was newsworthy for *Astir*. In 1869, the American painter Frederic Edwin Church visited Athens. Kalopothakis met him and subsequent-

⁶¹ “Necrology: Lewis R. Packard,” *The American Journal of Philology* 5, no. 3 (1884): 403-6.

⁶² Lewis R. Packard, «Τῷ κ. Συντάκτη τῶν Εὐαγγελικοῦ Κήρυκος» (To the Editor of Evangelical Herald), *Evangelikos Kyrix* 11, no. 2 (February, 1867): 141.

⁶³ Anastasios Diomedes Kyriakos, «Ἡ Ἀπάντησις» (The Answer), *Evangelikos Kyrix* 11, no. 4 (April 1867): 160-72.

⁶⁴ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 25-3-1867, 29-4-1867, 6-5-1867.

ly published an article titled “The Fine Arts in America.”⁶⁵ During his studies in the United States, Kalopothakis was hosted by the family of clergyman Robert Baird. As a member of the American Sunday School Union, Baird had traveled to Europe in 1835, where he spent eight years promoting Protestantism, particularly in Southern Europe. Kalopothakis described him as “learned and multilingual” philhellene.⁶⁶ In 1842, while in Geneva, Baird wrote “Religion in America,” which was a huge publishing success and was translated into many European languages. Kalopothakis published extensive portions of this work in *Astir*. Baird’s son, Henry Martyn Baird, visited Athens in 1851, where he studied Ancient and Modern Greek for a year.⁶⁷ He later wrote a book of his reminiscences, which serves as an excellent source for understanding the circle of Greeks who maintained friendly relations with Americans in Athens and those who were hostile to them.⁶⁸ Kalopothakis also had a close relationship with Horatio Balch Hackett, a professor of Ancient Greek and Latin literature at Brown University and a dedicated biblical scholar who spent six months in Greece in 1858-59 for studies, sponsored by the American Bible Union.⁶⁹ During his stay, he attended classes at the John Hill’s School in Athens and at the university, where he met the theologians Konstantinos Kontogonis, Theokletos Pharmakidis, and Konstantinos Assopios. After returning to America, Hackett maintained regular communication with Kalopothakis, supplied him with religious books through the Boston Tract Society and even became a subscriber to *Astir*.⁷⁰

The readers of *Astir* had the opportunity to become acquainted with the work and philhellenism of many Americans, whose activities would otherwise have remained unknown in Greece. One such exam-

⁶⁵ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 12-4-1869.

⁶⁶ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 5-4-1863.

⁶⁷ Priscilla M. Murray–Curtis N. Runnels, “Harold North Fowler and the Beginnings of American Study Tours in Greece,” *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 76 (July 2007): 601.

⁶⁸ Henry Martin Baird, *Modern Greece: A Narrative of a Residence and Travels in that Country* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1856), 79. Henry Martin Baird eventually became professor of Greek language and literature at the University of New York.

⁶⁹ George Whittemore, *Memorials of Horatio Balch Hackett* (Rochester: 1876), 80.

⁷⁰ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 12-3-1860, 24-6-1861.

ple was the case of Henry D. Gilpin, a lawyer who served as the 14th Attorney General of the United States. During the Crimean War (1853-56), Gilpin toured Greece and wrote a public letter expressing his outrage at the pro-Turkish sentiments in Europe, affirming that America “would be glad to see all enslaved Greeks enjoying the benefits of freedom.”⁷¹ Kalopothakis often praised Gilpin’s scholarship, piety, and philhellenism. He even ensured that a printed pamphlet of Gilpin’s public speech with philhellenic content was distributed to many scholars in Athens.⁷² Kalopothakis’ relationship with Samuel Gridley Howe, the “patriarch among the philhellenes,” was also noteworthy. Howe was deeply beloved in Greece for his personal presence and contributions during the struggle for Greek independence. During the Cretan Revolution (1866-69), Howe returned to Athens once again to organize aid for the refugees from Crete. Kalopothakis played a leading role in establishing an “American–Hellenic Committee” under Howe’s chairmanship. This committee, besides engaging in humanitarian work, aimed to foster “closer relations and stronger sympathy between the two nations.”⁷³

Kalopothakis also maintained contact with individuals who shared his ideological affinity and love for the United States. One such case was Anastasios I. Koulouriotis, of Arvanite descent, who was influenced by Jonas King in a similar manner to Kalopothakis.⁷⁴ From King, Koulouriotis learned about the ideals of American democracy, which inspired him to make a trip to the US for further studies. Alt-

⁷¹ Spyridon Pilikas, *Απομνημονεύματα της υπουργίας Σπυρίδωνος Πήλικα* (Memoirs of the Ministry of Spyridon Pilikas) (Athens: Typographeio Alex. Papageorgiou, 1893), 132-4.

⁷² *Astir tis Anatolis*, 27-2-1860.

⁷³ *Ἐκθεσις της τε Αμερικανοελληνικής Επιτροπής* (Report of the American-Hellenic Committee) (Athens: Typois Lakonias, 1868), 35; *Astir tis Anatolis*, 29-4-1867, 17-6-1867.

⁷⁴ Pias Skoulidas, «Ο Αναστάσιος Κουλουριώτης και το έργο του: συμβολή στη μελέτη των ελληνοαλβανικών σχέσεων (β΄ μισό 19ου αι.)» [Anastasios Koulouriotis and His Work: A Contribution to the Study of Greek-Albanian Relations (second half of the 19th century)], *Dodoni* KA/1 (1992), 221-48; Basil K. Gounaris, *Τα Βαλκάνια των Ελλήνων, από το Διαφωτισμό έως τον Α΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο* (The Balkans of the Greeks, from the Enlightenment to World War I) (Athens: Epikentro, 2007), 180, 182, 311-2.

though little is known about his activities there, apart from his enrollment at Lafayette College in Pennsylvania in 1841, which was under the influence of the Presbyterian Church, it is evident that Koulouriotis was impressed by the political and social achievements of American society. This experience served as a significant reference point in the development of his work.⁷⁵ After returning to Greece, Koulouriotis emerged as one of the most prominent early “Albanologists,” advocating for Greek–Albanian friendship and the harmonious coexistence of different ethnicities and cultures within the framework of a national state—an idea inspired by the American multi-ethnic paradigm. Kalopothakis developed a close relationship with Koulouriotis based on their shared American experience and Protestant education. Starting from 1862, Koulouriotis’ articles began appearing in *Astir*, advocating for the protection of political and individual freedoms, equality, liberty, and the maximization of popular sovereignty.⁷⁶ The strong bond between the two men is further evidenced by Kalopothakis’ prompt defense of Koulouriotis, when the latter, as a commissioner of the English Bible Society, faced persecution in Corfu and Kefalonia for attempting to sell translated copies of the Bible in the Modern Greek language.⁷⁷

Kalopothakis consistently advocated for closer commercial and economic relations between Greece and the United States, which he viewed as the “most natural and sincere friend of Greece.” In March 1858, when Greek–American John Diomataris was reappointed as US Consul General in Athens, Kalopothakis highlighted the opportunity for many Greek products to find a good market in America and criticized the government for neglecting these opportunities.⁷⁸ A few months later, in November 1858, following the arrival of an American merchant ship, Kalopothakis praised the quality and variety of Ameri-

⁷⁵ In a letter dated July 6, 1841, addressed to John Hill, Koulouriotis expressed his admiration for the United States: <https://hillarchive.gr/search/Κουλουριώτης> (accessed 28-8-2023).

⁷⁶ *Astir tis Anatólis*, 27-10-1862.

⁷⁷ *Astir tis Anatólis*, 23-10-1871, 27-5-1872, 10-6-1872, 8-7-1872, 5-1-1874.

⁷⁸ John D. Diomataris had studied at the University of Georgia, USA: E. Merton Coulter, *College Life in the Old South* (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 37-8; *Astir tis Anatólis*, 1-3-1858.

can products and suggested that Greece should open up the transatlantic trade and import many goods from the US, in exchange for Greek agricultural products.⁷⁹ *Astir* even informed the public about American industrial products sitting in warehouses in Piraeus and urged the Greek government to try out American machines that could efficiently separate seeds from cotton.⁸⁰ In 1868, when Charles Tuckerman was appointed as the first US ambassador in Athens, Kalopothakis hailed him as an “angel of a bright future” in Greek-American relations and the beginning of more active US involvement in the political affairs of the Near and Middle East.⁸¹ Kalopothakis envisioned that the United States would protect Christian populations within the Ottoman Empire, uphold liberalism, and promote free trade. The course of Greek-American relations didn’t meet his expectations, as they remained relatively weak until World War I. However, it is noteworthy that Kalopothakis sought an alternative solution to Greece’s economic and political challenges by invoking the support from a non-European power. The complex network of relations described above demonstrates Kalopothakis’ central role in the formation of a Greek-American public sphere and the promotion of Greek-American dialogue, which was pioneering for its time.

Conclusion

Kalopothakis’ endeavors to spread American Protestant values of work ethics, as a means for societal reform and progress in Greece, and to cultivate a Greek-American public sphere through his journal *Astir tis Anatolis* illuminates a fascinating chapter in the history of Greek intellectual thought and transatlantic relations during the mid-19th century. Kalopothakis emerged as a pivotal figure, uniquely positioned with firsthand experience of the United States and a deep commitment to promote the values of Protestantism, progress, and cultural exchange. In his intellectual universe, the United States served as both a model and a mirror for Greece in its pursuit of religious tolerance and economic prosperity. The American work ethic

⁷⁹ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 1-11-1858.

⁸⁰ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 21-2-1859.

⁸¹ *Astir tis Anatolis*, 10-10-1868.

was celebrated by Kalopothakis as a catalyst for economic prosperity and social advancement. Drawing parallels between the industriousness of American society and the potential for Greek development, Kalopothakis advocated for a moral renewal in Greece, grounded in Protestant values. Similarly, the notion of religious tolerance, as exemplified in the United States, was used by Kalopothakis as a testament to the potential of Greek society to flourish, if individuals were left free to practice their faith without fear of persecution or discrimination.

Astir transcended the boundaries of a mere Protestant publication, as Kalopothakis transformed it into a dynamic platform for dialogue and interaction between Greeks and Americans. By featuring American themes and engaging with the works and ideas of notable American intellectuals, he facilitated the exchange of knowledge, perspectives, and insights across the Atlantic. Kalopothakis' personal connections with American diplomats, intellectuals, and figures of influence played a crucial role in bridging the gap between the two countries. His efforts to introduce American ideas and works to the Greek public challenged the prevailing stereotypes about American culture and fostered a deeper understanding and appreciation of American intellectual achievements. Moreover, Kalopothakis' advocacy for closer commercial and economic relations between Greece and the United States and his emphasis on the potential benefits of transatlantic trade reflected his idealistic approach to addressing Greece's economic challenges and integration into the global economy.

While Kalopothakis' vision for Greek-American relations did not materialize during his lifetime, his pioneering efforts in fostering dialogue and intellectual exchange left a lasting legacy in the history of Greek-American relations. His role as a mediator between Greece and the United States, his promotion of mutual understanding and respect, and his dedication to advancing the values of American Protestant modernity served as an inspiration for future generations seeking to build similar bridges between the two nations.

*Dimitris Malesis** – *Gerassimos Karabelias***

**Great Powers and National Sovereignty: Naval Blockades on
Modern Greece by Allied Forces (1850, 1854, 1886, 1917)**

The Protocol of Greek National Independence, signed in London on 22 January/3 February 1830, outlined both its borders as well as the role of Great European Powers (England, France, and Russia) in it as guarantors of the country's territorial and political regime. The Great Powers earned that role due to the attempts of the Greeks to free themselves from the Ottoman yoke repeatedly failing throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Their interest to ensure that no single European state would grow powerful enough to dominate the others in the way that Napoleonic France had attempted, led the Great Powers to pay attention to the evolution of events in the region. When they realized that the growing weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire posed a threat to this precarious balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, they felt “forced” to actively involve themselves (e.g. Battle of Navarino Bay, landing of French troops in Peloponnese) in the realization of Greek independence.¹ The establishment of three domestic political parties that identified their ideological orientation with that of the Great Powers (they were even called the English, French, and Russian Party) was a clear sign of the deep gratitude that all Greeks felt towards these three European states. What the Greeks had failed to understand, however,

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¹ The military victories of Ibrahim Pasa in 1825 led a significant number of Greek military leaders to form the Zakynthos Committee and compose a document, signed by both Theodore Kolokotronis as the leader of the Land Forces and Andreas Miaoulis as the commander of the Naval Forces, historically known as the “Deed of Subordination,” requesting from the government in London to place the revolutionary lands under the British rule. See, Yiannis Giannopoulos, “Diplomacy: European rivalries and the establishment of the Greek state,” in *History of the New Hellenism, 1770-2000—The Greek Revolution, 1821-1832. The Struggle for Independence and the Establishment of the Greek State*, ed. Vassilis Panagiotopoulos (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2003) 254; Charles William Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence. A Study of British Policy in the East, 1821-1833* (New York: H. Fertig, 1973).

was that their country's "independence" was not due to the romantic attachment of European Powers either to Ancient Greece or to Christian Orthodox dogma but part of a greater plan for a new, post-Napoleonic type of supervision of international politics and economics. As Maass points out, "Small state creation, survival, or death had to submit to the concert states' demands [...] small states received protection when they contributed to the balance of power or when their survival was deemed helpful."² That type of misunderstanding would play a major role in Greece's political, economic, social, and military evolution, as well as its sovereign status both in the domestic and the international arenas.

I. The British Affairs (1849-50)

The first attempt of modern Greece to free the unredeemed Greeks from the Ottoman rule (Megali Idea) and, thus, extend the state's borders started in the early 1850s, in the wake of the Crimean War.³ King Otto's desire to implement the Megali Idea had an appeal on the masses. But his plan to rely heavily on Greek military and political personnel associated with the Russian party, caused a distress to London. Henry John Temple-Palmerston, the British foreign policy secretary, did not hesitate to show its opposition to actions adopted by the Athenian regime. The case of the British citizen Don Pacifico in 1849 and the financial conflicts he had with the Greek public sector emerged suddenly as a very important case, gaining thus international attention.⁴ Furthermore, the financial differences that the Greek state had with the Scottish lawman and historian George Finlay grew up immensely.⁵ In addition, demands emerged from London with regards to two small

² Matthias Maass, *Small states in World Politics: The story of small state survival, 1648-2016* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 95.

³ Elli Skopetea, *The "Model Kingdom" and the Megali Idea: Aspects of the National Problem in Greece, (1830-1880)* (Athens: Polytypo, 1988), 257.

⁴ Geoffrey Hicks, "Don Pacifico, Democracy and Danger: the protectionist party critique of British Foreign Policy, 1850-1852," *International History Review* 26, no. 3 (September 2004).

⁵ Epameinondas Kyriakides, *History of Modern Hellenism from the Foundation of the Kingdom of Greece to our days, 1832-1892*, vol. A (Athens: 1892), 589.

Greek islands, Elafonisos and Sapienza, which the British government considered as part of the Ionian Isles, a territory under its direct rule.⁶

British financial claims for the compensation of Don Pacifico, as well as the other issues, were an indication of the excessive measures that would follow. London gave the Greek government of Antonios Kriezis an ultimatum of twenty-four hours and when it expired, on January 6, 1850, British warships imposed a naval blockade not only of the port of Piraeus but also on those of Syros, Corinth, and Patras. At the same time, all types of commodities and goods carried out by Greek ships on the Aegean routes were confiscated.⁷ The blockade, which lasted for forty-two days, caused severe shortages of food and other goods, as domestic wheat production failed to meet the needs of the population, due to the harsh winter of that year, and the country was forced to import it from Russia.⁸ The “Parker events,” as they are known, named after the head of the British fleet, Vice Admiral Parker, provoked international reaction, with France and Russia declaring their support to the Greek government. After the diplomatic intervention of France, the amount of 140,000 drachmas was awarded to Don Pacifico as a compensation and the blockade was lifted.⁹ For the first time in its post-Ottoman period, the newborn Greek state had to confront the “concealed” character of a Great Power that claimed to be its protector.

The cynical behavior of the British military diplomacy was a clear sign that the interests of the British Empire did not necessarily coincide with those of the Greek state. The control over the naval routes of Eastern Mediterranean and the prevention of Russian descent to warm waters was of utmost importance to London. The newly invented steam-boats needed access to the ports of the region for the fastest possible transport of food, coal, and raw materials from Asia and the Greek state

⁶ Édouard Driault–Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*, vol. II (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1925), 337; Marietta Economopoulou, *Parties and Politics in Greece, 1844-1855* (Athens: 1984), 189.

⁷ Albert Washburn, “The Legality of the Pacific Blockade. III,” *Columbia Law Review* 21, no. 5 (1921): 235-6.

⁸ *Aion*, 7-7-1854; Government Gazette, “Decree on measures to prevent the spread of cholera,” no. 22, 7-7-1854.

⁹ Gunnar Hering, *The Political Parties in Greece, 1821-1936*, vol. A (Athens: MIET, 2006), 311-2.

was not to become an obstacle to their plans. In fact, the Wellington government (Arthur Wellesley) had to review its predecessor's philhellenic orientation because it realized that Great Britain had been dragged into a foreign policy orientation rather risky for its own interests.¹⁰ Thus, the protection of the borders of the Ottoman Empire would become the official British foreign policy in the mid-19th century,¹¹ to the detriment of most Greeks, especially to the descendants of the fighters of the War of Independence.¹²

II. The Crimean War (1853-56)

In Greece, the Russo-Turkish conflict of 1853 reawakened the hope for military and diplomatic support from Russia, a country with which they shared the same religious dogma. For Russia, Greece's involvement into a war with the Ottomans could serve her plans for a major military distraction from the south. The "Manifesto," as the proclamation issued by Tsar Nicholas in July 1853 was called, addressed all the Orthodox populations and left no misinterpretation that: "[...] the protection of Orthodoxy was the duty of sacrifice of our Blessed Ancestors."¹³ This proclamation touched the soul of a large portion of the Greek public opinion and appeared as a great opportunity for the pursuit of Megali Idea. The so-called Russian Party in Greece and the Athenian press that supported it forcefully argued that the only major power capable of assisting the country in the materialization of its national aspirations was in Petrograd. The newspaper *Aion*, published by Ioannis Filimon, linked the realization of the Great Idea only with the hostile attitude of the Russian Empire towards the Ottomans.¹⁴

At the same time, the head of the Russian Naval Ministry, Prince Sergeevich Aleksandr Mentzikov, arranged several meetings with the Greek ambassador and leader of the Russian Party, Andreas Metaxas,

¹⁰ Driault–Lheritier, *op.cit.*, 379-92.

¹¹ Jonathan Parry, *Promised Lands: The British and the Ottoman Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022), 216-7.

¹² Elpida Vogli, "Between two 'revolutions': The Kingdom of Otto and the 'protective' Powers," in *Aspects of Modern Greek History (19th-20th centuries)* (Kallipos.gr., 2016), 166-71.

¹³ *Aion*, 3-7-1854.

¹⁴ *Aion*, 1-1-1854.

to discuss the possibility of joint military actions. Furthermore, the unexpected visit to Athens of top Russian officers, such as Admiral Kornilov, who was then assistant general to the Tsar and had participated in the Navarino Battle, Major General Nepochitsynsky, and Lieutenants Sieglelev and Bostzhoff, and their meetings with Foreign Minister Andronikos Paikos and King Otto empowered the speculations for secret military co-operation. Even though no formal announcement was issued, the topic that dominated all discussions was the secret formation of a Greek-Russian military partnership with a mission; the realization of Megali Idea.¹⁵

An article published in April 1853 in newspaper *Aion* with the title “The Voracious Crave of Papism” brought to the surface the old friction between Greek Orthodox and Catholics to enhance the ties with Orthodox Czarist Russia. “Orthodoxy and the people of the east are the object of their [the Catholics and the Pope] hatred and curse [...], consider the Turks more as their brothers, and they even fight for them, instead of the Orthodox and the people from the east. [...] History mentions his name, Pope Nicholas, with horror, who prevented the Christian Kings of the West from making a military campaign for Byzantium, threatened by the Turks, because the Greek people did not acknowledge his spiritual and political and anti-Christian, sovereignty.” The campaign against the Pope was a common theme in the media as the tension grew to the point of reaching decisive conclusions such as that “Islamism and Catholicism are two parallel and totally homogeneous religious beliefs in their diverging role in approaching the truth.”¹⁶ In addition, the newspaper condemns the issue of foreign missionaries, Protestant and Catholic alike, which have made their presence visible since the first decades of independence: “the enemies of the Eastern Church are forcibly entering [people’s soul] by violence, by books, and by any means they master, as they try to destroy our sacred religion and bring us to a position of worshipping the Antichrist.”¹⁷

¹⁵ Stephanos Papadopoulos, “The Crimean War and Hellenism,” in *History of the Greek Nation XIII* (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon, 1977), 143.

¹⁶ *Aion*, 19-5-1854.

¹⁷ Dimitris Malesis, “Starting points of irrational tendencies in the formation of the modern Greek state: cultural conflicts around the Autocephalus of the Greek Church,” *The Greek Review of Social Research*, no.87 (1995): 5.

At the same time, Greek-Turkish relations began to escalate due to an issue that was triggered, regarding two villages on the border, which the Ottoman side claimed were on its own territory. The concentration of military troops at the border added heavier clouds in the already tense climate, especially after the replacement of the Ottoman-Turkish units, in July 1853, by mischievous Albanians who acted violently against the Greek residents.¹⁸ The climate of warfare in Greece was strengthened when several high-ranking officers, such as the secretary of military affairs, General Spyros Spyromilios, and General Kitsos Tzavellas, prompted into these affairs more state officials, such as the prefect of Athens and the chief of the police. In addition, General Spyromilios reorganized the Greek military forces at the border and appointed as their leaders his friends, Generals Gardikiotis Grivas and General Ioannis Gouras.¹⁹ The replacement of General Spyromilios as war minister by General Skarlatos Soutsos in October of the same year, due to heavy pressure by the French Ambassador Baron Rouan, did not suffice to alter the evolution of events.²⁰

Greece's military forces, however, were not a match for the Ottoman ones. The manpower of the Greek Armed Forces was limited by law to 9,630 men (front line, border patrol and gendarmerie). The Royal Phalanx and the Veteran Company, two forces that were used to provide with limited income retired military personnel from the war for independence and their descendants, gathered only 893 men.²¹ Although the Greek government supported brigandage as a source of warriors-soldiers, the latter would neither accept easily orders from the military hierarchy nor behave as a regular army in the battlefield.²² Similarly troublesome was the amount of ammunition and guns available.²³ The

¹⁸ Domna Donta, *Greece and the Forces during the Crimean War* (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1973) 31-2.

¹⁹ Government Gazette, Royal Decree "On the formation of two military headquarters," no. 24, 12-8-1853.

²⁰ Government Gazette, Decree "On the resignation of the Minister of Defense Spyromilios," no. 33, 9-10-1853; Government Gazette, Decree "On the appointment of Minister of the Army Skarlatos Soutsos," no. 33, 9-10-1853.

²¹ Government Gazette, Law SMSTY "On the determination of the strength of the army and on conscription for the year 1853 and 1854," no. 33, 9-10-1853.

²² Kyriakides, *op.cit.*, 527.

²³ Foreign Office, 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 2-6-1853.

military leadership tried to overcome all these structural weaknesses with appeals to the patriotic sentiments, especially towards the wealthy ones and the diaspora communities throughout Europe, targeting especially those who resided in London, Vienna, and Trieste.²⁴

The political leadership in Athens, however, did not dare to take the step of declaring war against the Ottoman Empire. But, at the same time, it could not disregard the growing spirit of irredentism and the excessive optimism of the public.²⁵ An interim solution that consisted of the incitement of liberation movements in Epirus, Macedonia, and Thessaly, without officially proclaiming a war, was preferred. This awkward and amateurish foreign policy orientation forced several active-duty officers to get directly involved as volunteers. The latter formally submitted their resignations to the military leadership and the king and joined, as privates, the struggle of guerrilla forces.²⁶

Several revolutionary skirmishes occurred simultaneously in Epirus and Thessaly in January 1854 and in a climate of enthusiasm and excessive optimism there were some minor military victories for the Greek forces. Similar acts in Macedonia, however, were not that successful, as the presence of Ottoman military forces there was quite strong.²⁷ Despite that, pro-war political and military groups in Greece, with their leading newspaper *Aion*, attempted to cultivate a victorious spirit by publishing either fake news about military successes or news that expressed the publisher's secret wishes: "The King conspired with the two naval forces of England and France for a complete neutrality." In addition, the newspaper claimed that "the fellow brothers" of Montenegro were ready to rebel, while the Ottoman Empire was a "cowardly" force unable to save itself. The victories of the guerrilla forces against Ottoman guards at a local level created a false enthusiasm to the public, the military, and the monarchy.²⁸

²⁴ Foreign Office, 32/207, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, 17-7-1853.

²⁵ Maria Todorova, "The Greek volunteers in the Crimean War," *Balkan Studies* 25.2 (1984).

²⁶ Nikolaos Dragoumis, *Historical Reminiscences*, vol. B (Athens: Nea Elleniki Vibliothiki, 1973), 160.

²⁷ Stephanos Papadopoulos, "The revolutions of 1854 and 1858 in Macedonia," *Society for Macedonian Studies*, no. 22 (1970).

²⁸ Papadopoulos, "The Crimean War", 145.

King Otto, driven by an unrelenting romanticism, attempted to win the favor of the protecting powers through dubious ways. For example, he tried to win the sentiments of the French leader, Napoleon III, by stressing in his letters that he is “the only King in the east” and his struggle was “in favor of the holy requests of the Cross.”²⁹ Even Queen Amalia called on the Greeks to follow the King, “the strongest in the east,” in a war against the Ottoman Empire, since this was in the “true interests of Europe.” King Otto also tried to informally promote the “Turkish issue” by sending troops to the border and claiming that “his government did everything it could to contain the explosion of popular sentiment.”³⁰

These daydreams, however, ended when both the London and Paris governments imposed a strict embargo on Greece, to punish the monarchy and the Greeks for their undesirable foreign and military policy. There were suggestions and warnings from both London and Paris, which were ignored by the overpowering patriotic zeal of the Greek monarchy. The naval blockade of the port of 1854 by the British and the French, apart from the national humiliation, caused the death of some 3,000 Athenians from the cholera pandemic transmitted by French soldiers. King Otto remained confined in the palace “and went through the trial with dignity,” while he urgently called back from Paris Ambassador Alexandros Mavrokordatos to take over the position of the prime minister, historically known as the “Ministry of Occupation.”³¹

The appearance of strong Ottoman land forces in the disputed areas led soon to an uneven war, whereas the Greek forces “were defeated by the enemy’s supreme and armed forces and came back on Greek territory, persecuted.”³² The gruesome end of the first attempt of a policy aiming at the liberation of the unredeemed Greeks as well as the cynical military intervention of allied forces into the country’s domestic affairs was followed by a period of relative silence and an end to illusions about the latter’s role. The dissolution of the English, French, and Russian political parties after a thirty-year course,³³ indicated that

²⁹ Papadopoulos, “The Crimean War”, 146.

³⁰ Papadopoulos, “The Crimean War”, 145.

³¹ Kyriakides, *op.cit.*, 169.

³² George Aspreas, *Political History of modern Greece, 1821-1921* (Athens: 1922), 227.

³³ Pavlos Kalligas, “The falling of the parties, and the ethics of our community,” in

both public and political leaders had learned that the interests of the Greek state do not necessarily coincide with those of the protecting powers. The latter started to encourage the people to rise against the monarch, leading eventually to King Otto's forced exodus in October 1862.³⁴ However, as the institution of the monarchy was the only one that could tame "the anarchy" and "immorality" of local citizens, as well as work as the "guardian" of their own "interests," the Great Powers elected the Danish Prince George as the new king of Greece.³⁵ The "dowry" to the new monarchy was the concession of the Ionian Islands from Great Britain to Greece in 1864,³⁶ setting the first step for the country's enlargement since its independence.

III. The Issue of Eastern Rumelia (1885-86)

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Balkan peninsula became once more the theatre of violent borderline reallocation as the dreams and ambitions of local elite and nationals for independence and border enlargement appeared capable of being materialized. The Great European Powers felt once more compelled to participate in that process to retain their control in south-eastern Europe. Russia's historical desire to increase its influence in the region fueled Bulgaria's historical nationalistic aspirations towards the Ottoman Macedonia, especially with the Treaty of St. Stephen (February 1878), causing the growth of heavy clouds of uneasiness into Greek political-military elites and the public. The strong reaction of Britain and Germany to Russia's goals led to the Berlin Conference in June of 1878, which revised the Treaty of St Stephen, erasing, thus, the country's nightmares about the future status of Ottoman Macedonia and creating the

Legal, Political, Economic, Historical, Philological Studies, vol. A (Athens: 1899), 499.

³⁴ George Finlay, *History of the Greek Revolution* (Edinburgh, 1861), 601-2.

³⁵ Spyridon Ploumidis, "An antidote to anarchy? Images of monarchy in Greece in the nineteenth and the twentieth century," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 45, no. 2 (2021): 243.

³⁶ Pandeimon Hionidis, "Exporting a Prince, Ideas and Institutions to Greece, 1862-4: Mid-Victorian Perceptions of Britain's Stand and Mission in the World," *Britain and the World* 10, no.2 (2017), 139.

conditions for the incorporation of Thessaly and a small part of Epirus into the Greek state.³⁷

The main party leaders, Charilaos Trikoupis and Theodoros Diligiannis, who dominated the Greek political arena, had a completely different political program and tactics. The modernist Trikoupis had diagnosed the inadequacies of the Greek state and considered that without economic and social development any attempt for irredentist policy, besides being ineffective, threatened the real interests of the country at large. He insisted that long-term planning was needed based on a modernization program that would make the state a credible interlocutor with European diplomacy. “When the moment of action comes to us,” Trikoupis said, “we wanted to see Greece with a force analogous to its means, but to be framed as a civilized state, as a state having a military full body [...] when we so agree, we can hope that we impose on ourselves outside of us, whether acting militarily in collusion or even before the action.” Trikoupis believed that the interests of Great Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the way to India could be identified with Greek aspirations and he fought to keep the country close to the policies of the government in London.³⁸

The Bulgarian annexation of the region of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, however, brought to the surface the fears of Theodore Diligiannis that this was the first step towards the satisfaction of Sofia’s aspirations in Macedonia and the realization of pan-Slavism in the Balkans. In addition, the Greek political and military elites felt uneasy with the u-turn in British foreign policy, as it was not Russia who supported and enhanced the Bulgarian aspirations but London. In fact, it was the British government which approved the annexation of Eastern Rumelia and the Russian government who did not.³⁹ Greece was not alone as Belgrade shared the same views with Athens on this issue. Serbia hastened to declare war on Bulgaria but was quickly defeated.⁴⁰ In Athens, war fever rose due to popular rallies and resolutions which suggested to the Greek government the adoption of dynamic response

³⁷ William Norton Medlicott, *Congress of Berlin and After* (London: Routledge, 1963).

³⁸ Hering, *op.cit.*, 547.

³⁹ Driault–Lheritier, *op.cit.*, 195-216.

⁴⁰ Ipek Yosmaoglu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 25.

measures; in this case the declaration of war. In one of these rallies, even King George I, succumbing to the pressure of the crowd, was obliged to make statements from the palace's balcony, full of vagueness and "seriousness, consistency and courage," not excluding the "many sacrifices" for the "interests of Hellenism."⁴¹

Not only did Diligiannis' government fail to pay attention to the absence of any European reaction to the Bulgarian coup and the positive stance of the Ottoman state but, captive to the internal pressure with all the pro-war features, it declared partial draft without any operational plan, putting additional pressure on the military leadership and on itself. Opposing views such as those of George Filaretos, who argued that the parliament had been late to convene for this great national issue, or of the minister of defense, Antonis Mavromichalis, who raised questions about the capabilities of the Greek army stating that "[...] it is true that the enthusiasm of the people has forced the military service to be delayed [but] it is not possible within twenty-four hours to multiply our army fivefold and to have enough and ready means to cover it for the first time," were neglected.⁴² The advancement of land forces to the borderlines of Epirus and Macedonia and the procurement of weapons, ammunition, and equipment of the fleet, revealed that noisy actions were more important than military ones. The permission to senior students of the military academy to enlist in the army before completing their education and pass the final exams was one such example.⁴³

At the same time, the British government did not hesitate to send a clear message to the Diligiannis administration on January 12, that any military action against the Ottoman Empire "would not be allowed." Diligiannis' response to the British statement was that London's position is "incompatible with an independent state." The British response mentioned that it was trying to "open the eyes of the Greek government to the dangers it was facing."⁴⁴ Indeed, on April 14, the ambassadors of France, Italy, Austria, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain urged the

⁴¹ Kyriakides, *op.cit.*, 624.

⁴² Kyriakides, *op.cit.*, 7-8.

⁴³ Anastasios Charalampis–Konstantinos Nieder, *Historical Memorandum on the Organization of the Regular Army of Greece* (Athens: Ministry of the Military, 1907), 267.

⁴⁴ *Proia*, 20-4-1886.

Greek government to put the military and naval forces in a “state of peace.” Even though the Diligiannis government made some announcements that it would “comply with the wishes of the Great Powers,” the French ambassador claimed that these statements were “vague” and in few days the British announced that a naval blockade on the country’s ports had been ordered and that any Greek–flagged ship that would attempt to break the blockade would be “exposed to foreclosure.”⁴⁵ Once again, Greece was diplomatically and financially isolated.

When the blockade was imposed, Diligiannis’ government seemed to prefer the heroic exit: instead of lifting the mobilization order, he submitted the resignation of his government on April 27, 1886, to the king. As he explained, if he had ordered for the war to begin, it would have been a “desperate” act.⁴⁶ When Charilaos Trikoupis took over the government, he condemned the Bulgarian coup in Eastern Rumelia and declared a pro-war policy, blaming the Diligiannis government for inaction. However, after a few days in office and facing the relentless reality, he abandoned his pro-war stance declaring that “the right moment of action had passed and only the path of retreat was now tolerable.” Trikoupis’ reverse stance offered an opportunity to his political opponents to accuse him of betrayal and called him to resign as a “collaborator of foreigners.” Some officers, in fact, wanting to react to the disgraceful blockade imposed by the Great Powers and motivated by the widespread climate of “betrayal,” broke through the Thessalian borders and entered with their armor into the Ottoman territory.⁴⁷

In the early morning hours of May 8, military clashes broke out, as the officers in charge serving at the border, acted emotionally, ignoring the orders of political and military leadership. The war spread in the following hours. The total strength of the Greek army, which amounted to 75,000 men, was indeed remarkable, and able to oppose the Turkish one as the Greek forces had clearly less losses than the Turks in all local battles. However, lack of military coordination led soon to the moral collapse and in conjunction with the worsening of state finances led to

⁴⁵ *Proia*, 26-4-1886; *Proia*, 27-4-1886.

⁴⁶ *Proia*, 8-5-1886.

⁴⁷ Dimitris Pournaras, *Charilaos Trikoupis: His life and works*, vol. B (Athens: 1939), 8.

an undesirable end.⁴⁸ A report that later examined the evolution of events referred to the military as an “enthusiastic” army without any form of discipline. A belligerent public opinion and the involvement of party affairs into the armed forces had brought to the surface the issue of discipline and the need for a regular army to behave as such and not as a guerrilla force. In addition, a state that wants to be seriously considered as a major force in both military and diplomatic actions should act as such. The moral collapse of the Greek society and the worsening of Greek state finances led historians to characterize the evolution of the entire event as “armed begging.”⁴⁹

IV. The First World War and the National Schism (1916-17)

From 1910 on, Greece changed its pace of military modernization under the leadership of Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos. This was followed by the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), which expanded the country’s borders by about 70%. The banner of the Great Idea did not disappear, as World War I presented Venizelos with an excellent opportunity to integrate the various Hellenic communities in the Eastern Mediterranean into a single national and enlarged state. At the same time, the rise of King Constantine I to the throne in March 1913, a King who did not share the constitutional sensitivities of his father and had his own plans for interfering in matters concerning the army and the country’s foreign policy, would put a strong mark on both the country and people’s affairs. The strong disagreement between King Constantine and Venizelos, that will manifest itself in 1915 when the country was forced to choose between the rivals of Central Powers and the Allies, would lead to a deep national division of Greek society and politics, known as a National Schism, and allow for another intervention of the allies in the evolution of the country’s internal affairs.

Venizelos, from the first moment he took over the reins of the country, was clearly in favor of Greece’s connection with the Western Entente forces. After all, they were the countries in which he had entrusted the reorganization and the training of the navy and the army

⁴⁸ Kyriakides, *op.cit.*, 634-8.

⁴⁹ Lina Louvi, *Perigelotos Vasileion. The Satirical Newspapers and the National Question (1875-1886)* (Athens: Estia, 2002), 284.

respectively. Venizelos incorporated his pro-Western beliefs from the very beginning in the context of a grandiose liberalism, based on which a modernized bourgeois state with a unified and long-term understanding of national issues would have to be formed. Believing in the Western European bourgeois-liberal parliamentary model, he claimed “that Greece had to fight for the ideas defended by England and France.” On the contrary, King Constantine I, a trained soldier at the Berlin Military Academy, never concealed his admiration for Germany and the mighty Prussian militarism.⁵⁰

For Prime Minister Venizelos, the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War on the side of the Central Forces had by itself created a new, bleak, reality. From the moment that the Ottomans refused to recognize Greek sovereignty over the Eastern Aegean islands, Venizelos understood that a new Greek-Turkish confrontation would be inevitable.⁵¹ At the same time, Berlin exercised additional pressure on King Constantine I to follow a policy of neutrality, favoring Bulgaria’s entrance into the war on its own side. The lure of peace was for the anti-Venizelist, royalist forces a major political weapon. As the leader of the anti-Venizelist party, Dimitrios Gounaris, argued “the policy of neutrality is the policy of peace. And the policy of peace is the natural policy for every state.”⁵²

When Venizelos raised the issue of entering the war with the Entente in early 1915,⁵³ he was faced with the rigid refusal of the palace and the pro-royal military officers. Within that year, he was forced to submit twice to the monarchy the resignation of his government. However, it was the occupation of Fort Rupel on May 13, 1916, by the Bulgarians without any resistance from the Greek military and diplomacy, that left no room for misinterpretation to Venizelos and his supporters. Berlin’s reassuring statements of recognition of the country’s national sover-

⁵⁰ George Ventiris, *Greece in the years 1910-1920: A Historical Study*, vol. A (Athens: Ikaros, 1970), 224.

⁵¹ *Eleftheron Vima*, 21-10-1934.

⁵² Newspaper of the Debates of the Parliament, Minutes of debates of 21 September 1915.

⁵³ Giorgos Mavrogordatos, “Venizelism and Urban Modernization,” in *Venizelism and Urban Modernization*, eds. Giorgos Mavrogordatos–Christos Xatziiosif, (University Press of Crete: 1992).

eignty or promises for a future concession of the city of Monastery to Greece, had no appeal to anti-royalist political and military groups.⁵⁴ In September of 1916, the majority of Venizelos' supporters in the armed forces formed a revolutionary government in Thessaloniki, the Committee for National Defense, and established military and diplomatic relations with the forces of the Entente.⁵⁵

From the point of view of international diplomacy, the attitude of the Entente towards Venizelos and his followers was not united, as only Britain and France supported this revolutionary step politically and militarily, while Russia appeared to be ambivalent and Italy indifferent, as both acknowledged their own expansive aspirations in the Balkans. However, the non-de jure recognition of the government of Thessaloniki by the British and French, initially left some hope of reconciliation with King Constantine I, even at the last minute. However, it was the German and Bulgarian military invasion in the Balkans and the critical escalation of military operations of the Entente Powers in it, that forced the Allies to demand the unilateral cooperation of the Greek state. Since the royal government in Athens continued to insist on neutrality, a strict ultimatum was delivered to the appointed Prime Minister Stefanos Skouloudis, demanding, among others, the complete demilitarization of the palace – controlled military forces, the resignation of the Skouloudis government and the dissolution of the parliament in parallel with the announcement of new elections.⁵⁶

Of interest, is the rationale of the statement from the British Embassy. After accusing the government for being “hostile” and thus actually cooperating with the Germans, it looks back at the long-standing relations with the Greek state: “The hostile attitude of the Greek government towards the Allied Forces which liberated Greece from the yoke of foreigners and secured its independence,” act “based on the rights which derive from them from the treaties and were ratified in each case in order to protect the Greek people, whenever they were

⁵⁴ Ventiris, *op.cit.*, 110; General Panagiotis Daglis, *Memoirs-Documents-Correspondence*, vol. A (Athens: 1965), 164-6.

⁵⁵ George Leon, *Greece, and the Great Powers. 1914-1917* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, IMXA, 1974), 172; IaKovos Michailidis, *The Movement of National Defense* (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2015).

⁵⁶ *Scrip*, 4-5-1916, 10-5-1916.

threatened in the exercise of their duties and in the enjoyment of their freedoms.” The answer of the royalist forces in Athens through the *Scrip* newspaper certainly reflects the view shared by half of the Greek society at the given time: “The freedom and independence of the Greek State, which Greece did not receive as a gift from the three European Forces, but conquered through its blood and its pre-eternal struggles and sacrifices, was abolished yesterday [...] Since yesterday Greece is chained through the chains of its three Protecting Forces, England, France and Russia.” What is interesting is that the anti-Venizelist newspaper recognizes the role of the “protector” in the three Allied Forces. It is simply their presence, and their demands are interpreted as a violation of the “independence” of the Greek state.⁵⁷

As the royalist forces continued to control Greece’s southern parts and the pro-Venizelos’ supporters the northern ones, the country was indeed split into two separate entities. The French MP Paul Benazet tried to bridge this gap when he arrived in Athens on a mission to find a compromise solution. His proposal provided for the withdrawal from central Greece of the military forces controlled by the monarchy and the delivery of large quantities of military equipment. For their part, the French would respect the neutrality of Greece, while not allowing the Venizelos-controlled military forces to expand further south.⁵⁸ However, the militant anti-Venizelist newspaper portrayed them as: “They are not Allies, but mercenaries and traitors,” while the hated Eleftherios Venizelos “was surrounded by foreign spears.”⁵⁹ “Greece was born and raised with the help of the European Forces. But she owes her greatness only to herself,” they claimed. “It is the King and the national Army and the blood of her own people that made her great.”

Since both the civilian governments and the military leadership of the British and the French desired Greece to be on their side, on November 18, 1916, a force of 3,000 men from the Allied army arrived in the port of Piraeus and occupied strategic points in the capital. Forces loyal to King Constantine I resisted and battles ensued, resulting in

⁵⁷ *Scrip*, 9-6-1916.

⁵⁸ *Scrip*, 9-10-1916.

⁵⁹ *Scrip*, 12-11-1916.

dozens of dead and wounded on both sides.⁶⁰ In fact, the number of civilian casualties on the first day of hostilities was incalculable. With the withdrawal of the allied forces the next day, a period of “incurable blindness” began, followed by a terrible cycle of violence and persecution of the Venizelists in the capital, with dozens of victims and arrests. The deplorable situation and the bloodshed in Athens resulted in the dethronement of the “bloodthirsty” King.⁶¹

The strict blockade imposed by the English and French forces after November 25 in southern Greece aimed at forcing King Constantine I and his loyal military forces to succumb to Venizelos’ government. But the royalist officers refused to leave the capital under various pretexts, showing complete indifference to the lack of basic goods and the suffocating conditions that the naval blockade had brought.⁶² The delivery of an ultimatum by the French senator Charles Selestan Jonnart to the government of Alexandros Zaimis on April 21, 1917, left no room for misconceptions. In June 1917 King Constantine I and the royal family left the country, “for security reasons and the salvation of Greece,” leaving behind his son Alexander on the throne. King Constantine, however, did not submit his resignation, considering “his removal as temporary, as he expected with conviction that Germany would eventually win.”⁶³

The Venizelists, were completely identified and denounced by the military leaders of royalist group as an instrument of the “foreigners.” Pro-royalist General Ioannis Metaxas argued that “a spectacle like that of Mr. Venizelos, imposed by foreign forces, foreign armies and fleets, forced the Greek people to starve [in order] to accept his power, and when that failed, by using foreign spears to impose itself in his

⁶⁰ Yiannis Mourellos, *The “November Events” of 1916. From the Archive of the Mixed Commission for Indemnities to the Victims* (Athens: Patakis, 2007).

⁶¹ Ventiris, *op.cit.*, 289.

⁶² Government Gazette, no. 80, 28-4-1917. Through the legislative decree Minister Dimitrios Aeginitis states the rationale of the decision “[...] to save the tender and vulnerable youth [...] from the urgency of exhaustion, or the malnutrition and the scarcity of bread.”

⁶³ General Stylianos Gonatas, *Memoirs from his Military and Civil Public Life from 1897 to 1957* (Athens, 1958), 73.

homeland, a unique form of action at least in the recent history.”⁶⁴ For General Victor Dousmanis, “Greece came out of neutrality, not voluntarily but through the spreading violence of foreigners” and reversing the serious accusation of betrayal of national interests by the pro-royalists, he emphasizes that “Greece was betrayed by those she wanted to save it by engaging in warfare, because those who aimed at great and material gains did not spare the blood, money, prosperity and honor of their compatriots.”⁶⁵

It was such provisions, however, that sharpened the criticism of the anti-Venizelists, referring to their “foreign spear,” “allied spear” and “the praetorian spear.” According to Anastasios Charalambis, who was then collaborating with Prime Minister Venizelos, the type and the extent of control exercised by the French in the Greek army had caused a “discomfort” even to Venizelos himself. The latter was determined to “make a statement where he deems [: fit],” for Saraille “If he continues to interfere and refer to issues that do not immediately concern military operations, he should come to rule Greece, because Venizelos does not mean to tolerate such interference.”⁶⁶ The policy pursued by Venizelos now seemed to be a one-way street, in the sense that the situation in which the Greek state had found itself did not leave much room for diplomatic maneuver in the most critical phase of the war. And even though the country’s contribution to the efforts of the Entente in the Macedonian and Ukrainian battlefields in 1917 and 1919 respectively appeared to be greatly appreciated by the Allies,⁶⁷ the latter’s role in the expedition of the Greek Armed Forces in Asia Minor could not be considered as either friendly or neutral.

Conclusion

Modern Greece’s entrance into the world of sovereign states through the military intervention, “protection” and “guidance” of Great Powers

⁶⁴ *Kathimerini*, 18-12-1834.

⁶⁵ General Victor Dousmanis, *Memoirs: Historical moments as I lived them* (Athens: 1946), 148-9.

⁶⁶ Anastasios Charalampis, *Memories* (Athens: 1947), 67.

⁶⁷ Erich Ludendorff, *My War Memories, 1914-1918*, vol. II (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1919), 729.

meant that the interests of the country, as a small state, were not a priority when the overall international order, according to Great Powers, was at stake. The fate of the country as a small state remained in their eyes that of a bargaining chip and an easily movable piece in the equilibrium of power politics in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, whenever the Greek political and military leadership either ignored or failed to understand the designs and the geo-political and geo-strategic plans and goals of Great Powers, not only the country's sovereign status but also its social, political, and economic well-being were put into enormous calamities. The individual acts of bravado by domestic political and military actors who seemed to be entrenched into a romantic view of international power politics, at the end would cost them, personally, to the people, and the country quite dearly. Most of the naval blockades imposed by the Great Powers and their repercussions, for example, would be averted if the domestic actors had moved away from the myopic view of international power struggle in the region. Similarly, the Asia Minor disaster in the early 1920s and the Civil War in the mid-1940s, could have been avoided if Greek political and military leaders had learned a lesson from past behaviors and actions of their "protective" Allies. Whether the Greeks have moved into the world of realism, might be a question pending an answer even into the 21st century.

*Maria Ntisi**

**The Treaty of Lausanne during the Three Days of Its Signing
as Reported by the Newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix* (National Herald)¹**

In this paper, we chose to study the newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix* (*Εθνικός Κήρυξ* means National Herald), a Greek newspaper in the United States of America, which was founded on April 2, 1915, in New York by Petros T. Tatanis, and more specifically the issues published during the three-day period of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, July 24-26, 1923. It was a Venizelist newspaper founded as a counterbalance to the pro-monarchist Greek newspaper in the United States *Atlantis*, in an attempt to break its monopoly. The editor-in-chief was Dimitrios Kalimachos.² In February 1915, the government of Eleftherios Venizelos resigned. The cause was his disagreement with King Constantine I over Greece's stance in World War I. While Venizelos advocated for Greece's entry alongside the Anglo-French Entente, hoping for concessions that would serve the territorial claims of the Great Idea, Constantine favored Greek neutrality for both strategic reasons and because he was widely seen as pro-German. Thus, began the National Schism, which kept Greek political life divided for another twenty-five years, until the outbreak of World War II.

The title *Ethnikos Kyrix* as well as the newspaper's logo were based on Venizelos' newspaper *Kyrix*, which was published in Chania. The word "Ethnikos" was added to show that the newspaper was not only for the Greeks in New York, but for all Greeks in the United States. The first issue was released on April 2, 1915, and cost two cents. The eight-column headline was "Interview of Venizelos with Ethnikos Kyrix. He Would Make Greece Equal to Italy." This headline was a direct

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¹ The newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix* was found in the Digital Library of the Hellenic Parliament, <https://library.parliament.gr/>

² «Ποιος είναι ο Εθνικός Κήρυκας» (Who is Ethnikos Kyrix), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, <https://www.ekirikas.com/about-page/> (accessed 10-8-2023).

reference to the vision of “Greater Greece” as Venizelos envisioned it, at a time when Italy had ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. It reflected the newspaper’s goals, namely, to support Venizelos and contribute to the struggle for Greek territorial claims.³

Tatanis, indeed, fought vigorously for the goals of Venizelism, the completion of the Great Idea, and the internal reconstruction of Greece, based on the principles represented by the Liberal Party. He was among the ranks of the Liberal organization in New York, maintaining continuous contact with Venizelos and the leadership of the party in Athens. When needed, he acted alone to advocate Greece’s positions in the United States, leveraging the authority entitled by his role as the director of the newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix*. A few days after the destruction of Smyrna, Tatanis sent an urgent telegram to the American President Warren G. Harding. He highlighted the dangers the Greek community in Eastern Thrace would face in the event of an attack by Turkish forces, stating that there were seventy-five thousand trained American citizens, including himself, ready to take up arms to prevent such a scenario. Due to financial difficulties, Tatanis sold the newspaper to the tobacco industrialist Evripidis Kehayas in 1933 but nonetheless remained with the newspaper until 1939. The Greek state honored him for his immense contribution by awarding him the Golden Cross of the Savior. He passed away at the age of 75 in 1959 in New York.⁴

In 1947, the company was taken over by Babis Marketos, while in 1976, Eugenios Rossidis, Deputy Minister of Finance of the United States, and in 1979, Antonios H. Diamataris took over. In 1982, *Ethnikos Kyrix* moved from Manhattan to its own facilities in Long Island City. The company also maintained offices in Boston, Athens, Nicosia, and Tripoli. In 1984, it acquired high-speed presses. It inaugurated its weekly English-language edition, *The National Herald*, which experienced overnight success and quickly gained significant circulation levels. In 2002, it started home delivery to subscribers in New York and more broadly on the East Coast. In 2003, it expanded its deliveries to

³ Alexandros Kitroef, «Ο Πέτρος Τατάνης, ο Εθνικός Κήρυξ και ο βενιζελισμός στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες» (Petros Tatanis, *Ethnikos Kyrix* and Venizelism in the United States), *Patris News*, 15-4-2015, <https://www.patrisnews.com/o-petros-tatanis-o-ethnikos-kiryx-o-venizelismos-stis-inomenes-politeies/> (accessed 10-8-2023).

⁴ Kitroef, op.cit.

subscribers in the New England area. In 2004, it launched its own website. In a historically significant development for the Greek-American community, the city of New York renamed the street in front of the *Ethnikos Kyrix*'s headquarters in Queens to "Ethnikos Kyrix–National Herald Way." In 2019, Heraklis A. Diamataris, son of Antonios H. Diamataris, took up the reins.⁵

The Content of the Treaty of Lausanne according to Ethnikos Kyrix

According to the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, which comprised 143 articles subdivided into five parts, namely political, fiscal, economic, communication, and general provisions, Constantinople would definitively come under Turkish sovereignty. All foreign troops in Turkey would withdraw. Peace between Greece and Turkey would be restored. Regarding the Patriarchate, the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church was authorized to remain in Constantinople.⁶ More specifically, regarding the status that would apply henceforth to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Venizelos stated that the Ecumenical Patriarchate would remain in Constantinople with all its spiritual and ecclesiastical authority intact. Its administrative jurisdiction would be the only one removed, which was separate from its ecclesiastical jurisdiction.⁷ The Treaty included

⁵ «Ποιος είναι ο Εθνικός Κήρυκας», *op.cit.*

⁶ «Τα 143 άρθρα της Συνθήκης της Ειρήνης. Και η ανταλλαγή των πληθυσμών μέρος της γενικής συνθήκης» (The 143 Articles of the Peace Treaty. And the Population Exchange as Part of the General Treaty), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁷ «Ομιλεί ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος. Τα μεγάλα ζητήματα. Η ανταλλαγή των πληθυσμών. – Οι εκπατρισθέντες πρόσφυγες αποζημιώνονται. – Η θέση του Πατριαρχείου. – Το έθνος οφείλει αιωνίαν ευγνωμοσύνην εις την επανάστασιν. Το ζήτημα του Πατριάρχου» (Eleftherios Venizelos Speaks. The Major Issues. The Population Exchange. – The Expatriated Refugees Are Compensated. – The Position of the Patriarchate. – The Nation Owes Eternal Gratitude to the Revolution. The Patriarch Issue), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923; However, Patriarch Meletius IV resigned at that time and left Constantinople. Regarding the departure of the "great champion of the nation," the Byzantine press dedicated deeply moving descriptions. His farewell was accompanied by touching events organized by the Greek community of Constantinople. Many Turkish citizens also honored him. For this see «Παραδόσεις αυτοθυσίας. Η αποχώρησις του Πατριάρχου» (Traditions of Self-Sacrifice. The Departure of the Patriarch), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 27-7-1923.

one of the harshest and most inhumane population exchanges, as it mandated the exchange of Greeks in Turkey with Turks in Greece.⁸

Regarding the Armenians, the issue wasn't resolved by the Treaty. Armenians were forced to seek refuge in neighboring countries, such as Syria, or seek a new homeland in southern Russia. The mandates over Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, which were permanently detached from the Turkish Empire, were recognized.⁹ The documents also included the Convention determining the status of the Turkish Straits, to be signed by Russia and Bulgaria, as well as a separate agreement on the borders of Thrace, trade and amnesty agreements, protocols on concessions, minority rights, judicial guarantees for foreigners, and documents of interest to Belgium and Portugal regarding certain parts of the Treaty.¹⁰

Yugoslavia announced at the last minute that it refused to sign the Treaty because it would harm its national interests.¹¹ As stated, the reason was that they did not approve and considered unacceptable the economic and fiscal conditions related to the distribution of the

⁸ «Τα 143 άρθρα», op.cit.

⁹ «Τα 143 άρθρα», op.cit.

¹⁰ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι παραμένουν εν Λωζάννη διά την Τουρκοαμερικανικήν Συνθήκην. Η απλή τελετή της υπογραφής και ο επιβλητικός πανηγυρισμός εν Λωζάννη. Η Γιουγκοσλαυία δεν υπέγραψε την Συνθήκην. Οι πληρεξούσιοι ευχαριστούν την ελβετικήν κυβέρνησιν διά την φιλοξενίαν της» (The Americans and the Turks Remain in Lausanne for the Turkish-American Treaty. The Simple Signing Ceremony and the Imposing Celebration in Lausanne. Yugoslavia Did not Sign the Treaty. The Delegates Thank the Swiss Government for Its Hospitality), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

¹¹ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι» (The Americans and the Turks), op.cit.; «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται σήμερον εις την Λωζάννην. Η Σερβία δεν θα υπογράψη την ειρήνην. Επίσημον γεύμα της ελβετικής κυβερνήσεως προς τους αντιπροσώπους» (The Peace Treaty is Being Signed Today in Lausanne. Serbia Will not Sign the Treaty. Official Banquet by the Swiss Government for the Delegates), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923; «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής υπεγράφη χθες μετά μεσημβρίαν εν Λωζάννη. – 7 Δυνάμεις υπέγραψαν το έγγραφον πλην της Γιουγκοσλαυίας. – Τα θεμελιώδη σημεία του νέου καθεστώτος της Εγγύς Ανατολής» (The Eastern Peace Treaty Was Signed Yesterday Afternoon in Lausanne. – 7 Powers Signed the Document except Yugoslavia. – The Fundamental Points of the New Regime in the Near East), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

Ottoman public debt.¹² The Treaty apportioned the Ottoman debt among the countries that, like Yugoslavia, had occupied part of the former Turkish Empire. Yugoslavia claimed that it annexed the former Turkish territories following the Balkan Wars and not as a result of the European War or the Greek-Turkish War. Therefore, it preferred to adhere to the conditions of the London and Bucharest Treaties, which had determined the political status of the Balkans.¹³ The Serbians were prepared to sign with reservations, but the leaders in the Conference deemed this impossible. After the Treaty's signing, an open protocol would allow for negotiations to continue with Serbia.¹⁴ Ultimately, it was agreed to negotiate directly with the European powers regarding potential obligations stemming from the Turkish loan.¹⁵

On July 23, Poland and Turkey conspired to establish a new treaty. The representatives of the two countries signed three documents: the general agreement, which restored friendly relations, a trade agreement based on most favored nation status, and additionally, a commercial nature document. This latter document included some terms of the Treaty of Lausanne.¹⁶

According to the newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix*, Italian newspapers were writing articles in favor of the immediate and without further delay annexation of the Dodecanese. It was observed that, following the decisions made at the Lausanne Conference and after Italy's resignations in Asia Minor and other areas and following the distribution of German colonies between France and England, Italy could not make any further resignations or sacrifices. They recalled the cultural work Italy accomplished during its decade-long occupation of the Dodecanese, asserting that the islanders themselves awaited the decree of annexation to finalize their status definitively.¹⁷

¹² «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής», *op.cit.*; «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*

¹³ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

¹⁴ «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*

¹⁵ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

¹⁶ «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*

¹⁷ «Συζήτησις εις την Ιταλίαν περί προσαρτήσεως της Δωδεκανήσου» (Discussion in Italy Regarding the Annexation of the Dodecanese), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923.

Among the issues that could have been tangential discussions within the framework of the Treaty of Lausanne was the Cyprus matter. *Ethnikos Kyrix* referred to a resolution by the National Assembly of Cypriots under the presidency of the Archbishop, through which a protest was raised against the existing administration of the island. The resolution still demanded the union of Cyprus with Greece, as well as the abolition of the subjugation tax. There had been no response to this resolution yet because the government deemed it prudent to await the delegation sent to London.¹⁸

The Christians residing in the neutral zone of the Straits received a warning from the French and English about the imminent withdrawal of the Allied forces and were advised to prepare themselves. They were to either leave or stay in their homes. However, eyewitnesses arriving from Dardanelles testified that new French reinforcements were arriving daily in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and that the British, despite their statements about their impending withdrawal, showed no inclination to leave from various points along the Straits. On the contrary, the measures being taken indicated their intentions for permanent settlement.¹⁹ Regarding the departure of the representatives, the English delegation left for England on the night of July 24. The others would depart the following day, leaving only the Americans and the Turks, who were still engaged in negotiations for the Turkish-American treaty.²⁰

The main points of the protocol concerning the evacuation of the Turkish territories by Allied troops, which was annexed to the general Peace Treaty, were as follows: firstly, the evacuation would commence immediately following the ratification of the Treaty by the Turkish

¹⁸ «Το Ζήτημα της Κύπρου εις την Βουλὴν τῶν Κοινοτήτων» (The Cyprus Issue in the House of Commons), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923.

¹⁹ «Ἡ Κωνσταντινούπολις εορτάζει. Τριπλὸς πανηγυρισμὸς τῆς ἐπετείου τοῦ Συντάγματος, τῆς υπογραφῆς τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ τῆς ἐξίσωσης τῆς Τουρκίας πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα κυρίαρχα κράτη. Προειδοποίησις τῶν Συμμάχων πρὸς τοὺς κατοικοὺς τῶν Στενῶν. Γαλλικαὶ ἐνισχύσεις εἰς τὴν χερσόνησον τῆς Καλλιπόλεως» (Constantinople celebrates. Triple Celebration of the Anniversary of the Constitution, the Signing of the Peace Treaty, and the Recognition of Turkey as Equal to Other Sovereign States. Allies' Warning to the Inhabitants of the Straits. French Reinforcements on the Gallipoli Peninsula), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923.

²⁰ «Οἱ Ἀμερικάνοι καὶ οἱ Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

National Assembly. The evacuation should be completed within a period of six weeks. Secondly, during the evacuation, all movable and immovable property, which was used by the Allies and belonged to the Turkish government, would be transferred to the Turkish authorities. Thirdly, all seized or confiscated property would be returned to their rightful owners. Fourthly, all warships, including Goeben, would be returned to Turkey, as well as all artillery guns removed from the warship Ümit and other Turkish vessels. Fifthly, from the signing of the protocol, the resale outside of Turkey of any item belonging to the Turkish government and used by the Allied forces was prohibited. Sixthly, England and Turkey mutually guaranteed the preservation of the regime between Turkish and Iraqi borders. Negotiations between England and Turkey on this matter would commence upon the completion of the evacuation.²¹

The Day of the Signing of the Treaty of Lausanne

The Treaty of Lausanne, aiming at restoring peace in the Middle East, would be signed on July 24, bearing the signatures of Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Romania, and Turkey.²² The large number of documents of the Treaty indicated that the Near East Conference had worked extensively.²³ It would be signed by Mustafa İsmet İnönü for Turkey, who was performing the duties of Deputy Foreign Minister, Sir Horace Rumbold for England, General Maurice César Joseph Pellé for France, and M. Giulio Cesare Montagna for Italy.²⁴ All the delegates jointly sent a letter of thanks to President Karl Scheurer of the Swiss Confederation, who was the head of the Conference, for the hospitality shown to them. The letter included Switzerland's longstanding desire for peace, concluding with the observation that this Treaty marked the definitive establishment of world peace.²⁵

²¹ «Οι Όροι της εκκενώσεως της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως και των Στενών» (The Terms of the Evacuation of Constantinople and the Straits), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

²² «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

²³ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

²⁴ «Ποιοι θα υπογράψουν την Συνθήκην της Ειρήνης» (Who Will Sign the Peace Treaty), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923.

²⁵ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

On July 23, a grand banquet was hosted by the Swiss Government to celebrate peace. Presided over by President Scheurer, the banquet was attended by all the delegates of the Conference, including the American Ambassador, Joseph Grew. On July 24, at 3 p.m., the peace signing ceremony took place in the grand and imposing hall of the University of Lausanne,²⁶ in the Lumières Palace,²⁷ with the proverbial Swiss simplicity.²⁸ The hall and the area around the building were adorned with flags, while formally dressed guards had taken charge of maintaining order. Approximately five hundred people, including local government officials and representatives of the Swiss authorities in Lausanne, attended the ceremony.²⁹ The delegates sat on either side of the president's seat, with the Allies on the right and the Turks on the left, next to whom also sat the American Ambassador, Joseph Grew.³⁰ President Scheurer, accompanied by his advisors, Vice President Ernest Chuard and Foreign Minister Edmund Schultz, entered the hall, opened the session,³¹ and promptly requested the delegates to sign the Treaty and the other documents.³² Then he delivered a brief speech,³³ addressing the delegates of the Conference in Lausanne, expressing the hope that the signing of the agreed Treaty would mark the beginning of the restoration of general peace and the relief of humanity from the anxieties, fears, and dangers of further armed conflicts among nations.³⁴ Subsequently, the representatives signed the various peace documents.³⁵ Ismet Pasha signed first on behalf of Turkey, followed by the Allies.

²⁶ «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*; «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής», *op.cit.*; «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

²⁷ «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής», *op.cit.*

²⁸ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

²⁹ «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής», *op.cit.*

³⁰ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

³¹ «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής», *op.cit.* «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

³² «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

³³ «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*

³⁴ «Πανζουρλισμός εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει. 101 κανονιοβολισμοί, φωταψίαι, λαμπαδηφορίαι, σφυρίγματα των πλοίων κλπ.» (Festivities in Constantinople. 101 Cannon Salutes, Illuminations, Torchlight Processions, Ship Horns, etc.), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923; «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

³⁵ «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*

When the signing process was completed, President Scheurer rose and, speaking in French, briefly but emphatically praised the work of the Conference and expressed his hope that peace would now be definitively and permanently restored.³⁶ In the end, he wished: “May the last session prove blessed.”³⁷ The entire simple ceremony concluded within an hour. An informal reception followed, hosted by the Allied representatives in the garden of the Baur au Lac hotel.³⁸

Regarding the aftermath of the Treaty in Turkey, special significance was attributed to the celebration, not only because it coincided with the anniversary of the proclamation of the Constitution of 1908, but also because the signing of the Peace Treaty was considered a precursor of a larger celebration, which was to take place the next day. The press emphasized on the fortunate coincidence of these two events, stating that although that day, the 24th, marked the anniversary of the nation’s liberation from the despotism of Sultan Abdulhamid II, the next day would remain in Turkish history as the date when Turkey established its internal freedom by ensuring its external recognition as a nation equal to other sovereign states. The city was festively decorated, with the streets of Pera and other European neighborhoods adorned in red with Turkish flags, and all the shops were closed. The celebrations were imposing, featuring numerous military parades, salutes with one hundred and one cannon shots, and the ships in the harbor blowing their whistles for hours. At the same time, the muezzins called the believers to the mosques, where special prayers were recited for those who fell in the last war. At night, there were torchlight processions in the city streets, accompanied by music and cheerful emblems.³⁹

In Lausanne, too, the signing of the Treaty was treated as a celebration. A grand display took place to commemorate the signing of the Treaty. The crowds in the streets, many of whom had come from rural areas, were joyful. The dome and the belfry of the cathedral were illuminated, visible from many miles away on both shores of the lake,

³⁶ «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής», *op.cit.*

³⁷ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι», *op.cit.*

³⁸ «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής», *op.cit.*

³⁹ «Κράτη» (States), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923. «Πανζουρλισμός εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει», *op.cit.*

while spotlights shed light over the surrounding hills. The hotels and all other buildings were adorned, with some of them displaying oversized illuminated signs bearing the Latin word PAX, meaning peace. A large crowd gathered at the University, with thousands of people crowding wherever they could near the amphiteatrical-shaped building. Many elegantly dressed ladies added a beautiful touch of color inside the hall.⁴⁰ They were not wrong to celebrate the event. After the Turks, the residents of Lausanne were the ones who benefited most from the peace negotiations, as for nine months they hosted in their city the large delegations of the various contracting countries, from the stay of which they financially profited.⁴¹

In Athens, the signing of the Peace Treaty did not provoke enthusiasm. It was inconceivable for it to be celebrated. It was not greeted with bell-ringing or other events as it had happened during the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres. However, liturgies and memorials were held in honor of those who fell during the war.⁴² During the memorials, which took place wherever there were Greeks, they expressed their gratitude for the great sacrifice made by the defenders of the honor and rights of the homeland. They also expressed their determination to restore the work of those who were sacrificed, which “had been allowed to be destroyed.” An observation that made a clear insinuation about the National Division and the harm it caused to the homeland. They should have dedicated themselves to its service and worship. This duty was imposed on them by the sacred memory of all those who fought and died defending their faith and homeland.⁴³

As reported by the newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix*, the correspondent of *The Times* in Athens claimed that the Greek people were relieved by the signing of the Peace Treaty because the curtain fell on the Asia Minor drama, and they were glad they could now focus their attention on

⁴⁰ «Οι Αμερικάνοι και οι Τούρκοι» (The Americans and the Turks), op.cit. “Οι Παναγηγυρισμοί της Λαζάννης (The Celebrations in Lausanne),” *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁴¹ «Οι Παναγηγυρισμοί», op.cit.

⁴² «Η εντόπωσις εκ της ειρήνης εις τας Αθήνας. Η προσοχή του λαού συνεκεντρώθη εις τα εσωτερικά ζητήματα» (The Impact of the Peace Treaty in Athens. The Public’s Attention Focused on Domestic Issues), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923; «Μνημόσυνα» (Memorial Services), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

⁴³ «Μνημόσυνα», op.cit.

settling internal matters.⁴⁴ Venizelos, announcing to the Greek government the signing of the Peace Treaty, stated that the Revolution should be proud of its accomplishment.⁴⁵ He had formulated that the Great Powers, as well as the Greek side, faced a *fait accompli*, the rectification of which could only be achieved through a new war, and as he reminded, neither side wanted the war to continue. They had theoretically supported the Greek side only, but not offering anything more.⁴⁶ They strongly supported Greece from the outset, but they were not willing neither to undertake war nor to nullify the peace negotiations.⁴⁷ *Ethnikos Kyrix* supported Venizelos' opinion that he had the right to be proud of the work accomplished, commenting as follows:

“The signed treaty, of course, was not the one the Greeks dreamed and desired. The peace envisioned by the noble and immortal warriors of Greece, as they tirelessly fought and fell gloriously on the battlefields for years, was of a vastly different nature. They believed that their struggles and the immeasurable blood they poured upon the earth without restraint aimed at the creation of a grand and mighty homeland, and the liberation of all its enslaved offspring. They had indeed momentarily rejoiced to see their longing fulfilled. Many of them had celebrated three years earlier the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, that treaty which, among other nations, restored the revered Greece of the five seas. And it was inconceivable that after about three years, Greece of the five seas would be restricted to the extent that the Treaty signed in Lausanne limited it. The national losses imposed upon us by this Treaty are immense and dreadful and it is impossible for the signing of it to bring any joy or enthusiasm among Greeks worldwide. And yet, the Revolution is entitled to pride itself on

⁴⁴ «Η Εντύπωσις εκ της ειρήνης», *op.cit.*

⁴⁵ «Ο Βενιζέλος αγγέλλει την υπογραφήν της ειρήνης. Η Επανάστασις πρέπει να είνε υπερήφανος διά το έργον της» (Venizelos Announces the Signing of the Peace Treaty. The Revolution Should Be Proud of Its Accomplishment), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923; «Και αληθώς δικαιούται» (And indeed deserves), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

⁴⁶ «Το έθνος οφείλει αιωνίαν ευγνωμοσύνην εις την Επανάστασιν» (The Nation Owes Eternal Gratitude to the Revolution), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

⁴⁷ «Ομιλεί ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος», *op.cit.*

succeeding in limiting the losses and misfortunes of the nation. There was absolutely no doubt that without the Revolution, the nation's miseries and losses would have been infinitely greater and more painful. Instead, they were averted by its actions, while its effectiveness ensured the signing of a treaty that resulted in Greece bordering Evros. If the Revolution had not timely organized the heroic army of Thrace, which stood guard unwaveringly and steadfastly in Evros for nine months, Evros would now be history for Greece. Only the Revolution itself, and no other, secured the present borders. And that army was undeniably the exclusive creation of the Revolution, entitling it to pride itself on achieving a peace vastly better than that which the criminal actions of the post-November traitors of Greece had destined for them.⁴⁸

Venizelos stated that the expulsion of the populations of Asia Minor was not a consequence of the exchange agreement but had already taken place a long time ago. What the Greek side sought through the agreement, and eventually achieved with Turkey's consent, was the removal of Muslims from Greece, facilitating the resettlement of Greek refugees and providing Greece with the means to compensate Greek refugees for the properties they left behind in Turkey. Without the agreement, their properties would have been confiscated and, additionally, they would not have received any compensation from Greece, as the removal of Muslims would not have taken place. No one was willing to go to war with Turkey to repatriate them and additionally be forced to protect them in the future against the Turkish government. Regarding the question of whether there was any significance to the circulating notion that without the agreement refugees could return, Venizelos emphasized that even without the agreement, they still couldn't return without securing permission from the Turkish government. And now, the agreement in no way prevented them from returning if they still secured Turkish permission. However, with the Treaty, the returnees would also end up with some property from the compensation they would receive from Greece. The population exchange agreement was not the

⁴⁸ «Και αληθώς δικαιούται», *op.cit.*

international act under which Greeks were expelled from Turkey, but it was the international act under which Muslims in Greece were expelled to facilitate the resettlement of Greek refugees and make their compensation feasible.⁴⁹ The Revolution, which had managed to organize the Greek army, provided the Greek delegation in Lausanne with the means to effectively defend the country's interests and achieve a fair peace agreement. Without it, "led by fugitives and deserters, the filthy goat stealers 'Plastirogonatades,' Greece would have been forced to accept Kemal in Athens to sign the treaty there, limiting the boundaries of the Greek state to the famous Menidi. Greece's relationship with Entente was favorable. Relations with Serbia and Romania were very friendly and the assistance they provided was invaluable."⁵⁰ He recommended the cessation of internal divisions through the conduct of free elections. The Mayor of Athens congratulated Eleftherios Venizelos on signing the Peace Treaty.⁵¹

The Treaty: Humiliating for the Allies

The fact that members of the Allied delegations hurried to depart from Lausanne immediately after the signing of the Peace Treaty, even before the planned nighttime torchlight procession held in their honor by the municipal authorities had begun, was not unusual.⁵²

The President of the Swiss Confederation had remarked that the signed Treaty indeed required painful sacrifices from all parties involved, attributing their acceptance of these sacrifices to their desire to contribute to the establishment of complete and general peace. The newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix*, which argued that the Treaty bringing peace did not necessarily signify victory or success, commented that it was impossible for the President of the Swiss Confederation to have spoken differently. It was indeed his duty not to let the opportunity afforded to him to express the desire and convey the wish for the restoration of

⁴⁹ «Το έθνος οφείλει», *op.cit.*

⁵⁰ «Ομιλεί ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος», *op.cit.*; The term "Plastirogonatades" (Πλαστηρογονατάδες in Greek) refers to the Greek military and political figures Nikolaos Plastiras and Colonel Stylianos Gonatas.

⁵¹ «Ο Βενιζέλος αγγάλλει», *op.cit.*

⁵² «Μετά σπουδής αναχώρησις» (With a quick departure), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

general peace slip. However, he added that it was impossible for President Scheurer to ignore that the sacrifices the Allies agreed to submit to in Lausanne, the humiliation they experienced by being forced to yield to the wishes, demands, and idiosyncrasies of the Turks were not driven by the desire to restore general peace, but by their own desire to rid themselves of an annoying distraction so they could dedicate all their time and energies to the struggles that generated greater interest. The whole world knew, and it would have been impossible for the President of the Swiss Confederation not to know, that the outcomes of the negotiations in Lausanne were as dismal and pathetic as portrayed by the signed Treaty, due to the disagreements prevailing among the Allies, especially between England and France. The disagreements were not limited solely to the issues settled by the Lausanne Conference but also spread to matters entirely unrelated to its tasks. The disagreement over these latter issues was the source of all the trouble that occurred in Lausanne during the nine-month period of the Conference's proceedings.⁵³

It was emphasized that just as the Turkish victory in Lausanne was highlighted by the world press, it would be fair to point out that the Turks owed the nine-tenths of their victory to the assistance of France. France maintained its stance in favor of Turkey due to the English reaction to the implementation of the French plans against Germany. However, the French government was willing to sacrifice Turkey entirely, despite the Ankara Agreement, and even Henry Franklin Bouillon's promises to Kemal Atatürk, if it secured the support or even just the tolerance of England in its occupation and indefinite maintenance of the German region of the Ruhr. But England appeared adamant on this issue. England chose to sacrifice its interests in the Middle East rather than negotiate with the French Prime Minister. It regarded the French occupation of the Ruhr as significantly more damaging to vital English interests. The signing of the Peace Treaty, which relieved England of the concerns and responsibilities of every subsequent anomaly in the Middle East, provided it with the opportunity to focus its attention and interest on resolving the Franco-German differences in a manner corresponding to its conceptions and interests. Already after the signing of the Treaty, a disputative period between England and France began,

⁵³ «Ο μέγας αγών» (The Great Struggle), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

a period characterized by great crises and utmost risks not only with regard to the relations of the two great countries, but also for peace in Europe, the restoration of which the President of the Swiss Confederation dutifully wished for. It was a wish shared by all, but no one could foresee to what extent it would be achievable. The coming days would show whether there was assurance of the restoration of general peace or if they were on the eve of a new general disturbance. It would depend on the response the French Prime Minister was preparing to give to the proposed plan for the settlement of German reparations put forward by England.⁵⁴

As commented, the reason the English representatives departed for London almost immediately⁵⁵ was that they “would be ashamed to prolong their stay in a place where they had committed the most shameful act.”⁵⁶ The party of Lloyd George hosted a celebratory banquet in the House of Commons in support of this issue. Former British Prime Minister, speaking at a gathering of National Liberals, followers of his Liberal Party, strongly condemned the Coalition government for its policy on the Ruhr issue, as well as for the Treaty of Lausanne, which he characterized as the most humiliating of all treaties ever signed by England.⁵⁷

The newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix* referenced the *Daily Chronicles* newspaper of England, which had expressed profound discontent with the English government for endorsing the Treaty of Lausanne. The

⁵⁴ «Ο μέγας αγών», op.cit.; «Η ασυμφωνία των Συμμάχων κακόν ολέθριον. – Ενθαρρύνει την Γερμανίαν εις την προσπάθειαν όπως καταπατήση τας εκ της Συνθήκης των Βερσαλλιών υποχρεώσεις της» (The Allies' Disagreement: A Grave Danger. – It Encourages Germany in Its Attempt to Violate Its Obligations from the Versailles Treaty), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁵⁵ «Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής», op.cit.

⁵⁶ «Μετά σπουδής», op.cit.

⁵⁷ «Ο Λούδ Τζωρτζ χαρακτηρίζει την Τουρκικήν Συνθήκην ως την ταπεινωτικωτέραν της Αγγλίας» (Lloyd George Describes the Turkish Treaty as the Most Humiliating for England), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923; «Ο Λούδ Τζωρτζ επικρίνει την κυβέρνησιν. Η Αγγλία συνήψε την ταπεινωτικωτέραν συνθήκην, ην υπέγραψε ποτέ. – Οι Γάλλοι κατέλαβον το Ρουρ ένεκα της αδυναμίας της παρούσης κυβερνήσεως» (Lloyd George Criticizes the Government. England Has Concluded the Most Humiliating Treaty it Has Ever Signed. – The French Occupied the Ruhr due to the Weakness of the Current Government), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923.

Treaty was considered humiliating for England and was seen not as a peace agreement but as a victory for the Turks. Therefore, the sacrifices during the war proved futile, and a negligible state was imposed upon the Allies due to machinations and rivalries among the Great Powers, which, beginning with the so-called Treaty of Bouillon and the covert support of Turkey by France against Greece, culminated in the humiliation of the Allies. *The Times*, as *Ethnikos Kyrix* wrote, had expressed the opinion that while the Treaty of Lausanne, at first glance appeared as a model of justice and magnanimity, yet it bore numerous dark aspects such as the abandonment of the Armenians and the population exchange. What remained to be seen was how the Kemalists, who proved to differ a little in their methods from Sultan Abdulhamid, would treat the freedom and independence secured by the signed Treaty.⁵⁸

Former Deputy Minister of Finance Mr. Hills and former head of the British mission in Greece, Admiral Smith, published in *The Times* a heartfelt plea on behalf of the refugees, whose dire situation, they stated, England bore responsibility for, as they became victims of their dedicated commitment to the Allies' struggle. *The Times*, in a prominent article, strongly advocated for the aforementioned appeal, emphasizing that the Greek and Armenian refugees were the victims of the Treaty with Turkey;⁵⁹ they were victims of England and the Allies.⁶⁰ The columnist reminded that the liberation of the Greeks and Armenians was one of the purposes of the war, which the Allies had so emphatically proclaimed. Believing in these allied pledges, Greek and Armenian refugees returned to their homes and supported the Allies against the Turks.⁶¹ Having placed their trust in the promises of their liberation,

⁵⁸ «Αγανάκτησις του αγγλικού τύπου διά την ταπεινωτικήν ειρήνην. Οι ηττημένοι Τούρκοι επέτυχον όρους νικητών» (The Indignation of the British Press over the Humiliating Peace. The Defeated Turks Achieved Terms of Victors), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁵⁹ «Εκκλησις επιφανών Αγγλων υπέρ του προσφυγικού δανείου. Η υποστήριξις του δανείου υποχρέωσις του αγγλικού έθνους» (Appeal from Prominent English Figures in Support of the Refugee Loan. Supporting the Loan is a Duty of the English Nation), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923; «Τα θύματα των Συμμάχων» (The Victims of the Allies), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

⁶⁰ «Τα θύματα», *op.cit.*

⁶¹ «Εκκλησις επιφανών», *op.cit.*

they emerged as the most fervent supporters of the Allied cause. This circumstance provoked the ferocity of the Turks against them in those months. However, the Allies proved unfaithful to their promises. Not only did they fail to liberate and protect them, but they also shamefully betrayed them, abandoning them to their mercy.⁶² The Turks rejected the Treaty of Sevres and the Greek King along with his “vain” advisors deemed it appropriate to strengthen the dynasty by defeating the age-old enemy. Their efforts, however, ended in dismal failure. The victorious Turks approached the Christians abandoned by the Allies, viewing them as relics of the past. Some were murdered, others were taken as captives to their harems. Greece welcomed the remainder as refugees, struggling to sustain them. It was incumbent, therefore, upon the English people to assist.⁶³ The provision of some assistance for the care of the refugees and for securing their settlement would be the least the Allied governments could do to partially rectify the terrible and unforgivable injustice they committed.⁶⁴

The newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix*, which aligned itself with the English side and opposed the French pro-Turkish stance, expressed that it was undeniable that the English government genuinely desired a friendly resolution of the issue. Despite France’s reaction to the satisfactory resolution of the Turkish issues, it was the earnest desire of the English government to maintain an intact friendship and alliance with France. On the other hand, the English government had made it clear that while it might tolerate sacrificing its interests in the Middle East for the sake of this alliance, it was by no means willing to sacrifice its interests in Europe and allow French hegemony in the continent.⁶⁵

British diplomacy boasted about its second diplomatic victory within three months regarding the Russian matter, compelling Russia to accept the Treaty of Lausanne regarding the Turkish Straits. The first diplomatic victory was considered Moscow’s concession in Lord Curzon’s telegram on May 8 regarding the dispute over fishing rights and the treatment of British subjects in Russia. Circles within the Foreign

⁶² «Τα θύματα», op.cit.

⁶³ «Εκκλησις επιφανών», op.cit.

⁶⁴ «Τα θύματα», op.cit.

⁶⁵ «Ο μέγας αγών», op.cit.

Office attributed the success to Lord Curzon, who possessed a profound understanding of the situation and wielded personal influence. This influence played a crucial role in persuading the Soviets to agree to the Treaty of Lausanne, despite their partial participation in the Conference. The British officials reminded that at the outset of the Lausanne Conference, Russia was only obligated to participate in the session addressing the Straits issue. As a result, this automatically meant the exclusion of the Russians during the Conference. British officials stated that the Foreign Secretary assured his government consistently about the outcome, insisting confidently that the Russians would sign the Treaty.⁶⁶

A question was raised in the House of Commons in London regarding whether the concessions of the Turkish Petroleum Company were affected by the Peace Treaty with the Turks, following the concession made to Chester. The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, MacNeil, responded that the Treaty does not include specific terms related to the concessions of the Turkish Petroleum Company and that the company's claims are not affected by the Treaty. The British government, as he added, considered that the obligations undertaken by the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1914 remained valid even after the Treaty of Lausanne.⁶⁷

The Americans and the Refugee Regime

The American newspapers that did not fail to editorialize on the Peace Treaty –and these constituted the majority– contented themselves with accompanying the event with sarcasm and acerbic comments, characterizing the signed Treaty as evidence of the moral decline of the Allied countries. The newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix* emphasized that they were

⁶⁶ «Συζήτησις εις την αγγλικήν Βουλήν διά τας παραχωρήσεις. Τα δικαιώματα της Εταιρείας των Τουρκικών Πετρελαίων δεν επηρεάζονται υπό της Συνθήκης. Το Υπουργείον των Εξωτερικών εξαγγέλλει τας διπλωματικάς επιτυχίας του. Προς αντιστάθμισιν της διπλωματικής αποτυχίας απέναντι των Τούρκων, φέρεται η κατά της Ρωσίας επιτυχία» (Debate in the British Parliament on the Concessions. The Rights of the Turkish Petroleum Company Are not Affected by the Treaty. The Foreign Office Announces Its Diplomatic Successes. To Offset the Diplomatic Failure with the Turks, Success against Russia is Highlighted), *Ethnikos Kyrix* 24-7-1923.

⁶⁷ «Συζήτησις εις την αγγλικήν Βουλήν», *op.cit.*

certainly not wrong. However, they would be more sincere and more reflective of the reality if they had the courage to extend their criticism of moral decline by attributing responsibility, also, to their own country. For what happened in Lausanne, America was not irresponsible. Perhaps it bore an even greater responsibility, as it had all the power to prevent many of the crimes committed. But unfortunately, it lacked the will.⁶⁸ So it wasn't just the Allies who promised during the course of the World War a better fate for the Christian people of the East. Even more enthusiastic and eloquent pledges had been given from the United States government. But it, too, forgot its pledges and consigned them to the dark fate, along with its protected Armenians, and all Christian people. Hence, the disgrace resulting from the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne was shared equally and no effort could salvage the country's reputation to solely attribute the responsibility for the abominable deed to the Allies.⁶⁹

Some American newspapers, as argued by *Ethnikos Kyrix*, which characterized them as committing an unrecognizable injustice, wanted to attribute the results of the negotiations in Lausanne to the fact that Greece did not prove, as promised, capable of fending off the danger of the Turkish army. It was an allegation that the events refuted, as Greece had faithfully and sufficiently fulfilled its obligations and promises. The triumphs achieved and the trophies set up by the Greek army in Asia Minor, fighting against the Turks, were the most undeniable proofs of Greece's sufficiency and ability to oppose the Turks. But it was natural for Greece to be weakened, as, apart from the Turks, it was also forced to confront the Allies themselves. The recent history could not be forgotten, let alone falsified, especially to the detriment of the Greek nation, which, with honor and sacrifices, defended not only its own rights, but also the interests of the Allies and human rights.⁷⁰

The Americans would attend the ceremony, but they would not sign the Treaty or any other related document. Their settlement with Turkey was hoped to be achieved through a separate agreement, negotiations

⁶⁸ «Σαρκασμοί» (Sarcasms), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁶⁹ «Κοινόν το αίσχος» (A Shared Disgrace), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁷⁰ «Ασύγγνωστος αδικία» (Inexcusable Injustice), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

for which were already underway.⁷¹ The signing of the Treaty of Peace in Lausanne would likely be followed by the final agreement on the terms of the Turkish-American Treaty of Friendship, on Thursday, July 26, in Washington.⁷² According to different sources, the negotiations for the Turkish-American treaty were at a critical juncture.⁷³ At the beginning of the week, obstacles arose in the negotiations between Ismet Pasha and Ambassador Joseph Grew. Official sources remained silent regarding the negotiations and were unwilling to discuss the extensive telegram sent by Grew.⁷⁴ Various aspects of this treaty remained unresolved and negotiations between the American and Turkish representatives were suspended until they received the expected instructions from Washington and Ankara.⁷⁵ Each delegation sent a telegram to its government, seeking to reconcile its views on the divergent points.⁷⁶ Elsewhere, it was reported that on the night of July 25, full agreement was reached between the American Ambassador, Joseph Grew, and Ismet Pasha regarding the specific American-Turkish treaty, concerning the trade relations between the two countries and the status of American citizens in Turkey. It was said that the documents would be signed very soon.⁷⁷

⁷¹ «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*

⁷² «Η υπογραφή της Τουρκο-Αμερικανικής Συνθήκης αβέβαια. Συγκεχυμένοι πληροφορίες εξ Ουασινγκτόνος» (The Signing of the Turkish-American Treaty in Doubt. Conflicting Reports from Washington), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁷³ «Η Τουρκο-Αμερικανική Συνθήκη κινδυνεύει να ναυαγήσει» (The Turkish-American Treaty is at Risk of Failing), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 24-7-1923; «Η Αμερική δεν ζητάει έκτακτα προνόμια εις την Τουρκίαν. Θέλει όπως τα ιδρύματα της εν Τουρκία τυγχάνωσι της αυτής περιποιήσεως ως και τι συμμαχικά. Τα φιλανθρωπικά και εκπαιδευτικά αμερικανικά Ιδρύματα υπό τον έλεγχον της Τουρκίας» (The United States of America Do not Seek Special Privileges in Turkey. They Want Their Institutions in Turkey to Receive the Same Treatment as Allied Institutions. American Charitable and Educational Institutions under Turkish Control), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

⁷⁴ «Η Υπογραφή της Τουρκο-Αμερικανικής», *op.cit.*

⁷⁵ «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*; «Η Τουρκο-Αμερικανική», *op.cit.*

⁷⁶ «Η Τουρκο-Αμερικανική», *op.cit.*

⁷⁷ «Επίκειται η υπογραφή της Συνθήκης της Τουρκίας και της Αμερικής. Πλήρης συνεννόησις μεταξύ Ισμέτ Πασά και Γκρου» (The Signing of the Turkish-American Treaty Is Imminent. Full Agreement between İsmet Pasha and Grew), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

Considering that the most significant issue in Lausanne was the restoration of peace in the Near East, as achieved by the signing of the Treaty, Washington had no reason to rush to conclude the Turkish-American treaty. However, due to the urgent need for detailed deliberations in Lausanne, Washington officials undoubtedly feared that some difficulty might ultimately hinder the conclusion of peace. It was understood that the most difficult thing remaining to be determined in the treaty was the wording.⁷⁸ On the following Thursday, when Ismet Pasha was planning to depart for Ankara, it would become known whether the treaty with the United States would be signed or the negotiations would be terminated.⁷⁹ On July 24, the American delegation visited the refugee settlements.⁸⁰

Population Exchange

The committee responsible for the population exchange, during its sessions, decided to divide the execution of the agreement into three parts: a) The transfer of Turks to Turkey and the transfer and temporary settlement of Greek refugees in the abandoned properties left by the Turks. b) The assessment of Muslim properties in Greece and Greek properties in Turkey. c) The payment to Greek refugees of the adjudicated compensation owed to them for the value of their abandoned properties in Turkey. For the systematic conduct of the entire task, a supreme refugee committee would be established, chaired by the Prime Minister or his deputies, operating with ultimate authority. The decisions of the committee, as announced by the Prime Minister, would be executed by various specialized services. The Prime Minister would oversee the majority of the work through departments chaired by one of the committee members. The departments would be: a) Statistical, consisting of a president, a section chief from the Ministry of National Economy, and one from the Ministry of Defense. b) Transportation, consisting of a president and two section chiefs as mentioned above. c) Settlement of rural population, divided into sections of Muslim estates and public estates,

⁷⁸ «Η Υπογραφή της Τουρκο-Αμερικανικής», *op.cit.*

⁷⁹ «Η ειρήνη υπογράφεται», *op.cit.*; «Η Τουρκο-Αμερικανική», *op.cit.*

⁸⁰ «Οι Αμερικάνοι εις τους προσφυγικούς συνοικισμούς» (The Americans in the Refugee Settlements), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

consisting of a president, two section chiefs from the Ministry of Agriculture, and two external specialists. d) Settlement of urban population, with one president, two section chiefs from the Ministry of National Economy, and two external specialists. e) Evaluation of the assets of the exchanging populations, consisting of one president, two members of the committee, and two section chiefs from the Ministries of National Economy and Agriculture. f) Accounting, led by one president and two experienced individuals from the upper echelons of the banking sector. g) Orphan Property. h) Community Property, each consisting of one member of the senior committee and two external specialists.⁸¹

The supreme committee would be elected by the ministerial council and would consist of Greeks and two or three foreign experts from the organizers of the refugee movement in Greece and Turkey. It would organize the departments, regulate their jurisdiction, and appoint and dismiss department personnel under its discretion. It would also advise the government on suitable individuals to be appointed by Greece as members of the joint committee and the joint subcommittees, and it would liaise on behalf of the government with the Joint International Commission on all matters falling within the jurisdiction thereof. The supreme committee would act as the representative of the state, overseeing all the abandoned property under Muslim ownership. It would temporarily accommodate compatriot refugees, determine the assistance provided to them, manage the appraisal of this property, and ultimately dispose of it following the valuation. It would also serve as the administrator of all immovable property belonging to the state, meaning it would make this property available, under the government's authority, for the resettlement of refugees. Within the month of July, refugee committees would be dispatched to Macedonia and Thrace to study the areas that were the most suitable for the resettlement of the refugees.

⁸¹ «Από την νέαν μετοικεσίαν Βαβυλώνος. Οι Τούρκοι της Ελλάδος εις την Τουρκίαν. Οι Έλληνες της Τουρκίας εις την Ελλάδα. Συμφώνως με τη Σύμβασιν Ελλάδος και Τουρκίας, Οι Έλληνες πρόσφυγες θα αποζημιωθούν διά την εγκατάλειψιν των περιουσιών των, χάρις εις την παρουσίαν του κ. Βενιζέλου εν Λωζάννη» (From the New Babylonian Relocation. Turks from Greece to Turkey. Greeks from Turkey to Greece. According to the Greek-Turkish Agreement, Greek Refugees Will be Compensated for the Abandonment of Their Properties, Thanks to Mr. Venizelos' Presence in Lausanne), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

Their studies would be submitted as soon as possible to the resettlement department in order for the final decisions to be made.⁸²

Based on the compiled statistics and decisions made by the supreme committee and the resettlement department, the transportation department would study the timing and means of transporting Muslims to Turkey, as well as the relocation of Greeks from their current locations to the designated resettlement areas. The department for the settlement of rural refugees would base its work on statistics, studies, and applications submitted by refugee delegations, indicating the areas previously inhabited by Muslims, where Greek refugees could be resettled. The decisions of the department would be approved by the supreme committee. It would be responsible for establishing committees, preferably consisting of military personnel, which would take over the abandoned properties by Muslims and, in collaboration with the representatives of the resettled refugees, they would transfer these properties to them. The department would establish general guidelines regarding the temporary allocation of these properties. Families consisting of at least five individuals would be settled in houses with two rooms, while houses with five or more rooms would accommodate two families. Additionally, the number of acres, olive trees, and vineyards to be allocated per rural family would be specified. The details of the matter would be studied by the department, which would provide appropriate guidance to the military and refugee committees. This department would allocate to the refugees –those unable to settle in Muslim-owned estates– the public estates, which the government would make available for this purpose. The urban resettlement department would allocate Muslim-owned estates in urban areas and provide assistance to the urban refugee population in pursuing urban professions. To populations who were not provided with land for cultivation and agricultural tools loans and cash advances would be provided. The necessary funds would be obtained by the state through loans from banks. To secure these loans, the properties of Muslims would be used. These advances would be proportionate to the professions and to approximately 20% of the property left behind in Turkey. The disbursements would be obtained from the National Bank as an interest-bearing loan, payable within five years based on the

⁸² «Ανωτάτη Επιτροπή» (Supreme Committee), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

orders of the president of the supreme committee and the president of the department. Additionally, the committee would study the issue of rents paid by refugees in urban areas, having the authority to requisition unoccupied buildings. The Department for the Assessment of Abandoned Properties in Turkey and Greece would operate based on a special regulation drafted by the supreme committee. The supreme committee and the departments would be under continuous and ongoing state supervision. For this purpose, a certain number of auditors from the Audit Office would be assigned to the supreme committee.⁸³

Refugee Loan

The newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrix* also addressed the issue of the refugee loan. As it was previously known, the refugee loan had been initially approved by the League of Nations. It was determined that the interest payments on this loan would be managed by the International Economic Control Commission, which was stationed in Athens for over twenty years. Surplus revenues from nearby sources were designated to service the loan, a surplus deemed by the League of Nations as more than sufficient to cover its interest payments in favor of the refugee loan. Furthermore, it was known that the League of Nations insisted on the participation of Greek banks in the approval of this loan, a demand that was accepted. The Governor of the National Bank, Diomedes, departed for Geneva to arrange matters related to this participation. All these events, along with the prestige of the League of Nations and the particular interest of the great European powers in bolstering this prestige, persuaded them that the loan would be granted and that the resettlement of refugees, both urban and rural, would be carried out in a manner largely satisfactory, thus alleviating the need for philanthropic concern.⁸⁴

⁸³ «Τμήμα Μεταφορών» (Department of Transportation), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

⁸⁴ «Προς οικονομικήν ανόρθωσιν. Το προσφυγικόν δάνειον. Σημαντικωτάτη απόδειξις της οικονομικής ανθηρότητας. – Δι' ελληνικών κεφαλαίων και δι' ελληνικών χειρών να εκτελεσθούν αι διά τους πρόσφυγας οικοδομικαί εργασίαι. – Καλούνται οι εν Αμερική Έλληνες να συμμετάσχουν κερδοφόρων επιχειρήσεων. – Ας λάμψη η ελληνική πρωτοβουλία και επιχειρηματικότητα» (Towards Economic Recovery. The Refugee Loan. A Significant Proof of Economic Prosperity. – Construction Work for the Refugees to Be Carried out with Greek Capital and by Greek Hands. – Greeks in

The terms of the loan and its exact amount were still unknown. Regarding the amount, it was determined by the League of Nations' delegates, tasked with examining Greece's economic situation, to be 10 million pounds, equivalent to 45 million dollars. This amount was not entirely sufficient to cover all the needs of the refugees; however, it would address the major issue of the refugee settlement and would facilitate the construction of factories to provide employment. Additionally, a significant portion of the loan would be allocated to agricultural facilities, such as the purchase of agricultural tools, livestock, and other necessities. Unfortunately, it did not seem that there would be surplus funds available for large-scale draining of marshes, which was crucial for Greece to solve the major issue on which the well-being and health of the Greek people depended. Draining the marshes would convert vast areas of cultivable and irrigable land, eliminating malaria, the scourge afflicting the Greek population. Perhaps it would require time, but it was impossible for private entrepreneurship not to understand the profitability of undertaking drainage projects in Greece.

Certainly, there was a fear that the interest on this loan would be burdensome due to the economic situation in Europe. However, the issue of the interest did not concern the state, whose finances would be burdened with servicing the new loan. Since this loan would be granted based on calculations, it was hoped that it would not be usurious. Economic reasons would justify many stringent terms, as even economically powerful countries in Europe, such as England and France, borrowed under unfavorable conditions. However, political considerations and philanthropy would impose different perspectives. Political motivations were certainly rooted in the Allies' awareness that they were also significantly responsible for the tremendous devastation occurring in Asia Minor and Thrace. Substantial involvement in this loan by the United States might have mitigated the interest. The private Greek economy would also participate in the loan through its banks. Over time, substantial Greek capital, both from within the country and from the diaspora, would invest in this loan. The reason for this was the guarantee given by the League of Nations and International Oversight,

America Are Called to Participate in Profitable Enterprises. – Let Greek Initiative and Entrepreneurship Shine), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

leading to the loan being considered highly secure, which it indeed was. This was a common occurrence. However, this fact brought into question whether the participation of the Greek economy should occur during the negotiation of the loans or afterward. Then, the issue of the loan allocation arose, a matter of utmost importance that should concern Greeks in the United States of America.⁸⁵

Regarding the issue of housing with funds from the refugee loan, it would naturally be contracted out to construction companies, which would stand to gain significant profits. Many foreigners, individuals or companies, made their proposals in anticipation of it. There were also proposals for sponsorships from abroad for prefabricated wooden houses, which would be relatively expensive and entirely unsuitable for the climate of Greece. The services of foreign entrepreneurs should be completely eliminated, and all housing-related work should be executed using Greek labor and Greek capital, in order for the entire profit to benefit Greeks. While there were Greek workers available, there were not enough funds allocated for this purpose. Therefore, an infusion of capital from Greeks in the United States was necessary and would contribute to ensuring that the entirety of the projects, and consequently the profits, would benefit Greeks in Greece and the United States and would help bring progress to Greece.

There was no risk involved in such ventures, as neither significant difficulties were expected in building typical houses nor would the capital be misappropriated. The construction companies would cover the expenses of the construction, which would be reimbursed by the government as the projects progressed. To construct urban and rural homes, as well as factories, schools, temples, etc., 10-15 million drachmas would be required, and for projects of such magnitude Greek capital was not yet available. Therefore, foreign capital would inevitably come into play, seeking clearly for secure and substantial profits. Undoubtedly, Greek capital was available in the United States of America and eager to be utilized in ventures posing no risk, while promising satis-

⁸⁵ «Προς οικονομικήν ανόρθωσιν», *op.cit.*

factory returns. It would thus be a desirable undertaking to encourage such movement in the United States.⁸⁶

There were highly significant projects of considerable scale aimed at draining marshlands and supporting agricultural ventures, as well as constructing roads, bridges, railways, and ports, including those of Piraeus, Kavala, Alexandroupoli, and others deemed essential. If the funds of the Greeks in the United States were directed towards Greece, no longer driven by philanthropic motives but purely for business and speculative reasons, they would revitalize this land, which lagged behind in terms of public utility projects and usefulness, in a backward state. All of these would also strengthen the national spirit, as well as the bonds between Greeks of the “old and the new world.” No more charity fundraisers for the relief of the suffering and the construction of temples and other projects in Greece. Greeks in Greece should stop waiting for their needs to be addressed by Greeks in the United States of America. They should strive to attract Greek-American capital not in a demanding manner, but by ensuring profits for them. When they instilled confidence in them, they would see stronger bonds emerge.⁸⁷

Twenty Americans had arrived in Greece on July 24 to assess the situation of refugees and the general economic conditions. Upon disembarking in Piraeus, they were welcomed by the government yacht Parnassos, on behalf of the Mayors of Athens and Piraeus, Colonel Plastiras, Prime Minister Gonatas, and a delegation of freemasons of the thirty-third degree, led by the Supreme Commander Kalogeropoulos. The consul, members of the American embassy, and members of the American expatriate community hosted the Americans within the premises of the American embassy. The reception was followed by a banquet, hosted by fifty prominent Greeks. On July 25, the Greek government organized a ceremony in honor of the Americans at Zappeion. There, the King bestowed the Golden Cross of the Savior upon eleven Americans, who had participated in the rescue of refugees from the catastrophe of Smyrna and beyond. The economic delegation departed

⁸⁶ «Τα ελληνομερικανικά κεφάλαια να μη μείνουν νεκρά» (Greek-American Capital Should Not Remain Dormant), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁸⁷ «Να μη χαθή η ευκαιρία» (The Opportunity Should not Be Missed), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

from Athens on the evening of July 25 and visited the eastern provinces of Greece. It would return to Athens on Saturday, July 28.⁸⁸

Conclusions

The three-day exploration of the details of the Treaty of Lausanne by the newspaper *Ethnikos Kyriks* provided us with a concise yet comprehensive overview, capable of briefly detailing the events and their aftermath for both those directly and indirectly concerned.

From one perspective, the pro-Venizelist newspaper, although acknowledging the failure of the Treaty of Lausanne for many, such as the Greeks, attempted to highlight its successful aspects. “The war ended, peace was restored, and the Muslims were compelled to leave Greece so that the Greek refugees, who had already begun to arrive in the Greek state since the beginning of the war, could settle more harmoniously there.”

Ethnikos Kyrix also shed light on how the dynamics change when the world evolves, with the cornerstone of every state being its economy. They proposed the introduction of foreign capital to eliminate the form of “economic support-dependency” and to take the form of a purely modernizing economic measure, the introduction of foreign capital-investments. However, the newspaper emphasized on the necessity of the capital coming from Greeks abroad, especially from the United States. It also called for the elimination of the habit of Greeks to demand assistance from them. Greeks within the Greek state needed to mature, abandoning emotional blackmail and starting to become a credible investment area.

After the restoration of external peace, all attention and concern of the revolution turned towards securing internal peace, which was necessary. Through the signed Treaty, the nation faced significant calamity. It lost extended territories but still retained enough land to live in peace.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ «Η Ελλάς τιμώσα τους σωτήρας των προσφύγων. Παρασημοφορία ένδεκα Αμερικανών» (Greece Honors the Saviors of the Refugees. Decoration of Eleven Americans), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 25-7-1923.

⁸⁹ «Η εσωτερική ειρήνη» (Internal Peace), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

Undoubtedly, the Treaty of Peace, signed in Lausanne between the Allies and Greece on one side and Turkey on the other, left Greece and Hellenism deeply wounded. One third of Hellenism was forced to abandon its ancestral homes and seek refuge, becoming refugees in Greece and other countries. The calamity was great, and the wound was deep for the Greeks of Pontos, Asia Minor, and the Thracians. That injustice should have caused pain to every living Greek.

As commented in the newspaper *Ethnikos Kyrrix*, the mental anguish of every Greek became greater when it was reflected that perhaps such a humiliating calamity could have been avoided if all Greeks, without exception, had proven themselves worthy to face boldly and rationally the circumstances in Greece at the end of the European War. Unfortunately, they proved to have fallen short of the circumstances and the high mission appointed to the Greek nation by the Treaty of Sevres. Were the conditions entirely superior to the moral and material forces of Hellenism? Or perhaps some shortcomings of Greek mentality and national life caused the inability of Hellenism to handle its forces effectively? Unfortunately, as it seemed, the latter was true. The Greek nation had enough capabilities to face the responsibilities it undertook, but it did not make good use of these capabilities. This was mainly the cause of their destruction. The lack of solid national cohesion among the various parts of Hellenism and the poor psychological awareness contributed to the fragmentation of national forces during critical moments led to the destruction of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. The Peloponnesian did not want to recognize the Cretan as his brother and jointly contribute to the liberation of Asia Minor and Thrace. They did not understand that a nation, in order to maintain its freedom and progress, must always be willing to sacrifice its individual interests. If they did not acquire closer national cohesion and learn that individual interests should be sacrificed for the greater good, they would soon lament their complete national destruction.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ «Αι συζητήσεις των ζητημάτων μας. Ο εθνικός μας χαρακτήρ. Το τοπικιστικόν πνεύμα του Νεοέλληνοσ. – Τα αίτια της εθνικής συμφοράσ. – Η έκτασις της καταστροφής. – Ανάγκη αναδιοργανώσεωσ των δυνάμεών μας. – Υπεράνω των ατομικών, κείται το υπέρτατον της πατρίδοσ συμφέρον» (Discussions on Our Issues. Our National Character. The Localist Spirit of the Modern Greek. – The Causes of National

Whether they would succeed in this or not, they didn't know. If they put the country above parties, if politicians prioritized the interests of the country over their ambitions, or if the Greek people invited more young men to govern them alongside a few of the tested old ones, perhaps they would again manage to make good use of their national strengths and recover.⁹¹

Misfortune. – The Extent of the Destruction. – The Need for Reorganization of Our Forces. – Above Individual Interests Lies the Supreme Interest of the Nation), *Ethnikos Kyrix*, 26-7-1923.

⁹¹ «Αι συζητήσεις των ζητημάτων μας», *op.cit.*

ΕΘΝΙΚΟΣ ΚΗΡΥΞ
THE NATIONAL HERALD PROGRESSIVE DAILY GREEK NEWSPAPER

ΤΕΤΑΡΤΗ 24 ΙΟΥΛΙΟΥ 1923 - Vol. 36, No. 3005
NEW YORK, 1923. ΠΡΩΤΗ ΕΚΔΟΣΗ, 1923. 8000 ΑΝΤΑΓΩΓΕΣ

Η ΕΙΡΗΝΗ ΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΕΤΑΙ ΣΗΜΕΡΟΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΛΩΖΑΝΝΗΝ

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ΑΠΟ ΟΛΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΚΟΣΜΩΝ

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Figure 1. Ethnikos Kyrix, 24-07-1923

ΕΘΝΙΚΟΣ ΚΗΡΥΞ

THE "NATIONAL HERALD" PROGRESSIVE DAILY GREEK NEWSPAPER

ΑΘΗΝΑΙΝΩΝ 1015 ΚΑΙ 1016 - ΤΟΜ. IX, No. 2411 - ΜΕΤ ΤΥΠΟΥ, ΠΕΜΠΤΗ 25 ΙΟΥΛΙΟΥ 1923

Η ΕΙΡΗΝΗ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ ΥΠΕΓΡΑΦΗ ΧΘΕΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΜΕΣΗΜΒΡΙΑΝ ΕΝ ΛΩΖΑΝΝΗ

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7 ΑΥΧΑΙΝΕΣ ΥΠΕΓΡΑΦΑΝ ΤΟ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΟΝ ΠΑΝΗ ΤΗΣ ΓΟΥΓΚΟΛΛΥ ΓΑΣ
ΤΑ ΘΕΜΕΛΩΔΗ ΣΗΜΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΝΕΟΥ ΚΑΘΕΣΤΩΤΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΓΓΥΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ

ΤΑ 140 ΑΡΘΡΑ ΤΗΣ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΣ

Μετα τον οριστικό και οριστικό πόλεμο της ειρήνης...

ΔΕΛΕΥΣΙΣ - Η ειρήνη της Ανατολής υπογράφηκε χθες μεσημέρι εν Λωζάννη, με την παρουσία των αντιπροσώπων των δύο στρατοπέδων...

ΟΙ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΙ ΠΑΡΑΜΕΝΟΥΝ ΕΝ ΛΩΖΑΝΝΗ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΗΝ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΗΝ

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ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΦΥΓΙΚΑ ΔΑΝΕΙΑ

Οι προσφυγικοί δάνειοι...

ΟΙ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΙ ΠΑΡΑΜΕΝΟΥΝ ΕΝ ΛΩΖΑΝΝΗ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΟΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΗΝ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΗΝ

Οι Αμερικανοί και οι Τούρκοι παραμένουν εν Λωζάννη...

ΤΑ "ΠΑΝΑΘΗΝΑΙΑ" Έξοδοσθ και κυκλοφορεί το τεύχος του Ιουλίου. Είναι
έκτακτον μεγαλειον. Τα προηγούμενα τεύχη έγιναν
ἀνάρπαστα. Σπεύσατε δια το νέον φαρμίσσον τεύχος.

ΣΕΛΙΑΣ 68 - ΤΙΜΑΤΑΙ ΜΟΝΟΝ 25 ΣΕΝΤΣ

Figure 2. Ethnikos Kyrix, 25-07-1923

ΕΘΝΙΚΟΣ ΚΗΡΥΞ
THE "NATIONAL HERALD" PROGRESSIVE DAILY GREEK NEWSPAPER
NEW YORK, BOSTON, ST. LOUIS, MO.
ΕΙΣ ΑΓΓΛΩΝ - ΑΥΓΟΥΣΤΟΣ 1923

ΣΥΝΑΝΤΗΣΙΣ ΠΛΑΣΤΗΡΑ-ΖΑΪΜΗ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΑΙΓΙΝΑΝ

Ο ΒΕΝΙΖΕΛΟΣ ΑΓΓΕΛΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΡΗΝΗΣ

Η ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΙΣ ΠΡΕΠΕΙ ΝΑ ΕΙΝΕ ΥΠΕΡΘΑΛΑΣΣΑ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΕΡΓΟΣ ΤΗΣ

ΕΚΑΤΑΣΤΕ ΕΙΣΑΦΗΜΟΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ
ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣΦΥΓΙΚΩΝ ΔΑΜΟΥ

Η ΑΜΕΡΙΚΗ ΔΕΝ ΖΗΤΕΙ ΕΚΤΑΚΤΑ ΠΡΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΝ

Ο ΤΖΟΝΣΟΝ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΕΘΝΟΥΣ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΥ

ΕΠΙ ΤΗΣ ΠΙΤΧΟΥΡΩΣ ΔΕΛΕΦΩΝ ΜΙΟΥΡΑ

ΤΑ "ΠΑΝΑΘΗΝΑΙΑ" Ήθελοδθη και κυκλοφορει το τευχος του Ιουλίου. Εινε εκπαιδων μεγαλειων. Τα προηγουμενα τευχη εγιναν αναρπαστα. Σπευσιατε δια το νεον θαυμασιον τευχος

Figure 3. Ethnikos Kyrix, 26-07-1923

*George Spentzos**

The Bulgarian Rearmament, 1923-1925

Introduction

The end of the First World War and the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly marked the crushing of Bulgarian nationalism. Among the treaty's stipulations, Article 65 addressed the disarmament of the Bulgarian armed forces, mandating a reduction to 20,000 personnel. However, the execution of Article proved to be a prolonged process, necessitating cooperation from Bulgarian authorities with the Military Inter-allied Commission of Control tasked with overseeing disarmament efforts. Throughout the early Interwar period, the Bulgarian government consistently evaded compliance with disarmament provisions. Employing various tactics such as labour service and the establishment of the Gendarmerie, Sofia managed to maintain a military force twice the legally mandated size.

The research will conclude that despite Bulgaria's efforts to rearm, its army in the early Interwar period did not possess the strength of its recent past, rendering it capable of challenging the territorial status quo. However, Bulgaria's rearmament coupled with the actions of the komitadjis (guerrilla fighters), as well as the continuous border incidents (highlighted by the Incident at Petrich in 1925), were sufficient to destabilize the Balkan security system.

Sofia violates the disarmament terms of the Treaty of Neuilly

The signing of the Treaty of Neuilly by Bulgaria, following its defeat in World War I, marked the end of Bulgarian aspirations to revive the "Greater Bulgaria" of the Treaty of San Stefano. According to article 65 of the Treaty of Neuilly the size of the Bulgarian army had to be limited to 33,000 men, including the strength of the Gendarmerie and Police forces. However, implementing Article 65 was challenging, as it necessitated cooperation from Bulgarian authorities with the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control, responsible for overseeing

* Postdoctoral Researcher of the University of Athens.

disarmament efforts.¹

In the autumn of 1923, four years after the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly, the disarmament of the Bulgarian army was not progressing as expected. Instead, a rearmament plan was underway, involving the concealment of existing arsenal and the acquisition of modern weaponry. Since October 1920, Sofia's main target had been to restore its army to pre-war levels by amending Article 65 of the Treaty of Neuilly and reintroducing compulsory military service. However, Bulgarian's efforts were thwarted by the refusal of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, to accept Stamboliyski's request. Curzon only agreed to the establishment of a gendarmerie, citing concerns about a communist threat from Stamboliyski and the perceived need to support Bulgarian forces with additional personnel.²

In November 1923, Sofia attempted to conceal its weaponry from the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control. Concurrently, Sofia lodged a protest because an officer of the Inter-Allied Commission investigated without the presence of a Bulgarian representative. According to the British officer leading the investigation, thousands of rifles, grenades, and other war supplies were hidden in Philippopolis (modern-day Plovdiv). These weapons had been loaded onto railway wagons, ready to be transported from one station to another in case of inspection.³ Throughout 1923 and 1924, Sofia adamantly refused to surrender a significant portion of its weaponry to the disarmament commission, resulting Bulgarian territory becoming a vast arsenal depot. Indeed, besides barracks and military installations, various inconspicuous locations such as lighthouses, small outposts, water mills,

¹ Areti Tounda-Fergadi, «Παραβιάσεις των περί αποπλισμού όρων 1919-20: Η περίπτωση της Βουλγαρίας» (Violations of the Disarmament Terms 1919-20: The Case of Bulgaria), in *IH Panellinio Istoriko Synedrio* (Thessaloniki: Hellinika Grammata, 1998), 406.

² Miranda Stavrinou-Paximadopoulou, *Η δυτική Θράκη στην εξωτερική πολιτική της Βουλγαρίας: Το ζήτημα της βουλγαρικής οικονομικής εξόδου στο Αιγαίο (1919-1923)* [Western Thrace in Bulgaria's Foreign Policy: The Issue of Bulgarian Economic Expansion into the Aegean (1919-1923)], (Athens: Gutenberg, 1997), 81; Tounda-Fergadi, op.cit., 406.

³ Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter DIAYE]/1924/6/A5XII, no. 219, Laskarakis (Sofia) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter MFA], 23-11-1923.

forests, etc., served as hiding places for concealment armaments.⁴

According to the Greek Consulate of Varna, Bulgarian authorities not only concealed small-volume arms but also hid heavy weapons, such as various types of guns, in abandoned factories. Despite the Greek embassy in Sofia reported the locations to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, no official response was received. Similar actions were taken by the embassies of the other Balkan States towards the Inter-Allied Commission. The stance of the Inter-Allied Commission, as reported by the Greek consulate of Varna, lacked a clear explanation. The most likely reason could be either that the Commission of Control lacked the necessary means to conduct investigations or that it was indifferent to the full implementation of the Treaty.⁵

In December 1923, in the western part of Shumen, a total of 6 mortars, 3 mountain artillery pieces and 12 field artillery pieces were hidden. Additionally, in warehouses containing inflammable materials, there were stored 24 field artillery guns. Near the Tatar quarter in Shumen, 60 machine guns there were hidden, and in the village of Troitsa, approximately 30,000 Mannlicher rifles were concealed. In warehouses in the town of Razgrad, 2,000 mortars were hidden. Furthermore, according to the Greek embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria had procured a significant number of horses from Austria for its army's needs, and seven train wagons filled with ammunition and mortars had been sent to the city of Sliven.⁶

The procurement of military equipment continued the following year, 1924, with the arrival of significant material from a Dutch steamship at the port of Varna. This vessel carried material for the army's engineering as well as 20 barrels of a new type of explosive substance, much more powerful than previous types of explosives.⁷

The above weapons purchases were known not only in Athens, but also in Belgrade. The Serbian delegate in Rome, after a meeting with

⁴ DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Tzanetos (Varna) to MFA, no. 888, 7-12-1923.

⁵ DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Tzanetos (Varna) to MFA, no. 893, 7-12-1923; DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 336, 19-12-1923.

⁶ DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Tzanetos (Varna) to MFA, no. 903, 20-12-1923; DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 2138, 14-12-1923.

⁷ DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, Ministers of Military Affairs and Navy Affairs, no. 110, 30-1-1924.

the Greek ambassador Psaroudas, confide in him that besides Italy, which was exporting weapons to Bulgaria, there were also other countries which exporting surplus weapons from the World War era. However, since arms sales to Bulgaria were illegal, the weapons were sold first to private individuals who then resold them to Bulgaria. The Serbian Ambassador ultimately estimated that only the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control could pressure the Bulgarian government to halt the armaments.⁸

The inability of the Commission of Control, to enforce the Treaty of Neuilly, emboldened Bulgaria. On January 21, 1924, the State Gazette of Bulgaria published a decision allowing the Ministry of Military Affairs to proceed with the purchase of various military items (e.g., fabric for uniforms, cloaks, bedspreads, 66,000 pairs of boots, and 50,000 tents). The Greek ambassador in Sofia informed Athens about these actions two days after the publication of the State's Gazette, when he visited Colonel Rink, the president of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control empowered to oversee Bulgaria's disarmament as stipulated by the Treaty of Neuilly. Athens promptly authorized Delmouzos to lodge a protest with Colonel Rink about the violation of the disarmament terms. Colonel Rink responded that in the days ahead he would protest in writing to the Bulgarian government, against the purchase of new weapon supplies. Furthermore, Rink confided in Delmouzos that he was certain that the Bulgarian government had been lying all along.⁹

The statements of the president of the Commission of Control did not benefit Greece at all. Specifically, the Great Powers appeared to view the violations of the disarmament with favoritism, possibly because the orders were placed in their own commercial houses, whatever that meant. Therefore, according to Delmouzos, the only way to fully implement the Treaty was through a joint and united effort from Greece, Serbia, and Romania towards the governments of the Great Powers, as well as the Bulgarian government itself.¹⁰

⁸ DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Psaroudas (Rome) to the Chief of the Hellenic General Staff (Athens), no. 1454, 16-2-1924.

⁹ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 852, 23-1-1924.

¹⁰ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 852, 23-1-1924.

Aircrafts purchases for the re-establishment of the Bulgarian Air-force

In addition to the above-mentioned violations, there were additional reports of Bulgaria procuring aviation equipment under the pretext of establishing a civil aviation service. In November 1923 the military attaché of Greece in Sofia, Laskarakis had a meeting with the President of the Inter-Allied Commission, who informed that Bulgaria would acquire soon 18 aircrafts to establish a postal air service. Moreover, Bulgaria already had around 16-20 pilots and aircraft mechanics. Therefore, Athens should immediately submit an official protest to the Supreme Council of Versailles regarding the article of the disarmament Treaty concerning Bulgaria's air forces. Specifically, highlighting the ineffectiveness of the restrictive terms imposed. Moreover, Athens could request that Bulgaria be prohibited from possessing any state or private aviation until could be proven that it was no longer a hostile country. Laskarakis also predicted that Greek request was likely to be accepted, due to Bulgaria's inconsistency towards the Allies and the large sums that already spent on aircraft purchases.¹¹

The news about the arrival in Sofia of 12 Potez aircrafts, three of which were second-hand and transported by railway from Italy, greatly concerned Athens. A few months later, in 1924, a state-owned aircraft manufacturing plant was established in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian plan to establish a military air force raised concerns within Greek diplomacy. Subsequently, the Bulgarian aviation directorate, sent a special commission to Paris to negotiate the order of 18 aircrafts of various types (Auro, Potez, Caudron, Henriot, Bristol), which, according to Bulgarian officials, their country was allowed to acquire.¹² Moreover, instructions were given to the military attaché of the Greek em-

¹¹ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 308, 14-11-1923.

¹² In early January 1924, the Greek ambassador to Paris, N. Politis, confirmed to Prime Minister Gonatas, that Bulgaria had ordered the following types of airplanes: 1) six airplanes Caudron with 140 horsepower engines, 2) three Potez with 370 horsepower engines, and 3) three Hanriot for training. Similar information was given from the Chief of the Hellenic Army General Staff, Vlahopoulos, according to which Bulgaria had procured six Caudron airplanes and three Potez. Also, Vlahopoulos requested appropriate action to be taken from the Inter-Allied Commission in Sofia, as these specific aircrafts had greater horsepower than the Treaty of Neuilly allowed.

bassy in Belgrade to inform the Serbian government, so that both countries could submit a joint official protest to the Supreme Council of Versailles, which was eventually done.¹³

The Bulgarian government, besides strengthening the army and the air force, was planning the reestablishment of the navy. According to Greek consulate in Varna, all officers of the Bulgarian navy who had been discharged after its dissolution in 1921, as stipulated by the Treaty of Neuilly, were called back to active service. So, at the beginning of 1924, the Bulgarian navy appeared to have a greater strength in terms of both personnel and officers compared to pre-war. Furthermore, various sections of the navy had been attached to the following ministries: 1) at the Ministry of Military Affairs, there was a maritime gendarmerie regiment with 4 companies of soldiers 2) at the Ministry of Railways there were all vessels of the Black Sea, the Naval Academy and Special Forces schools of two battalions in total. The Commander of these units was Captain Draganov, who had secretly assumed command and resided at the Ministry of Defense in Sofia.¹⁴

In the spring of 1924, Bulgaria continued to supply military equipment by procuring hundreds of rifles and cartridges, while it manufactured 60,000 military uniforms in its factories. Bulgaria was acquiring all kinds of weaponry through Trieste, according to information from the Serbian military attaché in Sofia. Furthermore, a significant number of weapons (mainly rifles) appear to have been supplied to Bulgaria from Turkey by sea routes. The port of Burgas was the point of delivery.¹⁵

¹³ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Kolovos (Burgas) to the Greek Embassy in Sofia, no. 1028, 3-12-1923; Alexandros Stavropoulos, «Ο παράνομος εξοπλισμός της Βουλγαρίας κατά την πρώτη δεκαετία του μεσοπολέμου» (The illegal armament of Bulgaria during the first decade of the inter-war period), in *K Panellinio Istoriko Synedrio*, 28-30 Μαΐου 1999 (Thessaloniki: Hellenic Historical Society, 2000), 247-54; DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 333, 15-12-1923; DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, N. Politis (Paris) to Prime Minister Gonatas (Athens), no. 43, 2-1-1924; DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Vlahopoulos (Army General Staff) to MFA, no. 2285, 23-1-1924.

¹⁴ DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 63, 15-1-1924.

¹⁵ DIAYE/1924/8/A5XII, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 2910, 25-3-1924; DIAYE/1924/8/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 670, 20-5-1924; DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 791, 19-6-1924.

Bulgaria, besides to its new arms acquisitions, retained a significant portion of the existing weaponry that it was supposed to surrender according to the Treaty of Neuilly. Specifically, war supplies and firearms were found hidden inside schools in the village of Vulche Pole (Kurtulen), as confirmed by the Greek consulate in Philippopolis. Additionally, a new road had been constructed from this village to the Greco-Bulgarian borders for military use. Significant weaponry appeared to be hidden in other areas such as Ivaylovgrad (Ortakoy) and Mandritsa. On May 24th, the Inter-Allied Commission discovered a significant quantity of weapons, machine guns, and ammunition in Svishtov (Sistovo). This incident upset the Bulgarian military circles in Shumen.¹⁶

The banning of arms imports, according to Article 81 of the Treaty of Neuilly, was a serious obstacle to Sofia's plans to reinforce its army. According to the military attaché in Sofia Laskarakis, from November 1919 to 1923 Bulgaria made no efforts (as it was obliged to do) to expand its military factory in Sofia and cover its defense needs completely. Despite this, Sofia received similar financial assistance (credits of 5 and 22 million lev in the annual budgets of 1922 and 1923, respectively). On the contrary, Bulgaria preferred to maintain many smaller factories so that it could request, depending on the circumstances, the lifting of the arms embargo.¹⁷

Sofia's plans for the reintroduction of conscription

Since 1920, Sofia desired the reinstatement of compulsory enlistment, which, combined with arms procurement, would allow it to significantly increase the size of its army during peacetime. However, the main reason for the reinstatement of conscription was primarily related to the possibility of general mobilization in case of war. According to estimations by Bulgarian military officials, if the voluntary service were applied for an extended period, the classes that would remain untrained from 1921 onwards would represent a significant loss in the

¹⁶ DIAYE/1924/8/1924, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 3295, 17-4-1924.

DIAYE/1924/A5/XII4, Zannettos (Varna), to Sofia Embassy, no. 369, 28-5-1924.

¹⁷ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, to Ministry of Military Affairs, to Army General Staff, no. 345, 25-12-1923.

event of mobilization. However, the refusal of the Great Powers to accept the Bulgarian request for the restoration of compulsory military service, led Bulgarian officials to adopt the measure of labor service, which would replace the conscription.¹⁸

Regarding the labor voluntary service, this ordinance had all the characteristics of a military service, with a reduced duration only (8 months instead of 2 years), while those serving on the borders would receive full military training. The labor service was not voluntary and could only be avoided by paying a high financial compensation. However, the inability of most Bulgarians to pay this compensation made it mandatory in practice. In 1924 those untrained classes of 1922 and 1923 were called upon to serve, under the tolerance of the Supreme Council of Versailles. Furthermore, the regulations in the barracks where the conscripts of labor service resided were purely military with uniforms similar to those of the army. Moreover, the leaders of the labor battalions were officers and non-commissioned officers of the army, while each battalion numbered 1,200-2,000 men. In total, the number of conscripts in labor service reached 18,000 by 1925.¹⁹

Since the implementation of voluntary conscription, in accordance with the Treaty of Neuilly, Sofia consistently submitted a memorandum to the Great Powers and the Supreme Council of Versailles. Through the memorandums, it made it clear that the imposed system of voluntary conscription incurred excessive costs. Therefore, Sofia claimed that it would not have been fair, in addition to the war reparations cost, to bear also the cost²⁰ of voluntary conscription. With these arguments, Sofia was preparing the ground for the reintroduction of compulsory conscription, while the main priority of Great Powers was

¹⁸ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 856, 21-1-1924.

¹⁹ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 856, 21-1-1924.

²⁰ According to Laskarakis, Sofia's protests in previous years regarding the high cost of voluntary service were only an excuse. The Greek military attaché therefore submitted a relevant study (number 444, 22-5-1924) for the budget of the Bulgarian Ministry of Military Affairs. According to the budget data from the last three years, it emerged that a significant portion of the envisaged expenses were used to maintain an army exceeding by one-third the permissible limits of the Treaty of Neuilly. Finally, Sofia, which ultimately complained about the high cost of voluntary service, had spent amounts ranging between 213-363 million leva in the last three years.

the issue of war reparations.²¹

Following the above, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kalfov submitted a verbal note to the embassies of the Great Powers, within November, aiming to amend the military terms of the Treaty of Neuilly. The Bulgarian Minister mainly highlighted the possibility of a communist uprising, while also mentioning the fear that communists could infiltrate the ranks of the army as volunteers under the system of voluntary conscription. Therefore, Kalfov requested the reinstatement of compulsory conscription for 10,000 men, while voluntary conscription would remain in effect for the rest of the army. Greek ambassador Delmouzos estimated that such a proposal perhaps he received support from the Italian and French embassies of Sofia.²²

Sofia, apart from the note verbal to the embassies of Great Powers, submitted also a formal demand to them. As soon as the Bulgarian movements became known to Athens, Prime Minister St. Gonatas informed the Greek embassies in Belgrade and Bucharest, in late November, regarding the Bulgarian demand, about conscription, to the Supreme Council of Versailles. The satisfaction of the Bulgarian request, according to Gonatas, would result in the complete overturning of the military terms of the Treaty of Neuilly. For this reason, the Greek Prime Minister authorized the ambassadors to issue a joint statement²³ on behalf of the Balkan states, for rejecting Sofia's demand.²⁴

The Greek embassy of London confirmed the joint front of the Balkan states against the Bulgarian demand. More specifically, on December 5, Kaklamanos informed that the Serbian ambassador had

²¹ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 458, 19-6-1924.

²² DIAYE/1924/1924/4/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 12052, 2-12-1923.

²³ Ambassador to Belgrade Mavroudis informed Prime Minister Gonatas about his meeting with the Serbian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who accepted the proposal to collectively protest against Bulgaria. Similarly, the Greek ambassador to Bucharest reported that the Romanian Foreign Minister had unequivocally stated that Bucharest strongly opposed Sofia's actions. Therefore, if the Romanian government confirmed that Sofia had made such a request, it would proceed with a verbal note demanding the implementation of the Neuilly Treaty.

DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Mavroudis (Belgrade) to MFA, no. 12104, 3-12-1923; DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Skassis (Bucharest) to MFA, no. 12196, 5-12-1923.

²⁴ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Gonatas (Athens) to Belgrade and Bucharest Embassies, no. 11762, 30-11-1923.

been instructed, due to the circumstances, to orally declare to the British government that Belgrade was negative towards the Bulgarian request. Regarding the Romanian embassy, Kaklamanos estimated that it would take a similar stance, while considering it quite unlikely for Britain and France to change their position, since the consent of the Balkan states was necessary for the revision of Article 59 of the Treaty of Neuilly.²⁵

The united front of the Balkan states against Sofia was also confirmed by the Greek military attaché in Belgrade, indicating that the Serbian leadership had made a strong demarché to the Bulgarian Ministry of Military Affairs and the Inter-Allied Commission of Control in Sofia, thus coordinating its actions with those of Greece. Meanwhile, the Romanian ambassador in Belgrade pledged to recommend to the Romanian General Staff to coordinate the actions of the Romanian military attaché of Sofia jointly with those of Greece and Serbia. However, these positive messages were somewhat tempered by the stance of the Romanian ambassador in Sofia, who was ready to support the Bulgarian request, influenced by Bulgaria's allegations regarding the communist threat. Similarly, the ambassadors of France and Italy in Sofia considered the Bulgarian requests worthy of interest, although they were negative towards the modification of the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly.²⁶

The Bulgarian government continued its efforts to revise the military terms of the Neuilly Treaty, so in early 1924 it made a new demarché to the Great Powers. However, the developments did not justify Sofia for its insistence on the issue of the reintroduction of conscription. At the end of February, Athens was received information from Greek embassy of Paris, about the negative outcome of the Bulgarian request to the Conference of Ambassadors. The latter informed the Bulgarian chargé d'affaires in Paris, Morfov, in writing, of the rejection of the request for the reintroduction of compulsory military service.²⁷

According to the Treaty of Neuilly, Bulgaria had the right to estab-

²⁵ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, D. Kaklamanos (London) to MFA, no. 12199, 5-12-1923.

²⁶ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Mavroudis (Belgrade) to MFA, no. 12446, 12-12-1923; DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 1250, 8-12-1923.

²⁷ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Romanos (Paris) to MFA, no. 1775, 28-2-1924.

lish a gendarmerie, the size of which should not exceed 13,000 men, including the police force. Moreover, the entire organization of the gendarmerie was prohibited from resembling that of the army, by 1923, the total number of Bulgarian police and gendarmerie was approximately 20,000, almost double the prescribed number. Moreover, the organization of the gendarmerie was, in violation of the peace treaty, similar to that of the army. Finally, the newly established Bulgarian gendarmerie consisted of 16 infantry battalions (actually regiments) and 8 cavalry battalions. These forces, added to the 24 infantry battalions and 3 cavalry regiments that Bulgaria had, according to Inter-Allied Commission of Control, totaled 40 regiments, as many as had before World War I.²⁸

Regarding the organization and structure of the Bulgarian gendarmerie, it violated international treaties, as its battalions were directly subordinate to the commanders of the land army infantry regiments. According to Greek Embassy, in the event of military mobilization, the infantry regiments were to form the composition of a division, consisting of three infantry brigades and six cavalry regiments. The total strength of the Bulgarian infantry was estimated at 48 regiments in total. In September 1924, according to the Hellenic Army General Staff, the total armed Bulgarian forces amounted to 45,000 men, while 9 months later were estimated at 61,000 men, including the force of gendarmerie, police, and the labour service conscript.²⁹

In contrast to the above, Bulgaria officially claimed that its army consisted of only 33,000 men in total, as stated in the table below:

²⁸ DIAYE/1924/4/A5XII, Delmouzos (Sofia) to MFA, no. 2100, 7-12-1923.

²⁹ DIAYE/1924/6/A5XII, Tzanetos (Varna) to MFA, to Sofia Embassy, no. 925, 23-12-1923.

Table 1
The Bulgarian army in 1924 (according to Bulgarian claims)

	Rifles	Revolvers and swords	Employees (unarmed)
Land Army	20,000	---	2,300
Border Guard	3,000	---	300
Gendarmerie	6,300	500	637
Police	2,335	3,965	---
Customs officer	600	270	---
Total	33,000	4,940	3,200

Source: DIAYE/1925/4/Γ/63, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 9733, 18-07-1925

The above data was not accurate, according to Laskarakis, as in the gendarmerie and police all personnel were armed and also most employees of the Bulgarian Ministry of Military Affairs were army officers. Additionally, the above table did not include the military units of the aviation, railway school, telegraphers, and navy. In this way, the Inter-Allied Commission accepted that the number of armed individuals did not exceed the prescribed ceiling of 33,000. Therefore, with the tolerance of the Great Powers, Sofia could recruit and include in its annually budget as many men as it wanted, under the pretext that the additional personnel were unarmed.³⁰

The Inter-Allied Commission of Control approves the temporary conscription of volunteers

The violation of disarmament terms continued with the same intensity in 1925. The Tsankov government, exploiting the unrest caused by the communists in the spring, succeeded in obtaining permission for a temporary conscription from the Supreme War Council of Versailles. Initially, it was allowed to mobilize 3,000 men and then another 10,000, whom it was supposed to dismiss by May 31st. This development significantly disturbed Athens, Belgrade, and Bucharest. According to a

³⁰ DIAYE/1925/4/Γ/63, Laskarakis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 9733, 18-7-1925.

publication in the *Embros* newspaper in late March, Serbia submitted a protest to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control in Sofia for the non-approval of this decision. The governments of the Balkan states considered this decision to be undermining the provision of the 33,000 men ceiling, which constituted the first step towards the reintroduction of compulsory military service. However, despite Athens protests to London, Britain remained positive towards the Bulgarian request.³¹

In the meantime, the situation was not developing positively for Athens and its neighboring countries. In a meeting between the Greek chargé d'affaires in London, Georgios Melas, and a representative of the British Foreign Office, it was revealed that the opinion of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, as well as that of the Supreme Council of Versailles, was favorable to satisfying Sofia's request. London believed that the risk of communist victory justified the decision, along with the favorable disposition of the French and Italian governments towards Sofia's request. For this reason, according to Melas, the British Foreign Minister gave instructions to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, so as not to bring obstacles and objections to the approval of the Bulgarian request.³²

The response of the Greek chargé d'affaires, Melas, to the Foreign Office director of Balkan Affairs, was that even if he lacked instructions from his government, he was obligated to strongly protest the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, as it temporarily overturned the terms of Bulgaria's disarmament. Semi-official demarchés were also submitted by Romania's and Serbia's ambassadors, awaiting instructions from their governments. The next day, on April 22, 1925, it became known that the Conference of Ambassadors officially approved the Bulgarian request.³³

The announcement of the Ambassador's Conference decision prompted the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Michalakopoulos, to send a telegram to Melas on April 22, informed him about the decision to appeal to similar military measures to those of Sofia (partial

³¹ DIAYE/1925/Γ/61^a/1, G. Melas (London) to MFA, no. 5394, 21-4-1925; *Embros*, 30-3-1925.

³² DIAYE/1925/ Γ/61^a/1, G. Melas (London) to Prime Minister Andreas Michalakopoulos, to MFA, no. 6133, 24-4-1925.

³³ *Ibid.*

mobilization). At the same time Michalakopoulos authorized Melas to deliver a demarché to London to communicate Athens' position. Right after, Melas attempted to meet with the British under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which was impossible at that time. Therefore, the Greek diplomat had no choice but to present the Greek positions to the British Director of Balkan Affairs. The British diplomat became greatly alarmed upon hearing that Athens intended to appeal to similar military measures. Subsequently, Melas received an urgent summons from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Austen Chamberlain, to appear at the Foreign Office, where the Director of Eastern Affairs Lampson read a note from Chamberlain. According to it, Austen Chamberlain instructed the British ambassador in Athens to visit Michalakopoulos with the aim of preventing the adoption of measures that would have consequences for the entire Balkans. Thus, Melas who had previously been informed telegraphically about Michalakopoulos' recent statements to journalists promptly informed Lampson. Greece now appeared more conciliatory, as Michalakopoulos stated that he would maintain a neutral stance towards events in Bulgaria, with the aim of reassuring London.³⁴

It appears that Michalakopoulos' statements satisfied London, as Chamberlain officially responded to Athens' demarché, emphasizing that London would consider only the recent statements of Michalakopoulos as indicative of Athens' intentions. At the same time, the British minister assured Melas that London would not accept, for any reason, the continuation of Bulgarian mobilization after the deadline of May 31 or any further increasing of the Bulgarian army in order to reassure Athens.³⁵

A subsequent telegram from Melas confirmed the above, specifically stating that the British government was convinced that any further increase of the Bulgarian army and the continuation of mobilization of the 10,000 volunteers beyond May 31 were impossible without risking peace in the Balkans. Due to these circumstances, the impend-

³⁴ DIAYE/1925/ Γ/61^α/1, G. Melas (London) to A. Michalakopoulos, to MFA, no. 6133, 24-4-1925.

³⁵ DIAYE/1925/ Γ/61^α/1, G. Melas (London) to A. Michalakopoulos, no. 6636, 4-5-1925.

ing arrival of Kalfov in London was not expected to benefit Bulgaria in any way, as it was certain that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs would accept Kalfov for a meeting only to discuss the situation in Bulgaria.³⁶

The stance of the French government on this issue, aside from London, was also of great importance. Athens, in cooperation with the governments of Serbia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, as well as individually, try to make it clear through its ambassador in Paris, Politis, that it was fully opposed to the continuation of mobilization of the 10,000 volunteers after May 31st. Furthermore, Politis made it clear that there was no chance for Athens to accept any further increase in the Bulgarian army, as it was rumored that Kalfov would request. However, the Secretary-General of the Conference of Ambassadors, Laroche, was opposed to any further increase in the Bulgarian army. Regarding the mobilization, Laroche committed that the 10,000 volunteers who had recently been conscripted would be discharged by May 31st. Laroche also stated that the meeting between the Foreign Minister of France, Aristide Briand and Kalfov in early May was of ceremonial significance. Regarding this, Briand rejected every request made by Kalfov regarding a new increasing in the Bulgarian army, as well as an extension of the volunteers' mobilization.³⁷

The Bulgarian Minister Kalfov, after visiting Paris, also traveled London to meet with British Foreign Minister A. Chamberlain, hoping to garner support for extending the duration of mobilization. According to Melas, this meeting, held for protocol reasons, saw Chamberlain emphasizing to Kalfov the absolute necessity for Bulgaria to comply with the decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors and the deadline set for the discharge of volunteers. Regarding this matter, Kalfov seemed not to insist at all, acknowledging that public security had been restored, thus eliminating the risk of a general uprising incited by the communists. Ultimately, the efforts of the Bulgarian minister shifted to reminding that although the risk of an uprising had disappeared, the possibility of sporadic incidents in various parts of his

³⁶ DIAYE/1925/ Γ/61^α/1, G. Melas (London) to MFA, no. 7233, 11-5-1925.

³⁷ DIAYE/1925 Γ/61^α/1, N. Politis (Paris) to A. Michalakopoulos, to MFA, no. 7745, 16-5-1925.

country had not ceased.³⁸

Moreover, a matter of particular importance for Sofia was to demonstrate to London the existence of Bulgarian communist groups in Vienna, despite the Austrian government's denial of such claims. Therefore, Kalfov asked Chamberlain to proceed with the submission of a memorandum to Vienna, with the collaboration of other Western powers, so that they would strongly draw attention and demand from Austria to undertake more active initiatives to eradicate the center that threatens the security of all of Central and Eastern Europe.³⁹

At the same time, reports from the Sofia embassy indicated that Bulgaria was in a dire situation regarding the discharge of volunteers, so it could not delay it much longer. Ambassador Rossetis informed that, according to his Serbian counterpart, two days earlier the Inter-Allied Commission of Control had formally requested to the Bulgarian government to proceed with the discharge of volunteers before May 31st, but Sofia had not yet officially responded. The prevailing belief in Sofia's diplomatic circles was that, following the resolute stance of the Great Powers and other interested states, Bulgaria would uphold the obligation it had undertaken, due to the high cost of conscription. On the other hand, there was also fear in Sofia that the volunteers enlisted for a limited period might express dissatisfaction in the near future, with unpleasant consequences.⁴⁰

From its side, Sofia was trying in every possible way to find support on the issue of the discharge of the volunteers, but the scheduled visit of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Kalfov to Bucharest understandably raised concerns in Athens. For this reason, the Romanian Foreign Minister, Ion Duca, in a meeting with the Greek ambassador, Konstantinos Kola, assured him of the clear position of the Romanian government on the issue of the volunteers. Furthermore, Duca estimated that Kalfov's trip was routine, expecting the same outcome as those in Paris and London. Duca also assured that any indication made

³⁸ DIAYE/1925/ Γ/61^a/1, G. Melas (London) MFA, no. 6724, 20-5-1925; DIAYE/1925/ Γ/61^a/1, G. Melas (London) to the Prime Minister, to MFA, no. 7579, 23-5-1925.

³⁹ DIAYE/1925/ Γ/61^a/1, G. Melas (London) to the Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 7579, 23-5-1925.

⁴⁰ DIAYE/Γ/61^a/1, Rossetis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 6509, 16-5-1925.

by the Bulgarian Prime Minister, regarding an extension of the duration of conscription, would be met with the complete negative response from Bucharest.⁴¹

On the other hand, Michalakopoulos' government was particularly concerned about the possibility of extending the duration of mobilization and sought to cancel, if possible, the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors. To achieve this, the Greek government attempted, through the ambassador Politis and in collaboration with the governments of Serbia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, to jointly draft a response to the Conference of Ambassadors. However, this effort did not yield any results, as the governments of the other countries did not share Greek concerns, deeming the expression of wishes by the Great Powers sufficient. According to this, the Great Powers stated that they would seek the discharge of volunteers by May 31st. Athens achieved only a declaration from the ambassadors of the other states, that the Conference made the decision regarding the mobilization of volunteers, without advising the interested states. Ultimately, it was decided that the response to the Conference of Ambassadors from Greece and the other states would be initially made verbally during a hearing granted by the President of the Conference, Cambon, on May 20th.⁴²

During the hearing, the ambassadors expressed to Cambon their governments' disagreement about the decision. Specifically, they mentioned that their opinion had not been sought on the issue of increasing the Bulgarian army. On the other side, the President of Conference of Ambassadors stated that the Conference had to deal with an extremely urgent matter, which imposed the immediate adoption of temporary measures. Since the opinion of the interested governments was not sought beforehand, there was a fear of lack of unanimity and consequently a prolongation of the turmoil in Bulgaria. On the contrary, the ambassadors argued that if they had been consulted beforehand by the Great Powers regarding the necessity of Sofia to mobilize volunteers to restore order, this measure could have been avoided. Cam-

⁴¹ DIAYE/1925/Γ/61^a/1, Kolla (Bucharest) to MFA, no. 6962, 23-5-1925.

⁴² DIAYE/1925/Γ/61^a/1, N. Politis (Paris) to A. Michalakopoulos, to MFA, no. 7746, 24-5-1925.

bon initially agreed and repeated that the measure was entirely temporary, adding that the French government, did not want, for any reason, to allow the continuation of the conscription of the 10,000 volunteers.⁴³

The Inter-Allied Commission of Control has decided on the demobilization of the volunteers

The trip of Sofia's Foreign Minister Kalfov, aimed at extending the conscription of volunteers, was unsuccessful. After receiving negative responses from his French and British counterparts, the Bulgarian minister met with the Italian Prime Minister Mussolini in late May. As Mussolini stated that the conscripted men did not represent a significant reinforcement for Sofia, and that the Bulgarian government could quell the unrest with its regular forces. Furthermore, Mussolini estimated that the indefinite extension of the conscription of volunteers would violate the disarmament terms of the Treaty of Neuilly. Such a decision, however, would provoke uprisings and protests from the governments of Sofia's neighboring countries, with unpredictable consequences for Bulgaria. Finally, Kalfov left Rome dissatisfied, with the impression that Italy, although it could support Bulgaria's demands, chose not to do so.⁴⁴

Rome's decision to not to assist Sofia was a major blow to the plans of the Tsankov government. However, the Bulgarian leadership continued its efforts undaunted. In a conversation between the President of the Inter-Allied Commission and the Serbian ambassador in Sofia, the president mentioned that the Bulgarian government informed him of its decision to discharge the 3,000 volunteers by May 31st. However, regarding the case of the 10,000 volunteers, Sofia requested permission to retain them until the end of June. Upon learning of the situation, Athens acted through its ambassador in Paris, Politis, collaborating with the Serbian ambassador, to submit a document to the Conference of Ambassadors. Athens and Belgrade jointly requested the Conference of Ambassadors to demand the dismissal of all volunteers, thereby immediately reducing the size of the Bulgarian armed

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ DIAYE/1925/Γ/61^o/1, Al. Karapanos (Rome) to MFA, no. 7749, 26-5-1925.

forces to the level specified by the treaty. The Romanian ambassador was also urged to take similar action.⁴⁵

Ultimately, the diplomatic efforts of the Balkan states seem to have yielded positive results, as the Conference of Ambassadors decided the dismissal of the 10,000 volunteers by May 31st. The announcement of the decision was made in Sofia through the Inter-Allied Commission. The Tsankov government promptly accepted the decision, proceeding with the dismissal of the volunteers. However, Sofia also informed the Inter-Allied Commission of Control that in the future, in the event Bulgaria found itself in a state of emergency, it would immediately proceed with the conscription of volunteers without obtaining prior permission from the Great Powers.⁴⁶

The positive outcome of this issue, which had seriously concerned Athens and the other neighboring states, was communicated to Athens by the Greek ambassador in Sofia. Rossetis informed the Hellenic General Staff that on June 1st that, according to the British representative of the Inter-Allied Commission, the dismissal of the remaining 10,000 volunteers had officially been decided one day earlier in Paris from the Conference of Ambassadors. The British ambassador in Sofia confirmed the above, stating that the Bulgarian government made a demarché, even though it was certain of its failure, solely to satisfy public opinion.⁴⁷

The discharge of the 10,000 volunteers was a matter of serious concern for the Balkan states, but it was not the only issue they wanted to bring before the Great Powers. On May 28th, the ambassadors of Greece, Serbia, and Romania in Paris, following consultation, submitted a joint demarché to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors. This demarché addressed not only the discharge of the volunteers but also the size of the Bulgarian army, which, according to Belgrade reached 74,350 men. The response from the President of the Conference of Ambassadors satisfied the demarché of the Balkan states. However, it questioned Serbia's position regarding the number of the

⁴⁵ DIAYE/1925/Γ/61^a/1, Rossettis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 7075, 26-5-1925; DIAYE/1925/Γ/61^a/1, N. Politis (Paris) to MFA, no. 7140, 28-5-1925.

⁴⁶ DIAYE/1925/Γ/61^a/1, Rossetis (Sofia) to MFA, no. 7557, 4-6-1925.

⁴⁷ DIAYE/1925/Γ/61^a/1, Rossetis (Sofia) to the General Staff of the Army, no. 7344, 1-6-1925.

Bulgarian army. Specifically, the Supreme Council of Versailles considered that the Bulgarian army did not exceed 40,000, including the 10,000 volunteers. Finally, the Conference of Ambassadors also indicated the need for close contact between the military attaches of Greece, Serbia, and Romania and the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control to avoid such misunderstandings in the future.⁴⁸

The pressures of the Balkan states at the Conference of Ambassadors and the submission of a demarché aroused the interest of the Supreme Council of Versailles, which met on June 24th. The Greek military attaché Vasileios Melas was invited to attend, with Marshal Foch presiding over the council. Alongside Foch, generals from the other Allied countries of Britain, Italy, and Japan participated, as well as military attachés of Serbia and Romania. The president of the Council announced that the purpose of the meeting was to ascertain the validity of the complaints of the governments of Greece, Romania, and Serbia regarding Bulgaria's military strength. Foch admitted that Bulgaria had partially violated the treaty, but not to the extent claimed by the Balkan states, indicating that it did not fully accept their concerns. The only positive aspect for the Balkan states was Foch's statement that the Allied Council would provide instructions for closer coordination between the Inter-Allied Commission of Control in Sofia and the military attachés of the three Balkan states.⁴⁹

Conclusions

Bulgaria even though it signed the Treaty of Neuilly, it never accepted it. In fact, revisionism became the cornerstone of Bulgaria's foreign policy throughout the interwar period. Governments of Balkan, and other countries feared that Sofia, initially through the actions of komitadjis and later through military invasion (which necessitated the rearmament of the Bulgarian army), aimed to overthrow the status quo established by the peace treaties of 1919. Furthermore, information reaching Athens indicated that Sofia not only violated disarmament provisions but also implemented a rearmament program for its army.

⁴⁸ DIAYE/1925/Γ/63/4, N. Politis (Paris) to MFA, no. 9281, 9-7-1925.

⁴⁹ DIAYE/1925/Γ/63/4, Th. Pangalos, Minister of Military Affairs (Athens) to MFA, no. 10190, 30-7-1925.

The issue of insecurity in the region was further exacerbated by the reluctance of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control to fully implement of Bulgaria's disarmament and the supply of military equipment to Sofia.

Greek officials, influenced by available sources, overestimated the strength of the Bulgarian army at the time, considering a conflict soon very likely. However, the Bulgarian army during the early Interwar period was not comparable to its pre-1918 strength. Continuous violations of disarmament provisions and overwhelming information about the rearmament of the Bulgarian army caused concerns in Athens, Belgrade, and Bucharest. Within this context, the Bulgarian government's attempt to exploit the communist uprising in the spring of 1925, seeking a temporary increase in its army through the recruitment of thousands of volunteers, provoked protests from neighboring states. Ultimately, the reactions of Balkan States were successful in preventing a permanent increase in the Bulgarian army, although the conscription of volunteers was allowed indefinitely.

Vemund Aarbakke*

The Making of a Turkish Hero and the Oppression of a Minority¹

Introduction

The recent upsurge of publications on the late Dr. Sadık Ahmet (1947-95) in Turkey provides us with a timely occasion for re-evaluating some of the events that formed the backdrop to his rise to fame and his role in a period of high tension in Greek-Turkish relations. Sadık acquired legendary fame during his lifetime and has after his untimely death been venerated by the Turkish ultra-nationalist right. Sadık is portrayed as an idealist with almost saintly qualities that served the people without ever thinking about personal interests. He was a “legendary” (*efsane*) leader of the Turkish nation. Other frequent adjectives are “unforgettable,” “symbol,” “champion of turkism,” etc. Various inspirational quotes attributed to him appear repeatedly beside the main text or in captions of pictures such as: “I am sent to prison because I am a Turk. If being a Turk is a crime, I will repeat it. I am a Turk and will remain so.” According to his adherents: “If the epics of heroes are not written, the people will read the lies of the oppressors.”² There is a plethora of bridges, roads, parks, secondary schools, hospitals, stadiums, etc. in Turkey that bear his name. Tellingly, the avenue in front of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul is named after him, and so is the avenue in front of the

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¹ I would like to thank Dr. Georgios Niarchos, Dr. Vasilis Manousakis and Dr. Ioannis Papageorgiou for commenting on earlier drafts.

² Prominent examples include Nilüfer Erdem, ed., *Doktor Sadık Ahmet* (Dr Sadık Ahmet) (Ankara: Yurt Dışı Türkler Birliği, 2021); The preface by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan indicates connections to the highest centres of power; Saadettin Yağmur Gömeç–Feyzan Göher–Hüsne Hilal Şahin, eds., *Balkanların Bozkurtu Sadık Ahmete Armağan* (Bestowal on Sadık Ahmet the Grey Wolf of the Balkans) (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2022); Murat Derin, *Batı Trakya Türklerinin Gür Sesi–Dostluk Eşitlik ve Barış Partisi* (The Proud Voice of the Western Thrace Turks–The Friendship, Equality and Peace Party) (Komotini: Bakeş, 2021); There is also the recent full-feature movie “Sadık Ahmet” (2024) by Hakan Yonat.

Turkish Foreign Ministry in Ankara. As is often the case, a master narrative is constructed and imposed by the simple method of repetition. Now, a new generation of Turkish scholars, many of which were not even born during Sadık's heydays, are writing to solidify this narrative. These books present the legend Sadık Ahmet that does not remotely resemble the historical person.

There are several difficulties involved when dealing with such an issue. Certain established narratives in both Greece and Turkey have remained unchallenged since they are espoused by powerful interest groups. Many practices also belong to the machinations of the so-called "Deep State" and are meant to remain hidden from public view. I do not engage in investigative journalism, and I am not interested in revealing new secrets. I do, however, want to make a sober evaluation of publicly available sources by the various parties involved.

The discussion of issues that are considered state secrets will often challenge the democratic sensibilities of people who would normally consider themselves liberal and progressive. Since all parties have been involved in actions that they would rather keep out of the public light, we are often faced with incomplete stories, serious omissions, and half-truths. In day-to-day politics, the practice of "credible denial" can be an easy way out, but in the long run, it often turns into "incredible denial" and creates new and larger problems than the initial lie was supposed to cover up. The initial denial may also have adverse consequences. A wrongheaded policy will often create unforeseen "collateral damage" by those who devised it.

My initial research on the Muslim minority in Greek Thrace hails back to the late 1980s, when I was still a master's student in Balkan Studies in Copenhagen, and I have kept up with developments since. I followed the meteoric rise of Dr. Sadık Ahmet as it unfolded. I first became aware of the unusual activities in Thrace because of the outburst of writings in the Greek press related to the June 1989 general election. I met Dr. Sadık Ahmet, as well as his team, on several occasions. In spring 1991, I was the interpreter of Bjørn Cato Funnemark of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee on his field trip to Thrace. Later I carried out extensive fieldwork in Thrace during the 1990s. I had personal contact with other active minority politicians during this era and people

who grew up with him in the same village.³ In the October 1993 election I joined Sadık on campaign speeches when he spoke in the villages close to Komotini, as I also did with the other candidates in this election. Some of the minority members would speak more candidly on Sadık, particularly when we met face to face outside public view. Others would express themselves more carefully. This was not necessarily a personal choice but a reflection of dependencies restricting their ability to speak freely. Despite this, it was not difficult to spot misgivings towards Sadık's actions. For example, when I asked the old minority politician Hasan Hatipoğlu about his views on Sadık as leader, he replied drily that he had yet to see any such ability.

Sadık Ahmet belongs to the first generation of minority members who obtained a Greek university degree. He was born on 7 January 1947, in Agra village (Küçük Sirkeli) in the Sappes plain east of Komotini. After completing primary school (1954-60) he continued his education in the minority secondary school in Komotini (1960-66). The school was established during the thaw in Greek-Turkish relations in 1952 when both countries joined NATO and was initially named after the Turkish president Celâl Bayar. Sadık obtained his university degree in medicine from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (1974). After completing his military and rural doctor service, he returned to Thrace in 1978. He completed his surgeon specialization in 1984 but did not obtain the position he coveted at the hospital in Komotini. During this period, Sadık did not engage in the problems of the minority and was somewhat of an outlier in the minority's political struggles. He would probably never have entered politics had his medical career not floundered. Although he is portrayed as a heroic leader, his rise to fame was largely due to external circumstances. Sadık would be imposed on the minority after a massive intervention by Turkey shortly before the

³ Among the minority people I consulted I can mention: Mehmet Bilge (Süleyman), Sebahaddin Emin (Salepçi), İsmail Molla (Rodoplu), İbrahim Onsunuğlu, Salih Halil (Hâki), Abülhalim Dede, Selahaddin Galip, Hasan Kaşıkçıoğlu, Hasan İmamoğlu, Hasan Hatipoğlu, Mehmet Müftüoğlu, Ahmet Hacıosman, Mustafa Hafız Mustafa (Bacaksız), Refika Nazım, Mustafa Mustafa (mikroviologos), Nazif Ferhat, Mehmet Çolak, Ahmet Veysel, Kenan Yusuf, Hülya Emin, Fevzi Tanpınar, Rıza Kırıldökme, Halit Eren, Mehmet Emin Ağa, and Ahmet Faikoğlu.

Greek general elections in June 1989. As late as February 1989, the journalist Hâki reacted in the following manner when local villagers hailed Sadık as the potential new minority leader:

As far as I remember, Mr. Doctor Sadık Ahmet joined us after 1976. Because it was in the aftermath of 1974 [Cyprus invasion], it was years when the minority suffered horrible oppression. Until 1984 this minority did not witness any ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT from Doctor Sadık Ahmet. On the contrary, he was utterly possessed by the DESIRE to earn quick money... The Minority knows it, the whole world knows it...⁴

Hâki's reaction indicates that although Sadık was already poised to become the leader of the minority, it was still not widely known within the minority. Hâki's characterisation of Sadık is very much in line with what I know from other minority members. His old classmate Dr. İbrahim Onsunoglu provided us with a more detailed portrait of Sadık in his obituary:

He [Sadık] was a man of action. Vigorous, industrious, stubborn, and avaricious. He seemed bold, self-reliant, and obstinate, but he was ready to bend when confronted with power and force. He always searched for a "protector" and found them too. During such periods [when he searched for a "protector"] he became amenable, serious, dignified, in short, another Sadık. After he had secured a "protector," there was nothing he deemed himself incapable of doing with the power invested in him, whether real or imagined. He came to, all his accumulated acrimony appeared, he broke and spilled everything around him, and he did not refrain from fighting persons or taking on problems he did not have the power to fight or undertake works where he could not be successful.

⁴ *İleri*, 24-2-1989; When he was an active journalist Hâki (1939-) got easily exited and spoke his mind. He could have made an excellent witness but would probably not be keen to speak in a Greek court and he has a pension from Turkey. I will use footnotes sparingly. The pre-2000 events are covered in greater detail and are meticulously documented in Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace" (PhD diss., University of Bergen, 2000).

He was a man of action. And he did not like to think. The fuel of his engine consisted of avarice and grudge. If you deprived Sadık of these two things he turned into a normal person. His most productive periods were the periods with the most avarice and grudge.⁵

The characterisations above are not some general remarks. On-sunoğlu refers to very concrete events. Sadık's first protector was the head doctor at the hospital where he had hoped to be employed (Gymnopoulos). The second protector was the forces in Turkey that supported him. In the period leading up to the June 1989 election, it was still not clear in Thrace that Sadık had been groomed by outside forces to become the new minority leader. It was not even known to his running mates on the same ticket that Turkish support would be skewed so heavily towards him.

The Background

To understand the motives and dynamics of the Greek-Turkish confrontation in Greek Thrace it is necessary to go back in time and provide some context. I will concentrate on two important factors: the conflict surrounding the identity of the minority and the dynamics of Greek-Turkish relations. The Muslim minority in Greek Thrace was exempted from the population exchange of the Lausanne Treaty (1923) to counterbalance the Greek Orthodox minority that remained in Turkey. At the time, it was in Turkey's interest to stick to the religious label and not engage in detailed questions about the ethnic identity of the population in its own territory. We have subsequently a peculiar situation where traditionally the Balkan Christians called all the Muslims "Turks" regardless of their ethnic background, while in Turkey Mustafa Kemal strong-armed a new Turkish identity on a population that self-identified as Muslim. It was inevitable that the innovations in Turkey would influence Thrace. In the 1920s, Turkish policies had a certain defensive flavour since prominent religious leaders in Thrace were perceived to be a threat to the Kemalist project. Later, the most important

⁵ *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 9-8-1995.

factor influencing the identity was the trajectory of Greek-Turkish relations. The minority itself had very little power and had to succumb to the interests of the states, or what is often referred to as “interstate reciprocity.” The Greek scholar Ilias Nikolakopoulos refers to it as a system of double protection where some would seek the protection of Turkey while others would seek the protection of Greece. We might as well also refer to it as a system of double oppression at times when the minority came under pressure. Within this context, Greece would vacillate between labelling the minority Muslim or Turkish depending on Greek-Turkish relations.

Usually, minorities do not thrive in nation-states, but in the Greek-Turkish case, this should in theory be offset by the balance between the two minorities and the mutual interest in their protection. A common view held, among others, by the former Turkish ambassador to Athens, Fahir Alaçam (1980-85), considered the minority question to depend on two balances: people and property. He supported his view on the minutes from the Lausanne negotiations. He claimed that each country would be pleased to get rid of the minority on its territory but recognised the problems it would create for the kindred minority in the neighbouring country. He complained that after the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul had left, Greece was reluctant to give Turkey a say over its “Turkish minority.”⁶ Needless to say, this approach put a premium on state interest and allowed little agency to the minorities.

The Greek Orthodox minority had not been able to survive the pressures of the Turkish national model. The most salient events after 1930 were the wealth tax (*Varlık vergisi*) in 1941, the pogrom in September 1955, and the expulsions in 1964. In the 1960s, the pressure on the Greek minority in Gökçeada and Bozcaada also increased, including large-scale expropriations. It can be difficult to discern exactly who formulated the Turkish anti-minority policies. For example, it became known only in 2005 that the 1955 September events were in fact organised by the clandestine Tactical Mobilization Group under the direction of four-star general Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu.

⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 15-3-1989.

The Greek policies followed a slightly different trajectory. Greece seems to have been more sensitive to the detrimental effects that discrimination in Thrace could have on the minority in Istanbul. Greece was also better integrated into international organisations promoting minority protection. This was not only the case after Greece became a member of the EEC in 1981. It hails back to the early days of the League of Nations. Furthermore, the two countries had different trajectories as regards their national aspirations. After the devastating losses in the Balkan wars (1912-13) the Ottoman Empire entered a path of consolidation centred on Asia Minor, while Greece still held ambitions towards unredeemed territories after the Asia Minor Disaster in 1922, such as the Dodecanese, Cyprus, and Northern Epirus, and had to prove that it could incorporate minorities in a civilized manner.

With the virtual elimination of the minority in Turkey, however, Greece embarked in 1965 on an anti-minority policy designed to pester them away while keeping a low profile, thus avoiding international attention. These measures are well known in Greece among those who occupy themselves with the minority and are referred to as “administrative harassment.”⁷ In the tense atmosphere after the 1974 Cyprus invasion, the minority sought at first to solve its problems within the Greek political systems. The minority held out hopes that the PASOK victory in the 1981 elections would bring the promised change but soon became disillusioned.

Turkish Identity

Before proceeding further, I should say a bit more about the Turkish identity. The Turkish Foreign Service represented the modern Turkish identity and sought from the early days to impose the Kemalist ideology on the minority. This received a boost in the early 1950s with the Greek-Turkish rapprochement but had a setback after the 1955 events. In the 1959 diplomatic negotiations, the recognition of a Turkish minority was

⁷ Angelos Syrigos, “Μουσουλμανική μειονότητα στη Θράκη” (Muslim Minority in Thrace), in *Μειονότητες & Θρησκευτικές και Γλωσσικές Ομάδες* (Minorities & Religious and Linguistic groups), eds. Anastasia Samara-Krispi-Angelos M. Syrigos-Antonis Klapsis (Athens: Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2023), 316; Χρήστος Ηλιάδης, «*Η Θράκη απειλείται*» (Thrace is under Threat) (Athens: Vivliorama, 2018).

a principal goal of the Turkish delegation. The Greek delegation considered that as a *quid pro quo*, they should then ask for the minority in Turkey to be recognized as Greek. This was, however, met with the opposition of the minority.⁸ The minority in Turkey is officially recognized as “Rum Ortodoks,” which is the traditional religious millet identity. There are two main reasons why the minority would oppose a change to this status. Firstly, Rum is a well-established minority identity that represents them. On the other hand, if they espoused an explicit Greek identity this would probably be viewed as a provocation and attract the ire of Turkish nationalists. In other words, they were afraid to make such a move. This is an obvious contrast to the brazen use of Turkish nationalist rhetoric by Sadık and his entourage. The “Turkism” of the minority, however, is also conditioned by other factors. The Turkish identity is integral to modernization. Since the minority was not integrated into Greek educational structures the road towards modernity went through Turkey and the Turkish national project.

The Cyprus invasion in 1974 alarmed Turkey’s neighbours. This took on its crudest form when Bulgaria started a name-changing campaign to eradicate its respective minority’s connection to Turkey.⁹ In Greece, the reaction surfaced after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in November 1983. Greece responded by outlawing the minority associations that had the epithet “Turkish” in their title such as the Turkish Union of Xanthi or the Komotini Turkish Youth Union. As a result, the contradictory Greek policy desired the minority to leave for Turkey, while simultaneously denying any formal relation to Turkish identity. Furthermore, Greece had recognised the minority as “Turkish” during periods of *détente*. Most famously when the Governor-General G. Fessopoulos gave strict orders in 1954 to change the title of the minority schools from “Muslim” to “Turkish.”

⁸ Christos Grammatikas, «Η συγκρότηση και λειτουργία της Μικτής Μορφωτικής Ελληνοτουρκικής Επιτροπής και η σημασία τους για τη μειονοτική εκπαίδευση στην Ελλάδα και την Τουρκία (1951-1974)» (The Formation and Function of the Mixed Greek-Turkish Education Committee and its Importance for the Minority Education in Greece and Turkey (1951-1974)) (PhD diss., Aristotle University, 2018).

⁹ Vemund Aarbakke, “The 1989 Exodus of Bulgarian Turks Revisited,” *Balkan Studies* 54, 2022.

This policy also increased the minority's de facto dependence on Turkey. In other words, the Greek discrimination policies had provided Turkey with added leverage over the minority that it was now ready to exploit. The tension in Thrace created a combustible situation that provided the local backdrop to Sadık's rise to fame.

Internationalisation

Developments in the international minority protection regime became important from the mid-1980s. During this period, the Greek government used many opportunities to condemn Turkey in international forums for the deplorable human rights situation and the treatment of the Kurds. The legitimate as well as nefarious Greek interest in the Kurds became a major point of friction with Turkey. An exact evaluation of the support for the Kurds is beyond the scope of this paper, but it culminated with the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999.

In the mid-1980s, we can observe new trends in the Turkish approach to the minority regime. Since the small remaining minority in Turkey could no longer provide any leverage to pressure Greece, attention was given to new methods. Instead of bilateral pressure, Turkish diplomacy started to opt for internationalisation. This was partly an answer to Greek tactics but also related to the ability to adapt to the evolving international framework for human rights and minority protection. Turkish diplomacy would use scholars with a genuine commitment to human rights, such as Baskın Oran, to modernise its approach as well as people who sought to use it instrumentally in the conflict with Greece. We can observe a clear shift in the involvement and orientation of émigré minority organisations in Turkey such as *Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği* (hereafter BTTDD). This organisation belonged to the few that did not change leadership after the coup of 12 September 1980, which indicates that it was already under firm control. BTTDD organised a highly publicised round-table discussion at the Marmara Etap hotel in Istanbul on 28 June 1986, attended by prominent scholars, including Kemal Karpat. The latter gave specific advice on how they would have to promote their case as Greek citizens in international forums and what kind of persons were needed for the job. They would need to target organisations such as Amnesty International, the

European Parliament, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the US Congress, the Helsinki Committee, etc.¹⁰ As Turkey was searching for a front figure, Sadık's name emerged after he went to Thessaloniki on 25 September 1987, and distributed a pamphlet with the grievances of the minority to the participants in a conference on democracy and human rights. He was also set for trial after being arrested in August 1986 for collecting signatures condemning the Greek oppression of the minority. Services in Turkey were in the process of examining Sadık's potential as a new leader when the former minority parliamentarian Hafız Yaşar visited Bursa in 1988. When asked about Sadık, he warned about his possible disruptive impact by making the analogy to a BMW with broken brakes. The first trial (22-24 June 1988) received only lukewarm support in the minority. Sadık had been charged according to the catch-all §101 and §192 of the Penal Code: "Disseminating false information" and "Provoking citizens into discord." Before the trial of appeal, scheduled for 20 December, an important event may have forced the decision to promote Sadık. Turkey was bothered by the protest of Greek and German left-wing activists at the Dev Sol trial in Ankara on 4 November and blamed Greek authorities for instigating the incident. To return the favour a massive campaign was staged leading up to the appeal trial. This involved minority members in Thrace under Turkish influence. The newly elected president of BTTDD, Tahsin Salihoğlu, played a major role. Sadık would also enjoy the patronage of high-level politicians, particularly the Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz.

The June 1989 Operation

The real showdown took place in the run-up to the general elections of 18 June 1989. This seminal event represents a watershed in the Greek-Turkish minority regime. İbrahim Onsunoglu has referred to it as the "June 1989 operation" and returned to it several times in his writings

¹⁰ The meeting was reported in the minority press close to Turkish diplomacy shortly after it found place. *Akın*, 10-7-1986; *Gerçek*, 30-7-1986. It was prominently featured in the first issue of the solidarity organisations in Turkey's flagship journal *Bati Trakya'nın Sesi* 1 (November-December 1987): 13-4.

since its negative consequences have plagued the minority until the present. There was much confusion about what was going on, despite the massive interest of the Greek press. It is necessary to lay out the various parameters. The elections were crucial to the scandal-ridden PASOK that stood to lose power. To minimize New Democracy's (hereafter ND) possibilities to gain an absolute majority, a proportional election law (1847/1989) had been voted through on the eve of the elections. The minority vote became important in domestic Greek politics since every vote counted. In such a climate, the political parties would be wary of antagonizing the minority voters. Their relationship with PASOK was strained anyway because of the discriminatory policy spearheaded by Deputy Foreign Minister Giannis Kapsis. The decision to field an independent minority ticket certainly raised many eyebrows but had to be dealt with in the context of party competition. In short, since PASOK had lost its hold on the minority, ND was expected to be the beneficiary. The massive vote for the ND candidate Mehmet Müftüoğlu in the 1985 elections was a warning sign. The rivalry between the two large parties was upset by the emergence of the independent ticket, which would hurt ND the most. For this reason, we can observe great circumspection by the major parties during the campaign period. There were also credible accusations of local PASOK cadres facilitating the independent candidates since their success would take a mandate from ND.

The independent ticket *Güven* (Trust) had three candidates: Dr. Sadık Ahmet, the lawyer Sebahaddin Emin (Salepçi), and the journalist İsmail Molla (Rodoplu). When I spoke with Sebaheddin Emin in 1993 he told me that he had been assured that Turkey would treat the candidates even-handedly, but it became clear that the system was rigged toward Sadık. That is the reason why he did not participate in subsequent elections. He had his law practice to fall back on in contrast to Rodoplu, who was financially dependent on Turkey. In previous elections, Turkish diplomacy would show its preferences discreetly, but this time, the Turkish forces that supported Sadık went on a rampage.

These forces included both state and non-state actors. The solidarity associations of Western Thracians in Turkey and Germany were mobilized. The associations in Germany had diverse members but the faction backed by Turkey prevailed under Cafer Alioğlu. They were tasked with

promoting Sadık in the elections. A massive campaign was launched in Turkish media including mainstream press, state radio, and television. Some in the Greek administration understood the seriousness of the situation, but many did not. They had grown used to the indiscriminate danger-mongering and were no longer able to discern real threats from the usual nationalist hooey. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Giannis Kapsis, is a case in point. He understood what was going on but could not intervene decisively because of the elections.¹¹ On the other hand, he had been among the foremost danger-mongers, and it would be difficult to discern his correct warnings from his previous spurious and manipulative communications. It resembles the tale about the young shepherd boy who cried “wolf” when he was bored and failed to get help when the real wolf appeared. Another factor is that Kapsis had great responsibility for creating the tense situation in the first place by enforcing an anti-minority policy that left it with no other support than Turkey.

The viciousness of the Turkish intervention was partly a reflection of insecurity. It entered new territory and felt uncertain about its chances to prevail. The success of the Turkish campaign relied firstly on the traditional prestige of the “Motherland” and the exasperation of the minority caused by the discrimination against it. The heavy-handed intervention by ultra-nationalist Turkish forces constituted its sinister side. The intervention was certainly perceived differently by different segments of the minority. Turkey put primarily pressure on minority members in positions of influence. Others may have been carried away by the general climate. The result was an overwhelming victory for the independent ticket headed by Sadık. The methods employed were later presented in a minority newspaper as follows:

They would make you feel sorry. They would take you out of the protocol and not invite you for receptions [at the consulate]. They would put you on the blacklist. They would prohibit your entrance to Turkey. You would not be able to visit your kith and kin in Turkey, friends, the house which your father bought for you with a lot of sacrifices. You would not be able to send your children to

¹¹ Giannis P. Kapsis, *Οι τρεις μέρες του Μάρτη* (The Three Days of March) (Athens: Nea Sinora, 1990), 145-8, 302.

Turkey for studies. The scholarship would be cut, the social aid [to teachers educated in Turkey etc.] would be cut. There would be threats that your child which you had sent to Turkey for studies would be expelled. They would expel you from the country one day, they would roughen you up a little. You would also be taken in for interrogation [when visiting Turkey], and you would have an experience you would never forget if you were among the lucky ones who had not been taken in for interrogation yet. They would teach you a lesson. If they were so disposed, they would be quick to declare that you were “pro-infidel, a man of the Greek Administration, collaborator, KYP agent [Greek secret services], Greek spy, national traitor, etc.” Your Turkish [minority] customers here [in Greece] would immediately stop to come. And you had no Christian customers. Your friends would start to avoid you and change direction if they met you in the street. They would raze you to the ground. They would show you. Just like they had shown so many people. Or, again just like they had elevated so many people.¹²

Sadık did not refrain from hurling base threats. During the election campaign he said: “Let them [the party candidates] go to Turkey and I will get their legs broken.”¹³ Sadık would also make exaggerated claims about how he would take the minority issue to international human rights organisations and solve their problems in a matter of days.¹⁴ In a different political environment, there would maybe have been more measured reactions to Sadık’s erratic and reckless behaviour but in the context of Thrace any reasonable discussion was drowned in the nationalist hubbub. Sadık himself seemed to have been carried away by his newfound fame and did not understand properly his relation to those who had created him. Consequently, he was somewhat of a loose cannon.

Turkey would mobilise international human rights organisations to prevent irregularities in the elections. These organisations observed certain authoritarian features of the state apparatus such as: the voting of

¹² *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 17-2-1994.

¹³ *Birlik*, 29-6-1989.

¹⁴ *Hürriyet*, 15-6-1989.

soldiers bussed in to dilute the minority vote, the strike of the border police to prevent busses with voters from Turkey, jamming of Turkish radio and television, delays at the voting booths, etc. The covert actions by Sadık's sponsors went largely unnoticed. The elections resulted in a resounding victory for the independent *Güven* ticket.

Further Developments

The lack of a decisive result for the largest party led to the subsequent elections in November and April before ND secured the narrowest possible majority. The real watershed had been the June elections. After this, Turkey was firmly in control and did not need to escalate further. Sadık was prevented from running in the November election because of a technicality. This led to the election of his erstwhile running mate Rodoplu. Fissures were already beginning to show in the independent camp. Sadık was jealous of Rodoplu and claimed that he had been elected with his votes.

Sadık went on trial on 25 January 1990, with accusations related to the behaviour of the candidates of the *Güven* ticket during the November election campaign. Sadık was sentenced to eighteen months, the loss of political rights for three years, and sent immediately to prison. The verdict did not sit well with human rights organisations. The American Helsinki Watch report termed the trial "perhaps the most egregious Greek action denying the ethnic identity of the Turkish minority."¹⁵ The tense situation in Thrace culminated in the anti-minority riots of 29 January. The involvement of the consul Kemal Gür in the aftermath of the riots created further tension in Greek-Turkish relations and led to his expulsion. He was believed to be connected to ultra-nationalist circles. As recently as December 2023 he spoke at an arrangement by the Western Thrace Student Union of Ankara on "Western Thrace Turks and Dr. Sadık Ahmet."

I was a student in Copenhagen at the time and could follow closely the involvement of the Danish Helsinki Committee. The chairman, Erik Siesby, approached the verdict as a classic case of minority persecution

¹⁵ Lois Whitman, *Destroying Ethnic Identity - The Turks of Greece* (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1990), 17.

and showed great satisfaction when Sadık was released on the eve of the April elections. Sadık now had a new team and shared the ticket with Ahmet Hacıosman (1958-) and Mustafa Hafız Mustafa (Bacaksız) (1945-96) [hereafter MHM]. There was no more competition among the candidates, everybody worked for Sadık. At this stage, MHM played an important role in the promotion of Sadık. He belonged to the generation who had studied in Turkish teacher colleges. His approach was not to challenge the policy of either Greece or Turkey but to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the minority regime. He was considered one of the best pens in the minority and had worked in several minority newspapers. MHM had previously penned the election newspaper of a Christian candidate in the local election and was now tasked with propagandising Sadık. In other words, he was a pen for hire. MHM had never had any personal ambitions but preferred to act in the wings. When I first met him, he delivered the usual platitudes about Sadık, but when he understood that I was aware of the situation he hardly bothered to conceal what was happening. He knew his role and referred to himself jokingly as the “Goebbels” of the minority. The *DEB* and *Balkan* newspapers he edited presented a tedious string of eulogies to the great leader Sadık.¹⁶ MHM claimed to be very much in touch with the mentality of the minority and for the sake of understanding better the forces in play it can be pertinent to pause a little with the notion of Sadık as the great leader. The idea of investing a leader with supreme prowess is not unique to Sadık. The way someone like Erdoğan is portrayed as the great leader (*Reis*), is part of a pattern in Turkish political life. MHM writings remind me of similar praise to Rauf Denktaş by Fikret Alasya in the periodical *Türk Kültürü*. Some of the same patterns arguably exist in Greek politics as seen, for example, in Giannis Kapsis’ excessive flattering of Andreas Papandreou. It is, however, more pronounced in Turkey. Jenny White devoted an article to the theme where she states inter alia:

Hierarchies characterizing Turkish political life are brittle because they are not founded in organizational competence, in rules

¹⁶ *DEB* was the Newspaper of Sadık Ahmet’s party: *Dostluk Eşitlik ve Barış Partisi* (Friendship, Equality and Peace Party). It was later superseded by *Balkan*.

and procedures, in merit, or even on a relationship of trust between leader and followers. These networks instead constitute what I call a spindle autocracy, grounded in loyalty and obedience to a single, central person instead of the organization itself or to the concept of merit as a marker for leadership and promotion.¹⁷

Much of the praise heaped on Sadık and the slandering of his opponents seem petty, but there was a lot at stake. MHM would promote Sadık not only with the goal of uniting the minority under one leader. On another level, it was part of the tug-of-war between Greece and Turkey for the control of the minority. This can be seen for example in the mufti controversy. When the mufti of Komotini died in 1985 his succession became a subject of dispute between the different factions within the minority. Eventually, there would be two sets of muftis. Meço Cemali became appointed mufti by the Greek authorities while later İbrahim Şerif was “elected” through an informal procedure backed by Ankara. Greece would prosecute İbrahim Şerif for usurping an official title. This would lead to a series of trials that eventually resulted in Şerif’s vindication in the Council of Europe. Basically, the verdict stated that his followers were free to recognise him as a religious leader without the interference of the Greek state. Of course, he could not take on the function of the official mufti in the Greek administration. In reality, it was not so much a question of religious freedom as a dispute where Greece would use state power to contain Şerif, while the other side would try to undermine the authority of Cemali through its clandestine network. Since Cemali held high prestige in the minority, this was not an easy task. An interview with Cemali provides us with an impression of the forces in play.

“I was insulted a lot. I didn’t mind. The only thing that really got to me was that Mustafa Bacaksız kept referring to me as ‘Miço’ in his writing. That really bothered me. Before he died, he asked for forgiveness from me through a mutual acquaintance. So, I said: Let me forgive... What would happen if I forgave?! Will God forgive the sin committed by calling a person who believes and

¹⁷ Jenny White, “Spindle Autocracy in the New Turkey,” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 24, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2017).

says, ‘I am a Muslim’ ‘Miço,’ that is, by pretending that he has become a Christian? I don’t think so.”¹⁸

In his mudslinging, MHM did not refrain from using base tricks. “Miço” is a wordplay on Cemali’s first name Meço and the Turkish spelling of the Greek diminutive for Dimitris “Mitsos.” In this case, MHM was trying to undermine the authority of a religious leader by targeting religious sentiment in the minority. At the same time, we can see how it backfired on MHM. When this is said, I should stress that MHM was very deliberate in his writings. He would know exactly where to toe the line in order not to expose himself to libel action. In this regard, he distinguished himself from the recklessness of Sadık.

The Independent MPs Prevail

The election of Sadık, together with Ahmed Faikoğlu in Xanthi, in April 1990, had certain tangible consequences. I have previously touched on Turkey’s search for a front figure to promote the minority issue internationally. Sadık, however, was not someone who was proficient in presenting coherently the minority issue. He was more in his element hurling simple slogans. In many of his appearances on Turkish news, they would use voice-over. In his international appearances on record, he was very incoherent and spoke in a way that was hardly intelligible for someone unfamiliar with the minority. He had been elevated to a political position that he was not remotely qualified for, but this was lost in the clamour surrounding the elections and the general confusion in Greek-Turkish relations.¹⁹

Furthermore, since Turkish intervention had become the determining factor, the minority politicians would make declarations to please Ankara that were unrelated to problems in Greece. The various “unacceptable” declarations of the independent MPs would be prominently featured in the Greek press at the time and provided journalists with a never-ending supply of sensationalist material. I remember vividly a conversation with a minority member in the early 1990s when I was

¹⁸ *Azınlıkça*, 17-2-2020; MHM had various health problems related to diabetes.

¹⁹ For a transcript of a presentation in Washington DC see Aarbakke, “The Muslim Minority,” 660-1.

still new to the game. I had commented that the declaration by the minority MP was unproductive and offensive. I received an immediate reply: “He is not shouting so that they can hear it in Athens but so that they can hear it in Ankara.” On another occasion, I was told that the behaviour was due to greater fear of Turkey than of Greece.

The Mitsotakis government voted through a new election law (1907/1990) to secure its position after coming to power in the 10 April 1990 elections. One feature of this law was a 3% threshold on a national basis. This corresponds to almost two hundred thousand votes and would make the elections of independent MPs impossible. The scene was set for a showdown in the 10 October 1993 parliamentary elections. I spoke with the prefect of Rodopi, Constantine Siatras (ND), on the eve of the elections. He told me about an incident that he later presented in writing.²⁰ He had consulted prominent Muslims in the local administration (*Koinotarches*) about a suitable candidate for his party and they had proposed the veterinarian Ali Nuri on 14 September. The next day, however, they came to the prefect and told him –visibly anxious– that they had changed their mind and now proposed Sadık Ahmet as a candidate for the party. The prefect concluded that:

It must be understood that the Muslims of Thrace are not free and not in the position to freely make decisions that are contrary to the line drawn by Turkey and disseminated and imposed by the Turkish Consulate with its hundreds of salaried agents.²¹

Sadık was not one to sacrifice his personal interest, although this would leave the minority without parliamentary representation for the first time in its history. It was also in part a showdown between the various factions that had support in Turkey. Sadık claimed that in the upcoming elections, the minority would not elect an MP but a leader. He would become the new Arafat or Mandela of the minority. Then, as the only leader of the minority, they would have to accept him in the Greek parliament either they wanted it or not. He claimed the Greeks

²⁰ Konstantinos Siatras, (former prefect of Rodopi) “Το Μειονοτικό/Μουσουλμανικό Πρόβλημα της Θράκης (Ειδική αναφορά στο νομό Ροδόπης)” (The Minority/Muslim Problem of Thrace with special reference to the Rodope Prefecture), (January 1994).

²¹ Siatras, op.cit.

were afraid of him as he was backed by the MPs and ministers of the Motherland Turkey who wanted the victory to be great.²² Sadık did not refrain from racist slurs in his competition with other leading figures. I remember my friend Mehmet Bilge was all flustered after Sadık had called Mehmet Emin Aga a Pomak and Ahmet Faikoğlu a Gypsy at a time when the policy was to present the minority as uniformly Turkish.²³ The election result was a landslide victory for Sadık as he obtained a result you normally see only in totalitarian states. He received 24,956 votes, while the most successful party candidate, Hasan Ali (PASOK), received 651. Despite the electoral triumph, it was clear that many in the minority had become uneasy about the confrontational policy.

A more nebulous question concerns exactly which forces in Turkey were behind Sadık. It became clear that the Foreign Department was not the only player involved and maybe not even the most important. This can be estimated from the rift between Sadık and part of the minority elite that had traditionally enjoyed the support of Turkey. Sadık's desire to be the sole leader with dictatorial powers would naturally not go down well with the latter. Both factions would make frequent trips to Turkey and subsequently publish photographs together with important politicians to convince the minority about their standing. It was clear, however, that Sadık was most favoured. The situation came to a head with an incident that involved the Turkish consul in Komotini. It started when the consul, Hakan Okçal, attended the trial of the "elected mufti" Mehmet Emin Aga in Xanthi on 12 April, 1994. Allegedly, after Aga was convicted, the consul said to the MPs who had come from Turkey to attend the trial:

"Let us eat lunch at Aga's house." Sadık who always wanted to be the sole centre of attention opposed this. When the consul insisted Sadık responded: "Who are you to interfere in our business?" Consul: "I am the representative of the Turkish Republic." Sadık: "I am the elected leader of the Western Thrace Turkish minority. You are

²² *Eleftherotipia*, 31-10-1993.

²³ Sadık's mudslinging is also mentioned in the Hakan Okçal. "Sadık Ahmet filmi ve Batı Trakya'da Türk kimliği" (The Sadık Ahmet Movie and Western Thrace Turkish Identity), *T24*, 16-2-2024, <https://t24.com.tr/> (accessed 24-11-2024).

an appointed bureaucrat and cannot speak like that to me.” Consul: “We are going to Aga’s house; you can do whatever you want.” Sadık (screaming): “I will show you. I will get you sacked from the Foreign Department. I will send you back to your village. You must obey me, I am the elected leader, leader.”²⁴

This episode sent shock waves through the minority, and it could have taken a much worse turn if the consul had not kept his composure. People were particularly upset about the way Sadık had insulted the consul publicly in front of the police and the Greeks in general. All those who traditionally had close connections to the consulate such as minority teachers, religious and youth associations, and political opponents condemned Sadık vehemently.²⁵ By now the two factions had long been at each other’s throats and the incident brought out all the accumulated resentment towards Sadık. It turned out, however, that Sadık still had strong backing in Turkey and his rivals were compelled to accept Sadık as leader after a massive intervention by Ankara.²⁶ The Solidarity Associations in Turkey wrote that on 8 June “national unity” (*millî birlik*) had been secured in Western Thrace. The minority had “put all its conflicts behind and opened a new page.”²⁷ This was not exactly the case. If anything, the situation got worse and Sadık became increasingly more and more isolated after he had quarrelled with just about everybody, even his closest collaborators.

Sadık’s adventures came to a tragic end when he collided with a tractor outside the village Sosti (Susurköy) on the evening of 24 July 1995. In Turkish nationalist circles, it is referred to routinely as a suspicious (*şüpheli/şaibeli*) accident. I have also heard Christians express the opinion that he was “bumped off” (*τον έφραγαν*). This is most certainly wrong. I do not dispute that he had many enemies and had received death threats on several occasions. The accident, however, was due to a combination of unfortunate circumstances. Sadık was returning late from a circumcision ceremony when a tractor entered the road at a place

²⁴ *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 19-5-1994.

²⁵ Mehmet Emin Aga made a vicious attack on Sadık in *Gerçek*, 20-5-1994.

²⁶ *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 16-6-1994.

²⁷ *Bati Trakya'nın Sesi*, 6-1994.

with limited visibility. Sadık drove fast and could not stop in time. Another factor was that he drove the smaller car of his wife. If they had taken his Mercedes, the accident would probably not have been fatal. I was at home in Norway painting my house when I heard the news on the radio. A week or so later I spoke with his erstwhile collaborator MHM in Komotini. When I asked if there had been foul play he answered immediately: “That old man (on the tractor) could not have accomplished such a job” (*O ihtiyar öyle bir iş beceremez*). He could not have said this publicly, however, without being accused of selling out to the authorities. Others in the minority (Rıza Kırıldökme) would say to me that Sadık became the victim of his own recklessness. I also discussed the matter with some Muslim villagers at a meeting in Germany who had spoken with the tractor driver in the fields just minutes before the accident. They said there was no way that he could have ambushed Sadık. While we discussed this Cafer Alioğlu bellowed from the podium: “Sadık Ahmet did not die. He was killed by a dirty Greek.” Needless to say, no one would argue against him publicly. Interestingly, the Turkish consul of this period also mentioned Sadık’s recklessness in a recent article and did not suspect foul play.²⁸ In Turkish nationalist discourse, however, the firmly established expression “suspicious accident” will probably stand the test of time and forever be a part of Dr. Sadık Ahmet lore.

The only one who could have shattered the Sadık Ahmet myth was probably Sadık himself. When I spoke with the former MP Hasan İmamoğlu shortly after Sadık’s death, he mentioned that Sadık fell out of favour in Turkey not for a lack of effort, but because of his erratic behaviour. They would ask him to take one step, and he took ten. When I later spoke to another prominent minority figure, Salahaddin Galip, he would compare the behaviour of the independent MPs and tell me that while Faikoğlu was aware (*bilinçli*) of the impact of his behaviour, Sadık was not (*bilinçsiz*). Towards the end of his life his erratic behaviour had become a liability even to his sponsors in Turkey. A couple of months before his death he was threatened and humiliated in front of his peers in an Istanbul hotel and told in no uncertain terms that he was

²⁸ Okçal, “Sadık Ahmet filmi.”

finished. “Tokuç” Mustafa Hasanoğlu had been assigned by the Turkish Deep State to do the job.²⁹ Sadık’s untimely death turned out to be timely for his legacy. His sponsors rehabilitated him posthumously to protect their “investment.” Just when Sadık was about to be declared a traitor, he was declared a hero and leader again. He has since been a rallying point for the Turkish ultra-nationalist right. The anniversary of his death has turned into a major annual event where high-ranking politicians from Turkey attend the rites at his grave-memorial in Komotini.³⁰

Different Stories – Different Interests

It is difficult to patch together a coherent narrative about subjects that cannot be discussed freely. My knowledge of minority affairs comes from a wide variety of sources, but a couple stand out. Firstly, Mehmet Bilge (1947-2018), since I came to know him in 1991 when he was still a student in Thessaloniki and discussed many of the issues with him as they unfolded. He had very pronounced “minority reflexes,” which helped me understand the mentality and anxieties of a minority person. He grew up in the same village as Sadık and was a close friend of both Sebahaddin Emin (Salepçi) and İbrahim Onsunoglu, who were on opposite sides in minority politics. He felt more comfortable with those who had the approval of the “Motherland” but was not a blind follower of Turkish policies. Secondly, İbrahim Onsunoglu (1948-2021), who I also

²⁹ Onsunoglu published an account of this event on Facebook on 24 July 2017. It later appeared in Greek translation on the website <https://tourkikanea.gr/> under the title: «Απειλές θανάτου και βρισιές κατά του Σαδίκ Αχμέτ λίγους μήνες πριν τον θάνατό του!» (Death threats and cursing of Sadık Ahmet a few months before his death). MHM confirmed to me right after Sadık’s death that he had fallen out of favour in Turkey. Tokuç Mustafa Hasanoğlu (1943-2017) hailed from Greek Thrace and belonged to the same circles as Tahsin Salihoğlu.

³⁰ See for example: *Ülkü Gazetesi*, 25-7-2023, <https://www.ulkugazetesi.net/2023/07/25/dr-sadik-ahmet-vefatinin-28-yilinda-anildi/> (accessed 24-11-2024); Ayhan Mehmet, *Dr. Sadık Ahmet ölümünün 29. yılında Batı Trakya’da anıldı* (Sadık Ahmet was commemorated on the 29th anniversary of his death), *Anadolu Ajansı*, 25-7-2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/dr-sadik-ahmet-olumunun-29-yilinda-bati-trakyada-anildi/3284791> (accessed 24-11-2024). The articles have many photos from the ceremony and names of dignitaries present.

came to know very well. He must rank as the most important public intellectual of his generation by a distance. Most of his writings are in Turkish, but he was also one of the few of his generation who was willing and able to present the problems of the minority to a Greek audience. He wrote continuously about minority matters from the late 1970s until his death.³¹ I would broadly classify his writings into three periods. In the period before 1989, he was mainly criticising the Greek discrimination of the minority. The blatant Turkish interference in the 1989 elections caused him to change course. In the beginning, he hesitated to write since he found it difficult to discuss openly matters that exposed the minority. However, his perception that the Turkish intervention did great harm to the minority made him overcome his hesitation. It should be noticed that the stalwart of Kemalism in Xanthi, Osman Nuri Fettaoğlu, also criticised Turkey after the September 1955 events because of the damaging consequences to the minority. He did this, however, as someone who was held in high regard by Turkish diplomacy. When the Greek discrimination abated in the 1990s, Onsunoglu lost his urge to write for a while. Later, he started to write again about his experiences in the style of memoirs. In this sense, he is an important source for minority history. Besides his unquestionable intellectual capacity and moral integrity, there are other reasons why he was able to write openly about what happened to the minority. Firstly, he had no direct dependency on Turkey since he worked as a psychiatrist in a Greek public hospital in Thessaloniki outside the environment

³¹ His writings are not readily accessible since they appeared in a range of obscure minority newspapers and one-off contributions to various Greek publications. In the early period, they appeared most prominently in *İleri* and especially in *Trakya'nın Sesi*. He also had his own newspaper named *Denge* for a short period in the late 1980s. Minority newspapers during this period were simple publications consisting of a single sheet of paper. In his later years, he would write in the periodical *Azınlıkça*. Other outlets were the now defunct websites *Barikat*, *Tiken*, and the still active website <https://radikal.gr/> of Mustafa Çolakali. He often commented on recent events on Facebook. The most accessible samples may be found on YouTube in a series of interviews titled “Batı Trakya'nın Bilinmeyen Tarihi, Dr. İbrahim Onsunoglu” (The Unknown Sides of Western Thrace's History). Some of his writings were republished in the newspaper *Paratiritis tis Thrakis* and, more recently, on the website <https://tourkikanea.gr/>, which also translated several articles into Greek.

controlled by his adversaries. He felt an obligation to compensate for the Turkish scholarship that had enabled him to study in Thessaloniki. However, when push came to shove, his primary allegiance was to the minority community and not to the Turkish state. He also had a keen awareness of his obligations as a Greek citizen. In other words, he would not bend to forces in Turkey that acted contrary to the interest of the minority. This may sound easier than it was. He summed up the pressure on minority members in Thrace during the height of confrontations in 1992 as follows:

Fear is a very human feeling. I do not see anything wrong with it. You ask if I am afraid of the Minority mafia [his term for those who had the backing of Turkey at the time]. Is this mafia nothing to be frightened of? One move from the mafia, and suddenly you are not allowed to enter Turkey. They say that on the other side [i.e., in Turkey] they will get your legs broken, and they are broken. Suddenly, the social benefits [from the consulate to unemployed teachers etc.] you receive are stopped. Suddenly, you see that you have been declared pro-infidel. And suddenly, you see that your friends start to look at you differently. Suddenly, the customers of your shop are halved... And what did not happen afterward? You see that unsigned letters circulate through everybody's hands implying such immorality, including insults and the worst kind of curses against you, your family, and your wife, which cannot even be taken in the mouth. What they diffuse by whispering is another thing... Who said that I am not afraid of the mafia? Of Hafız Aga, Hasan Hatipoğlu, Rodoplu, Sadık Ahmet, Ahmet Faikoğlu, Sebahaddin Emin, İbrahim Şerif, Aydın M. Arif?³²

In later years, Sadık's family took actions to muzzle any critical voices. When some of Onsunoğlu's writings were republished in the local newspaper *Paratiritis tis Thrakis*, his son Levent asked the editor in a letter dated 3 July 2018 to remove the article. He claimed that the false, defamatory, and slanderous reports of the columnist insulted the memory of his father and caused heavy moral damage to himself and

³² *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 16-1-1992.

his family.³³ Levent prosecuted Onsunoglu on 15 January 2019, for offending the honour and reputation of Sadik. His wife and two children demanded twenty thousand euros each in compensation for moral damages and suffering.³⁴ Sadik, with the backing of the Turkish Deep State, had succeeded in silencing those who were susceptible to pressure from Turkey. Now the Greek legal system was mobilised. The indictment contains a long list of in total thirty-seven excerpts from Onsunoglu's writings that are supposed to constitute libel against Sadik. These are, however, well-known episodes for people in the know. When it mentions that Sadik was likened to a BMW with faulty brakes it was not even Onsunoglu's statement. He was simply conveying what was expressed by Hafiz Yaşar. Even Halit Eren, who was among Sadik's supporters in Turkey, characterised his behaviour as "wild" when I spoke with the former in Istanbul in the autumn of 1993. We can look in more detail at just one of these supposedly libelous statements:

He had attracted attention by his statement that "blood would be spilled" if the expropriation went forth. Fortunately, the expropriation was cancelled and [...] Sadik did not need to spill blood.

This is a concrete episode that was covered widely in the Greek press. After the Greek government decided not to proceed with the planned expropriations, circles within ND brought their preferred minority politicians, Hasan İmamoğlu and Ali Nuri, to Athens to let them reap the political benefit of being those who announced the cancellation. However, Sadik ruined the performance by threatening that blood would flow if the agricultural prisons were established. The retreat of

³³ Levent Sadik, «*Επιστολές αναγνωστών*» (Readers Letters), *Παρατηρητής της Θράκης*, 3-7-2018, <https://www.paratritis-news.gr/koinonia/epistoles-anagnoston-5/> (accessed 24-11-2024).

³⁴ I would like to thank Onsunoglu's daughters for providing me with the legal documents related to the trial. This includes the decisions: County Court of Komotini, Dec. No: 30/2021 (Special Procedure for Property Disputes-Disputes from Newspaper Articles/Radio Broadcasts/Internet Posts), unpublished; Single-member Court of First Instance of Rodopi, Dec. No: 59/2023 (as an Appellate Court), unpublished. I should add that Onsunoglu referred to my doctoral thesis in his defence.

the Greek state was thus attributed to Sadık's brinkmanship.³⁵ It is understandable that Levent Sadık reacted to the unflattering descriptions of his father. However, Onsunoglu died in May 2021. You would expect that Levent would have laid the case to rest but the legal action was shifted to Onsunoglu's two daughters. It is an open question whether it was pursued for the love of money or out of pure vengeance. The court of appeal stipulated the final compensation to seven thousand euros, a result that did not satisfy any of the parties but was ultimately paid. The verdict did not dispute the veracity of Onsunoglu's statements but condemned his ironic style, which could be offensive to Sadık's family. We should also keep in mind that the incidents Onsunoglu referred to were made in public by a public persona. Onsunoglu's statements should count for little in comparison with Sadık's mudslinging already referred to. The foul-mouthed Sadık had even called the upright and honest minority politician Mehmet Müftüoğlu *gâvurcu* (pro-infidel).³⁶ Furthermore, Sadık and his henchmen imported from Turkey and Germany even threatened Onsunoglu physically in the run-up to the June 1989 elections.

Levent was just a child at the time most of these events took place (he was fifteen years old when his father died) and has since been raised on the fairy-tale version of the Turkish ultra-national right. Onsunoglu's version, on the other hand, is solidly planted in first-hand experience. It is an open question if the indictment was just a personal initiative of the Sadık family or if the ultra-right circles in Turkey that back them and have rallied around the family since his death, are the main culprits. In the latter case, it would represent an effort to obliterate the last vestiges of free speech in the minority. There is also the question of protecting

³⁵ Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority," 485, 770. See footnotes 227 and 263 for the coverage in the Greek press; The episode is so well known that it was even included in a recent series of articles on the minority. Stavros Lygeros, «Το μυθιστόρημα της μειονότητας – Για μία χούφτα μουσουλμανικών ψήφων...» (The Tale of the Minority – For a Handful of Muslim Votes...), *SLpress*, 18-6-2023, <https://slpress.gr/ethnika/to-mythistorima-tis-meionotitas-gia-mia-choyfta-moysoylmanikon-psifon/> (accessed 24-11-2024); The episode was also described in the Turkish bibliography: Nilüfer Erdem, *op.cit.*, 339.

³⁶ It is difficult to have a feel for loaded words in a foreign language, but I would say it is on the level of the word "niggerlover" as used in the deep south of the US.

the Sadık “brand name,” where the family was among the main beneficiaries.

The descriptions by Sadık’s peers in the minority converge. In plain English they describe him as greedy, callous, unscrupulous, and incompetent. He had been elevated by outside forces to a political position that he was not remotely qualified for. On the positive side, he was strong, energetic, and industrious. His recklessness was probably an asset in the atmosphere of Komotini during the 1989 election campaign. It is, however, not a good quality for a surgeon. What Onsunoglu mentions in the quotation below was widely known within the minority.³⁷

However, if there is someone in the Minority who will be remembered most for his aphorisms, it is probably Sadık Ahmet. The late Sadık who objected to the urologists’ opinion that the late Komotini Mufti Hüseyin Mustafa should have prostate surgery. How can one forget his polite words: “The Mufti is peeing in cascades?” And indeed, another of his polite words revealing his relationship with the institutions of the Motherland and endowing a political legacy to the parliamentary candidates after him: “A MİT [Turkish secret services] car is waiting at the border for those who don’t vote for me!”³⁸

The second incident refers to intimidation of the voters and the long-term effects of the “June 1989 operation.” Turkey has moved the goal-post and is interfering more openly than before. For example, the consul general of the Republic of Turkey in Komotini was overheard in the garden of the Komotini Turkish Youth Union when Ayhan Karayusuf was unexpectedly elected in the 2012 general elections. He had not been aware of Karayusuf’s potential and said that if he had known, he would

³⁷ Several botched operations were mentioned in an article by Titos Kondopulos, “Δύο (αντ) Έλληνες με τουρκικά διαβατήρια” (Two (anti) Greeks with Turkish passports), *Περιοδικό ΕΝΑ* (October 1991). This article was probably written within the climate of the time to smear Sadık, but it was based on facts. I know several such stories from my friend Mehmet Bilge.

³⁸ The above quotation appeared on Facebook on 16 January, 2015. İbrahim Onsunoglu would often return to certain events and a more elaborate version can be found in: “Rodoplu’nun söyleşisi” (Rodoplu’s conversation), *Azınlıkça Dergisi* 25 (December 2006).

have directed another five hundred votes to him. Then, he could have claimed that Karayusuf owed his election to the consulate.

I do not think that Onsunoglu's main concern was to criticize Sadik. A reoccurring theme in his writings was rather the lack of freedom in the minority's public sphere because of Turkish interference.³⁹ There were, however, many reasons for criticising Sadik since he was the spearhead of Turkish intervention in Thrace. You could even claim that Onsunoglu's characterisations are mild compared to the methods of Sadik's accomplices. His many dubious contacts in Turkey are well documented. In the official hearings after the Susurluk scandal (3 November 1996), it became known that Sadik had close relations with the mafia boss and contract killer Abdullah Çatli. This was possibly related to his other business interests but is indicative of whom he kept company.

Epilogue

When I started my research on the minority, I was thinking of approaching it in the realm of national ideology and ethnic tension. There were, however, other sides that I had not suspected. They do not interest me but merit a few words. When I was in Athens, I contacted the Turkish Embassy to inquire into their view on the situation in Thrace, just as I had earlier done with the Greek Foreign Department. They did not seem very ready to discuss this but set up a date with the Counsellor Ömer Haluk Sipahioğlu. We had a very pleasant conversation but very little to the point on Turkish minority policies. A week or so later, on 4 July 1994 he was gunned down by the 17 November terrorist organisation outside his residence. I was shocked and saddened by the event, but I must admit that it also triggered some thoughts about what was going on in Greek-Turkish relations?

It is disheartening to observe counterproductive approaches to minority policies that involve forces outside "normal" political procedures. It is, however, a problem that these approaches have created vested interests and interest groups that are exploiting the situation and striving for their continuation. Even the former Vice Foreign Minister,

³⁹ See for example *Trakya'nın Sesi*, 31-10-1991.

Giannis Kapsis, could refer to these groups when it suited him.⁴⁰ I seriously doubt, however, that he could absolve himself from blame, as he was a driving force behind the secret directives that created the tensions in the late 1980s. In the above case, he dealt with the Greek side, but as we have seen above, the Turkish interest groups have become a monster that will be difficult to harness. There is a dire need for a reset in the Greek-Turkish minority regime. This would need sincerity from all the parties involved. The harmful effects of the activities by ultra-nationalist circles were indeed also recently pointed out by the former Turkish consul to Komotini.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Giannis P. Kapsis, *Για ν' ανατείλει ο ήλιος πρέπει να δύσει. Ζειμπέκικο και κόκα κόλα: Όταν η διαπλοκή έγινε ιδεολογία* (The Sun Has to Set Before it Rises. Zeybekiko [a traditional dance] and Coca Cola: When Corruption Became Ideology) (Athens: Livanis, 2005), 73.

⁴¹ Okçal, "Sadık Ahmet filmi."

*Volga Kurbazande**

A Comparative Analysis of Headline Articles on the Annan Plan

This article focuses on the Cyprus conflict, at a pivotal time when it came the closest to a resolution, in the month before the 24 April Annan Referendum. It explores the coverage of the Annan Plan in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek media and seeks to understand the interpretive frameworks within which the plan was presented by the parties. Conflict is never static. Rather, it is dynamic, with constant changes, developments, adaptations, and reactions. The newspaper coverage of the conflict provides researchers with the opportunity to understand how this process occurs, or rather how it is given meaning.

This article examines the process mentioned above by presenting a comparative content analysis of headline articles that appeared in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers referring to the Annan Plan during April 2004, when the referendum took place. The analysis covers twelve newspapers: *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Vatan*, *Haravgi*, *Fileleftheros*, *Machi*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Yeni Şafak*, *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea*, and *Kathimerini*.

The research questions are as follows:

RQ 1: What are the patterns of similarity and difference in the use of “win-lose,” “win-win,” “lose-lose,” “there is no alternative,” and “risky gambling” theories in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek newspapers analyzed?

“Win-win,” “win-lose,” and “lose-lose” are game theory terms that describe the outcomes of a particular negotiation. They also have been used in the field of conflict resolution. A win-win outcome occurs when each party perceives that it has won. Usually, this outcome is reached after an integrative bargaining process. Win-lose outcomes occur when one party perceives it has won and the other that it has lost. In most cases, this outcome is reached after a distributive bargaining process.

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Lose-lose outcomes are when all parties are worse off than at the beginning of the negotiation.¹

The “there is no alternative” theory builds on Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory that postulates that gains and losses are valued differently.² According to prospect theory, which is also known as loss-aversion theory, more weight is put on perceived gains. The “risky gambling” theory is a schema of understanding, developed by this study to refer to the association of voting affirmatively or negatively during the Annan Referendum to games of chance and risk-taking.

RQ 2: Does the coverage of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers of the Annan Plan demonstrate characteristics of the Mediterranean Media Model such as press-political party parallelism? What additions to the Mediterranean Media Model can the findings of this content analysis make?

RQ 2 focuses on whether the content analysis findings confirm that the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek coverage of the Annan Referendum fit Hallin and Mancini’s Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralistic Media Model.³ After their study of media in western democracies, Hallin and Mancini suggested that there are three media models: the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model; the North, Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model; and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model. Accordingly, five countries constitute examples to this model: Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France.

Four objectives are taken into consideration when discussing the findings on headline articles. First, drawing on McCombs and Shaw’s agenda-setting theory, to compare the frequency of news on the Annan Plan making the headlines.⁴ Second, in the light of Hallin and Mancini’s

¹ Brad Spangler, “Win-Win, Win-Lose, and Lose-Lose Situations,” in *Beyond Intractability*, ed. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, 2003), <https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/win-win>.

² Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,” *The Journal of Business* 59, no. S4 (1986): S251, <https://doi.org/10.1086/296365>

³ Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁴ Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass

Mediterranean Media Model,⁵ to evaluate the dataset with a particular emphasis on Seymoure Ure's concept of press political party parallelism.⁶ Third, to compare the use of win-win, win-lose, lose-lose, there is no alternative, and risky gambling theories. Fourth, to trace the development of the solution theory used by pro-yes newspapers and the continuation of the status quo theory used by pro-no newspapers.

The Comparative Frequency of Headline Articles on the Referendum

The frequency of headline articles on the referendum shed light on how often the Annan Plan was covered in the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek print media. Why, then, is this important? The relevance of the frequency of the Annan Plan making it to the headlines can be explained by the mass communication theory of agenda setting. Introduced by McCombs and Shaw, the theory demonstrates that people prioritize issues presented to them as important by the media. After surveying North Carolina voters during the 1968 US presidential elections, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw reached this conclusion. In this study, the frequency of topics related to the Annan Plan appearing in the headlines during April 2004 was calculated. The analysis includes the Turkish Cypriot newspapers *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, and *Vatan*; the Greek Cypriot newspapers *Haravgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi*; the Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, and *Yeni Şafak*; and the Greek newspapers *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea* and *Kathimerini* have been calculated. The results are significant as they demonstrate the agenda-setting process in both the primary parties of the conflict, namely Northern Cyprus and Southern Cyprus, and the secondary parties to the conflict, Turkey and Greece.

As to the print media of primary parties to the conflict, in the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers analyzed, all 25 of the headline articles are on the Annan Plan, thus making the frequency percentage 100%.

Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1972): 176–87.

⁵ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*.

⁶ Colin Seymour-Ure, *The Political Impact of Mass Media* (London: Constable, 1974; Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications).

Continuing the discussion with the frequency of headline articles in the print media of the secondary parties to the conflict, namely Turkish and Greek newspapers, it should be noted that in the Turkish and the Greek press, it is nearly identical. Sixteen of the 25 headline articles in the Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Yeni Şafak* are on the referendum, which amounts to 64%. The same percentage is seen in *Kathimerini*. The median percentage frequency is, thus, 64%. To be more precise, the issue is slightly more prioritized in Greece than Turkey; however, the difference is not significant. Interestingly, all the Greek Cypriot newspaper headlines analyzed are against the Annan Plan; the only variation occurs among the percentages. The leftist *Haravgi* has the highest rate of headline articles against the plan.

To sum up, the findings on the frequency in Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers are identical, as all the island newspapers headlines in April 2004, both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot, were about the Annan Plan. Secondly, the frequency percentages in the Turkish and Greek newspapers are similar, with the Greek newspapers having a slightly higher rate.

Press-Political Party Parallelism and Support of the Annan Plan

Initially, Hallin and Mancini, who proposed the Mediterranean Media Model, suggested that four countries fit the model: Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.⁷ Accordingly, the media landscape of these four countries had common characteristics, such as the late transition to democracy and political parallelism. Papathanassopoulos and Miconi revisited Hallin and Mancini's Mediterranean Media Model and added Malta, Turkey, and Cyprus to the initial list of countries.⁸

According to Hallin and Mancini, one of the key characteristics of this model is press-political party parallelism.⁹ They assert that media in Southern European countries are strongly politicized and that political parallelism is high. The concept of press-political party parallelism (PPP) introduced by Seymour-Ure has three features: ownership of the

⁷ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*.

⁸ Stylianos Papathanassopoulos and Andrea Miconi, *The Media Systems in Europe* (Cham: Springer Nature, 2023).

⁹ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*.

mass media by political parties, the editorial choice of the news organizations, and the party affiliation of the readers.¹⁰ Research on Turkish and Greek media landscapes reveals the prominence of press-political party parallelism.¹¹

How do the findings on headline articles on the Annan Plan in Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish newspapers relate to the findings of the above-mentioned former research? The findings of this study also indicate the presence of press-political party parallelism in Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek media. Press-political party parallelism is, for example, clearly evident in the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis*, which advocates a “no” on the referendum, owned by the Greek Communist Party. It should be noted that this newspaper also serves as an example of Seymour Ure’s second feature of press-political party parallelism.

Similarly, the position taken by the two Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Yeni Şafak* in relation to the referendum is related closely to the position of the political party with which they show parallelism. In parallel with the Justice and Development Party (hereafter JDP), *Yeni Şafak* takes a pro-yes position. To the contrary, *Cumhuriyet*, in parallel with the Republican Peoples Party (CHP)], takes a pro-no position. The Greek Cypriot *Haravgi* displays press-political party parallelism with the Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú Progressive Party of Working People] (AKEL) and the Turkish Cypriot *Vatan* displays press-political party parallelism with the National Unity Party [Ulusal Birlik Partisi, hereafter UBP]. Both newspapers take a pro-no stance in alignment with the AKEL and the UBP.

The support of the Annan Plan is the highest, with 64%, in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Afrika*. In the analysis of headline articles, press-political party parallelism can be understood by the percentages of

¹⁰ Seymour-Ure, *Political Impact of Mass Media*.

¹¹ Ali Çarkoğlu and Gözde Yavuz, “Press–Party Parallelism in Turkey: An Individual Level Interpretation,” *Turkish Studies* 11, no. 4 (2010): 613–24; Papathanassopoulos and Miconi, *Media Systems in Europe*.

leaders quoted in them.¹² The Republican Turkish Party [hereafter CTP] leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, is quoted in 36% of the headline articles of *Afrika*. The support for the plan is amounted to 41% in *Kıbrıs*. However, the rate of appearance of quotes from a single political leader fall under 10% in this newspaper. In contrast to the Turkish Cypriot newspapers *Afrika* and *Kıbrıs*, *Vatan* is against the Annan Plan. The percentage of opposition to the plan in this newspaper is 24%, and President Denktaş is quoted in 47% of the headline articles.

Among the Turkish newspapers, *Milliyet* and *Yeni Şafak* support the plan. On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet* opposes it. The percentage of headline articles against the plan in *Cumhuriyet* is 25%. The percentage of headline articles that support the plan in *Milliyet* is 54%, being seven articles out of 13, while in *Yeni Şafak* it is 56%, with nine articles out of 16.

The analysis of the Greek Cypriot newspaper headline articles demonstrates that three out of 27 headlines from *Haravgi* are against the plan, which is equivalent to 11%. As to the headline articles from the newspaper *Fileleftheros*, eight out of 22 headline articles are neutral to the plan, giving a percentage of 36%. In *Machi*, 13 out of 26 headline articles are against the plan, i.e., 50%.

The percentage of headlines against the plan is comparatively high in the analyzed Greek newspapers. Twenty-five out of 27 headline articles of the newspaper *Rizospastis* oppose the plan, which amounts to 93%. Five out of 20 headline articles of the newspaper *Ta Nea* are neutral to the plan, coming to 25%. In *Kathimerini*, four out of 16 articles support the plan, which is also equivalent to 25%.

Findings from Turkish Cypriot Headline Articles

First, two of the three Turkish Cypriot newspapers analyzed in this article took a pro-yes position on the Annan Plan. Regarding the use of the win-win, win-lose, lose-lose, no alternative, and risky gambling theories, only a single headline article was found that used the no alter-

¹² It is important to note that the unit of analysis in the following sections is the published headline in each newspaper. The tables report each newspaper separately and thus the percentages are calculated in reference to the number of observations (i.e., *n*) for each newspaper.

native theory in the newspaper *Kıbrıs*. This single article is highly relevant because the exact content of the theory is given in the wording “There is no plan B in Cyprus, it will not be better.”¹³ Finally, the newspapers *Kıbrıs* and *Vatan* do not use any of the five theories mentioned above.

Among the three analyzed Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the pro-yes *Afrika* and *Kıbrıs* use a solution theory. On the contrary, the pro-no newspaper *Vatan* uses a continuation of the status quo theory. This raises the question of what constitutes the building blocks of these theories and whether they follow a particular pattern. In *Afrika*, one headline article appears daily, accompanied by a sentence in direct dialog with the reader that is presented before the headline. For example, one such sentence reads “Denktaş Says That If They Say ‘Yes’ and We Say ‘Yes,’ We Are in Trouble. Someone Will Be in Trouble, but Who That Will Be Is Already Known.”¹⁴ Also, these sentences present short questions such as “We Are Entering the Last Week with One ‘Yes,’ and One ‘No.’ Let’s See Where We Will Be Next Sunday, Still in This Inn, or in Europe?”¹⁵

These short remarks also include quotations and sarcasm. One reads, “Talat says if the Greek side enters the EU, they will do so like a child with a runny nose. Since our mother is going to wipe our nose, we are going to be clean.”¹⁶ They serve as short opinions presented through the headline articles, aiming at constructing the solution theory. In parallel to these comments, the solution theory is also developed in the headline articles through the use of quotations and statistics. Hallin and Mancini¹⁷ and Hallin and Papathassopoulos¹⁸ underline the tradition of advocacy reporting in the Mediterranean model. *Afrika* serves as a good example of advocacy reporting, strongly advocating for a “yes” vote in the referendum.

In the newspaper *Kıbrıs*, we see quotes from the leaders not only of the primary parties of the conflict, i.e., Turkish Cypriot politicians, but

¹³ *Kıbrıs*, April 15, 2004.

¹⁴ *Afrika*, April 18, 2004.

¹⁵ *Afrika*, April 19, 2004.

¹⁶ *Afrika*, April 2004.

¹⁷ Hallin and Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems*.

¹⁸ Papathanassopoulos and Miconi, *The Media Systems in Europe*.

also of the secondary parties, i.e., Turkish politicians, and from officials of third-party institutions, such as the United Nations.

Prime Minister Talat is quoted in 5% of the *Kıbrıs* headline articles, while Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan is quoted in 6%. Also, the Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, the Under Secretary of the UN De Soto, the US Special Envoy for Cyprus Weston, and the President of Azerbaijan Aliyev are all quoted in the headline of at least one of the newspapers. Rather than press-political party parallelism, the quotation pattern in this newspaper is related to the solution theory the newspaper adopts in relation to the Cyprus conflict. Thus, the editorial choice of the newspaper is to quote the speeches of leaders supporting a solution.

The solution theory also appears in this newspaper in the form of “call for action” headline articles. These headline articles are either in question form or use the imperative mood such as “Come on to the Rally,”¹⁹ “Where are the police?”²⁰ “Do Not Miss the Historical Opportunity,”²¹ and “Hear Our Voice, Akuste Mas.”²² The use of Greek in one of these headlines is noteworthy as it shows that the newspaper also targets the Greek Cypriots with its headline. Similar to *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs* also engages in advocacy reporting, strongly advocating for a “yes” in the referendum.

In *Vatan*, instead of the solution theory, we see the application of the continuing the status quo theory. This theory develops around three pillars: quotes, statistics, and the negative consequences of a “yes” vote to Turkish Cypriots and Turks. The quotation pattern in the *Vatan* newspaper is as follows: regarding the quotations of Turkish Cypriot leaders in descending order, President Denktaş is quoted in 16% of the headline articles, the leader of UBP Derviş Eroğlu is quoted in 5%, and Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat is quoted in 2%. As mentioned above, these quotes seek to strengthen the newspaper’s continuation of the status quo theory. As an example, the headlines “Eroğlu: Traps That Will Put the Future of Our People in Danger and Deficits Still Exist in the New

¹⁹ *Kıbrıs*, April 14, 2004.

²⁰ *Kıbrıs*, April 21, 2004.

²¹ *Kıbrıs*, April 21, 2004.

²² *Kıbrıs*, April 15, 2004.

Plan,” “Do Not Give Up Your State,” and “I Will Call on Every Individual to Unite Under the Flag of ‘No’” quote UBP leader Derviş Eroğlu and President Denktaş for this purpose. Quotes from Turkish Cypriot and Turkish non-governmental organizations supporting the continuation of the status quo or a “no” vote also appear.

The headline article “We Do Not Want to Be Iraq; We Do Not Want to Be Left Without a State or Be Palestine Either” constitutes an example of the use of quotes from Turkish Cypriot civil society.²³ The headline articles “The Mothers of Martyrs Are in Cyprus”²⁴ and “National Conscience and Cyprus in Malatya”²⁵ constitute examples of quotes from Turkish civil society in support of a “no” vote. Thus, quotes from primary and secondary parties of the conflict are used instrumentally by *Vatan* for the same purpose. However, the newspaper uses quotes from third parties to the conflict in a more informative manner. For instance, Vice Secretary General De Soto is quoted in the headline article “De Soto Has Returned to the Island,”²⁶ a statement that is informative rather than instrumental. From here, we can draw the conclusion that two different types of quotes are used in the *Vatan* headline articles on the referendum: instrumental and informative. However, the number of instrumental quotes is higher.

A second finding of the content analysis is the high significance of the theory of “constitutional court” and “referendum law” in the headline articles of the selected newspapers. This theory is used in relation to the approval of the referendum law by the Cypriot constitutional court as to make it valid. The use of this theory can be better understood from the perspective of Putnam’s two-level games. In Putnam’s two-level games, bargaining between the negotiators is referred to as level I and separate discussions within each group of constituents on whether to ratify the agreement is referred to as level II (Putnam, 1988). Five of the headline articles of *Afrika* and three of *Kıbrıs* use the constitutional court/referendum law theory. This amounts to 5% of the *Kıbrıs* headline articles, and 20% of those of *Afrika*.

²³ *Vatan*, April 17, 2004.

²⁴ *Vatan*, April 20, 2004.

²⁵ *Vatan*, April 5, 2004.

²⁶ *Vatan*, April 7, 2004.

Findings from Greek Cypriot Headline Articles

First, it should be noted that all Greek Cypriot newspapers analyzed take a pro-no position, whether left or moderately conservative on the political spectrum. These newspapers use the continuation of the status quo theory, like the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* and Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Vatan*. The Greek Cypriot headlines theory the Annan Plan as a “continuation of 1974.” “The continuation of the 1974” theory draws a parallel between the Turkish intervention in the island and the Annan Plan. However, this theory is more prominent in the Greek headlines. Another interesting parallel is between the headline articles of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist newspaper *Vatan* and those of the Greek Cypriot nationalist newspaper *Machi*. In contrast to the analyzed Turkish Cypriot newspapers, the Greek Cypriot newspapers make use of the win-lose or lose-lose theories. In the leftist *Haravgi* three out of twenty-seven headlines use the win-lose variant, amounting to 11%.

Regarding the rightist *Machi*, one of 26 headlines, amounting to 4%, use the win-lose theory. The risky gambling theory also is present in the Greek Cypriot newspapers. For example, the *Fileleftheros*'s headline articles “Papadopoulos Puts First His Cards on the Table”²⁷ and “The Last Card is on the 12th”²⁸ use the risky gambling theory in their narrative. *Haravgi*'s headline articles “The People Have the Floor («Ο λαός έχει το λόγο»),”²⁹ “Tassos’ answer is no («Όχι απαντά ο Τάσσος»),”³⁰ “Tassos Papadopoulos: We Insist on a Intercommunal Bi-Zonal Federation («Τάσσος Παπαδόπουλος: Επιμένουμε σε δικοινοτική διζωνική ομοσπονδία»),”³¹ and *Machi*'s headline “No Agreed Solution Was Reached («Δεν επετεύχθη συμφωνημένη λύση»)”³² constitute examples of the win-lose theory.

The Greek Cypriot newspapers *Haravgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi* use the same continuation of the status quo theory as the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* and the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Vatan*. Notably,

²⁷ *Fileleftheros*, April 4, 2004.

²⁸ *Fileleftheros*, April 13, 2004.

²⁹ *Haravgi*, April 1, 2004.

³⁰ *Haravgi*, April 8, 2004.

³¹ *Haravgi*, April 23, 2004.

³² *Machi*, April 1, 2004.

the Greek Cypriot nationalist *Machi* constructs its continuation of the status quo theory, using the same building blocks as the Turkish Cypriot nationalist *Vatan*. Like *Vatan*, *Machi* first justifies a “no” to the referendum, by giving reference to Greek Cypriot civil society. The *Machi* headline articles “Thousands of Members (7,000) of DISY Opted in Favor of No,”³³ “The Youth is Rising Against. The Gimmickry of Anastasiadis Embarrasses Cyprus Internationally,”³⁴ “Overwhelming ‘No’,” and “The People Have Spoken. Members of DISY Demand the People’s Decision Be Respected,”³⁵ trace the use of the civil society pillar of the continuation of the status quo theory.

Also, in Greek Cypriot newspapers the Annan Plan is viewed as the “continuation of 1974.” It should be noted that this theory is more prominent in the Greek newspapers than the Greek Cypriot newspapers. 16% of *Haravgi* headline articles present the Annan Plan as a continuity of 1974. The percentage of framing the Annan Plan as a continuity of 1974 is lower in *Fileleftheros* and *Machi*, with 5% and 7%, respectively.

Findings from Turkish Headline Articles

The risky gambling and win-win theories are present in the Turkish newspapers. The risky gambling theory is used in four of *Cumhuriyet*’s headline articles, which is equivalent to 25%. The win-win and risky gambling theories are used in *Yeni Şafak*. The win-win theory is used in one article, amounting to 6%, and the risky gambling theory is used in two articles, adding up to 13%.

A significant finding of the Turkish headline articles content analysis is that the no alternative theory is used as part of the solution theory by newspapers that support a “yes” to the plan, whereas the risky gambling theory is used regardless of the position of the newspaper in relation to the plan.

Even though the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* and the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Yeni Şafak* are from the opposite ends of the political spectrum, both newspapers use the continuation of the status quo theory and support it similarly. *Cumhuriyet*, which is against the plan,

³³ *Machi*, April 22, 2004.

³⁴ *Machi*, April 23, 2004.

³⁵ *Machi*, April 25, 2004.

builds its theory, similar to *Vatan*, through the use of quotes. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot statesmen and officials, and representatives of the European Union are quoted for this purpose. The President of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the Chief of the General Staff Özkök, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen, are all quoted once, which is equivalent to 6%. The CHP Deputy Head Öymen and the Turkish Cypriot President Denктаş are quoted twice (13%). One headline article is particularly indicative of how the quotations are used instrumentally to build the theory. For example, in the headline “Gül: The Pros of the Annan Plan Are More. Öymen: Even Those Who Signed Sévres Knew What They Signed. There Will Be Problems,”³⁶ both opinions are presented; however, the second statement is emphasized by being given more space in the headline.

An interesting finding about the *Cumhuriyet* headlines is that the newspaper goes beyond advocating a “no” in the Annan referendum, questioning its legitimacy. One example is the headline “Two peoples that are going to the ballots under threat and pressure will vote on the Annan Plan without knowing the content.”³⁷ This article, printed on the day of the referendum, questions its legitimacy implicating that the referendum is being carried out under threat and pressure and people will vote without knowing the content of the referendum.

In the Turkish newspaper headlines, legal references have a prominent presence. To be more specific, concepts related to European law such as primary law, secondary law, and the derogation issue are present. These references cannot be understood without prior knowledge of the concepts. First, the treaties of the European Union are considered primary law, whereas the body of law deriving from the principles and objectives of the treaties are considered secondary law. Secondary law also includes regulations, decisions, directives, recommendations, and opinions. In relation to the Annan Plan, it requires the approval of the member states’ parliaments in order for it to gain the status of primary law. However, the concern is that even if the plan becomes primary law,

³⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, April 7, 2004.

³⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, April 24, 2004.

cases about displaced persons and properties can still be brought to the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice.

Derogations are provisions in an EU legislative measure which allow part of the measure to be applied differently. In the context of the Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriot side has made permanent derogations from the EU *acquis* concerning the right to buy property and the right to reside (IKV report). Thus, the Annan Plan introduced temporary derogations that limited the rights of Greek Cypriots to reside and buy property in the North for fifteen years. Two of the *Cumhuriyet* articles (13%) give reference to primary law, and one of the gives references (6%) to the derogation issue. One of the *Yeni Şafak* articles gives reference to primary law (6%).

The majority of *Milliyet*'s headline articles support the Annan Plan, yet none of the five game theoretical theories are used in this newspaper's headline articles. A particularity of *Milliyet* stands out in the analysis: the priority it gives to the international community. Based on personal experience, as a reporter on the foreign news desk during the late 1990s, I can argue that this is related to the newspaper's large number of foreign correspondents and the tradition of foreign news leverage in the newspaper's daily news meetings, compared to other newspapers. Five of 13 headline articles, which amount to 38%, include references to the international community: three to the European Union, including three quotations from the European Union Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen, and two to the US administration, including one from the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. *Milliyet* uses the pro-resolution theory and develops this theory with references to the international community, in the form of either informative articles or quotations from representatives of the international community, such as the EU or the US administration. The newspaper also places itself within this solution theory, as seen in the article "Powell Gave His Message to Cyprus Through *Milliyet*: 'Saying No Would Not Be Intelligent.'"³⁸

Finally, there are common headline articles in the examined Turkish newspapers. The *Cumhuriyet* headline "EU Commissioner Verheugen: The Greek Cypriots Have Fooled Us"³⁹ and the *Milliyet* article headline

³⁸ *Milliyet*, April 17, 2004.

³⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, April 22, 2004.

“Historical Confession about Greek Cypriots from Verheugen: I A” share the same content and present it from the same perspective. Thus, it can be said that the articles are practically the same. Also, at times, the exact content is given in a different perspective. The *Cumhuriyet* article “Reservations Put Forward in Extraordinary Cyprus Meeting. Power Resides in Government. The National Security Council Has Not Assumed Responsibility,”⁴⁰ the *Milliyet* article “NSC: The Judgement Belongs to the Government,”⁴¹ and the *Yeni Şafak* article “NSC: Yes, to the Plan, Caution to the Application” constitute an example of the latter.

We also see the use of the solution theory in the newspaper *Yeni Şafak*. This newspaper also uses quotations from Turkish and Turkish Cypriot politicians as well as EU officials as part of the solution theory. Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül are quoted in two of the newspaper’s 16 articles, accounting to 13%. The Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen, are quoted in 6% of the same articles.

Findings from Greek Headline Articles

In the Greek newspapers, the win-lose theory is not that prominent. One of the 27 *Rizospastis* headline articles demonstrate the use of the win-lose game theoretical theory, meaning an equivalent of 4%. Also, in the same newspaper, one article uses the lose-lose theory. “Solidarity with the Cypriot People”⁴² can be given as an example of the lose-lose theory and the headline “Resounding No to the Annan Plan”⁴³ as an example of the use of the win-lose theory.

Rizospastis shares the same continuation of the status quo theory with *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Haravgi*, *Fileleftheros*, and *Machi*, yet with one significant difference: the strongest “no” to the plan comes from this newspaper. How *Rizospastis* develops its no theory is of particular interest. Firstly, the newspaper presents the Annan Plan as a continuation of 1974.

⁴⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, April 6, 2004.

⁴¹ *Milliyet*, April 6, 2004.

⁴² *Rizospastis*, April 2, 2004.

⁴³ *Rizospastis*, April 8, 2004.

This theory is also used in the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Haravgi*'s headline articles; however, it is more prominent in *Rizospastis*.

Secondly, it presents the plan as an imperialist plot orchestrated by Britain, the United States of America, the UN, and the EU. Out of 27 *Rizospastis* headline articles four are against the UN and its representatives, equivalent to 15%, while 20 of the same headlines are against the EU and its representatives (74%). The same percentage of *Rizospastis* headlines are against the United States and their officials. The articles against Britain and its officials are 11 out of 27, amounting to 41%. The headline "No to the Imperialist Atilla"⁴⁴ is an example of this pattern in the newspaper. The article headlines "Europoison Against Cyprus,"⁴⁵ "The Europeans Were Dripping with Eurovenom,"⁴⁶ "Plans of Blackmail by the USA, the EU, Escalation of Pressure by the American-British,"⁴⁷ and "Pressure and Disinformation Binge on Behalf of the USA–EU"⁴⁸ are examples of framing the plan as an imperialistic plot. Thus, it is evident that *Rizospastis* uses the narrative of conspiracy theories to portray the plan.

Interestingly, for *Rizospastis*, the main adversaries are the third parties, rather than the primary and secondary parties of the conflict. In fact, references to Turkish Cypriots are positive, as visible in the following articles: "Bidding of Clash with the Imperialist Planning, Firm Solidarity with Turkish and Greek Cypriots"⁴⁹ and "Plan-Trap for the People of the Region."⁵⁰ The strong opposition to the plan by *Rizospastis* can be explained by the newspaper's ownership. Among the newspapers analyzed this newspaper, it is the only one owned by a political party, the Communist Party of Greece.

The headline articles of the two other Greek newspapers *Ta Nea* and *Kathimerini* also oppose the plan; however, their interpretation of the Annan Plan as a continuation of 1974 and as an imperialist plot orchestrated by Britain, the United States, and the EU is not as strong as in

⁴⁴ *Rizospastis*, April 18, 2004.

⁴⁵ *Rizospastis*, April 22, 2004.

⁴⁶ *Rizospastis*, April 22, 2004.

⁴⁷ *Rizospastis*, April 17, 2004.

⁴⁸ *Rizospastis*, April 20, 2004.

⁴⁹ *Rizospastis*, April 14, 2004.

⁵⁰ *Rizospastis*, April 15, 2004.

Rizospastis. *Ta Nea* has only one article that refers to the Annan Plan as the continuation of 1974. The language that *Kathimerini* employs for third parties is more neutral when compared with that of *Rizospastis*, as seen in the article “The international actors are advocating for yes.”⁵¹ While *Ta Nea* is also critical of third parties in relation to the Annan Plan, it does not theory the plan as an imperialistic plot. The following can be shown as an example of the newspaper’s presentation of third parties: “Vote Yes or Forget Us: Ultimatum from Europe, the USA, the UN.”⁵² Another interesting point is that the Annan Plan becomes instrumental in *Rizospastis*’s criticism of the Karamanlis government, which was in power during the Annan referendum period. *Rizospastis* is highly critical of Prime Minister Karamanlis and his government’s policies regarding the Annan Plan. Twenty-five out of 27 headline articles, or 93%, are critical of Prime Minister Karamanlis.

In its coverage of the Annan Plan, *Kathimerini* emphasizes on the disagreement about the referendum between the Greek government, headed by Prime Minister Karamanlis, and the Greek Cypriot government, headed by President Papadopoulos. The newspaper underlines Karamanlis’ effort in the direction of obtaining a “yes” from the referendum, in contrast to Papadopoulos’ “no.” Four out of 16 *Kathimerini*’s headline articles support Prime Minister Karamanlis (25%).

Also, *Ta Nea*’s coverage underlines the disagreement between the Greek and the Greek Cypriot government regarding the plan. The newspaper takes a critical stance against the government of Karamanlis as demonstrated in the article “‘Yes’ silently and humbly by Karamanlis.”⁵³ *Ta Nea* bases its criticism of Karamanlis’ government on the use of numerical data. “Booming ‘No’ but Takes Sides” and “71% Have Stated that the Greek Government Must Openly Declare Its Intentions”⁵⁴ are two examples of this practice.

⁵¹ *Kathimerini*, April 2, 2004.

⁵² *Ta Nea*, April 2, 2004.

⁵³ *Ta Nea*, April 16, 2004.

⁵⁴ *Ta Nea*, April 16, 2004.

Conclusion

The analysis of the headline articles' dataset yields five sets of conclusions. The first set refers to the positions the headline takes towards the plan. Among the 12 newspapers analyzed, *Afrika*, *Kıbrıs*, *Milliyet*, and *Yeni Şafak* are in the "yes" camp of the referendum, whereas *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, *Haravgi*, *Fileleftheros*, *Machi*, *Rizospastis*, *Ta Nea*, and *Kathimerini* are in the "no" camp. The highest percentage of support for the plan among the newspapers in the "yes" camp is given by the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Afrika*, while the highest rate of opposition in the "no" camp is given by the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis*.

The second set is related to the no alternative and other theories. The first significant outcome is that the no alternative theory is used in newspapers that support the Annan Plan. However, the risky gambling theory is used in both pro-yes and pro-no newspapers. Pro-no newspapers also prefer to use the theme of negative consequences of a "no" vote in the referendum. Secondly, one of the sources of the there is no alternative theory regarding the referendum is the US State Department, as demonstrated in Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech.

The third set of conclusions addresses the usage of the solution theory and the continuation of the status quo theory by pro-yes and pro-no newspapers respectively. The analysis demonstrates that the continuation of the status quo theory contains similar elements. This parallel is particularly visible between the Turkish Cypriot nationalist *Vatan* and the Greek Cypriot nationalist *Machi*.

The fourth set of conclusions is related to press political party parallelism and patterns of similarity. Despite the expectation that there would be similarity in how newspapers of similar political leaning covered the Annan Plan, the outcome regarding the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot newspapers demonstrates the opposite. For example, the leftist Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* shows more similarity with the Turkish Cypriot conservative daily *Vatan*. Both newspapers take an actively pro-no position and use the theory of continuation of the status quo. This can be explained by press political party parallelism.

In the context of Turkish media, since the Annan Plan was supported by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, newspapers opposing the government, such as *Cumhuriyet*, took a pro-no position,

while newspapers aligning with the government, such as *Yeni Şafak*, took a pro-yes position. *Milliyet*'s stance on the plan cannot be explained by press political party parallelism, since at that time the newspaper did not show parallelism with a political party, despite the fact that it can be regarded as center-left. A significant pattern of parallelism can also be seen in how the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* instrumentalizes the Annan Plan to criticize the Erdoğan government and how the Greek newspaper *Rizospastis* does the same to criticize the Karamanlis government. Thus, both *Cumhuriyet* and *Rizospastis* do not agree with the pro-yes position of the Turkish and the Greek governments and criticize their policies on the Annan Plan. Also, it should be noted that all three of the analyzed Greek newspapers are critical of the Karamanlis governments' policies vis-a-vis the Annan Plan, whereas in the Turkish context, a significant degree of criticism is only present in *Cumhuriyet*.

The fifth set of conclusions pertains the theories specific to this dataset, particularly the headline articles of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek newspapers. The "constitutional court and referendum law" theme has a significant presence in Turkish Cypriot newspapers, creating a moment of flashback to Putnam's two-level games. In Turkish newspapers, concepts related to European law, such as primary law, secondary law, and the derogations issue, were very common.


Finally, each dataset brings a new angle to the research, offering a distinguishing result. To follow this logic, what is then the contribution of the dataset on headline articles of the selected newspapers to the study, holistically speaking? The newspaper coverage in all the countries studied reflects Putnam's two-level games. For the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot newspapers, the first level is Cyprus, and the second level is Turkey and Greece. From the perspective of the Turkish and Greek newspapers, Turkey and Greece are the first level and Cyprus is the second. The toolkit of these two-level games are the remarks of the politicians on the issue, often given in quotations. It would be better to say three-level games, if we consider international organizations, such as the UN and the EU, and other countries with stakes, such as the United States and Britain, as the third level.

This is an example of descriptive research. Not every segment of the parties is represented in the analyzed content, it still provides us with a

thorough understanding. The point of departure for this research was, first, learning how game theoretical theories such as win-win, win-lose, lose-lose, and there is no alternative were connected to the “yes” and “no” campaigns of the press before the twin referenda on the Annan Peace Plan.

The second question was whether the studied Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek press collectively constitutes an example of the Mediterranean Media Model. We found that game theoretical logic was used not only to promote the “yes” or “no” positions but also to challenge the referendum itself. Political parties rejected the game theoretical logic when opposing the referendum. Thus, the logic of game theory appears to be the backbone of the referendum.

As for the Aegean Mediterranean triangle of Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece, the study not only proved that the newspapers studied constitute an example of the Mediterranean Model but also went a step further. Specifically, it uncovered the complexity of a multiparty conflict where primary and secondary parties adhere to the Mediterranean Media Model. One pattern that emerged was that the conflict did not only concern the primary parties related to it, namely the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, but was also extended to the conflicting interest of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey on one side, and Greek Cypriots and Greece on the other. Another pattern that emerged is that, although the parties viewed the issues at stake differently, they used the same metaphors to understand and explain the conflict. Thus, we can conclude that even in conflict, a shared identity or common ground exists, suggesting a possible path to resolution.

Figure 1. Comparative Frequency of Headline articles⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The newspapers in Series 1 are *Afrika*, *Haravgi*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Rizospastis*; The newspapers in Series 2 are *Kıbrıs*, *Fileleftheros*, *Milliyet*, and *Ta Nea*; The newspapers in Series 3 are *Vatan*, *Mahki*, *Yeni Şafak*, and *Kathimerini*.

Table 1. *Leaders Quoted in Headlines*

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Leaders</i>	<i>Quote Freq</i>	<i>Quote (%)</i>
<i>Afrika</i> (N=25)	M.A. Talat	9	36
<i>Kıbrıs</i> (N=66)	Various		
<i>Vatan</i> (N=58)	Denktaş	27	47
<i>Haravgi</i> (N=27)			
<i>Fileleftheros</i> (N=22)			
<i>Machi</i> (N=26)	Papadopoulos	10	38
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (N=16)			
<i>Milliyet</i> (N=13)			
<i>Yeni Şafak</i> (N=16)	Erdoğan Abdullah Gül	4	25
<i>Rizospastis</i> (N=27)			
<i>Ta Nea</i> (N=20)			
<i>Katimerini</i> (N=16)			

Table 2. Support Given to Annan Plan in Headlines

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Support Freq.</i>	<i>Support (%)</i>	<i>Against Freq.</i>	<i>against (%)</i>	<i>Neutral Freq.</i>	<i>Neutral (%)</i>	<i>Not ment. Freq.</i>	<i>Not ment. (%)</i>
<i>Afrika</i> (N=25)	16	64					9	36
<i>Kıbrıs</i> (N=66)	27	41					39	59
<i>Vatan</i> (N=58)			14	24	2	3	5	9
<i>Haravgi</i> (N=27)	2	7	3	11	17	63	5	19
<i>Fileleftheros</i> (N=22)					8	36	14	64
<i>Machi</i> (N=26)	1	4	13	50	4	15	8	31
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (16)			4	25	1	6	11	69
<i>Milliyet</i> (13)	7	54					6	46
<i>Yeni Şafak</i> (16)	9	56					7	44
<i>Rizospastis</i> (N=27)			25	93			2	7
<i>Ta Nea</i> (N=20)	2	10	1	5	5	25	12	60
<i>Katimerini</i> (N=16)	4	25			2	31	10	44

Table 4. References to Third Party Intervention in headlines⁵⁶

Newspaper	UN, Kofi An- nan		EU, Günther Verheugen		USA, Presi- dent Bush, Secretary of State Powell, Special envoy for Cyprus Weston		Great Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair		Russia, President Putin	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
<i>Afrika</i> (N=25)	3	12	2	8	3	12			1	4
<i>Kıbrıs</i> (N=66)	2(+) 1	3 (+) 2	1(+) 1	2(+) 2	1(+) 3	2(+) 5				
<i>Vatan</i> (N=58)	5	9								
<i>Haravgi</i> (N=27)	2(-) 23	7 (-) 85	2(-) 15	7(-) 56	1(-) 1(+) 10	4(-) 4(+) 37	1(-) 3	4(-) 11	1(+) 3	4(+) 11
<i>Fileleftheros</i> (N=22)	16	73	10	45	14	64	5	23	3	14
<i>Machi</i> (N=26)	10	38	1(-) 4	4(-) 15	4(-)	15(-)	4(-)	15(-)	1(+)	4(+)
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (N=16)	2 2(-)	13 13(-)	2(-) 2	13(-) 13	2(-) 1	13(-) 6	1	6	1(-) 1	6 6(-)
<i>Milliyet</i> (N=13)			1(+) 2	7(+) 15	1(+) 1	7(+) 7				
<i>Yeni Şafak</i> (N=16)	5(+)	31(+)	1	6	2(+)	13(+)			1(+)	6 (+)
<i>Rizospastis</i> (N= 27)	4(-) 12	15(-) 44	20(-) 1(+) 1	74(-) 4(+) 4	20 (-) 1	74(-) 4	11(-) 1	41(-) 4	1(-) 5	4(-) 19
<i>Ta Nea</i> (N=20)	1(-) 12	4(-) 60	1(-) 14	4(-) 70	5(-) 12	25(-) 60	2	8	1	4
<i>Kathimerini</i> (N=16)	1(-) 11	6(-) 69	2(-) 11	13(-) 69	13	81	5	31	4	25

⁵⁶ Positive references have been indicated with a “+” sign, while negative references have been indicated with a “-” sign, and neutral references have been combined with quotes.